THE ,POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WOLOF ADHERENCE TO MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS IN THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY

Lucy Behrman

The major ethnic groups in Senegal had been exposed to Islam long before they joined the Muslim brotherhoods, or tariqas, in the nineteenth century. Indeed, the Tukulor had converted to Islam en masse by the end of the eighteenth century, while the Wolof had been in contact with Muslim Marabouts long before the first Europeans appeared in the fifteenth century. 1 Numerous Wolof converted during this early period, although the group as a whole did not accept the religion until the end of the nineteenth century.2 But the advent of the brotherhoods, which caused the mass conversion of the Wolof in that century, was more than a continuation of the long process of Islamization. The brotherhoods appeared as dynamic movements, symbolizing the social and political protest of the followers which they attracted. This essay seeks to answer three major questions about this attraction of the brotherhoods for the Wolof: first, what attributes of the brotherhoods made them particularly suit- able for stimulating and channeling political protest and reform movements? Second, what specific factors in the Senegalese situation during this period gave the brotherhoods their dynamic appeal? And finally, what was the political significance of the Wolof conversion at this time?

1. Louis Verribre. "La Population du Sen6gal (Aspects Quantitatifs)," (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Faculty of Law and Economics, Uni- versity of Dakar, 1965), 51.

2. See Martin Klein, "The Muslim Revolution in Nineteenth Century Sene - gambia, " and Lucy Behrman, "The Islamization of the Wolof by the End of the Nineteenth Century, " in African History Papers, ed. D. McCall, published for Boston University, Praeger, 1967 (not yet appeared). See also V. Monteil, "Lat-Dior, Damel du Kayor (1842-1886) et l'Islamisation des Wolofs," Archives de Sociologie des Religions, XV-XVI (1963), 77-104.

African Historical Studies, I, 1 (1968) 60

WOLOF ADHERENCE TO MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS

The Brotherhoods as Political Organizations

The simplest answer to the first question appears to be that the brother- hoods were appropriate vehicles for reform, because they came from outside the Senegalese social and political system; although members of brotherhoods had proselytized in the West African area prior to the eighteenth century, in- tensive efforts at conversion in the Senegal area did not begin until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.3 However, a brief sketch of the de- velopment of the Muslim orders shows that this answer is not sufficient to ex- plain the attraction and force of the tariqas.

The communities which foreran the brotherhoods grew up in the early years of Islam and were based in Islamic mysticism, or Sufism. The members of the small Sufi communities in the early period lived an ordered life in which individual moral and physical discipline, as well as mystical theology and ritual, were emphasized.4 These orders had only limited appeal to the few men willing to give up their worldly possessions and live an ascetic life to achieve a state of union with God. Later, however, the organizational basis of these communi- ties changed, the stress on individual moral and physical discipline declined, and the Muslim orders took on the form which attracted followers throughout the Far and Near East and North Africa.5 By the end of the eleventh century the informal communities of ascetics were being converted into organized brother- hoods whose members, living together in regulated communities, adhered to a body of spiritual rites .6 The change in emphasis from individual self-discipline to mystical theology, which is of particular importance to this study, came in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries and is often associated with Ibn al-Arabi of Murcia (d. 1240 A.D.), whose esoteric mystical interpretation of Islam pointed the way for the development of the later brotherhoods in which the mass of brothers could satisfy their religious duties by devotion and obedience to a handful of mystically adept leaders. In addition the brotherhoods in the later period softened the strict rules of orthodox Islam, stressing the state of a man's heart rather than his actual behavior, and popularizing Muslim tradi- tions to make them understandable at the lowest level. Local practices and

3. J. Spencer Trimingham, A History of Islam in West Africa (Glasgow, 1962), 156-160.

4. Octave Depont and Xavier Coppolani, Les Confr6ries Religieuses Musul- manes (Alger, 1897), x.

5. See Louis Massignon, Essai sur les Origines du Lexique Technique de la

Mystique Musulmane (Paris, 1914-1922), 5, 285-286; John Alden Williams, Islam (New York, 1961), 149-150, 196-198; H. A. R. Gibb, Mohammed- anism, An Historical Survey (London, 1954), 143.

6. Louis Massignon, "Tarika, " Encyclopedia of Islam, M. Th. Houtsma et.al., eds., XLII (1929), 667-672.

61

LUCY BEHRMAN

beliefs alien to Islam were tolerated as long as they did not contradict the desired union with Allah which all true brothers wished to achieve.7

Although these factors vulgarized and distorted Islamic teachings, they also made Islam appealing to simple men. The mass of members of the orders apparently often forgot the teachings of the Qu'ran and of Muhammad; ignorant of the major doctrintes of Islam, they concentrated on obedience to their leaders. This attitude was made possible largely because of the emphasis of later Sufism, which stressed the ability of the brotherhood leader to act as

intermediary between Allah and man. Whereas early Sufism had emphasized individual effort, it was later believed that most men could not achieve union with the Divine by themselves.8 Concurrent with the shift in emphasis pre- Islamic beliefs in magic were mingled with Islam. Belief grew in legends about the miracles performed by early mystics9 and the magical ability of current leaders who had received divine grace or baraka from Allah. The leaders were revered as saints, and their tombs became the centers of pilgrimages because of the miracles which might occur there. Montet, a French writer, reports that in Morocco in the nineteenth century such leaders were believed to have innumerable powers: they could, for example, lift large loads alone, repel bullets, or go for long periods without food and water; they could be ubiquitous, become invisible, or be instantly transported to far-off places; or they could walk on water or dry up an ocean; and they were capable of keeping away evil

spirits, healing the sick, and resurrecting the dead. Montet concludes from his observations in Morocco that Sufism had degenerated into anthropolatry: "Living or dead, the saints, however illiterate they may be . . . are adored."10

The leaders of the brotherhoods were called shaykhs, or in North and West Africa, Marabouts. Marabout is a French term coming from the Arabic word for fortified camp or monastery and is used for a Muslim holy man, whether or not he is connected with the brotherhoods. 1 According to the

7. Gibb, Mohammedanism, 115, 142; Wilfred Cantrell Smith, Islam in Modern

History (New York, 1957), 44-45. 8. Gibb, Mohammedanism, 143; Williams, Islam, 169; P. J. Andre, L'Islam

et les Races. Vol. II: Les Rameaux (Mouvements R6gionaux et Sectes) (Paris, 1922), 27.

