The Ploughshares Monitor
Transcript of The Ploughshares Monitor
The Ploughshares Monitor | Summer 2011 1
Ploughshares MonitorThe
Efforts to ban cluster bombs
A view from PakistanIran’s nuclear ambitions
as seen from next door
Keeping track of armsCanada’s exports to Sudan
reveal challenges of the ATT
Nuclear disarmamentIt is time for Canada
to take a leading role
After GadhafiIs Libya poised to be
the new Afghanistan?
AUTUMN 2011 | VOLUME 32 | ISSUE 3
A quarterly publication of Project Ploughshares • Available online: www.ploughshares.ca
by Earl Turcotteare under threat
Long-term menace
Long-term menaceEfforts to ban cluster munitions are under threat.by Earl Turcotte
The Ploughshares Monitor
Volume 32 | Issue 3
The Ploughshares Monitor is the quarterlyjournal of Project Ploughshares, the peace centre of The Canadian Council of Churches.Ploughshares works with churches, nongovernmental organizations and governments, in Canada and abroad, to advance policies and actions that preventwar and armed violence and build peace. Project Ploughshares is affiliated with the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies,Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo.
Office address: Project Ploughshares57 Erb Street WestWaterloo, Ontario N2L 6C2 Canada519-888-6541, fax: [email protected]; ww.ploughshares.ca
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Contents
Cover story
COVER: An unexploded BLU-97 cluster submunition lies on the ground in Afghanistan,near Bagram. John Rodsted/Cluster Munitions Coalition
A legacy for the takingThe time is now for Canada to make anti-nuclear history.by Cesar Jaramillo
PhotosFarewell Reception for Nancy Regehr
Iran, Pakistan and nuclear ambitionsWhat do Iran’s nuclear ambitions mean to Pakistan?by Nicole Waintraub
South Sudan’s unsteady startThe newborn nation faces daunting challenges. by John Siebert
Detour through DarfurCanada’s exports reveal the trouble with tracking arms.by Kenneth Epps
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7
10
15
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Autumn 2011Kenneth Epps
Maribel Gonzales
Debbie Hughes
Tasneem Jamal
Cesar Jaramillo
Anne Marie Kraemer
Matthew Pupic
Wendy Stocker
John Siebert Executive Director
PROJECT PLOUGHSHARES STAFF
more
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Familiar opening scenesAre Canadian Forces in for another Afghanistan? by John Siebert
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The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 2011 3
Long-termmenaceInternational efforts
to ban cluster munitions
are under threat
By Earl Turcotte
The extensive use of cluster
munitions during the last
three days of the conflict
between Israel and
Hezbollah in southern
Lebanon in the summer of 2006 provided
new impetus for the international commu-
nity to work toward their ban.
Cluster munitions are conventional
weapons designed to release or disperse
explosive submunitions over a wide area.
Each weapon typically contains hundreds
of submunitions; an average cluster bomb
can cover one square kilometre. In addi-
tion to causing often extensive “collateral
damage” at the time of use, many submu-
nitions fail to detonate on impact and re-
main a potent threat to civilians for
decades after peace has been restored.1
For years, the international community
was unable to secure a mandate to negoti-
ate a legally binding instrument on cluster
munitions in the traditional UN forum for
conventional arms discussions, the Con-
vention on Certain Conventional
Weapons (CCW). As a result, Norway,
with strong support from Austria, Ireland,
New Zealand, Mexico, and the Holy See,
ABOVE: MohammadAbd el Aal, 12, waswalking in the mountainsof Southern Lebanon inMarch 2009 when hestepped on an unex-ploded cluster submuni-tion. The resultingexplosion tore off his leg.Cluster Munition Coalition
The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 20114
led a process outside the CCW, beginning
in early 2007, which resulted in the negoti-
ation of the Convention on Cluster Muni-
tions. This process mirrored the model
Canada had established a decade earlier
with anti-personnel mines. In both in-
stances, the weapon in question has been
banned and States Parties have assumed
obligations to destroy stockpiles and clear
contaminated areas within a specific pe-
riod of time, and to rehabilitate victims.
States Parties are also required to im-
pose legal penalties for the commission of
acts forbidden by the Convention. Coun-
tries including France, Ireland, and the
U.K. have legislated prison sentences of
10 years or more.
Troubling questions about Canada
Although Canada was not among the six
states that led what became known as the
Oslo Process on Cluster Munitions, it par-
ticipated actively from the first formal
meeting in Oslo in February 2007 and was
among the first states to sign the Conven-
tion on Cluster Munitions when it opened
for signature on December 3, 2008. To
date, Canada has not ratified the Conven-
tion and so is not yet legally bound by its
provisions.
Throughout negotiations Canada
worked closely with likeminded states to
ensure the highest possible humanitarian
standard in the Convention while, at the
same time, ensuring that Canada and par-
ticipating allies could continue to engage
effectively in combined military opera-
tions with allies who have chosen not to
become party to the Convention. This last
concern led to the development of Article
21 of the Convention, which makes ex-
plicit provision for continued military in-
teroperability with non-party states.
Paragraph 3 of this Article states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of
Article 1 of this Convention and in
accordance with international law,
How cluster bombs work
Cluster bombs come in a variety of different forms
and are usually dropped from an airplane or fired
in artillery shells.
The spinning shell breaks away to release multiple
bomblets, known as submunitions, which disperse
over a wide area. An average cluster bomb can
cover one square kilometre.
Unexploded ordnance continues to kill and
maim, decades after bombs are dropped.
CLUSTER MUNITIONS
The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 2011 5
CLUSTER MUNITIONS
States Parties, their military person-
nel or nationals, may engage in mili-
tary cooperation and operations with
States not party to this Convention
that might engage in activities pro-
hibited to a State Party.
At least 77 states, including several
NATO members, possess cluster muni-
tions. Although Canada currently has clus-
ter munitions in its military arsenals, it has
never used them.
Other countries such as the U.S., which
used cluster munitions most recently in
the early days of the conflict in
Afghanistan, believe that these weapons
have great military utility and will likely
continue to use them in certain circum-
stances for the foreseeable future.
Given this reality, Article 21 is an es-
sential element of the Convention. It pre-
serves military alliances between States
Parties and non-party states that are vital
to Canada’s national interest and to global
peace and security. Without this Article,
NATO and similar military alliances
would be at some legal risk and it would
not have been possible for many states to
ban cluster munitions and to assume the
many other legally binding obligations
contained in the Convention.
