The Prediction and Control of Organized Crime: A Risk ...

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Document Title: The Prediction and Control of Organized Crime:A Risk Assessment Instrument for TargetingLaw Enforcement Efforts

Author(s): Jay S. Albanese

Document No.: 199047

Date Received: January 2003

Award Number: 2000-IJ-CX-0009

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The Prediction and Control of Organized Crime

A Risk Assessment Instrument for Targeting Law Enforcement Efforts

Jay S. Albanese Virginia Commonwealth University

j [email protected]

2001

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice.This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of viewexpressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the officialposition or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

Abstract

There are five ways in which the prediction and control of organized crime can be

achieved more effectively. Improvements to data collection, utilizing a team approach to

gather information, the application of a risk assessment instrument to target law

enforcement efforts, understanding the parameters of such an instrument, and connecting

organized crime risk assessment to the implementation of law and policy are practical

ways in which organized crime activity can be better anticipated, investigated, and

prevented. Connecting isolated incidents to organized crime through better information

fiom offenders, victims, and police is possible with teams of investigators, researchers,

and analysts, An organized crime risk assessment tool is presented that offers systematic

analysis of opportunity factors, the criminal environment, and harm potential among the

17 risk factors identified. Risk assessment can be used to evaluate the influence of

organized crime in local jurisdictions, and the impact of new laws and policies that affect

commerce and criminal opportunities.


It was September 2000 when Ukrainian journalist Heorhiy Gongadze disappeared after

writing articles alleging corruption and links to organized crime by Ukrainian government

officials. His headless corpse was found near Kiev four months later. A protracted, and

still unsolved, investigation ensued with allegations of direct involvement by the

president of Ukraine, and alleged links to organized crime figures, who may not have

been happy with accusations in the press of crime and corruption.

In an unrelated case, six illegal immigrants were found dumped on the side of the

road in Foggia, Italy. They were believed to have suffocated to death in a truck and were

discarded there. Police believed these were only some of hundreds of illegal immigrants

from Eastern Europe and Asia who land of the shores of Italy looking for a better life in

Europe. In Arizona, 14 illegal immigrants from Mexico died five days after being

abandoned by smugglers in the heat of the desert. Several others managed to survive the

115-degree heat and were hospitalized. These were among more than 100 deaths from

exposure in the Arizona desert by illegal immigrants in less than a year.

In still another case, a 25-year-old Portuguese woman was arrested at Kennedy

Airport in New York with nine pounds of Ecstasy pills valued at $500,000 in bags taped

all over her body underneath her clothes. The tape she used apparently set off the metal

detector. She arrived in New York on a flight from Lisbon, although authorities believe

the pills originated in Amsterdam or Israel.


What’s the Connection?

These incidents of murder, human smuggling, and drug traficking are typical of how we

learn about organized crime: illegal immigrants are arrested, bodies are discovered, or a

drug courier is arrested by police. We usually discover the crime at the “street” level,

long after the planning, conspiracy, and organization have occurred that made the crime

possible. The cases described above each suggest a connection to organized crime, but

police immediately face two problems.

1. Is the body, person, or suspect really connected to organized crime, or is it simply

an individual law violation occurring apart from a larger criminal enterprise?

2. How does a particular incidentFt into the larger picture of organized crime in the

area---how does it compare in seriousness and risk to other types of organized

crime activity in that jurisdiction?

Establishing a connection to organized crime, and ranking the relative seriousness of the

problem for longer-term investigation and targeting purposes, are difficult problems that

rarely are addressed in systematic fashion.

A method to answer the second question of comparative risk is proposed here, but

the first question also requires attention. Making the connection from a single incident to

a larger criminal conspiracy has never been easy. How are police expected to make these


connections when crimes like these occur with regularity with offenders often crossing

jurisdictional boundaries?

From Isolated Incidents to Organized Crime

There are three ways we learn about most crimes: the accounts of offenders, victims, and

police agencies. By using a combination of these three sources of information, the link

between isolated criminal activity and organized crime can be established.

Offender Information

Offenders know the most about crime because they developed the motive, the criminal

design, chose the victim, and committed the crime. Offenders are potentially the richest

source of information about crime but, unfortunately, comparatively few are caught. In

the United States, for example, only about 28 percent of robberies known to police result

in arrest, although 70 percent of murders are solved. Informants, surveillance, and

undercover investigations are three police methods involving offenders that can help

determine whether a link to organized crime exists.

Using known offenders for information and as informants to investigate criminal

conspiracies is a common police strategy in most countries. Informants are the most

cost-effective investigative tool in organized crime cases. The typical informant is a


criminal who chooses to cooperate with the police in exchange for a reduced charge,

sentence, or immunity from prosecution. But this is not always the case. Sometimes

honest people simply wish to report wrongdoing. Both criminal and non-criminal

informants desire anonymity in order to protect their safety. U.S. courts have generally

held that the government is entitled to keep secret an informant's identity who has

provided information about a possible law violation. This is called the "informer's

privilege." The privilege is not absolute, however, and can be overcome if the defense

can show it is crucial to the defendant's case. The legal status and protection of

informants varies widely around the world.

The information obtained from an informant is used to investigate more serious

criminality. For example, an arrested drug courier can be used to determine who are the

wholesale drug suppliers in a given area. An illegal waste disposer can provide

information about other participants in an illicit enterprise. There is usually little expense

involved with informants, unless the informant is paid for the information or is placed

under government protection. In addition, informers can provide information that would

require months of undercover investigation to obtain.

In recent years there has been a well-documented stream of organized crime

figures who have become informants. Such high-level criminals as Nicky Barnes, Jimmy

Fratianno, Sammy Gravano, Mickey Featherstone, Anthony Casso, Anthony Accetturo,

Michael Franzese, and Steve Flemmi all became informants for the government and

testified against their former cohorts in crime. This trend of has occurred for three

reasons:


1. Longprison sentences for racketeering and drug conspiracy law

violations in many jurisdictions force criminals to consider prison as

the "end of the line," rather than as merely a cost of doing business.

2. Witness protection programs are available in a growing number of

countries, which allow a potential informant a way to avoid the future

wrath of his or her co-conspirators after testifying against them.

3. A diminished sense of "honor among thieves" or loyalty to an

organization or ethnic heritage exists now than in the past. Many

criminals are simply in it for the money, and when caught, they look

for the easiest way out, regardless of who might be "sacrificed" to

accomplish it.

