45

The Politics of the 'Peaceful Atom' by Ernest Yanarella

The public release on October 30, 1979 of the f ina l report of the President's Commission on the Accident a t Three Mile Island headed by John Kemeny of fers us a point of reference from which to examine c iv i l ian nuclear p0wer.l by examining the history and pol i t ics of the "peaceful atom" from the Manhattan Project to Three Mile Island can we properly understand the problems which t h i s Presidential Commission highlighted and for which it sought remedies.

Conversely, only

What are some of the major findings of the Kemeny Commission? Among the most important findings and conclusions reached by the twelve-member commission were these:

-- despite Congressional action i n 1974 to separate the regulation from the promotion of nuclear power, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission "is so preoc- cupied with the licensing of plants tha t i t has not given primary consider- ation to overall safety issues" (p. 51);

-- insuff ic ient a t tent ion was paid by General Public U t i l i t i e s Corporation (GPU) and i t s subsidiary Metropolitan Edison (MetEd) to the fac t that "nuclear power requires management qualifications and at t i tudes o f a very special character as well as an extensive support system of sc ien t i s t s and engineers,I1 (p. 22) and therefore GPU and MetEd "did not have suff ic ient knowledge, expertise, and personnel t o operate the plant o r maintain it adequately" (p. 44);

-- a "mind se t" existed among personnel i n the regulatory agency and the elec- t r i c u t i l i t y that atomic reactor technology i s suff ic ient ly safe and as a consequence of th i s heavy equipment orientation tha t " t ra ining of MetEd oper- ators and supervisors was inadequate and contributed s ignif icant ly t o the seriousness of the accident" (p. 49);

-- "at a l l levels of government, planning for of f - s i te consequences of radio- logical emergencies a t nuclear power plants has been characterized by a lack of coordination and urgency" (p. 39) and "emergency planning had a low pr ior i ty i n the NRC and the AEC before it" owing a t l eas t i n par t t o " the i r confidence i n designed reactor safeguards and t h e i r desire t o avoid rais ing public concern about the safety of nuclear power" (p. 38).

The thesis of th i s a r t i c l e i s that the Manhattan Project -- as shaping event and as organizational paradigm -- foreshadowed the subsequent organization of programs for c ivi l ian nuclear power and the ways tha t the form of organization dis tor ted pub- l i c pr ior i t ies and values concerning energy technologies and our energy future. ever the merits o r l i a b i l i t i e s of nuclear energy, the pol i t i cs of i t s development from World War I1 to the Three Mile Island accident confused fundamental issues, ob- scured the r e a l intentions of i t s bureaucratic managers, and contributed to a lack of public management of the nuclear t rus t . The atomic-industrial complex i n and a f t e r World War I1 quickly became inadequate to the task of developing a safe, re l iable , and commercially successful nuclear power system. Furthermore, th i s e l i t i s t , in terest- ridden s t ructure has yet to respond appropriately to growing awareness of the public interest . Manhattan Project and i t s successor, the Atomic Energy Commission, to i t s symbiotic

What-

This thesis i s developed with special a t tent ion to the organization of the

Copyrlght 1981 PEACE AND CHANGE

46

relationship with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, to the relative pressures generated by the conflicting interests and perspectives of the nuclear industry, en- vironmental and scientific groups, and to underlying changes in public perceptions of nuclear power and its risks.

The Manhattan Project and the Origins of the Atomic-Industrial Complex

The origins of civilian nuclear power and the mythical beliefs with which it was invested lay in the successful American program to outrace Nazi Germany in the fabri- cation of a military weapon of unparalleled destructive power based on the atom. Prompted by Albert Einstein's 1939 letter which informed Roosevelt of the awesome energy potential housed in the atom and of certain German advances in atomic physics, the United States Government eventually expended some $2 billion and engaged tens of thou- sands of scientists, engineers, and other p rsonnel in a foup-year program to develop an atomic bomb known as the Manhattan Project. 3

For our purposes, the significance of the Manhattan Project for the later develop- In the first place, this project laid the ment of civilian nuclear power was two-fold.

foundations of the interconnected network of government bureaucracies, university re- search facilities and scientific laboratories, and industrial enterprises which eventually crystallized into the atomic-Industrial complex, the power constellation which emerged after the Second W rld War to become the chief promoter of atomic energy development in the United States.? As defined by the Atomic Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954, this network includes the following components: scientific laboratories, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and the nuclear power industry.

the Atomic Energy Commission, its supporting national

In the second place, the Manhattan experience of successfully putting together a public/private development program provided the paradigm for later attempts in the United States to promote rapid technological development (e.g., the Apollo program) and offered an illusory guide for achieving technological solutions to social o r political problems, such as energy, housing, health. Simply put, that model dictated mass1 e infusions of money, a phalanx of technologists, and a focused technological goal. t

One example of the metaphorical use of the Manhattan Project can be seen in President Richard Nixon's effort to mobilize the nation to embrace a commitment to the Project Independence energy program. 1973, he called upon the American people to unite behind his predominantly high-tech- nology and "technological fix" program by setting "as our national goal, in the spirit of Apollo, with the determination of the Manhattan Project, that by the end of this decade we will have developed the potential to meet our energy needs without depending upon any foreign energy sources.115

In his energy speech outlining the program on November 7,

Government Supervision Over the Atomic-Industrial Complex

The Atomic Energy Commission (A.E.C.), the government administrator of the atomic- industrial complex, was a child of World War 11. Since the decade of the forties, the atomic energy establishment has never transcended the principal characteristics and key contradictions of its origins in the wartime program to develop an operating nuclear weapon and of its subsequent adaptation to peaceful energy.