However, Article 21 clearly does not
allow activities during combined military
operations with non-party states that
would diminish the object and purpose of
the Convention. Significant prohibitions
are still in place, as are positive obligations
of States Parties, including: to notify non-
party states of obligations under the Con-
vention, to encourage non-party states to
become party to the Convention, to pro-
mote the norms it establishes, and to
make best efforts to discourage states not
party to this Convention from using clus-
ter munitions. Article 21 is intended
mainly to ensure that the armed forces of
States Parties are not held legally liable for
activities contrary to the Convention that
may be carried out by the forces of non-
party states, despite the best efforts of
States Parties to discourage them.
Canada will likely ratify the Convention
during the next session of Parliament.
The process has been delayed since 2008
by an intense and protracted debate
among government officials to determine
which military activities would be legal or
politically and morally acceptable during
combined military operations with non-
party states.
To ratify the Cluster Munitions Con-
vention, the government is preparing leg-
islation that, among other things, will
specify penalties for the commission of
acts prohibited by the Convention. Al-
though I cannot disclose the specific rec-
ommendations that have been agreed by
the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade and the Department
of National Defence, it is my considered
judgment that if the legislation as recom-
mended is adopted, some of the activities
that would be permitted during combined
operations with non-party states would be
At least 77 states, including several NATO members, possess cluster
munitions. Although Canada currently has cluster munitions
in its military arsenals, it has never used them.
The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 20116
CLUSTER MUNITIONS
inconsistent in the extreme with the ob-
ject and purpose of the Convention. In
some instances, Canada would be deliber-
ately and significantly aiding and abetting
the use of cluster munitions.
If these recommendations are passed
into Canadian law, I believe that Canada
will be isolated among the 109 signatories
for its unacceptably broad interpretation
of what is permitted under the Conven-
tion. Should Canadian Forces personnel
undertake the activities in question, they
would be vulnerable to prosecution in
other jurisdictions and by the Interna-
tional Criminal Court. Most disturbingly,
Canada could be complicit, if not respon-
sible, for more civilian deaths from the
use of this indiscriminate and inhumane
weapon.
Threat on another front
Numerous members of the Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons, includ-
ing the U.S., Russia, China, India, Pakistan,
and Brazil have expressed no interest in
becoming party to the Convention on
Cluster Munitions. The CCW established
a Group of Governmental Experts that
has been negotiating a separate instru-
ment on cluster munitions for almost four
years, but with no agreement to date. As
the CCW operates on the basis of consen-
sus decision-making, any one state can,
and often does, prevent agreement on
substantive measures.
Unlike the Convention on Cluster Mu-
nitions, the latest Chair’s draft text under
consideration in the CCW contains:
i) a complete ban only of cluster muni-
tions produced before 1980;
ii) no required technical measures to
ensure greater accuracy of such
weapons, beyond a general statement
that states should strive for greater ac-
curacy;
iii) only one fail-safe feature to ensure
greater reliability (that has proven inad-
equate to date);
iv) no limitation on the number or
weight of submunitions;
v) no deadline for stockpile destruction;
vi) no definition of a cluster munition
victim;
vii) a deferral period of up to 12 years,
during which any cluster munition pro-
duced after 1980 can be used.
If widely adopted, this text could lead
to the fragmentation of international hu-
manitarian law and possibly undermine
the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
Moreover, it will be of negligible humani-
tarian benefit.
It seems, then, that the Convention on
Cluster Munitions is under some threat,
from within and without. People of con-
science must do everything possible to
ensure that States Parties and countries
such as Canada, which aspire to become
a state party to the Convention, reflect
their very real international legal obliga-
tions in their national laws, policies, and
actions. They must also ensure that lesser
international instruments such as the
draft text under negotiation in the CCW
do not weaken the high standards
achieved in the Convention on Cluster
Munitions. The innocent victims of war
deserve nothing less. �
Notes
1. More information on cluster munitions can be found in the Autumn 2007 Ploughshares Monitor at www.ploughshares.ca.
2. Further information about this event and cluster munitions can be found on the Group of 78 website: www.web.net/~group78.
Earl Turcotte
was the Senior
Coordinator for
Mine Action at
the Canadian
Department of
Foreign Affairs and Interna-
tional Trade (DFAIT) from 2005
to early 2011. He led the Cana-
dian delegation throughout
the negotiation of the Conven-
tion on Cluster Munitions. In
February 2011, he resigned on
principle from DFAIT to
protest what he believes are
seriously flawed joint recom-
mendations from DFAIT and
the Department of National
Defence on legislation de-
signed to enable Canada to
ratify the Convention on Clus-
ter Munitions. This article is
based on a June 2011 presen-
tation by Turcotte to the
Group of 78 in Ottawa.2
Aremarkable conflu-
ence of circumstances has
opened up a window of
opportunity for Canada to advance
what is arguably the most important
international security issue in history:
the elimination of nuclear weapons.
Not since the heyday of Canada’s
contributions to peacekeeping opera-
tions and its championing of the Ot-
tawa Treaty to ban landmines has this
country had such a propitious oppor-
tunity to make a lasting mark on the
global stage as it does now with nu-
clear disarmament.
This month Canadian civil society
leaders sent Prime Minister Stephen
Harper a set of recommendations on
the role that Canada should play to
advance the objective of a nuclear
weapons-free world. (See page 9.)
Copies were also sent to members of
all federal political parties; key gov-
ernment officials at the Department
of Foreign Affairs, the Canadian Nu-
clear Safety Commission and the De-
partment of National Defence;
Members of Parliament; and Sena-
tors and over two dozen diplomatic
missions in Ottawa.
Specifically, the Canadian Gov-
ernment is being asked to take con-
crete steps to implement a historic
motion passed unanimously by the
House of Commons and Senate in
2010. The motion urges the govern-
ment “to engage in negotiations for
a Nuclear Weapons Convention as
proposed by the United Nations
Secretary-General” and “to deploy a
major world-wide Canadian diplo-
matic initiative in support of pre-
venting nuclear proliferation and
increasing the rate of nuclear disar-
mament.”
Canada is uniquely positioned to
assume such a leadership role. Be-
sides enjoying well-earned interna-
tional credibility as an honest broker,
the country is a member of NATO,
an active player in the global nuclear
energy industry, a state party to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
and a member of the G8 and G20.
Yet the Harper government has
failed to make nuclear disarmament a
top foreign policy priority.
Could it be because there is a lack of
domestic support for nuclear disarma-
ment?
