The Pakistan Army From 1965 to 1971

8/14/2019 The Pakistan Army From 1965 to 1971

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DEFENCE NOTES

The Pakistan ArmyFrom 1965 to 1971

Selected Excerpts from Pakistan Army Since 1965 re-drafted as anarticle exclusively for the Defence Journal. The Pakistan Army Since

1965 is the second volume of the Two Volume history of Pakistan Army

and covers Pakistan Army from 1965 till 2000.

Maj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN from WASHINGTON DC makes

an interesting foray down memory lane.

The finest summarising of the incalculable qualitative harm inflicted on the Pakistan Army, by the self-promoted Field Marshal of peace, by a contemporary, was done by Major General Fazal I Muqeem, whenhe described the state of affairs of the Pakistan Army during the period 1958-71; in the following words: "We

had been declining according to the degree of our involvement in making and unmaking of regimes. Gradually

the officer corps, intensely proud of its professionalism was eroded at its apex into third class politicians and

administrators. Due to the absence of a properly constituted political government, the selection and promotion

of officers to the higher rank depended on one mans will. Gradually, the welfare of institutions was sacrificed

to the welfare of personalities. To take the example of the army, the higher command had been slowly

weakened by retiring experienced officers at a disturbingly fine rate. Between 1955 and November 1971, in

about 17 years 40 Generals had been retired, of whom only four had reached their superannuating age. Similar

was the case with other senior ranks. Those in the higher ranks who showed some independence of outlook

were invariably removed from service. Some left in sheer disgust in this atmosphere of insecurity and lack of

the right of criticism, the two most important privileges of an Armed Forces officer. The extraordinary wastage

of senior officers particularly of the army denied the services, of the experience and training vital to their

efficiency and welfare. Some officers were placed in positions that they did not deserve or had no training for"

1.

The advent of Yahya Khan and Yahyas Personality

Immediately after the 1965 war Major General Yahya Khan who had commanded the 7 Division in the Grand

Slam Operation was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General, appointed Deputy Army C in C and C in C

designate in March 1966 2. Yahya was a Qizilbash3 commissioned from Indian Military Academy Dehra

Dun on 15 July 1939. An infantry officer from the 4/10 Baluch Regiment, Yahya saw action during WW II in

North Africa where he was captured by the Axis Forces in June 1942 and interned in a prisoner of war camp

in Italy from where he escaped in the third attempt4. In 1947 he was instrumental in not letting the Indian

officers shift books 5 from the famous library of the British Indian Staff College at Quetta,where Yahya was

posted as the only Muslim instructor at the time of partition of India.Yahya was from a reasonably well to do

family, had a much better schooling than Musa Khan and was directly commissioned as an officer. Yahya

unlike Musa was respected in the officer corps for professional competence. Yahya became a brigadier at the

age of 34 and commanded the 106 Infantry Brigade, which was deployed on the ceasefire line in Kashmir in


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1951-52. Later Yahya as Deputy Chief of General Staff was selected to head the armys planning board set

up by Ayub to modernise the Pakistan Army in 1954-57. Yahya also performed the duties of Chief of General

Staff from 1958 to 1962 from where he went on to command an infantry division from 1962 to 1965.

Yahya was a hard drinking soldier approaching the scale of Mustafa Kemal of Turkey and had a reputation of

not liking teetotallers. Yahya liked courtesans but his passion had more to do with listening to them sing or

watching them dance. Thus he did not have anything of Ataturks practical womanising traits. Historically

speaking many great military commanders like Khalid Bin Waleed, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Eftikhar Khan

and Grant were accused of debauchery and womanising. These personal habits still did not reduce their

personal efficiency and all of them are remembered in military history as great military commanders! The

yardstick is that as long as a military commander performs his job as a military leader well, debauchery drink

etc is not important. Abraham Lincoln a man of great integrity and character when told by the typical military

gossip type commanders, found in all armies of the world and in particular plenty in the Indo-Pak armies,

about Grants addiction to alcohol dismissed their criticism by stating "I cannot spare this man. He fights"!

Indeed while the US Civil War was being fought a remark about Grant was attributed to Lincoln and

frequently repeated as a joke in army messes. The story thus went that Lincoln was told about Grants

drinking habits, and was asked to remove Grant from command. Lincoln dismissed this suggestion replying

"send every general in the field a barrel of it"! Once Lincoln heard this joke he said that he wished very muchthat he had said it! 6 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, praised by his enemies, i.e. the British, in the British Official

History of WW One, as one of the greatest military commanders in worlds history was a great consumer of

alcohol and chronic womaniser! It has been alleged that Kemal was a homosexual (a typically Turkish

pastime) too and frequently suffered the ravages of venereal disease! The same was true for Petain one of the

greatest military commanders of the French Army in WW One!

Gul Hassan Khan who served with Yahya in the General Headquarters in the early 1960s described Yahya as

"professionally competent" and as a man of few words whom always approached the point at issue without

ceremony.7 Muqeem described Yahya as "authoritarian by nature" and "reserved by temperament".8 Major

General Sher Ali under whom Yahya served assessed Yahya as an officer of the "highest calibre". Shaukat

Riza writing as recently as 1986 described Yahya as a good soldier, as a commander distinguished for his

decision making and generous nature and one who gave his total trust to a man whom he accepted as part of

his team or a colleague.9

Contrary to Gauhars judgement Yahya, at least in 1966-69, was definitely viewed as a professional in the

army. His shortcomings in functioning as the Supreme Commander that became evident in the 1971 war were

not known to anyone in 1966. No evidence exists, but it appears that Yahyas sect and ethnicity may have

played a part in Ayubs decision to select Yahya as C in C. Musa writes in his memoirs that Yahya was not

his first choice as Army C in C but was selected by Ayub overruling Musas reservations about Yahyas

character 10. This further proves that Ayub selected Yahya as the army chief for reasons other than merit. I

am not implying that Yahya was incompetent, but merely the fact that Ayub was motivated by ulterior reasons

to select Yahya. These reasons had something to do with Yahyas political reliability by virtue of belonging to

a minority! Yahya was not a Punjabi or a Pathan but belonged to a minority ethnic group as well as a minority

ethnic group, just like Musa.This was no mere coincidence but a deliberately planned manoeuvre to have as

army chief a man who was not from the two ethnic groups which dominated the officer corps, the Punjabis

being more than 60 % of the officer corps and the Pathans being the second largest group after the

Punjabis!11 Altaf Gauhar Ayubs close confidant inadvertently proves this fact once he quite uncharitably, and

for reasons, other than dispassionate objective historical considerations, described Yahya as one " selected


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in preference to some other generals, because Yahya, who had come to hit the bottle hard, had no time for

politics and was considered a harmless and loyal person".12

Selection of Army C in C

Foreign readers may note that almost all army chiefs of Pakistan Army were selected primarily because they

were perceived as reliable as well as pliable! In Addition ethnic factors Vis a Vis prevalent political

considerations played a part in their selection. Thus Liaquat the first premier selected a non Punjabi as the

armys first C in C since in 1950 Liaquat was involved in a political confrontation with Punjabi politicians of

the Muslim League and had established a Hindustani-Pathan-Bengali alliance to sideline the Punjabi Muslims.

Thus the most obvious nominee for the appointment of C in C i.e. Major General Raza, a Punjabi Muslim was

not selected. Instead Ayub an ethnic Pathan, and one who already had been superseded and sidelined, and

with a poor war record was selected as the first Pakistani Muslim army C in C. Similarly Ayub selected Musa

simply because Musa was perceived as loyal despite not being competent! Yahya as Gauhar Ayubs closest

adviser and confidant admits, as earlier mentioned, was selected because he had hit the bottle hard; i.e. was

harmless, and was loyal, and thus no danger to Ayub! In other words Gauhar advances a theory that Ayub

selected Yahya (Gauhars subjective judgement) simply because it was politically expedient for Ayub to have

this particular type of man as army chief! Gauhar judgement of Yahya has little value since it was highlysubjective but Ayubs reasons for selecting his army chief, as Gauhar describes it speaks volumes for the

character of Ayub and I would say the orientation of all Pakistani politicians, both civilian and military! In third

world countries every army chief is a military politician! The process was carried on and continues to date but

this chapter deals with only 1965-1971, so more of this later!

The same was true for extensions given to the army chiefs. Ayub got three extensions since Iskandar Mirza

perceived him as a reliable tool. He booted out Mirza, his benefactor, after the last extension in 1958! Ayub

gave Musa an extension of four years in 1962 since he perceived Musa as reliable and politically docile, and

thus no threat to Ayubs authoritarian government. Since 1962 when Musa got his extension of service by one

additional term of four years, which prolonged his service from 1962 to 196613, no Pakistani army chief wasgiven an extension beyond his three or four year term. The situation however was still worse since Yahya took

over power in 1969 and thus automatically extended his term as C in C till December 1971. Zia usurped

power in 1977 and thus gave himself a nine year extension as Army Chief till he was removed to the army and

the countrys great relief in August 1988 by Divine Design! Beg attempted to get an extension by floating the

idea of being appointed as Supreme Commander of Armed Forces14 but was outmanoeuvred by his own

army corps commanders, who gave a lukewarm response to the idea and by Ghulam Ishaq who was a

powerful president and had a deep understanding of the military mind by virtue of having loyally and

successfully served three military dictators.

