The Problem of Chinese in the Philippines

7/30/2019 The Problem of Chinese in the Philippines

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The Problem of the Chinese in the Philippines

Author(s): Russell M'Culloch StorySource: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Feb., 1909), pp. 30-48Published by: American Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1945907 .

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THE PROBLEM OF THE CHINESE IN THE PHILIPPINESRUSSELL M' CULLOCH STORY

The close of the war with Spain in 1898 and the cession of the Phil-ippinesto the United Statesbrought o this country a numberof seriousand difficultproblems n the islands other than those immediatelycon-nected with the exercise of governmentalcontrol over them. Not theleast among these problemswas that which concerned he presenceofthe Chineseand the questionas to their future admission or exclusionfrom the islands. An attempted solution was reached n the extensionto the islands in September,1899, of the exclusion laws of the UnitedStates. Theselaws are based upon the limited treaties of 1880 and of1894, both of which modified the general treaty of 1868. The lattertreaty provides for the free admission of Americans o China and alsofor the unrestrictedentranceof the Chinese o the United States. Atthe time of the agitation against the incoming of the Chinese in theseventies, negotiationswerecommencedwith Chinawhich in the treatyof 1880 secured her consent for a limited suspensionof the admissionrights of the Chinese to the United States. A similarconcessionwasobtained from China in 1894, limited to ten years in its operation.Since the expirationof this treaty Chinahas claimed hat the provisionsof the treaty of 1868 obtained, while the United States has contendedthat the treaties of 1880 and of 1894 abrogated he rights of the Chineseto free admission to United States territory. This contention of theUnited States is obviouslyforced and without sufficientbasis eitherintheory or in fact, and the interpretation s maintainedsolely because ofthe weakness of China and her inability to prevent the United Statesfrom ignoringher protests. This attitude of inattention wouldhardlybe assumed oward a moreable and aggressivenation.Notwithstanding hese facts it may be assumedthat the sentimentinthe United States on the question of Chineseexclusion s so strongthatany treaty which providesfor the free admissionof the Chinesemust

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THE PROBLEM OF THE CHINESE IN THE PHILIPPINES 31ultimately be nullified n one way or another. But the problem n thePhilippines s a great deal more complicated f a policy of exclusionisto be carriedout. Sucha policy can even be seriously questioned asto its basis in wisdom, equity and necessity, economic or political.Although frequentlyexpelled from the islands by the Spaniards theChinesehad been enjoying comparativefreedom during the last fiftyyears of Spanish rule. The restrictions which were imposed did notconstitute any real exclusion. The number of the Chinese in thePhilippines had increasedat a wonderfulrate and their activity hadbeen such as to aid materially in the advancementof the businessinterests of the archipelago. Hence, when by military order theUnited States policy of exclusion was made operativein September,1899, the Chineseminister,Mr.Wu Ting-fang,enteredan immediateprotest. As early as Februaryof the same year Mr.Wu had inquiredof Secretaryof State Hay as to "what policythe United States govern-mentintends or is likely to adopt in dealingwith the question of Chi-nese immigration o the Philippines." Mr.Wu in this memorandumpointedout that while the treaty of peacehad not yet been ratified,theUnited States was in control;that the trade between Chinaand thePhilippineswas centuries old and very large; that there were manyChinesein the Philippines as artisans, farmers, traders, merchants,bankers, etc.; that the treaties of 1880 and 1894 relatingto exclusionpertainedonlyto the North Americancontinent,andthereonly becauseof peculiarlabor conditions which did not obtain in the Philippines.'In his protestin SeptemberMr.Wu called attentionto the fact that theexclusionwas unwarranted s a militarymeasure; hat it was a depar-ture from the announcedpolicyofthe president o leave the status quountil congressshould determinethe relationof the Philippinesto theUnitedStates;andthat it wasaninjustice o the Chinese ubjects n theislands and would disturbthe relationsbetweenthe two governments.Havingreceivedno replyfromSecretaryHay, Mr.Wu protestedagainin Novemberand still again in December,callingparticularattentiontothe exclusionof merchants and others of the exempt classes specifiedin the treaty of 1894. In a communication ated May 7, 1900,Mr.Wumakesthe statementthat the presenceof the Chinesen the Philippines

I See complete correspondence in Document 397, 1st Sess., 56th Cong.