Different observers place varying levels of weight on these three reasons, but certainly

some combination of them has changed the stakes in creating criminal informants.

The low cost of informants is offset to some degree by problems of reliability and

credibility. A number of the "mob trials" that occurred in the United States during the

1980s and 1990s resulted in acquittals because juries did not believe the testimony of

government informants. A journalist reported after one of these acquittals, "The last

piece of evidence requested by the jury for re-examination was a chart introduced by the

defense that showed the criminal backgrounds of seven prosecution witnesses. It listed

69 crimes, including murder, drug possession and sales, and kidnapping." Defense


attorney Alan Dershowitz observes, "A bought witness may tell the truth--but only if it

suits his interest to do so."

This issue of the reliability of informants (many are forced to admit they have lied

in the past) and credibility (will juries believe the testimony of admitted criminals?) are

problems particularly when the witnesses have been paid by the government. For

example, Sammy Gravano's testimony in New York against former "boss" John Gotti

apparently was believed by the jury resulting in a conviction, but his testimony against

Pasquale Conte and other alleged crime figures in another trial, was not. Two hours after

it began deliberations, the jury sent out a note that said, "We believe that Sammy

Gravano's testimony is essential to the government's case. We have already debated his

credibility, and have reached an impasse."

The handling of informants by police has been a subject of controversy in

balancing the assistance they provide in solving crimes that would otherwise be difficult

to solve versus the concessions given to them (money, freedom, or reduced prison

sentences). Trials provide a forum for defense attorneys to examine the motives and

payments informers receive, but some believe additional protections for defendants are

needed in cases where an informant's testimony is central to the prosecution's case and

direct evidence does not exist to disprove statements believed to be lies. Similarly, the

government must live up to promises made to informants.

Undercover investigations are not employed very often in organized crime cases

due to the length of time required to gain acceptance and access to information about

criminal organizations. The constant danger to the undercover oficer if his or her

identity was discovered also makes these investigations risky. But a successhl


undercover operation can produce many convictions and disrupt an entire criminal

organization. A well-known undercover success is Joe Pistone, who worked undercover

as “Donnie Brasco” inside the Bonanno crime group in New York for six years. His work

resulted in more than 100 convictions of organized crime figures. Other undercover

agents have also produced significant cases over the years. Pistone’s case also illustrates

the risks of undercover work. He and his family had to move four times while he was

testifying, he did not see his family for three months while working undercover, and he

resigned the FBI without serving long enough to earn a pension due to threats against

him. He believes there is a $500,000 contract on his life, so his life undercover appears to

have changed, rather than ended.

Surveillance of suspected offenders in the community by police has a long

tradition in police work. Physical surveillance is complicated by the private spaces in

which criminals can conceal themselves. Police need some proof of criminal activity,

“probable cause” in the United States, in order to enter homes and businesses. Portable

communications technology has made it easier to plan crimes by telephone or e-mail.

Most governments require some level of proof, like probable cause, before police can

eavesdrop on these conversations. Therefore, both physical and electronic surveillance

need some reliable information in advance the about planned criminal activity in order to

be successful. This advance information comes from informants and sometimes from

victims.

Victim Information


Victims of organized crime have been underutilized in making criminal cases. In

addition to helping solve crimes, victims can provide information about the nature and

circumstances of crimes, which can then be used to anticipate and prevent future

incidents. Researchers can be a useful resource for interviewing victims and organizing

the information they possess. For example, criminologist Ko-lin Chin interviewed

business owners in New York City’s Chinatown to obtain information about the victim’s

perspective on extortion by Chinese gangs there. Chin found gang extortion to be a

common and longstanding practice---nearly 70 percent of businesses in Chinatown had

been approached by gangs for money, goods, or services. He found most victims were

extorted three or four times per year. The businesses received a benefit from paying off

gangs because this protected them from being shaken down by other individuals and

gangs. Chin found that “most Chinese business owners comply with gang extortion

demands because such practices are considered consistent with Chinese customs and not

worth resisting. Businesspeople are generally willing to pay the gangs some money to

avoid further, more significant problems.’’ These gangs were exclusively Chinese (they

spoke Cantonese 89 percent of the time), and their common heritage was central to the

extortion efforts. For example, gangs often exploited the Chinese custom of “lucky

money,” where money is given away on holidays such as the Chinese New Year.

Ukrainian researcher Vladimir Tulyakov interviewed business owners in Odessa,

a port city on the Black Sea. He discovered that extortion of business owners was

common, and given the weak condition of Ukraine’s government, most extortion attempts

were carried out by “legitimate” regulatory inspectors as a way to supplement their

government salary. He found that business victimization there had changed “from mass


criminal extortion to mass legalized extortion by abuse of power” of government

inspectors and their agencies.

The rich context offered in these interviews with victimized businesses provides

information often not known to police or to policymakers, because most of these crimes

are never reported to police. Also, crimes occurring in new ethnic communities or in

foreign languages are difficult for police to investigate and often receive little public or

media attention despite their seriousness. These studies demonstrate that researchers and

academics can be used effectively to gather information that can help inform and design

interdiction and prevention efforts.

Governments and their police agencies have an obligation to protect victims and

witnesses who jeopardize their safety in order to provide criminal information and

thereby protect others. New York State was held liable for the deaths of two businessmen

in the garbage hauling industry, when the state Organized Crime Task Force failed to

keep its promise to protect them in return for their testimony against competitors linked to

organized crime. The victims’ families were entitled to monetary compensation because

the state failed to meet its obligation to them. Cases like this erode the willingness of the

public to assist in organized crime investigations and point to the need for systematic and

effective witness protection programs.

Police Information

In most countries police gather data about crime that include crimes reported to them and

arrests made. This information usually has little utility for understanding organized crime


because it lacks detail. For example, U.S. police count arrests nationwide for gambling,

prostitution, and stolen property, but it is not known what proportion of these arrests are

related to organized crime, which would make this data useful for law enforcement or

policy planning. In Ukraine, Belgium, and some other countries, police reports include

information about whether an offense was committed as part of a group or gang of

different sizes. Small additions of information like this, now known only to the arresting

officer, would do much to improve the ability of crime data to inform organized crime

control efforts. In the United States, a National Incident-Based Reporting System

(NIBRS) has been developed to gather more information about each criminal incident

known to police, but this is a voluntary data system and most police departments do not

participate, so its usefulness has been limited thus far.

