THE POLITICAL USES OF COMMISSIONS OF ENQUIRY (1): THE IMPERIAL — COLONIAL WEST INDIES CONTEXT THE...

THE POLITICAL USES OF COMMISSIONS OF ENQUIRY (1): THE IMPERIAL —COLONIAL WESTINDIES CONTEXT THE FORSTER AND MOYNE COMMISSIONSAuthor(s): Howard JohnsonSource: Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3 (SEPTEMBER 1978), pp. 256-283Published by: Sir Arthur Lewis Institute of Social and Economic Studies, University of the WestIndiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27861718 .

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256

THE POLITICAL USES OF COMMISSIONS OF ENQUIRY (1):

THE IMPERIAL - COLONIAL WEST INDIES CONTEXT

THE FORSTER AND MOYNE COMMISSIONS

By

Howard Johnson

INTRODUCTION

The operation of commissions of enquiry in the colonial political systems of the British West Indies has been a subject to which few political scientists or historians have been attracted. Those scholars who have acknowledged the importance of these Commissions in the policy making process have not usually provided us with detailed empirical studies of these ad hoc advisory bodies [Jones 20, pp. 244-6; Jones and

Mills 21, p. 327].l This article analyses the reasons behind imperial decisions to

establish two commissions of enquiry in the British West Indies in the late 1930s: The Forster Commission of 1937 appointed to enquire into the Trinidad disturbances of that year, and the Moyne Commission of 1938 established to investigate the social and economic conditions of the West Indian colonies. These commissions were chosen for study because they were established at a time when events in the West Indies attracted considerable attention in Britain.

THE WEST INDIAN BACKGROUND The appointment of these commissions of enquiry must be viewed

against the background of recurrent labour unrest in the British West Indian colonies in the late 1930s. Between 1934 and 1939 most colonies had experienced strikes and riots.2 These disturbances were primarily an expression of economic distress. In the post-W?rld War I years the principal agricultural staples like sugar, cocoa and bananas on which the West Indian economy relied, suffered a serious decline in market prices as supplies exceeded effective demand. Some agricultural commodities also suffered from the effects of plant disease and hurricane damage. This crisis in the colonial economy was intensified by the world-wide depression of the 1930s.. As Charles Kindleberger has noted, "... business decline in industrial countries spread to less developed countries of the world primarily by means of reduced [colonial] exports" [Kindleberger 24, p. 190]. The consequences of these developments were increased unemployment and underemployment of the labouring population and a deterioration in social conditions. In some industries workers were



THE FORSTER AND MOYNE COMMISSIONS 257

forced to submit to drastic wage cuts. This situation was further

complicated by the return of labourers repatriated from Cuba, Costa Rica and Panama who added to the numbers of the unemployed.

Trinidad Riots In Trinidad, the centre of the disturbances which broke out in June

1937, was the industrialized oilfield area. Workers at the Forest Reserve field of Trinidad Leaseholds Ltd., "the dominating influence in the Trinidad oil industry" [85, p. 23], had begun peaceful strike action on 19 June after their claims for increased wages were refused. The strike had developed into a riot on the same day when the police attempted to arrest Uriah Butler, a popular leader in the oilfield area [85, p. 59].

Within the next two days strikes and riots spread to other oilfields, to the sugar belt and eventually to Port-of-Spain [85]. By the time order

was restored, with the aid of imperial reinforcements, 14 persons had been killed, 59 wounded, hundreds arrested and substantial damage done to property [Lewis 27, p. 22].

These riots received widespread attention in the London Press, for, as Lord Olivier later explained, the combination of riots and oil provided them with good copy [Olivier 33,p. 282].? One consequence of these disturbances was that backbench Labour M.Ps. who had previously exhibited interest almost exclusively in African labour problems began to take an interest in West Indian labour conditions.4 It was one of these backbenchers, Arthur Creech Jones (M.P. for Shipley) who, on 28 June asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies, William Ormsby Gore, whether there would be an "independent and searching enquiry" into the causes of the disturbances [60;61]. Ormsby-Gore readily accepted the idea of a commission and assured Creech Jones that there would be an enquiry after order had been restored in the colony [60; 61] This was an assurance based on the knowledge that it was the accepted convention for commissions of enquiry to be established after colonial events of that nature.5 The responsibility for setting up a commission of enquiry was, however, that of the Governor. Early in July Sir Murchison Fletcher, the Governor of the colony proposed the establishment of a commission to enquire into the causes of the dis turbances [56].

The major decisions concerning the establishment of the commis sion came increasingly to be taken by Ormsby-Gore and the permanent officials at the Colonial Of fic?. Ostensibly an occurrence of purely local

significance, the Trinidad disturbances were regarded by Ormsby-Gore, in particular, as having important implications for the British programme of rearmament for the impending war. Ormsby-Gore considered the oil field, the centre of the disturbances, to be of major strategic importance in the British war effort [79].

Let us examine briefly the importance of oil to the war economy and, in particular, the significance of Trinidad's oil to imperial defence. The imperial planners realized that oil was not only the essential

ingredient of modem warfare,6 which depended on the internal combus



258 SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES

tion engine; but was also crucial for the continued functioning of the civilian economy which was essential to any war effort. Preparations for war were therefore based on the assumption that there would be

adequate oil supplies. Britain, however, was almost totally dependent on

imported oil. It was feared that in wartime Britain would not be able to procure supplies of oil from her usual peacetime sources. It was

anticipated that sea communication links with the usual supplier might be disrupted and that a neutral United States might disallow exports of oil fuel in excess of the normal peacetime requirements.7 Ormsby Gore realized that in wartime the Trinidad oilfield which had accounted for 62.8 per cent of the Empire's production of crude oil in 1936, would be one of the few British-controlled oilfields on which the fighting services could rely [79;85, p. 23]. Trinidad's importance was based, however, not on its crude oil output which was only 0.92 per cent of world production in 1936 but on the production by the colony's major oil companies of different types of refined oil fuels, under contract, for the Admiralty and Air Ministry [79;85]. In 1937, for example, Trinidad Leaseholds Ltd. were constructing an iso-octane plant at their refinery at Point-?-Pierre for the production of high octane aviation fuel to be used in the fighter aeroplanes for the defence of London [Ormsby-Gore 79] .8

Ormsby-Gore's recognition of the strategic importance of Trinidad's oilfields and oil refineries to imperial defence made him anxious that there should be no recurrence of the industrial disturbances. He was aware that the oil-wells and refineries with their complicated machinery would prove obvious targets for sabotage by discontented workers. Such sabotage, he anticipated, could result in millions of pounds worth of damage to oil installations. It was this fear of the possible consequences of industrial unrest which made Ormsby-Gore so anxious to placate the oilfield workers [79]. As he remarked in a letter of 10

July 1937 to Sir Walter Citrine, General Secretary of the Trades Union

Congress, "it ... behoves Government in the interests of the State, even more than in those of property, to take all such steps as are humanly possible to prevent the cause ?

and especially any legitimate causes ? of

trouble arising" [Ormsby-Gore 79].

Oilfield Grievances

The Colonial Office view of the causes of the disturbances was

shaped primarily by Sir Murchison Fletcher, who was convinced that the oilfield workers had "legitimate gievances". He identified their main

complaint as the increased cost of living in the oilfield area. This increase in the cost of living was officially estimated at 17 per cent over the 1935 figures in the Fyzabad area. Although the management of the oil companies were aware of the situation they had delayed granting a

general wage increase. It was also claimed that once a worker was dismissed by an oil company the Trinidad Petroleum Association (to which all the principal companies belonged) prevented his employment by another company. Finally, the workers complained of racial discrimination in the oilfields.

