1

TheOriginsofPhenomenologyinAustro-GermanPhilosophy:BrentanoandHusserl

GUILLAUMEFRÉCHETTE

Thisisthepre-peerreviewedversionofthefollowingarticle:[Fréchette, Guillaume, „The Origins of Phenomenology inAustro-GermanPhilosophy.Brentano,Husserl, J.Shand(ed),A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Philosophy, Wiley-Blackwell, 2019, pp. 418-453],whichhasbeenpublished infinalformathttps://doi.org/10.1002/9781119210054.ch16.This article may be used for non-commercial purposes inaccordancewithWileyTermsandConditionsforUseofSelf-ArchivedVersions.

InJ.A.Shand(ed.),BlackwellCompanionto19th-CenturyPhilosophy,London,Wiley-

Blackwell,2019,pp.418-453.

§1.HistoricalBackground.Brentanoand19th-centuryEuropeanphilosophy §1.1.Aristotle’sheir §1.2.Brentanoandhisschool §1.3.Husserl§2.SomeGeneralPrinciplesofBrentano’sPhilosophy §2.1.Principle(a):Philosophyasascience §2.2.Principle(b):Anti-Kantianism §2.3.Principle(c):Empiricism §2.4.Principle(d):Themereologicalnatureofsubstance §2.5.Principle(e):Thecorrectnessprinciple§3.ThePhenomenologyofBrentanoandHusserl §3.1.Phenomenology,Phenomena,andExperiences §3.2.Descriptionanditstools

i) exactnessii) examplesiii) eideticvariations

§3.3.Intentionalityi) thebasictheoryofintentionalityii) theenhancedtheoryiii) thereisticversioniv) Husserl’saccountofintentionality

§3.4.Consciousness§3.5.Emotionsandvalues§3.6.Psychologismandanti-psychologism

1. HistoricalBackground.Brentanoand19th-CenturyEuropeanPhilosophyThedevelopmentofphenomenologyin19th-centuryGermanphilosophyisthatofa

particularstreamwithinthelargerhistorical-philosophicalcomplexofAustro-German

2

philosophy.ItfindsitsoriginsevenbeforeHegel’sdeathin1831,intheteachingsand

worksofBernardBolzano,anddevelopsintoastructuredwholethroughtheworksof

FranzBrentanoandhisschool.Thismaincurrentinitsdevelopmentincludesother

parallelAustrianinfluencesfromJohannFriedrichHerbart,RichardAvenarius,Ludwig

Boltzmann,ErnstMach,LudwigWittgenstein,andthemembersoftheViennaCircle;and

contributionsfromitsnaturalalliesinGermanphilosophy,especiallyFriedrich

Trendelenburg,RudolphHermannLotze,andGottlobFrege.Ithashadfurther

ramificationsineconomics,notablyintheworksofCarlMengerandLudwigvonMises,

inliterature,intheworksofFranzKafkaandRobertMusil,andinmanyotherfields.1

BrentanoisthebackboneofAustro-Germanphilosophyformanyreasons.He

cametoAustriain1874,whichheconsideredtobeafavorablecontexttofounda

philosophicalschool;2hewasinstrumentalinreintroducingBolzano,thegrandfatherof

Austro-Germanphilosophy,toAustrianphilosophers;hetrainedorcontributedtothe

trainingofmanygenerationsofAustro-Germanphilosophers,rangingfromCarlStumpf

andAntonMartytoAlexiusMeinong,ThomasMasaryk,ChristianvonEhrenfels,Alois

Höfler,EdmundHusserl,KazimierzTwardowski,OskarKrausandSchmuelHugo

Bergman;andhewasanacknowledgedinfluenceonmanyphilosophersrangingfrom

Stout,Moore,andHeideggertotheViennaCircle(theauthorsoftheManifesto)and

manyotherlate20th-andearly21st-centuryphilosophers,onbothsidesoftheanalytic

vs.continentaldivide.Asthe“grandfatherofphenomenology”3resp.the“disgusted

grandfatherofphenomenology,”4butalsoasthekeyfigureonthe“Anglo-Austrian

AnalyticAxis”(Simons1986;Dummett1988:7),Brentanoisatthesourceofthetwo

mainphilosophicaltraditionsin20th-centuryphilosophy.Inthisarticle,Iwillfocus

mainlyonhisplacein19th-centuryEuropeanphilosophyandonthecentralthemesand

conceptsinhisphilosophythatweredeterminantinthedevelopmentofthephilosophy

ofhismostgiftedstudent:EdmundHusserl.

1 Cf. other similar definitions of Austrian and Austro-German philosophy in Haller (1979), Simons (2000), Smith (1981, 1989, 1994, 1996), and Mulligan (1989, 1990, 1997, 2001, 2012). 2 On his philosophical appreciation of Austria, see for instance his inaugural lecture “On the Causes of Discouragement in the Philosophical Domain”, in Brentano (1929, pp. 85ff). See also his recollections in his letter to Bergman from 1909, published in Bergman (1946, p. 125). On his project to found a school as such, see Brentano (1895, p. 34), Husserl (1919/1976, pp. 156ff/48ff), and Fisette and Fréchette (2007, pp. 14ff) for further sources. 3 See Baumgartner (2003). 4 Ryle (1976).

3

Aristotle’sHeir

Brentano’sinterestinphilosophywasdoubtlesslargelyconditionedbythegreat

philosophicalandliterarytalentsinhisfamily,anditsroleinthedevelopmentof

GermanRomanticism.HisuncleClemensBrentanoandhisauntBettinavonArnim

markedthehistoryofGermanRomanticism,andareamongthedirectsuccessorsof

GoetheandtheWeimarerKlassik.Hisfather,ChristianBrentano,waswellknownasa

Catholicwriter.Hetookagreatinterestinphilosophy,andwasinstrumentalin

publishingtheNachlassofhisbrotherClemens.HesupposedlyattendedSchelling’sfirst

lecturesinJena,whichlefthimwithaterribleimpression.5

TheyoungFranzstartedhisstudiesinMunichin1856,underthesupervisionof

ErnstvonLasaulx,whowasalsoafriendofhisuncleandonwhomhehadpreviously

madeaverygoodimpression.6HespenttwoyearsinMunich,afterwhichhewentto

BerlintostudyAristotleunderthesupervisionofTrendelenburg.Later,Brentanowould

writethathedidnotalwaysconsiderTrendelenburg’smethodofcloselystudyingtext

appropriate,andthatitwasinfactAquinaswhowashisforemostguidetoAristotelian

philosophy.7InMünster,hespentanacademicyearworkingunderthesupervisionof

FranzJakobClemensandChristophBernhardSchlüter,whonotonlytrainedhimin

medievalphilosophy,butalsointroducedhimtoNeo-Scholasticism.8

5 See his biography in Christian Brentano (1854, XIV). 6 From Lasaulx’s correspondence as quoted in Stöltzle (1904, p. 231): “Franz is in fact a subtle man, whom I like very much“ (“Franz ist in der Tat ein feinsinniger Mensch, der mir sehr wohl gefällt.”) 7 See his letter to Hugo Bergman of January 22, 1908, published in Bergman (1946, p. 106). “I am far from denying that he [Trendelenburg] was once my master. It was indeed he who guided me to Aristotle. And as I was attending his lectures on Aristotle, I compared in the library the commentaries of the great schoolman [Aquinas] and found there some passages favorably explained, which Trendelenburg was not able to make comprehensible.” See also Brentano’s letter to the Prussian Academy of Sciences in 1914: “With Trendelenburg, I shared all my life the conviction that philosophy is capable of a truly scientific approach, but that it is incompatible with such an approach when, without any reverence toward the ideas transmitted by the great thinkers of earlier times, it aims to insert them anew in every head. Therefore, I followed his example when I dedicated some years of my life to the study of the works of Aristotle, which he taught me to consider as an unexploited treasure trove. The same conviction that there are no prospects for true success in philosophy when one does not proceed as in other scientific disciplines brought me to the conviction not to embrace everything at the outset, but rather to concentrate my whole energy on a few relatively simple tasks, as did Archimedes, Galilei, and according to his own report, Newton, who allegedly compared his work with that of a child fishing out a few shells from the sea. Here, not only does the old saying that the half is greater than the whole obtain, as it seems to me: even for a minuscule part, one can say that it is better to tackle it than wanting to embrace the whole for then, in reality, one embraces nothing.” Letter quoted in Oberkofler (1989:IXf.) Husserl famously adapted Brentano’s motto using a monetary metaphor: “Not always the big bills, gentlemen: small change, small change!” quoted in Gadamer (1987, p. 107). 8 Brentano’s third habilitation thesis (see Brentano 1866/1929, p. 137) was partly inspired by Clemens, who published a well-known book (Clemens 1856) on philosophy as a servant to theology. For some time, Brentano first planned to write his dissertation on Suarez under the supervision of Clemens, who was famous for his scholarship on Suarez. First drafts of this dissertation are deposited in Brentano’s Nachlass at the Houghton Library of Harvard University.

4

From1860to1862,BrentanospentmostofhistimeworkingonhisPhD

dissertationonthevariousmeaningsofbeinginAristotle(Brentano1862).Shortlyafter

hisdoctorate,heenteredtheDominicanconventinGrazasanovice,butleftonlyafew

monthslater.HetookholyordersintheCatholicseminaryinWürzburginAugust1864.