No. Civil society organizations
across the country, as well as former
diplomats and government officials,
and more than 550 recipients of the
Order of Canada are urging the
Canadian Government to respond
to the groundswell of support for
concrete steps toward nuclear disar-
mament. Polls have shown that
more than 88 per cent of Canadians
would support an enforceable
agreement to eliminate nuclear
weapons.
Might the Canadian government be re-
luctant to support a cause that does not
resonate with the international public?
The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 2011 7
A legacy for the taking
Cesar Jaramillo
The stars are aligned for Canada to take a leading role
in the movement to eliminate nuclear weapons
Nuclear Free
Zone
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
8 The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 2011
No. In more than 20 countries, includ-
ing the five major nuclear powers,
polls show that more than 75 per cent
of people are in favour of a nuclear
weapons ban. The organization May-
ors for Peace, with a membership of
more than 5,000 mayors from around
the world, is rigorously campaigning
for a ban. The UN Secretary-General
has made nuclear disarmament a key
priority, and more than two-thirds of
UN members have voted in favour of
negotiating a convention to prohibit
nuclear weapons.
Could it be, then, that the government
does not want to antagonize the United
States?
No. In a departure from past U.S.
policy, President Barack Obama has
publicly committed to the goal of a
world free of nuclear weapons. In
Prague, in 2009, he called upon the
international community to take
concrete steps toward this end.
Since the emergence of nuclear
weapons over 60 years ago, there
has been no more opportune time
for Canada to take up the cause of
nuclear disarmament without fear
of upsetting its influential neigh-
bour to the south.
It is hard to find a compelling reason
why the Canadian government has
not made nuclear disarmament a top
priority. Fortunately, the window of
opportunity is still open. But just
barely. The U.S. presidential race will
soon be in full swing and there is no
guarantee Mr. Obama or his position
on nuclear weapons will remain intact.
Canada could show its unequivo-
cal resolve to play a key role in this
process, for instance, by heeding the
first of six specific recommendations
that have just been sent to the Prime
Minister:
Canada should support UN res-
olutions calling for formal nego-
tiations toward a nuclear
weapons convention to begin in
2014, and should offer to host in
2012 a preparatory committee
meeting of states and civil soci-
ety representatives to begin plan-
ning for that negotiation process.
The process of nuclear disarma-
ment will be complex and the road to
an actual convention that eliminates
nuclear weapons will have obstacles.
All the more reason to start laying the
groundwork for a Nuclear Weapons
Convention now, before the acciden-
tal or deliberate detonation of a nu-
clear weapon—by a state or non-state
actor—reminds the world of just
how urgent this matter is.
The Canadian Government could
play a critical role in ridding the
world of the most destructive
weapons ever conceived. At the same
time, it would illustrate the response
of a democratic government to the
explicit desires of its citizens and
elected representatives. And it is hard
to think of a more valuable legacy
for the Prime Minister than paving
the way to a world free of nuclear
weapons. �
Cesar Jaramillo is a Project Officer
with Project Ploughshares.
LEFT: U.S. PresidentBarack Obama publiclycommitted to the goal ofa world free of nuclearweapons in April 2009.He is pictured here withUN Secretary-GeneralBan Ki-moon at the Se-curity Council Summit onnuclear non-proliferationlater that year. Mark Garten/UN
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
9The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 2011
Recommendations of the Sponsoring Groups
The Ottawa Experts Seminar on a Nuclear Weapons Convention, held April 11 and 12, included participants from the
academic community and civil society, as well as diplomats, parliamentarians, and government officials. The discussions addressed
a broad range of legal, political, security, and verification requirements for progress toward a global legal ban on nuclear weapons.
Taking into account the deliberations at the seminar, the sponsoring groups—Canadian Pugwash, Physicians for Global Survival,
Project Ploughshares, and World Federalist Movement – Canada—put forward the following recommendations:
1.Canada should support UN resolutions calling for formal negotiations toward a nuclear weapons convention to begin in 2014 and
should offer to host in 2012 a preparatory committee meeting of states and civil society representatives to begin planning for that
negotiation process.
2. The Minister of Foreign Affairs should welcome the unanimous motions in the Senate and House of Commons calling for a new
Canadian diplomatic initiative in support of nuclear disarmament and request that a special joint committee of the Senate and
House of Commons hold hearings and prepare a report on how best to implement those unanimous motions.
3.The Government of Canada should re-establish a special disarmament verification unit within the Department of Foreign Affairs
and International Trade. Significant human and financial capital should be directed toward building Canadian expertise with regard
to nuclear disarmament, drawing on lessons learned from verification regimes related to nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear testing,
and chemical weapons. An urgent priority is the development of verification procedures and technology in support of the still to be
negotiated fissile materials treaty. The overall focus of the new unit should be to develop and implement credible verification mecha-
nisms, procedures, and technology to ensure compliance with a nuclear weapons convention.
4.Canada should continue its efforts within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to promote transparency and accountability
and to address the NPT’s “institutional deficit.” Such measures include proposals for annual decision-making meetings of the NPT,
for the establishment of an ongoing administrative support unit, and for more consistent and comprehensive reporting by States
Parties regarding national efforts toward full compliance with the NPT.
5. In support of the NPT Review Conference’s call on states "to further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all
military and security concepts, doctrines and policies," Canada should initiate discussions within NATO with a view to ending the Al-
liance’s reliance on nuclear deterrence. Such discussions should include the call for an immediate no-first-use pledge by NATO, as
well as increased attention to transforming the security relationship between Russia and NATO. Canada should also insist on the re-
moval of NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons from the territories of non-nuclear weapons states in Europe, and encourage discussions
to begin leading to a global legal ban on nuclear weapons.
6.Canada should restore the practice of an inclusive approach to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), to take advantage of the
expertise within the NGOs, for example, by restoration of the annual government-civil society consultation and by naming represen-
tatives of civil society organizations to the Canadian delegation to the First Session of the NPT Preparatory Committee, 2012. In this
regard, we are pleased to note Canada’s endorsement of the “Berlin Statement by Foreign Ministers on nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation” of April 30, 2011, which includes this promise: "We will actively promote disarmament and non-proliferation edu-
cation, based on our conviction that education is a powerful tool for mobilizing further disarmament and non-proliferation efforts
globally by enhancing awareness and understanding among our citizens.”
The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 201110
Detour through Darfur
The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 2011 11
The different methods Canada used to export armsto Darfur expose the challenges of tracking weapons
Canada has made laudable
efforts in recent years to
support African security
forces conducting peace-
keeping operations under
adverse conditions in Sudan’s Darfur re-
gion. Contributions have included dona-
tions of security equipment and services.