Black artisans claimed that the oil companies showed a marked



SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES 259

preference for white men for promotion to senior positions ? a policy

which hindered their advancement. Workers also accused the senior management of Trinidad Leaseholds Ltd., who were mainly South African in origin, of exhibiting overt racial prejudice. This anti-white

feeling in the oilfield area was heightened by the Italian invasion of

Abyssinia [Hetcher 55; 56] .9

These grievances had accumulated in the absence of effective

machinery for collective bargaining. In the first place there were no trade unions which served oilfield workers. At the time of the disturbances there were only two registered trade unions neither of which had attracted much support from the colony's labouring popula tion [S5, p. 49]. The shortcomings of the Trade Union Ordinance of 1932, which permitted no peaceful picketing and gave trade unions no

immunity against action in tort, had acted as a deterrent to the establish ment of other trade unions and as a curb on the effectiveness of the

existing ones [S5, p. 48]. In the' second place there was no functioning labour administration

for the resolution of labour disputes. Throughout the 1930s the Colonial Office had repeatedly urged action on the provision of work men's conpensation, arbitration procedure and minimum wages. Although these pressures had resulted in the enactment of labour legisla tion in the colony the local administration had not implemented them

[85, pp. 47-50]. The course of events served to accentuate the need for establishing

communication links between employers and employees. The meeting between Ormsby-Gore and a deputation from the West India Committee on 3 July 1937 highlighted the lack of contact between capital and labour [77] .10 Members of the deputation were unanimous in claiming that the disturbances had nothing to do either with dissatisfaction over

wages or the high cost of living but was the work of a "minority of extremists" and the "machinations of agitators". Mr. R. Beaumont, the

representative of Trinidad Leasehold, who had recently visited the colony, stated emphatically that there had been no suggestion of dis content with labour conditions. He expressed the view that the strike was caused by agitators and that the oilfields had been used as "a specta cular starting point for it" [77].

This employer perspective on events in Trinidad was in marked contrast to the reports received from Fletcher who had established to the Colonial Office's satisfaction the validity of the workers' complaints. The Colonial Office diagnosis of the causes of the outbreak in Trinidad and possible solutions were clearly articulated by the Marquess of Dufferin and Ava, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, in the House of Lords on 29 July 1937:

It does seem fairly clear that there is a lack of liaison between employers and employees and the Government, the three parties in the island. No one

is more conscious than my right honourable friend of the extreme

importance of establishing that liaison in any Colony but particularly in a Colony which lends itself so readily to cases of sabotage and the like [69].




As the above policy statement indicates, a major objective of the Colonial Office was to set up a machinery for the constitutional settle ment of disputes regarding rates of wages and conditions of labour. This was not a new departure but a concern which had predated the strikes and riots in Trinidad. Early in June 1937 Ormsby-Gore had instructed his officials to take action to ensure that effective labour administration was established in the colonial territories [93].

Subsequent events in Trinidad had emphasized the urgent need for such a policy in that colony. Ormsby-Gore recognized the desirability of establishing formal mechanisms to smooth labour relations not only from a narrow business point of view but also in the interest of the State. He feared that in the absence of organized unions, sabotage would be used as a technique of trade unionism. Ormsby-Gore knew from his recent observation of industrial relations in Britain that machinery for conciliation in industrial matters had averted innumerable strikes [77]. It was his view that the existence of this machinery would also ease tensions between employers and employees in Trinidad, especially in the oilfields where disruption of work would adversely affect the war effort. Implicit in Ormsby-Gore's view of the role of trade unions in the colony

was a recognition of the conservative effects of this liberal concession. Workers militancy, which could lead to industrial dislocation, could be contained by incorporating unions into the economic system. The

report of the Forster Commission later stated these ideas which had been implicitly rather than overtly expressed by Ormsby-Gore:

Such a movement [towards establishing constitutional Trade Unions] given sympathetic guidance by Government and a tolerant encouragement on the part of employers during the transitional stage of its development, is the surest means of securing industrial stability and the removal of ex

tremist tendencies [85, p. 81].

Ormsby-Gore realized that the interests of the Imperial Government would be best served by actively promoting trade unionism in Trinidad. But he was also aware that this more liberal policy would be opposed by the agricultural, commercial and oil interests in the colony who were hostile to trade unions. These business interests regarded trade unions as a threat to the system of business control. After the outbreak of the disturbances these business groups had characteristically urged the Colonial Office to use force, to protect private property and the small

European community which controlled it [77]. Ormsby-Gore had baulked at the suggestion by major colonial investors that a permanent naval station should be maintained in Trinidad for the protection of industrial interests and European residents. He anticipated that such an action would alienate the labouring class whom he w?s seeking to

placate. On this matter the broader security interests of Britain took obvious precedence over the narrower economic interests of the local investors.

Although Ormsby-Gore refused to adopt the repressive policies




advocated by the representatives of capital, he admitted the responsi bility of Government to maintain law and order [77]. Most important was the responsibility of the local and metropolitan governments to

provide a favourable climate for the successful operation of the oil

companies. That the Colonial Office should have been so solicitous of the interests of the oil companies is not surprising. As has been

emphasized previously the continued productivity of these companies was considered by the British Government to be a national security asset. The relationship between the British Government and British oil

companies was one of mutual dependence. These companies supplied oil to the British Government which was totally dependent on imported oil. The British Government, on the other hand, often eased the business

operations of British oil companies in foreign countries and areas under British control by diplomatic intervention [See Jones 22; Tugendhat 44,

p. 89]. 11 This close relationship between Government and the oil companies

had dated from the earliest days of oil's importance as a vital industrial and strategic raw material. It came to be widely felt in Government circles that oil was too important a commodity to be left entirely to the oil companies [Sampson 39, p. 51]. This was a major consideration in the British Government's decision to acquire a majority shareholding in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1914, and behind its attempts to gain British 'control' of the Shell group in the early 1920s [Sampson 39, p. 58; Gareth Jones 22, p. 671].

The visit of representatives from the Asiatic Petroleum Company to Mr. F. A. Starling, Director of the Petroleum Department on 20 July 1937 was clearly intended as a reminder to the British Government of its

obligation to maintain a suitable political climate for the operation of these oil companies. These representatives expressed anxiety that industrial strife in Trinidad might spark off further industrial unrest in the Mexican and Venezuelan oilfields, and as a result disrupt oil supplies to the United Kingdom from these countries. This was information

which Starling thought the Colonial Office should have in formulating its

policy on Trinidad. As he observed in a letter to H. Beckett, the head of the West Indian Department:

The outcome of the industrial troubles in Trinidad will doubtless be watched in these other countries and I think you should have the informa

tion I have given as to our very considerable interests in that part of the

world, which are of very great importance to us at the present time and

would be vital in the event of war [87].12

The evidence indicates that Ormsby-Gore took these obligations to

private enterprise into consideration in formulating policy on Trinidad. The trade unionism which he envisaged was one which would be

compatible with the interests of the employer class in the colony. In

the arrangements for the commission of enquiry into the disturbances

Ormsby-Gore would ensure that the labour movement would pose no

threat to capital's control of the economy.




THE FORSTER COMMISSION

Ormsby-Gore with this clear conception of the solutions which the Trinidadian situation demanded saw the commission of enquiry as the means by which they might gain acceptance. He was in a position to achieve this aim beacuse by early July the initiative on the matter of the commission has passed from the Governor to the Colonial Office. The Governor seems to have regarded the appointment of a commission of

enquiry as one method of allaying the initial unrest. For him the commission would be a primarily local one to inquire into events of

purely local significance. Fletcher as Governor had therefore suggested that a commission, to be appointed by himself, should include a chair

man selected by Ormsby-Gore and four local members nominated by himself [56]. Ormsby-Gore had, however, very definite and different views on the composition of the commission. He had expected that it would include at least two members nominated by him. As he observed in a Minute of 6 July, "I had contemplated at least 2 [members] from

here (1 a suitably steady and reliable Chairman) and a moderate Trades Union man" [78].