One of the most important aspects of the atomic-industrial complex was the working relationship between the civilian and military energy programs. of these programs, both civilian and military research and development i n the nuclear field have been actively pursued under the institutional umbrella of the A.E.C. over, in its early years the A.E.C. focused almost exclusively upon military applica- tions of atomic energy and then later on, when it did turn its attention to civilian

Since the beginning

More-

47

applications, it did so without basic concern ei ther f o r the commercial feas ib i l i ty of c ivi l ian nuclear techno ogy or for the larger public health and safety problems of c ivi l ian nuclear power. b

A second significant aspect of the r i s ing atomic-industrial complex was the emer- gence of a network of national laboratories as the key scientific-technological com- ponent of the A.E.C. needs for large, generously-funded, and well-staffed research f a c i l i t i e s to divide the labors of exploring questions of theory and application.7 The emergence of th i s network of national laboratories ( L a Alamos, Lawrence-Berkeley, Lawrence-Livermore, Brookhaven, Pacific Northwest, Argonne, Oak Ridge, and Sandia) had important consequences for the kind of energy future sought by the A.E.C. and the atomic-industrial complex, and the relationship between the Atomic Energy Commission and the national labs helps explain why that energy future was advanced. extremely large sc ien t i f ic organizations commanding the ta len t of tens of thousands of sc ien t i s t s and engineers and hundreds of millions of dol lars of the federal R & D budget each year. administrators worked to immunize the labs from changing trends, sh i f t ing pr ior i t ies , and budget cuts i n governmental policy, jus t as the laboratories' top management of f i - c ia l s have labored to integrate new government p r i o r i t i e s (suchas biological research on the effects of low-level radiation, energy conservation, environmental research, and even non-nuclear research and development) into the i r mission-oriented research. changing fashions and the ascendency of new interests and pr ior i t ies within governmental science and technology policy and programs, the labs have s t r iven to press these new concerns and new emphases into the old mold of t h e i r early days i n the Manhattan Project which stressed a high technology, capital-intensive orientation to doing research.

This network grew out of the Manhattan Project 's organizational

In the f i r s t place, these research f a c i l i t i e s a re

In order to assure the s t a b i l i t y of t h i s national resource, the c iv i l ian

Despite

In the second place, within the loose, decentralized organizational structure of the A.E.C. and i t s weak management philosophy, these sc ien t i f ic labs succeeded i n carving out broad areas of authority i n management and program development i n re la t ion to the civi l ian agency. Their major program, the development of complex, esoter ic , an very expensive nuclear technology, became the highest p r ior i ty i n the A.E.C. agenda.g In practical terms, t h i s has meant that the nuclear power/fast breeder/fusion programs have maintained a position of dominance vis-a-vis other energy programs, such as coal research, solar , wind, geothermal, and conservation, thus effectively hobbling research i n sof t energy technologies. To the extent that these l a t t e r forms of renewable energy have been explored a t a l l , they have been forced to f i t in to the high technology/nuclear model of technological development, thus compromising t h e i r in t r ins ic p o l i t i c a l and ethical vir tues . 9

The future course of c iv i l ian nuclear power was also mightily influenced by the dual administrative responsibi l i t ies of promotion and regulation assigned to t Energy Commission which the Congress wrote into the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.p8 I t proved impossible to carry out fa i thful ly both assignments within a s ingle agency. practice, the regulatory ro le suffered most often as the A.E .C . , constantly goaded by an aggressive Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, became ever more zealous i n i t s advance- ment of nuclear power, apologetic i n i ts treatment of atomic reactor and industry short- comings, and authoritarian i n i t s treatment of internal questioning and external dissent against the nuclear faith.11

Atomic

In

In fac t , the A.E .C . was chiefly concerned with the promotion of nuclear power. Given the success of the national labs i n developing high-technology projects with l i t t l e regard for t h e i r future commercial use, the A.E.C. might never have gotten its c iv i l ian atomic reactor program out of the research and development stage i f it had not been f o r the Eisenhower Administration's desire to see the dream of the "peaceful atom" become a real i ty . Working f i r s t i n the domestic arena and then i n the international realm, the federal government moved to trigger commercial development of atomic reactor technology through the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.12 This legis la t ion revised the 1946 Act i n order

48

to permit private ownership of nuclear reactors under Atomic Energy Commission license. At the same time, the Administration's "Atoms for Peace" program had the effect of disseminating atomic energy information for peaceful purposes in a manner th unfortunately contributed to exacerbating the nuclear proliferation problem. af has

The federal push for commercialization of nuclear power technology finally cul- minated in the adoption of the light-water type reactor -- a design that emerged from the Navy nuclear propulsion program and its desire to arrive at a safe, reliable, and compact reactor for its submarine program. Thus, despite the subsidy by the A.E.C. of a host of demonstration projects involving multiple reactor design ideas as part of its Power Reactor Demonstration Program from 1953-1960, the federal agency ultimate y settled upon a design for commercial production that stemmed from a military program. This decision had two consequences which contributed significantly to the woes of the nuclear industry and the inception of nuclear power opposition.

It

First, the Atomic Energy Commission shifted attention away from resolving remaining problems of the light water system and toward exploring advanced reactor designs like the far more complex and potentially dangerous sodium-cooled fast breeder reactor. additional spurs to this turn toward more exotic programs were: the high-technology orientation built into the A.E.C. by the influence of the national laboratories upon the organization's researcheenda, and the technocratic outlook and PO tical clout of offi-

Two

cials like Milton Shaw (A.E.C. Is Director of Reactor Development). i$ Adoption of the light water design had a second major consequence. Once the com-

mercialization of light water technology was authorized by the A.E.C., the nuclear reactor industry responded quickly to increase the size of commercial reactors from the small submarine model to something on the order of 50 MW in the mid-fifties, to 600-800 MW in the late sixties, and to the 1130 MW Marble Hill plant now being built at Madison, Indiana.

By the early seventies, these results produced an atomic establishment uninterested in the remaining technical problems and commercial shortcomings of the light water de- sign and a nuclear power industry unprepared for public criticisms once these flaws be- came recognized.