The different methods and routes Canada
has used to send equipment to peacekeep-
ing troops in Sudan illustrate the complexi-
ties of arranging and monitoring
international arms transfers. They also ex-
pose one of the core challenges to negoti-
ating an effective global Arms Trade Treaty.
Since 2004 the Canadian government
has provided transportation and other
equipment to the security forces of the
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)
and the subsequent African Union/
United Nations Mission in Darfur (UN-
AMID). The largest equipment ship-
ments1 have been:
• Armoured vehicles, shipped from
Canada in 2005 to Senegal, and then
to Sudan. Surplus Canadian Forces
vehicles—100 Grizzly personnel car-
riers and five Husky recovery vehi-
cles manufactured by General
Motors Canada—were supplied on
loan to the armed forces of Nigeria,
Rwanda, and Senegal. Under Opera-
tion Augural, Canada’s Department
of National Defence (DND) pro-
vided training for the troops operat-
ing the armoured vehicles. The
vehicles were used for Darfur peace-
keeping operations until June 30,
2009.
• 24 MRAP (Mine resistant and am-
bush protected) vehicles for police
forces from Burkina Faso, Senegal,
and Uganda to use in Darfur. The
MRAP vehicles were built in South
Africa and shipped to the three
African states in 2009 and 2010.
When related equipment and opera-
tor and maintenance training are in-
cluded, the MRAP vehicles cost
more than $35-million (Pugliese
2009).
• Helicopters and fixed wing aircraft,
leased from private operators.
Canada spent over $95-million on
the charter of up to 25 helicopters
and two AN 74 transport aircraft
from September 2004 to early 2007.2
The aircraft were manufactured in
Russia, Canada, and elsewhere and
their transfer to Sudan was arranged
by the operators. Although the air-
craft provided airlift capacity for
AMIS and UNAMID troops, they
were piloted by civilians. The
arrangement is an example of pri-
vate sector provision of military sup-
port equipment and services.
By Kenneth Epps
OPPOSITE: CanadianGrizzly armoured vehi-cles arrive in August2005 at the Port ofDakar in Senegal enroute to Sudan. Marc Lacourse/DND
The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 201112
CANADIAN MILITARY EXPORTS
Reporting and monitoring shipments
In submissions to the UN Register of
Conventional Arms from 2005 to 2008,
Canada reported “100 Grizzly APC [ar-
moured personnel carriers] are on loan to
African Union mission in Darfur, Sudan”
as part of the background information on
Canadian military holdings. When the pe-
riod of their loan ended in 2009, the ar-
moured vehicles—98 Grizzlies and five
Husky armoured recovery vehicles—were
shipped from Sudan to Uruguay. (Two
Grizzlies were destroyed during the peace-
keeping missions.) Canada reported the
transfer to Uruguay (via Sudan) to the UN
Register.3
Canadian shipments of the armoured
vehicles thus were made transparent by
the reports to the UN Register. From the
Register records it is possible to independ-
ently monitor reported arms transfers,
even if this must occur after the fact.
In the case of the MRAP vehicles,
Canada appears to have operated like an
arms broker, arranging financing and
shipment details without producing or
holding the shipped equipment. Although
the vehicles are military armoured vehi-
cles, Canada did not report the donated
vehicles to the UN Register or in Cana-
dian reports on military exports. As the
supplier, South Africa documented the
transfer of six GILA MRAP vehicles to
Burkina Faso and 12 vehicles to Senegal
in its submission to the UN Register for
2009. (The six vehicles for Uganda may
yet be reported by South Africa in future
submissions to the UN Register.)
The three recipients have not reported
the import of the MRAP vehicles from
South Africa. Nor have they reported
their subsequent shipment to Sudan, al-
though the UN Register does not require
reports of transfers if the exporting state
retains title and control of the equipment.
(If the vehicles were left in Sudan and title
transferred to another state, however, this
would constitute an export.) It is also un-
likely that the African states will report the
return of the MRAP vehicles to their
home territory. As a result, the move-
ments of the armoured vehicles from
South Africa to the three African opera-
tors and then to and from Sudan have
been, at best, only partially transparent.
According to a 2010 release from the
Canadian government, following the six-
month deployment of Ugandan police
and vehicles to Sudan that year, “the Gov-
ernment of Uganda will have the choice
of using the vehicles and equipment to
extend the deployment or take part in
other peacekeeping missions around the
world” (Government of Canada 2010).
For the moment, the vehicles remain in
Sudan with the security forces of the
three African states, all of which have re-
newed their peacekeeping commitments
in Darfur. Despite the conditions set by
the Canadian government, however, it is
not clear how future use or repatriation of
the vehicles will be monitored and re-
ported.
There are important concerns about
repatriation of the MRAP vehicles in par-
ticular. In Uganda, for example, there is a
significant risk that following repatriation
the GILA vehicles will be used by security
forces to repress legitimate political oppo-
sition to a less-than-democratic govern-
ment. Human rights monitors have
reported the recent use of armoured vehi-
cles by Ugandan police and soldiers to at-
Canada may provide equipment to protect
human rights in one country, only to risk
subsequent human rights violations with
the same equipment in another country.
The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 2011 13
CANADIAN MILITARY EXPORTS
tack demonstrators (Human Rights Watch
2011). Canada thus may provide equip-
ment to protect human rights in one
country, only to risk subsequent human
rights violations with the same equipment
in another country.
Concurrently with the armoured vehi-
cle shipments, Canada chartered aircraft in
Darfur to supply troops and to assist mili-
tary medical evacuation. (DFAIT has cited
at least one occasion in 2007 when a Mil
MI-8 helicopter was used to evacuate
Nigerian AMIS peacekeepers that had
been wounded during an attack on their
camp by rebels.) Because the aircraft were
leased, they will be removed from Sudan
by their operators when the contracts are
completed. The chartered aircraft do not
fall within the categories of the UN Regis-
ter. Canada also does not document leased
equipment in its report on Canadian mili-
tary exports, particularly if, as in this case,
the equipment is certified as civilian, re-
gardless of military end-users.
Indeed, Canada has no mechanism to
report the transfer of chartered helicop-
ters for military end-use. In the case of
Darfur, Canada reported the costs to hire
helicopters and fixed wing aircraft to sup-
port the African Union peacekeeping
troops, but did not report the number or
nature of the cross-border transfers in-
volved. This is not unusual. Currently,
there is little to no transparency in the in-
ternational movement of equipment
owned by private security firms.
Transfer transactions
The equipment provided by Canada for
peacekeeping missions in Darfur illus-
trates some of the many types of transac-
tion used to transfer equipment between
and among states for military end-use.