Yahya Khan as Army Chief-1966-1971

Yahya energetically started reorganising the Pakistan Army in 1965. Today this has been forgotten while

Yahya is repeatedly condemned for only his negative qualities (a subjective word which has little relevance to

generalship as proved in military history)! The post 1965 situation saw major organisational as well as

technical changes in the Pakistan Army. Till 1965 it was thought that divisions could function effectively while

getting orders directly from the armys GHQ. This idea failed miserably in the 1965 war and the need to have

intermediate corps headquarters in between the GHQ and the fighting combat divisions was recognised as a

foremost operational necessity after the 1965 war. In 1965 war the Pakistan Army had only one corps


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headquarter i.e the 1 Corps Headquarters. Soon after the war had started the US had imposed an embargo

on military aid on both India and Pakistan. This embargo did not affect the Indian Army but produced major

changes in the Pakistan Armys technical composition. US Secretary of State Dean Rusk well summed it up

when he said, "Well if you are going to fight, go ahead and fight, but were not going to pay for it"!15

Pakistan now turned to China and for military aid and Chinese tank T-59 started replacing the US M-47/48

tanks as the Pakistan Armys MBT (Main Battle Tank) from 1966. 80 tanks, the first batch of T-59s, a low-

grade version of the Russian T-54/55 series were delivered to Pakistan in 1965-66. The first batch was

displayed in the Joint Services Day Parade on 23 March 196616. The 1965 War had proved that PakistanArmys tank infantry ratio was lopsided and more infantry was required. Three more infantry divisions (9, 16

and 17 Divisions) largely equipped with Chinese equipment and popularly referred to by the rank and file as

"The China Divisions" were raised by the beginning of 196817. Two more corps headquarters i.e. 2 Corps

Headquarters (Jhelum-Ravi Corridor) and 4 Corps Headquarters (Ravi-Sutlej Corridor) were raised.

In the 1965 War India had not attacked East Pakistan which was defended by a weak two-infantry brigade

division (14 Division) without any tank support. Yahya correctly appreciated that geographical, as well as

operational situation demanded an entirely independent command set up in East Pakistan. 14 Divisions

infantry strength was increased and a new tank regiment was raised and stationed in East Pakistan. A new

Corps Headquarters was raised in East Pakistan and was designated as Headquarters Eastern Command.18It was realised by the Pakistani GHQ that the next war would be different and East Pakistan badly required a

new command set up.

Major General Sahibzada Yaqub Khan took over as the armys Chief of General Staff and thus Principal Staff

Officer to the C in C soon after the 1965 war. Yaqub was an aristocrat from a Hindustani Pathan background

and was altogether different from the typical north of Chenab breed in depth of intellect, general outlook and

strategic perception! In words of Fazal Muqeem a sharp observer and one who was not lavish in praising

anyone "planning had taken a turn for the better when Major General Yaqub Khan became the Chief of

General Staff.19 In other words Muqeem was implying that planning level in the army was relatively poor

before Yaqub became the Chief of General Staff. But Muqeem went further and stated that the armys war

plans in the post 1965 era were still vague about "what action should be taken in West Pakistan if an attack

was mounted against East Pakistan".20 We will discuss more of this later.

Promotions and Appointments

Selection and assessment of officers for higher ranks had depended on one mans will and his personal likes

and dislikes since 1950. Initially it was Ayub from 1950 to 1969 and Yahya from 1969 to 1971. Dictators

fear all around them and this was the principal tragedy of the Pakistan Army. Selection and assessment of men

was not a plus point in Yahyas personality. It appears that either Yahya was not a good judge of men. In this

regard Yahya continued Ayubs policy of sidelining talented officers who had the potential of becoming a rival

at a later stage! We will first deal with selection for higher ranks vis-a-vis war performance. Almost no one,

who had blundered, except Brigadier Sardar Ismail the acting divisional commander of 15 Division, was really

taken to task for having failed in the discharge of his military duties!21 Lord Bashir of Valtoha fame was

promoted, and commanded the 6th Armoured Division after the war! On the other hand Major General

Abrar, who had proved himself as the finest military commander, at the divisional level, at least by sub

continental standards, was sidelined and ultimately retired in the same rank!22 Lieutenant Colonel Nisar of 25

Cavalry who had saved Pakistans territorial integrity from being seriously compromised at a strategic level at

Gadgor on the 8th of September 1965 was sidelined. This may be gauged from the fact that at the time of


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outbreak of the 1971 War Nisar although promoted to brigadier rank, was only commanding the Armoured

corps recruit training centre, a poor appointment for a man who had distinguished himself as a tank regiment

commander in stopping the main Indian attack. A man whose units performance was described by the enemy

opposing him as one "which was certainly creditable because it alone stood between the 1st Indian Armoured

Division and its objective"23 was considered by the Pakistani General Headquarters pedantic officers as fit

only to command a recruit training centre while one who was instrumental in failure of the main Pakistani

armour effort at Khem Karan was promoted to Major General rank and trusted with the command of

Pakistans Armoured division! Brigadier Qayyum Sher who had distinguished himself as a brigade commanderin 10 Division area in Lahore was also not promoted! Qayyum Sher was one of the few brigade commanders

of the army who had led from the front. Major General Shaukat Riza who rarely praised anyone had the

following to say about Shers conduct while leading the Pakistan armys most important infantry brigade

counter attack on Lahore Front as a result of which the Indian 15 Division despite considerable numerical

superiority was completely thrown off balance. Shaukat stated that "Brigadier Qayyum Sher, in his command

jeep, moved from unit to unit and then personally led the advance, star plate and pennant visible. This was

something no troops worth their salt could ignore".24 but the Armys Selection Boards ignored Qayyum Sher

once his turn for promotion came! Qayyum Sher did well in war and was awarded the Pakistani D.S.O i.e. the

HJ! But war performance or even performance in peacetime training manoeuvres was, and still is, no criteria

for promotion in the Pakistan Army! Qayyum retired as a brigadier, remembered by those who fought under

him as a brave and resolute commander, who was not given an opportunity to rise to a higher rank, which

Qayyum had deserved, more than any brigadier of the Pakistan Army did.

Analysis and reappraisal after the 1965 War

The 1965 War was rich in lessons and many lessons were learned; however the armys reorganisation was

badly affected by the political events of 1968-71. The two major areas of improvement after the war were in

the realm of military organisation and military plans. It was realised finally that infantry and armoured divisions

could not be effectively employed till they were organised as corps with areas of responsibility based on

terrain realities.

The post 1965 army saw major changes in terms of creation of corps headquarters. On the other side no

major doctrinal reappraisal was done after the 1965 War except raising new divisions and corps no major

reform was undertaken to produce a major qualitative change in the armys tactical and operational

orientation. Today this is a much criticised subject. The events of 1965-71 however must be taken as a whole.

When one does so a slightly different picture emerges. A major start was taken soon after 1965 after Yahya

had been nominated as the deputy army chief, towards improving higher organisation and corps were created,

but this process was retarded by the much more ominous political developments which increasingly diverted

the army chiefs energies into political decision making from 1969 onwards.

The 1965 War was a failure in higher leadership. This was true for both sides. However, qualitative superiority

by virtue of superior doctrine strategic orientation and operational preparedness became relatively far more

important for the Pakistan Army than the Indians.

The Indians had already embarked on a programme of rapid expansion since the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962.

The material and numerical gap between the Indian and Pakistan armies started widening from 1962 and after

1965 it reached dangerous proportions! Further because of the 1965 War the Indians got an opportunity to

improve their command and control procedures. The Indians the reader must note were already one step


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ahead of the Pakistanis in higher organisation since their army was organised to fight as corps since 1947-48

while the Pakistan Army had fought the 1965 War organised in divisions.

The Indians had failed to make good use of their considerable numerical superiority in infantry in 1965 but,

they had learned many lessons which. This meant that in the next war the Indians could employ their

numerically superior forces in a relatively better manner than in 1965. Further Pakistan had lost its major arms

supplier the USA which had imposed an arms embargo on Pakistan. Thus the technical superiority in

equipment which Pakistan had enjoyed in 1965 was nullified after 1965. On the other hand India had a much

larger economy and thus far greater potential to buy from the open market than Pakistan. All these factors

demanded a major qualitative change. One that would ensure that Pakistan could survive another war with

India.It was an entirely new situation.