Ormsby-Gore had Colonial Office support for his objections to Fletcher's proposals. H. Beckett, for example, maintained that there would have to be a Labour representative on the commission appointed from England [46]. The composition of the commission of enquiry was

not, however, the only matter on which Colonial Office had reservations. The method of appointing the commission also came up for discussion. It was felt that a commission of enquiry could not be appointed jointly by the Governor and the Secretary of State [47]. The formula for

membership of the Commission finally agreed on was that there should be two local members nominated by Fletcher and three from the United

Kingdom selected by the Colonial Office. The Commission would be

appointed by and report to the Secretary of State for the Colonies

[Ormsby-Gore 79] .13 What had started out as a local enquiry with a

preponderance of local members had become by early July a commission of enquiry which would reflect the metropolitan perspective on colonial events. In concrete terms it meant that the Colonial Office which had

previously been limited to urging the colonial administration to imple ment labour legislation now had a greater opportunity to influence the course of events.

Ormsby-Gore's, concern to secure industrial stability in Trinidad was the predominating influence in the selection of members of the Commission as well as in the choice of its terms of reference. He antici

pated that a commission of enquiry would recommend the establishment of trade unions which he regarded as essential to the maintenance of industrial peace. Such a proposal, he calculated, would be more

favourably received by both the employers and the working class if recommended by an 'impartial' rather than by a 'representative' commission. Thus Ormsby-Gore and the permanent officials at the Colonial Office ensured that persons with a direct personal interest were

excluded from membership. As he explained in the House of Commons




on 21 July 1937: ...this is to be an entirely impartial inquiry. Neither the employers nor the strikers should be on the Commission, but should give their evidence before it. ...It is essential that this should be an entirely outside inquiry to which all sides can make their representations [62] ,14

There was, however, another pressing reason for establishing the impartial nature of the Commission. The Mediation Committee which had been appointed by Fletcher with H. A. Nankivell, the Acting Colo nial Secretary, as ichairman, had lost the employers' confidence after both men had made speeches in the Legislative Council which colonial investors had deemed to be pro-labour [68].

Ormsby-Gore and the senior Colonial Office officials had clear ideas on the membership of the commission. It was generally agreed that the chairman should be someone with legal experience and possibly connected with industrial courts [48]. Ormsby-Gore had originally proposed that a retired colonial judge be appointed as chairman but, after objections from Fletcher, John Forster had been finally selected. Forster was Deputy Umpire under the Unemployment Acts and acted as Chairman of the Industrial Court. There was also a general consensus that a member should be nominated by the labour movement. This insistence on a labour member on a commission of enquiry of this type

was not unusual in this period. As Alan Bullock observed, by the late 1930s "the right of the T.U.C, to be consulted on any legislation or to be represented on any enquiry dealing with social and industrial matters was taken for granted" [Bullock 8, p. 600]. On this occasion Sir Walter Citrine was asked to recommend a representative from the labour movement [79].

It must not be imagined, however, that the member appointed was intended to champion working class interests in the colony. Ormsby

Gore had earlier specified that the representative of the trade union movement should be a "moderate unionist"

? a phrase which in the context of Britain of the 1930s had special significance. In the years after the General Strike it came to mean a trade unionist who was not convinced of the imminent overthrow of capitalism or the inevitability of conflict between capital and labour. Such a trade unionist was fairly typical of a labour movement in which the leadership had increased their collaboration- with state and management [Hobsbawn 14, pp. 39-40; Cole 12, p. 441]. This leadership also shared along with other sections of British society, the fear of the outbreak of uncontrolled rioting and

revolutionary movements [Branson and Heinemann 6, p. 7; Citrine 11, pp. 316-7].

Ormsby-Gore expected that the trade unions would also appreciate the problems of the investor in the colonial context. He anticipated that this exposure of the trade unionist to the views of the employer class

would come through social contact. Thus he had observed in a letter to Citrine: "I am sure an English Trades Unionist who is a good mixer will be a real help in advising how best we can put the house in order"




[Ormsby-Gore 79]. The trade unionist eventually recommended by Citrine was Sir Arthur Pugh, who had recently retired as General

Secretary of the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation and who had served as Chairman of the General Council of the Trades Union Congress at the time of the General Strike.15

The third 'home' member, it was agreed, should be an ex-colonial civil servant of "wide colonial experience" [49]. Mr. Thomas Fitz gerald, former Postmaster General of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika was selected for this slot. It was assumed by the Colonial Office officials that Fitzgerald's experience with an African and East Indian labour force in the East African colonies would give him special insight into Trinidad's labour problems. The two remaining members of the commission were Fletcher's nominees. One of these local members was Mr. G. A. Jones, Commissioner of Agriculture at the Imperial College of

Agriculture, and the other was a black Trinidadian, Mr. Kenneth Vincent Brown, Third Puisne Judge in the colony.

It is important to note that all the London members of the Commission had practical experience in labour relations. This was in

keeping with the Colonial Office view that the Trinidadian problem was largely a labour problem. Despite Ormsby-Gore's claim that the commission would be an impartial one, Colonial Office officials knew before their departure for Trinidad, that these members were "pro labour" [53]. This was a description, however, which merely indicated that they accepted the necessity for establishing trade unions.

Ormsby-Gore announced the terms of reference for the Commission on 21 June 1937. The commissioners were directed to:

...inquire into and report upon the origin and character of the recent disturbances in the Colony of Trinidad and Tobago and all matters relating thereto, to consider the adequacy of the steps taken to deal with these disturbances, and to make recommendations [Foster Report 85, p. 3 Intro.].

These terms of reference reflected the Colonial Office's perception of Trinidad's problems for it sought to focus attention on the disturbances as a mere labour dispute rather than as an event which had its origins in

underlying social and economic issues.16 It is also clear that the Commission was expected to investigate Fletcher's handling of the disturbances. This directive was the Colonial Office's response to the adverse criticisms by the employer class, of Fletcher's efforts to settle the dispute. This aspect of the Commission's duties explains the

appointment of two members with legal qualifications and experience who were accustomed "to testing and dealing with evidence" [63].

Forster's Recommendations

The report of the Forster Commission was published in February 1938. It recommended the establishment of trade unions and machinery for conciliation of labour disputes in the colony. The trade union move

ment which the members of the Commission evisaged, however, was one which would be subject to the control of the colonial administration in




the early stages of its development. The commissioners felt that the workers would need the guidance and assistance of the local administra tion in the organization of trade unions:

While ... every encouragement should be given to the growth of authorized Unions along recognised Trade Union lines, some means must be found to

protect such Unions from the errors of inexperience during the transition

stage between their inception and the time when they are fully capable of negotiating unaided direct with employers [Foster Report 85, pp. 87-8 ].

Thus the Forster Commission recommended the creation of a labour department which would be responsible for the regulation of trade unions among other things. This department, they suggested, should be given wide discretionary powers. The department would, for

example, be able to withhold the registration of trade unions, if the

Secretary of Labour felt that the 'credentials' of persons seeking to

register unions were unsatisfactory [85].17

It is clear from the recommendations cited that the commissioners had balanced the obvious need to provide some institutional arrangement for settling labour disputes and the expressed view of the private investors that certain restraints would have to be imposed on trade union activities. The Commission had visited the colony in September and October of 1937 when employers were especially fearful that they were

losing control of labour to the emerging trade unions [57]. By the time of the arrival of the Forster Commission in September two trade unions

representing the oil workers and the sugar workers had been formed with A. C. Rienzi, and East Indian lawyer, as president of both organizations [Singh 40, pp. 453-5]. The business class was anxious about the

dominating influence of Rienzi, who controlled the workers of the two most important sectors of the economy. Sir Lennox O'Reilly, an un official member of the Legislative Council and legal adviser to the oil and sugar industries, was representing the business point of view when he observed on 7 October 1937 that,

We are presented at one stroke with two fully developed Trade Unions, and this is the alarming part. What one should like to see is the establish

ment by gradual and easy stages of unions capable of expressing the

collective wishes of the workers, and not to register the decisions of a

President who is not a worker and who has no part or lot in industry [Fletcher 57].

