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January 2010

The Politics of the Romanticization of PopularCulture, or, Going Ga-Ga Over Pop Culture: ACritical Theory AssessmentEric Bain-Selboeric.bain-selbo@wku.edu

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Recommended Repository CitationBain-Selbo, Eric. (2010). The Politics of the Romanticization of Popular Culture, or, Going Ga-Ga Over Pop Culture: A CriticalTheory Assessment. Unpublished.Available at: http://digitalcommons.wku.edu/phil_rel_fac_pub/10

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ThePoliticsoftheRomanticizationofPopularCulture,or,GoingGa‐GaOverPopCulture:ACriticalTheoryAssessment

EricBain‐Selbo,WesternKentuckyUniversity

AUTHOR’SNOTE:Thispaperisarevisionofonegivenatthe2010meetingofthePopularCultureAssociation.Itremainsaworkinprogress.DONOTECITEWITHOUT

PERMISSIONOFTHEAUTHOR.

Thedebateaboutthevalueormeritofpopularculturehaspersistedforcenturies.

OnemightevenseePlato’scriticismofpoetsinhisdayasanearlyexampleofpopular

culturebashing.Morerecently,writerslikeMatthewArnold(19thcentury)andDwight

MacDonald(20thcentury)leveleddamagingcritiquesagainstthecultureofthemasses.

ThispaperwilltakeasitsstartingpointFrankfurtSchoolphilosopherslikeTheodor

AdornoandMaxHorkheimer.Theircritiqueofmasscultureandthecultureindustry

influencedasignificantnumberofculturalcriticsfromthemid‐20thcenturyon.

Inmanyways,anumberofcontemporarytheoristshavesoughttoredeempopular

culturebycelebratingthe“silverlining”oftheotherwise“darkcloud”ofmediocrityand

manipulationthatpassesascultureinAmericansociety.WhereastheoristslikeAdorno

andHorkheimermayhaveborderedonthehyperbolicintheircondemnationofmass

culture,developingatooone‐sidedcritiqueofpopularculture,somemorecontemporary

theoristshaveswungtotheotherextreme,developingone‐sidedcelebrationsofpopular

culture.TheworkofJohnFiske,beginninginthe1980s,isanexampleoftheswingtothat

extreme.Iwillsummarizethecriticismsofhisapproachtopopularculturethatcanbeand

havebeenmade.AmorerecentchampionofpopularcultureisHenryJenkins,whosework

hasfocusedondevelopmentsincomputertechnologyandsocialmedia.Yet,hisworkis

subjecttomanyofthesamecriticismsthatcanbemadeinregardtoFiske’swork.Inthis

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paper,then,Iwillarguethatcontemporaryeffortsfromthe1980stotodaytoromanticize

popularculturethreatentoobfuscatethepowerfulanddetrimentaleffectsofthecapitalist

cultureindustry—andthatwedesperatelyneedamoremeasuredcritiqueofpopular

cultureinordertoattainafairassessmentofitscostsandbenefits.Iwillpayparticular

attentiontocostsandbenefitsastheypertaintothehealthofourdemocracy.

Whiletheycertainlywerenotthefirstorthelasttheoriststocritiquemassculture

orthecultureindustry,AdornoandHorkheimerremainexcellentexamplesofthose

thinkerswhoseepopularcultureasadangerousandenslavingelementinWestern

societies.Intheirfamousessay“TheCultureIndustry:EnlightenmentasMassDeception,”

AdornoandHorkheimerarguethatthecultureindustry(thatwhichproducesmassor

popularculture)isfullywithinthecontrolofwealthyandpowerfulpeopleand

corporations.Thoseinpowerusethecultureindustryasawayofcontrollingorpacifying

thegeneralpopulation—allthebettertothenexploitthemforeconomicgain.Thekeyto

thiscontrolorpacificationisthemindlessorvapidcharacterofwhatthecultureindustry

produces.Theproductsofthecultureindustrydonotspurtheimaginationorcreativityof

theconsumers,andtheycertainlydonotelicitanyreflectiveorcriticalthought.

Evenworse,theverydesireforthepablumofthecultureindustryisproducedby

thecultureindustryitself.Myuseoftheword“pablum”isparticularlyfittinginthiscase.