The year 1965 was a watershed in Pakistani military history. Till 1965 Pakistani planners thought in terms of

liberating the Pakistani Alsace Lorraine i.e. Kashmir! The issue in the next war was no longer adding more

territory but merely preserving the countrys territorial integrity! The country was in the grip of serious internal

and external crisis. The Internal crisis stemmed out of 11 years of military rule which had sharply polarised the

country into two wings i.e the Eastern and the Western Wing and even within the Western Wing the bulk of

the populace was alienated with the Ayub regime. It appears that this major change in the overall geostrategicposition was not grasped by those at the highest level. It appears that till December 1971 no one in the

Pakistani GHQ seriously thought that the Indians would overrun East Pakistan. Too much hope was based on

US or Chinese intervention. The Chinese could not possibly have intervened since all Himalayan passes were

snowbound in Nov-Dec 1971. The United States on the other hand made no serious effort to pressurise India

into not attacking East Pakistan. To make things further complicated the countrys internal cohesion was

seriously weakened by the political conflict between the East and West Pakistan Provinces and the

countrywide anti Ayub agitation which finally led to the exit of the self promoted Field Marshal Ayub from

power in March 1969. The situation was extremely delicate, complicated and only a truly great leader at both

civil and military level could have remedied the situation. Unfortunately for the Pakistan Army and the country

there was no such man to steer the countrys ship out of troubled waters.

It appears that 1965 war was not rationally analysed in Pakistan at all. In this regard the Pakistani military

decision-makers were swept away in the emotional stream of their own propaganda! The fact that the

Pakistan Army was in a position to inflict a decisive defeat on the Indians in the war, but failed due to primarily

poor leadership at and beyond brigade level, and due to doctrinal and organisational deficiencies at the higher

level was not accepted! It was a natural result of the fact that Pakistan functioned as a pseudo democracy

under one man! This in turn had led to a ban on frank and open analysis of the armys performance and role!

On the other hand the Indian Armys poor performance was openly and frankly analysed and the Indian critics

did not spare the Indian C in C General Chaudri.25 It would not be wrong to say that the Indians thanks to a

democratic system in which the army was not a sacred cow, unlike Pakistan, analysed their failings in 1965 in

a more positive and concrete manner. Shaukat Riza the officially sponsored historian of the Pakistan Army

admitted this fact. Shaukat thus observed, while briefly analysing the Commander in Chiefs General Training

Directive of 1968, that "We admitted that the enemy would have better resources in number of troops, quality

of equipment, research, development and indigenous production. In face of superiority we were relying solely

on quality of our troops to win a war against India. But there was nothing in our satchel of organisation, tactical

doctrine or even quality of professional leadership, which could substantiate this confidence. This was self-

hypnosis where we were not really hypnotised.26 It may be noted that the General Training Directive

identified the enemy threat relatively realistically only in an extremely vague and rudimentary sense but gave no


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solution or tangible doctrine to combat it except, operations on broad front for all formations except those in

Kashmir, Mountain Warfare for formations in Kashmir and Baluchistan, Snow Warfare for troops in the

Northern Areas, Desert Warfare for formations located in Sind Baluchistan and Bahawalpur, Jungle and

Riverine Warfare for formations in East Pakistan and Frontier Warfare for all formations in NWFP and

Baluchistan!27 It was a piece of extreme naivety and was probably drafted by a staff officer after reading the

recommendations of the last two years training directives and was merely signed by the army chief 28. The

1969 training directive dealt with attack by infiltration and anti infiltration measures29, something, which was

just a whimsical fancy in a staff officers mind! Infiltration was buried soon and in 1971!

Strategic and Operational Dilemmas

Fazal Muqeem quite correctly described the adverse strategic situation in the post 1965 period in the following

words, "with the almost daily expansion of the Indian Armed Forces since the 1965 war, it had become

economically impossible for Pakistan to keep pace with her. The policy of matching Indian strength with even

1/3 or _ in numbers had gradually gone overboard. Under these circumstances all that Pakistan could do was

to avoid war with India and to strive to resolve her disputes through political and diplomatic means.30 The

only problem with this quote is the fact that, at that time i.e. the period 1965-71 no one at the helm of affairs

was ready to think so realistically and rationally! Fazals wisdom is the wisdom of hindsight, expressed sometwo years after Pakistan Army had fought the disaster and humiliating war in its history and Pakistan was

dismembered into two countries. The Pakistani nation had been fed on propaganda about martial superiority

of their army! Brigadier A.R Siddiqi who served in the armys propaganda/media management wing known as

the ISPR (Inter Services Public Relations Directorate) states that "the 1965 war had exalted the military image

to mythical heights. 31 The common man drew false conclusions and to compound things further, the 1965

war was viewed differently in West and East Pakistan. The West Pakistani populace and particularly the

majority West Pakistani ethnic groups i.e. the Punjabis saw the war as a triumph of a preponderantly Punjabi

Muslim army over a numerically larger Hindu army! The East Pakistanis viewed the war as a war fought by a

West Pakistani dominated army to protect West Pakistan, where some 90 % of the army was stationed! The

Indians had not attacked Pakistan deliberately since their strategy was based on the fact that in case the bulk

of Pakistan Army in the West Pakistan provinces northern half i.e. Punjab was destroyed Pakistan would

automatically sue for peace or collapse! Thus they had concentrated the bulk of their army against West

Pakistan in the 1965 War. On the Eastern Front the Indians outnumbered the Pakistani troops defending East

Pakistan by more than three to one but did not attack East Pakistan out of fear of Chinese Army the bulk of

which was concentrated opposite Indias Assam Province and the North East Frontier Agency. Later after the

1965 war the Indians with the benefit of hindsight painted this timid action in not attacking East Pakistan as an

act of grand strategic dimensions. In any case the harm was done as far as East Pakistani perceptions about

the war were concerned. The East Pakistanis increasingly started viewing the army as a west Pakistani entity

created to defend only West Pakistan. The seeds of secession were firmly sown as a result of the 1965 War.

The strategic and operational dilemmas faced by the Pakistan Army can only be understood in terms of the

complicated political situation in the period 1969-1971. Yahya Khan attempted to solve two highly

complicated political problems that he had inherited from his predecessor and who were also the father and

architect of both the problems. These were restoration of democracy and resolving the acute sense of

deprivation which had been created in the East Pakistan province as a result of various perceived or real

injustices during the period 1958-1969. Secessionist tendencies had emerged in the East Pakistan province

where the people viewed Pakistans federal government with its capital in the West Pakistan as a West

Pakistani elite dominated affair. A government which was Muslim in name but West Pakistani (Punjabi, Pathan


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and Hindustani in order of merit)32 dominated in essence and which had been exploiting the East Pakistan

province like a colony since 1947! We will not examine the details of this perception since it is beyond the

scope of this book. We are only concerned with the fact that this perception made things very complicated for

the Pakistan Army. The bulk of the army was concentrated in the West Pakistan province in line with the

strategic doctrine that defence of East Pakistan lay in West Pakistan. The likely political danger now lay in the

fact that the East Pakistanis were increasingly viewing the army as a foreign and hostile entity. This perception

could make things difficult for the lone infantry division of the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan. The Indian

Army had been rapidly expanded since 1965 and the Indians now possessed a military capability to overrunEast Pakistan while part of its army kept the bulk of the Pakistan Army stationed in the West wing in check.

The situation was made yet more complex by fears in West Pakistan about the East Pakistani majority leader

Mujeebs intention to reduce the army in case he won the 1970 elections that Yahya had promised. Further

Mujeebs "Six Point Formula" if enforced would have led to virtual disintegration of Pakistan since it envisaged

a confedral system with a very high level of provincial autonomy. What would happen in case a civil war

started in the East wing after the 1970 elections and India decided to take advantage of the adverse internal

political situation by invading East Pakistan. The military planners in the GHQ knew clearly that in case an

armed insurrection broke out in the East Pakistan province one infantry division would not be control it. In

case troops were sent from the West wing to reinforce the East Pakistan garrison, the war plans in the West

Wing would be compromised. These were serious questions, which no one in the GHQ could answer in 1969.

No one exactly knew what would happen in the first general elections of Pakistan. How could anyone know?

This basic right had been denied to the common man in both the wings since 1946!