Still, the Atomic Energy Commission was supposed to regulate the industry. Its record of pro forma licensing and operating review practices and weak safety inspection proved so irresponsible that by the early seventies the scientific community and the environmental movement were mounting challenges as t and environmental impact of civilian nuclear power.lg For a while, the A.E.C. with help from the J.C.A.E., its Congressional partner, could stave off these assaults. It mani- pulated its own regulatory rules and procedures (after all, it was both judge and accused). It introduced largely cosmetic changes that entailed minor back-fitting of safety devices on reactors under construction, though not as a rule on reactors already in operation. Eventually, the seriousness of the charges and the authoritarian manner of the A.E.C./ J.C.A.E. responses eroded their credibility. By 1974, the Congress could no longer evade the political issue, and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1975 split up the promotion and regulatory fmctions of the A.E.C. and allocated them to two separate agencies -- the Energy Research and fTvelopment Administration (E.R.D.A. ) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (N.R.C.).

the safety, public health risks,

This governmental reorganization did not alter significantly the high technology/ nuclear bias of the old A.E.C. nor did it succeed in practice in creating a genuine watch- dog agency to regulate the nuclear power industry and to protect the public's health and safety. in the new organizational structure of energy research and development. When E.R.D.A. was founded, for example, roughly 84% of its staff were personnel transferred from the

One reason for this lay in the continued dominance of old A.E.C. staff members

49

Atomic Energy Commission.18 earlier abuses and strengthen regulation, the N.R.C. continues to operate with priorities heavily skewed toward a nuclear future. uncertain of the relationship between its legislative mandate and its political authority, and thus ever sensitive to cues and signals from the Executive Branch. "caught between Administrative initiatives to get more nuclear power plants into opera- tion by speeding up the licensing process and public initiatives to prevent greater use of nuclear power unless the government improves its process for assuring the safety and security of plants and the safe disposal of nuclear wa~tes."~9 Thus ensnared, the N.R.C. has shown a tendency to ride with the momentary and changing political currents: some- times it has exerted regulatory authority on behalf of the public; sometimes it has ac- commodated the priorities of the larger atomic-industrial complex; and often it has simply postponed decisions, awaiting a choice dictated by the next crisis. seem that to be a nuclear regulator these days is to suffer extreme neurosis.

Although the energy reorganization was designed to prevent

It has been understaffed and underfunded,

It has been

It would

The present state administration of nuclear power development thus has been saddled with enduring characteristics and inconsistencies derived from the legacy of the Manhattan Project and the immediate post-war organization of the atom. mental stages, governmental supervision of atomic energy has taken the form of a tight- managerial, weak-supervisory agency with an energy research and development program driven by the high technology impetus of its scientific arm and charged with contradictory tech- nological and public trust responsibilities.

The Congressional Watchdog: The J.C.A.E.

Throughout its key develop-

Legislative oversight of the nuclear industry in the public interest has been no more successful than the executive A.E.C. rested in the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (J.C.A.E. 1. creature of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and its civilian promoters intent on pursuing the dream of the "peaceful atom," the J.C.A.E. was able to amass sizable legislative and administrative power over American development of atomic energy for military and civilian uses through a combination of formal authority, superior political s k i l l s of its chairmen and other committee members, and cozy relationships with the nuclear power industry and the national laboratories. Often more zealous in promoting atomic programs than even the commissioners of the A.E.C., this Congressional committee succeeded in virtually monopo- lizing the whole legislative terrain in the field of energy policy generally and atomic power in particular in a manner that was detrimental both to public health and safety and to the development of alternative energy programs.20 Rather than serving as a guardian of the responsible development of atomic energy, the Joint Committee was quickly trans- formed into a watchdog for the atomic establishment.

of legislative oversight of the atomic energy field is perhaps understandable, in view of the fact that in 1977 the J.C.A.E. was stripped of its awesome powers and supplanted by the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and other committees. For over twenty years, however, this committee contributed to the neglect of health and safety concerns in the development of commercial nuclear power and betrayed the public trust by serving as the chief Congressional apologist for and promoter of nuclear energy, rather than as the American public's legislative representative.

The Nuclear Industry and the Nuclear Dream

For two decades, responsibility for review Another institutional

The Kemeny Commission's silence on the role of Congressional negligence in the area

When critics and proponents speak of the nuclear power industry, they usually have in mind either the electric utilities industry or the atomic reactor builders o r both. Actually, the nuclear industry really encompasses a wide variety of other elements spanning the whole nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium mining and milling, fuel enrichment and fabrication, waste storage and disposal management, and even unions (like the powerful

50

Internat ional Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers Union). Although the industry is more diverse and technologically d i f f e ren t i a t ed than customarily depicted, i t s various components have shown the same tendencies toward economic concentration and s t r u c t u r a l integrat ion which have been cha rac t e r i s t i c of the energy f i e l d as a whole. This claim can be supported by a number of examples: the less than a handful of commercial r eac to r construction corporations, t he few enrichment plants managed by huge, energy-related corporations l i k e Union Carbide and Kerr-McGee, the invasion of t he oil majors i n t o uranium mining and other f ace t s of the f u e l cycle, and the monopolistic styyture of the u t i l i t i e s industry (overwhelmingly privately-owned and publicly-regulated) .

The importance of i ndus t r i a l concentration and integrat ion i n nuclear pol icy i s dramatically revealed in the e l e c t r i c u t i l i t i e s component .2* The bas i c a rch i t ec tu re of the e l e c t r i c u t i l i t i e s industry came t o have the following f ea tu res : a monopoly s t ruc tu re regulated by a weak public service commission; a bias toward large-scale, cen t r a l s t a t i o n power generation; a s t ruc tu re of investment earnings determined by a fixed r a t e of re turn based upon the industry 's c a p i t a l base; a low research and develop- ment budget; conservative business and management pract ices; and a crude, neanderthal c a p i t a l i s t ideolom which of ten leads i t s o f f i c i a l s t o engage i n per iodic "red-bait ing" of i t s opponents.