TherootofthewordisfromtheLatinpabulum,meaning“foodstuff.”Inthe1930s,pablum

becameatrademarkforaprocessedcerealforinfants.Metaphoricallyitsincehasbeen

usedtorefertoentertainmentoramusementthatisbland,unappealing,orlackstaste.It

perfectlydescribeswhatAdornoandHorkheimerthoughtabouttheproductsoftheculture

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industry.Thoseproductsareblandandunappealing,inpartbecausetheycatertothe

lowestcommondenominatorofthemasses(e.g.,crudehumor,slapstickcomedy,

uncomplicatednarratives).Andliketheinfantstowhompablumwasfed,consumerslack

anyrealfreedomorchoiceinthetransactionsconductedwiththecultureindustry.“The

consumersaretheworkersandemployees,thefarmersandlowermiddleclass,”Adorno

andHorkheimerwrite.“Capitalistproductionsoconfinesthem,bodyandsoul,thattheyfall

helplessvictimstowhatisofferedtothem[bythecultureindustry].”1Inthisway,the

consumersarenotsubjectsabletoexercisetheirfreedombutobjectsthataremanipulated

bythoseincontrolofthecultureindustry.2

Whileonemightthinkthatthepleasuresofmassorpopularcultureprovide

consumerswithanescapefromthedrudgeryandtediumoftheworkweek,theyactually

arepartofthesystemthatimprisonsthem.AsAdornoandHorkheimerconclude:“Pleasure

alwaysmeansnottothinkaboutanything,toforgetsufferingevenwhereitisshown.

Basicallyitishelplessness.Itisflight;not,asisasserted,flightfromawretchedreality,but

fromthelastremainingthoughtofresistance.”3Wecanrejectthisproductorthatformof

entertainment,butweincreasinglyareincapableofcriticallyassessingorresistingthe

dominantideology4‐‐theideologyofnever‐endingconsumptionasameanstopersonal

fulfillmentandhappiness.

1TheodorAdornoandMaxHorkheimer,DialecticofEnlightenment(translatedbyJohnCumming,NewYork:Continuum,1994),133.2AdornoandHorkheimer,Dialectic,142.3AdornoandHorkheimer,Dialectic,144.4AdornoandHorkheimer,Dialectic,166‐167.

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Adornoextendedandperhapssharpenedthiscritiqueinhislateressay“TheCulture

IndustryRevisited.”Hearguesthatthe“dreamindustry[cultureindustry]doesnotso

muchfabricatethedreamsofthecustomersasintroducethedreamsofthesuppliers

amongthepeople.”5Evenworse,nobodyseemstocarethattheirdreams(read“wants”or

“desires”)arenottheirownbutarethedreamsofcommodityproducers.AsAdorno

affirms,“Thecustomerisnotking,asthecultureindustrywouldhaveusbelieve,notits

subjectbutitsobject.”6ItisinthissensethatAdornoarguesthatthecultureindustryisnot

aconsequenceofhumandesires,itdoesnotconformitselftothewantsoftheconsumer,

ratheritconformstheconsumertoitself.Adornoconcludesthat“thecultureindustryis

nottheartoftheconsumerbutrathertheprojectionofthewillofthoseincontrolonto

theirvictims.”7Insuchasituation,thereisnofreedom,noresistance,andnogenuine

democracy.LittlewonderthenthatAdornoprophesizes:

Theneonsignswhichhangoverourcitiesandoutshinethenaturallightof

thenightwiththeirownarecometspresagingthenaturaldisasterofsociety,

itsfrozendeath.Yettheydonotcomefromthesky.Theyarecontrolledfrom

earth.Itdependsuponhumanbeingsthemselveswhethertheywill

extinguishtheselightsandawakefromanightmarewhichonlythreatensto

becomeactualaslongasmenbelieveinit.8

5TheodorAdorno,TheCultureIndustry(NewYork:Routledge,1991),93.6Adorno,Culture,99.7Adorno,Culture,185.8Adorno,Culture,96.

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TheargumentsmadebyAdornoandHorkheimeraboutmassorpopularculture

probablyarenotfullyapplicabletoday.Popularculturetodayisfarfromhomogenousand

repetitive.Popularculturetodayismorevariedandcreativethanitwasin1950.However,

whatAdornoandHorkheimerstillmighthaverightistheeffectsofpopularcultureonits

audience.Itstillmaybetruethatconsumersofpopularculturegenerallyarevictims,that

theyarerobbedoftheirfreedom,andthatitisusedasawayoffacilitatingtheexploitation

ofthelaborforce.

Oneofthebestexamplesoftheromanticizationofpopularculturecanbefoundin

theworkofJohnFiske.Heidentifiespopularcultureastheprocessbywhichconsumers

maketheirownmeanings(aliberatingact)outoftheproductstheyaregiven.Heargues

thatpopularcultureis“madefromwithinandbelow,notimposedfromwithoutorabove

asmassculturaltheoristwouldhaveit.Thereisalwaysanelementofpopularculturethat

liesoutsidesocialcontrol,thatescapesoropposeshegemonicforces.”9Fromthisposition,

theargumentsofAdornoandHorkheimerarewrongoratleastoverstated.