Yahya Khan and the Political Situation- 1969-1971

Now a word on Pakistans internal political situation in 1969 and its negative effects on the Pakistan Army. It

appears that, had not Ayub Khan alienated the East Wing by his pro West Pakistani elite policies and also had

not alienated the West Pakistani and East Pakistani populace by his self-serving policies, there would have

been no East Pakistan problem which resulted in Pakistans break-up in 1971 or any anti-Ayub agitation in

both the countrys provinces of East and West Pakistan that finally led to the fall of the Ayubian system of

government in March 1969. The foreign readers may note that the East wing versus West wing rivalry had

been constitutionally resolved through the passing of the 1956 Constitution, once the representatives of the

East wing had most large heartedly accepted the principal of 50 % parity in the countrys legislature despite

the fact that their actual ratio in the countrys population entitled them to 54 % seats in the assembly! Both the

wings now started coming closer since issues were settled inside the parliament rather than by subversion or

agitation. However Ayub in league with the president Iskandar Mirza repeatedly conspired to derail

democracy and in league with Iskandar Mirza finally usurped power in the country by imposing the first

Martial Law in October 1958. He sidelined Mirza in less than a month and imposed a one-man rule on the

country. Ayub despised the East Pakistanis and as Army C in C had stopped more raisings of infantrybattalions of East Pakistanis. The East Pakistanis on the other hand were anti-Ayub and resented Ayubs

policies of allocating a predominantly large part the resources of the country on the development of the West

Wing. Further during the Ayub era, the strategic doctrine that defence of East Pakistan lay in concentrating the

bulk of the Pakistan Army in the West wing was developed. This further alienated the East wingers since there

was an unofficial ban on recruitment of Bengalis in the fighting arms of the army and the expanded army

increasingly became a West Pakistani army, instead of being a national army.33

Once Ayub handed over power to Yahya Khan on 25 March 1969 Yahya inherited a two-decade

constitutional problem of inter provincial ethnic rivalry between the Punjabi-Pathan-Mohajir dominated West


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Pakistan province and the ethnically Bengali Muslim East Pakistan province. In addition Yahya also inherited

an eleven-year-old problem of transforming an essentially one-man ruled country to a democratic country,

which was the ideological basis of the anti Ayub movement of 1968-69. Herein lies the key to Yahyas

dilemma. As an Army Chief Yahya had all the capabilities, qualifications and potential. But Yahya inherited an

extremely complex problem and was forced to perform the multiple roles of caretaker head of the country,

drafter of a provisional constitution, resolving the One Unit question 34, satisfying the frustrations and the

sense of exploitation and discrimination successively created in the East Wing by a series of government

policies since 1948. All these were complex problems and the seeds of Pakistan Armys defeat andhumiliation in December 1971 lay in the fact that Yahya Khan blundered unwittingly into the thankless task of

cleaning dirt in Pakistans political and administrative system which had been accumulating for twenty years

and had its actual origins in the pre 1947 British policies towards the Bengali Muslims. The American author

Ziring well summed it up when he observed that, "Yahya Khan has been widely portrayed as a ruthless

uncompromising insensitive and grossly inept leaderWhile Yahya cannot escape responsibility for these

tragic events, it is also on record that he did not act aloneAll the major actors of the period were creatures

of a historic legacy and a psycho-political milieu which did not lend itself to accommodation and compromise,

to bargaining and a reasonable settlement. Nurtured on conspiracy theories, they were all conditioned to act in

a manner that neglected agreeable solutions and promoted violent judgements. 35

The irrefutable conclusion is that Yahya failed as an Army Chief not because he lacked the inherent capabilities

but because he tried to do too many things at the same time. This as we earlier discussed was the prime

reason for failure of the Pakistan Army to develop and function as a dynamic entity beyond unit level in the

1965 war and in the pre 1965 era.

In all fairness one cannot but admit that, Yahya Khan, sincerely attempted to solve Pakistans constitutional

and inter provincial/regional rivalry problems once he took over power from Ayub in March 1969. The

tragedy of the whole affair was the fact that all actions that Yahya took, although correct in principle, were too

late in timing, and served only to further intensify the political polarisation between the East and West wings.

He dissolved the one unit restoring the pre 1955 provinces of West Pakistan, promised free direct, one man

one vote, fair elections on adult franchise, a basic human right which had been denied to the Pakistani people

since the pre independence 1946 elections by political inefficiency, double play and intrigue, by civilian

governments, from 1947 to 1958 and by Ayubs one man rule from 1958 to 1969. However dissolution of

one unit did not lead to the positive results that it might have lead to in case "One Unit" was dissolved earlier.

Yahya also made an attempt to accommodate the East Pakistanis by abolishing the principle of parity, thereby

hoping that greater share in the assembly would redress their wounded ethnic regional pride and ensure the

integrity of Pakistan. Instead of satisfying the Bengalis it intensified their separatism, since they felt that the west

wing had politically suppressed them since 1958. Thus the rise of anti West Wing sentiment in the East Wing,

thanks to Ayub Khans anti East Wing policies, had however reached such tremendous proportions that eachof Yahyas concessions did not reduce the East West tension. Yahya announced in his broadcast to the nation

on 28 July 1969, his firm intention to redress Bengali grievances, the first major step in this direction being, the

doubling of Bengali quota in the defence services 36. It may be noted that at this time there were just seven

infantry battalions of the East Pakistanis. Yahyas announcement although made with the noblest and most

generous intentions in mind was late by about twenty years!

Yahya cannot be blamed for the muck that had been accumulating for more than two decades. Yahyas

intention to raise more pure Bengali battalions was opposed by Major General Khadim Hussain Raja, the

General Officer Commanding 14 Division in East Pakistan, since the General felt that instead of raising new


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purely Bengali battalions, Bengali troops should be mixed with existing infantry battalions comprising of

Punjabi and Pathan troops.37 Such was the strength of conviction of General Khadim about not raising more

pure Bengali battalions that once he came to know about Yahyas orders to raise more East Pakistani

regiments, he flew to the General Headquarters in Rawalpindi to remonstrate against the sagacity of raising

more pure Bengali units. Khadims advice that Bengali troops could not be relied upon in crisis situations

should have been an eye opener for all in the GHQ. No one at least at that time took his advice seriously. It

appears that the generals were convinced that the Bengali was too meek to ever challenge the martial Punjabi

or Pathan Muslim

The Bengalis were despised as non martial by all West Pakistanis. However much later an interesting

controversy developed in which the Punjabis and Hindustanis blamed each other for doing so! The

Hindustanis blaming Aziz Ahmad etc and the Punjabis blaming many Hindustani ICS old foxes of the 1950s!

There is no doubt that this exercise in Bengali degrading was neither totally or exclusively Punjabi led but a a

true for all West Pakistanis business!

The foreign reader may note that Bengalis were despised as a non martial race from the British times. Sir Syed

Ahmad Khan a Hindustani Muslim and an eminent Muslim leader of the North Indian Muslims in late 19th

century made open fun of Bengalis in his various speeches, notably the one delivered at Lucknow in 1887. I.HQureshi another prominent Hindustani Muslim and a post 1947 cabinet minister declared in a roundabout

manner that the Bengalis were an inferior race. Ayub made various remarks implying that the Bengalis were an

inferior race in his memoirs written in 1967.38

Inflated Perceptions about Pakistani military effectiveness

The essence of the whole business was the fact that the Pakistani GHQ placed entire reliance on the Superior

Valour and Martial Qualities of the Pakistani (Punjabi and Pathan Muslim soldier) vis a vis the Hindu Indian

soldier, as proved in 1965 war and felt that somehow, in the next war to miracles would occur and the

Pakistan Army would do well! The tangible military facts of the Indo Pak politico-military scenario were notanalysed in their true dimension! It was a classic case of perceptual distortion and losing sight of reality. Eric

Berne an eminent psychologist defined "adjustment" as "ability to change ones images to correspond to a new

reality. Berne rephrases "adjustment" as "flexibility" which he defines as " ability to change your images as they

should be changed according to reality". This in Bernes view is more important than intelligence. Berne thus

concluded that the successful man is the one whose images correspond most closely to reality, because then

his actions will lead to the results, which he imagines".39 This as a matter of fact are one of the prime

functions of a military and political leader. The success of the western democracies lay in the fact that one man

was never totally in command but civil and military functions were divided and shared between various

appointment holders aided by a host of staff officers and research Organisations. This sadly was not

Pakistans case where one man from 1958 wielded all power, both civil and military onwards. The situation

was not so complicated till 1965 since Pakistan enjoyed material and technical superiority till 1965 and

because the troop ratio between Pakistan and India was relatively manageable40. Unfortunately in Pakistan

after 1971 all blame was heaped on Yahyas shoulders. The fact that the psychosis that had afflicted the

Pakistani decision makers in the period 1966-1971 and finally led to the great humiliation of 1971, had a close

connection with the nature of Pakistans experiences as a nation in the period 1947-1971 was not accepted

and instead Yahya was made a scapegoat for all that had gone wrong. We will analyse more of this in the next

chapter. I will quote Berne once again to define greatness or the lack of it in Pakistan during the period 1947-

1971. But before we do it we must understand that man is not fully autonomous but is a prisoner of historical


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environmental and physiological circumstances. There are very few truly great men who act more

autonomously than the multitude. Berne thus defined individual human greatness as " A great man is the one

who either helps to find out what the world is really like or else tries to change the world to match his image. In

both cases he is trying to bring images and reality closer together by changing one or the other. In the period

1966-1971 Pakistan did not have the resources to change the world to match its images nor great men who

had the depth of character and intellect to find out what the world is really like and changing their images!