Brentano’sdissertationmadeagoodimpressiononTrendelenburg,who

suggestedtoErnstMachin1865thathebeappointedtoachairinphilosophyinGraz.9

Thesameyear,BrentanosubmittedhisPsychologyofAristotle(publishedlateras

Brentano1867/1977)ashabilitationthesisinWürzburg.10The25thesesdefendedin

hishabilitationexaminationin1866(Brentano1866)attesttothecontinuityof

Brentano’sphilosophicalprogramme.Hedefendedmostofthemlaterinhiscareer.In

this,hefollowedhismastersTrendelenburg,Clemens,andLasaulxintheircritical

stancetowardKantandHegelandtheirinterestinascientificphilosophy,alongwith

influencesfromFrenchpositivism,empiricism,Aristotle,andAquinas.

ThesetofparticularpositionstakenbyTrendelenburg,Clemens,andLasaulxis

complex,butaquicklookattheirbasicphilosophicalviewsshowsthattheycomplement

eachotherinawaywhichBrentanowasobviouslyawareof,withadecisiveimpacton

hisphilosophicaleducation.TherenewalofCatholicphilosophyproposedbytheNeo-

ScholasticstreampropoundedbyClemenswasdirected,amongothertargets,against

Günther’sHegel-inspiredspeculativetheology.11Analogously,Trendelenburg’seffortsto

returntoAristotle’stheoryofcategorieswasalsodirectedagainstKant’sdeductionof

thecategoriesandthekindofsystematicphilosophythatemergedfromitviaHegeland

Schelling.Onanotherlevel,Lasaulx’sKulturpessimismusandhistheoryofthehistoryof

philosophyasaVerfallsgeschichtewasalsodirectedagainsttheso-calledmodernand

progressivetendenciesrepresentedbythebourgeoisphilosophiesofKantandHegel.In

thisrespectBrentano’sphilosophyofhistory(eveninitsearliestform:seeBrentano

1867a)sharesmanysimilaritieswithLasaulx’sPhilosophiederGeschichte(1856),which

defendsahistoricalpositivismclosetoComte’sviewofthethreestagesofhistory–an

approachthatwasinfluentialintheconservativeGermancirclestowhichBrentano’s

family,includingBrentanohimself,belonged.12

9 On this, see the correspondence between Mach and Trendelenburg published in Thiele (1978, p. 205). 10 On these dates, see Stumpf (1922, p. 29). 11 On Clemens as the main German representative of Neo-Scholasticism, see Stöckl (1870, p. 836). 12 On Lasaulx’s cyclical Verfallsgeschichte, see Schnabel (1937, p. 168) and in particular Schoeps (1953, pp. 62ff.).

5

BrentanostartedlecturinginWürzburgasaPrivatdozentinphilosophyin1866.

Hisfirstlecturesdealtwiththehistoryofphilosophy,followedsoonafterby

metaphysics.HisearlyWürzburglectureswereattendedbyCarlStumpf,AntonMarty,

CarlvanEndert,ErnstCommer,LudwigSchütz,andHermannSchell.13Notonlydid

Brentanohaveastrongphilosophicalinfluenceonthematthetime,hewasalsotheir

mainreferenceinreligiousaffairs.

TheschoolofBrentanomighthavedevelopedquitedifferentlyifBrentanohad

notbeencommissionedin1869bytheBishopofMainz,Ketteler,todraughta

memorandumonpapalinfallibilityinpreparationforthefirstVaticanCouncil,which

startedinDecemberofthatyear.Inthisdocument(Brentano1969),Brentanorelies

mainlyonphilosophicalargumentstoargueagainstpapalinfallibility.Theworkonthis

memorandumwasthebeginningofhiscrisisoffaith,14andledhimtotheconclusion

thatalldogmasarebasedonrealandinsolublecontradictions.15

Evenbeforewritingthismemorandum,however,Brentanowasalreadyvery

optimisticaboutthepossibilityofatheisticversionofpositivisminthephilosophyof

thesciences,whichwouldbesupportedbyanAristotelianmetaphysics.Hisdiscussions

oftheworksofHelmholtz,Mill,Comte,andWhewellinhis1867/68lectureson

metaphysicsalreadyshowthathewaswellacquaintedwithpositivismatthetime.The

connectionbetweenhisviewsonthenaturalsciences,metaphysics,andtheology

becameclearinalecturehegaveinWürzburgin1869(andin1879inVienna),where

hearguedthatthesecondlawofthermodynamicsformulatedbyClausiusandThomson

(LordKelvin)offersasupportforthecosmologicalprooffortheexistenceofGod,as

Thomson(1855)andClausius(1865)hadarguedbeforehim.16

WiththeproclamationofthepapalinfallibilityinJuly1870,Brentano

progressivelyabandonedhisCatholicconvictions,butmaintainedhispositionasapriest

(andhispositionasprofessorofphilosophyatWürzburg)untilApril1873.Hisofficial

defectioncameonlyafewweeksbeforehebecameinvolvedindiscussionsforthe

appointmentofareplacementforthechairofFranzLottinVienna,whichheobtained

withthesupportofLotze.

13 See Stumpf (1919/1976, p. 103/19). 14 See Fels (1926/27), Utitz (1954, p. 77), Hertling (1919, pp. 208ff), Freudenberger (1969, pp. 148ff), Fisette and Fréchette (2007, pp. 25ff) 15 See Stumpf (1922, p. 71). 16 See Brentano (2016).

6

AshispositioninWürzburgbecameincreasinglyuncomfortableafterhis“inner

break”withtheChurch,inthespringof1872hetookasabbaticalterm,travelingto

Englandwherehemetwithotheropponentsofinfallibilism–mostnotablyWilliam

RobertsonSmith,CardinalNewman,HerbertSpencer,andGeorgeJacksonMivart.He

returnedtoWürzburginthelatesummerof1872,andgavehislastsemesteroflectures

therein1872/73.

The1872/73lecturesonpsychologybeartheinfluenceofBritishempiricism,

whichBrentanostudiedintensivelyduringhisstayinLondon.Theywerealsothebasis

onwhichhestartedworkonhisPsychologyfromanEmpiricalStandpoint,particularly

duringthesummerandfallof1873.HisPsychologywasconceivedasasix-volume

project,whichwouldcoverinvestigationson1)Psychologyasascience;2)Psychical

phenomenaingeneral;3)Presentations;4)Judgements;5)Actsofloveandhate;and6)

Theimmortalityofthesoul.Ultimatelyonlythefirstvolumeandthefirstpartofthe

secondwerepublished,inBrentano(1874).Brentanocontinuedwithworkonthethird

volumeinspring1875,butabandonedtheprojectshortlythereafter.17

BrentanoandhisSchool

BrentanocametoViennawiththeprojectoffoundingaschoolandencouraging

Austrianyouthtoenterphilosophy,18andfoundimmediatesuccess.Themost

prominentamonghisfirstViennastudentswereTomásMasaryk(whowouldlaterbe

instrumentalinintroducingHusserltoBrentano),SigmundFreud,AlexiusMeinong,

AloisHöfler,BennoKerry,AlfredBerger,andChristianvonEhrenfels.

However,Brentano’sacademiccareerinViennatookanunexpectedturnin1880,

whenhedecidedtomarryIdaLieben.Atthetime,asaformerpriesthewasnoteligible

tomarryunderAustrianlaw.HethusrepudiatedtheAustriancitizenshipthathehad

acquiredthroughhisappointment,whichalsoforcedhimtoresignfromhischair;he

acquiredSaxoncitizenshipandmarriedinLeipziginSeptember1880.Hethen

continuedtolectureinViennaasaPrivatdozent.Althoughtheministrypromisedto

reinstatehiminhischaironmultipleoccasions,thisneverhappened.This,alongwith

otherdifficultieswiththeauthorities,aswellasthedeathofhiswife,ledBrentanoto17 Even before the first book was published on Easter 1874, Brentano wrote to Lotze about his doubts on the project. Years later, in a diary entry from 1904, he detailed the motives of his decision not to continue the project on the basis of his view that psychology was not yet ready at that time for such comprehensive works. See Falckenberg (1901, p. 112) Fréchette (2012, pp. 104ff), and Rollinger (2012, p. 301). 18 See Bergmann (1946, p. 306).

7

leaveViennain1895.Hemadethedecisionpublicandexplaineditindetailinapublic

lecturein1894,andthestorysooncametobeknowninViennaastheAffaire

Brentano.19

HislaterteachinginViennawasparticularlyfruitful.Amonghismostimportant

studentsfromthepost-1870Viennaperiod,wefindFranzHillebrand,EmilArleth,

KazimierzTwardowski,HansSchmidkunz,JosefClemensKreibig,andEdmundHusserl.

Brentano’slastyears,between1895and1917,werespentmostlybetween

Schönbühel,hissummerresidenceontheDanube,andFlorence,whereheelected

domicile.Hisformerstudentsvisitedhimregularlyinbothplaces,andsenttheirown

studentstostudyBrentano’sphilosophywiththemasterhimself.Marty’sstudentswere

particularlyreceptivetothisoffer:HugoBergman,AlfredKastil,OskarKraus,EmilUtitz,

andJosefEisenmeierallcamefromPragueandvisitedBrentanoregularly,assistinghim

indictationsandreadings,whichbecamenecessaryafter1903,whenheunderwentan

eyeoperationthatlefthimalmostcompletelyblind.Inparticular,OskarKrausand

AlfredKastilplayedanimportantroleinpublishingsomeofBrentano’slecturesinthe

1920sand1930s.