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32 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWis indispensableto "the proper developmentof those islands." Healso observedthat this was the unanimous estimony of AmericanandEuropean ravelersand students.Apparently,however,the Americangovernmentwas from the firstdeterminedon a policy of exclusion. The reportof the Schurmanncommission n 1899 stated that the problemof Chineseimmigrationas affectingcommerceand business "is seriousand demandsconsid-eration." It was also emphasized hat the natives opposedthe comingof the Chinese.2 In the testimonysubmittedto this commissionduringits sittings in Manila, Mr. Neil MacLeod,the representativeof theLondonTimes,suggestedthat the entranceof the Chinesebe restrictedby meansof a tax.3 Thememorandum f Mr.GabrielGarciaAgeo,alsosubmitted to this commission,concludesthat the Chinesehad beenunduly protectedby Spainto the detrimentboth of Spain and of thePhilippines; hat the lossesto the islandshad beenconsiderable,ortheChineseconsumed mportsfrom China. He suggestedthree measuresof restriction:first, impose heavy duties on Chinese goods; second,impose heavy duties on opium;and third, prevent the Chinesefromengaging n agriculture. Mr.Ageolaid stress,however,on the fact thatthe Chinese ill a need in the Philippines,especially n the cities and inthe performance"of unhealthytasks."4The chargeswhich were urged against the Chinesebeing admittedto the islandsand which formedthe basis for the action of the UnitedStates military may be summarizedas follows:(1) They remit their earningsto China;5 (2) they practice cheat-ing and deception in trade and business;" 3) they intermarry andthe halfbreedsare troublesome7 (4) the influence of the Chineseisgenerallydegrading;85) the Chinesedo not bring their wives to theislands.9The dilemmawith whichthe United States governmentfounditself

2 Report of the Schurmann Philippine Commission, vol. i, pp. 150-159.3Ibid., vol, ii, pp. 48, 49.4 Ibid., vol. ii, p. 432 et seq.; p. 444.5Ibid., p. 17.61bid., p. 18.7 Ibid., pp. 187-190; p. 19.8 Report of the First Philippine Commission, vol. ii, p. 178.1Ibid., p. 55.



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THE PROBLEM OF THE CHINESE IN THE PHILIPPINES 33confrontedwas a trying one. The one horn consistedof a desire tosatisfy the demands of the labor element in this country and of theFilipinosby the adoptionof a policy of exclusion; he otherof a demandon the partof contractorsof labor,the Chinesegovernment, he Chineseresidents of the islands, and of numerous travelersin the archipelagofor at leasta restrictedadmission. It wasthen generallyadmitted,andis so still, that the free admissionof the Chinesewould greatly hastenthe developmentof the islands. But the real issue at stake then andnow and the question whichmust be most fully considered s whetheror not the presenceof the Chinese s essentialto the best developmentof the Philippines. This is the problemwhich the United States hastried to solve in adopting the slogan of "The Philippinesfor the Fili-pinos." And working on the basis that the islands can be betterdeveloped,or at least as well developed,by the Filipinosalone as withthe aid of the Chinese,a rigid exclusion policy has been adopted, rein-forcedby a system of registrationwhich admits of the deportationofall Chinesefound in the islands whose names are not registered. Allwho enter and leave the islands are accuratelymeasuredand descrip-tions taken so that evasions of the laws are practically impossible.These measureshave been made possible by three successivesteps onthe partof the United States: first,the militaryorderextendingto thePhilippinesand enforcing here the exclusion of the Chineseas in theUnited States; second,the enactmentof congress n 1902 establishingexclusion; and third, the enactment of the Philippine governmentin 1903.10

The passage and enforcementof the above laws has not, however,done away with the immense sentiment which favorsthe admissionofthe Chinese to the islands. Consequently agitation has not ceasedupon the question, and, while the policy of the United States hasremainedunchanged,a candid considerationof the problem s timely.One of the first questionswhich will arise in any discussion s, Whathas been the recordof the Chinese n the islands? Beforethe Americanoccupationthe recordof arrivals and departuresof the Chineseshowsan increaseof 36,250in the five years from 1889 to 1893. In the firstfive years of American occupation from 1899 to 1903 the excess of10 Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor, no. 58, May, 1905, p. 861.



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34 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWarrivalsover departureswas but 8624 and this entire excess came inthe first three years of the period, the excess of departuresduring thelast two years of the period being 122.11 The arrivalshave slightlyexceededthe departuressince 1903, but the Chinesepopulation n theislands may be said to have become practicallystationary by 1901.The census of 1903, published in 1905, shows that there are in theislands 41,035 Chinese,though private estimates go up to 100,000.12UnderSpanishadministrationan effortwas made to admit the Chineseonly for purposesof unskilled abor,the lower kindsof service,and foragriculture. The immigrantswere forbiddento engage in any trade,art, industry, or commercialoccupation. Chineseimported for theraising of tobacco were not taxed. But in 1877 there were only 197Chinese engaged in agriculturein the islands. In 1879 a Spanishwritersays that the Chinaman ould at will leave Manilawithout food,light, or clothing,for he had monopolizedall the retail commerce. Healso adds that not a Chinamandevoted himself to agriculture.13Thefact of the matter seemsto be that the historyof the Chinamann thePhilippines s very similar o whatit has beenelsewhere-he willengagein the lowergrades of occupationsonly when forcedto do so. Hencethe utility of the Chinamanorperforminghe less desirable asks in theindustrial development of the Philippines may well be questioned.To use him in such lines meansthe countenancingof contract labororpeonage,both of which wouldbe contrary o the principlesof Americanadministration. However, in work on public improvementssuch asroad building the Chinesehave been extensively used even since theAmericanoccupation. Mr.N. W. Holmes,chiefengineerof the UnitedStates PhilippineCommission n 1902says that "1000Chinamenat onepeso per day are worth morethan all the laborLuzon could furnishatthe rate of board alone."'14 Mr. Robert McGregor,city engineer ofManila,claims that the Chinese aborerwill do 20 per cent morethanthe Filipinoand require ess superintendence.15 Lieutenant J. H. Riceof the ordnancedepartment,U. S. A., states that the Chinese are

11Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor, no 58, May 1905, p. 859.12 Census of the Philippine Islands, 1905, vol. ii, p. 14.13 Bulletin of Bureau of Labor, no. 58, May, 1905, p. 860.14 Report of the Philippine Commission (1902), part i, p. 157."5Ibid., p. 177.



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THE PROBLEM OF THE CHINESE IN THE PHILIPPINES 35superiorto the Filipinos in skill, ability and steadiness.", Mr. J. F.Norton, the chief civil engineer,wrote in 1903 that there was no possi-bility of finishing he proposedrailroad ines except by the importationof Chineseor other foreign abor.17 In 1902GovernorWilliamH. Taftreported hat the Benguet road engineerand the merchantsof Manilaboth favoreda foreign aborsupply, inferring he natural sourceof suchsupply, the Chinese.18 The development of the Philippinesdemandsa laborsupply and the lack of a sufficientsupply is concededto haveretarded and is today retarding the development desired. Chinesecoolielaborseemsto meet the requirements. But as alreadyexplainedthe Chinesewill not remain at this labor except by penal contract.They do not even seek it voluntarily because the real wagespaid forthe lowergrades of work performedis no higherin the Philippinesthan in China.'9 At best it might be a little higher, but would notserve to attract great numbers of Chinese. However, contract laborwill not be tolerated. Thus with no inducementoffered the Chinesecoolieand his being protected from forced labor the prospects of alarge influx of this class of Chinese,even were they unrestricted,would not be threatening. Today there are almost none of this typeof Chinese n the islands.The position of the Chinaman n relation to agriculturehas beentouched upon. The futility of any expectationthat the Chinesewillgo into agriculture o any great extent is shown in the census figures or1905,whenof the total Chinesepopulation n the islandsbut602 couldbe classedas agriculturalistsor 0.048 per cent of the total agriculturalpopulationof the archipelago.20 Less than 1 per cent of the Chinesewere agriculturalists.2' Therefore no plea for the admission of theChineseas a meansof developingagriculture eemsto be well supportedby the presentattitude of the Chinesenow in the islands owardagricul-ture. In this particular he facts would seem to warranttheir exclu-sion, for in reality no injustice is being done to them norindeedto theinterestsof the Philippines.

"IReport of the Philippine Commission (1902) part i, pp. 257-258.17 Ibid. (1903), vol. i, pp. 404, 405."IIbid. (1902),part i, pp. 23, 24.19Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor, no. 58, May, 1905, p. 870.20 Censusof the PhilippineIslands, 1905,vol. ii, pp. 894, 895.21 Ibid., p. 118.



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36 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWThe placeoccupiedby the Chinese n some of the other walksof life,especiallythose requiringskill or businessability, is clear. In manu-

facturingand mechanicalpursuitsthe Chinamans generallyconcededto be "a more efficientworkmanthan the Filipino."22 He excels inshipbuilding, machinery making, repair work, rope making, textilemanufacturing, nd furnituremaking. Someof these industriessuffercontinualdepressionn the Philippinesbecauseof the competitionwiththe Chinese,particularlywith Hongkong, Shanghai,and other greatAsiatic ports. This competitionmust limit the extent to whichmanu-facturingcan be successfullyand profitablycarriedon in the islands,even should Chinese abor be freely admitted. Recoursemust be hadto the aptitudeof the Filipinofor machineryandthe superiorndustrialorganization under American control. Of the present number ofChinesen the Philippinesa total of 6710 areengagedin manufacturingand mechanicalpursuits,whichis 0.69 per cent of the total numberofpeoplein the islandsengaged n similaroccupations,and 16 per cent ofthe numberof Chinese n the islands.23 Inasmuchas a great many ofthose in the Filipinorankswhoareclassifiedunderthis head are womenwhoengage n weavingandotherhomeproduction, he real importanceof the Chinese in the manufacturingand mechanical industries isprobablygreater han the figureswillactuallyshow. But on the wholetheir influence s not of such importanceas to warrantany conclusionsas to the necessityof the Chinesefor the best and fullest developmentof the islands. If the tariffpoliciesof the Philippinegovernmentor ofthe United States should radicallychangethen the conditionswouldbe altered,but thereis little prospectof suchan extreme modificationnthe situation and hence the tariff policy may be omitted fromthisdiscussion.Of the Chinesein the islands almost 24 per cent are engaged indomestic and personalservice.24 Over 7.2 per cent are cooks. Yetthis classificationof Chinesecomprisesonly 1.7 per cent of the totalpopulation engaged in such tasks.25 Their superiority s hardly ever