It was obviously in an effort to allay the fears of the colony's employer class that the commissioners had given the labour department power to refuse registration to those labour organizations led by militants.

These recommendations were received with enthusiasm by colonial investors and by the Colonial Office. In the House of Lords, for example, the Duke of Montrose, the Chairman of one of the colony's oil

companies, pledged his co-operation in the implementation of the commissioners' recommendations [70]. The Colonial Office position on




trade union development was stated in a memorandum of May 1938.

"Undoubtedly there must come considerable Trade Union development in the West Indies; but the fact is that at present Trade Union leaders of the English type do not exist and it is a little dangerous to force the pace unduly" (my emphasis) [73] .18

As that statement suggests, the Colonial Office officials had taken into consideration the implications of trade union militancy for the

colony's oil industry. Thus both colonial investors and the Colonial Office felt most comfortable with the type of trade unions proposed by the Commission. As Aneurin Bevan, Labour M.P. and Trade unionist, perceptively remarked during the parliamentary debate on the report of the Forster Commission:

... these trade unions are to be registered, and the purpose of that, we are

told by the report, is that, as these people have had no experience in

managing unions and might run amuck, they are not, therefore, to have

independent unions, but certificated unions, in other words they are to have good unions. Those unions that are led by good boys will be registered and will negotiate with the employers, and those unions that are led by bad boys, like Uriah Butler, will not be registered at all; in other words, you will have tame unions, unions that the employers want (my emphasis) [64].

THE ROYAL COMMISSION The strikes and disturbances in Trinidad and Barbados in June and

July 1937 had been followed by the establishment of commissions of

enquiry to investigate the causes of these events. There were, however, parliamentary demands for a general commission to enquire into West Indian conditions. Some Labour M.P.s asked initially for a commission to examine colonial labour conditions. But with the publication of the reports of the Trinidad and Barbados Commissions, the Labour lobby came to demand a more wide-ranging investigation. These reports had revealed that the origins of the disturbances lay not merely in the absence of institutional arrangements for collective bargaining but also in social and economic grievances. These Labour requests for a general commission of enquiry were reinforced by similar demands from a small

group of Conservative M.Ps. acting as a sugar lobby. They complained that, coritrary to expectations, the international commodity arrange

ment of 1937 had resulted in a slump rather than an increase sugar prices. These M.P.s expect?d that a commission to the West Indies would inevitably result in greater British Government aid to the sugar industry.19

The Colonial Office resisted for some time the pressures for a general Commission. In May 1938, for example, the members of the West Indian Department of the Colonial Office decided against a commission which might, they feared, recommend measures which the British Government would be unwilling to finance [73]. They anticipated that Treasury officials, who regarded a balanced budget as a




necessary prerequisite for a return to economic prosperity, would not entertain any proposals for increased financial assistance to the West Indian colonies.

By early June, however, the Colonial Office stance on the matter of a West Indian Commission had changed. This change of outlook is best explained by colonial events. The island-wide disturbances in Jamaica late May alerted the previously complacent Colonial Office to the dangers of contagion and the need for a policy of containment of such outbreaks. It was also with this awareness of the threat of revolution from the periphery of the colonial empire, that senior Treasury officials endorsed, in June 1938, the Colonial Office proposal for a Royal Commission to the West Indies. They had come to accept the idea that this Commission would result in further demands on the British

Exchequer [Wardley 94; Hophins 59]. 20 On 14 June 1938 the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Malcolm MacDonald, announced in the House of Commons the Government's intention to appoint a Royal Commission to the West Indies [65].

Political Reasons

What purposes did the Colonial Office expect the Royal Commis sion to the West Indies to serve? Doubts were expressed about its useful ness at the time of the announcement of the Commission. The Spectator, for example, had observed with honest scepticism:

It may be doubted whether yet another enquiry on this scale is necessary The relevant information is already available, further delay may cause further trouble and speed is of the essence of the problem when condi tions have become intolerable [91 ].

The evidence indicates that the Colonial Office had decided on a commission after considering the kinds of issues raised by the Spectator. The Colonial Office officials admitted in a memorandum prepared in June 1938 that they already had information, from a wide range of sources, with which they could formulate policy towards the West Indian colonies [74]. The fact is that the Royal Commission to the West Indies was appointed, to use Cartwright's categories, for "political" rather than for "substantial" reasons [Cartwright 9, p. 84].

Colonial Office officials had carefully calculated what the responses to the appointment of the Commission would be. The mere announce

ment of a Royal Commission to the West Indies was expected to restore calm to the West Indian colonies in general and to Jamaica in particular [71;74]. They felt that the appointment of this Commission would reinforce the carefully nurtured impression that the British Government was genuinely concerned with the best interests of the colonial popula tion. This action was also intended to mollify domestic critics of the Government who had pressed for a comprehensive enquiry into West Indian conditions [71;74]. The Colonial Office viewpoint on these functions of the Royal Commission was best expressed by Sir Henry

Moore in a note prepared late in May:




From the departmental view its chief immediate advantage would be the beneficial political effect it would have both in the West Indies and at home in assuring the public that His Majesty's Government was prepared to take a hand in West Indian problems on a long range basis...[76].21

More important, however, was the hope of the Colonial Office officials that the appointment of a commission, with the promise of

positive action to improve colonial conditions, would provide supporting evidence for Britain's claim to being a 'benevolent' colonial power. This was important at a time when Britain's colonial record was being openly criticized by Germany and Italy and less overtly by the Americans

[Johnson 19, pp. 69-70] .2 2 The Colonial Office clearly recognized the propaganda value of the establishment of the Commission.

The major function of the Royal Commission was to gain wide acceptance for a course of action which Colonial Office officials had decided was expedient. They were convinced that the underlying cause of the colonial disturbances was the low standard of economic and social conditions in the colonies. They traced this situation to the depression in the dominant agricultural sector. The solution to these problems, as they saw it, would lie not in temporary palliatives but in a "longterm policy of reconstruction" in the West Indian colonies. This policy would involve an expansion of the social services, aid to revive the staple agricultural industries, and the creation of new job opportunities for the colonial population by diversifying the economy. It was recognized that the British Government would have to assume some financial responsi bility for the schemes since most colonies would be unable to finance them from normal revenues [74]. The Colonial Office's response to the colonial crises may be described as channelling revolution along paths of peaceful reform by providing cash [See Steel 43, p. 2?5].

These proposals did represent a significant change in Colonial Office

thinking on colonial development. Up to this point it had been the

widely accepted view in government circles (in the Colonial Office as

well as the Treasury) that a colony should have only those social services which it could finance from its own revenues. While the Colonial

Development Act of 1929 had provided loans and grants to the colonies for economic development there had been no comparable assistance for the provision of welfare services [Johnson 19, pp. 64-5]. The Colonial

Office, at this stage, accepted the principle that the British Government should help to finance schemes of economic development and social welfare which the colonies could not afford. One Treasury official estimated in June 1938 that the annual expenditure on aid to the West Indian colonies could amount to as much as ?500,000 [94].

The generosity of these proposals, by the standards of those times, should not, however, obscure the fact that economic benefits were

expected to accrue to the British economy. Implicit in the plan for the reconstruction of the West Indian economy was the recognition that these colonies would then become better markets for British products.




It ought to be remembered that the sharp decline in the price of primary products had ruined the primary producing colonies as markets for British manufactured goods. This connection between colonial economic revival and metropolitan prosperity was later explicitly stated in a Colonial Office document of 1939: "Apart from the question of

moral responsibility the general advancement of the Colonial people is of direct material benefit to the Colonial powers"[88].