Fiskecontendsthatpopularcultureismoreaboutmeaningthanproduct.Inother

words,thecultureindustrymighthavecontrolovertheproductsthatitmakes,butit

cannotcontrol(atleastnotcompletely)theusesandmeaningsthatpeoplefindforthose

products.Ashesays,“Allcommoditiesareconsumedasmuchfortheirmeanings,

identities,andpleasuresastheyarefortheirmaterialfunction.”10Bluejeans,forexample,

9JohnFiske,ReadingthePopular(Boston:UnwinHyman,1989),2.10Fiske,Reading,4.

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donotsimplyserveasagarmentthatprotectsusfromtheelements.Theymeansomething

tousandmeandifferentthingstodifferentpeople.11

Thisabilitytomakemeaningbeyondthecontroloftheproducersiswhypopular

cultureisaformofresistance.AsopposedtoAdornoandHorkheimer,Fiskeseesthe

consumerasapersonofsignificantfreedom.“Theculturalindustries...havetoproducea

repertoireofproductsfromwhichthepeoplechoose,”hewrites,but“despiteallthe

pressures,itisthepeoplewhofinallychoosewhichcommoditiestheywilluseintheir

culture.”12Headdsthatthe“peopleareunlikelytochooseanycommoditythatservesonly

theeconomicandideologicalinterestsofthedominant.”13Bluejeans,again,serveasagood

example.Fiskerecountsastoryofaskingaclasstodescribejeansandwhattheymean.He

writes:“Jeanswereseenasinformal,classless,unisex,andappropriatetocityorcountry;

wearingthemwasasignoffreedomfromtheconstraintsonbehaviorandidentitythat

socialcategoriesimpose.Freewasthesinglemostcommonadjectiveused,frequentlywith

themeaningof‘freetobemyself.’”14Howoneusesjeansisanexpressionoffreedom.For

example,tearingholesinone’sjeansisnotsomethingthemanufacturerintended,butan

11Fiske’semphasisonmeaningiscentraltohisdistinctionbetweenpopularandcriticaldiscrimination.Criticaldiscriminationisthepurviewoftheelite,theprofessionalculturalcritic.Populardiscriminationisthepurviewofthepeople.Populardiscriminationhastodowith“relevance”—the“interconnectionsbetweenatextandtheimmediatesocialsituation”oftheconsumer(reader,viewer,etc.)(“PopularDiscrimination,”inPopularCulture:AReader,editedbyRaifordGuins&OmayraZaragozaCruz(LosAngeles:SagePublications,2005),216).Theconsequenceoftheseinterconnectionsisthatdifferentpeoplewillcreatedifferentmeaningsfromculturalproductions.Thus,culturalproductionshaveapolysemiccharacteratthepopularlevel,fortheyareopentogeneratingmanydifferentkindsofmeaning.12Fiske,Reading,5.13Fiske,Reading,5.14JohnFiske,UnderstandingPopularCulture(NewYork:Routledge,1989),2.

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actoffreedombytheconsumer(supposedlyanexpressionofpersonalstyle,eventhough

everyoneisdoingit).Whilepopularculturealwaysbears“tracesoftheforcesofdomination

andsubordination,”italso“showssignsofresistingorevadingthoseforces.”15ForFiske,

wearingtornorraggedjeansisanactofresistance.Heconcludes:

Butmoresignificantthananyotherpossiblemeaningofraggedjeansisthe

factthattheraggednessistheproductionandchoiceoftheuser,itisan

excorporationofthecommodityintoasubordinatesubcultureandatransfer

ofatleastsomeofthepowerinherentinthecommodificationprocess.Itisa

refusalofcommodificationandanassertionofone’srighttomakeone’sown

cultureoutoftheresourcesprovidedbythecommoditysystem.16

AsSethMeyerandAmyPoellerfamouslyhavesaidonSNL’sWeekendUpdate:

Really?Dowereallywanttocelebratetearingholesinourjeansasavictoryoffreedom

overcorporatecontrol?Dowereallythinkthatthe“commoditysystem”caresifwetear

holesinourjeansornot,aslongaswecontinuetobuyitsjeans?Indeed,assoonastorn

jeansbecamepopularthejeanproducersstartedsellingpre‐tornjeans.Whilewemight

lookatthissequenceofeventsasagreatexampleofconsumersleadingproducers,wejust

aswellcouldlookatitasproducersquicklyfiguringouthowtofurtherexploitconsumers.

EvenFiskemustqualifyhisowncelebratoryremarks.Hestates:

Suchpoliticalgainsinthespecificitiesofeverydaylifeareprogressiverather

thanradical.Theyenlargethespaceofactionforthesubordinate;theyeffect

15Fiske,Understanding,5.16Fiske,Understanding,15.