9. A. J. Arberry, Sufism, An Account of the Mystics of Islam (London, 1950), 119.

10. Edouard Montet, Le Culte des Saints Musulmans dans l'Afrique du Nord et

plus specialement au Maroc (Geneva, 1909), 26-32. 11. Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Arabic, ed. J. Milton Cowen (Ithaca,

1961), 323. The word has come to mean generally a holy man but in some instances has been extended also to the tombs of Muslim saints and to any- thing of sacred character including animals, tress, and stones. There is even an exotic bird which the French call a "marabout." Montet, Le Culte, 16.

62

WOLOF ADHERENCE TO MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS

nineteenth-century French authorities on Islam in North Africa, Octave Depont and Xavier Coppolani, the Marabouts prepared the way for the Berbers to receive the brotherhoods, which then undercut the power of the Marabouts, thereby forc- ing them to join the tariqas. 12 This explains why in West Africa today Mara- bouts are almost always affiliated with Muslim brotherhoods. In fact, the leaders of the order come from these Marabouts.

A Marabout possessed baraka, which he could transmit to his sons or perhaps to selected followers .13 At the outset a Marabout, like any early Sufi, had to live a virtuous life, be versed in the Qu'ranic sciences, and achieve grace at least partially through his own efforts. However, by the time the brother- hoods reached West Africa, the leadership of the orders had become the right of certain families, whose members needed no special virtues to benefit from their family's position.14 Certainly there were many Marabouts who were

highly trained and educated men and lived exemplary lives, but popular opinion identified as a Marabout any man who was either descended from a Marabout, had Qu'ranic education, or was reputed to possess magical powers, whether or not he lived a virtuous life, resided with other members of his order, or had

many followers.

The Marabouts' power and authority, however, depended on their per- sonal dynamism as well as on their family connections and their position in the hierarchy of leaders of the brotherhood. The most powerful Marabouts could rely on the unquestioning obedience of thousands of followers whose fealty was repaid by the Marabout's prayers for them. It was characteristic of a tariqa for the members blindly to obey the commands of their leaders in most secular matters as well as in religious ones. The Sufi leaders were practically wor- shipped by their followers, who did not question the commands they received. The devotion expected by, and given to, the Marabout can be seen from the prescription of the founder of the Qadriyya brotherhood, Sidi Abd al-Kadar al-Djilani, who advised the members of his order: "You should be in the hands of your shaykh like the corpse in the hands of the mortician. It is God himself who commands by his voice. "15 The attachment of disciple to master could be- come so strong that a French administrator, P. J. Andr6, like Depont and Coppolani and others, could write that in North African brotherhoods "the obedience to the shaykh has replaced the cult of Allah."16

12. Depont and Coppolani, Les Confreries, xii. 13. Andre, L'Islam, 26. 14. Depont and Coppolani, Les Confr6ries, 143-144. 15. Napoleon Ney, Un Danger Europeen; Les Societ6s Secretes Musulmanes

(Paris, 1890), 22; M. Charles Brosselard, Les Khouans: de la Constitution des Ordres Religieux Musulmans en Algerie (Alger, 1859), 14; Louis Rinn, Marabouts et Khouan: Etudes sur l'Islam en Alg6rie (Alger, 1884), 90.

16. Andre, L'Islam, 27; Depont and Coppolani, Les Confr6ries, xi.

63

LUCY BEHRMAN

Not surprisingly, this devotion of the brotherhood members to their leaders was practically demonstrated through material contributions. An offer- ing, or ziara, which was sometimes quite large, as well as the member's dime, or tenth of his crops, were paid to the brotherhoods. Land around the center of the brotherhood was worked by the members (usually lay affiliates and full brothers together), and the men made payments (habus or wakaf) to the brotherhood for the use of this land. The leaders also received other types of contributions including payments for initiation and labor corv&es since adepts of an order were morally obliged to sow and harvest for their leader. Through these and similar contributions the brotherhoods, and more specifically the leaders, had large material resources. Indeed, the periodic payments and labor corvees were not all that a Marabout could demand. As Depont and Coppolani said, everything a man had could be taken by the leaders: "the goods of their followers are their property, their horses are their mounts and their huts . . . are accessible to these venerable parasites."17

Because of the frequent contributions of money by the members and the absolute control exercised by the leaders, the brotherhoods appeared to many French observers as states within the French colonial state. Indeed the French commentators had to recognize that the members' blind obedience to the leaders and their loyalty to the brotherhood as a whole were the major sources of political strength of the Muslim orders. With the brotherhoods tightly unified behind them, the leaders could speak with great authority. Consequently, the tariqas often wielded enormous political power in North Africa and elsewhere. As one

nineteenth-century writer aptly commented:

Never has autocracy shown itself with more prominent and decided appearance; never either has the dogma of obedience been proposed and accepted in more formal or absolute terms. It is therefore permissible to affirm that in this double principle of authority on one side and personal abnegation and passive obedience on the other, re- sides the principal factor of the extraordinary power of the Muslim religious orders. l8

The Advent of the Brotherhoods in West Africa

Thus, the tight organization of the Muslim brotherhoods and the unques- tioned authority of the leaders made the brotherhoods particularly suited as vehicles of social and political reform when they began to attract converts among the Wolof at the end of the nineteenth century. Before this, although they had

17. Depont and Coppolani, Les Confreries, 279, 239, 243-244. 18. Brosselard, Les Khouans, 22.

64

WOLOF ADHERENCE TO MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS

been in contact with Muslims for many centuries, the Wolof had not felt the full impact of the orders. Soon after their appearance in the Middle East the broth- erhoods had spread to North Africa, where in the twelfth century they stimulated the powerful Almohad (al-muwahhidun) movement with its strong appeal to the mass of Berbers. 19 Shortly thereafter the North African brotherhoods began to filter into West Africa, where their introduction coincided with and reinforced the general Islamization of the area immediately to the south of the Sahara.