22 Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor, no. 58, May, 1905, pp. 858, 859.23 Census of the Philippine Islands (1905), vol. ii, pp. 894, 895.24Ibid.25 Ibid., p. 118.



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THE PROBLEM OF THE CHINESE IN THE PHILIPPINES 37questioned and they are much preferredto the natives.26 But thedemandforChinese n personalserviceandthe degreeof their superior-ity in such workis not sufficientto warrant either a demand for theirfreeadmissionor their exclusion,except as some betterreasonmaythusbe supplemented.There are eighty-sevenChinese n the Philippinesengaged n profes-sional activities, only 0.84 per cent of the total numberof personsinsuch pursuits.27 Thusthis sphere of activity may also be eliminatedasa basisforany conclusions hat they arenecessary orthe best develop-ment of the islands. Ofthe numberof personsengaged n unknownorunproductiveoccupations he Chinese urnishbut 0.04 per cent, whichhowever,was 3.07 per cent of the total Chinesepopulation. But over55 per cent of this class of Chinesewere women.28 Therefore, o far asthese figures mean anything they show that the Chinese are a self-supporting ndependentelementin the population.For the real part played by the Chinese n the economic life of thePhilippine Islands one must look at the figures which in the censustaken in 1903aregroupedunderthe headof Trade andTransportation.(Seetables, p. 900). Under this division are classified23,364Chinese,comprising10.26percent of the entire numberof those thus occupied.29As merchantsthe Chinesestand preeminent,33.9 per cent of thembeingso classified,while 14.7 per cent of them are salesmenand 2 percent are clerks.30 It is suggestedthat the only reasonwhy the China-man has so widely goneinto commercial ife is becausehe cannot com-pete with the native labor,especiallythe unskilled workmen. This atleast has been inferred from the fewness of the agriculturalworkersafter a half centuryof practicallyunrestrictedadmission o the islandsprior o Americanoccupation.31 The Chinamans feared n commercialcircles. The census report says that the "Chinaman n Manila,withhis gainful instincts, indifferenceto surroundings, persistence and

28 Mrs. Campbell-Dauncey in her work An English Woman in the Philippines,p. 176, claims that despite Governor Taft's praise for the Filipinos, Mrs. Taft pre-ferred and employed Chinese servants.27 Census of the Philippine Islands (1905), vol. ii, pp. 894, 895.28 Ibid.29 Ibid.30 Ibid., p. 118.31 Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor, no. 58, May, 1905, p. 869.



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38 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWgreater skill,has always beenlargelyin evidence and readyto competesuccessfullywith the Filipinos in nearly all trades and drive them tooccupations of lower and less profitable kinds."232This suggests adifferent idea, viz: that the Chinamanwill not compete with theFilipinounskilled aborbecausehe can do better in commercial ines of

TABLE I.This table shows the occupations of the Chinese in the Philippines as classified in theCensus of 1905.

Per cent ofMale. Female. Total. total num-ber isame class.

Agriculture .601 1 602 0.048Professional work .86 1 87 0.34Domestic and personal .9,696 107 9,803 1.70Trade and transportation .23,330 34 23,364 10.26Manufacturing and mechanical .6,670 40 6,710 0.69Unknown or unproductive .688 843 1,531 0.04Cf. Philippine Census, vol. ii, pp. 894-5.

TABLE II.This table shows the total number of natives and of Chinese in the different occupations.

Natives. Chinese.Agriculture ........................................... 1,162,108 601Professional work..................................... 21,155 86Domestic and personal ................................. 420,044 9,696Trade and transportation ............................... 120,004 23,330Manufacturing and mechanical .......................... 234,970 6,670

Cf. Philippine Census, vol. ii, pp. 894-5.activity. An American umbermerchant is opposed to the admissionof the Chinese, saying, "They drive Americans out of business."33Even an Europeanmercantileemployerof labor on a largescale says,"As to Chinese, so long as they are allowed in the country only as

32 Census of the Philippine Islands (1905), vol. iv, p. 432.33Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor, no. 58, May, 1905, p. 865.