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shifts,howeverminute,insocialpowerrelations.Theyarethetacticsofthe

subordinateinmakingdowithinandagainstthesystem,ratherthanof

opposingitdirectly;theyareconcernedwithimprovingthelotofthe

subordinateratherthanwithchangingthesystemthatsubordinatesthem.17

Thisisnosmallqualification.Theclaimofcriticaltheoryisthatpopularculturefunctions

topreventanyseriousor“radical”critiqueofthedominantsystem—asystempermeated

withcontradictionsandinjustices.Ifthe“freedom”oftheconsumerneverentailsthe

seriousor“radical”critiqueofthesystem,thenthat“freedom”becomesjustanother

elementinthesmoothfunctioningofthesystemitself.

ItseemsoddthenthatFiskewouldwrite:“Despitenearlytwocenturiesof

capitalism,subordinatedsubculturesexistandintransigentlyrefusefinallytobe

incorporated—peopleinthesesubcultureskeepdevisingnewwaysoftearingtheir

jeans.”18And,Iwouldadd,theproducerskeepdevisingnew(profitable)waysofgetting

thesesubculturestopurchasenewjeans.Fiskemakesthepointthatchangeisonlygoingto

occurfromthebottomup(perhaps,“bellbottomup”weshouldsay).19Hecertainlyis

correct.ButchangeisnotgoingtooccurjustbecauseItearholesinmyjeans.Indeed,ifI

seeholesinmyjeansasalegitimatesourceofrebellion,Iprobablywillfailtoengageinthe

kindofgenuinepoliticalactionnecessarytoaddresssystemicinequitiesandinjustices.In

otherwords,ifbytearingholesinmyjeansIbelieveIampartofsomekindofmovement

forsocialchange,willthisnotsimplyrelievemeofanyfurtherresponsibilitytohelpin

17Fiske,Reading,11.18Fiske,Understanding,19.19Fiske,Understanding,19.

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achievingrealsocialchange?Or,toputitoneotherway,ifIthinkthattearingaholeinmy

jeanspreventsmy“incorporation”intothedominantsystemdoesthisnotsimplyobfuscate

thefactthatIalwaysalreadyamincorporated?

Fiskecorrectlynotesthatthestudyofpopularculturehastendedtogointwomain

directions—eithercelebratingpopularculture“withoutsituatingitinamodelofpower”or

situatingitwithinamodelofpowerbutinsuchawaythattheconsumersimplyis

dominated(hasnoroleorfreedominpopularculture).20Heproposesathirdway.Histhird

way“seespopularcultureasasiteofstruggle,but,whileacceptingthepoweroftheforces

ofdominance,itfocusesratheruponthepopulartacticsbywhichtheseforcesarecoped

with,areevadeorareresisted.”21Despitehisrejectionofasimplecelebrationofpopular

culture,onestillisleftwonderingifFiskegoestoofarinhisowncelebrationofthe

“evading”or“resisting”tacticsofotherwisemanipulatedandexploitedconsumers.And,if

weweretoadoptFiske’sview,woulditnotdivertourattentionfromtheoverwhelmingly

slavishmentalityreflectedinthebehaviorofmostconsumersofpopularculture?Oneneed

onlyreadtheexcellentworkofJulietSchortofullygraspthatmentalityandhowitis

cultivated.InTheOverspentAmerican:WhyWeWantWhatWeDon’tNeed,shedetailsthe

waysinwhichAmericansfeelcompelledtopurchaseawidevarietyofconsumer

products—eventothepointofputtingthemselvesintosignificantdebt.22AndinBornto

Buy,sheshowshowfromtheearliestagewearehabituatedintotheconsumerculture—

20Fiske,Understanding,20.21Fiske,Understanding,20.22JulietSchor,TheOverspentAmerican:WhyWeWantWhatWeDon’tNeed(NewYork:HarperPerennial,1998).

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indeed,howweare,aboveallelse,consumersfrombirthtodeath.23Inlightofherresearch,

itishardtocelebratethekindofresistancethatFiskeidentifies.

Withthedevelopmentofnewtechnologies—rangingfromcellphonestothe

internettomassivemulti‐playergames,championsofpopularculturehavesparkeda

renewalofconsiderationofthevalueormeritofpopularculture.LikeFiske,HenryJenkins

emphasizestheparticipatorynatureofpopularculture,especiallyasitisreflectedinwhat

hecalls“convergenceculture.”Healsoemphasizesthewaysinwhichconvergenceculture

isgivingrisetonewcommunitiesand,possibly,politicalaction.

Jenkinsdescribesconvergencecultureastheplace“whereoldandnewmedia

collide,wheregrassrootsandcorporatemediaintersect,wherethepowerofthemedia

producerandthepowerofthemediaconsumerinteractinunpredictableways.”24Perhaps

themostimportantcharacteristicofthisnewconvergencecultureisthatitsnew

consumersareactiveparticipantsinit.Thus,convergencecultureisparticipatoryculture.25

“Ifoldconsumerswereassumedtobepassive,thenewconsumersareactive,”Jenkins

writes.“Ifoldconsumerswerepredictableandstayedwhereyoutoldthemtostay,then

newconsumersaremigratory,showingadecliningloyaltytonetworksormedia.Ifold

consumerswereisolatedindividuals,thenewconsumersaremoresociallyconnected.If

23JulietSchor,BorntoBuy(NewYork:Scribner,2004).24HenryJenkins,ConvergenceCulture:WhereOldandNewMediaCollide(NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress,2006),2.25Jenkins,Convergence,3.