These proposals were fully endorsed by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet but Colonial Office officials anticipated the opposition of Parliament and the British public to a policy whose implementation would impose "new burdens on the Exchequer" [54]. In the first place parliamentarians and the British public having little knowledge of or interest in the colonies were unlikely to prove sympathetic to an

expensive scheme to improve colonial conditions especially at a time when there were domestic economic problems requiring attention. It is true that the Colonial Development Act of 1929, nominally an

attempt to aid colonial development, had gained bipartisan support and

public approval. But it should be remembered that the primary (and often stated) objective of this legislation was to provide jobs in heavy industry for unemployed British workers [Brett 7, p. 131].

In the second place, Labour politicians in particular could be

expected to counter proposals for further financial assistance to the colonies by pointing to the prior claims of the 'special areas' in Britain itself. During the 1930s the essentially conservative National Govern

ment had remained largely indifferent to the plight of the 'special areas' ?

those areas in the North and the Celtic fringe which, according to Robert Skidelsky, accounted for about 60 per cent of abnormal un

employment in the interwar years [Skidelsky 41, p. 7; Miller 31, pp. 465-72].

The National Government did eventually adopt a programme of aid to the depressed areas in 1934, but this scheme was circumscribed by the limited funds made available and the restrictions on the use of these funds [Mowat 32, p. 466; Branson and Heinemann 6, pp. 57-60]. Leaders of the labour movement, who had constantly urged the govern ment to take action to restore the depressed areas, were not slow in

pointing out the inadequacies of this legislation. Ernest Bevin,23 in a

speech to the annual T.U.C. Conference in 1935, had compared unfavourably the financial provisions made for the 'special areas' with those made for the colonies under the Colonial Development Act of 1929:

It was easy for the Colonial Development Committee to advance money to build the Zambesi Bridge to link Nyasaland with Portuguese East Africa... but we cannot get a bridge across the Severn and cannot get a road

developed because of the regulations that have been laid down [Bullock 8, p. 542].

Bevin had, in this statement, expressed more than an individual

opinion. It must have occurred to MacDonald and his permanent officials that these plans might attract further criticisms of this nature




from the labour movement. Finally, the National Government had come

to office pledged to a policy of 'national economy' [Macmillan 28, p. 96]. Thus it would have to justify to its own supporters this new

expenditure. From this appraisal of the domestic political environment the

Colonial Office decided that a Royal Commission would aid in building public support for the proposed change in policy. A Royal Commission was deliberately chosen by the Colonial Office to indicate to Parliament and the British electorate the importance of West Indian problems [74]. The officials were confident that the commission, after its deliberations, would conclude that West Indian problems could only be solved by large-scale financial assistance

? a view shared by the leading newspapers and periodicals [90;91;92]. Such a recommendation made by an

independent and prestigious commission of inquiry would, they believed, receive a far more favourable reception that the announcement of a Colonial Office decision [74] The Commission's main educative function was that it would, in its report, give an indication of how it had arrived at this recommendation. 24 This was certainly the expectation of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir John Simon, who had observed in June 1938 that a Royal Commission would have to provide "a full

explanation" for any recommendations of a large subsidy to the Wes? Indian colonies [54]. This aspect of the Commission's functions was

perhaps best described by Lord Olivier. Dismissing the idea that the commission had been set up primarily to gather information on West Indian conditions, Olivier observed:

Most members of Parliament are ... like their constituents, exceedingly ignorant about West Indian affairs; and as the British Government will

certainly have to face demands for financial help at the cost of the British

Exchequer or of the British consumers, if the present state of affairs in the West Indies is not to continue, whether the Colonial Office makes such demands on its own judgement or on the strength of a Report next year by a Royal Commission the Cabinet no doubt thinks it prudent to have the backing of some document to comfort the conscience of its party supporters, to say nothing of mitigating the Liberal opposition or the grumbling of Labour politicians who may point out that their constituents, including co-operative consumers, the un-employed, the slum-dwellers and the denizens of the special areas, may have prior claims to consideration at the cost of the British public [34, pp. 1-2].

The selection of the members of the commission, which was largely MacDonald's responsibility, reflected the main objective of the National

Government in setting up the commission: to dissipate opposition to the

change in colonial policy. 'Disinterested' experts were appointed to

ensure that the findings of the commission would be regarded as

authoritative. Representatives of major affected interests were selected

in order to make the report acceptable to a wide cross-section of the

British public. The Colonial Office officials had agreed that "any




Commission appointed should be composed of persons of standing and of wide experience"[74]. However, more specific considerations also

guided MacDonald in his choice of members, as a brief examination of their careers will show.

Lord Moyne was chosen as chairman of the Commission. He was a well-known political figure who had had a distinguished political career. Prior to his elevation to the peerage in 1932, Moyne, as Walter Guiness, was M.P. for Bury St. Edmunds from 1907 to 1931 and had held several

political offices ? most recently as Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries

from 1925 to 1929. An obviously important consideration in his choice as chairman was his record as a committee man. He had acted as chair man of the departmental committee on housing in 1933, of the Royal Commission on the University of Durham in 1934, and of the depart mental committee on British films in 1936. In the colonial context

Moyne had also served as chairman of the Financial Mission to Kenya in 1932 [Legg and Williams 23, p. 333].

MacDonald selected commissioners who were, in his view, qualified to consider the various aspects of West Indian problems. Among those chosen were Dr. Mary Blacklock and Dame Rachel Crowdy. The evidence indicates that MacDonald had made a conscious effort to include women on the commission [58].

Dr. Mary Blacklock was an expert in tropical medicine. She had served as a medical officer in Sierra Leone and as Professor of Pathology at Lady Hardinge College, Delhi. At the time of her appointment Dr. Blacklock was a member of the Colonial Advisory Committee, and Curator of the Museum of the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine.

Dame Rachel Crowdy was a distinguished social worker with international experience. She had been Chief of the Social Questions and Opium Traffic Section of the Leag?e of Nations from 1919 to 1931 and was more recently a member of the Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture of Arms, 1935 ?1936.

Sir Edward Stubbs, unlike the other, commissioners, had first-hand

experience of the West Indies. He had served as Governor of Jamaica from 1926 to 1932 and had continued to take an active interest in West Indian affairs. In 1938 he was a member of the West India Committee and of the Jamaica Imperial Association [95].

The commission had two representatives from the academic world. Hurbert Henderson was an economist and a Research Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. He had been Joint Secretary of the Economic

Advisory Council from 1930 to 1934 and as such 'unofficial' economic advisor to the Government [Skidelsky 41, p. 206]. His practical ex perience in government must have been regarded by MacDonald as a

distinct advantage.

The other academic appointment was that of Professor F. L.

Engledow, Drapers' Professor of Agriculture at Cambridge University and head of the Cambridge School of Agriculture. Engledow had a knowledge of tropical agricultural conditions. At this time he was a




member of the Colonial Advisory Committee of Agriculture and Animal Health and had visited several areas of the Colonial Empire including the West Indies. He was also a member of the governing body of the

Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture. Engledow was selected after MacDonald had decided that the commission should include a person of some standing in the agricultural world qualified to speak "with

authority on agricultural matters" [72]. MacDonald was careful to include on the Commission representa

tives of "major bodies of opinion and interests" with no single interest predominating [Jackson 16, p. 388]. Sir Walter Citrine, General

Secretary of the Trades Union Congress since 1926 and President of the International Federation of Trade Unions since 1928, was the representa tive of the labour movement. This was an astute choice because Citrine

was influential not only in the trade union movement but also within the Labour Party, which had come to be dominated in the 1930s by the trade unions. As Henry Pelling has noted:

In this period of disorder among the more committed Socialists and intellectuals the General Council of the T.U.C, under the leadership of

Bevin and Citrine abandoned its usual role of being the sheet anchor of the

party and instead moved in to take the helm [Pelling 36, pp. 76-7; Brand 5, p. 161].