The potential utility of connecting arrest information with gang or group

involvement is illustrated by Alexander Yarmish and his colleagues who examined trends

in the proportion of crimes committed by organized crime groups in Ukraine. Using

government reports, they found the share of crime committed by groups increased from

0.7 percent to 1.7 percent between 1995 and 1999. Most groups (95 percent) consisted of

10 of fewer members, with the typical group consisting of between 4 and 10 members.

The scope of the operations of these groups was largely restricted to one city or district

(56 percent), with far fewer having known international links (4 percent). Using both

government-collected information and interviews with offenders in prison, the Yarmish

study also provided detailed information about the nationalities, age, education, and

employment status of offenders involved in organized crime groups-information useful to

both police and government officials to establish law enforcement targets and future law


and policy.

Police are sworn to apprehend criminals and to prevent crime, so collection of

data about their activity often is secondary to law enforcement tasks. For this reason

governments should insure that all police agencies systematically collect more detailed

information about criminal incidents. Here again, academics and researchers can perform

a useful role in organizing and analyzing crime data in ways that are useful to law

enforcement agencies, as the Yarmish study illustrates. In this way police actions can be

informed by regular analysis of trends, criminals, and crime groups in a particular area.

Definition of Organized Crime

It is important to be clear about the precise definition of organized crime, because it is

broader in scope than popular images suggest. The term brings to mind visions of career

criminals in ethnic neighborhoods comprised of recent immigrants. In the United States,

the vision of Italian-American gangsters predominates due to the success of those groups

and popular media portrayals in books and films such as The Godfather, which is still the

most popular book ever written about crime and one of the highest-grossing movies ever

made. Even though it is a work of fiction, most people believe The Godfather is real

because it corresponds to their image of organized crime.

In fact, organized crime is both more diverse and more complicated than popular

portrayals would have us believe. This is due to its universality and the kinds of people

who commit it. First, all societies report problems with organized crime at some level,


and the ethnicity of the participants is not controlling. In the same way that armed

robbers are not explained effectively by their ethnicity, organized crime is committed by

persons of all backgrounds. The "ethnicity trap" occurs when the idea is promoted that

some ethnic groups are somehow more crime-prone than others, and that ethnicity can in

some way shed light on the causes of crime. There is no evidence that this is the case.

Although ethnicity can help describe some types of organized crime in certain places and

at certain times, it does not help to expZain its existence. Something more than ethnicity

is clearly required because people fkom all ethnic backgrounds have engaged in organized

crime of various kinds.

Confusion about organized crime was exacerbated by the U.S. President's

Commission on Organized Crime, which did not offer any clear definition, offering

instead a series of characteristics of "criminal groups", "protectors", and "specialist

support" necessary for organized crime. Key words like "mafia," "mob", "syndicate",

"gang", "outfit1' are often used to characterize it, but the precise meaning of these terms is

often lost in discussions of the "appearances" and "earmarks" of organized crime.

A general definition of organized crime was attempted by criminologist Frank

Hagan who found that definitions had been offered by 13 different authors in books and

government reports about organized crime written during the previous 15 years. I have

updated Hagan's analysis with authors who have attempted to define organized crime in

more recent writings. The results are summarized in Table 1.


The consensus of investigators focuses on four primary elements: a continuing

organization that operates rationally for profit, use of force or threats, and the need for

corruption to maintain immunity from law enforcement. There is considerably less

consensus about public demand for the service, monopoly control, restrictions on

membership, ideology, specialization, secrecy, and the extent of planning. It is possible,

of course, that a particular organized crime group could possess all eleven of the

characteristics above, but most groups are characterized by the four primary elements.

There is evidence that organized crime groups vary widely in cohesiveness, continuity,

and sophistication, but this does not affect whether or not these groups are part of


organized crime-rather, it only affects the types of criminal activity the group is able to

carry out.

There is debate about the size of the group necessary in order to be considered part

of organized crime. Some countries have decided that groups with two or three members

are the smallest groups to be considered organized crime. This debate over exact group

size is arbitrary because organized crime should be defined by its activity. Groups as

small as two appear quite often, and many larger organized crime groups are dominated

by a strong leader with many interchangeable subordinates. In some ways these groups

exist due to the power and influence of one individual, although in other cases organized

crime is a symptom of a much larger subculture of smuggling and fraud that exists in

certain areas. Nevertheless, the definition of the term “group” must be accommodated

and an individual career criminal working alone should be distinguished from one

working in the context of a group, because the potential for harm is increased with

multiple participants. Therefore, groups of two or more that engage in organized crime

activity should be considered part of the definition of organized crime group. But what is

organized crime?

A general definition of organized crime, based on a consensus of writers over the

course of the last three decades (see Table l), reads as follows:

Organized crime is a continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works

to profit from illicit activities. Its continuing existence is maintained

through the use of force, threats, and/or the corruption of public officials.


It is apparent that crimes by corporations during the course of business, or crimes by

politicians or government agencies, also can be considered part of "organized" crime. In 0

the case where a political leader steers contracts to a favored contractor and circumvents a

competitive bid process, is the political leader or the contractor part of organized crime?

The answer is that they both are part of organized crime because they fulfill the elements

of the definition. For example, official misconduct by government officials, obstruction

of justice, and commercial bribery, are all types of organized criminal behavior.

Inasmuch as they fulfill the requirements of the definition above, they constitute a part of

what is known as organized crime. The U.S. National Advisory Committee on Criminal

Justice Standards and Goals recognized three decades ago that there are more similarities

than differences between organized and the so-called "white collar" crimes.

Accordingly, the perpetrators of organized crime may include corrupt

business executives, members of the professions, public officials, or

members of any other occupational group, in addition to the conventional

racketeer element.

Therefore, organized and white collar crime overlap when they involve the important

elements of organization @e., multiple participants), rational criminal motive, and the use

of corruption andor violence to maintain immunity. Criminologist Nikos Passas

concludes that "analytically, the corrupt activities of ordinary businesses and criminal

businesses are indistinguishable."

Nevertheless, there is a distinction between white collar and organized crime.


Corrupt politicians, government officials, and businesses that seek to abuse their authority

or avoid the legal process are somewhat different fkom similar crimes committed by

criminals lacking such legitimate roots. White collar crime consists of offenses that occur

during the course of otherwise Zegitimate business that involve a violation of trust (e.g.,

the public who the government official represents, shareholders in a corporation, or an

employee’s violation of fiduciary responsibility). It is this planned and systematic law

violation, that sometimes involves abuse of authority or of the legal process, which also

lies at the heart of organized crime.