Many Pakistani intellectuals with the naivety of a provincial farm maiden try to heap the whole blame on liquor

and Yahya or on liquor alone! This unfortunately is too simplistic a view! The Pakistanis as a nation were

forming wrong and unrealistic images right from 1947! Too much faith was based on ideology (Islam) to unite

two entirely diverse regions of East and West Pakistan! Even Shauakat Riza a pro establishment historian,

commenting on religion as a common factor between the East and West wings caustically noted that Twenty

four years is too long to gamble on one card41 History was distorted to show that the Muslims were ruling

the timid Hindu when the British snatched power from the brave Muslims by treachery! This was sadly not the

case! In reality the Muslims were saved from total defeat by the British advent in India! A false image was

formed by official propaganda right from 1947 that the Muslims were more martial than the timid Hindus

were! It was a poor modification of the "Martial Races Theory" of the British, which was a purely imperialist

theory to "Divide and Rule" India! But once Pakistan was defeated in 1971, all blame was heaped on Yahyaand liquor, disregarding the fact that Yahya was merely the tip of the iceberg, and the irrefutable fact that many

great commanders in history were absolutely incorrigible and compulsive womanisers and drinkers!

This fact was noted by some officers soon after 1965 but the majority were victims of the psychosis of Islamic

Martial Military superiority that overwhelmed the West Pakistani psyche during the period 1966-1971!

Brigadier A.R Siddiqi in his book on the Pakistan Armys press image thus narrated a thought-provoking

incident soon after the war. Siddiqi met Brigadier Qayyum Sher who as just discussed had distinguished

himself as an infantry brigade commander in the battle opposite Lahore. Qayyum Sher was unhappy about the

unrealistic expectations and myths that were being created as a result of the official propaganda. Qayyum Sher

told Siddiqi, "Miracles he mused, may indeed have happened, but they happen only once. Let me tell you that

your press chaps are doing a lot of harm to the soldier psychologically by publishing all those foolish stories. I

wonder what they are really trying to tell the world. That the Pakistani soldier can fight his war only with the

help of his celestial allies. That he is facing an enemy inferior to him in all respects. I admit Gods help is of the

utmost importance but its no substitute for ones own performance. It would be quite stupid to forget that the

Indian soldier is as much of a professional as his Pakistani counterpart. He has been trained in similar military

systems and institutions and fights like hell when he has to. The only reason why the Pakistani soldier put up a

comparatively better performance in this war was that he fought largely on his own home ground as a

defender. Siddiqi further noted that "The Pakistani image makers, however, had little use for such sterile talk.

They had their own mental picture of the war and regarded it as the only correct one. Anybody who dared tospeak of the war more realistically simply betrayed a diffident and defeatist mentality The merest

suggestion of the criticism of the military performance became a taboo.42 Sher was not alone in entertaining

these views. Major General Tajammul Hussain Malik who very ably commanded the 3rd Baluch opposite

Lahore on the BRB states in his memoirs that the Indian superiority opposite Lahore was not as overwhelming

as later portrayed in the Pakistani official propaganda. Tajammul thus stated, "We had Patton Tanks

whereas Indians had mostly Sherman Tanks which were comparatively much inferior. Similarly our

artillery guns out ranged the Indian artillery guns. They had an overall superiority of infantry,

perhaps of about 1 to 2 but most of their divisions were comparatively ill equipped and untrained

and they had to guard a much bigger frontier.43


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Many years earlier one of the greatest thinkers of this world Sigmund Freud rightly noted that "the irrational

forces in mans nature are so strong that the rational forces have little chance of success against them. Freud

thus concluded that "a small minority might be able to live a life of reason but most men are comfortable living

with their delusions and superstitions rather than with the truth". As a matter of fact whole nations can be

victims of delusions. This has happened many times in history. The same was true for the Pakistani nation, or

the predominantly West Pakistani elite!

Sultan Khan who served as Pakistans Foreign Secretary with Yahya during the fateful year of 1971 noted at

many places in his memoirs that most Pakistani generals thought that the Pakistani soldier was more martial

and would somehow emerge successfully through the East Pakistan War. Gul Hassan, Sultan thus noted, was

one of them and firmly believed in the power of bayonet to solve all problems! The tragedy is that after the

war all the blame was heaped on Yahya and the fact that the whole elite and all those who mattered were

under influence of highly irrational ideas was deliberately suppressed. Till this day in presentations and studies

carried out in Pakistan Armys schools and colleges of instruction, Yahya is made the scapegoat for the entire

1971 fiasco and the fact that the whole of West Pakistani was under influence of a psychotic state is ignored.

Historical Background of Superiority Complex in the Pakistan Army

It is necessary to examine the historical reasons for this false feeling of superiority in the Pakistan Army in

1969-71. It may be noted that the vast bulk of Muslims, just like the vast bulk of Hindus of the Indo Pak Sub

Continent were caught in a vicious square of "ethnicity "ideology" "exploitation by feudal and capitalist

classes" and above all "British Colonial rule" during the period 1858-1947. In 1857 the common soldiers

(sepoys), both Hindu (some three fourth) and Muslims (around one fourth) from modern UP province

attempted a rebellion against the British. This rebellion was crushed by the Britishers using European as well as

Punjabi (largely Muslim and relatively less Sikh and Hindu) Pathan (less in number than Punjabis) Gurkha and

Madrasi troops. The rebellions end in 1858 marked a major turn in British policy in India. Till 1857 British

policy as executed by various Viceroys of the private English East India Company was markedly egalitarian

and anti feudal. A major policy change was introduced from 1858 onwards once the British crown took overthe governance of India. Feudals who were viewed as unnecessary anachronisms by Dalhousie were now

viewed as allies against future rebels while ethnic/religious factors which were not important in army

recruitment before 1857, now became a matter of careful policy, since the pre 1857 was largely one in which

soldiers were mixed down to platoon level regardless of race or religion. The British policy now changed since

the Hindustani44 Hindus and Muslims regardless of race or religion had jointly rebelled. Thus from 1858

onwards the British introduced the concept of One class companies with soldiers from one religious as well as

ethnic class in any single infantry company or cavalry troop. Due to various reasons discussed in detail in the

previous volume of this history the British actively followed a policy of Punjabising from 1858 to 1911. As a

result by 1911 the Indian Army was largely a Punjabi although not a Punjabi Muslim dominated army45.

The reader may note that during the period 18851911 when the ethnic composition of the British

Indian Army changed from a Hindustani majority/Hindu/Non Muslim dominated army to a Punjabi

Majority/Punjabi Muslim heavy army in 1911; no major war took place; that could prove that

Punjabi troops or Punjabi Muslim troops were better than Hindu troops or the Hindustani troops,

and the concept that the British changed the ethnic composition based on proven fighting ability in

actual combat; has no connection with any reality of military history.Thus the Martial Races

Theory was based more on political considerations than on any tangible or concrete military

effectiveness or relative combat effectiveness in any war! In any case the pre 1947 Indian Army


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was never a Muslim majority army at any stage of its history. Many Britishers were crystal clear

about the situational or historical relativity of the so called martial effectiveness even in the first

half of the nineteenth century. Henry Lawrence a Civil Servant of the English East India Company

thus summed up the whole business about martial effectiveness once he said Courage goes much

by opinion; and many a man behaves as a hero or a coward, according as he considers he is

expected to behave. Once two Roman Legions held Britain;now as many Britons might hold Italy". On

the other hand , the reasons why the British preferred the Punjabis in the army in preference to other races

were rationalised by many Britishers by stating that the British preferred the Indian Army to be composed ofMartial Races46.