Husserl

NotonlydidBrentanofulfillhisdesiretofoundaphilosophicalschool,buthealso

transmittedthisdesiretomanyofhisstudents.ThiswasthecaseofMeinong(Graz),

Marty(Prague),Stumpf(Berlin),Twardowski(Lemberg),Hillebrand(Innsbruck),andof

courseHusserl(Göttingen/Freiburg).Hisphenomenologyinfluencedseveral

generations,startingfromtheMunichandGöttingenphenomenologistsandextending

tothelatergenerationofFreiburgphenomenologistsafter1919.Butfirstafewmore

remarksonHusserlinthisspecificcontext.

TwoyearsafterBrentanowasappointedinVienna,hesentoneofhisfirst

doctoralstudents,TomášMasaryk,tospendsometimeinLeipzigstudyingpsychology

underthesupervisionofWundt.20ItwasonthisoccasionthatMasarykmetafellow

Moravian,theyoungEdmundHusserl,whoattendedWundt’slecturesasafirst-year

undergraduate.MasaryksuggestedtoHusserlthathegotoViennatostudyunder

19 See for example Anonymous (1894, 1894a, 1895). 20 This was also the case of Twardowski: see Twardowski (1991/1999).

8

Brentano,buttheyoungHusserlwasinLeipzigtostudyunderWeierstrass.Helater

continuedhisstudiesinmathematicsinVienna,completinghisdoctoratein1883.

Husserlwasheadingforacareerinmathematics,andacceptedapositionas

assistanttoWeierstrassinBerlin,wherehespentasemester.Inautumn1883he

enrolledinmilitaryservice,duringwhichhisinterestinphilosophygrewconsiderably

AfterhavingspentthelastpartofhismilitaryserviceinVienna,hedecidedtobegin

attendingBrentano’slecturesaftercompletinghisservice.

HusserlspenttwoyearsinViennaattendingallofBrentano’slecturesand

seminars:onpracticalphilosophy,elementarylogic,Hume’sEssayonHuman

Understanding,psychologyandaesthetics,andTheLimitsofourKnowledgeofNatureby

DuBois-Reymond(1872/1874).21HusserlleftapositiveimpressiononBrentano,who

invitedhimtospendhissummerholidayswithhimonLakeWolfgangnearSalzburg,

andeven,togetherwithhiswifeIda,paintedaportraitofhim.22SinceBrentanohimself,

actingatthistimeonlyasaPrivatdozentinVienna,wasnotinapositiontohabilitate

Husserl,hesuggestedthathegoeithertoPrague,tohabilitateunderMarty,ortoHalle,

tohabilitateunderStumpf.23HusserlleftforHalle,andayearlaterobtainedhis

Habilitationwithathesisontheconceptofnumber.Theworkwasexpandedafewyears

laterintothePhilosophyofArithmetics(1891/2003),Husserl’scontributiontoa

Brentanianphilosophyofmathematics,whichhededicatedtoBrentano.

Husserlspent14yearsinHalleasaPrivatdozent.Thepublicationofhismagnum

opus,theLogicalInvestigations,in1900-01,wasaturningpointbothinhiscareerand

hisphilosophicaldevelopment.ThegoodreceptionthattheworkreceivedfromDilthey,

theNeo-Kantians,andtheGöttingenmathematiciansfacilitatedhisappointmentin

Göttingen.Philosophically,Husserl’sviewsevolvedconsiderablybetweenhisPhilosophy

ofArithmeticsandtheLogicalInvestigations.Manydifferentfactorscontributedtothis

evolution,includingamongothershiscorrespondencewithFregeandhisstudiesofthe

philosophicalworksofBolzanointhemid-1890s.Theseledhimtohiscritiqueof

psychologismintheLogicalInvestigations,whoseepigraphwasGoethe’sproverbial

remarkthat“oneisagainstnothingmorestridentlythantheerrorsonehasfirstset

21 See Husserl (1919, p. 155/1976, p. 48). 22 According to Spiegelberg (1981, pp. 119-122) the painting was destroyed in the bombing of Antwerp in 1940. 23 On April 8, 1886, Brentano wrote to Marty: “Dr. Husserl and Hillebrand are thinking about going to Prague this summer. Unfortunately, I could not tell them what you plan to lecture on.” On October 22, 1886, he wrote again to Marty: “Husserl has now left for Halle. I recommended him to Stumpf with the reserves that seemed appropriate: I want to see what Stumpf thinks of him.”

9

aside.”Wewillreturnlater(section3)tothecritiqueofpsychologism,whichplayeda

centralroleinthedevelopmentofphenomenology.

2. SomeGeneralPrinciplesofBrentano’sPhilosophyInsofarasphenomenologyisoriginallyaspecificbranchofAustro-Germanphilosophy,

BrentanoandHusserlshouldbetakenequallyasitsfounders.LikeChristianity,

phenomenologyunderwentschismsthatdividedtheoriginalterritoryintodifferent

subterritories.OneofthefirstschismsoccurredafterHusserl’ssuddendiscoveryofhis

Egoin1913.24ThisdiscoveryslowlybroughtHusserlontothepathofSouthwestern

Neo-Kantianism,aphilosophythatisdirectlyopposedtotheoriginalthrustof

phenomenology.FromtheperspectiveofBrentano’sstudents,hisphilosophicalheirs,

andtheircontemporaries,anotherimportantschismbecamemanifestwiththe

publicationofHeidegger’sBeingandTimein1927andhis1929inaugurallectureWhat

isMetaphysics?25

However,sincethisarticleisconcernedwiththeoriginsofphenomenology,we

willonlydealherewiththemesandconceptswhicharecentraltophenomenologyasa

branchofAustro-Germanphilosophy:i.e.,thosewhichwereinplacebeforethevarious

schismsdescribedabove.Thefocusisonthesethemesandconceptsastheyrelate

directlytothebasicprinciplesofBrentano’sphilosophy,ortheirdeterminantroleinthe

developmentoffurtherAustro-Germanstreamsthatoriginatedinphenomenology:

Gestaltpsychology,thetheoryofobjects,Munich-Göttingenphenomenology,andmany

othermovementsin20th-centuryphilosophy.

Asmentionedearlier,Brentano’s25habilitationthesesfrom1866documenthis

programmeinphilosophy.Thissetof25propositions,characterizingthecorrect

methodologyforphilosophy,theconnectionbetweenlanguageandthought,drawingthe

linebetweengoodandbadphilosophy,andstatingthecoreprinciplesofethicsand

metaphysics,presentsomeofthemostfundamentalanddurableideasinBrentano’s

philosophy.Followingtheinnerstructureofthesepropositions,26itisreasonableto

24 Husserl announced the discovery in a rather discreet manner, as a footnote in the second edition of the Logical Investigations (Husserl 2001, p. 353). On Husserl’s discovery of the self, see Fréchette (2013a). 25 On the reactions of the Brentanians, see for instance Kraus (1931, p. 140) and Stumpf (1930). Carnap (1931, pp. 230-1) and Ryle (1931, pp. 230-1), who were otherwise both sympathetic to some aspects of early phenomenology, also noticed the change of perspective. 26 Contrary to the work that it prefigures, there has been little study of the inner structure of Brentano (1866). Kraus categorized the themes of the theses: methodology, ontology and metaphysics, continuity, psychology,

10

isolatefivegeneralprinciplesamongthem,whichcanservehereasaguideto

Brentano’sconceptionofphilosophy:

fivegeneralprinciplesformBrentano’sphilosophy

a) Philosophyisascience:philosophyshouldbepracticedasasciencein

theunitarysenseoftheterm,whichexcludesadistinctionbetween

speculativeandexactsciences,andwhichmeansusingthesame

methodsasthenaturalsciences(seetheses1and4);

b) Anti-Kantianism:Kantianism,includingitsviewsontheproofsofthe

existenceofGod,isfalse(seetheses1,6,7);

c) Empiricism:philosophystartsfromexperience(seetheses12,13,14,

15);

d) Themereologicalnatureofsubstance:theaccidentcontainsits

substance;thereareultimatespecificdeterminationsofthesubstance,

butsincewedonothaveanintuitionofanindividualsubstanceinall

itsdeterminations–weonlyhaveintuitionsofanindividualsubstance

throughtheaccidentsgiveninintuitiveperception–wecannot

properlyknowit27(seetheses16,17).

e) Correctnessprinciple:somethinghasvaluejustwhenitiscorrecttolove

it;ajudgmentistruejustwhenitiscorrecttoacknowledge

(anerkennen)theexistenceofitsobject(seetheses24,25).28

FurtherprinciplesofBrentano’sphilosophy,whichareformulatedinthe25habilitation

theses,alsoplayedanimportantroleinhisintellectualdevelopment,althoughfor

variousreasonstheydonotsharetheprivilegedpositionofthefivebasicprinciplesin

hissystem:

philosophy of language, freedom of the will, ethics, and aesthetics (Brentano 1929, p. 165). Detailed discussions of some of the theses can be found in Gilson (1955), Ingarden (1969), and Sauer (2000). 27 The idea behind theses 16 and 17 is that the accident contains the substance and, analogously, that our concepts (e.g., the concept of redness) contain in themselves the intuition of something red. Like accidents, concepts are one-sidedly detachable from the intuition at their base (resp. from substance). See the quote in Chrudzimski (2004, p. 142). Thesis 16 is about the logical parts of a whole, which stand in a line of predication and which constitute, as a whole, the individual of a kind. Thesis 17 is about the metaphysical parts of a whole: every metaphysical part is different. 28 Cf. also Brentano (1889/1902, p. 17/15f).