Criminologist Letizia Paoli observes that both juvenile gangs and terrorist groups

frequently become involved in organized crimes, such as drug trafficking, extortion, or

weapons trafficking. On the other hand, these groups are unlike most organized crime

groups in that they

exist for relational or ideological reasons, rather than to merely make a profit through

crime. Juvenile gangs and terrorist groups can be considered part of organized crime

when they engage in the activities of typical organized crime groups. Because their goals

or ideology can change, their common organized crime activity should include them in

investigations of organized crime.

Types of Organized Crime


The definition of what constitutes an organized crime group is broad, but the specific

types of illegal activities can be clearly categorized into three major types: provision of

illicit goods, provision of illicit services, and infiltration or abuse of legitimate business.

Within each of these categories are more specific crimes, which constitute what we know

as organized crime.

The provision of illicit services involves an attempt to satisfy the public demand

for money, sex, and gambling that legitimate society does not fulfill. The specific crimes

involved include: loansharking, prostitution, and gambling. Loansharking is the lending

of money to individuals at an interest rate in excess of that permitted by law. Organized

prostitution offers sex for pay on a systematic basis. Gambling is games of chance where

money is wagered in violation of the law. Each of these crimes occurs as a continuing

enterprise due to the failure of a sizable portion of the public to obtain money, sex, or

gambling in a legitimate way, such as through bank loans, marriage, or government-

sponsored lotteries.

The provision of illicit goods is a category of organized crime that offers

particular products that a segment of the public desires, but cannot obtain through

legitimate channels. The sale and distribution of drugs and the fencing and distribution of

stolen property are examples of specific crimes in this category. There is a great demand

for drugs, such as marijuana, cocaine, and heroin, that are either illegal or are distributed

under very strict regulations imposed by a government. Needless to say, these regulations

do not diminish the demand for these drugs and, as a result, some people attempt to

obtain them illegally. In a similar way, a significant portion of society desires to obtain

attractive products, regardless of where the seller originally obtained them. Due to this


demand, organized criminals have arisen who "fence" stolen merchandise by buying

stolen property, or trafficking in humans, and then selling them customers who do not

care from where it came.

0

The third category of organized crime is the injiltration or abuse of legitimate

business. Labor racketeering and the takeover of waste disposal companies are two

examples of infiltration of legitimate business. Labor racketeering involves the use of

force or threats to obtain money for insuring jobs or labor peace. This often entails the

threat to employers or employees that if money is not paid, there will be no job, or that

violence, strikes, andor vandalism will occur at the business. In a similar way, some

waste disposal companies have been taken over through the use of coercion to intimidate

legitimate owners to sell the business or to have it operated by an outsider by means of

intimidation. Table 2 illustrates this three-part typology of organized crime.

Table 2

A Typology of Organized

Crime

I Type of Activity 1 Nature of Activity 1 Harm [ Provision of Illicit Goc(ds and Services 1 Gambling, lending, sex,

narcotics, stolen property, trafficking in humans. Consensual activities No inherent violence Economic harm

1 Infiltration or Abuse of Legitimate Business 1 Coercive use of legal businesses for purposes of exploitation. Non-consensual activities

Threats, violence, extortion Economic harm

The provision of illicit goods and services is distinguished most clearly from the


infiltration of legitimate business in its consensual nature and lack of inherent violence.

Organized crime figures who offer illegal betting, loansharking, or drugs rely on the

existing demand among the public to make money. They also rely heavily on return

business, so they want the illicit transaction to go well to insure future bets, loans, and

other illicit sales. It is unusual for criminal syndicates to solicit business in this fashion.

Instead, those interested in illicit goods and services seek out the illicit opportunities.

Violence plays no inherent role in the activities themselves, although bad debts cannot be

collected through the courts, as they are for loans and sales in the legitimate market.

Therefore, threats or violence occurs when one party to the transaction feels cheated or

short-changed, and there is no legal alternative for resolving the dispute. Violence also

can occur in an attempt to control or monopolize and illicit market. If a group wishes to

comer the market on illicit narcotics in a particular area, it may threaten or intimidate its

illicit competitors. Once again, these threats are used as an enforcement mechanism,

rather than as an intrinsic part of the provision of illicit goods and services themselves.

The infiltration of legitimate business is more predatory than the provision of

illicit goods and services. Here, organized crime groups attempt to create a need for their

services, rather than exploit an existing market as in the case of illicit goods and services.

Demands for "protection" money or no-show jobs to avoid property damage, work

stoppages, or violence are examples of the predatory nature of the infiltration of

legitimate business. In legal terms, organized crime uses coercion or extortion in the

infiltration of legitimate business, which involves implied or explicit threats to obtain a

criminal objective. Coercion and extortion are not necessary to provide illicit goods or

services because the demand already exists among the public.


All organized crimes can be grouped into these three categories. Recent

manifestations of organized crime, such as money laundering, insurance fiaud, and

corruption of public officials are crimes that attempt to infiltrate or abuse legitimate

businesses by creating a need for organized crime elements through bribery and extortion.

Theft and sale of intellectual property, stolen vehicles, art, and firearms are examples of

the provision of illicit goods to satisfjr an existing demand for these items.

The Genesis of Organized Crime

Organized crime is clearly more prevalent in some areas than in others. Likewise, some

new immigrants have been involved in organized crime, yet the vast majority of new

immigrants are law-abiding citizens. It also appears that certain industries have been

disproportionately impacted by organized crime, yet examples can be found of organized

crime involvement with virtually every type of business. Therefore, it is necessary to

distinguish factors that describe organized crime in some locations at certain times from

factors that help to expZain the existence of organized crime in all places at all times.

The search to explain organized crime has become more urgent in recent years

with the ease of international travel and trade, the globalization of communications via

the Internet, and the emergence of many new democracies in Eastern Europe and around

the world that are struggling to establish themselves. Because of these changes, the

likelihood that local organized crime problems move to other locations to exploit new

victims is greater than ever before. Especially in new democracies, fears that alliances

n


between corrupt leaders, businesses, and criminals can bankrupt a nation are quite real.