The Grizzly and Husky armoured vehicle
RIGHT: Master CorporalGilles Laplante, a driverinstructor, stands withAfrican Union troops inThies, Senegal, after aday of driver training onthe Grizzly armoured ve-hicle in August 2005.Marc Lacourse/DND
The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 201114
shipments are illustrative of government-
to-government transfers as loaned equip-
ment. Canada retained ownership of the
armoured vehicles in Sudan, and subse-
quently transferred title when the vehicles
were shipped to Uruguay.
The MRAP shipments also were gov-
ernment-to-government transfers, but as
donated equipment. Titles to the MRAP
vehicles were transferred to Burkina Faso,
Senegal, and Uganda. Canada sponsored
the use of the vehicles in Sudan.
The chartering of aircraft illustrates the
growing use of equipment owned and op-
erated by private contractors for military
missions. Private security actors within
military operations have created many
grey areas of responsibility, particularly in
situations involving armed conflict. This
includes responsibility for authorizing and
reporting transfers of military equipment.
States use many types of transaction to
legitimately transfer military goods to
other states. These include imports, ex-
ports, transit and transshipment of goods
through intermediate states, as well as
transfers arising from sales, gifts, loans,
leasing, and military aid. Actors include
state officials as well as private agents such
as brokers, transporters, and financial
backers. Illicit and irresponsible arms
traders may rely on parallel or even over-
lapping actors and agencies to conduct
arms transfers. To reduce criminal
weapons transfers and better control the
international trade in military goods, all
transactions and actors must be effectively
regulated, and decisions to authorize arms
transfers, as well as arms deliveries, should
be reported in a transparent manner.
Preliminary meetings to negotiate a
global Arms Trade Treaty have included
discussions of scope, which is taken to in-
clude not only the range of weapons,
components, ammunition, and services to
be included in the treaty, but also the
range of transactions used to transfer mil-
itary equipment among states. As illus-
trated by Canada’s equipment transfers to
support peacekeeping operations in
Sudan, the type, source, and route of mili-
tary equipment from one state to another
can vary widely. To prevent loopholes that
will be used by criminal and irresponsible
arms traders, Arms Trade Treaty negotia-
tions must reach a comprehensive inter-
pretation of scope. Treaty provisions must
ensure that all equipment transferred for
use by security forces is appropriately au-
thorized, tracked, and reported. �
Notes
1. DND also supplied other equipment such as
helmets.
2. This does not include $23-million spent by the
Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA) on aviation fuel and temporary police sta-
tions near IDP camps. Sources of cost estimates
are from a Government of Canada press release,
November 25, 2004 and CIDA Project Browser.
3. The figures reported to the UN Register do not
correspond to the data from Report on the Export
of Military Goods from Canada 2007-2009 by For-
eign Affairs and International Trade Canada
(DFAIT). Although DFAIT reported recent ship-
ments of Item 2-6 goods (ground vehicles and
components) to Uruguay, they were valued at
$1,256,960 during 2007 and $150,000 during
2008. The report identified no shipments of mili-
tary goods to Uruguay in 2009.
References
Government of Canada. 2010. Canada and the
Netherlands supplies vehicles and equipment to
Uganda Police for Darfur Peacekeeping. Press re-
lease, February 9.
Human Rights Watch. 2011. Uganda: Launch In-
dependent Inquiry into Killings. May 8.
Pugliese, David. 2009. David Pugliese’s Defence
Watch, Ottawa Citizen, October 7.
Kenneth Epps
is Senior
Program
Officer
with Project
Ploughshares.
CANADIAN MILITARY EXPORTS
The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 2011 15
The world welcomed its
newest state on July 9, 2011.
The Republic of South
Sudan became the 54th country in
Africa, in the culmination of the six-
year process outlined in the Compre-
hensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
signed in January 2005 between the
Government of Sudan and the Sudan
People’s Liberation Army/Movement
(SPLA/M). The celebrations by South
Sudanese at home and abroad have
been exuberant, but it is hard to shake
a lingering sense of foreboding.
The act of creating a new country
from the territory of an existing coun-
try is generally a recipe for more con-
flict rather than part of the resolution
of a decades-long civil war. In this
case, however, there can be no argu-
ment with the outcome. In January the
people of South Sudan overwhelm-
ingly voted to create their own country
in an internationally recognized refer-
endum on self-determination. With
considerable international pressure
being applied to Sudan to recognize
the referendum outcome, Sudanese
President Omar al-Bashir complied
and subsequently attended the inde-
pendence ceremonies in Juba, the in-
terim capital of the new Republic.
Even if the prospect of war be-
tween the two states has receded, both
still face disruptive internal conflicts.
Sudan’s President, who came to
power in a coup, stands indicted by
the International Criminal Court for
crimes committed against civilians in
Darfur. While continuing to engage in
violence in Darfur, al-Bashir’s govern-
ment recently renewed armed assaults
in the Sudanese states of South Kord-
ofan and Blue Nile. The majority pop-
ulations of these states are aligned
tribally, politically, and militarily with
the SPLA in the south. The border
state of Abyei, claimed by both Sudan
and South Sudan, was recently over-
run by Sudan’s military. Behaviour in
Sudan is no longer moderated by
southern participation in the national
government, which marked the six-
year interim period of the CPA.
South Sudan starts life as an inde-
pendent state as one of the poorest
and least developed countries in the
world. Despite a pressing need for so-
cial services, roads, schools, and hos-
pitals, emerging government
structures are weak and still unable to
deliver. An estimated 40 per cent of
the annual national budget is commit-
ted to military and police forces. Such
a concentration of funds on security
is not compatible with longer-term
sustainable development.
The government and military of
South Sudan are dominated by one
ethnic group, the Dinka, but long-held
resentments and tensions with the
Nuer and other groups threaten inter-
nal coherence. Tensions, earlier
checked by focusing on a common
northern foe, have increased over po-
litical representation and the negotia-
tion of an interim and then a
permanent constitution. Former SPLA
generals recently launched rebellions in
outlying areas. Intensive pastoralist
raids continue between communities,
leaving hundreds dead and countless
uprooted as people flee for safety.
Sudan and South Sudan, now sepa-
rate countries, have no choice but to
continue to work together as neigh-
bours. They are inextricably linked to-
gether by oil, which is primarily
extracted in South Sudan, but shipped
through Sudan’s pipelines and de-
pendent upon Sudan’s refining and
shipping infrastructure. Oil accounts
for the vast majority of revenues of
both governments.