Alphonse Gouilly, a twentieth-century French administrator and scholar, has divided the Islamization process into five periods which help to place the advent of the brotherhoods in their proper context. The first period, which Gouilly calls the Berber phase, was in the eleventh century, when the Almora- vids (al-murabitun) conquered the hitherto pagan kingdom of Ghana in the western Sudan. The second, or Mandingo, phase took place during the fifteenth century, when converted Negro Africans, using Islamization as a weapon of their states, began to convert other Africans. In the sixteenth century came the Sonrai period when, owing particularly to the kingdoms on the eastern Niger, Islam spread rapidly in the Niger area. During the Peul phase in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Tukulors in the Futa Toro (Senegal), the Futa Djalon (Guinea), and the Hausa regions (Northern Nigeria) conducted holy wars to spread their version of Islam to neighboring pagan and Muslim tribes. The last phase came at the end of the nineteenth century when various Islamic states fought to spread their authority, using the cover of Islam as a justification.20 Although missionaries and traders belonging to the orders had entered West Africa long before, Sufi brotherhoods were particulary im- portant in the fourth and fifth periods.

The brotherhood which apparently first appeared in West Africa was the Qadriyya tariqa. Founded by the sharif21 Si Muhammad Abd al-Qadar al-Djilani (1079-1166), originally from Baghdad, the order spread over the Middle East and North Africa at an early date. It soon divided into myriad branches, some re- taining only the most tenuous connections with the motherhouse in the Middle East. The Qadiri order was introduced into the Sahel region in the fifteenth cen-

tury by Muhammad Abd al-Karim al-Maghrib. But it was Al-Mukhtar ibn Ahmad (1729-1811), the son of one of al-Maghrib's disciples of the Arab Kunta tribe, who founded a center for the order north of Timbuktu which became the base for the order in West Africa. 22

19. The Almoravid (llth century) movement was an orthodox group in contrast to the Almohads, who were closely linked to the Sufi movements. See Gibb, Mohammedanism, 121.

20. Alphonse Gouilly, L'Islam dans l'Afrique Occidentale Frangaise (Paris, 1952), 47.

21. The title sharif indicates descent from Muhammad. 22. Andre, L'Islam, 32-33; Rinn, Marabouts, 173-200; Depont and Coppolani,

Les Confreries, 293-355; Gouilly, L'Islam dans i'A.O.F., 57; J. Spencer Trimingham, Islam in West Africa (Oxford, 1959), 94.

65

LUCY BEHRMAN

The second important brotherhood to come from North to West Africa was the Tijaniyya order founded by a Qadiri named Sharif23 Ahmad ibn Muham- mad al-Tijani (1735-1815). At the age of twenty-one he traveled from Ain Mahdi (Morocco) to Mecca. After his return to North Africa he had a revelation from the Prophet (c. 1781) and, as a result, founded the Tijani brotherhood. Sometime thereafter al-Tijani sent a missionary from the Ida Ou Ali ethnic group, Muham- mad al-Hafiz ibn al-Mukhtar ibn Habib al-Baddi, to Mauritania. There, he con- verted the Ida Ou Ali, who then had considerable influence in the proselytization of the surrounding area, including portions of Senegal.24

Following al-Tijani's death, his spiritual successors quarreled, causing a division of the order into two motherhouses, one at Fez and one at Ain Mahdi. Most of the important Tijaniyya branches in West Africa are affiliated with the former center. Intensive missionary activity was conducted in West Africa in association with various commercial undertakings. The most important con- version in this period was that of Umar Tall (1794/7-1864), a member of the Tukulor ethnic group in the Futa Toro. While in Mecca, where he arrived in 1828, he met one of al-Tijani's close companions, who named him Moqaddim25 of the order in West Africa. Umar Tall then returned to West Africa, going first to the area presently called Northern Nigeria, where he remained until 1838. He then went to Massina and the Futa Djalon, and did not return to his home territory until 1846, by which time he claimed the rank of khalif in the Tijani order and had gathered an army of volunteers. In 1851-1852 he launched a holy war and conquered a large part of the Sudan touching on Senegal in the Futa Toro region. When Al-Hajj Umar died in 1864, much of the large area he had converted reverted to its old religious traditions. The Futa Toro, how- ever, because it was peopled by a majority of Tukulor, remained almost solidly Tijani. Furthermore, the Islamization movement was continued by Umar Tall's

disciples, who conducted various smaller holy wars, some of which were of

major importance in the conversion of the Wolof.26

Equally important among the Wolof was the Murid brotherhood, which was founded in 1866 by a Wolof Marabout of Tukulor ancestry of the M'Bake family, Muhammad Ibn Muhammad ibn Habib Allah (1850-1927), called Ahmad

23. His descent from Muhammad is disputed. See Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, The Tijaniyya, A Sufi Order in the Modern World (London, 1965), 116.

24. Trimingham, Islam in West Africa, 97. 25. Representative of and assistant to the head of the order. A khalif is the head

of an order for a region -- the term is also used for the head of the entire brotherhood.

26. Abun-Nasr, The Tijaniyya, 101-128; A. Le Chatelier, L'Islam dans

l'Afrique Occidentale (Paris, 1899), 167-174.