The factors that explain the existence of organized crime are of three kinds:

opportunity factors, the criminal environment, and special access or skills. It will be

shown that distinguishing the important aspects of each of these factors enables the

identification of high-risk activities and businesses at high risk of organized crime

involvement.

Opportunity Factors

Opportunity factors for organized crime are of four types: economic, governmental, law

enforcement, and social or technological changes. Changing combinations of these

factors help determine the nature and extent of organized crime in a specific area.

Economic factors impact on the presence of organized crime through economic

conditions such as poor standard of living, high demand for an illicit product or service

combined with an affordable supply, and a competitive environment that makes it

possible to cater to the demand. Organized illicit drug distributors flourish in an

environment like this, as would providers or prostitution, gambling, and loansharking.

For example, a major organized crime case in Philadelphia began on a college campus

when a student placed large illegal bets on sporting events and could not repay his losses.

He was threatened by a local organized crime figure, and the student went to the Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for help. Electronic surveillance was begun, ultimately

resulting multiple convictions for conspiracy, racketeering, and murder. An FBI agent

assigned to the case said later, “Most of our major mob cases start out as gambling


investigations.” In a similar way, cocaine use in the United States has leveled off in

recent years, but estimates show much more traffkking from cocaine-producing countries

in South America toward Europe. The demand and economic stability needed to be a

large drug consumer is present in many of the countries of Western Europe, and cocaine

producers have begun shifting their trafficking patterns to meet this demand.

Poor economic conditions in Eastern Europe and Asia have helped fuel

international trafficking of women and children to Western Europe and North America

both for prostitution and an illicit labor force. Unemployment, government oppression,

and hopelessness promote risk-taking behavior by those who seek opportunities outside

their home country. Although some human trafficking involves kidnapping, much of it

exploits vulnerable and desperate people, showing the importance of economic conditions

in the genesis of organized crime.

On the other hand economic conditions might not result in organized crime

activity if other factors are present to intervene. Certain kinds of government conditions,

law enforcement factors, and certain social or technological changes can either promote

or inhibit organized crime activity.

Government conditions and actions can inhibit or contribute to the existence of

organized crime. Contributory government factors include a weak central or local

government that has difficulty enforcing laws and contracts, corruption among political

leaders, or laws that create or expand criminal markets (e.g., laws prohibiting new drugs,

new tobacco taxes or restrictions, changes in the way taxes are collected on fuel oil,

absence of money laundering prohibitions, privatization of businesses in former socialist

countries without laws to regulate how it is carried out). In Haiti, links have been


established among political leaders, protected drug traffickers, and a weak police force.

In a less transparent way, Russia’s pervasive government corruption and inadequate laws

to regulate business dealings during the 1990s resulted a government that lacked both the

political will and legal instruments necessary to combat entrench organized crime

interests. Russian oil, for instance, was stolen by criminals or corrupt plant managers and

then sold in Rotterdam--the proceeds wired through front companies in Europe and

deposited in London banks. Organized crime figures subsequently requested $40 million

in US. currency from a U.S. bank through a Moscow bank. The U.S bank obtained a

wire transfer of hnds fi-om the London bank, took a commission on the exchange, and

then flew the U.S. currency from the U.S. to Moscow. The money was then withdrawn

by Russian organized crime figures who used it to buy narcotics (to sell and make more

money), buy property, or attempt to influence politicians or elections. This type of

criminal enterprise is made possible by government conditions that include inadequate (or

absent) laws regulating the privatization of business and money laundering, an existing

climate of corruption in the business sector, and banks that are either controlled by

organized crime interests or that fail to exercise due diligence in knowing their clients.

The first step needed to close this kind of criminal opportunity is government legislation

that specifically prohibits or regulates these activities.

Law enforcement factors are those characteristics of police agencies that

discourage or promote organized crime activity. Law enforcement factors include the

degree to which police are well-trained and adequately paid, levels of police corruption,

and the extent of government interference in police operations. The level of police

effectiveness varies significantly around the world and also within nations, and the


evidence shows that ongoing vigilance is needed to insure police are not corrupted by

association with organized crime activity. An examination of 28 drug-related corruption

convictions by U.S. police officers at the Mexican border discovered internal control

weaknesses. These included failure to monitor agents who inspected individuals with

whom they had close personal relationships, not inspecting police personnel who crossed

the border, and failing to evaluate training and measures designed to insure integrity.

More dramatically, reform-minded leaders in criminal justice have been killed in places

such as Italy and Russia in order to protect existing criminal arrangements. These

murders OCCUT only where criminal groups believe that apprehension by police agencies is

unlikely or higher government figures have been corrupted. The hdamental importance

of law enforcement’s ability to be trained and operate in a professional way without

unnecessary political interference cannot be overstated.

Social or technological changes that involve new individual freedoms or new

technology can promote or limit opportunities for organized crime. Examples include

rapid changes in access to the Internet, the ability to travel freely, cell phone access,

software copying capabilities, changes in the legal status of women, and similar factors

that create or shift opportunities for both legitimate and illegitimate purposes. For

example, frauds based in Nigeria are becoming increasingly global as e-mail access

permits unsolicited requests from official- looking agencies to transfer money as advance

fees for “insider” deals on oil sales, real estate, or currency conversion. Although most

people ignore these e-mails, a small response from thousands of e-mails produces

millions of dollars in proceeds from fraud.

Technology has extended the reach of criminals to permit theft of property across


national boundaries. For example, groups within Russia and Ukraine were identified as

major manufacturers of pirated CD software and music. More than one million credit

card numbers have been stolen by organized hacker groups in Russia and Ukraine that

specifically target U.S. computer systems associated with e-commerce and e-banking. In

a similar way, the growth of the Internet has extended the reach of the sex industry in

distributing pornography and recruiting women and children into prostitution.

Combinations of economic, governmental, and law enforcement factors, and

social or technological changes can create or inhibit the opportunity for the development

or expansion of organized crime in a specific location at a given time. These opportunity

factors can be aggravated or mitigated with the presence of certain characteristics in the

criminal environment and in special skills or access required.

Criminal Environment

The criminal environment is the nature of the offending population in a particular area. Is

there a history of organized criminal activity? Is there a history of organized crime

activity in this area for this product or service? If so, the likelihood of organized crime

exploitation of the opportunity factors described above would be increased. The garment

industry in New York City offers a case study of continuing organized crime infiltration

for much of the twentieth century. It began in the 1920s when Arnold Rothstein was

hired by clothing designers to fight against labor unions, and labor unions paying him to

stop strike-breakers. The influence over the garment district in New York was

maintained by organized crime control over trucking companies and drivers’ unions,


which could be used to thwart timely delivery of time-sensitive designer clothes to stores.