Negotiations continue between
Sudan and South Sudan on such cru-
cial matters as shared oil revenues, bor-
der demarcation, and citizenship. But
many difficult issues remain unre-
solved. What status will Sudan’s cur-
rency have in South Sudan? Many
people from Sudan in the north live in
South Sudan and vice versa. In which
country will they have citizenship?
How will property ownership be recog-
nized, trade patterns adjusted, and
countless social interactions maintained
along what is now an unmarked but
potentially lethal international border?
The peace promised in the wake of
the birth of the Republic of South
Sudan is most assuredly welcome. It
also is fragile. The international com-
munity will need to stay alert and active
in support of stability and develop-
ment in Sudan and South Sudan if this
is to remain a good news story. �
South Sudan’s unsteady start
John Siebert
Africa’s newest nation is born, but it is poor, weak
and faces internal and external conflicts
The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 201116
Developments in Iran’s
nuclear program are
often viewed from the
perspective of North
American and Euro-
pean policy priorities. Here I explore the
issue from the perspective of one of
Iran’s most embroiled neighbours: Pak-
istan. This article, which draws on a series
of confidential interviews with retired
Pakistani senior military and diplomatic
officials and nuclear scientists, is part of a
larger research project to gauge the per-
spectives of Iran’s neighbours on the pos-
sible development of nuclear weapons by
Iran.
Generally positive relations between
Pakistan and Iran are rooted in a common
history, ethnicity, and language. Neverthe-
less, Pakistan’s relationship with Iran has
vacillated greatly over the past half-cen-
tury. It can be broadly divided into four
periods: the reign of Shah Mohammed
Reza Pahlavi of Iran (1941-1979), the
Khomeini years (1979-1989), the post-
Khomeini period (the 1990s), and post-
9/11 (2001-present).
The time of the Shah was viewed by
many as a period of enlightenment in the
Muslim world because of the leadership
of secular modernists in the formation of
the nascent nation states of Turkey, Iran,
Iran, Pakistan and nuclear ambitions
Interviews with Pakistani officials shed light on the relationship between the neighbours
By Nicole Waintraub
The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 2011 17
IRAN-PAKISTAN RELATIONS
and Pakistan. Pakistan’s government be-
came a secular military dictatorship under
Ayub Khan and relations with Iran grew
stronger.1 At one point, there were sug-
gestions that Pakistan, Iran, and
Afghanistan could form a confederation
of states, bolstered by oil from Iran and
manpower from Pakistan; this idea, never
developed, lingered in the minds of many
people. Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan
did, however, cooperate with Turkey in
forming the Regional Cooperation for
Development to encourage mutual eco-
nomic and social development. As well,
both Iran and Pakistan were key players in
U.S. alliance politics of the Cold War to
contain the influence of the Soviet Union
in the region.2
Pakistan-Iran relations shifted dramati-
cally in the late 1970s with the revolution-
ary overthrow of the Shah in Iran3 and
the rise to power in Pakistan of President
Zia-ul-Haq, a devout Sunni leader. Not
only did Iran and Pakistan experience
growing ideological friction, they also had
vastly different regional orientations. At
the time, Iran saw its nemesis as Iraq and
the Arab world, while Pakistan was fo-
cused on its rivalry with India and, begin-
ning in 1980, the Soviet Union’s
occupation of Afghanistan. Pakistan’s nu-
clear program developed in this context,
primarily in response to the development
of nuclear weapons by its arch-rival, India.
Although Iran and Pakistan attempted
to rebuild their relationship during the
1990s, their efforts were complicated by
clashing approaches to Afghanistan. While
Iran supported the Shi’a minority in
Afghanistan, Pakistan supported the pre-
dominantly Sunni Taliban. Despite this
important difference, an overwhelming
force in favour of rapprochement was a
common heavy scrutiny and sanction by
the U.S.—Pakistan because of its growing
nuclear weapons program and Iran be-
cause of its open disregard of U.S. policy
directives.4
After the events of September 11, 2001
and the invasion of Afghanistan, the
Afghanistan factor changed completely.
Iran, increasingly antagonistic toward the
U.S. under President Ahmedinejad, saw
the invasion driving the Taliban out of
Afghanistan while at the same time bog-
ging the U.S. down in a counter-insur-
gency war. Meanwhile, Pakistan found
itself ambiguously aligned with the U.S. in
the so-called “war against terror.”
Commentators acknowledge the prob-
lematic dealings that Pakistan has main-
ABOVE: Shah Mo-hammed Reza Pahlaviand his wife, Farah, arepictured in Tehran in1968. Relations betweenIran and Pakistan werestrong during the Shah’sreign. UN Photo
The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 201118
tained with the Taliban. Nevertheless, it is
understood that Pakistan’s cooperation is
fundamentally important to U.S. objectives
in the region. This tenuous relationship
between Pakistan and the U.S. has harmed
Pakistan’s relations with Iran.
To be sure, other factors have a bearing
on the relationship between Pakistan and
Iran. Most notable of these is the rise of
China and the economic opportunities it
creates for both countries. Iran and Pak-
istan have independently formed ties with
China based on economic interests and, in
Pakistan’s case, to counter-balance India’s
role in the region. Relations of these four
countries are and will remain complicated.
For example, China’s development of the
Gwadar Port in Pakistan is an important
component of its sea connections to
North Africa.5 However, this port is in di-
rect competition with the Chabahar Port
in Iran, an Indian initiative that is seen in
Pakistan as an attempt by India to deny
China its foothold in the region and to
undermine Pakistan’s longstanding role in
transit trade with Afghanistan.
On the nuclear issue
Many of the experts I interviewed think
that the Western press has radically over-
stated the nuclear relationship between
Iran and Pakistan. They believe that A.Q.
Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist who,
between 1980 and 2000, covertly sold de-
signs and technology to support nuclear
weapons development in Libya, Iran, and
North Korea, was personally greedy, but
not working for the political and military
leadership in Pakistan when selling
abroad. Although elements of Pakistan’s
military establishment supported nuclear
proliferation in Iran, the Pakistani govern-
ment did not take this position officially
or publicly. Pakistan staunchly supports
every country’s right to nuclear energy, but
only for peaceful purposes.
When asked to outline perceptions held
by the general public on the possible mili-
tarization of nuclear development in Iran,
my sources listed the following:
1. Anti-American – Some believe that
the U.S. is trying to ensure that no fur-
ther Islamic countries develop a nuclear
weapon. Iraq and Libya figure promi-
nently here. Many Pakistanis hold that
the more weapons Pakistan produces,
the more difficult it will be for the U.S.
to dismantle its nuclear weapons pro-
gram. This view tends to be more sym-
pathetic to further development of
Iran’s nuclear program.