11

f) Metaphysicalcontinuism:spaceisafinite,non-emptycontinuum(theses

8,9,10);

g) Linguisticempiricism:languagewasdevelopedasanauxiliarytoolfor

thought(theses18,19).Thisisacorollaryofprinciple(c).

h) Logicalreductionism:Somejudgments,likedisjunctivejudgments,are

simplylinguisticformulationsofother,morefundamental,formsof

judgments(theses20,21);

i) Indeterminismisnotachallengetofreewill(thesis23);29

j) Philosophyshouldnotbeconsideredaservanttotheology,although

theologymightsometimesserveasaguidingstar30(theses2and3).

Amongthevariousreasonswhyprinciples(f)to(j)donotcountasbasicprinciples,it

maybehelpfultostressafewinparticular:changesinBrentano’sviewsatdifferent

stagesofhisdevelopment(e.g.,principlei);insightsthatwouldbesubstantially

developedonlylater(e.g.,principleh);thelimitedapplicationofcertaininsightstoa

specificdomainofphilosophy(principlesfandg);andhavingmetaphilosophical

significancechieflyoutsidephilosophy,andthereforenotbeingdirectlyrelevantasa

philosophicalprinciple(principlej).

Someofthesefivegeneralprinciplesaredeliberatelyformulatedheresoastobe

interpretableinmorethanoneway,fortworeasons.First,thereisnodocumentation,

besidescrypticmarginalnotesbyBrentanohimself,onhowheactuallydefendedthe

thesesduringhisdisputatio.Second,andconsequently,Brentano’slaterphilosophy

mustbeusedtosubstantiatetheprinciples.Sincehechangedhismindmorethanonce

onmanyphilosophicalmatters,thefivegeneralprinciplesareillustrateddifferently

dependingontheparticularviewdiscussed.

Principle(a):Philosophyasascience

29 This position differs from Brentano’s later compatibilist position on free will, from the 1870s onwards, for instance in Grundlage der Ethik, where he rejects indeterminism and argues for a compatibilist account. Kraus argues in Brentano (1929, p. 180) that the early Brentano was an indeterminist, but besides principle (i) and a small remark by Stumpf (1919, p. 106/1976, p. 21) there is no clear evidence that he has been an indeterminist in his early years. 30 On the guiding star (stellae rectrices), see Werle (1989, p. 134) and Sauer (2000, p. 128). On the guidance of theology, see particularly Brentano’s teacher Clemens (1859, p. 15ff), on the “guidance of theology.” The rejection of papal infallibility expressed in 1869 (reproduced in Freudenberger 1969) seems to articulate a clean break with this idea behind principle (j). For an alternative reading of the connection of principle (j) to the core principle (a), see Brandl (forthcoming).

12

Accordingtoprinciple(a),philosophymustopposethedistinctionbetweenexactand

speculativesciences,sincethisoppositionisitsconditionofexistence(thesis1)andthe

methodsofphilosophyarenoneotherthanthemethodsofthenaturalsciences(thesis

4).Thefirstthesiswasdirectedamongotherthingsagainstspeculativeidealistic

projectslikethatofSchelling;31butitwasequallydirectedagainstarestricted

understandingofthe“exact”sciencesasconsistingonlyofstudiesinvolvingquantitative

measurements.32Brentano’sidealofphilosophyasasciencecombinestheideathat

thereisasenseof“speculation”accordingtowhichmetaphysicsisaspeculative,and

yetexact,enterprise–evenmoresothan“exactphysics”(inasenseiakintoComte’s

positivemethodapositivespeculation)33–withtheideathattruesciencemustalso

allowforthiskindof“speculativeexactness,”andnotonlyforthekindofexactness

requiredbyquantitativemeasurements.

Giventhisreadingofthesis1,itiseasiertounderstandthesenseinwhich

Brentanoconsidersthatphilosophybeunderstoodasascience,andhisclaimthatit

sharesitsmethodswithnaturalsciences.Likethenaturalsciences,philosophyuses

methodssuchasobservation,deduction,andinduction,insofarastheyareapplicableto

theobjectsoftheirinvestigation.However,thisdoesnotmeanthatallphilosophical

investigationsshouldbeconductedwiththemethodsofthenaturalsciences,which

wouldamounttonaturalism.Rather,assuggestedinthesis1,thereisasenseinwhich

philosophicalinvestigationscanbespeculativeandyetexactandscientificinthetrue

sense.34Principle(a)thereforeallowsforaunitarysenseofsciencebyvirtueofthe

identityofmethodsbetweenphilosophyandnaturalsciences(insofarastheydealwith

thesameobjects,i.e.,physicalphenomena),whileleavingroomforakindofexactnessin

philosophywhichmakesitscientificinabroadersensethanthatimpliedbythestrict

commonalityofmethodsreferredtointhesis4.35

31 In particular, it is directed against Schelling’s view that philosophy should cut itself off from all domains of “ordinary knowledge” (gemeines Wissen), as programmatically announced in the first issue of his New Journal for Speculative Physics (Schelling 1802, p. 34; 1859, p. 262). This passage has often been quoted in the school of Brentano as the example par excellence of the dangers of speculative idealism in philosophy. See Brentano (1929, p. 104) or Stumpf (1908, p. 17). 32 See Brentano (1987, p. 6) and Oberkofler (1989:5). 33 See Brentano (1968:127) and (Sauer 2000, p. 124) 34 See Brentano (1987:303) 35 See also Haller (1993) for a similar reading, which makes it possible to draw a direct connection between Brentano’s fourth thesis and the Vienna Circle’s project of a unitary science. In his introduction to the philosophy of sciences that is much influenced by the Vienna circle, Richard von Mises (1939/1956) quotes Brentano’s thesis 4 as an epigraph. On exactness as a method in descriptive psychology, see Mulligan (1989).

13

Principle(b):Anti-Kantianism

Principle(b)followstosomeextentfromthesis1,whichsupportsprinciple(a),insofar

astherejectionofspeculativeidealismisconcerned.Itisalsoacorrelateofprinciple(c).

In1866,BrentanoarguedagainstKantianism,albeitonlyanaspectofKant’sideas,

namelyhisphilosophyofreligion.Thesis6isaniceexamplethatBrentanousedto

disclosetheweaknessesofKantianism.InithenegatesKant’sideathatthedesign

argumentfortheexistenceofGodcanonlyproveanorderoftheworld,butnotan

authoroftheworld.InKant’sview,thehypothesisofacreatoroftheworldonthebasis

ofobservedcausalrelationsbetweenphenomenaisnotjustifiedbecausethegap

betweenempiricaldataandtheirrelationsandtheabsolutedeterminationsofthe

highestcauseoftheworldisunbridgeable.36Brentanoargues,againstthisview,that

Kant’sconclusionsimplystandssquarewithhisownconceptionofsyntheticapriori

truths:afterall,ifKantholdsthelawofcausalitytobeasyntheticaprioritruth,thenthe

factthatwedonotexperienceGodasaprimarycausecannotpossiblybeanobstacleto

thedesignargument.37Besides,Brentanoargues,theassumptionofacreatoris

reasonablesimplyonthebasisoftheprobabilitycalculus,anddoesnotinvolvereliance

onthecosmologicalorontologicalarguments,asKantcontends.

Thesis7dealswithKant’sdiscussionofGodasensrealissimumintheCritiqueof

PureReason(B604ff).BrentanoarguesthatKantiswronginsayingthattheexistenceof

GodasacreatordoesnotimplyGod’sinfiniteperfection.Theargumentsupportingthe

thesiscanbedeductivelyconstrued:supposingthatacreatorexists,wecandeducethe

creator’sinfiniteperfection,sinceto“createoutofnothing”meanstohavean

unconditionedeffect;havingsuchanunconditionedcreativeeffectisincommensurably

superiortohavingaconditionedeffect,andhavinganunconditionedeffectisnot

possiblebysimplyaddingconditionedandfiniteeffects;therefore,ifGodexists,by

deduction,hemusthaveinfiniteperfection.38

Theargumentbehindthesis6isacentralelementinBrentano’santi-Kantianism:

ifsyntheticaprioritruthsaretruthsthatobtainindependentlyofexperience,andif

temporalandspatialdeterminationsareformsofourunderstanding,thenanysynthetic

aprioritruthabouttemporalorspatialdeterminationissimplymadetruebyour

understanding,whichisastandardtowhichevenKanthimselfcannotliveupto.36 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (B: 651-658). 37 See Brentano (1968, p. 86) and Hoppenstedt (1933:64). 38 See also Brentano (1929:171).

14

Therefore,excludingexperienceasoneofthefoundationsofknowledgegivesusatbest

“blindprejudices,”Brentano’sepithetforKant’ssyntheticaprioritruths.39

InBrentano’sopinion,KantandReidadoptthesamebasicideathatthereare

commonsensejudgments–judgmentswhich,thoughtheyarenotevident,appeartobe

certainandlikelytofoundascience.OnBrentano’sview,Kantgoestoofarinhisfight

againstskepticismbyassertingthattheobjectsofknowledgearegiventousinblind

judgments.Brentanothereforerejectssyntheticapriorijudgmentsnotbecausetheyare

apriori,butbecausetheircorrectnesscannotbe“seen”–i.e.,becausetheyare“blind.”