Moreover, although t h e industry was managed by t r a d i t i o n a l business administration s t r a t eg ie s and was f i s c a l l y conservative, i t was a growth-oriented industry, project ing new e l e c t r i c a l generating f a c i l i t i e s on the basis of growth of e l e c t r i c a l demands of around 7 percent per year (which meant a doubling of e l e c t r i c a l requirements every 10 years). mercial atomic energy, t he e l e c t r i c u t i l i t i e s industry and i t s conservative business managers showed indifference, even r e ~ i s t a n c e . ~ 3 avai lable , and the technology of coal-f i red and o i l - f i r e d generating p l an t s was a t hand and mature. Moreover, environmentalism had not ye t become a powerful p o l i t i c a l force. Thus, i n t he absence of govenunent subsidies and guarantees, the e l e c t r i c u t i l i t i e s were unwilling t o invest in a very expensive and unproven technology such a s nuclear power.

When i n 1954 the government pushed f o r involvement of p r iva t e en te rp r i se i n com-

After a l l , coal and o i l were cheap and

Within a short time, industry a t t i t u d e s were modified by two fac to r s : t h e i r t r ad i - t i ona l f e a r of socialism and the apparent cost-competitiveness of atomic power. Once again, t h e spectre of public power was conjured up, t h i s time i n debates i n the ea r ly f i f t i e s i n the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, when Democratic members sought t o main- t a i n f ede ra l control over a develo ing nuclear technology almost e n t i r e l y subsidized by federal funds a t the R & D level .2B Then, i n order t o spur purchases of atomic reactors a t home and abroad, two of the major reactor manufacturers -- Westinghouse and G.E. -- offered "turn-key" contracts t o po ten t i a l purchasers. t o construct a complete nuclear power p l an t a t a f i rm p r i ce such t h a t " a l l the u t i l i t y had to do was 'open the door' of i t s and s t a r t the generating Such contracts created the impression t h a t the day of nuclear power generation as a mature technology had arr ived. ordering atomic generating f a c i l i t i e s on the assumption t h a t a commercial breakthrough i n nuclear power had taken place, t ha t atomic reactors were sa fe and d i f f e red i n no s ign i f i can t respect from o the r power p l an t s , and t h a t therefore they could promote diver- s i t y of f u e l sources f o r power generation and thus serve as a hedge against t he fu tu re cost escalat ion o r disrupt ion of suppl ies in o i l o r coal .

That i s , these vendors offered

omplete p l an t a t a specif ied date i n the fu tu re

The u t i l i t i e s began

The naive and f a c i l e a t t i t u d e of u t i l i t i e s and vendor o f f i c i a l s toward atomic reactors was pa r t i cu la r ly onerous f o r t he development of s a fe nuclear power p l an t s which would pay due regard t o public heal th . By conceiving of an atomic r eac to r simply as one of a number of means of producing steam t o tu rn a turbine, the industry obscured the e s sen t i a l novelty, complexity, and d i s t i n c t i v e r i s k s of electric power generated by atomic energy. As Irvin Bupp has succinct ly put i t :

51

The nuclear power system is an interconnected s e t of subsystems t h a t extend f a r beyond the atomic generating s t a t ion i t s e l f . The r e l i ab le production of e l e c t r i c i t y from nuclear f i s s ion re- quires the operation of a fue l supply system t o provide uranium; a fuel preparation system t o 'enrich' the uranium and package it i n appropriate form; a power-plant operating system t o build and maintain the reactor and associated generating equipment; and a spent-fuel treatment and disposal system. Moreover, these several systems a r e not connected i n a simple one-way fashion. There a re complex technical and economic linkages among them, and each de- pends on the other i n complicated and of ten subt le ways . . . . To believe tha t nuclear power is merely a new way to bo i l water i s to believe tha t ope -heart surgery i s merely a new way to r e l i eve minor chest pains. 2tt

Quite simply, u t i l i t y o f f i c i a l s -- being t r ad i t i ona l business managers, not high tech- nologists -- l o s t s ight of o r never t ru ly appreciated t h i s crucial point. they f a i l ed t o integrate i n t h e i r organizational s t ruc tu re personnel with the expertise to administer t o the peculiar requirements of nuclear power generation i n i t s wider systemic framework, and they did not adapt t h e i r standard operating procedures t o take account of the d i s t inc t ive features and possible hazards of the e n t i r e nuclear fuel supply system.

Consequently,

The reaction of the u t i l i t i e s industry was instead t o adopt a heavy equipment or ientat ion and a naive optimism about nuclear reactor s a fe ty exemplified by the com- monplace quip tha t "nuclear power plants were designed by geniuses t o be run by id io t s . " Needless t o say, the or igins of the Three Mile Island accident and perhaps of future accidents of genuinely catastrophic proportions can be traced i n pa r t t o misperceptions by the u t i l i t i e s .

Why the Nuclear Dream Faded

There was a time when c i v i l i a n nuclear power was touted a s an unalloyed blessing promising us "e l ec t r i c i ty too cheap t o meter" and an environment f r e e of the pol lutants and contaminants associated with other energy sources. Presidents spoke s t i r r i n g words to r a l l y American ci t izens behind the Nuclear Dream; s c i e n t i s t s and engineers designed bold and imaginative plans f o r r ea l i z ing the dream of cheap nuclear power; Congressmen pro- moted these projects and funded them with astronomical budgets; c i t i zens awaited the nuclear cornucopia. the hightide of nuclear power, nei ther the e l e c t r i c u t i l i t i e s industry nor the government r ea l ly believed the myth tha t nuclear power r ea l ly would become cheap and r e l i ah le . claims fo r c iv i l i an nuclear power were chimerical; they offered a powerful symbol through which to mobilize the American public behind a commercial enterpr ise which the e l e c t r i c u t i l i t i e s were reluctant t o embrace and which couid only be supported and launched through heavy government involvement and public ~ u b s i d y . ~ 7 The t e s t of industry confidence i n t h i s new technology came i n the mid-f i f t ies , when the Price-Anderson B i l l rel ieved pr ivate enterpr ise of the sole burden of insuring i t s e l f against t he potent ia l claims deriving from catastrophic nuclear accident. By lobbying f i e r ce ly f o r i t s passage and a t every ten-year extension, the nuclear industry has revealed i ts deeper uncertainty regarding the safety of nuclear power.