66

WOLOF ADHERENCE TO MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS

Bamba.27 In approximately 1880 Ahmad Bamba was initiated into the Qadiri tariqa by Shaykh Hajj Kamara, and later, judging this insufficient, he traveled to Mauritania to be initiated by Shaykh Sidia, the head of a major Qadiri branch derived from the Kunta center. He joined Lat Dyor's entourage, and, by 1886, when Dyor was killed, Bamba hadgained a reputation for learning and piety. In that same year he received a revelation of his mission to found his own order, which he based in Touba (in Diourbel). 28

From the outset the French authorities feared Ahmad Bamba, 29 who they believed hoped to reestablish a Wolof state under his own control. He had at- tracted followers of Lat Dyor, Al-Bur Ndyaye, Maba, and many others identified with opposition to the colonialists. Rumors circulated about his anti-government statements and occasionally about the large scale collection of arms and volun- teers by his followers. Bamba lived his life under close surveillance by the French and was exiled in 1895 and again in 1897.

The Reasons for the Wolof Conversion

A partial answer to the second question raised in this paper, concerning the factors in the Senegalese situation which made the brotherhoods particularly attractive to the Wolof, is that the Wolof, already imbued with Islamic ideas,

27. Bamba's father, Momar Antisali, was also a Marabout. He married the sister of Lat Dyor and became the teacher of MaBa's children. This ex-

plains Bamba's early contacts with these resistance leaders and their

supporters. 28. For detailed information on the origin, development, and major character-

istics of the Murids, see CheikhTidjane Sy, "Traditionalisme Mouride et Modernisation Rurale au Senegal, Contribution a l'Etude des Rapports entre Socialism et Islam en Pays Sous-Developp&s, " (Unpublished Doctoral Dis- sertation, University of Paris, 1965). See also Vincent Monteil, "Une Confr6rie Musulmane; Les Mourides du S6engal," Archives de Sociologie des Religions, XIII-XIV (1963), 77-104; E. Marty, "Les Mourides d'Ahmadou Bamba (Rapport a M. le Gouverneur General de l'Afrique Occi-

dentale), " Revue du Monde Musulman, XXV (Dec. 1913), 3-164; M. Chailley et al., eds., Notes et Etudes sur l'Islam en Afrique Noire (Paris, 1962), 53-74, 127-194, 115-125; Medoune Thiam, Cheickh Ahmadou Bamba, Fonda- teur du Mouridisme (1850-1927) (Dakar, 1962); Muhammad Mustafa An, Hyattu Shaykh Ahmad Bamba (2 vols., Dakar, n.d.). See also the unpub- lished reports on the Murids in Dakar Archives.

29. See Lucy Behrman, "Ahmad Bamba, 1850-1927, " in John Ralph Willis, ed., Studies on the History of Islam in West Africa, forthcoming.

67

LUCY BEHRMAN

were particularly receptive to an intensive Islamization effort by the brother- hoods. But more fundamental reasons can be found from an examination of traditional Wolof society at this time.

The nineteenth century was a period of confusion and insecurity for the Wolof, who sought first to express their opposition to the colonial authorities both as individuals and as a group, by adherence to the brotherhoods. Their organizational strength and the authority of their leaders made the brotherhoods particularly suitable organizations for political protest, providing the members with strong protection against injury or punishment in a fight against any hated group and promising them Paradise if they died fighting for the brotherhood. Religious sects or "revitalization movements" have played such roles at various times in Africa: The Christian Harris movement in the Ivory Coast was, for example, such a group; and Suret-Canale states that the development of new religious groups is a response to "the sharpening through the effects of colonial- ism, of the internal contradictions of African society."30 Respected authorities on North African Islam, such as Depont and Coppolani, complained that the orders there were recruiting many discontented elements of society and were becoming major centers of resistance.31 Of the brotherhoods in Senegal which resisted the colonialists, some of the most powerful were branches of the Tijaniyya led by Umar Tall and his disciples and Ahmad Bamba's Murid order, which became a symbol of resistance shortly after it founding in 1866. It is hard to know whether or not Bamba deliberately attempted to opposed the French; indeed, it is quite probable, as Suret-Canale has suggested, that the Murids did not have "a revolutionary character principally and directly turned against the colonial domination,

" but that they were led to express protests against colonial oppression only to the extent that the colonial regime oppressed them.32 It makes little difference in this context what Ahmad Bamba's actual intentions were, for the results were similar whether or not he wished to fight the French. His reputation among the Africans, as well as among the French, was that of opposing the colonialists; the discontented flocked to him as they had to the brotherhoods in North Africa, and, although their first strong following came principally from the Wolof, the Murids later drew from other ethnic groups as well.

A second factor in the Senegalese situation which pushed the Wolof toward the brotherhoods was the Muslim orders' initial stance as vehicles of social reform. There were conflicts among the social classes or sectors within the Wolof as there were within other ethnic groups in Senegal. Although

30. Jean Suret-Canale, Afrique Noire Occidentale et Centrale: G6ographie, Civlisations, Histoire (Paris, 1964), 128-129.

31. Depont and Coppolani, Les Confr6ries, xxi. 32. Suret-Canale, Afrique Noire, 128-129.

68

WOLOF ADHERENCE TO MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS

this attraction is the most nebulous to speculate upon because of the extreme

difficulty of knowing exactly which social sectors within the ethnic groups were

opposed or allied, it is a vital consideration, for friction among various parts of the population was an important element in Senegalese politics. A disruption of the balance between sectors could and did in many cases lead to the emer- gence of certain sectors' interests in a new group which would be a stronger champion of its interests than the individual sector had been. The brotherhoods thus provided a chance for the dissatisfied sectors of the Senegalese population to seek to better their position. This was true not only among the Wolof, but also among the Tukulor and other tribes in the area. Thus Suret-Canale, as well as the Senegalese scholar Chiekh Tidjane Sy and others, believes that Al