The "Martial Races Theory" in reality was an Imperial gimmick to boost the ego of the cannon fodder. Various

British writers like Philip Mason frankly admitted that the real reason for selective recruitment was political

reliability in crisis situations which the Punjabis had exhibited during the 1857-58 Bengal Army rebellion.47

Another British officer thought that "Martial Races Theory" had a more sentimental and administrative basis

rather than anything to do with real martial superiority. C.C Trench thus wrote, Reasons for preferring

northerners were largely racial. To Kiplings contemporaries, the taller and fairer a native, the

better man he was likely to beThere was a general preference for the wild over the half educated

native as being less addicted to unwholesome political thinkingBrahmins had been prominent inthe mutiny, and their diet and prejudices made difficulties on active service48. The Special

Commission appointed by the Viceroy to enquire into the organisation of Indian Army was more blunt in

outlining the political reliability factor once it stated that "lower stratum of the Mohammadan urban population,

the dispossessed landholders (many of them, off course, Muslims), the predatory classes, and perhaps the

cadets of the old Muhammadan families (as) the only people who really dislike British rule 49 . The reason

why the Punjabis whether Sikh Hindu or Muslim were more loyal to the British at least till 1919 lay in complex

socio-political background of the province and the complex relationship between the Sikhs Hindus and

Muslims of the province. Its discussion is beyond the scope of this work. The fact remains that in the first

world war the Punjabi case for priority race for recruitment to the army was once again reinforced when the

Punjabi soldiers, Sikh Muslim and Hindu loyally served the British in France Mesopotamia Egypt Palestine

and Gallipoli. Philip Mason thus wrote that the "Punjabi Muslims were steady as a rock while a faint

question mark hung over the Pathans 50. Such was the difference in reliability within the units that when two

Pathan squadrons of 15 Lancers passively refused to fight against the Turks in Mesopotamia, the Punjabi

Squadrons remained staunch and the Pathan squadrons were disbanded and replaced by Hindustani Hindu Jat

Squadrons from 14th Murray Jat Lancers! The Hindustani/Ranghar Muslims were also further discredited

once the 5th Light Infantry a pure Hindustani/Ranghar Muslim unit composed of Delhi region Hindustani

Pathans, and Ranghar Muslims rebelled and seized Singapore for about a day in 1915.51 It was more a

question of political reliability than being more martial that led to further Punjabisation of the army after the first

world war. Thus in 1929 as per the Report of the Statutory Commission on Indian ConstitutionalAdvancement, military ability was not evenly distributed in the entire population and, the capacity to fight was

confined to the martial races! The commission ignored the fact that recruitment was done to fill ethnic quotas

as decided by the Indian government and was not open to all classes! As per this commissions report some

86,000 or some 54.36% Indian Army combatants out of a total of 158,200 were from Punjab province.

These did include some Ranghar Muslims who were administratively Punjabi although Hindustani

ethnically/culturally, but there is no doubt that the vast bulk of these men were ethnically Punjabi. The

important part of the whole business was the fact that once 19,000 Nepali Gurkhas, who were in reality

foreigners, included in the above mentioned total of 158,200 men are excluded the Punjabi share in Indian

Army rose to 61.8%. The Pathans thanks to their political record in the First World War had been reduced to


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just 5,600 men 52 or just 4.02% out of which at least a thousand were non Pathans!

The same state of affairs continued till the outbreak of the Second World War with the major change being the

Punjabi Sikhs who became relatively less reliable politically because of being under communist influences 53.

However the reader may note, so as not to be led astray by any false claims that in 1939 the Indian Army was

only 37% Muslim, the rest being non Muslim including about 12.8 % Sikhs 10.9% Hindu Gurkhas and 37.6%

other Hindus54. Immense demands of WW Two forced the British to diversify the recruitment pattern of the

Indian Army and although Punjab remained the top contributor of recruits, it provided about 754,551 out of a

total of 24,61,446, or 30.65% recruits to the Indian Army between 3rd September 1939 and 31 August

1945. 55 The reader may note that some 314,356 or a total of 41.66% from the Punjab contribution and

12.77% recruits were Punjabi Muslims56. Thus although Punjab led positionwise as a province in recruitment,

there never was any Punjabi Muslim majority or even Punjabi Muslim majority or even near majority in

recruitment to the Indian Army in WW Two. However a myth was widely propagated in Pakistan that the

Punjabi Muslims were the most martial race and the Pathan Muslims were the second most martial race57. I

may add that I heard this ridiculous and irrational myth thousands of times in the course of my 13 years service

in Pakistan Army. On the other hand the knowledge of historical knowledge may be gauged from the fact that

as late as 1992 in a book written and published in the staff college a brigadier made the Mughal Emperor

Humayun fight the second battle of Panipat, at a time when Humayun was already dead!

In August 1947 the British Indian Army was divided into the Pakistan and Indian armies. Two divergent

recruitment policies were followed in both the armies. The Indians broadened their armys recruitment base,

officially declaring that recruitment was open to all Indian nationals.58 Thus the post 1947 Indian Army drifted

away from being the pre 1939 Punjabised army. In Pakistan, Mr Jinnah the politician-statesmen who created

Pakistan almost single-handedly, as the countrys first Head of State, adopted a sensible policy, to make the

army a national army. Jinnah ordered immediate raising of two infantry battalions of Bengali Muslims in 1948

reversing the anti Bengali policy of the pre 1947 British colonial government.59 Jinnahs far sighted as well as

just policy of bringing Bengalis in the fighting arms of the Pakistan Army was discontinued by General Ayub

Khan who was the first Pakistani Muslim C in C of the Pakistan Army and became the Army Chief in January

1951. Ayub although allegedly guilty of tactical timidity in the WW Two in Burma60 had a low opinion61

about the Bengalis and discontinued the expansion of the East Bengal Infantry Regiment from 1951 to 1966.

Thus by 1966 the Pakistan Army was a predominantly West Pakistani (Punjabi dominated) army. In addition

the vast bulk of it except one infantry division was stationed in West Pakistan in line with the strategic concept

evolved in Ayubs time that the defence of East Pakistan lay in West Pakistan. Thus the Martial Races

Theory was carried on till 1971 and in 1971 the vast bulk of West Pakistanis really felt that they were a

martial race. This superiority complex played a major part in the wishful thinking in the Pakistani High

Command that somehow the Indians would not invade East Pakistan in strength or even if they did so, the

troops of this martial race (which was subdued by an 8 % Sikh minority from 1799 to 1849, till it wasliberated by the English East India Company!) would frustrate the Indian Army, despite all the tangible

numerical and material Pakistani inferiority. Foreign Secretary Sultan Khans memoirs are full of the existence

of this irrational belief in the Pakistani High Command. Whatever the case at least the 1971 War proved that

the real reason for the Indian Armys martial fervour or relatively better performance was the British factor,

keeping in mind the net total available resources of British Empire or its allies in the two world wars.

New Raisings 1966-1971 and the armys operational plans

New raisings as discussed earlier were done right from 1965-66 onwards. The Pakistani high command


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correctly assessed that lack of infantry played a major role in the failure of Pakistani armour to translate its

convincing material and technical superiority into a major operational or strategic success. New raisings

became more essential since US military aid, which had enabled Pakistan Army to function relatively more

effectively as compared to the Indians, was no longer available because of the US ban on arms exports to

both India and Pakistan.

EXISTING DIVISIONS AND NEW RAISINGS FROM 1965 TO DECEMBER 197162

SER

NO1965 REMARKS

1966-

1968REMARKS

1968-

1971REMARKS

1 7 DIV Peshawar Part of 2 Corps.Reserve Division to Support 1 Armd Div

Operations in Bahawalnagar area.

2 8 DIVSialkot. 1

CorpsPart of 1 Corps

Defence of Shakargarh Bulge. Under 1

Corps

310

DIV

Lahore 1

CorpsPart of 4 Corps.

Defence of Ravi-Sutlej Corridor. Part of 4

Corps

4

11

DIV Ditto Part of 4 Corps.

512

DIV

Headquarters In

MurreeDefence of Azad Kashmir

614

DIVEast Pakistan Defence of East Pakistan

715

DIVSialkot Part of 1 Corps. Defence of Sialkot Sector.Under 1 Corps

8

1

ARMD

DIV

Multan 1

Corps

Part of 2 Corps.Strategic Reserve.Stationed at Multan.

Under 2 Corps.

9

6

ARMD

DIV

Kharian 1

CorpsPart of 1 Corps.

Strategic Reserve.Stationed at Kharian.

Under 1 Corps.

109

DIV

Reserve Div. Raising

completed at Kharian

by 1968.

Airlifted to E.Pak in March 1971

11

16

DIV

Reserve Div. Quetta.

Raising complete by

1968.

Ditto

1217

DIV

Kharian. Raising

complete by 1968.

Reserve Division

To support 6 Armoured Division

operations

1318

DIV

Raised at Hyderabad in June-July 1971 for

defence of 560 miles area from Rahimyar

Khan to Rann of Katch.

1423

Raised at Jhelum in June-July 1971 for

Chhamb-Dewa Sector previously in area of


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DIV 12 Div.

1533

DIV

Raised in December 1971.Reserve

Division of 2 Corps later split between

Shakargarh Bulge and Sindh in the war.

1637

DIVRaised in Dec- 71 Jan-72.

The table of raisings above is self-explanatory. The most important organisational changes which occurred in

the army till the 1971 war were as following. Firstly the army was organised into three corps i.e the 1 Corps, 2

Corps and 4 Corps and 12 18 and 23 Divisions. The 1 corps headquarter was designated to command four

divisions i.e 8, 15, 17 InfantryDivisions and 6 Armoured Division63. 15 and 8 Infantry Divisions were

responsible for defence of Sialkot Sector and the Shakargarh Bulge respectively while 17 Infantry Division

and 6 Armoured Division were the strike force of the corps and also part of Pakistan Armys strategic

reserves. In addition the 1 Corps also had an independent armoured brigade (8Armoured Brigade). 4 Corps

consisting of 10 and 11 Infantry Divisions, 105 Independent Infantry Brigade and 3rd Independent Armoured

Brigade was responsible for the area between Ravi River and Bahawalpur. The 2 Corps with its headquarters

at Multan was a strategic reserve corps. This corps consisted of the 1st Armoured Division (Multan), 7

Infantry Division and later 33 Infantry Division. Three infantry divisions i.e the 12, 23 and 18 Infantry

Divisions were directly under GHQ and responsible for defence of Azad Kashmir, Chhamb-Dewa Sector and

Sind-Rahimyar Khan respectively.