Yet, even during the heady days of t he l a t e f i f t i e s and ear ly s i x t i e s ,

The

The Nuclear Dream has faded fo r a var ie ty of reasons. Not the l e a s t s ignif icant of these reasons is economic. I f the nuclear power industry never swallowed the public propaganda about nuclear power becoming lltoo cheap to meter," i t did a t l e a s t f ee l t ha t i t could become competitive with other methods of e l e c t r i c generation. proven i l l u so ry fo r , despi te the o i l embargo and the coal s t r i k e , c i v i l i a n nuclear power has not achieved any notable economic advantages from its nearly f i f t e e n years of

This hope has

52

commercial operation and experience. growth and management of other types of technology, nuclear technology has not conformed to the learning curve model of maturing technology ence leads to lower costs and greater reliability.2t Nuclear power plants have tended to cost more to construct, be more expensive to run, and operate at a lower level of efficiency either than had been estimated beforehand o r than in comparison with gener- ating facilities fired by coal or 0il.~9

In contrast to the typical cycle of commercial

here building and operation experi-

Another factor which helped to undermine the Nuclear Dream was the emergence of a pervasive environmental consciousness in America in the late sixties and its institu- tionalization into a broad movement intent on repairing the ecosystem. tially co-opted by the efforts of mainstream politicians to integrate it into the oper- ating system and thus defuse it of its radical ecological and political potential, environmentalism apparently has seeped deeply into the public consciousness and remains a potentially radical force f o r transforming our relationship with nature as well as for fundamentally altering those social and economic institutions which presently re- flect and reproduce that relati0nship.3~ In the case of nuclear power, the environmental movement in the early seventies adopted legal tactics to intervene in siting and licensing processes of nuclear power plant development. such plants posed threats to man and environment through thermal pollution of the waters o r because of inadequate attention given to the geological formations beneath areas chosen as sites; and it had become clear that, in the absence of legal compulsion, the Atomic Energy Commission would not conform to the requirements in the National Environ- mental Policy Act of 1969 to prepare environmental impact statements f o r major projects where environmental consequences could be anticipated. Indeed, this vulnerability was exploited. Maryland in 1972, the A.E.C. was compelled in the landmark Calvert Cliffs decision to submit to the letter of the N.E.P.A. req~irements.3~

Although par-

By this time it had become obvious that

Challenged by a well-funded and politically s a w environmental group in

About the same time, politically-activist scientific groups helped to precipitate a technical debate over important questions about the safety, efficiency, public health, and national security implications of atomic energy and its place in our energy future. Best represented by the Union of Concerned Scientists, which was formed in 1970 and which now claims a membership of 85,000, this movement effectively challenged the A.E.C., the nuclear industry, and its scientific allies on technical issues which the public had been assured had already been ~ettled.3~ In reopening these questions to technical review and public scrutiny, these scientists succeeded in disclosing the existence o f sharp differences of opinion between A.E.C.Is research scientists and its regulatory staff. They eroded public faith in the credibility of the Nuclear Dream and provoked pervasive doubt that science could give unequivocal answers to these problems. Thus, the environmental movement was successful in assaulting the atomic-industrial comDlex in the legal arena and public-interest scientific groups were able to confront the atomic establishment in the technical realm.

Pro-nuclear forces were compelled to grapple with a third challenge on the field of grassroots politics -- the no-nuke movement. centrally-directed organization than a loosely-coordinated, highly-decentralized net- work of local alliances, the no-nuke movement represents in im ortant respects the democratic remnant of the burnt-out radicalism of the sixties.33 It remains riddled with all of the contradictions of a single-issue movement which wants to be broader and is stymied both by the absence of a theory of political change and by its polyglot membership. Seabrook remains the symbol both of the no-nuke movement's imagination and determination and of the llmits of its power and influence to date. In contrast to the anti-rationalism of the New Left of the late sixties, the movement is unquestionably thinking and reflective. It seems to be keenly aware of its shortcomings, is striving to take democracy seriously as an organizational principle and as a way of life, and knows what typically happens to political movements in the United States which do not

Less a nationally-organized and

53

broaden their political programs and constituencies . 34 Somewhat more difficult to document, there seems to be in the public an altered

attitude toward atomic radiation and other nuclear hazards. Radiation in particular has come to be identified as an especially dangerous pollutant and a silent menace. Perhaps influenced by the controversy within the technical community over the health effects of low-level radiation and mindful of the cover-up by the A.E.C. of the health dangers and consequences of radiation fallout from the atomic testing in the 1950s, the public has grown increasingly skeptical of the levels of risk to human beings from radi- ation and chemicals permitted by government agencies. Americans have come to the view that an involuntary risk imposed upon them by others or a danger to future generations ought to be significantly lower than a self-imposed risk. That is, while many citizens seem evidently prepared to accept a higher level of risk associated with automobile travel, routine occupational hazards, and personal accidents or illnesses resulting from individual habits like drinking alcoholic beverages o r taking saccharin, they are not willing to permit a similar level of risk when it flows from arbitrary or bureaucratic decisions foisted upon them by agencies o r industries (consider the public controversies over the evacuation of citizens at Middletown, Pennsylvania, o r at Love Canal, New York) or when it involves uncertain risks to their children or to their children's children. 35 This rapidly evolving public attitude suggests in Barry Commoner's view that "the public has now become aware that new environmental pollutants represent an assault by the present generation not merely on involuntary living victims -- who have some recourse, however difficult -- but on generations not yet born, and therefore utterly defenseless.1t36

As a result, growing numbers of

The significance of this shift in public perception and attitude toward radioactivity and other environmental pollutants is that it destroys the whole foundation of the risk/ benefit alculus that some scientists and bureaucrats have tried to sell to the American public.37 Even though some scientists and politicians have been willing to modify o r suspend environmental regulations in order to increase energy supply o r generate new synthetic sources of fuel and energy, an impressive number of Americans have maintai ed a steadfast commitment to improving the environment in the face of increasing c0st.3~

Conclusion

No one can tell for sure what the ultimate meaning and consequences of the Three Mile Island nuclear mishap will be for the future of civilian nuclear power in the United States. For some, like Alvin Weinberg, it may prove to be the "salvation of atomic energy," while for others, like Amory Lovins, it spells the doom of the nuclear power industry in America.39 been removed from the technical and bureaucratic realm, where scientists previously had maintained a decisive influence over the making of nuclear power policy, and has been thrust squarely into the political arena, where the stakes and currency are different and where the role of public opinion and the citizen have become controlling.