Hajj Umar's Tijani branch expressed "the need for liberation of former cap- tives, of women, of youth, against the tyranny of traditional 'feudal' or familial cadres. "33 In the early twentieth century the nearby French Soudan provides another example of such a group when the Rimaybe and the Bella, former cap- tives of the Peul and the Tuareg respectively, sought a change in their situation

through joining the Hamalliyya, a Tijani sub-group. People of low social caste, unsatisfied chiefs, and Marabouts all tried to find the solution to their problems in this brotherhood. Thus, in his explanation of one of the major Hamallist

uprisings in 1930, a French commandant notes that the major Hamallist Marabout in his region was recruiting former captives who, upon joining the Muslim order, broke completely with their former masters and even tried to kill them.34

In Wolof territory in the end of the nineteenth century the Islamic holy wars led by the successors of Al Hajj Umar, such as Maba, expressed the desires of large groups of the population for an improvement in their position relative to other groups. Vincent Monteil, a noted French scholar, suggests in fact that the Muslim leaders sided with the Wolof peasants against the war- riors and the nobles in a class war over frictions that had built up between the two groups over centuries, as the nobles and warriors pillaged the peasants at will. Thus, jihad leaders, in carrying out their holy missions, were also acting as heads of a class revolution.35

Monteil's view is not difficult to support, as many early European writers describe widespread pillaging by kings and nobles. There is additional

proof in local traditions, such as the tale of the revolt in the Djolof kingdom in

33. Suret-Canale, Afrique Noire, 129; Sy, "Traditionalisme Mouride," 26-27. 34. R. L. Moreau, "Les Marabouts de Dori, " Archives de Sociologie des

Religions (1964), 113-134; Dakar Archives, Queqneaux, Commandant de Cercle de Gorgol, "Rapport sur les Causes de l'Incident du 15 F6vrier, 1930, " CI 848.

35. Monteil, "Lat-Dior, " 103-104; Sy, "Traditionalisme Mouride, " 26-27.

69

LUCY BEHRMAN

which the Mauritanians and Marabouts sided with the people against the ruling classes, although these eventually reasserted their authority.36 French colonial authorities also tended to interpret the Muslim wars among the Wolof as class wars. Robert Arnaud wrote in 1912:

In Wolof country formerly the intrusion of Islam constituted a veritable social revolution and was in reality an opposition of the proletarian caste to the aristocracy, a class struggle; the cultivators had very strong sentiments of repulsion against the warriors who exploited them. Thanks to Islam they formed a bloc against the aristocracy which had remained fetichist, the crowd against its oppressors. The warriors did not conceal the dislike they felt for the Marabouts.37

However, to explain the Muslim holy wars simply as social revolutions is probably not sufficient. Even accepting that there was a widespread and fixed enmity between the Wolof peasants and nobles, it appears that not only, or even mainly, the peasants sought to improve their social position by joining the brotherhoods. All dissatisfied sectors of the Wolof turned to the Muslim orders, including the nobles who had lost their power through the French in- vasion.

A glance at the Murid movement shows some of the complexities of the situation. Ahmad Bamba, as the French administrator Paul Marty points out, was surrounded by warriors and nobles who had been involved in the last struggles against the French, although the mass of his followers came from the rural population which was composed of former slaves or poor freemen. This combination indicates that the nobles saw in the Murid movement an op- portunity to regain their authority, whereas the former slaves, Marty suggests, saw in the Muridiyya a new form of security to replace the old, tightly con- trolled system to which they had been accustomed -- a security which was no more than a new type of slavery under the descendants of their former rulers 38 Marty may have overlooked the fact that many peasants must have turned to the Murids because the brotherhood seemed to provide an escape from control by their former rulers, but his analysis does illustrate the point made here that the motivations of the men who became Murids were varied and complex; that the desire for social reforms was certainly a major factor stimulating the

36. P. Cultru, Premier Voyage du Sieur de la Courbe fait a la Coste d'Afrique en 1685 (Paris, 1913), 132-133.

37. Robert Arnaud, "L'Islam et la Politique Musulmane Francaise en Afrique Occidentale Frangaise, " Renseignements Coloniaux et Documents Publies par le Comit6 de l'Afrique Frangaise et le Comit6 du Maroc (1912), 9.

38. Paul Marty, Etudes sur l'Islam au Senegal, Vol I: Les Personnes (Paris, 1917), 206.

70

WOLOF ADHERENCE TO MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS

Wolof to join the brotherhoods, but that one cannot therefore interpret the suc- cess of the brotherhoods among the Wolof as being solely, or even primarily, due to the desire of the lower classes to assert themselves against the nobles.

It would also be a mistake to ignore the important social implications of the Muridiyya (and other brotherhoods) since the new lords, the Marabouts, were drawn from a wider section of the population than the old ruling class, at least in the early years. There was in the early years, moreover, a degree of social mobility in the brotherhoods which the old tribal system lacked. Land ownership and political power in general were now divided between the aristo - crats, who became Marabouts, and the old maraboutic families, some of which had been poor and without power before the nineteenth century. In addition a peasant disciple, if he worked hard and obeyed his Marabout, could hope to be elevated to the position of a lesser Marabout, an advance in status not nor- mally possible in the secular tribal system. Nonetheless, the nobility together with the maraboutic families provided the bulk of the Marabouts, especially the important ones, and the mass of peasants and low caste artisans remained subjected as they had been under the tribal system.39

Whatever the nature of the social reforms which the Muslim brother- hoods espoused in the middle and late nineteenth century, the "sclerosis" which Suret-Canale mentions soon set in. The momentum for change was lost and the maraboutic leadership became closely associated with the colonial regime and the old aristocracy. This had occurred in the Umarian Tijani brotherhood in Senegal before the Murids rose to importance, 40 and by the early 1900's it was true of the latter brotherhood as well. Colonial authorities began to remark on these alliances which became increasingly evident. A political report of 1904 states:

It is therefore necessary for us to observe with care the alliance which tends to be formed between the aristocracy . . . and the Marabouts. The Marabouts enrich themselves by their (alms) collections, the aristocracy . . . to the contrary, which only drew its fortune from its arbitrary power and its attacks which are no longer permitted, grows poorer from day to day. The descendants of the old families, therefore, give to the rich "sikh" [Marabout] their daughter or their relative in exchange for a large dowry. 41

39. Cheikh Tidjane Sy states that Bamba was a reformer who was able to detach himself from the traditional caste system in order to judge men by their merit rather than by their class status. Nevertheless, few low caste men became important in the Murid hierarchy, even in the early years. See Sy, "Traditionalisme Mouride," 56-57.