Organized crime influence was supposed to have ended in 1992 when Joseph and

Thomas Gambino pled guilty to antitrust charges, agreed to pay $12 million in fines, and

leave the industry permanently. A “special master” was brought in to monitor the

industry in New York and institute reforms over a five-year period. But only one year

0

after the special master left, indictments were brought against several organized crime

figures, including Joseph DeFede, who allegedly ran the Lucchese crime family in New

York, for imposing an annual “mob tax” of several hundred thousand dollars on

contractors and clothing designers in exchange for labor peace. DeFede pled guilty in

1999 and was sentenced to five years in prison. This case illustrates how difficult it can

be to remove the influence of organized crime from an industry.

Another important factor in assessing the criminal environment is the history of

general (non-organized) criminal activity in the area, especially for the product or service

of concern. Generic criminal activity might indicate a somewhat reduced risk of

organized crime involvement, as would the lack of any prior criminal involvement in the

product or service area. For example, several remote and rural jurisdictions in the United

States have established legalized casino gambling in recent years, and it has been alleged

that organized crime groups emerge to provide illicit services such as prostitution. The

threat of organized crime involvement is far less in these remote areas than it is in areas

where the presence of organized crime has already been established. As noted below

under “exacerbating factors,” it is also important to account for criminal activity in

neighboring jurisdictions to anticipate the likelihood of cany over to other areas.


Special Skills or Access

Given the existence of certain opportunity factors and knowledge of the criminal

environment, special skills or access also might be needed in order to exploit these

criminal opportunities. For example, the threat of smuggling nuclear materials from the

former Soviet Union turned out to be a minor threat due to the special access required and

logistical problems in accomplishing this task, which greatly reduced the likelihood of its

occurrence. Nevertheless, continuing lax oversight and increased demand could result in

organized crime groups devoting the resources necessary to make smuggling nuclear

materials profitable. Likewise, software piracy that involves breaking the codes behind

licensed products requires computer expertise that is still rare, although such knowledge

and skills are becoming more common.

Harm

Estimates of potential harm can be made so that activities of greater social

consequence can be given priority. Harm can be assessed in terms of monetary cost,

individual ham, and long-term social costs. These estimates can be based on the harm

caused in past known cases, combined with any additional factors present in the local

jurisdiction that might increase or decrease the potential harm. Accurate estimation of

harm potential allows law enforcement agencies to be proactive in their enforcement

approach based on objective estimates of seriousness, rather than relying solely on

complaints or other reactive approaches in combatting organized crime.


Risk Assessment: Prediction of High Risk Conditions

Activities at high risk for local organized crime involvement can be determined

systematically by screening a jurisdiction for the presence and level of the opportunity

and environmental factors described above: economic governmental, law enforcement,

criminal environment, special access requirements, socialhechnological changes that

affect criminal opportunities, and potential harm. A systematic prediction, or risk

assessment, model merely summarizes the experience of the past as a guide to making

decisions that affect the future. These models simplifL complex reality into its major

components. Criminological prediction models have proved to be fairly simple in

construction with a small number of important predictor variables, and therefore are

easily adopted in practice. Many jurisdictions now employ probation, parole, and

sentencing guidelines that are based on prediction models. These models utilize the

experience of past probation, parole, or sentencing candidates and compare that

experience with similar current cases to help make an informed judgment about risk

assessment. For example, probation and parole prediction devices have been very useful

in distinguishing “high risk” groups of offenders from “low risk” groups for helping

determine release from prison or the intensity of supervision required in the community.

In the same way, the risk assessment tool proposed here can help distinguish “high risk”

from “low risk” local markets for organized crime activity of specific kinds.


INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

Figure 1 presents a practical method of applying prediction methods to organized

crime in the form of a risk assessment tool. The risk assessment tool is comprised of 17

variables in six categories: economic factors (4), government (3), law enforcement (4),

sociaVtechnologica1 change (2), criminal environmenthpecial skills (3), and potential

harm (1). As described above, these six categories of factors are the most likely to affect

the nature and extent of organized crime in a jurisdiction. The risk assessment tool will

have the greatest utility when applied to specijk illicit activities in aparticular locality.

Most organized crime is local in nature and even transnational organized crime groups

choose locations based on specific features. Therefore, risk assessment tools applied to

entire countries or states are likely to overlook important variations within those large

jurisdictions. In the same way that organized crime operates differently in different

neighborhoods in Manhattan and Brooklyn in New York City, the same is true in

Moscow, Kiev, Mexico City, and other large jurisdictions. Smaller cities and towns may

have less variation within them, making application of a risk assessment tool appropriate

to the entire locality. In a similar way, specific illicit activities have different risk

potential in different localities. Therefore, the risk of organized illegal gambling,

prostitution, drug traflficking, government bribery, extortion, or human smuggling will

vary dramatically among jurisdictions, requiring separate applications of the risk

assessment tool. In this way, such a tool can help law enforcement agencies set priorities


in logical and systematic fashion, directing their limited resources to the illicit activities

and localities that are shown to be at highest risk for organized crime involvement.

Measurement the 17 factors involves some creativity on the part of the

investigators, although prior research in prediction methods suggests that ordinal

(low/medium/high) or dichotomous measures (yedno) may be all that is required to

assess risk levels. A method for measurement of each of the 17 factors is suggested in

Figure 1, which shows that a combination of police intelligence information, analysis of

previously gathered arrest data, and surveys and estimates made by researchers and

academics can generate the most useful information. Such a “team” approach to risk

assessment, involving police, analysts, and researchers, may be an exemplary

arrangement for organizing the information needed for the organized crime risk

assessment tool. There are numerous examples worldwide of successful partnerships

among police, investigative analysts, and researchers in addressing criminal justice

problems. The cooperation of these groups in evaluating and targeting the risk posed by

organized crime involvement in different illicit activities and locations is a logical and

necessary step forward.