Sir Percy MacKinnon, a member of Lloyds, of which he had on several occasions served as Chairman, was, it can be assumed, the re presentative of the City. MacDonald must have hoped that the City, which had throughout the 1930s urged domestic retrenchment, would be willing to accept a recommendation for financial assistance to the colonies from a commission on which one of their members had sat. But MacKinnon was more than the representative of the major financial interests. As a former director of British Airways Ltd. with a practical knowledge of aviation, his- appointment reflected the interest of the officials of the General Department, in particular, in the establishment of a British West Indian air service [50;96] ,25

Finally there were two representatives from the major political parties. The appointment of Morgan Jones, Labour M.P. for Caerphilly and a trade unionist was balanced by that of Ralph Assheton, Conserva tive M.P. for Rushcliffe, Nottinghamshire and a member of the Stock Exchange. These appointments represented more than a balance between the political parties; they also provided a balance between individuals from different class backgrounds.26 Both Morgan and

Assheton could be regarded as typical parliamentary representatives of their respective parties [Ross 38, p. 76].

Recommendations

Gordon Lewis has commented that the members of the Moyne Commission were "hardly fiery revolutionaries" [Lewis 26, p. 88]. They were not intended to be. MacDonald and his permanent officials calculated that a report recommending a change in colonial policy would




have greater authority coming from persons with "the basic conservatism of personal success" and who would view colonial problems from within the system of values shared by most members of British society [Hanser 14, p. 176].

There was one notable omission in the membership of the Royal Commission

? a member from the West Indies. There is no evidence that MacDonald had even contemplated nominating one.27 One is left to speculate about the reasons for this omission. It is possible to argue that this Commission was aimed primarily at convincing the British public of the wisdom of potentially expensive solutions to West Indian problems and was thus composed of persons known to them. However, the more convincing explanation is that Colonial Office officials were

deliberately catering to the prejudices of the colonial population who were more likely to accept the recommendations of a commission comprised of men of status in British society rather than one including local representatives [See Lewis 26, p. 91].

As MacDonald had remarked, in the House of Commons, with a fine sense of public relations, "... I hope that the names of the members of this Commission ... will in themselves be an assurance to the people of the Colonies which they are to visit that His Majesty's Government are serious in their efforts to grapple with their problems in an adequate way" [66].

The terms of reference for the Moyne Commission were decided on

by MacDonald after consultation with Moyne. The Commission was invited to "investigate social and economic conditions in Barbados, British Guiana, British Honduras, Jamaica, the Leeward Islands, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Windward Islands, and matters connected there with, and to make recommendations" [67].

In contrast with those of the Forster Commission these terms of reference wer? wide. The Colonial Office officials were, in fact, inviting the Commission to recapitulate, for the benefit of the British public, the social and economic conditions existing in the colonies. It was on these social and economic problems that the Colonial Office wished to focus the commission's attentions. Thus political and constitutional problems

were not included in the terms of reference. MacDonald felt that these questions should be considered only as far as they affected "social and economic progress" [83].

The Moyne Commission did report as the Colonial Office had expected. Although the full report was not made publicly available until 1945, the recommendations of the Commission were published in February of 1940. In a passage from these recommendations which echoed the Colonial Office's earlier analysis of West Indian problems the commissioners observed: "There is a pressing need for large expenditure on social services and development which not even the least poor of the

West Indian Colonies can hope to undertake from their own resources." It was for this reason that the Moyne Commission recommended a grant of ?1,000,000 by the British Government to finance social and economic




development in the colonies [84].

CONCLUSION The strikes and riots of the late 1930s in the British West Indies had

a wider imperial significance. Trinidad's oilfields were important to the British Government's programme of military preparedness for war, and the disturbances, in general, focussed embarrassing attention on British colonial performance in the West Indies.

In Trinidad Ormsby-Gore decided to promote the establishment of

"responsible" trade unions and labour administration as the best method of achieving settled labour relations in the colony's oilfields. The solution to regional problems was seen as a long-term policy of recon struction which the British Government would help to finance.

The main function of both the Forster and the Moyne Commission was to facilitate the introduction of these defensive reforms. The Forster Commission was expected to recommend the labour legislation which Ormsby-Gore desired. The Moyne Commission, on the other

hand, was expected to provide public support for metropolitan financial assistance to the colonies in a time of financial stringency.

There are two other important points which should be made about the use of commissions of enquiry in the colonial context. The Colonial Office relied on the myth of the imperial government, acting through the commission of enquiry, as a neutral intermediary. In the case of both the Forster and the Moyne Commissions the British Government sought to convey to the colonial population the impression that commissions of

enquiry appointed from London brought to their duties objectivity and detachment. The evidence suggests that the projection of this useful image of commissions of enquiry did increase colonial receptivity to their recommendations [Singh 40, p. 453].

Finally, the Colonial Office used the commission of enquiry as a mechanism for introducing change in the colonies along desired lines without appearing to impose Colonial Office solutions. Colonial Office officials were, in this period, especially sensitive about seeming to govern the colonies from the metropolis when constitutional responsibility for the administration of the colonies rested with the colonial govern

ments. 28

As Sir Cosmo Parkinson, then Permanent Under-Secretary of State in the Colonial Office, remarked in 1939, "it will be fatal if we ever allow ourselves to be forced into the position, or drift into the position, of attempting to govern any part of the Colonial Empire from Downing Street" [Parkinson81; Moore 75].




FOOTNOTES

1 There has been, by contrast, a revival of scholarly interest in the role of ad hoc advisory bodies in policy making in Britain in recent years. See, for example, Chapman [10]; Rhodes [37]; Cartwright [9].

2For the sequence of these disturbances see Report of West India Royal Commission [86, p. 196].

^Sydney Olivier (First Baron Olivier) had served as a permanent official in the Colonial Office and later m Governor of Jamaica. Olivier was created a peer in 1924 and was in the same year appointed Secretary of State for India in the Labour Qovernment. In 1929 he was appointed Chairman of the West Indian Sugar Commis sion. He was, at this time, one of the Labour Party's leading spokesman on colonial (especially West Indian) issues.

4These backbenchers included Arthur Creech Jones (M.P. for Shipley), David Adams (M.P. for Durham, Consett), Ben Riley (M.P. for Dewsbury), T.W. Sorensen (M.P. for West Leyton), Wilfred Paling (M.P. for Wentworth), George Ridley (M.P. for Clay Cross), George Mathers (M.P. for Linlithgowshire). For a discussion of the activities of these backbench Labour M.P.s see Johnson [19, pp. 57-9]. See also Malmsten [29, pp. 190-3].

5J. H. Emmens, a Principal in the West Indian Department of the Colonial Office commented in a Minute of 10 th Sept., 1938: "In my experience it is always the case, when there has been a disturbance in a Colony, for a local enquiry of some sort to be held, and for Parliament to press for one" [52].

6For a useful discussion of the importance of oil in the wartime context see Jensen [ 7 ].

7For an extended discussion of this subject see Johnson [18, pp. 43-4].

^The Royal Air Force and the air defence of Britain were of central im portance in the British rearmament programme. As Corelli Bar nett has remarked: "...rearmament in Britain was dominated throughout its course by an obsession with air power. It was the comparative progress of the Luftwaffe and the R.A.F. which fascinated the attention of most governmental discussions on rearmament..." Barnett [4, p. 494]. See also Smith [41, p. 153].

^Lord Cadman, the Chairman of Anglo-Persian Oil Company, was later in 1937 to describe the top colonial and metropolitan executives of Trinidad Leaseholds Ltd., as having *a South African Gold-mining complex about "niggers*

' [Parkinson 81].