40. Suret-Canale, Afrique Noire, 129. 41. Dakar Archives, "Rapport sur la Situation Politique - AOF" (1st and 2nd

Trimestre, 1904), 2G 4.5.

71

LUCY BEHRMAN

The 1915 political report comments on the Marabouts' increasing collaboration with the colonialists:

And it is precisely because these religious chiefs profit from these situations that they have an interest in being with us and in that case they would be our support. Their interests are in effect linked with ours and the more we develop the acquisitive faculty of the indigene by the creation of new needs, the more we augment the wealth of the brotherhoods through the followers and of which the sum is higher than the taxes paid to the administration. It is for this reason that in this period of crisis [the first world war] we have nothing to fear from the maraboutic influence.42

Most of the Muslim orders in Senegal, then, had become part of the "Establish- ment" by the early twentieth century. After this period only the Hamalliyya, which developed in the early twentieth century, was identified with social re- forms, but it did not have much influence in Senegal and, like the other orders, lost most of its reforming character once it had become established.

Closely connected with the whole question of the reformist character of the Muslim brotherhoods at their foundation is the attraction which these

groups had as substitutes or reinforcements for tribal society. This is the third, and perhaps the most important, reason for the conversion of the Wolof to Islam in the end of the nineteenth century. The phenomenon involved is not at all unique to Senegal or to Africa. It is readily observable that, when the equilibrium of a group is disturbed, the members of that group tend to

compensate by actions foreign to their normal pattern of living and often join substitute groups which promise to restore the lost balance. 43 Another ex-

ample of this behavior seems to be that described by David Apter among the Fon of Dahomey.44

The Wolof had a highly developed state system, and their social struc - ture was tightly connected to their religious beliefs and customs.45 The arrival and entrenchment of the colonialists destroyed these living patterns and introduced

42. Dakar Archives, Lieutenant Governor to Governor General, July 22, 1915, No. 695, 2G 15.6.

43. See discussions of this phenomenon in David Truman, The Governmental Process, Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York, 1964), 30-31; V. O. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (New York, 1958), 46-47.

44. David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago, 1965), 99, 81-122. 45. For general information on the history and customs of the Wolof see the

following: David P. Gamble, The Wolof of Senegambia (London, 1957); Henri Gaden, "Legendes et Coutumes Senegalaises, Cahiers de Yoro Dyao," Revue d'Ethnographie et de Sociologie, III (1912), 119-137, 191-202; L. J. B. Berenger-F6raud, Les Peuplades de Senegambie (Paris, 1879); articles in Coutumier Juridiques de l'Afrique Occidentale Francaise, Vol. I:

Senegal (Paris, 1939); L. Geismar, Recueil des Coutumes Civiles des Races

72

WOLOF ADHERENCE TO MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS

new elements which challenged old values and habits. In order to conquer the area, the French had to break the power of the Wolof kings and nobles. The Wolof kingdoms were broken into smaller units: those who resisted were beaten in war; those who did not, or who eventually made peace, found themselves de- pendent on the colonial system for their authority, as their former sources of power were destroyed and their lines of revenue abolished.46 Thus the Wolof were forced to look for a means of replacing their old way of life.

A major factor in the disintegration of Wolof society for which the French were responsible was the introduction of peanuts as a commercial crop into the traditional agricultural system. Wolof family living patterns were closely tied to agriculture. Land was owned by the family as a whole and could not be sold. It was the duty of the chief of the family to distribute some of the land among the members of his family, who would work the major part of their time in the com- mon field. The cultivation of a commercial crop of peanuts changed this system altogether. Farmers now had the strong incentive of money and the new goods it could buy to cultivate the small private plots which had hitherto been an un- important addendum to their principal work in the common field. However, many farmers apparently continued to show token recognition to the position of the heads of their families through annual gifts in money or kind. One adminis- trator wrote:

du Senegal etabli par L. Geismar, Administrateur en Chef des Colonies

(St. Louis, 1933); David Ames, "Belief in Witches among the Rural Wolof of Gambia," Africa, XXIV (1959), 263-273; David Ames, "The Selection of Mates, Courtship and Marriage among the Wolof, " Bulletin de 1'IFAN, XVIII (1956), 156-168; David Ames, "Wolof Cooperative Work Groups, "

in Continuity and Change in African Cultures, William Bascom and Melville Herskovits, eds. (Chicago, 1959), 237; R. Rousseau, "Le Senegal d'Autre- fois, Etude sur le Cayor, Cahiers de Yoro D~ao, " Bulletin du Comite d'Etudes Historiques et Scientifiques de l'Afrique Occidentale Francaise

[BCEHSAOF], XVI (1929), 133-211; R. Rousseau, "Le Senegal d'Autrefois, Etudes sur le Oualo, Cahiers de Yoro D~ao,

" BCEHSAOF, XIV (1931),

133-211; R. Rousseau, "Le Senegal d'Autrefois, Etude sur le Toube, Papiers de Rawane Roy, " BCEHSAOF, XIV (1931), 334-364; R. Rousseau, "Le Sene6gal d'Autrefois, Seconde Etude sur le Cayor (Compl6ments tir6 des Manuscrits de Yoro D~ao)," Bulletin de l'IFAN, III (1941), 79-144; R. Rousseau, "Le Village Ouoloff (S6n6gal), " Annales de Geographie, XLII (1933), 88-94.

46. Julian Wood Witherell, "The Responses of the Peoples of Cayor to French Penetration, 1850-1900" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1964), 160-161.