Applying a Risk Assessment Tool in Practice

Figure 1 illustrates the kinds of questions to be answered in applying the risk assessment

tool in practice and provides detail of what each factor attempts to measure. The rate at

which the 17 factors in this model change in any location will vary over time. For


0

example, local standard of living, government strength, corruption level, level of police

training, and police working conditions are likely to change slowly, although government

transition and elections can change the political climate quickly. On the other hand,

affordable supply of an illicit product, new laws that inadvertently expand illicit markets,

and social and technological changes occur with great rapidity. Therefore, it is necessary

to screen a jurisdiction periodically with a risk assessment tool for specific illicit

activities in order for the risk assessment to remain current. Such periodic re-evaluations

of risk also will permit refinement in the measures used as indicators. The measurement

methods used will become more reliable as more experience is gained in applying the

model over time to different kinds of illicit activities.

There is a tendency to view organized crime activities as unique events, but

regular application of a standard assessment tool helps to reveal the similarities in the

nature of organized crime operations across groups and jurisdictions. For example, a

“typical” Russian extortion was described in Florida where a Russian immigrant bragged

about his connections with organized crime in Moscow, and threatened a couple who

owned a bagel shop and deli to sell him 49 percent of the business and also pay him

$25,000 per month for protection. The terrified owners sold their share of the deli for a

fiaction of its value and fled to Canada. In a strikingly similar but unconnected case in

Boston, an Irish-American organized crime figure forced a couple to sell their successful

liquor store to him for less than its value, or else they would be killed. In a later grand

jury investigation, the original owners lied about the extortion effort due to their fear of

reprisal. Ironically, they were victimized again when convicted of perjury for lying

before the grand jury. These virtually identical extortions occurred 10 years apart and


were committed by different types of organized crime figures in completely different

settings. More systematic efforts to assess organized crime risk in different locations

could lead to better anticipation and intervention in organized crime activities, rather than

constant repetition of old scams on new victims.

Cigarette Smuggling: A Case Study

Cigarette smuggling provides an example of how a risk assessment tool for

organized crime can be used in practice. Why cigarette smuggling? It is widespread,

very costly, the illicit market involves different kinds of criminal groups, and it is a legal

product. Problems have been reported in more than 30 countries with cigarette

smuggling occurring both within and among nations. Some of the smuggling has been

conducted by otherwise legitimate businesses that wish to increase their profits illegally,

while other cases involve sophisticated organized crime operations and government

knowledge. The illegal profits from cigarette smuggling also are enormous, harming the

legitimate sector and the ability of governments to raise tax revenues. The seriousness of

the problem is illustrated by six member countries of the European Union that decided in

2001 to prosecute large U.S. tobacco companies for allegedly smuggling large quantities

of contraband cigarettes into Europe. Unlike the entirely illegal market for illicit

narcotics where smuggling primarily involves concealment, the illicit cigarette market is a

legal but highly regulated market that requires more creativity on the part of smugglers in

order to make illegal transactions appear legal. This complicates investigation and

apprehension efforts. The director of the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms


states “we have found with increasing frequency that our investigations into.. .alcohol and

tobacco product diversion have led to international organized criminal involvement .”

In 2000 New York State raised the tax on a pack of cigarettes by 55 cents,

increasing the price to about $4.75 per pack and as high as $50 per carton, the highest

price anywhere in the United States. The tax increase was designed to raise government

revenue, but it had the effect of creating a whole new category of organized criminals,

mostly small business people who saw an easy way to increase their profits because

convenience stores often make 25 to 30 percent of their sales in cigarettes. Smugglers

simply drive five hours south to Virginia where cigarette taxes are the lowest (a carton of

cigarettes sells as low as $20), buy cases of cigarettes, drive back to New York, and sell

them at New York prices-making about $50,000 per van load of cigarettes.

Applying the 17-factor risk assessment model to cigarette smuggling, it can be

seen there was no change in the local standard of living during this time (a very short

time-frame for the tax increase), the demand for cigarettes did not change significantly

over that period, nor did the effectiveness of the government in enforcing the law,

corruption level, police training, working conditions, police corruption, government

interference, social or technological changes, or the criminal environment. The sudden

implementation of a major cigarette tax increase made larger economic and institutional

changes impossible over such a short period.

On the other hand, the affordable supply dropped as taxes doubled overnight, the

competitive market became more attractive as a 1 0-hour roundtrip drive to load up on

Virginia cigarettes was now made worthwhile given the huge, sudden disparity in

cigarette prices between states, and there were no special access or skills required to enter


the illicit market. An application of the risk assessment tool prior to passage of the new

tax law would have made it clear that such a sudden jump in taxes would likely result in

dramatic increases in smuggling, and that additional law enforcement resources would be

needed to enforce the new tax law. If a secondary objective was to decrease public

demand for smoking and health costs by raising taxes, a much more gradual tax increase

would be needed. The result instead was a large increase in cigarette smuggling into New

York City. Under federal law it is a felony punishable up to five years in prison for

transporting more than 60,000 cigarettes across state lines without paying applicable state

taxes, but the law is not a deterrent. A New York City investigator said about the

smugglers, “I don’t think there’s high school diploma among them, and they’re making a

lot of money.”

Analysis of cigarette smuggling in other jurisdictions would require application of

the risk assessment tool to local conditions there. For example, the U.S.-Canadian border

has been the site of cigarette smuggling through Indian reservations that straddle the

border. Because U.S. Indian reservations do not have to pay taxes, a carton of cigarettes

is about $14 cheaper if purchased on the reservation. Therefore, truckloads of cigarettes

have been diverted through the reservations, where they were bought without paying tax,

and then resold in Canada or in the U.S. A former Mohawk tribal chief and R.J.

Reynolds cigarette manufacturer sales director were convicted in a scheme in which

truckloads of Canadian-brand cigarettes were illegally diverted to smugglers in the United

States, who would then smuggle the cigarettes back into Canada and sold on the black

market. The cigarette manufacturer admitted to aiding in this scheme and paid $15

million in fines to the U.S. government. In 2001, Canada increased its substantial taxes


on cigarettes by another $4 per carton for the purpose of raising revenue and discouraging

smoking. In an effort to mitigate increased smuggling, Canada also has provided

additional resources to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canada Customs, and related

enforcement agencies to improve their ability to intervene in smuggling activity. These

enforcement resources are “dedicated to providing timely and accurate information on the

nature and extent of contraband activity thereby enabling the Government to establish

tobacco tax policy.. .and evaluate the impact of any [future] tax increase.” A risk

assessment tool is one mechanism by which Canadian police agencies can assess levels of

cigarette smuggling by organized crime at different locations along its 3,000-mile border

with the United States.