2. Balance of power in the Middle East –
Some feel that Israel’s nuclear weapons
monopoly in the Middle East is prob-
lematic. Thus, it would not necessarily
be a bad thing for Iran to balance the
power dynamic in the region with nu-
clear weapons of its own. Such a devel-
opment would not, however, have a
direct impact on Pakistan.
3. Sunni vs. Shi’a rivalry – Others be-
lieve that an Iranian nuclear bomb
would be a Shi’a bomb, which could
provide sufficient grounds for the pre-
dominantly Sunni Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates to acquire their
own nuclear weapons. Such a develop-
ment is undesirable, as it would place a
significant amount of pressure on Pak-
istan.
4. Nuclear weapons nonproliferation –
Some feel that the nonproliferation
regime is a coalition of the likeminded.
Friends with nuclear weapons are given
support and a seat at the table, while
others are vilified and sanctioned. In
this view, countries with a nuclear-
weapons capability that capitulate to
outside pressure leave themselves vul-
nerable.
Official thinking in Pakistan focuses on
the dire consequences at domestic, re-
Nicole
Waintraub
was an intern
with Project
Ploughshares
from September
2010 to August
2011.
IRAN-PAKISTAN RELATIONS
The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 2011 19
IRAN-PAKISTAN RELATIONS
gional, and international levels should Iran
develop nuclear weapons:
1. Nuclear proximity – If Iran were to
develop nuclear weapons, Pakistan
would be flanked by two nuclear-armed
countries—Iran on the west and India
on the east. At best, relations with Iran
have been mixed. Relations with India
have degenerated into war on several
occasions. Being sandwiched between
two nuclear-armed states would make
Pakistan very uncomfortable.
2. Sunni-Shi’a tensions – There is con-
cern that the Shi’a minority in Pakistan
(approximately 15-20 per cent of the
total population) would be emboldened
if Iran were to develop a nuclear
weapon, a ‘Shi’a Bomb’. Saudi Arabia, a
Sunni country with a significant Shi’a
minority, might also decide to develop a
nuclear weapon, also increasing pres-
sure on Pakistan.
3. Reaction of U.S. and other interna-
tional partners –Pakistani officials are
keenly aware of the public debates in
the U.S. and Israel on pre-emptive
strikes against Iran. Were they to occur,
Pakistan would find itself in an impos-
sible position. Not only could it suffer
in the crossfire of such pre-emptive
strikes, Pakistan would come under a
great deal of pressure to pick a side.
Official thinking in Pakistan is also
driven by concern about increasing ties be-
tween India and Iran,6 although India’s nu-
clear deal with the U.S. and a vote against
Iran by the International Atomic Energy
Agency’s Board of Governors have compli-
cated that relationship. Many commentators
feel that India will continue to orchestrate a
strategic encirclement of Pakistan. The im-
plications for Pakistan of a relationship be-
tween a nuclear India and a nuclear Iran are
unclear, but must be of concern.
Emboldening the minority
Commentators in Pakistan do not believe
that Iran poses a direct threat to Pakistan,
with or without nuclear weapons. Never-
theless, the development of nuclear
weapons in Iran would present serious im-
pediments to long-sought stability in Pak-
istan by potentially emboldening its Shi’a
minority, and would place tremendous
pressure on its foreign policy. Many Pak-
istanis also wonder how such a develop-
ment would affect its longstanding
conflict with India. The result of the de-
velopment of nuclear weapons by Iran
would likely be a further destabilization of
Pakistan and Pakistan’s relationships with
its Asian and Middle East neighbours. �
Notes
1. See Robert LaPorte (1969), Succession in Pakistan: Continuity and change in a garrison state, Asian Survey, 9:11, pp. 842-861; Wayne
Wilcox (1969), Political change in Pakistan: Functions, constraints and goals, Pacific Affairs, 41:3, pp. 341-354; Sumit Ganguly (2000), Pakistan’s
never-ending story: Why the October coup was no surprise, Foreign Affairs, 79:2, pp. 2-7.
2. See Shirin Tahir-Kheli (1977), Iran and Pakistan: Cooperation in an area of conflict, Asian Survey, 17:5, pp. 474-490.
3. See Janne Bjerre Christensen (2011), Strained alliances: Iran’s troubled relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan, Danish Institute for Interna-
tional Studies Report, 2011:03.
4. See Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid (2008), From great game to grand bargain: Ending chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Foreign Af-
fairs, 87:6, pp. 30-45.
5. See Christopher J. Pehrson (2006), String of pearls: Meeting the challenge of China’s rising power across the Asian littoral, Strategic Studies
Institute.
6. See C. Christine Fair (2007), India and Iran: New Delhi’s Balancing Act, The Washington Quarterly, Summer, pp. 145-159; Monika Chansoria
(2010), India-Iran Defence Cooperation, Indian Defence Review, 25:1.
20 The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 2011
It may be churlish to begrudge
Prime Minister Harper some
self-congratulatory hyperbole
for the Canadian military’s con-
tribution to the civil war in
Libya. On August 21, the rebel forces,
supported by NATO airstrikes since
March, swept the capital of Tripoli.
Moammar Gadhafi and his regime were
no longer in control of most of the coun-
try, effectively replaced by the National
Transitional Council (NTC). While repre-
senting only part of the Libyan popula-
tion, the NTC has nonetheless been
recognized by a significant number of
countries—including Canada—as the le-
gitimate government of Libya, and the
NTC representative has taken his place at
the United Nations.
Who beyond his family and hard core
supporters will mourn Gadhafi’s fall? Not
most Libyans, we can assume. During 42
years in power, the eccentric and terror-
producing Gadhafi took dictatorial control
over their lives, denying personal freedoms
and committing gross and systematic vio-
lations of fundamental human rights.
On September 1 in Trapani, Italy,
Harper (Prime Minister 2011) congratu-
lated Canadian Forces on their contribu-
Familiar opening scenes
Libya is rid of Gadhafi, but will Canadian Forcessoon be bogged down in another Afghanistan?
By John Siebert
ABOVE: A Libyan rebelfighter sits on the stepsof a bullet-ridden build-ing in Ajdabiya. Kate Thomas/IRIN
LIBYA AND THE CANADIAN FORCES
21The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 2011
tion to the Libyan campaign:
Just as Canadians thank you for your
work here, I know that countless
thousands of Libyans have reason to
be grateful, too. Few will ever know
you by name. Some may not even yet
be born. But if Libya can seize the op-
portunity that now lies before it, the
real results of your actions these past
five months will be seen. . . freedom
of speech, freedom of assembly—the
freedom of simply being left alone.