What is certain, however, is that the fate of atomic power has

This case study of the politics of nuclear power development in the United States has shed light on the underlying sources of the impasse in nuclear power policy in the United States. years has stemmed from the origins of America's war-time pursuit of an atomic bomb and the immediate post-war concern to unlock the secrets of the nuclear genie for peaceful purposes. In particular, the closed nature of the interactions among the various com- ponents of the atomic-industrial complex, coupled with the self-reinforcing pressures toward promotion of civilian nuclear power, fostered an organizational structure and supporting political climate which would eventually undermine its own legitimacy and would simultaneously provoke grave doubts about the nuclear option itself. Indeed, once the light of public scrutiny was cast upon the organizational and political processes

In no small part the volatility of the nuclear power debate in recent

54

shaping nuclear policy s ince its beginnings, t h e i r c r ed ib i l i t y dissolved very quickly. Cri t ics merely had to expose the overwhelmingly e l i t i s t , se l f - interested, and authori- t a r i an character of those processes advancing it.

A r a t iona l , coherent energy policy incorporating technically-feasible options and democratic processes remains an overriding need of public policy i n the United States . The his tory of p o l i t i c s of c iv i l i an nuclear power reveals an instance where technologi- c a l development and democratic po l i t i c s became an t i the t i ca l . For technologists, pol i - t i c i ans , and ci t izens a l ike , the development of c iv i l i an nuclear power from World War I1 t o the present provides many sobering lessons. Failure to learn these lessons w i l l l i ke ly lead t o a compulsive replay of the past under somewhat d i f f e ren t and probably worse circumstances.

NOTES

1. !!The Need fo r Change: The Legacy of TMI -- Report of the President 's Commission on the Accident a t Three Mile Island," John Kemeny, Chairman. Executive Office, October 31, 1979). Parenthetical page references i n the t ex t a r e from t h e f i n a l published report .

Project (Boston: L i t t l e , Brown and Company, 1967); and Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, J r . , The New World, 1939-1946: Atomic Energy Commission (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania S t a t e University

(Washington, D . C . :

2. On the his tory of the Manhattan Project, see Stephene Groueff, The Manhattan

A History of the United S ta t e s

Press, 1962).

On the notion of the atomic-industrial complex and more broadly the energy complex, see Ernest J. Yanarella and Randal H . Ihara, "The Emergence of the Energy Complex i n Corporate America," 1978 APSA Conference paper, New York City, August 30 - Sep- tember 3, 1978; and Ernest J. Yanarella and Randal H. Ihara, '!The Military/Energy Connection: The Ins t i t u t iona l i za t ion of the 'Technological Breakthrough' Approach t o Energy R & D," Northeast Peace Science Review 1 (19781, pp. 187-207.

See I rv in C . Bupp's discussion of t h i s mobilization model i n IIEnergy Policy Planning i n the United States: Ideological BTU'S,~~ i n Leon Lindberg, ed., The Energy Syndrome (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977), esp. pp. 285-92, as well as the pa ra l l e l s drawn between the Apollo Program and the Manhattan Project, on the one hand, and President Carter 's synfuels crash program, on the other, i n Yanarella and Ihara 's "The Emergence of the Energy Complex in Corporate America," pp. 1 and 2.

5. Cited by Bupp, Vnergy Policy Planning in the United S ta t e s , " p. 286.

6. Noted by Irvin C . Bupp and Jean-Claude Derian, Light Water: How the Nuclear Dream Dissolved (New York: Basic Books, Inc. , Pubs., 1978), p. 55; Albert H. Teich, "Bureaucracy and Po l i t i c s i n Big Science: National Laboratories i n AEC and ERDA,lI a paper presented a t the 1977 annual meeting of the American Po l i t i ca l Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1-4, 1977.

7. See Teich, "Bureaucracy and Po l i t i c s i n Big Science"; U.S. Congress, Joint Committee

Relations between Headquarters and the

on Atomic Energy, !!The Future Role of the Atomic Energy Commission Laboratories," [Joint Committee Prind U.S., G . P . O . , October 1960); and the Report to the Comptroller General, The Multiprogram Laboratories: Resource fo r Nonnuclear Energy Research, Development, and Demonstration (Washington, D . C . , U.S. General Accounting Office, May 22, 1978). laboratories a re t reated in Hewlett and Anderson, The New World, 1939-1946, passim.

(Washington, D . C . : A National

The or igins of the national

55

8. Analysis of t h i s tendency is the main focus of Teich's essay, "Bureaucracy and Poli- t i c s i n Big Science,11 and is s imilar ly investigated through the use of budgetary data i n Peter B. Natchez and I rv in C . Bupp, "Policy and P r io r i ty i n the Budgetary Process,1' American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, LXVII (September 19731, pp. 951-63.

9. For evidence of the former trend, see Yanarella and Ihara, "The Military/Energy Connection," esp. pp. 201-03. For the l a t t e r , see Allen Hammond and W i l l i a m Metz, "Solar Energy Research: (July 15, 1977), pp. 241-44; Herbert G . Reid and Randal Ihara, "Technocracy, Demo- cracy and Solar Energy," Helios Symposium Proceedings, I1 (Albany, N.Y. : S t a t e University of New York a t Albany, 19781, pp, 283-92; John Keyes, The Solar Conspiracy (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y. : Morgan and Morgan, Lfd., 1977); and Ray Reece, The Sun Betrayed: The Corporate Seizure of Solar Energy (Boston, Mass.: Southend Press, 1979).

