The Politics of Population Change
description
Transcript of The Politics of Population Change
The Politics of Population Change
Eric KaufmannProfessor of Politics, Birkbeck College, University of London
What of Unevenness?
• World is not one cultural and political unit. If it were, no problem
• Power has shifted from empire to nation, from the rulers to the people since 1776/1789
• Spread of democracy (starting 18th c, esp. post-1980s)
• A battle of numbers. Getting a majority now counts, i.e. Iraq, Syria, Bahrain…
Uneven Growth Between:
• World Region/Civilization• Nation• Ethnic group• Religion• Regions within a nation
International Conflict
Countries’ population as % of Britain
•Hedley Bull claims 100 million a threshold for Great Power
•‘Boots on the Ground’ continues to matter as does scale economies for military procurement
•Perceptions matter as much as reality
•Rise of China?1800 1850 1870 1900 1913
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
300%
350%
400%
RussiaU.S.Ger-manyFrance
Demography and Ethnic Conflict: Northern Ireland
• "The basic fear of Protestants in Northern Ireland is that they will be outbred by the Roman Catholics. It is as simple as that." - Terence O’ Neill, Unionist PM of Northern Ireland after resigning, 1969
Developing World Transition More Rapid
• At the end of the demographic transition Denmark 5 times greater population, Guatemala up to 24 times greater population.
0
1
2
3
4
5
60 20 40 60 80 100
120
140
160
180
200
220
240
260
Years since onset of demographic transition
Surv
ivin
g O
ffspr
ing
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Popu
latio
n de
nsity
(ind
ivid
uals
per
sq
km
)
Denmark SO
Guatamala SO
Guatamala Pop Density(World Bank)
Denmark PopulationDensity
Guatamala Pop Density(UNPD)
Internal Racial Demographic Change: California, 1970-2030
California's Population by Racial Category, 1970-2030
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Asian
Hispanic
Black
White
UK: A Multiracial Future?
Age Structure (‘Youth Bulge’)
• More young people – dependency ratio - poverty
• More young people – unemployment - poverty• More young poor unemployed people – recruits
for ethnic, class, religious violence• More young poor unemployed people –
elite/middle class fear – autocracy• Aging population brings different effects
Young age structure, rather than Islam or poverty, is most closely related to democracy
Expansion of Islam; Decline of Animists and Seculars
Past and Projected Global Religious Affiliation (World Religious Database)
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Christian Muslim Hindu Nonreligious +Atheist
Other
1900
1970
2000
2025
Eurabia?Proportion of Muslims in Austria's under-15 Population, 2000-2100
Current Muslim Fertility
Muslim Fertility Converges to
Average by 2030
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
2001
2006
2011
2016
2021
2026
2031
2036
2041
2046
2051
2056
2061
2066
2071
2076
2081
2086
2091
2096
2101
Perc
ent M
uslim
Direct Effect:
Ultra-Orthodox Salford
vs
mainstream Jewish Leeds
Conclusion
• Not just how much population, but how it is distributed across political, ethnic, religious units
• Uneven growth and transition, coupled with numbers increasingly counting for power
• Shifting within and between states• Both numbers and age structure affect politics