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THE PROBLEM OF THE CHINESE IN THE PHILIPPINES 39laborers, t mightnot be so bad; but if they are to go into business,likethey donow,as soonasthey have saveda little moneyit wouldbe a verybad thing."234 Another American merchant says, ". . . . if theChineseareallowed,they might drive all the Americanshere out of theislandsby theircompetition.Y35 Whenthese statementsareconsideredthe animus for the exclusionof the Cihnese roma commercialpoint ofview becomesmoreevident. In ManilatheRozario,a broadstreetandone of the principal horoughfares,s occupiedchiefly by Chineseshopsand is a busy place.36 The principaltradersin Iloilo, the second sea-port in the islands in importance,are Chineseor Chinese mestizos.37TheChinese ormthe intermediaries etweenthe foreignmerchantsandthe natives,beingtrustedby the latter.38 By meansof bamboofreightboats the Chineseare able to reach far into the interior with theircommerce. The manner in which they have won the confidenceofthose with whom they deal has been one of the chief sourcesof theirsuccess.39 The fact of the matter is that the Chinaman hreatens, inthe Philippinesas in otherpartsof the Orient,to become the master ofthe entire field of trade and transportationexcept in so far as he isrestricted from so doing. This dominanceis what is really feared.Coupledwith the prejudiceagainst the Chinesein the United States,the hatred felt by the high class Filipinostoward him because of hiscommercialsuperiorityhas led to the extension of the exclusion lawsto the islands and to their being made even more strict than in thiscountry. Whether or not this exclusionis justifiablecannot, however,be fully determineduntil other factorsare taken into consideration.

The place of the Chinamansocially and as a citizen is importantin determininghis claimfor freeadmission o the Philippines. Is he adesirableadditionto the elementsof populationthere? As a ruletheChinaman s content to leave political life alone as long as he is per-mitted to make a livelihoodon an equality with others. The Chinese34 Ibid., pp. 862, 863.3 Ibid., p. 863.36 Directory of China, Japan, the Philippines, etc. (1898), p. 499.37 Ibid.,p. 531.38 Census of the Philippine Islands, vol. i, p. 39. Also Bulletin of Bureau of Labor,no. 58, May, 1905, p. 858.39H. M. Wright, Handbook of the Philippines, pp. 218, 219.40 F. W. Atkinson, The Philippine Islands, pp. 261-263.



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40 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWwill even submit to many repressive measures and not complain.They do not aim at citizenship as we understandthat term in theUnited States. In the Philippinesthe Chineseare after profits pri-marily. They do, however, make homes and mingle freely with theFilipino races. Marriageswith Filipinowomenare frequent. In factthe Chineseareoften preferredas husbands. They make moremoney,areliberalwith it. to their families,andthey are soberandindustrious.40But in generalthe Chinesereturnto China to spend the profits theyhave accumulated n the islands, leaving no social impress upon thecommunity n whichthey have lived except a negative one, unlesstheconclusionbe acceptedthat the teaching of such habits as gambling,adulterationof goods, etc., constitute such an impression. In partthis failureof the strongerrace to greatly influencethe weaker is dueto the early and continued contact of the Filipinoswith Europeans.4Amongthe elements of the problemwhich requireconsiderationarethe racial differencesand capacities of the Chineseand the Filipinos.The Chineseare describedas frugal, ndustrious,persistent;the Malaysand the Spanishas not S0.42 The contentionis urgedthat the Filipinorace is weak and lacking in virility. Thus stimulus is needed whichtheAmericanwillnotsupplyby marriage,utwhich heChineseill.43The Chinamenofthe Philippinesaredifferent rom those ofthe laundryclassintheUnitedStates. Theycanread andwrite.44 "It must be tan-talizing for the keen, industriousChineseto be almost on the soil ofthis Eldoradoof lazy nativesand high wages. The Chinesemake their own and their employers' ortunes,"writesone observer ndescribing he precautions aken and in criticizing he manner n whichthe crewsof the Chinesevesselsare guarded o preventtheir landinginthe islands.45 The Chinesecooliesnever refusework,are reliable,andnever complain, s the testimony of another.46 The Chinaman"doesnot buildup industriesnorintroduce mprovements. He is a reaction-ary rather than a progressivecharacterin both an industrialand a

41 J. A. LeRoy, Philippine Life in Town and Country, pp. 36-38.42 A. J. Brown, New Era in the Philippines, p. 79.43 Ibid., pp. 82-87.44 Ibid.,p. 80.45 An English IWoman n the Philippines, p. 176.46 New Era in the Philippines, p. 34.