Forhim,acceptingblindjudgments(blindeVorurteile)asthebasisofourknowledge,

andestablishingtheexistenceofGod,theimmortalityofthesoulandfreewillas

postulatesofpracticalpurereason,isasymptomoftheutmostdecay.40

BrentanospentconsiderableenergyarguingagainstallaspectsofKantian

philosophy,forinstanceinaposthumouslypublishedworkagainstKantwrittenin1903

andentitled“DownwithPrejudices!AWarningtothePresentintheSpiritofBaconand

DescartestoFreeItselffromAllBlindAPrioris.”41Eventheconstructionofhislectures

onmetaphysicsfrom1867/68isutterlyanti-Kantian:hebegins,asKantdoesinthe

CritiqueofPureReason,withthe“transcendentalphilosophy,”butconcludesthis

openingsectionindirectoppositiontoKant:

WehaveconcludedourapologyofwhatKantwouldhavecalledthe

transcendentalpartofmetaphysics.Wenowproceedtoinvestigatewhatmightbe

called,inhislanguage,transcendent.Hestopshere.Fromthestandpointofhis

conclusions,heforbidsustocarryon.However,hisconclusionisnotours.Heends

upwithaskepticalattitude[thatmaintains]theunknowabilityofthethinginitself

andthesubjectivityofourprinciples.We,incontrast,haveseenthatwedohave

indubitableprinciples.42

Principle(c):Empiricism

Asinthecaseofprinciple(a),thegeneralprinciple(c)hastwodifferentdomainsof

applicationinBrentano’sphilosophy.Inmetaphysics,hisempiricismtakestheformofa

critiqueofskepticismtowardsthepossibilityofknowledgeandofarejectionof

dogmatism.Brentanoarguesfortwokindsofimmediatelyevidentknowledge:39 See Brentano (1926/1998, p. 26/99). 40 Brentano (1926, p. 22) 41 In Brentano (1925). 42 Quoted and translated in Baumgartner (2013, p. 233).

15

1) axioms,whichincludetautologies,universalpredications(e.g.,“redisacolor”),

predicationsofabasisforsomebeing(e.g.,“everythingwhichiscoloredis

extended”),thetruthofacorrelative(e.g.,“ifaisbiggerthanb,thenbissmaller

thana”),mereologicaltruths(e.g.,“ifalionexists,thentheheartofalionexists”,

or“ifthereisabody,thereisasurface”),thedeterminatenessofthatwhichis

incompletelypresented(e.g.,“acoloriseitherred,blue,white,etc.”),essential

relations(e.g.,“10metresistwiceaslongas5metres”),thenecessityofa

position,form,ororderinginacontinuum(e.g.,“3p.m.isearlierthan4p.m.),and

doublenegation.43

2) Innerperceivings(e.g.,theknowledgethatIampresentlyhearing(whenIdo),

theknowledgethatIwanttosleep(whenIdo),etc.).

Metaphysicsisnotonlybasedonimmediateevidentknowledge,butalsoonmediate

(andthusonlyprobable)knowledge,whichisobtainedthroughinductionfromrepeated

observations.ThiskindofknowledgeiswhatBrentanocallsa“physicalcertainty”of

whatisgiveninexternalperception.

Beingbuiltonthesetwosourcesofimmediateevidentknowledgeandonthe

“physicalcertainty”ofmediateknowledgeofouterperceptionsecurestheempirical

groundsofmetaphysics.Ofcourse,physicalcertaintyisnotevidence:thisiswhythe

beingsBrentanoinvestigatesarenotsimplythetableoutthere,andalsonotthe“things

heard”orthe“thingsseen,”butratherthe“hearer-of-a-tone”orthe“seer-of-a-bird.”

Onlyinthisformaresubstancesaccessibletoinnerperception.44

Theseconddomainofapplicationofprinciple(c)ispsychologyperse.For

Brentano,psychologyreliesonthesametwosourcesofknowledgeasmetaphysics:

“physicalcertainty”obtainedbyinductionfromobservationviaouterperception,and

evidentknowledge,basedeitheroninnerperceptionorontheself-evidenceofaxioms.

Psychologyisthereforeanempiricalsciencewithrespecttothelawsofsuccession

betweenphenomena,theexplanationoftheircauses,andthepredictionoffurther

phenomena–whicharelawsobtainedbyinduction–butalsoregardinginnerly

perceivedphenomena,whicharesubjecttoself-evidentlaws.

Principle(d):Themereologicalnatureofsubstance

43 See Brentano (1867b: 31766). 44 Smith (1987) aptly calls Brentano’s beings “augmented substances.”

16

Aswehaveseenabove,Brentanodefendsaconceptionofbeingsassubstancesthatare

augmentedbytheirattributesoraccidents.Therearenoisolatedsubstances:substances

arenotseparablefromtheiraccidents.Rather,substanceswiththeiraccidents,that

whichhealsocalls“things,”aretobetakenasmetaphysicalwholes.

Thisconceptionofsubstancesaswholesiscalleda“mereological”conception,

withreferencetoTwardowski’sstudentLeśniewski,whocoinedthisnameforthe

theoryoftheformalrelationsbetweenawholeanditsparts.Thebasicprinciple(d)is

supportedbyBrentano’shomonymicreadingofAristotle’sconceptofbeing.In

Brentano’sview,allsensesofBeing–beinginthesenseofaccidentalbeing,inthesense

ofthetrue,inthesenseofbeingpossibleandinthesenseofthecategories–are

derivativefromthefundamentalmeaningofbeingaccordingtothecategories.45Toput

itdifferently,thefirstsubstanceisincludedinthefocalmeaningofallthewaysinwhich

wespeakofbeing,allofwhichexpress“modesofexistenceinthefirstsubstance”

(Brentano1862/1975:178/118).46

Principle(d)suggests,inthelineofAquinasandAristotle,thataccidentisesseest

inesse,i.e.,thatthebeingofaccidentsisaninexistence(inwohnen)inthesubstance.“The

substancewhichhasaqualityisneitherthequalitynorthepossessingofthequality,but

stillthepossessingofthequalityisnotforthesubstanceafurtherquality.Rather,the

possessingofaqualityisessentiallyidenticalwiththesubstance”(SeeBrentano1867b:

31792).47Inhis1874Psychology,Brentanostepsbackonthismereologicalrelationof

inwohnenandcharacterizesintentionalityasthe‘inwohnen’ofanobjectinamentalact.

Principle(e):thecorrectnessprinciple

Brentano’sconceptionofvalueintermsofdesire-worthiness(1866)orlove-worthiness

(1889)isalreadysetoutasoneofthe25thesesin1866.Althoughsomeelementsofthe

theoryarepresentinhisViennalecturesonpracticalphilosophy,48theaccountwasfirst

presentedinprintin1889:“Wecallsomethinggood,ifloveofitiscorrect.Whatistobe

lovedwithcorrectlove,whatisworthyoflove,isthegoodinthewidestsense.”

(Brentano1889:17,translationmodified).Thisisthebasicfittingattitudeaccountof

45 Brentano relies here on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 1003b6-10. 46 On this interpretation of Brentano’s reading of Aristotle’s homonymic conception of being as substance, see for instance Owen (1960) and Shields (1999:217ff). 47 The same idea is discussed in Brentano’s first project of a PhD dissertation on Suarez from the early 1860s. See Brentano (frühe Schriften: 1000054)). 48 Brentano (1952/1973).

17

valuethatBrentanoproposed–yearsbeforeEwing(1947)andScanlon(1998)–in

whichevaluativecategoriesareaccountedforintermsofdeonticcategories.Brentano

defendedtwovariantsofthetheory.Accordingtothefirst(Brentano1889;Brentano

1930),someofouremotionsarecorrectbecausetheyareinharmonywiththevalueof

theobject(Brentano1930:25).Thesecondviewhassometimesbeencharacterizedas

theorthonomyview(Kraus1937):tosaythatouremotionsarecorrectisjusttosaythat

theyareexperiencedorknownascorrect(Brentanouseshere“characterizedas

correct”,alsrichtigcharakterisiert).49Inthiscontext,loveisahighermodeoftaking

pleasureinsomething.50Itshouldbeaddedalsothatprinciple(e)holdsnotonlyfor

emotions,butalsoforjudgments.Thejudgmentexpressedby“aexists”istrue,Brentano

argues,ifandonlyifacknowledging(anerkennen)theexistenceofaiscorrect.51Wewill

returntothecorrectnessprincipleinsection3below.

3. ThephenomenologyofBrentanoandHusserlDespitethevarietyofstanceswhichBrentanoexpressedonontology,metaphysics,and

psychologyoverthecourseofhiscareer,thesefiveprinciplesremaincentraltohis

wholephilosophythroughout:theyhaveanimportantplaceinwhatcouldbecalled

Brentano’sphilosophicalworldvieworsystem.52Byextension,theyalsoareessentialto

hisconceptionofphenomenology.SinceHusserl’sphenomenologygrewoutof

Brentaniansoil–althoughotherinfluences,fromBolzanoandFrege,areessentialto

understandingitsspecificities(seebelow)–letusnowturntothecentralissuesinthe

twothinkers’accountsofphenomenology,andtotheirrespectiveapplicationsofthe

principlesmentionedabove.

Phenomenology,Phenomena,andExperiences

Brentanointroducedphenomenologyasaphilosophicaldisciplineinhisfirstlectureson

metaphysicsinViennain1877/78.53Hefirstusedtheterm‘phenomenology’to

characterizeresearchintothecontentsofmentalstates,onlylater(inVienna)

expandingthelexiconofthedisciplinewiththeexpressions“descriptivepsychology,”49 Brentano (1889/1902, p. 19-20/18). 50 On Brentano’s orthonomy view, see Kraus (1937, pp. 165ff) and Mulligan (forthcoming). 51 On Brentano’s theory of judgment, see Brandl (2014). 52 On Brentano’s worldview, see Fréchette (forthcoming-a). On Brentano’s philosophical system, see Kriegel (forthcoming). 53 See Masaryk’s notes on Brentano’s metaphysics lectures in Masaryk (1877/78), where phenomenology is described as a “part of metaphysics.”