10. In a public conference i n October 1969, Harold Green commented on the importance of the 1946 Act f o r future energy development i n the U.S. when he noted: "There i s no doubt i n my mind tha t i f , i n 1946, we had created some other kind of commission o r some other kind of j o in t committee -- f o r example, a commission t o maximize produc- t i v i t y of power produced from f o s s i l fue l without pol lut ing the environment and a companion jo in t committee -- we wouldn't have t o be concerned about using nuclear power today to meet the th rea t of a dwindling f o s s i l fue l supp1y";quoted i n Harry Foreman, ed., Nuclear Power and the Public (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 19701, p. 243. The decisive role played by American commercial nuclear power development f o r the development of a world market f o r commercial nuclear reactors and f o r exacerbating the nuclear p ro l i f e ra t ion problem i s highlighted i n Steven J . Baker's Commercial Nuclear Power and Nuclear Prol i ferat ion, an Occasional Paper of the Cornell University Peace Studies Program.

Making Solar After the Nuclear Model?," Science, 197

11. Observed and catalogued by H. Peter Metzger, The Atomic Establishment (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972) and Ralph Nader and John Abbotts, The Menace of Atomic E n e r a ( N e w York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc. , 1977).

12. See two relevant RAND reports -- Robert Perry, e t . a l . , Development and Commerciali- zation of the Light Water Reactor, 1946-1976 (Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND Corporation, June 1977), pp. 6, 10, and passim; and Wendy Allen, Nuclear Reactors f o r Generating E l e c t r i c i t : U.S. Develo ment from 1946 t o 1963 (Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND Cor- poration, ;une 1977), pp! 7 and 8 , 28-38.

13. For an examination of t he cavalier a t t i t u d e taken by the Eisenhower Administration toward the widespread disclosure of atomic energy knowledge triggered by the "Atoms f o r Peacell program, see Arnold Kramish, The Peaceful Atom i n Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1963).

1 4 . The comprehensive and de f in i t i ve study of the Admiral Hyman Rickover management of development of the l i g h t water reactor f o r the Navy's submarine propulsion program is Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Nuclear Navy, 1946-1962 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).

15. Teich, I1Bureaucracy and P o l i t i c s i n Big Science," pp. 38-40; and Bupp and Derian, Light Water, pp. 53-55 and 184-85.

16 This i s examined a t some length i n Richard Lewis' The Nuclear Power Rebellion: Citizens vs. the Atomic Industr ia l Establishment (New York: Viking Press, 1972); and Joel Primack and Frank von Hippel, Advice and Dissent: Sc i en t i s t s i n the P o l i t i c a l Arena (New York: New A m e r i c a n h a Gyorgy, e t a l . , No Nukes: Everyone's Guide to Nuclear Power (Boston, Mass.: Southend Press, 1979) , esp. pp. 1-28, and 381-90.

56

17. For a fu r the r c l a r i f i c a t i o n of t h e broader context wi th in which t h i s d iv i s ion took place, see Mary Ames, Outcome Uncertain: Science and the P o l i t i c a l Process (Washington, D.C. : Communications Press, Inc . , 19781, pp. 184-90.

18. This i s revealed by analyses of da t a gathered by Common Cause i n Serving Two Masters (Washington, D . C . : Common Cause, October 1976), c i t e d by Nader and Abbotts, The Menace of Atomic Energy, pp. 277-78.

19. Ames, Outcome Uncertain, p. 187.

20. Harold P. Green and Alan b s e n t h a l l s book remains the most d e f i n i t i v e study o f t h e Jo in t Committee from 1946-1963 -- Green and Rosenthal, Government of t he Atom: The In t eg ra t ion of Powers (New York: Atherton Press, 1963). Also re levant i n car ry ing the h i s to ry of t he J .C.A.E. t o 1971 is H. Pe te r Metzger's The Atomic Establishment. prerogatives of t h e committee, see Nader and Abbotts, The Menace of Atomic Energy,

For an ana lys i s of t he demise and paring down of t h e power and

pp. 287-92.

21. On t h e ex ten t of concentration i n t h e nuclear indus t ry , see Anna Gyorgy, e t a l . , "The Nuclear Power Power Structure,Il No Nukes, pp. 148-65; and Nader and Abbotts, The Menace of Atomic Energy, pp. 261-70; as well a s Sheldon Novick, The E l e c t r i c War: The Fight over Nuclear Power (San Francisco, Cal.: S i e r r a Club Books, 19761, chs. 24-28, 30, 35, 43-47; and Herbert S. Sanger, Jr., and W i l l i a m E. Mason, The St ruc tu re of t he Energy Markets: A Report of TVA's An t i t ru s t Inves t iga t ion of t h e Coal and Uranium Indus t r i e s , vo ls . I and I1 (Knoxville, Tenn.: Tennessee Valley Authority, June 1 4 , 1977, and February 26, 1979).

22. Sheldon Novick's h i s t o r i c a l examination of t h e o r ig ins and development of t h e e lec- t r i c u t i l i t i e s indus t ry -- and, in pa r t i cu la r , h i s treatment of t h e guiding manager- i a l hand of Samuel I n s u l l -- is extremely revealing. See Novick, The E l e c t r i c War, e spec ia l ly chs. 16, 18, 20, 24, 26, 28, 30, 43 and 45. See a l s o Thomas Hughes, "The E l e c t r i f i c a t i o n o f America: (January 19791, pp. 124-61.

Monica, Cal.: RAND Corporation, June 1977), pp. 5-14, and passim.

The System Bui lders , f f TechnoloPy and Culture, XX

23. See Arturo Gandara, E lec t r i c U t i l i t y Decisionmaking and the Nuclear Option (Santa

24. The p r iva t e vs . public controversy is ca re fu l ly examined by Ph i l ip Mullenbach, Civ i l ian Nuclear Power: Twentieth Century Fund, 1963), pp. 9-14, as well as by Green and Rosenthal, Govern- ment o f t h e Atom, pp. 60-61, and passim. The e l e c t r i c u t i l i t i e s ' " t r a d i t i o n a l f e a r of socialismT1 -- i . e . , public power in any form -- i s placed in h i s t o r i c a l context and pa ra l l e l ed with t h e acceptance of t h e compromise of publ ic regula t ion of p r i - va t e ly owned monopolies by t h e r a i l r o a d indus t ry i n t h e 1800s by Sheldon Novick -- Novick, "The Ba t t l e aga ins t Socialism Begins," The E l e c t r i c War, pp. 219-21.