Tangibles and Intangibles - The Pakistan and Indian Armys military worth by

January 1971

By January 1971 the Pakistan Army was a reasonable military machine. Its main battle tank was the Chinese

T-59 which was almost as good as any Indian tank.Its strategic reserves had the potential to deter any Indian

aggressive military move. It was on its way to becoming a really national army since Yahyas announcement of

1969 to allow recruitment of Bengalis in the fighting arms. Organisationally the command was coherently and

logically distributed in corps and divisions and the organisational imbalances of 1965 had been totally

removed. Yahya Khan had not failed as the C in C.

The Indian Army was numerically larger but the advantage was not overwhelming since the Indian Army was

divided between the Chinese Border West Pakistan and East Pakistan. Technically the Indians had relatively

better Soviet tanks but numerically the Pakistani armour was larger than Indian armour and possessed more

higher organisational flexibility by virtue of having two full fledged armoured divisions as against one Indian

armoured division.

Later events of 1971 clouded our perception and we in Pakistan tend to view things as entirely simple for the

Indian military planners. The Indian military dilemma was a possible three front war with the Indian Army

divided between West Pakistan East Pakistan and the Indo Chinese border. The Pakistani defence problem

was a two front war with its army divided into two parts i.e one defending the East Pakistan and the major

part defending West Pakistan. The Pakistani planners had evolved a clear-cut strategy to overcome this

dilemma. The Indian strategy as it was later applied in 1971 war was based on a choice of time which reduced

the likely threats that it faced from three to two since the December snow effectively nullified chances of

Chinese intervention and enabled release of Indian Mountain Divisions earmarked for the Chinese Border to


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participate in a war against Pakistan. Even then the final Indian plan was a gamble and would have failed if

Pakistan had launched a pre-emptive attack in October 1971. The C in C Indian Western Command admitted

this fact. General Candeth who was C in C Western Command states in his book that the most critical period

was between 8 and 26 October when 1 Corps and 1 Armoured Division were still outside Western

Command. Had Pakistan put in a pre-emptive attack during that period the consequences would have been

too dreadful to contemplate and all our efforts would have been trying to correct the adverse situation forced

on us.64

There were however major shortcomings in both the armies at the higher leadership level. These pertained to

the "Intangible aspects of military leadership". The mercenary origins of the pre 1947 Indian Army had resulted

in the creation of an orders oriented machine! This was true for both Indian and Pakistani Armies. These

shortcomings had their origin in the pre 1947 British era and were common with the post 1947 Indian Army.

The Indian Armys military worth was retarded and downgraded because of a civilian leadership which

viewed the army as a reactionary entity consisting of mercenaries who had collaborated with the British rulers.

This attitude was revised once India suffered serious loss of prestige in the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962.

However changes in military spirit of an army occur very slowly and by 1971 Indian Army was still trying to

recover from many teething problems. The Pakistan Army in 1947 had consisted of relatively talented as well

as spirited officers. The Rawalpindi Conspiracy of 1951 had however started a witch-hunt and many dynamicofficers were removed or sidelined. This conspiracy against originality and boldness had intensified when Ayub

Khan started manipulating extensions from politicians and the army was reduced to a personal fiefdom of

Ayub during the period 1951-1969! In the process the Pakistan Army lost the services of many more

experienced officers simply because they were sidelined through political supersession or were retired. The

gap between the two Indo Pak armies in quality of experience may be gauged from the fact that the first Indian

C in C was eight years senior to Ayub in service and the course mate of Musa, the second Muslim C in C of

the Pakistan Army i.e Manekshaw became the Indian C in C eleven years after Musa! This may have worked

positively for the Pakistan Army had Musa been a man with an independent outlook! Musa on the other hand

as Gul Hassans memoirs revealed lacked independent judgement dynamism or talent! The Pakistan army

during the period 1951-71 became a highly orders oriented machine! Smart on the drill square, tactically

sound but strategically barren and lacking in operational vision! One whose first Pakistani C in C was more

interested in political intrigue and industrial ventures than in the basics of higher military organisation or

operational strategy!

The reader must bear in mind that the only major difference despite all other differences between the Indian

and Pakistan Armies was that the Indian Army was numerically larger than the Pakistan Army was. In quality

of higher military leadership both the armies by virtue of being chips of one pre 1947 block were little different

from each other! Both the Indian and Pakistan Armies of 1971 were like the Austro-Hungarian armies of

1809. They consisted of perhaps equally brave junior leaders but were severely handicapped since rapidexpansion since the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and since the 1965 war. Having more corps and division despite

being impressive on paper had not made the Indian or Pakistani military machine really effective because of

poor training at divisional and brigade level. Both numerically larger than they were in 1965, but were

organisationally ineffective beyond battalion level, having dashing young leaders but tactically and operationally

inept brigade divisional and corps commanders from the older pre 1947 commissioned generation whom were

initially supposed not to go beyond company level, had the transfer of power not taken place in 1947. The

strike corps was a new concept and the Indian 1 Corps which was shortly created before the 1965 war was a

newly raised formation whose corps commander and armoured divisional commanders were about to retire in

1965 when war broke out. The Indian commanders beyond unit level, as was the case with Pakistan Army,


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consisted of men who had experience of infantry biased operations in WW Two and did not understand the

real essence of armoured warfare. It was this lack of understanding that led to the failures in achieving a

decisive armour breakthrough in both sides. It was a failure of command as well as staff system where even

the staff officers on both sides were too slow for armoured warfare and worked on yards and furlongs rather

than miles. Their orientation was position oriented rather than mobility oriented and their idea of a battlefield

was a typical linear battlefield. Their Burma or North African experience where the Japanese and Germans

frequently appeared in their rear had made them extra sensitive about their flanks. These were men who

thought in terms of security rather than speed. Conformity rather than unorthodox dynamism, having beentrained in the slavish colonial orders oriented British Indian Army was the cardinal script of their life. It was this

British system in which every senior commander was more interested in doing the job of those one step junior

to him that led to the lack of dash and initiative at brigade and battalion level. They were trained that way and

there behaviour as far as the timidity at brigade and divisional level has to be taken in this context. Yahya was

not a superman who could clean up the Pakistani political system and reform Pakistan Army within an year or

two! He started the job of reorganising and reforming the Pakistan Army but had to leave it half way once he

was forced to clean up the political mess in 1969. He made an admirable attempt to clean the political garbage

which had accumulated since 1948 but was over taken by the tide of history which in 1971 was too powerful

to be manipulated by any single man!

The Indian Army of 1971 was much larger than the Indian Army of 1965! It was many times superior

strategically and operationally to the 1965 Indian Army in terms of material strength, technological strength and

numerical strength. The Pakistani defence problem was far more complex in 1971 than in 1965. Even in terms

of foreign policy Pakistan had just been ditched by one superpower in 1965. The situation in 1971 was far

more worse since India had been adopted by another superpower which, unlike the Naive half hearted,

American Village maiden, was resolutely poised to go with India through thick and thin! Yahya made unique

and brilliant moves to bring the USA and China together and vainly hoped that the Americans would help him!

Unfortunately the US betrayed a country which had been loyally served US interests since 1954! Foreign

Secretary Sultan Khans memoirs recognise Yahyas contributions and dismiss many myths about Yahya

having gone out of his way to annoy the Soviets. This aspect is however beyond the scope of this article.

CONCLUSION

The Pakistan Army and Yahya inherited a complex historical problem, which had many fathers, at least half of

whom were civilians and politicians! The Bengali alienation started from 1948 over the language question, was

increased through Liaquats political intrigues to sideline Suharwardy and delay constitution making and thus

holding elections which held a threat of a Bengali prime minister challenging the Hindustani-Punjabi dominance

of Muslim politics! The first sin was committed once Suharwardy was sidelined! This was followed by

coercion and intrigue to force parity on the Bengalis! They even accepted this unjust formula in 1956! Ask the

Punjabis today to agree to a 50% parity as against all three provinces and then evaluate the generosity and

magnanimity of the Bengalis! The death verdict of Pakistans unity came in 1958 when Ayub took over and

allied with the West Pakistan civil-military-feudal-industrialist clique to sideline the Bengalis for eternity from

the corridors of power! Familiar names , and a familiar combination constituted the ruling clique! A Punjabi

financial wizard, one Dawood, some generals, some civil servants, some Hindustani specialists, one old fox

who knew how to twist the law, then young, and some younger whiz kids constituted the ruling clique! They

took Pakistan back to 1864 or even 1804! Local bodies, two huge provinces like the Bengal and Bombay

Presidency etc! The seeds of the division were laid between 1958 and 1969! Yahya Khan whatever his faults

was a greater man than Liaquat or Ayub! He held the first ever general elections based on adult franchise!