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THE PROBLEM OF THE CHINESE IN THE PHILIPPINES 41civicsense. . . . . TheChineseopposeswhilethe Filipinowelcomesthe introduction of labor saving machinery."47 The Chinese cannotgive incentive and initiative to the working people for they "do notpossessthe progressivequalities themselves. 48 Such are some of thevaryingestimatesof the Chineseas workingmenand as citizensin theeconomicand political life of the people of the Philippines. Similardivergences n the estimates of the abilities and characteristicsof theFilipinos are prevalent. "The Filipino is ready to adopt new waysof doing things."49 The native labor is indolent and its efficiencylessened by a propensity to gamble.50 The Filipinos are "ready toworkfor a sufficient nducement.I' "OurFilipinoshave been faithful,without bad habits prejudicial o their integrity." They have madeextraordinary progress in the industrial virtues.52 The Filipinopossesses "very little saving instinct."53 "It only requires a littlediplomacyto make these people (Filipinos) industrious."54All wit-nesses agreethat the Filipino has a great knack of imitation and apti-tude forhandlingnew kindsof machinery,etc. One employeraccusesthe Filipinosof being shirkful, ly, deceitful,devoid of energy,preferringlying to telling the truth, ignorant, lazy and lacking in judgment.55Anotherspeaksof them as without skill or desireto becomeskilled,asnot efficient,systematic, rapid or trustworthy, and as hard to teachthese qualities.56The variety of testimony considered eems to justifyalmost any conclusion. Much more could be offered,about half of itfavorableand the rest unfavorable o the Filipino. Onething must benoted-the harshest words against the Filipino come from UnitedStates armyengineers,men of armytrainingand usedto handlingmenin industryas soldiersarehandled. Wherethe native has been studied,his peculiarities nd demandsconsidered,he wordsconcerninghim as a

47 Bulletin of Bureau of Labor, no. 58, May, 1905, p. 862.48 Ibid.49 Ibid.50 Ibid., p. 864.51 Ibid., p. 866.52 Ibid.53 Ibid., p. 867.54 Ibid., p. 868.55 Mr. Holmes in Report of the Philippine Commission (1902), part i, pp. 153-158.56 Mr. Rice in Report of the Philippine Commission (1902), part i, pp. 257-258.



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42 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWlaborer are much more encouraging and support the hope that theislands can be rapidly and well developed without the importationofforeign abor. Writingin 1903,Mr.Taft says that as conditionssettlethe Filipinocan be madea good laborer,not so goodas the AmericanorChinese,but one with whom it will be possible to carry on great con-structive works.57 He cites statementsfrom H. Krusi,vice-presidentofthe Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company,who was successfullyusingnative laborand who thought that though the Chinesewould expeditethe developmentof the islands, yet in the end they would do injury.58It is worthy of notice that whileChiefEngineerHolmesof the PhilippineCommissionwas one of the most severe in his condemnationof theFilipinoas a laborer,his successor,MajorL. W. V. Kennon,has lookedfavorablyupon their work. The Report of the PhilippineCommissionin 1906 is very optimistic of the future of native labor and sees thechief difficultyin securingcompetent supervision. The work of theFilipinoon the railroads, n the shipyards,on the street railwaylines,on the farms and in mining is upheld and praised.59 "The Filipinoexpends energy enough to make the country a gardenbut it is not properlydirected."60So much then for the respectivemerits of the native and the Chineselabor. The contentions over the questionare so diverseas to precludeany dogmaticconclusions,but it is at least evidentthat the case againstthe Filipinohas not been adequatelyand sufficientlyproven. Hencehe should be given a liberal opportuntiy to demonstrate whateverability he may possess.

The attitude of the natives toward the Chinese ought to be con-sidered n the adoptionor rejectionof a policy of exclusion. With fewexceptionsthe Philippine nhabitantsareopposedto the freeadmissionof the Chinese. As early as 1903 Mr.Taft wrote that it would be a"greatpoliticalmistake" o admit freelythe Chinese aborers.6' Indus-triallythe natives hate the Chinese.62 Dr. Victor S. Clarkreportsthat57 Report of the Philippine Commission (1903), vol. i, pp. 54, 55.58 Ibid.59 Report of the Philippine Commission (1906), vol. ii, p. 69; vol. iii, p. 776.60Ibid., vol. ii, p. 496.61Ibid. (1903), vol. i, pp. 54, 55.62 The Philippine Islands (Atkinson), p. 261.



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THE PROBLEM OF THE CHINESE IN THE PHILIPPINES 43"no Filipinowas found,whetheremployeror employee,who wishedthepresent exclusion policy amended."63Again he says, "All Filipinoemployers and employees interviewed .. . were opposed tothe admissionof the Chineseon any terms; and "a plebiscite of allpersons n the Philippineswouldappearalmost unanimous n favor ofthe present exclusionlaws."64 The native opposition,indeed, is notquestioned. To a certainextent, therefore, he Filipino s imbuedwiththe idea of developingthe islandshimself and for himselfand unques-tionably it would be inviting politicaloppositionfor the United Statesto throwopenthe countryto exploitationby any other race of laborers.