Economic I ssues and Policy Formulation (New York: The

25. Bupp and Derian, Light Water, p. 48.

26. I r v i n C. Bupp, "The Nuclear Stalemate,Il i n Robert Stobaugh and Daniel Yergin, eds . , Energy Future (New York: Random House, 19791, p. 118.

27. On t h e use of economic myths and p o l i t i c a l symbols t o promote mass manipulation and publ ic acquiescence t o e l i t e designs, see genera l ly Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses o f P o l i t i c s (Urbana, Ill.: University of I l l i n o i s Press, 1964); and Herbert G. Reid, ed., Up t h e Mainstream: Everyday Life (New York: David McKay Company, 19741, In t roduct ion t o Part V. I n t r a c i n g t h e myth of cheap and r e l i a b l e nuclear power t o i t s o r ig ins , Sheldon Novick

A Cr i t ique of Ideology in American P o l i t i c s and

57

i n The E lec t r i c War a t t r i bu te s i t s power and force t o President Roosevelt's New Deal dream of inexpensive and abundant e l e c t r i c power under public auspices, saying: "This dream of the 1930s . . . persis ted almost to the present day. Nuclear power, a t the end of World War 11, was widely believed to be the technical breakthrough which would make a l l t h i s possible. With a kind of re l igious f a i t h , many people, pa r t i cu la r ly those of the p o l i t i c a l l e f t , believed tha t e l e c t r i c i t y ' too cheap t o meter' would move mountains and r a i s e up the most humble; t ha t i t would usher i n a pastoral utopia without smoke o r slums." (pp. 237-38).

28. Argued by Bupp and Derian, Light Water, pp. 79-82, and 185-87.

29. See, generally, Saunders Mil ler ' s The Economics of Nuclear and Coal Power (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976) : and Charles Komanoff, "Nuclear Power Is More Expensive than Coal,

Ecological Ideals ," Science, 170 (November 27, 19701, pp. 945-52; Herbert Marcuse, "Nature and Revolution, Counterrevolution and Revolt (Boston: Beacon Press, 19741, pp. 59-78; and Andre Gorz, Ecology as Po l i t i c s (Boston: Southend Press, 1980).

Environmental Review (December 1977).

30. For analysis and supporting arguments, see Leo Marx, "American Ins t i t u t ions and

32. The controversy over t he emergency core cooling system is scrut inized by two public- i n t e re s t s c i e n t i s t s -- Joel Primack and Frank von Hippel, Advice and Dissent, pp. 208-35.

33. For two in t e rna l h i s to r i e s of the no-nuke movement, see Anna Gyorgy, e t a l . , No Nukes, pp. 1-29, 381-90; and Harvey Wasserman, E n e r n Wars (Boston, Mass.: Lawrence H i l l Publishers, 1979). of the anti-nuclear movement i s offered by Samuel McCracken i n "The War against the Atom," Commentar , 66 (Septamber 19771, pp. 33-47, and "The Harrisburg Syndrome," C a m m e n t a r y , d l 9 7 9 ) , pp. 27-39.

34. For 8 thoughtful discussion of the Clamshell Alliance and i t s offshoots, see Marty Jezer's "The Soc ia l i s t Potent ia l of the No-Nuke Movement," Radical America, X I (September - October 1977), pp. 63-69. This analysis should be tempered by Murray Bookchin's insightful caveats about the ecotecbnocratic biases of s o f t energy paths advocates, "Energy, 'Ecotechnocracy,' and Ecology," Liberation, IXX (February 19751, pp. 29-33. t ex t in Herbert G. Reid and Randal Ihara, "Technocracy, Democracy, and Solar Energy."

An extremely skept ical view of t he development

Bookchin's reservations a re put i n to a broader theo re t i ca l con-

35. I draw heavily upon Barry Commoner's arguments i n h i s essay, "Nuclear Power: Bene- f i t s and Risks ," in Harry Foreman, ed. , Nuclear Power and the Public, pp. 224-39, esp. 234-36.

36. Ibid. , p. 236.

37. This e f f o r t i s i l l u s t r a t e d by numerous r isk/benefi t s tudies in the energy f i e l d -- growing out of the emergence of the new f i e l d of risk analysis -- and by the appear- ance of te levis ion commercials by chemical companies l i k e Monsanto and Dupont emphasizing the beneficence of chemicals and new chemical discoveries. Par t icular ly controversial has been the study by Herbert Inhaber, Risk of Energy Production (Ottowa, Canada: Atomic Energy Control Board, 1978), summarized i n "Risk with Energy from Conventional and Nonconventional Sources , I 1 Science, 203 (February 29,

58

1979), pp. 718-23. See the rejoinder by Anne and Paul Ehrlich, "The 'Inhaber Report,' Parts I and 11," The Mother Earth News 1979).

38. For three recent surveys supporting t h i s claim, see "Attitudes toward Risk i n American Society Today, Cambridge Reports (September 1978) ; OR0 Public Opinion Index: Report t o Management, vol. 36, nos. 17 and 18 (September 19781, Opinion Research Corporation, vol . I, no. 2 (January 4, 1979).

39. See comments on Three Mile Island by Alvin Weinberg (Director, I n s t i t u t e f o r Energy Analysis, Oak Ridge, Tennessee), i n h i s a r t i c l e , "Can We Fix Nuclear Power?I1 SIPIscope, 7 (March-June, 1979), pp. 2-6; and Amory Lovinsl e a r l i e r post-mortem on the nuclear industry, "Epitaph f o r an Industry," Not Man Apart (November 1977).

(July/August and September/October

Princeton, N . J . ; and ABC News - Harris Survey Release,