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theworkofmediaconsumerswasoncesilentandinvisible,thenewconsumersarenow

noisyandpublic.”26

Jenkinsprovidesnumerousexamplesofconvergenceculture.Ashowassimpleas

AmericanIdolincludesconsumerparticipationintheformofaweeklyvote.Theshow

Survivorhasspawnednumerouswebsiteswherefanscandiscusstheshowand,insome

cases,shareinformationthatmightberelevanttofiguringoutwhothewinnerisgoingto

be.TheMatrixtrilogyoffilmsisanevenbetterexample.Themoviesweresupplemented

withaDVDofcollectedanimethatprovidebackgroundandadditionalinformationforthe

movies.Onlinegamesallowedfanstoentertheworldofthemoviesandevenextendthe

storybeyondthethirdfilm.

ForJenkins,theparticipatorynatureofnewconsumerscangiverisetonew

communities.Thesenewcommunitieshaveanumberofuniquecharacteristics.First,they

frequentlycanbedefinedas“knowledgecommunities”—communitiesinwhich

informationisfreelyandwidelyshared.Survivorfancommunitiesareagreatexample.

Second,thesecommunitiesavoidthe“expertparadigm”—everyonehasthecapacityto

contributetothegenerationofknowledgeandthusthecommunitiesareverydemocratic.27

Third,thesecommunitiesarefragile.AsJenkinsnotes,thesecommunities“aredefined

throughvoluntary,temporary,andtacticalaffiliations,reaffirmedthroughcommon

intellectualenterprisesandemotionalinvestments.Membersmayshiftfromonegroupto

26Jenkins,Convergence,18‐19.27Jenkins,Convergence,29.

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anotherastheirneedschange,andtheymaybelongtomorethanonecommunityatthe

sametime.”28

Jenkinsarguesthatfanparticipationwithpopularculturethroughthesenew

communitiesisanexpressionoffreedom.Butarethefansreallyfreeoraretheyjustmore

captiveconsumers—nolongerboundtoatelevisionsetbutnowtotheircomputerorcell

phoneaswell?Doesthedemocratizationofknowledgethroughpopularcultureresultin

increasedormoreeffectivecivicparticipation?Whatarethelargerpoliticalimplicationsof

convergenceculture?

SuchpoliticalquestionsarecentraltoJenkins’assessmentofnewtechnology

(particularlyweb‐basedtechnology).Hearguesthatproponentsof“digitaldemocracy”

“aretalkingabout...changingthewayspeoplethinkaboutcommunityandpowersothat

theyareabletomobilizecollectiveintelligencetotransformgovernance;andwhattheyare

talkingaboutisashiftfromtheindividualizedconceptionoftheinformedcitizentoward

thecollaborativeconceptofamonitorialcitizen.”29Theidealofthe“informedcitizen”

suggeststhetypeofpersonwhogathersavastarrayofinformationsothatheorshecanbe

fullyinformedaboutpublicissues.Butwhocandothattoday?Theissuesaremore

numerousandcomplexthaneverbefore,andthereissimplytoomuchinformationforany

singleindividualtomaster.The“monitorialcitizen”issomeonepluggedintoanetworkin

whichavastnumberofpeoplearetrackingawiderangeofissues,sharingwithone

anotherthemostimportantinformation.Thisis“collectiveintelligence”atworkinthe

28Jenkins,Convergence,27.29Jenkins,Convergence,219.

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politicalsphere.Forexample,maybeIknowalotaboutthePalestinian‐Israeliconflictand

theAmericanroleinit,butverylittleaboutmountaintopremovalinEasternKentuckycoal

country.Viatheinternet,Icansharemyknowledgeabouttheformerandfindpeoplewho

canprovidemethemostimmediateorcriticalinformationaboutthelatter.