In additionto the oppositionof the Filipinopeoplethemselvesto anychangein the exclusionpolicy,the Americanmerchants n generalandmany in particularare avowedly opposedto the free admissionof theChinese. It must be admitted,however,that there is a diversity ofopinionamongAmericanemployers,especiallyas between militaryandcivil employers. The sugarplantersunanimouslyopposeany change.The demandforthe admissionof the Chinese s analyzedas beingcon-fined to two principalsourcesand as being localizedin these. Thesourcesare the Americanemployersjust mentionedand the Europeanemployers,the latter, excepting those of the mercantile class, beingpractically unanimous against exclusion.65The shipbuilders arementionedas beingthe mostclamorousorthe admissionof the Chinese.The AmericanChamber f Commerceent a representativeo Washing-ton in 1903to urgethe modificationorrepealof the exclusion aws, butto no avail. Sincethat time the agitationin this body has died downto a great extent.66 The chamber of commerce also included theSpanish, English, and German interests. The principalpoints urgedin favor of the desiredadmissionof Chineselabor are: (1) Labor isscarce; (2) the Chineseare necessary for the businessdevelopmentofthe islandsin orderthroughskilledlabor to preservecertainindustriesalreadyestablishedand to enableothersto be undertakensuccessfullyagainst Chinesecompetition on the mainland,and through unskilledlabor to build roadsand public improvementsand workin mines and

13 Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor no. 58, May, 1905, p. 861.64 Ibid., pp. 896, 897.65 Ibid., pp. 862, 863.08 Ibid., p. 863.



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44 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWagriculture specially n the thinly settled and remotedistricts;67(3) andfinally the Chineseare necessary n orderto make the Filipino work.68Admittedly the manufactureof hemp and shipbuilding have sufferedsomewhatbecauseof competitionwith China. This has been offset to alarge extent, however, by the protectivetariff of 1905 whichis now inforce. The necessity for unskilledlabor is not made plain. And asforthe presenceof the Chinesebeingan incentive for the native to laborthe burden of the testimony seems to show that the pressure of suchcompetitionforces the Filipino downward. Accordingto an investi-gation made as early as 1593 the Chinesecompetitionin the islandscaused a cessation of native industry.69 Testimonyto the same effecthasbeen previouslycitedin this discussionand wasbasedon experiencesince American occupation. Besides the extreme scarcity of nativelaboris a difficultywhichhas apparentlybeen overcome n large meas-ure, forin 1906Mr. Dean C.Worcester,secretaryof the interior or thePhilippine Commission, tates in his annual reportthat the supply ofFilipino aboris abundantand satisfactoryat very low prices.70 Othertestimonyis plenty to showthat employerscan get all the native laborthey desire and that they are constantly replacing he Chinesewithnatives as rapidlyas the latter become sufficiently killed.Subordinateo these moreimportantconsiderations reobjections oexclusion based on the difficulty of executing the policy due to theproximityof Chinaand the desireof Chinesestowawaysto land in theislands. ' The idea is also urged that it is better for the Malay to letthe coolie do the lowergradesof workand the native himselfaspiretohigher things.72 The debt to the Chinesefor their having taught thenatives long ago many of the things they now knowabout industryandcommerce73 the contention that only by the admission of the Chinesecan the United States ever be recompensed or what the islands havecost this country74 that the influx of the Chinesewould really be a

67 Report of the Philippine Commission (1902), part i, pp. 21, 22.68 Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor, no. 58, May, 1905, p. 863.69 Census of the Philippine Islands, vol. i, p. 485.70 Report of Philippine Commission (1906), vol. ii, p. 69.71 Report of Philippine Commission (1902), pt. ii, p. 840.72 Philippine Life in Town and Country, p. 95.73 New Era in the Philippines, p. 82.74 Ibid., p. 87.



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THE PROBLEM OF THE CHINESE IN THE PHILIPPINES 45great source of revenue75 that the limited introduction of Chineseinstructors in agriculture would better the present crude methods76and that the strict enforcementof the exclusionlaws and the deporta-tion of unregisteredChinese nvite opposition from powerful nfluencesin the businesscommunity;77hese reasonsare all cited and involved inthe efforts to modify or abolish the exclusion policiesof the Americanand native governments n the Philippine Islands. And last but notleast are the superficialobservationsof Americanand European ravel-ers in the islands, most of whom judge from what the Chinamanhasaccomplished n the Straits settlements, Siam and other Asiatic tropicsand come too hastily perhaps o the conclusion hat the presenceoftheChineses imperative n the Philippineswheresuch progresshas not yettaken place.78 The conclusionsof Dr. Victor S. Clark,as expressedinhis report on Labor Conditions n the Philippine Islands,are basedon a personal tudy of the situation in 1905 and favor continuedexclu-sion, relying for the maintenance and extension of industry on thepresentmechanicand operativepopulationand the additionswhich areconstantly being made to it from the ranks of the natives. Anotherrecent student in the Philippineswrites that "the businesspeople mostfriendly to the Filipinos believe that the Chinese would hasten theeconomic development of the islands wonderfully,but admit that theChinese are not necessary." A unique suggestionhas been made tosupply temporary demands for labor by five year importations ofChineseat good wages, with Filipino apprentices or every Chinese, helatter to be taxed $50 per head on admission, and the employer to beput underbond to return the Chinese o China at the end of the fiveyears, by which time "there will be enough skilled Filipinos."79 Oneis thereforejustified in view of all the evidence in concludingthat theadmissionof the Chinese, either freely or under moderaterestrictions,wouldhastenthe economicdevelopmentof the islands.An elementof growing mportance n the consideration f the Chineseproblem n the Philippines s that of labor organizations. The latter