18

“psychognosy,”or“phenomenognosy.”Asapartofmetaphysics,phenomenologywas

thenintroducedasaformofinvestigationthatprecedesontologybutfollowstheso-

called“transcendentalphilosophy,”thepartofmetaphysicsthatdealswithskepticism

andtheargumentsagainstit.Inthiscontext,phenomenologywasintroducedasan

“investigationonthecontentsofourpresentations”(Brentano1867b:31739),dealing

withthewayssubstanceappears,inoppositiontothewayssubstanceis.

ThemotivationbehindBrentano’sintroductionofphenomenologyasasortof

preliminarytoontologyisnotverywelldocumented.Whewell’s(1847)Historyof

InductiveSciencesmadeastrongimpressionontheyoungBrentano,andmayhave

influencedhiminthiscontext.54Notably,Whewell’sproposeddistinctionbetween

explicative-causal(ætiological)anddescriptive(phenomenological)sciencesispalpable

inBrentano’searlymanuscriptsontheclassificationofthesciences.55Thisdistinction

alsoplayedarolelateron,inBrentano’sexplanationoftheroleofdescriptive

psychologyinhisVienneselectures,whenheusedananalogywiththedistinction

betweengeognosyandgeologytoillustratethedistinctionbetweenphenomenologyand

psychologymoregenerally.56

IntroducingphenomenologyintometaphysicsallowsBrentanotodistinguisha

fieldofinvestigationonthewayssubstanceappears,asopposedtothewayssubstance

is(ontology).Principles(a)and(c)inparticularestablishthepossibilityofascientific

investigationofphenomenaasthefirststepingainingknowledgeofthenatureof

substance.Thisalsofollowsfromprinciple(d),insofaraswehaveintuitionsof

individualsubstancesonlythroughtheirperceivedaccidents.Inthissense,

phenomenologyisnotsimplyapreliminarytoontology,butalsoprovidesitwithits

toolsofanalysisanditsepistemicsecurity.Asinnerperception,whichis

phenomenology’sfieldofinvestigation,showsusmentalphenomenaasreallyexisting,

soistheexistenceoftheirparts,especiallythelogicalandmetaphysicalparts,also

54 Brentano had an annotated copy of the History of Inductive Sciences in his library, as well Mill’s book on Comte (Mill 1868) in a French translation. 55 See for instance Brentano (EL75, 12921–12), where the distinction between descriptive (beschreibende) and causal (nach Wirkungen) sciences. This distinction also played a central role in Schlöder (1852), another work that the young Brentano received as a prize and annotated. The distinction between the science of objects and the science of phenomena is discussed in Schlöder (1852, xxv); Brentano refers to it in the aforementioned manuscript. 56 See Brentano (1982/1995, p. 6/7-8) and Brentano (1895, p. 34).

19

securedbyinnerperception.57Phenomenologythereforemakesauthenticmetaphysical

knowledgepossible.

Theintroductionofphenomenologyintometaphysicscoincidesmoreorlesswith

Brentano’smoreintensiveresearchinpsychology,andassuchisanapplicationof

principle(d)totheempiricalstudyofthemind.Psychologyasascienceofthemind

investigatesnothingotherthanthequalitiesofthesubstance,i.e.,inthisspecific

case,thequalitiesofsoul.ThisisalsowhyBrentanooftenspeakspositivelyofLange’s

“psychologywithoutasoul,”58althoughforhimitmerelymeansthatpsychologycan

onlyinvestigatethephenomenathroughwhichthesoulisgiventous–whatBrentano

callspsychicalphenomena,whichareonlyperceivableinnerly.Butpsychologyisnot

onlyaninvestigationofsoulthroughitsphenomena:italsoinvolvesastudyoftheir

originsandtheirsuccession,anexplanationoftheircauses,andthepredictionoffurther

phenomena.ThispartofthepsychologicalinvestigationiswhatBrentanosometimes

calls“geneticpsychology.”Sincethecausesofphenomena,theirsuccession,andtheir

predictioninvolvephysicalprocessesexistinginthenaturalworld,psychologymust

followthesamemethodsasnaturalsciences:observation,deduction,andinduction,

insofarastheyareapplicabletotheobjectsoftheirinvestigation,asformulatedin

principle(a).Psychology,andmoreparticularlygeneticpsychology,istherefore

involvedwiththesamephenomenaasthenaturalsciences.Thesearecalledphysical

phenomena.Hereweseethefullconsequencesofthesis4:asubsetofphilosophy(which

includesmetaphysicsandpsychology)sharesthesameobjectsasthenaturalsciences

(physicalphenomena)andmustthereforeapplythesamemethodstotheir

investigation.

Withinthisstrictframework,Brentanoconsiderspsychicalphenomenathemain

objectofthepartofpsychologyhecallsphenomenologyordescriptivepsychology.What

aretheessentialfeaturesofpsychicalphenomena?Afterall,anaturalscientist,or

physiologist,couldwellarguethattheyarereducibletophysicalphenomena.Thisisone

57 See Brentano (1867a: 31739): “When it is formulated in general, the question of the existence of realities belongs to ontology. If we would call everything that is not intentional an external thing, the question of the existence of external things would be the first question of ontology. But this is not the usage. We do not use to call our own mental phenomena in this way... The question about what is real is thereby already partially answered. The existence of phenomena of inner perception, and thereby the existence of their parts, in particular of the logical and metaphysical parts“. 58 Brentano (1874/2015, p. 27/22).

20

ofBrentano’smostpatentconcernsinhisPsychology,anditisalsothemotivation

behindhisargumentsontheirreducibilityofthementaltothephysical.Heoffers

differentarguments–ontheabsenceofextensionofpsychicalphenomena,ontheir

innerperceivability,andsoon.Butwhatheconsiderstobethe“mostexcellent”traitof

mentalphenomenaoverphysicalphenomenaistheirintentionality,i.e.,thefactthat

theyaredirectedtowardsomethingastheirobject.

InHusserl’sview,itwasthisfeatureofpsychicalphenomenathatwasthemost

important.Earlyenough,however,HusserlwasdissatisfiedwithBrentano’sconceptof

psychicalphenomena.Hismainconcernwasthatcallingboththesementalactsand

theirobjects“phenomena”ismisleading,sinceitgivestheimpressionthattheapparent

things(e.g.,theredspotIamseeing)“onlyappearasanaloguesofsensations”(Husserl

1901a/2001:235/342),andnotaspropertiesofthecorrespondingobjects.Husserldid

notformallyaccuseBrentanoofthisconfusion,buthiswayofavoidingtheconfusionis

alsoarejectionofBrentano’sview:

“Ifanexternalobject(ahouse)isperceived,presentingsensationsareexperiencedinthisperception,buttheyarenotperceived.Whenwearedeludedregardingtheexistenceofthehouse,wearenotdeludedregardingtheexistenceofourexperiencedsense-contents,sincewedonotpassjudgmentonthematall,donotperceivetheminthisperception(Husserl1901a/2001,pp.237/344-5).

Therefore,weshoulddistinguishbetweenmyexperiencing(Erleben)ofsense-

contents(myhavingphysicalphenomena)andmyperceivingthehouse.Thecolorspots

Iamexperiencingmaybecalledphysicalphenomena,butitwouldbewrong,according

toHusserl,tocallsuchanexperienceaperception,andafortioriadelusiveperception.

Althoughexperiencemayinvolvepositiontaking(Wahr-Nehmung),thepositiontaking

isnotconstitutiveofwhatanexperience(Erlebnis)is.59

AtleastsinceGadamer(1985,pp.157ff)andHeidegger,theconceptualhistoryof

ErlebnishasusuallybeentracedbacktoDiltheyandthephilosophyoflife

(Lebensphilosophie),amovementtowhichtheearlyHusserlhasbeenassociated.60In

facthowever,Husserl’sterm,conceptanduseofErlebnis,ordasErlebte,wasalready

59 Husserl’s concept of experience is in some way similar to Dretske’s “non-epistemic seeing” (Dretske 1969), since these two concepts describe a level of sensory experience which doesn’t involve conceptual structure. However, contra Dretske, Husserl rejects the idea that epistemic seeing is only a“seeing that”. 60 On similar views, see Cohen and Moran (2012, p. 195) and Carr (2014, pp. 20ff)

21

presentinBrentano’slecturesonpsychologyin1887and1891.Adiscussionofthe

experienced(dasErlebte)canbefoundinthefewpagesofHusserl’snotesonthis

lectureswhicharestillextant.61

ThebasicreasonforHusserl’spreferenceforErlebnisseoverphenomenaisto

avoidtheconfusionbetweentwokindsofphenomena,physicalandpsychical,

consideredastherespectiveobjectsoftwokindsofperception,outerandinner,where

onlytheformercanleadtodelusion.Uptothispoint,Brentanowouldstillagree.The

differenceisthatforHusserl,perceivingisnotexperiencing:perceptioninvolves

interpretation(Auffassung),whereasexperiencingisjustaccesstosensorydatapriorto

anyinterpretation.Brentanoindeedoftenseemstooverlookthisdifference,sincefor

himexperiencingisperceiving,andperceptionitselfisajudgmentandthereforea

position-taking.Furthermore,Husserl'suseofthebroaderconceptofErlebnisse,instead

ofthenarrowerconceptofmentalphenomena,allowshimtoisolateacategoryof

mentalactswhicharenotintentional.Distinguishingbetweenexperiencingand

perceivingallowshimtoreserveintentionalityforperceptionsandforsomelived

experiences.ForHusserl,intentionalityisnotthemarkoflivedexperiences.