Monitorialcitizenshaveavarietyofwaysinwhichtheycanshareinformation.For

example,Jenkinswritesaboutwhathecalls“photoshoppolitics”—thekindofpolitical

expressionthatentailsusingPhotoshoporsimilarsoftwaretocreateimageswithpolitical

content.WhileJenkinsseemstorecognizethelimitsofsuchpoliticalexpression,he

suggeststhat“crystallizingone’spoliticalperspectivesintoaphotomontagethatis

intendedforbroadercirculationisnolessanactofcitizenshipthanwritingalettertothe

editorofalocalnewspaperthatmayormaynotactuallyprintit.”Headdsthatfor“a

growingnumberofyoungAmericans,images...mayrepresentasimportantasetof

rhetoricalresourcesastexts.Passingsuchimagestoafriendisnomoreandnolessa

politicalactthanhandingthemacampaignbrochureorabumpersticker.”Heinsiststhat

suchimages“maybecomethefocusforconversationandpersuasion.”30

PoliticalparodythatmightappearonYouTubeorsimilarsiteslikewiseisan

importantnewformofpoliticalexpressioninpopularculture.YouTubeisanexemplary

modelforJenkinsbecause1)it“representsthemeetinggroundbetweenarangeof

differentgrassrootscommunities”;2)it“functionsasamediaarchivewhereamateur

curatorsscanthemediaenvironment,searchingformeaningfulbitsofcontent,and

bringingthemtoalargerpublic”;and3)it“functionsinrelationtoarangeofothersocial

30Jenkins,Convergence,233.

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networks;itscontentgetsspread”viablogs,FaceBook,andmore,where“itgetsreframed

fordifferentpublicsandbecomesthefocalpointfordiscussion.”31Throughtheiruseof

YouTubeandsocialnetworkingsites,Jenkinsseesarenewedpoliticalandsocial

engagementamongyoungpeople.32Heconcludes:

YoungpeoplehavecometoseeYouTubeassupportingindividualand

collectiveexpression;theyoftenfeelexcludedbythepolicy‐wonklanguage

oftraditionalpoliticsandtheinside‐the‐beltwayfocusofmuchcampaign

newscoverage.Parodyoffersanalternativelanguagethroughwhichpolicy

debatesandcampaignpitchesmightbeframed,onethat...modelsitselfon

popularculturebutrespondstodifferentethicalandpoliticalimperatives...

SuchamodelseesInternetparodiesasspringboardsforlarger

conversations—whetherthroughblogsanddiscussionforumsonlineorface‐

to‐facebetweenpeoplegatheredaroundawatercooler.”33

DespiteJenkins’arguments,wehavegoodreasonstobeskepticalaboutthemerits

of“photoshoppolitics”andonlinepoliticalparody.Toequatephotoshopimagesto

campaignbrochuresorevenworsebumperstickers(bothprettypoorformsofpolitical

discourse)ishardlyanendorsementfortheuseofsuchimages.Jenkinsarguesthatsuch

images,aswellaspoliticalparody,cangiverisetobroaderormoresubstantive

discussions.Isthereanyevidencetosupportsuchaclaim?Isnotpoliticalexpressionofthis

sortsimplysharedamongpeoplewhoalreadythinkalike?Whatistheretotalkaboutifwe

31Jenkins,Convergence,274‐5.32Jenkins,Convergence,288‐9.33Jenkins,Convergence,289.

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alreadyagree?Evenworse,theimagesandvideosthatheseemstocelebrate(evenifonly

tentatively)areoftenill‐informedgibberish.Cantheyreallyleadtocarefullyconsidered

conversation?Isadeliberativedemocracyaidedorbenefitedbysuchpoliticalexpression?

Jenkinsconcludesthatfor“betterorworse,this[“photoshoppolitics,”political

parodyonYouTube,etc.]iswhatdemocracylookslikeintheeraofconvergenceculture.”34

Mycontention,contrarytoJenkins,isthatitmightbeforworse!Recentresearch,perhaps

summarizednowherebetterthaninRobertD.Putnam’sseminalworkBowlingAlone:The

CollapseandRevivalofAmericanCommunity,showsasteadydeclineincivicandpolitical

engagementbythevastmajorityoftheAmericanpublic—includingtheyouthuponwhom

Jenkinspinssomuchhope.Writtenin2000,Putnamconcludesthat“Americansareplaying

virtuallyeveryaspectofthecivicgamelessfrequentlytodaythanwedidtwodecades

ago.”35Thedataindicatethatduringthefirsttwothirdsofthe20thcentury,Americans

wereincreasinglyinvolvedinciviclife,andthatinthelastthirdtheyslowlybecameless

andlessinvolved.36Putnamconsidersanumberoffactorsthathelptoexplainthis

phenomenon,butperhapsthemostimportantaretheadventoftelevisioncultureand

rampantconsumerism—cornerstonesoftoday’spopularculture.

Putnamalsoislesshopefulinregardtothepotentialofnewtechnologytostemthe

tideofcivicnon‐engagement.Earlyresearchindicatesthatinternettechnologyusersareno

34Jenkins,Convergence,293.35RobertD.Putnam,BowlingAlone:TheCollapseandRevivalofAmericanCommunity(NewYork:Simon&Schuster,2000),41.36Putnam,Bowling,183.