7-An English Woman in the Philippines, p. 176.76 The Philippine Islands, p. 177.77 Report of Philippine Commission (1903), vol. iii, p. 307.78 Cf. H. C. Stuntz' The Philippines and the Far East, pp. 265-283.79 Report of the Philippine Commission (1902), part i, pp. 9, 10.



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46 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWhave had a remarkablegrowth since American occupation and areparticularlyalert on the question of the admissionof the Chinese. Inadditionto the argumentsalreadyadvancedfor exclusionthey cite thefollowing: (1) that it takes the Chinese aborerbut one to two years tobecomea merchant,thus inviting a continual influx of low class laborand preventinga rise in the generalconditionsof labor; (2) that labororganization s spreadingamong the natives with good results and willdo much towardmaking he Filipinoan efficientworkman; 3) andthatthe admission of the Chinesewill forever prevent the opening of theUnited States markets freely to the Filipinos, or such a policy wouldmean Americancompetition with Chinese abor.80The most important of these observationsis the last. One of thechiefhopesof the Filipino sinceAmericanoccupationhas been that offree trade with the United States. It has beencontinuallyadvancedasthe most effective and immediatemethod of stimulating developmentin the islands. Certain t is that in the presenttemperof the Americanpeopleand theirattitude towardcompetitionwith ChineseandJapaneselabor, no thought of free trade withthe Philippinescould be entertainedif the exclusion policy should be abated. The sentiment prevails inPhilippinemercantile circles that the admissionof the Chinesewouldconstitute a permanent barrier o even favorable trade relations,andthat of the two measures the latter would be most beneficialin thedevelopment of the islands.8' Says one businessman in the islands,"their (Chinese)admission would destroy our chance of tariff con-cessionsfrom the United States-which is very muchmoreimportantfor the country."82 As far as governmentalrelations are concerned tis allegedthat without exclusionChineseblood wouldsoon predominateand America wouldsoon have a Chinesedependency"from which wemight well seek deliverance."83 To what extent modificationsof thepresent system of governmentwould be necessary s nowhereoutlined.Owingto the submissive and peaceful traits of the Chinese hey prob-ably wouldnot be great or radical. But the policywould changefunda-mentally, for the present policy is, ostensiblyat least, to makea self-

80 Report of the Philippine Commission (1902), part i, pp. 21-23.81 Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor, no. 58, May, 1905, p. 863.82 Ibid., p. 865.8' The Philippine Islands, p. 260.



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48 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWexclusionis a questionableone, especially inasmuch as freetrade withthe United States has not been secured and is very uncertain,if notunlikely. The balance of the argumentappearson the surface o be infavor of the admission of the Chinaman,at least under moderaterestrictions. But even this conclusionmay be taking snap judgmenton the Filipinos. Their economicdevelopmentsince Americanoccu-pationhas beensteady and acceleratingn pace,even thoughstill com-paratively slow. However, it has not been shown that the Filipinocannot developthe islands,nor can this now be shown. The native inthe past ten years has had to learn the dignity of labor,the objectsoflabor. He has had to acquire wants in order to stimulate to earningactivity. He has had, moreover,to shoulder part of the burden ofplanning for his country's future. Well indeed, if by far the greaternumberof witnessesmay be credited, has the native met the demandslaid uponhim. Today the islands are looking forward o a more pros-perous future and to at least closer trade relations with the UnitedStates. To admit the Chinese now is to invite a disturbing social,political and economic factor into the life of the islands. Until theUnited States is herselfwillingto open her doorsfreelyto the laborersof Chinaand riskthe encounterbetween Chineseand Americanstand-ards of life, it does not behoove this nation to invite a similarconflictbetweenthe Chineseandthe Filipinos, he latter not havingreachedourstandards,but hoping to do so and engaged in an earnest effort toaccomplishthis end. The present number of the Chineseis not amenace to peace and industry in the archipelago. They will soon beabsorbed n the native population. The danger lies in the coolie classwhoin the struggleto advancethemselves hinderthe upwardcourseofthe Filipino. To best conserveand advance the politicaland economicinterests of the future Philippinenation, therefore,the continuanceofthe present policy of exclusionseemsadvisable.

The Problem of Chinese in the Philippines

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