Descriptionanditstools

Exactness.Brentano’sdescriptivepsychologyandHusserl’sphenomenologyhavein

commonthesearchforexactness,bothinthedescriptionsthemselvesandinthe

analysisused.Brentano’sdescriptivepsychologylectures,forinstance,developatlength

onpossibleargumentsinthedebatebetweenempiricismandnativismonspace

perception.Brentanoandmostofhisstudentsdefendedthenativistaccountaccording

towhichspaceisnotdeducedfromexperience,butisaconcreteelementofour

experience.Thisobsessionwithexactitudeinargumentationanddescriptionisalso

attestedbyStumpf(1924/1930,p.210/394),andmanifestinmanyotherworksfrom

theschoolofBrentano.62Husserlalsoexpressesasimilarconcerninhisargumentinthe

fifthlogicalinvestigation(Husserl2001,pp.146-170),inwhichheexploresdifferent

61 Husserl had a large collection of lecture notes from Brentano’s lectures, which he donated to the Brentano Society in Prague in 1930. These were obviously destroyed during the war since no traces of them are left. A fragment of Husserl’s lecture notes on the 1887 descriptive psychology lectures (copied from the notes of Schmidkunz) does give evidence of the Brentanian origin of Erlebnis and Erlebte: “When I say that descriptive psychology describes what is experienced in immediate experience (das in unmittelbar Erfahrung Erlebte), I am not talking about an enumeration of individual cases, but about what is generally characteristic about the elements that remain while the composition changes.” On “experiencing”, see also Brentano (1982/1995). 62 On exactness in the School of Brentano, see Mulligan (1986).

22

alternativeinterpretationsofthethesisthateveryactisapresentationorhasa

presentationasabasis.

Examples.Anothercentralelementofthemethodologyofdescriptivepsychologyisthe

useofexamples.AllofthedescriptivecasesinBrentano’sdescriptivepsychologystart

fromexamples:thisisaprinciplewhichBolzanocalledanexplication(Verständigung)in

thenarrowsense,forcaseswhereaconceptualanalysisisnotavailable.Brentanouses

thesametechniquefordescriptivepsychology:

Averyspecifictechnique[i.e.,ofdescriptivepsychology]oftenmakesitnecessarytobringsomeoneelsetopayattentiontosomethingwhichheattheoutsetsimplycannotfind,whichheevenputsdecisivelyandliterallyintoquestion.1.Demonstrationofexamples,where[something]is[there]andisnot.2.Expositionoftheconsequences.3.Evidence(Nachweis)fromexperimentations.

Furthermore,thetechniquenecessitatesaspecificpractice(Übung)whosemostessentialpreconditionsarestillmissing,aslongasexperimentsareconductednolessthanunmethodicallyorfollowingpoormethods.Finally,itrequiresinparticularacertaindivisionoflabor,whichisalmostneverpracticedinthephilosophicaldomain.(Brentano-forthcoming)[1887:157-8]

Husserltoopresentsphenomenologyasaphilosophythatbeginswithexamples.Large

partsoftheLogicalInvestigationsarebuiltonwhatHusserlcalls“analysesofexamples”

(Bespielsanalysen),whichareanessentialpartofanyargument.Thispracticeisdrawn

directlyfromBrentano’sdescriptivepsychology.IntheprefacetohisPhilosophyof

Arithmeticsforinstance,Husserlstressesthefactthathedoesnotuseanyterminology

whichisnotintroducedbyexamplesordefinitions.63

Eideticvariations:EideticvariationsbuildontheBeispielsanalysen:theiraim,in

Husserl’smethod,istogainknowledgeofnecessities.Forexample,seeingawhitecoffee

cup,wemayask“Whatholdsupamidsuchfreevariationsofanoriginal…asthe

invariant,thenecessary,universalform,theessentialform,withoutwhichsomethingof

thatkind…wouldbealtogetherinconceivable?”(Husserl1962/1977,p.72/54).Atsome

point,inimaginativelyvaryingthecoffeecup,wecomeupwithfeaturesthatcannotbe

63 Husserl (1891/2003, p. VII/6): “I have made sparse use of philosophical terminology, which is rather indeterminate in any case. In particular, I have used no terms not sufficiently clarified through definition or examples.”

23

variedwithoutmakingtheobjectitselfinconceivable(asacoffeecup),e.g.,thatitisnot

areceptacleforliquid.

Husserl’suseofwhathecallseideticvariationsisreminiscentofBolzano’suseofthe

logicofvariationinhisWissenschaftslehre(Bolzano1837/2014),abookHusserlknew

verywell.

Reduction:Infact,whenHusserlfirstintroducedthephenomenologicalreductionina

Seefeldmanuscriptfrom1905,hebeganwiththeexampleofabeerbottle:

“Iseeabeerbottlethatisbrown,andIrestrictmyselftothebrowninits

extension,‘justasitisactuallygiven’…Iperceive–thisbrowncontent.Itis

somethingthatendures.Itisconstantlythesame.Itcoversacertain

phenomenologicalextension.Isawityesterday;Irememberittoday.Ithaslasted

untiltoday.Transcendence!”(Husserl1966/1991,p.238/245-246).

ForHusserl,thefocusonwhatis“actuallygiven,”bracketingallfurtherassumptionson

thenatureorexistenceoftheobjectsperceived,hasthefunctionofneutralizingour

dogmaticattitudetowardsreality–whathealsocallsanaïvemetaphysicalattitude–in

ordertomakeusawareofouractivecontributionsinourcommercewiththeworld,as

inourapprehensionofobjects.Bracketingthenaturalattitudetowardsthebeerbottle

allowsusto“see”howthisobjectisconstitutedthroughmeaning-bestowingacts,i.e.,

howits“sense”(Sinn)isconstituted,andhowthissensedeterminesourapprehension

oftheobject.

After1913Husserldevelopedthisideaindetailinvastanalysesofhowthemost

diverseaspectsofrealityareconstituted:meaning,time-consciousness,theexperienced

body,intersubjectivityandintersubjectivereality,andeventheworlditselfaswe

experienceit:ourlife-world(Lebenswelt).

Themechanismatwork,the“bracketing”thatischaracteristicofthe

phenomenologicalreductionintheworksthatHusserlpublishedafter1913,isat

bottomquitesimilartothestancehedefendedintheLogicalInvestigations,andwhich

hecalledtherethe“metaphysicalneutrality”ofphenomenology.Inthiscontext,he

arguedthatquestionsconcerningthepossibilityofknowledgeoronwhetherthereisan

externalrealityshouldberejectedasmetaphysicalquestions,whichhavenoplacein

24

phenomenology(seeforinstance1901/2001a,p.26/pp.177-8).Manyothersimilar

affirmationscanbefoundthroughouttheLogicalInvestigations.64Like

phenomenologicalreduction,metaphysicalneutralityisamethodologicaldevicewhich

definesthedomainofphenomenologicalresearch,namely“phenomena”:i.e.,whatis

directlygiventous.Inbothcases,werefrainfrommetaphysicalassumptionsonthe

natureofperceivedcolors,tones,andevenonthenatureorexistenceofconsciousness.

Despitethisimportantsimilarity,phenomenologicalreductiondiffersintwo

fundamentalaspectsfromthestanceofmetaphysicalneutrality.First,theformerisa

generalizationofthelatter,whichrangesnotonlyovertheobjectsofperception,but

overallpossibleobjectstoutcourt.Second,whilemetaphysicalneutralityisa

descriptiviststance–itaimsonlytoprovideaphenomenologicallyplausibleanalysisof

ourexperiencesandtheircontents–themotivationbehindphenomenologicalreduction

isfoundational,whichmakesitatypicalidealist(andneo-Kantian)device:itaimsto

isolatetheconditionsofpossibilityofthings“justastheyareactuallygiven.”Ina

Kantian-Cartesianfashion,HusserlcomestotheconclusionintheIdeasthatsinceI

cannotimaginetheworldbeingannihilatedwithoutimaginingbeingmyselfconsciousof

thisannihilation,thensubjectivitymustbeconsideredastheconditionofpossibilityfor

theappearanceoftheworld.ThisisHusserl’s‘discoveryoftheI,’whichprovidesthe

foundationalbasisofhisanalysisofconstitution.65

Thereisnoconsensusonhowexactlythesignificanceofthefoundationalist

projectHusserlpursuedintheIdeasshouldbeunderstood.Afterthepublicationofthe

Ideasin1913,Husserl’sownstudentsandclosecollaboratorsandcolleagues–Adolf

Reinach,JohannesDaubert,MaxScheler,TheodorConrad,AlexanderPfänder,Edith

Stein,JeanHéring,MoritzGeiger,andRomanIngarden(tonameonlyafew)–reactedin

differentwaystoHusserl’sfoundationalistproject,butingeneraltheyhadoneoftwo

reactions:eithertheydismisseditasawholeortheyremainedindifferent,consideringit

asanoptionalandthereforeinessentialwayofunderstandingphenomenological

analysis.AlthoughsomeofHusserl’slaterstudentsinFreiburgweresympathetictothe

foundationalistproject–amongthemJanPatocka,EugenFink,AlfredSchütz,Ludwig

Landgrebe,andTheodorCelms–theprojectitselfonlysurvivedHusserl’sdeathinthe

64 See also 1901/2001a: pp. 6/166, 129/249, 201/296; 1901/2001: pp. 401/106, 413/113, 729/317, 732/319. 65 Relevant passages on the reduction are to be found in Husserl (1913/1983, pp. 61-62/68-70; 73-74/85-87; 202-204/236-239).