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morecivicallyengagedthannon‐users.37Inaddition,onlinecommunitiescanbecompared

toorganizationslikeGreenpeaceortheNationalRifleAssociation.Suchgroupsmayhave

manymembers,butmostmembersdolittlemorethansendinacheckformembership

dueseachyear.Whiletheleadershipofsuchgroupsmayexertinfluenceingovernment,the

groupsthemselvesarehardlygoodexamplesofparticipatorydemocracy.Inaddition,

internetoronlinecommunities,asJenkinsalsonotes,havelooseaffiliationtiesamong

members.Putnamargues:“TheInternetisapowerfultoolforthetransmissionof

informationamongphysicallydistantpeople.Thetougherquestioniswhetherthatflowof

informationitselffosterssocialcapitalandgenuinecommunity.”38Thus,heconcludesthat

some“oftheallegedlygreaterdemocracyincyberspaceisbasedmoreonhopeandhype

thanoncarefulresearch.”39

Putnamidentifiesanumberofchallengesfordigitaldemocracy,including

inequalitiesofaccessandthelimitationsofcommunicationthatisnotface‐to‐face.Perhaps

themostsignificantchallenge,however,iswhathecalls“cyberbalkanization.”Whilereal‐

lifecommunitiestodayoftenincludesignificantdiversity,onlinecommunitiesarevery

muchhomogeneous.“Localheterogeneitymaygivewaytomorefocusedvirtual

homogeneityascommunitiescoalesceacrossspace,”Putnamwrites.“Internettechnology

allowsandencouragesinfraredastronomers,oenophiles,Trekkies,andwhitesupremacists

tonarrowtheircircletolike‐mindedintimates...[thus]decreasingsocialcohesion.”40

37Putnam,Bowling,170.38Putnam,Bowling,172.39Putnam,Bowling,173.40Putnam,Bowling,178.

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Intheend,Putnamasks:“WilltheInternetinpracticeturnouttobeaniftier

telephoneoraniftiertelevision?Inotherwords,willtheInternetbecomepredominantlya

meansofactive,socialcommunicationorameansofpassive,privateentertainment?Will

computer‐mediatedcommunication‘crowdout’face‐to‐faceties?”41Itmayturnouttobe

somethinginbetweenthetelephoneandtelevision,butitprobablydoesnotyetdeserve

thehypethatJenkinsandothersseemtogiveit.42Mostimportantly,itisunclearwhether

ornoteffectivesocialcapitalcanbegeneratedandrealpoliticalactionachievedifwe

increasinglyneverhaveface‐to‐faceinteractionwithneighborsandfellowcitizens.Putnam

concludes:

Apoliticswithoutface‐to‐facesocializingandorganizingmighttake

theformofaPerot‐styleelectronictownhall,akindofplebiscitary

democracy.Manyopinionswouldbehear,butonlyasamuddleof

disembodiedvoices,neitherengagingwithoneanothernorofferingmuch

guidancetodecisionmakers.TV‐basedpoliticsistopoliticalactionas

watchingER[apopularAmericantelevisionshowaboutahospital

emergencyroom]istosavingsomeoneindistress.Justasonecannotrestart

aheartwithone’sremotecontrol,onecannotjump‐startrepublican

citizenshipwithoutdirect,face‐to‐faceparticipation.Citizenshipisnota

spectatorsport.

41Putnam,Bowling,179.42Researchonthecivicparticipationofmillenials(today’syoungadults)is,frommyperspective,ambiguousatbest.

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Politicswithoutsocialcapitalispoliticsatadistance.Conversations

amongcallerstoastudioinDallasorNewYorkarenotresponsible,since

these“participants”neednevermeaningfullyengagewithopposingviews

andhencelearnfromthatengagement....Withoutface‐to‐faceinteraction,

withoutimmediatefeedback,withoutbeingforcedtoexamineouropinions

underthelightofothercitizens’scrutiny,wefinditeasiertohawkquick

fixesandtodemonizeanyonewhodisagrees.Anonymityisfundamentally

anathematodeliberation.43

Withoutsocialcapitalfromface‐to‐faceorganizinganddeliberation,ourdemocracymay

verywellhanginthebalance.44

Partoftheproblemwiththeargumentsoftoday’schampionsofpopularcultureand

digitaldemocracyisthattheyconfusethedemocratizationofpopularculturewithgenuine

politicalfreedom.AsJenkinsnotesinregardtotelevision,democratizationinthatmedium

“isbeingdrivenbyeconomiccalculationandnotbysomebroadmissiontoempowerthe

public.”45Despitethisnote,however,heclaimsthatthebiggestchangeinAmericanmedia

“maybetheshiftfromindividualizedandpersonalizedmediaconsumptiontoward

consumptionasanetworkedpractice.”46Suchpracticeistheworkofwhathecalls

“consumptioncommunities.”Butthisbegsthequestion:Aretheserealcommunities(at

leastinPutnam’ssense,asdeliberativebodiesthatcreatesocialcapitalandachieve

43Putnam,Bowling,341‐2.44Putnam,Bowling,349.45Jenkins,Convergence,254.46Jenkins,Convergence,255.