73

LUCY BEHRMAN

The personal goods, formerly of negligible quantity now surpass in importance the collective family goods. Thus, by the force of things, a disaggregation of family solidarity [occurs] which has shown its consequences in all domains.47

The disintegrative force of the introduction of peanuts into the agricultural system was beginning to be felt in Senegal by the end of the nineteenth century. Peanuts had been grown in Senegal for a long time -- the sixteenth-century traveler Andre Alvarez de Almada had noted them during his visit48 -- and the French had begun to foster their growth long before the mid-nineteenth century, but it was around this date that they began to encourage their cultivation in earnest in an attempt to make Senegal a profitable colony. After 1850 peanuts were being produced for export in significant amounts, and by the end of the century peanut growers were moving from the center of production at Cayor to other regions to look for new fields and thus to extend the impact of peanuts .49

The undermining of the powers of the chiefs and the introduction of commercial agriculture by the French are only two of the many factors contrib- uting to the breakdown of the Wolof living patterns. In addition, the mere presence of the colonialists with their apparently superior way of life raised questions about old ways of doing things, and the establishment of French forts and trading centers drew increasing numbers of people into French service as clerks, soldiers, domestics, etc., thus adding a new dimension to the economic and social options open to the Wolof. Furthermore, population movements to the north of the Senegal as well as increased contact through trade and war with the Futa Toro peoples are additional kinds of influences which may have con- tributed to the insecurity of the Wolof in the nineteenth century, leading them to turn to the brotherhoods for reinforcement.

The brotherhoods, despite their tight hierarchical organization, had a long history in the Muslim world of a flexibility characterized by their habit of accepting the customs of the people among whom they found themselves, imposing only their political authority and a few major Islamic prescriptions. Thus it was not difficult for the tariqas to adjust themselves to the Wolof situation, acting as a replacement for the old framework of political and social authority and pro- viding a structure in which the Wolof could find a defined role to play. As else - where in Africa, where, as Marcel Cardaire points out, Islam succeeded be - cause of the isolation of pagan tribesmen who, finding their old system crumbling, turned away to find a new one, 50 the Muslim orders were able to help the Wolof adapt to changes in Senegal.

47. Geismar, Recueil des Coutumes, 35. 48. Joseph Foquet, La Traite des Arachides dans le Pays de Kaolack et ses Con-

sequences Economiques, Sociales et Juridiques (Saint Louis, 1958), 19. 49. Witherell, "The Responses of the Peoples of Cayor, " 23. 50. M. Cardaire, L'Islam et le Terroir Africain (Koulouba, 1954), 49; Marty,

Etudes sur l'Islam au Senegal, I, 192.

74

WOLOF ADHERENCE TO MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS

The Political Significance of the Wolof Conversion

While in general the Wolof as members of brotherhoods followed their old ways, despite the overlay of Muslim customs and sayings, their political leadership was definitely modified by the new affiliation. They now turned to the Marabouts when they wanted anything done, and the former nobles and kings, as they were absorbed into the ruling structure of the Muslim orders, found as Marabouts an even greater authority than their pagan counterparts had had. The Marabouts combined the feudal-type authority over land of the nobles with a much greater authority, based on religion as well as force, over the lives of their subjects. In different brotherhoods the position of the leaders was, not

surprisingly, different. Of the branches of several orders which the Wolof

joined, the Murid order had a noticeably more powerful leadership because of the emphasis which Ahmad Bamba had placed on the virtues of working for one's leader and of complete discipline. The Murids' first loyalty was to their brother- hood personified by its Marabouts, whose every command had a considerable

degree of authority. While the stress on discipline was less in other orders, all of the leaders of the brotherhoods among the Wolof had considerable political power.

It seems clear that the answer to the third question raised in the begin- ning of this paper has been largely answered. The Wolof conversion in the end of the nineteenth century was politically significant because the political leaders of the ethnic group became the Marabouts. How important and unusual this fact was for the development of Senegalese politics can be seen by comparing the Wolof with their neighbors the Tukulor, who had been in contact with Islam at least since the eleventh century.51 Thorough Islamization of this group did not take place until the torodo (torodbe) drove out the pagan Peul Denyianke dynasty in 1776, but thereafter the Islamization of the Tukulor was intensified, and a series of Muslim chiefs called almanys ruled until the end of the nine- teenth century, when the French took over the area.52 Islam was thus a factor

51. For general information on the history and customs of the Tukulor see the

following: Felix Brigaud, Connaissance du Senegal, Fasicule 11: Histoire Traditionelle du Senegal (Saint Louis, 1962); J. Lombard, Connaissance du

Sen6gal, Fasicule 5: Geographie Humaine (Saint Louis, 1963); Henri Labouret, Paysans d'Afrique Occidentale (Paris, 1941); L. Geismar, Re- cueil des Coutumes, Coutumiers Juridiques, I; Henri Gaden, "Du Regime des Terres de la Vallee du S6negal au Fouta ant6rieurement a l'Occupation Frangaise," BCEHSAOF, XVII (1935), 403-414. For modern statistics, see

J. L. Boutillier et al., La Moyenne Valee du Senegal (Dakar, 1962). 52. Abdoulaye Diop, Soci6et Toucouleur et Migration (Enquite sur la Migration

Toucouleur a Dakar) (Dakar, 1965), 10, 84; Vincent Monteil, L'Islam Noir

(Paris, 1964), 62-63, 77; Labouret, Paysans d'Afrique, 82.

75

LUCY BEHRMAN

of great importance in Tukulor history for many centuries, and that ethnic group traditionally felt it was the carrier of Muslim civilization and was superior to the pagan groups around it. 53 Since the early eighteenth century, the Tukulor, led by the torodo, had launched holy wars on their neighbors. By this time they were in direct contact with representatives of Muslim brotherhoods. Indeed, the Qadriyya orders, led by members of the Ida Ou Ali and later of the Kunta groups, had many followers among the Tukulor, although with the coming of Umar Tall the overwhelming majority of the group became Tijani. Interest- ingly enough, however, the Tukulor Marabouts did not become a major political force in the Futa Toro as they did among the Wolof. This fact is all the more striking when one considers that the major branches of the Sufi brotherhoods among the Wolof were founded by Marabouts of Tukulor ancestry. 54 There were, of course, powerful Tukulor Marabouts on regional and local levels, but most of the nationally politically important Marabouts who appeared in the early twentieth century had a largely Wolof following and did not live in the Tukulor regions. Why, then, should the brotherhoods among the Tukulor, who were ex- posed to Islam longer than were the Wolof, be of significantly less political importance ?