* ̂Present at this meeting were representatives of the oil, agricultural and commercial interests in the Colony.

nThe Foreign Office had, for example, intervened on behalf of British oil companies operating in Mexico and Venezuela in the late 1930s. As F. A. Starling, Director of the Petroleum Department had remarked: "It is not our job to enter into the details of these industrial troubles, but we have in the past year or two had to ask the Foreign Office in several occasions to get our Ministers in these countries to help the oil companies in meeting some of the difficulties which have arisen" [87].

This close relationship between government and oil companies is not limited to Britain. For a discussion of the American situation see Barnet [3, pp. 198-205].

12The Asiatic Petroleum Company was the marketing company for the Royal Dutch/Shell group. It should be noted that in 1937 both major British oil companies




(Royal Dutch/Shell and the Anglo-Persian Company) had financial interests in two of the colony's oil companies. See Baptiste [2] ; and Elwell-Sutton [13, p. 47].

was found necessary to pass a special ordinance authorising the Secretary of State for the Colonies to appoint the commission of inquiry. The ordinance in existence at that time permitted only the Governor of the colony to appoint commis sions of inquiry. Forster Report [83, p. 5 Intro.]; Minute by A. H. Poynton [82].

14An 'impartial' commission in this context is a commission which includes no individuals with a direct personal interest. A Representative' commission, on the other hand, is one on which persons representing groups or organisations with an interest are intentionally selected for membership.

1 ̂ Citrine's biography of Pugh gives some insight into his reasons for choosing Pugh as the trade-union movement's representative. According to Citrine: "Pugh was a born conciliator and did much to promote the good relations which existed between the workers and the trade unions in the iron and steel industry and the em

ployers" [Williams and Palmer 45, p. 828 ].

l^The members of the Forster Commission pointed out, in their report, the norrowness of the terms of reference:

Lest it be felt that we have placed a wider interpretation on our terms of reference than they might at first appear to be capable of bearing, we desire to explain that our investigations have led us to the conclusion that the true causes of the disturbances had such wide ramifications throughout the entire structure of the Colony as to make it essential for us to treat of our subject on a comprehensive scale [Forster Report 85, p. 7 Intro.].

17The commissioners also took a conservative line on the question of wages in the oilfields. They argued that though the financially successful companies could afford increase in wage rates a general increase would dislocate the industry.

18ln this memorandum prepared by the permanent officials of the West Indian

Department the main conclusions of the Forster Commission on wages and trade union activities had been quoted with approval.

19The sugar lobby included Conservative M.P s like Captain Arthur Evans

(M.P. for South Cardiff), Major H. A. Procter (M. P. for Accrington), and F. A.

Macquisten (M. P. for Argyll) [Johnson 19, p. 59].

20Wardley was a Principal and Sir Richard Hopkins, Second Secretary in the

Treasury.

21sir Henry Moore was an Assistant Under-Secretary in the Colonial Office.

22 During the depression years the traditional American hostility to the British

Empire had been reinforced by the decision taken by the British and the Dominions at Ottawa in 1932 to establish preferential tariffs. By these Ottawa Agreements American Manufacturers, who were searching for foreign markets, were shut out of the lucrative markets of the Empire. Thus a major objective of United States' foreign economic policy of the late 1930s was to prise open the British Empire to American trade Medlicott [30, pp. 288-9]; Kimball [23, pp. 232-259] ; Amery [l,pp. 203-4].

23 Bevin had been General Secretary of the Transport and General Workers




Union since 1921.

See Gerald Rhodes' perceptive comments on the "educative effect" of commissions of inquiry Rhodes [37, pp. 203-4].

J. A. Calder was an Assistant Secretary in the Colonial Office.

Morgan Jones was the son of a miner while the evidence suggests that Assheton was from an upper middle-class background. He was educated at Eton and Christ Church, Oxford.

MacDonald clearly intended to have this class balance. His earliest list of possible members of the commission had included D. R. Grenfell and Tom Williams, Labour M.P s who had both been miners and trade unionists, and Lord Cranborne, son of the

Marquis of Salisbury. [50 ?

CO. 318/433. File No. 71168 (Undated and numbered 21 in that file].

MacDonald did, however, attempt to secure a Canadian member for the Commission [89].

28 Thus Sir Cosmo Parkinson noted in 1947: 'It is sometimes supposed that

the Secretary of State administers colonial territories. That is a complete misunder

standing of the position. Colonies are administered by the colonial governments, that is the constitutional position and that is the factual position' [80, p. 63].

FOOTNOTES

[1] AMERY, Leopold, My Political Life, Vol. Ill: The Unforgiving Years 1929-1940, London: Hutchinson, 1955.

[2] BAPTISTE, Fitzroy A., "New War Technologies, New War Resources and the Changing United States' Politico

Strategic Assessment of the British and other European Colonies in the Caribbean Area, 1914-1939", paper pre sented to the 10th Conference of Caribbean Historians held at the College of the Virgin Islands, 26 March

- 1

April, 1978.

[3] BARNET, Richard J., Roots of War, New York: penguin, 1976.

[4] BARNETT, Corelli, The Collapse of British Power, London: Eyre Methuen, 1972.

[5] BRAND, C. F., The British Labour Party, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965.




[6] BRANSON, Noreen and HEINEMANN, Margot, Britain in the Nineteen Thirties, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971.

[7] BRETT, E. A., Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa, New York, 1973.

[8] BULLOCK, Alan, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, Vol. I, London: Heinemann, 1960.

[9] CARTWRIGHT, T. J., Royal Commissions and Departmental Committees in Britain, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1975.

[10] CHAPMAN, Richard A. (ed.), The Role of Commissions in Policy Making, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1973.

[11] CITRINE, Lord, Men and Work, London: Hutchinson, 1964.

[12] COLE, G. D. H., A Short History of the British Working-Class Movement (revised edition), London: George Allen and

Unwin, 1952.

[13] ELWELL-SUTTON, L. P., Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1955.

[14] HANSER, Charles J., Guide to Decision: The Royal Commission, Totowa, New Jersy : The Bedminster Press, 1965.

[15] HOBSBAWN, E. J., "Trends in the British Labour Movement since 1850", in Labouring Men, London: Weidenfeld and

Nicolson, 1964.

[16] JACKSON, R. M., "Royal Commissions and Committees of Enquiry", The Listener, 12 April 1956.

[17] JENSEN, W. G., "The Importance of Energy in the First and Second World Wars", The Historical Journal, Vol. 11. No.

3, 1968.

[18] JOHNSON, Howard, "Oil, Imperial Policy and the Trinidad Dis turbances, 1937", The Journal of Imperial and Common wealth History, Vol. 4, No. 1,1975.

[19] _, The West Indies and the Conversion of the British Official Classes to the Development Idea", The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 15, No. 1, 1977.



THE FORSTER AND E COMMISSIONS 279

[20] JONES, Edwin, "Tendencies and Change in Caribbean Adminis trative Systems", Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2, 1975.

[21] JONES, Edwin and MILLS, G. E., "Institutional Innovation and Change in the Commonwealth Caribbean", Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4, 1976.

[22] JONES, T. Gareth, "The British Government and the Oil Com panies 1912-1924: The Search for an Oil Policy", The Historical Journal Vol. 20, No. 3, 1977.

[23] KIMBALL, Warren F., "Land-Lease and the Open Door: The Temptation of British Opulence, 1937-1942", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 86, No. 2, 1971.

[24] KINDLEBERGER, Charles, The World in Depression 1929 1939,. London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1973.

[25] LEGG, L. G. Wicfcham and WILLIAMS, E. J. (eds.). Dictionary of National Biography, 1941-50, London: Oxford Univer sity Press, 1959.

[26] LEWIS, Gordon, The Growth of the Modern West Indies, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969.

[27] LEWIS, W. Arthur, Labour in the West Indies, London: Victor Gollancz, 1939.