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politicalaims)?Jenkinshimselfnotesthefragilityofsuchcommunities—sodependenton

thewhimsofconsumerdesires.Yet,heinsiststhatthe“politicaleffectsofthesefan

communitiescomenotsimplythroughtheproductionandcirculationofnewideas(the

criticalreadingoffavoritetexts)butalsothroughaccesstonewsocialstructures(collective

intelligence)andnewmodelsofculturalproduction(participatoryculture).”47Butjustas

wemayquestionthedegreetowhichwehaverealcommunitieshere,soitishardtosee

whythese“effects”areverypoliticaloreffectiveforthatmatter.

ToJenkins’credit,heisabitmorecautiousprobablythanFiske.Hequestions

himself(“HaveIgonetoofar?”48)andseemstorecognizethelimitsofhisarguments.In

regardtoonlinegameslikeTheSimsOnline,hewritesthat“peoplemakepassionatebut

oftenshort‐terminvestmentsintheseonlinecommunities:theycanalwaysmove

elsewhereifthegroupreachesconclusionsthatruncountertotheirownbeliefsordesires.

Assuch,thesegamesrepresentinterestingandsometimestreacherousspaceto‘play’with

citizenshipanddemocracy.”49Suchcommunitiesaredifferentthanrealones.Wecannot

justclickabuttonorhittheoffswitchtoleaverealcommunities.Indeed,Jenkinswarnsus

inthelastsentenceofthe“Afterword”:“Weneedtobeattentivetotheethicaldimensions

bywhichwearegeneratingknowledge,producingculture,andengaginginpolitics

together.”50Still,muchofConvergenceCulturewalksadangerouslinebetween

47Jenkins,Convergence,257.48Jenkins,Convergence,257.49Jenkins,Convergence,242.50Jenkins,Convergence,294.

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romanticizingpopularcultureandprovidingasober,criticalassessmentofit.And

frequentlyJenkinsfallsontheformersideoftheline.

Conclusion

IfindmuchthatIagreewithinFiskeandJenkins.However,readingoraccepting

onlytheirworkresultsinanoverly‐optimisticifnotglamorousviewofpopularcultureand

recentdevelopmentsinit.Whilebothauthorsmakeaneffortatprovidingabalanced

approach,by‐and‐largeIthinktheyfailtodoso.Amorebalancedapproachwouldtake

moreseriouslythekindofcriticismsmadebyAdornoandHorkheimer(outdatedthough

theymaybe).

TowardstheendofConvergenceCulture,Jenkinsdrawsthedistinctionbetweenthe

politicsofcriticalutopianismandthepoliticsofvictimization.Theformerisbasedonthe

“notionofempowerment,”whilethelatterisbasedona“politicsofvictimization.”The

formerfocuseson“whatwearedoingwithmedia,”whilethelatterfocuseson“whatmedia

isdoingtous.”51Jenkinsclearlyputshimselfintheformercamp(and,IthinkFiskecango

theretoo),whileAdornoandHorkheimerfallinthelattercamp.Thetruthinthismatter

(aswithmosttruths)canbefoundsomewhereinbetween.Whilecertainelementsin

popularculturecertainlyholdoutgreatpromiseforrevitalizingourcultureandperhaps

evenourdemocracy,muchofpopularcultureremainsameansbywhichconsumersare

manipulatedandincreasinglycutofffromoneanother.Frommyperspective,boththe

51Jenkins,Convergence,259.

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politicsofcriticalutopianismandthepoliticsofvictimizationremainextremepositions,

onesthatarebestavoidedifwearetoprovideamoresoberappraisalofpopularculture.

Whenfacedwiththeindividualismandisolationofindustrialismandurbanization,

PutnamnotesthatProgressiveeracivicleaderscreatedclubs.Thismightsoundliketoo

easyofananswer,butinmanywaysitwasbrilliant.Itbroughtpeopletogetherforface‐to‐

faceconversations,someofwhichtouchedonpressinglocalorregionalissues.Outofthese

conversations,socialcapitalwasgeneratedanditbecamepossibleforcitizenstoeffectively

addressmanycommunityconcerns.Thisworked,tosomedegree,fordecades.Butas

Putnamsopowerfullyshows,Americansslowlyabandonedclubsandcommunity

organizations(or,moreaccurately,succeedinggenerationssimplydidnotjoin).Sowhere

willwedevelopthesocialcapitalinthefuture—thesocialcapitalneededtoliveandwork

effectivelytogether?Iamnotsure.ButIdonotthinkpopularcultureisgoingtobethe

answer,foritremainsmoreofahindrancethanahelp.