One reason often put forward in Senegal by Tukulor and non-Tukulor alike is that the Tukulor, through their long contact with Islam, became more closely acquainted with the Qu'ran and the doctrines of Islam than did the Wolof and, being more educated in the religion, had less need for the Marabouts to act as intermediaries between them and Allah. Furthermore, with a better knowledge of Islam, they were less likely to glorify the powers of their Mara- bouts. Since the intellectual gap between the Marabouts and their disciples was smaller among the Tukulor than among the Wolof, the Marabouts could therefore gain less authority. 55 But this interpretation is difficult to accept. Blind obedience and extreme respect for the Marabout could be found in many brotherhoods, even among peoples in North Africa with as long an acquaintance with Islam as the Tukulor. Nor does the lack of Qu'ranic education explain the exceptions to the rule who are Tukulor and have Tukulor followers.

A more satisfactory answer is found in the traditional socio -economic structure of the Futa Toro, where politics and society in general were directed by important clan leaders, a clan in the Futa being comprised of several fami- lies, although not all of one family necessarily belongs to one clan. The leaders

53. Diop, Societe Toucouleur, 13. 54. Bamba's ancestors were Tukulor, as were those of Al Hajj Malik Sy, founder

of the most important branch of the Tijaniyya among the Wolof. 55. Interviews with: Ibrahima Faye, Governor of Sine-Saloum, Feb. 4, 1966,

Kaolack; Alphonse N'Diaye, Governor of the River Region, March 10, 1966, Saint Louis; Madior Cisse, Marabout and employee of the regional court in Saint Louis, March 10, 1966, Saint Louis. Also interviews with government officials and relatives of the major Marabouts, March 14, 1966, Saint Louis.

76

WOLOF ADHERENCE TO MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS

of these clans headed important families which owned large concessions of the land in the nineteenth century, and indeed still do, despite land reforms. 56 While the social structure of the Tukulor in the Futa Toro by no means remained unchanged throughout the many centuries since the introduction of Islam, the changes resulted only in an accretion of custom. Thus the fall of the Denyianke led to the rule of the Muslim almamys but did not alter the economic and political control of the area by Tukulor clan leaders. In fact, the almamys were named

by the great families, 57 so that their power stemmed not from their role as Muslim leaders but from their family connections. The Marabouts in the Futa, then, never had the opportunity to rise to power. Even Al Hajj Umar, who united many clans for a short time in a religious war, did not change the Futa

system. This continued social, economic, and political power of the clans

among the Tukulor should be compared to the decline in power of Wolof tradi- tional rulers in the nineteenth century when the political and social system of that group was threatened by contacts with the French, and Marabouts and brotherhoods stepped in to reinforce and replace a disintegrating tribal system, thereby becoming politically powerful because they replaced the traditional

kings and nobles. Thus, it is primarily in the differences between the pre- Islamic social structure of the two groups that the differences in their response to Islamization lie, resulting in the political dominance of Muslim leaders

among the Wolof.

Summary and Conclusion

This paper has proposed that the reasons for the political power of the Marabouts among the Wolof can be found in the nature of the brotherhoods and in the general insecurity of the ethnic group at the time at which it joined the Muslim orders. The brotherhoods had developed by the twelfth century into

tight hierarchical organizations whose leaders had unquestioned authority over their followers. The orders attracted followers in Senegal because they sym- bolized opposition to the colonialists, expressed the desire of various parts of the population for social reform, and provided a framework of security for the Wolof whose social and political system was disintegrating. The Wolof joined the Muslim orders whose leaders replaced the traditional kings and nobles as social, economic, and political rulers.

56. Diop, Societe Toucouleur, 11. 57. Ibid.

77

LUCY BEHRMAN

It is useless to speculate at this point on what would have happened to the Wolof had the brotherhoods not come into Senegal in the nineteenth century. It seems clear, however, that in the almost seventy years of this century the political dominance of the brotherhoods has had both negative and positive effects on the political development of the group. On the one hand the Marabouts have facilitated the Wolof's adjustment to new ways of doing things. For example when they embraced commercial peanut production and set their followers to

raising the crop, as well as encouraging the use of new tools, fertilizers, and techniques. Moreover, the Marabouts have acted as intermediaries between their adherents and first the French and then the Senegalese political leaders; they have organized political support for politicians and have explained in a

simplified form the duties which new political programs calls for among the Wolof. 58 On the other hand, the Marabouts' authority is based in the almost slave-like position of their disciples, which contradicts and blocks the develop- ment programs espoused by the politicians; the political development of the Wolof must eventually involve their liberation from such domination and in- sofar as this is accomplished seriously threatens the power of the Marabouts. Whatever its effects, however, it is evident that adherence of the Wolof to the brotherhoods in the nineteenth century had enormous political significance.

58. See Sy, "Traditionalisme Mouride, " 135-150; Lucy Behrman, "The Political Influence of Muslim Brotherhoods in Senegal" (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Boston University, 1967).

A REPORT ON

AFRICAN MATERIALS AND ACTIVITIES IN

SOME EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS

by

Daniel F. McCall

An introductory guide to African collections in certain archives and museums in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy,

Sweden, and Switzerland.

Monograph Series Number I, 1967

(Mimeographed, soft cover. 59 pages. $1.50) Boston University African Studies Center

Orders may be addressed to Susanne Marcus, African Studies

Center, 10 Lenox Street, Brookline, Massachusetts 02146.

78