[28] MACMILLAN, Harold, The Past Masters: Politics and Politicians 1906-1939, New York: Macmillan, 1975.

[29] MALMSTEN, Neal R., "The British Labour Party and the West Indies 1918-39", The Journal of Imperial and Common wealth History, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1977.

[30] MEDLICOTT, W. ., Contemporary England 1914-1964, London: Longmans, 1968.

[31] MILLER, Frederic M., "The Unemployment Policy of the National Government, 1931-1936", The Historical Jour nal, Vol. 19, No, 2,1976.

[32] MOW AT, Charles Loch, Britain Between the Wars 1918-1940, London: Methuen, 1962.

[33] OLIVIER, Lord Sydney, "The Scandal of West Indian Labour Conditions", Contemporary Review, Vol. 153, 1938.




[34] -, "The Truth about the West Indies", The Nine teenth Century and After, July 1938.

[35] PARKINSON, Sir Cosmo, The Colonial Office from Within 1909-1945, London: Faber and Faber, 1947.

[36] PELLING, Henry, A Short History of the Labour Party, London: Macmillan, 1961.

[37] RHODES, Gerald, Committees of Inquiry, London'; George Allen and Unwin, 1975.

[38] ROSS, J. F. S., Parliamentary Representation, London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1943.

[39] SAMPSON, Anthony, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Com panies and the World They Made, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1975.

[40] SINGH, Kelvin, "Economy and Polity in Trinidad, 1917-38: The Influence of Ethnic, Class and Imperial Factors", Ph.D. Thesis, University of the West Indies, 1975.

[41] SKIDELSKY, Robert, Politicians and the Slump, London: Macmillan, 1967.

[42] SMITH, Malcolm, "The Royal Air Force, Air Power and British Foreign Policy, 1932-37", The Journal of Contemporary

History, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1977.

[43] STEEL, Ronald, Pax Americana, New York: Viking Press, 1971.

[44] TUGENDHAT, Christopher, Oil: The Biggest Business, London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1968.

[45] WILLIAMS, E. T. and PALMER, Helen M (?ds.), Dictionary of National Biography, 1951 960, London: Oxford Univer? sity Press, 1971.

Official Documents

[46] BECKETT, H., Minute CO. 295/600, File No. 70307 6 June 1937.

[47] _, Minute, C. O. 295/600, File No 70307, 8 June 1937.

[48] _, Minute, C. O. 295/600, F?e No. 70307, 13 July 1937.




[49] BOYD, E. M., C. O. 295/600, F?e No. 70307, 19 July 1937 [to Thomas FITZGERALD].

[50] CALDER, J. A., Minute, C. O. 318/433, File No. 71168, 27 May 1938.

[51] CAMPBELL, Sir John, Minute, C. O. 318/433, File No. 71168, 23 May 1938.

[52] EMMENS, J. H., Minute, C. O. 137/826, F?e No. 68868, 10 September 1938.

[53] _, Minute, C. O. 295/600, F?e No. 70307/1, 19 October 1937.

[54] "EXTRACT from Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, on Wednesday, the 15th of June, 1938," C. 0:318/433, File No. 71168.

[55] FLETCHER, Minute, C. O. 295/599, File No. 70297, pt. 2, 26 June 1937, [to ORMSBY-GORE, Conf.].

[56] _, Minute, C. O. 295/599, File No. 70297, pt. 1, 5 July 1937, Tel. No. 140 fto ORMSBY-GORE].

[57] _, C. O. 295/600, File No. 70307/1, 24 October 1937, [to ORMSBY-GORE, Secret].

[58] HOLMES, M. G., Letter, 26 June 1938, [to Sir COSMO PARKINSON].

[59] HOPKINS, Sir Richard, Minute, T. 161/853, File No. S43411, 11 June 1938.

[60] HOUSE OF COMMONS Debates, 5th Series, Vol. 325, 1634, 28 June 1937.

[61] _, Debates, 5th Series, Vol. 325, 1796, 29 June 1937.

[62] _, Debates, 5th Series, Vol. 326, 2191, Undated.

[63] _, Debates, 5th Series, Vol. 332, 831, 28 February 1938.

[64] _, Debates, 5th Series, Vol. 332, 851, 28 February 1938.

[65] _, Debates, 5th Series, Vol. 337, 93, Undated.




[66] _, 5th Series, Vol. 338, 3341, 28 July 1938.

[67] _, 5th Series, Vol. 338, 3299, Undated.

[68] _, 5th Series, Vol. 106,1062, 29 July 1937.

[69] HOUSE OF LORDS DEBATES, 5th Series, Vol. 106, 1066-7, Undated.

[70] _, 5th Series, Vol. 107, 850, 23 February 1938.

[71] MacDONALD, Malcolm, Minute, T. 161/853, F?e No. S43411, 10 June 1938, [to Sir John SIMON].

[721 _, Minute, C. O. 318/433, F?e No. 71168, 6 July 1938 [to Rt. Hon. W. S. MORRISON].

[73] "MEMORANDUM Prepared by WEST INDIA Department on Proposed General Commission of Enquiry", C. O.

318/433, File No. 71168, 20 May 1938.

[74] "MEMORANDUM by the Secretary of State for the Colonies on Proposed Royal Commission to Enquire into the Situation in the West Indies", Secret. C. O. 318/433, File No.

71168, Undated.

[75] MOORE, Sir Henry, Minute, C. O. 852/250, F?e No. 15606, pt. 2, 19 June 1939.

[76] "NOTE by Sir H. Moore for Basis of Further Discussion with S. of S.", C. O. 318/433, File No. 71168, Undated.

[77] "NOTES of Meeting Between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and a Deputation of the West India Committee on 3 July, 1937", C. O. 295/599, File No. 70297, pt. 1.

[78] ORMSBY-GORE, Minute, C. O. 295/600, File No. 70307, 6 June 1937.

[79] -, Letter, C. O. 295/600, File No. 70307, 10 July 1937, [to Sir Walter CITRINE, Personal and Conf.].

[80] PARKINSON, Sir Cosmo, Minute, C. O. 852/250, File No. 15606, pt. 2, 21 August 1939.

[81] -, Minute, C. O. 295/601, F?e No. 70308, 8 October 1937.



THE FORSTER AND MOYNE COMMISSIONS 2?a

[82] , A. ., Minute, C. O. 295/600, F?e No. 70307, 10 August 1937.

[83] _, Minute, C. O. 318/433, F?e No. 71168/3, 23 September 1938.

[84] RECOMMENDATIONS OF WEST INDIA COMMISSION 1938 39, Cmd. 6174, February 1940.

[85] REPORT of Commission on Trinidad and Tobago Disturbances 1937, Cmd. 5641, 1938.

[86] REPORT of West India Royal Commission, Cmd. 6607, 1945.

[87] STARLING, F. A., Minute, C. O. 295/599, File No. 70297, pt. 2, 21 July 1937 [to H. BECKETT].

[88] "SUMMARY of Proposals in Connection with a Central Fund for Research: Lord Hailey's African Survey", C. O. 852/190, File No. 15606.

[89] TELEGRAM to U. . High Commissioner to Canada, C. O. 318/ 433, File No. 71168, Conf. No. 127, 22 June 1938.

[90] THE NEW STATEMEN AND NATION, 1014, 18 June 1938.

[91] THE SPECTATOR, 1082, 13 May 1938.

[92] THE TIMES, Editorial, "The West Indies", 2 August 1938.

[93] VERNON, R. V., Minute, C. O. 323/1319, F?e No. 1766/2, 14 June 1937.

[94] WARDLEY, D. J., Minute, T. 161/853, File No. S43411, 9 June 1938.

[95] WEST INDIA COMMITTEE Circular, LIIL 313-4,1938.

[96] -, LUI, 309,1938.



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