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Something that the so called Quaid e Millat had failed to hold for four long years, not withstanding all hollow

rhetoric by his admirers that he was going to make a great announcement on 16 October 1951, the original D-

Day in 1999 too! Yahya restored provincial autonomy, brought the Bengalis in the army, and reorganised the

army! He did everything that was right but it was too late! He was fighting against the tide of history! The

Pakistan Army was tossed into a volcano whose architect enjoyed total power for eleven years and retired

peacefully to enjoy his hard earned wealth. Ayubs son has remained in the corridors of power in one form or

another and is still a running horse! Yahya Khan is much criticised for problems with which he had nothing to

do! For having done a job which Liaquat should have done in 1950! The Pakistan Army was a relatively goodfighting machine in 1971! Great reforms were made in organisation, education and training! It was recovering

from the curse of one-man rule! The cyclone of 1970 in words of an Indian general destroyed everything! Yes

there was a far more dangerous intangible and invisible cyclone that had been building up since 1948! This

cyclone had four great fathers! Yahya Khan was not one of these four great men! The "Martial Races Theory"

that played a major role in Pakistani overconfidence in 1971 before actual operations had many fathers and

dated from British times.These British officers had in 1930s described Jews as non martial! Compare the four

Arab-Israeli wars with this attitude! The military action in 1971 was widely hailed in West Pakistan! Yet in

December 1971 only Yahya was blamed! Yahya was not the architect of the problems that destroyed the

united Pakistan of 1971! He paid for the sins of all that ruled Pakistan from 1947 to 1969! He could do little

more than what a midwife can do in birth of a child as far as the childs genetic codes are concerned! The

failure of 1971 was not an individuals failure but failure of a system with flawed constitutional geographic

philosophic and military organisational and conceptual foundations! I find nothing better to repeat once again

the saying that Success surely has many fathers and failure is an orphan! We must however not forget that the

failure of 1971 had roots that go back to 150 years of history!

References and Explanatory Notes

1Page-258 & 259- Pakistans Crisis in Leadership-Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan (Retired)-National Book Foundation-

Ferozsons-Rawalpindi-1973--Fazal I Muqeem was a sycophant, bu t a clever one in the sense that once he wrote his first

book "The Story of the Pakistan Army", he was in the run for promotion and naturally had to play the sycophant whichmost men who rise to higher pos itions do! In 1973 Fazal was a retired man and under no external motivation to please Ayub!

Any dispass ionate reader can gauge Fazals calibre as a writer from reading both his books. It was certainly much higher

than Shaukat Riza whose three books on the Pakistan Army in some ways are harder to decipher than the Dead Sea Scrolls!

2Page-125- The Military in Pakistan-Image and Reality Brigadier A.R Siddiqi (Retired)-Vanguard-Lahore-1996.

3 Qizilbash is a Persian speaking tribe of Turkish origin employed as mercenary so ldiers by Safavid kings of Iran and by

Nadir Shah who himself was a Turk but not a Shia unlike the Qizilbas hes . Once Ahmad Shah Abdali became the first king of

Afghanistan after its independence many Qizilbashes entered his service and were based in Kandahr and later Kabul. Many

Qizilbash nobles were pos ted in Peshawar as Nadir Shahs o fficials once Nadir Shah invaded India in 1739. In addition many

Qizilbashes were granted estates by Ahmad Shah Abdali and some came and s ettled in Lahore after the First Afghan War.

The Qizilbash were Shia by sect and Persian s peaking. Yahya Khan was from the Peshawar branch of Qizilbashes. Thoseliving in Peshawar identified themselves as Pathans and spoke Pashto as a second language but were distinct from Pathans

as an ethnic group. Yahyas father was from the Indian Police Service and served in various appointments as a police officer

during the British Raj. Yahyas brother was also in the Police Service of Pakistan and later served as Director Intelligence

Bureau.

4 Page-122- The Pakistan Army-War 1965 Major General Shaukat Riza (Retired)-Army Education Press-Rawalpindi-1984.

5 The Indians deny this assertion but this is something which is accepted in Pakistan as an irrevocable fact of history. It is

of little military bearing since few officers make use of libraries anyway! This career profile may not be very accurate since I

do not have acces s to official records . These details are based on various references to Yahyas military career. Refers

Page-111- Memoirs of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan-Lieutenant General Gul Hassan Khan -Oxford University Press-Karachi-


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1993. Pages-131 & 144- The Story of the Pakistan Army- Major General Fazal I Muqeem Khan-Oxford University Press-

Lahore-1963. Pages-47 & 122- Shaukat Riza-Op Cit. Page-37 Brig A.R Siddiqi-Op Cit.

6Pages-192 & 194- Partners in Command- Joseph.T.Glatthaar- The Free Press -New York-1994.

7Page-238-Gul Hassan Khan-Op Cit.

8 Page-28-Fazal Muqeem-Crisis in Leadership--Op Cit.

9Page-154-The Story of Soldiering and Politics in India and Pakistan-Major General Sher Ali (Retired)-First Printed-1976-Third Edition-Syed Mobin Mahmud and Company-Lahore-1988. Page-122-Shaukat Riza-1965-Op Cit.

10 Page-187-Jawan to GeneralGeneral Mohammad Musa- East and West Publishing Company-Karachi-1984.

11The Punjabis as an ethnic community were the largest community in the officer corps of the pre 1947 Indian Army. No

exact s tatistics exist but by and large the Sikh/Hindus of Punjab were the larges t group in the officer community followed by

Punjabi Muslims survey of Indian officer cadets done in 1954-56 showed that majority of the officer cadets were from Indian

Punjab or from Delhi which was a Punjabi majority city (Indian Parliament Estimates Committee-1956-57-Sixty Third Report-

Ministry of Defence Training Institutes-New Delhi-Lok Sabha Secretariat-Appendix-Seven--Quoted by Stephen Cohen-

Page-183-The Indian Army-Stephen.P.Cohen-Oxford Univers ity Press-New Delhi-1991) after 1947 The Punjabi Mus lims were

however denied the top slots in the army during the period 1947-72, Ayub being a Hindko speaking Pathan, Mus a being a

Persian speaking Mongol-Hazara and Yahya being a Persian s peaking Qizilbash. Tikka was the first Punjabi chief of thearmy.In my course of stay in the army I had various discussions with old officers and almost all agreed that there were

groupings in most units on parochial lines which were mostly Punjabi and Pathan groups . The Punjabis of areas north of

Chenab river tended to be more clannish with stress on district or sub regional groupings like Sargodha, Chakwal, Pindi,

Attock Khus hab etc. The Punjabis of areas south of Chenab river which were more economically prosperous and more

educationally advanced were by and large not parochial having acquired the big city or urban mentality. These tended to

look down upon groupings based on cas te and d istrict lines and operated more on relations based on personal rapport than

kinship on village and district bas is. There was definitely a strong feeling in Punjabi officers (something which was most

natural) of the pre 1971 era that the army was Pathan dominated.Both Ayub and Yahya although not Pashto speaking were

viewed as Pathans by Punjabi officers. Musa was viewed as a rubber stamp and as a mere shadow of Ayub. The Hindustani

Muslims the third largest but relatively better educated group (although not distinguished for any unique operational

talent) were not united because they were mostly from urban backgrounds and had like the Punjabis from big cities south of

Chenab the selfish or self centred big city mentality. Thus as individuals the Hindustani Muslims like the urban Punjabisdid well but were not parochial like the Pathans or the Punjabis from north of Chenab river. They were viewed as politically

more reliable by virtue of being an ethnic minority bu t were sidelined from higher ranks in most cas es. The most glaring of all

was the case of Major General Abrar Hussain who was not promoted despite outstanding war performance at

Chawinda.Sahibzada Yaqub who later refused to agree to military action in East Pakistan was also a Hindustani Mus lim.

Yahyas circle was not based on ethnicity on the principles of companions hip. Thus Peerzada was from Bombay, while Umar

and Hameed were Punjabis. Bilgrami another close as sociate was Hindustani. Lieutenant General Chisht i described Yahyas

attitude towards selecting officers for higher command ranks the following words; Do you see this. I told you, we do not

need educated people in the Army (Quoted by Lieut. Gen. F.A Chishti- Betrayals of Another Kind-Lieutenant General Faiz

Ali Chishti-Asia Publishing Hous e-London-1989). It is not possible to cross check Chishtis s tatement and it may be an

exaggeration.Yahya however did promote some ex rankers and known Yes Men with extremely limited intellect like Tikka and

Niazi. Chishti was not an ex ranker. His book on the Zia era is thought provoking and is compulsory reading for anyone who

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