The Prime Minister went on to charac-
terise the contribution as Canada “punch-
ing above its weight.” The Royal Canadian
Air Force flew more than 750 sorties, or
about 10 per cent of the total. Two ships
from the Royal Canadian Navy helped to
enforce a maritime blockade. According
to the Prime Minister (2011), “Soldier for
soldier, sailor for sailor, airman for air-
man, the Canadian Armed Forces are the
best in the world.”
He was not alone in singing their
praises. Former Canadian Ambassador to
the United Nations Paul Heinbecker
(2011) enthusiastically wrote on August
23: “Success, vindication, satisfaction, op-
timism; there are many legitimate ways to
characterize the so far happy events in
Libya.” Being an old hand, Heinbecker
knows his way around a qualifier, in this
case the caveat “so far.”
Caution is warranted. The difficulty
with the current upbeat take on Libya is
that we have seen the opening scenes of
this movie before—in Afghanistan and
Iraq—and the rest of the show has not
been very pleasant.
Granted, no two wars are the same.
Libya is not Afghanistan, nor is it Iraq.
But the similarities are worth noting. Each
is driven by ethnic and tribal divisions, ex-
ploited for decades by dictatorial govern-
ments, and blessed with valuable natural
resources such as oil deposits that could
finance new futures.
We should remember the 2001 tri-
umphal entry of the Northern Alliance
into Kabul as the routed Taliban regime in
Afghanistan headed for Tora Bora. While
that victory came easily, with the assis-
tance of U.S. Special Forces riding on
horseback and calling in U.S. air strikes,
winning the peace in Afghanistan still
proves illusive 10 years later. On May 1,
2003, President George W. Bush made his
“mission accomplished in Iraq” speech
onboard the USS Abraham Lincoln. U.S.
troops are still in Iraq eight years later.
The UN Security Council approved
military action by an international coali-
tion led by NATO to halt abuses and the
spread of terrorism in Libya. U.S. leader-
ship in concert with NATO has been key.
Here again, similarities can be seen with
the Afghanistan war.
In Libya, terrorism was by the regime
against its own people. The invocation of
the “responsibility to protect” by UN Se-
curity Council resolutions 1970 and 1973
in March 2011 to stop Gadhafi’s forces
from wiping out civilians in Benghazi
quickly and openly morphed into regime
change. Except for the damage done
through the inappropriate use of the R2P
doctrine in Libya to cover for regime
change, the parallels with Afghanistan and
Iraq pretty much hold.
Let’s not forget the flood of arms in
Libya that will enable violent responses to
We should remember the 2001 triumphal
entry of the Northern Alliance into Kabul
as the routed Taliban regime
in Afghanistan headed for Tora Bora.
LIBYA AND THE CANADIAN FORCES
22 The Ploughshares Monitor | Autumn 2011
grievances by all factions for decades to
come. Before March 2011, the Gadhafi
regime was armed to the teeth. During the
fighting of the past five months, NATO
members and others supplied NTC rebels
with small arms and light weapons to even
the fight. Now Government arsenals are
reportedly being looted (Lucas 2011).
How long before a franchise of “IEDs R
Us” opens in Libya, as it did in
Afghanistan and Iraq?
The inherent catastrophe fuelled by the
prevalence of guns and bombs in Libya is
worsened by another casualty in this civil
war: the UN arms embargo on Libya. Re-
ports indicate that the Chinese offered and
perhaps supplied arms to the Gadhafi
regime in defiance of the embargo (Smith
2011). However, NATO members and oth-
ers supplying the Libyan rebels with arms
must also come under scrutiny. There is, ad-
mittedly, some dispute about whether the
UN arms embargo applied only to Gadhafi’s
regime or to all sides in this civil war. Clarifi-
cation is being sought on whether Canada
also violated the UN arms embargo.1
The primary response of NATO par-
ticipants in the Libya campaign to the ap-
parent victory of the NTC forces is, much
like Prime Minister Harper’s speech, char-
acterized by a sense of vindication. They
assisted in vanquishing an evil regime, and
now bless the new leadership they chose.
Current talk at international donor confer-
ences focuses on establishing democracy,
state building, and post-conflict recon-
struction and development assistance for
infrastructure and the establishment of a
vibrant private sector.
These plans and good wishes must
translate into actual policies, programs,
and institutions that have a positive effect
in Libya over the coming years. None of
these same promises and plans have been
successfully implemented so far in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Having taken the
military plunge, however, there is no turn-
ing back from the reconstruction chal-
lenge in Libya. To rebuild is the third pillar
of the R2P doctrine. For the sake of the
people of Libya, Canada and its NATO
allies must succeed, but the portents are
not encouraging.
Initial tallies reported by the interim
health minister of the NTC of deaths in
Libya since fighting began in February
are 30,000, with 50,000 wounded and
possibly 4,000 still missing (Sacramento Bee
2011). The actual numbers have not yet
been independently verified. Revenge is
in the air. Gadhafi remains at large.
Fighting continues within Libya. It is not
yet clear if Libya’s regional neighbours
will all fall in line to support the NTC, or
if, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, some will
provide sanctuary and support for a pro-
longed insurgency against the new gov-
ernment.
Winning the war does not mean that
the peace will be won. We must hope that
Canada and its NATO allies have learned
this lesson from Afghanistan and Iraq. �
Note
1. At the end of August, Project Ploughshares
sent a letter to Canadian Foreign Minister John
Baird, asking for clarification on Canada’s official
interpretation of the UN arms embargo. To view
the letter, please go to: www.ploughshares.ca.
References
Heinbecker, Paul. 2011. Plenty of credit to go
around in Gadhafi’s fall. The Ottawa Citizen, Au-
gust 23.
Lucas, Ryan. 2011. Weapons proliferation a
‘key concern’ in Libya. The Globe and Mail, Sep-
tember 14.
Prime Minister (Canada). 2011. Statement of
the Prime Minister of Canada while in Trapani,
Italy. September 1.
Sacramento Bee, The. 2011. Libyan estimate:
At least 30,000 died in the war. September 8.
Smith, Graeme. 2011. China offered weapons
to Gadhafi. The Globe and Mail, September 3.
John Siebert
is Executive
Director
of Project
Ploughshares.
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for Nancy Regehr
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Waterloo, Ontario
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