It is important to recognize when assessing risk that estimates of harm are not

limited to financial costs. A cigarette smuggling case between North Carolina and

Michigan involved a police raid of 18 businesses and homes and the arrest of 22 people,

several of whom were linked to Hezbollah, the Middle East terrorist organization. It was

alleged that the cigarette smuggling profits were being used to fund their terrorist group

activities based in Lebanon. The state of Michigan estimated losing approximately $75

million per year from cigarettes diverted from low tax states. In similar fashion, North

Korean officials in Eastern Europe and Africa have been accused of using their embassies

and front companies to smuggle untaxed cigarettes and other illicit goods. It is feared

that these profits are being used to h d North Korea’s nuclear capability. A year-long

investigation by the Center for Public Integrity concluded that three large tobacco

manufacturers worked closely with individuals and companies directly connected to

organized crime over a long period of years. Evidence was found of smuggling networks


between legitimate tobacco companies and organized crime groups in Canada, Colombia,

China, Southeast Asia, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and the United States. It was

estimated that one in three cigarettes exported worldwide is sold on the black market. It

can be seen that potential harm will be different in each jurisdiction and for each illegal

activity, and it must be accounted for in assessing risk.

Exacerbating Factors

In addition to the factors described in the risk assessment model, there are exacerbating

factors that contribute to the risk of the presence of organized crime. These

“background” factors affect the likelihood of organized crime by creating a context,

which promotes its existence. These factors include geographic location, local history,

and cultural traditions or beliefs.

Geographic location affects the degree to which a country or local jurisdiction

will be subject to the influence of organized crime. For example, a country like Ukraine

borders six other countries providing a natural transit point from East to West, and it is

likely to at least be a transportation route for smuggling of various kinds. Likewise, a

local jurisdiction located on a major interstate highway or directly between two

population centers is likely to experience problems that may not be of its own doing, but

the result of an unfortunate geographical location. Clearly, a country or jurisdiction

cannot change its geographic location but it must be aware of the events and trends in

neighboring jurisdictions in order to anticipate organized crime problems that might be


imported or travel through its borders.

Local history also affects the likelihood of organized crime. A history of

government oppression, for example, works against the likelihood that new government

prohibitions or policies will be accepted or followed. A long history of smuggling and

tax evasion also works against new efforts to thwart these behaviors. A recent history of

war or ethnic violence also can make change difficult when there exists deep divisions of

opinion within a country or region. Understanding the importance of history is crucial

when planning new laws, policies, or regulations. Effective organized crime efforts will

require specific components designed to accommodate or change the historical opinions

or behaviors that may work against them.

Cultural traditions and beliefs can have a dramatic impact on the risk of

organized crime. The role and status of women in a society or region, the acceptability of

drug use, tolerance for corruption, and the status of children can each have a significant

impact on the extent of prostitution, violence, drug trafficking, graft, and trafficking in

human beings. These traditions or beliefs are slow to change and require education and

policies that promote non-exploitive attitudes. Such efforts are not organized crime

prevention efforts per se, but they must be accounted for when planning more direction

interventions.

Conclusions and Recommendations

There are five ways in which the prediction and control of organized crime can be


achieved more effectively. Improvements in data collection, the application of a risk

assessment instrument to target law enforcement efforts, understanding the parameters of

such an instrument, utilizing a team approach to gathering information, and connecting

organized crime risk assessment efforts to the implementation of law and policy are

practical ways in which organized crime activity can be better anticipated and prevented.

These five methods are detailed below.

1 . Improvements in data collection need to be made in distinguishing crimes

committed by individuals from those committed as part of group activity. Some

countries now make these distinctions, which makes it possible to obtain

information on trends regarding group versus individual criminal activity of

various kinds. Other jurisdictions should follow this lead.

2. A practical method of applying prediction methods to organized crime in the form

of a risk assessment tool should be implemented. The risk assessment tool is

comprised of 17 variables in six categories: economic factors (4), government (3),

law enforcement (4), social/technological change (2), criminal

environmentlspecial skills (3), and potential harm (1). These six categories of

factors are most likely to affect the nature and extent of organized crime in a

jurisdiction.

3. n e r e are four parameters for an organized crime risk assessment tooI to be

usefbl in practice. It must be location-specific (i.e., findings will vary by


geographic location), activity-specific (Le., different activities will have different

risk levels), time-specific (i.e., conditions change over time so risk assessment

must done periodically), and all factors must be measured comparativei’y against

levels found in other jurisdictions.

4. A “team ” approach to risk assessment, involving police, analysts, and

researchers, is an exemplary arrangement for organizing the information needed

for application of an organized crime risk assessment tool. The types of data and

analysis needed (intelligence, arrest/group trends, surveys, economic data, harm

estimates) require the contributions of each of these groups. There are numerous

examples worldwide of successful partnerships among police, investigative

analysts, and researchers in addressing criminal justice problems. The

cooperation of these groups in evaluating and targeting the risk posed by

organized crime involvement in different illicit activities and locations is a logical

and necessary step forward.

5 . An organized crime impact assessment should be conducted prior to the

implementation of new laws or policies that affect commerce. The example of

cigarette smuggling illustrates that even a simple tax revenue measure can have

disastrous results in expanding organized crime and harming local economies,

when existing knowledge of organized crime risk factors are not solicited or

applied.


Figure I Organized Crime Risk Assessment Tool Albanese-2001

1 Risk Factors (@onomic, Government, Law enfor Social/technological change, Harm) Measurement Method

Medium (2), High (3) I El. Local standard of living is low (encouraging participation in illkgal activity)

nal history and special skills, I I Assessment Low (l),

Local economic indicators

involvement) Police records, victimization surveys

PROPERTY OF National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRSj Box SO00 Reckvilk. k4D 20869-SOOl! This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice.

This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of viewexpressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the officialposition or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

[ C2. Have criminal groups existed in this market in the past? - (incr4sing the likelihood of OC I group involvement in the market) victimization surveys [ C3. Are technical or language skills or other special access requilfed to participate in the illicit activity (i.e., barriers to entry for new offenders)? Comparative level of skills/ access needed

Police records,

1 H1. How serious is the potential harm? - (estimate the financial and human costs of the activid on the jurisdiction) Projections of cost and social imDact I Risk Assessment Total Vor this activity & locution)

References


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