25

formoftheGabelsbergermanuscripts,whichhavebeenprogressivelypublishedsince

the1950s.

Eventoday,aftermorethan60yearsofintensivepublicationofHusserl’smanuscripts,

thereisstillnoconsensusonthenatureoftheproject.Onewidespreadinterpretation

amongHusserlscholarshasitthattheprojectisfullyfoundationalistandthat

phenomenologicalreductionisinessencearefineddevicefortranscendentalidealism,

whichgivesphenomenologicaldescriptionstheirvalidityforknowledge.Another

interpretation,inspiredbyFøllesdal(1969)anddevelopedfurtherbySmithand

MacIntyre(1982),issimilarinspirittothe‘indifferent’reactionofearly

phenomenologists:eitherwithorwithoutfoundationalistconcerns,phenomenology

essentiallygivesatheoryofourmeaning-bestowingactivities.Therefore,the

foundationalistprojectisoptional.

Intentionality

Thesetwotakesonthefoundationalistprojectofpost-1913phenomenologyarebest

illustratedbythedifferentconceptionsofintentionality,intentionalobject,and

intentionalcontentwhichhavebeendefendedbyphenomenologistssincethen.Here,

Brentano’stheoryofintentionalityisofcentralimportance.Thistheoryisoneofthe

mostlastinginfluencesofhisthought,notonlyonAustro-Germanphilosophyingeneral,

butalsoon20th-centuryphilosophy,bothinthepost-Husserlianphenomenological

traditionandinanalyticphilosophy.

Thebasictheoryofintentionality.Brentanoproposedmanydifferent

descriptionsofintentionality.Commontoallofthemistheclaimthatintentionalityisa

characteristicpropertyofsomethingmental(anact,orasubjectinthereisticphase),

whichservesasameanstoclassifywhatbelongstothedomainofthementalandwhat

tothedomainofthephysical.ThischaracteristicpropertyiswhatBrentanoalsocalls

“directiontowardsanobject”orthe“immanentobjectivity”ofanact,whichmakesthe

basictheoryarelationaltheoryofintentionality.However,thesetwofurther

appellationsdonothelpmuch,sincetheyseemtopointatfeaturesthatarenot

obviouslyidentical:thefactthatintentionalityisaboutness–e.g.,desiringanicecream

isanintentionalstatewhichisaboutanicecream–andthefactthattheobjectofan

intentionalactis“contained”or“intentionallyinexists”intheact.Infactthesetwo

featuresdonotevenseemtobecompatible,atleastprimafacie:ifmydesiringanice

26

creamisintentionalandifintentionalobjectsarecontainedintheact,itseemsthatI

cannotreasonablydesireanicecreamiftheicecreamisalready‘contained’inmyact.

IthasbeenusualsinceChisholm(1957,p.169)toconsiderthesetwo

appellationsasexpressionsofoneandthesamefeature.OnChisholm’sreading,

Brentanoiscommittedtotheviewthatintentionalobjectsaresomekindofintra-mental

entitiesenjoyingsomediminishedkindofexistence.Inthiscase,mydesiringanice

creamhasanintentionalobject,the“icecreamrepresentedanddesired,”whichis

distinctfromthedairyproductthatImaysubsequentlyenjoy.66

Itisquestionable,however,whethertheaccountofBrentano’sconceptof

intentionalitythatChisholmsketchesisafaithfulreconstructionofBrentano’sideas

aboutintentionality.Tobesure,Brentanohimselfisnotverycarefulinhisdescriptionof

intentionalityinthePsychologyfromanEmpiricalStandpoint(1874/2015,p.106/92-

93),where“content”and“object”areusedinterchangeably.Thismaybeexplainedin

manyways.Perhapsthemostimportanttomentionisthattheontologyofintentionality

isnotBrentano’sprimaryconcerninthePsychology:hefocusesinsteadonthedualism

ofthementalandthephysicalthatintentionalitygrounds,andwiththetaskof

psychologyasascienceofphenomena.Inthelattercase,itindeedmakesnoimportant

differencewhetherthephenomenadescribedarecalled“contents”or“objects,”since

theyaresimplyphenomena.Thisiswhy,inthiscontext,theontologicalimplicationsof

intentionalityplaynosignificantroleintheprojectconductedinthePsychology.

Despiteitsapparentlimitationsandthemainlypsychologicalmotivationsbehind

thebasictheory,ithastheadvantageofrangingoverallmentalphenomenaand

explainingtheircommoncore,notwithstandingthefactthatwesometimesmake

perceptualerrorsorthinkofobjectswhichdonotexist.Thisadvantageshouldnotbe

underestimated,asitallowsBrentanotoofferanaccountoftheintentionalnatureofour

phenomenalexperiences.Whatit’slikeformetoenjoyanicecreamissomethingwhich,

onthefaceofit,doesnothavemuchtodowithastateoftheworld,andyetitseemsthat

theexperienceoftastinganicecreamhasanintentionalobjectwhichisthecontentof

theexperience,itsphenomenalfeatures,whichseemtobedistinctfromthephysical

propertiesofthedairyproductperchedontheconeinmyhand.Thisisthegistofthe

formulationwefindinPsychologyfromanEmpiricalStandpointconcerningthecontents

66 Chisholm (1967, p. 201); (1960, pp. 4-5.) I argue against this account in Fréchette (2013) and (2016a).

27

ofexperience,i.e.,physicalphenomena:“Knowledge,joy,desire,existactually;colour,

tone,warmthonlyphenomenallyandintentionally.”

Theenhancedtheory.Thebasictheoryoffersaunifiedrelationalaccountof

intentionalitywhichtakesseriouslythefactthatourexperiencehasphenomenal

contentthatisconstitutiveoftheintentionalityofouracts.However,itdoesnotsay

muchaboutexperienceswhicharenotstrictlysensoryexperiences.Mydisappointment

aboutwintercomingtoosoonisclearlylinkedinasignificantwaytosensorycontents,

butsuchcontentsareobviouslynotallthereistosayaboutthecontentofmy

disappointment.Thebasictheorydisplaysasimilarshortcomingwithregardto

judgment,e.g.,myactofmeaningasexpressedby“2+2=4”.

InthePsychologyof1874,suchcaseswerepresentedasmoreorlessanalogous

tosensoryexperiences,leavingmanyquestionsopenastohowabstractpresentational

contentsorthecontentsofemotionsandjudgmentsaretobeconsideredinsome

importantsenseassensoryandyetconstitutedthroughactswhichareessentially

distinctfromsensings.67Brentanoconsideredthesecasesinmoredetailinhislectures

onlogicinthe1870sand1880s,andalsoinhislecturesondescriptivepsychologyinthe

1880sand1890s.Atleastforthecaseofactsofmeaning,butplausiblyforallmental

acts,heproposesanalternativeaccountoftheintentionalrelation.Sincethesetextsare

stillunpublished,itmaybeworthquotingsomeofthepassagesdetailinghisaccountof

actsofmeaningatlengthhere:

Likenames,assertionstoohaveadoublereference:(a)tothecontentofapsychicalphenomenonassuch;(b)toaputativeexternalobject.Thefirstisthemeaning.(EL80:61-62)….Thenamemanifestsamentalphenomenon,[it]means[bedeutet]thecontentofapresentationassuch(theimmanentobject?),[and]itnamesthatwhichispresentedthroughthecontentofapresentation.Wesayaboutthis:thenameisattributedtoit.Whatonenamesaretherealobjectsofthepresentationwhich–iftheyexist,aretheexternalobjectsofthepresentation.(Onenamesthroughthemediationofmeaning)(EL81:13528)…Icallthepresentedaspresentedthecontentofthepresentation.Icallobjectofthepresentationthepresentedundertheguisethroughwhichitispresented(ifitexists).Therealwaysisacontentwhensomethingispresented.Butthepresentationoftenlacksanobject.Manydifferentobjectscancorrespondtoonesinglecontentofpresentation.Andonesingleobjectcancorrespondtomanydifferentcontentsofpresentation(PS48)….Thename…expressesthepresentationinsuchawaythatitnamesthatwhichispresentedby

67 Brentano and his early students – Stumpf and Marty – made many attempts in lectures and correspondence to account for this fact, particularly through sophisticated conceptions of abstraction. See Fréchette (2015a) and (forthcoming-b) on these various attempts.

28

thepresentation,anditnamesitunderitsmediationandforthisreasoncompletelyorincompletelydetermined(orundetermined)inthesamewayasitpresentsit.Inthisway,thepresentationisthesense(Sinn)ofthename;thethingisthatwhichisnamedbythenameandinthemostpropersensethatwhichisdesignatedthroughit…(EL72,12578-9).

ItisthusfairtosupposethatthebasicaccountwasnotBrentano’slastwordon

intentionality.Betweenthe1870sandthebeginningofthe20thcentury,Brentano

developedtheenhancedviewthatatleastsomementalacts,namelymeaningacts,

involveadistinctionbetweenthecontentandtheobjectofthepresentation,the

judgment,ortheactofdesire.Especiallyinthe1880sandafterward,thisdistinctionwas

popularizedinprintbyTwardowski(1894/1977)andMeinong(1899/1978).

Accordingtotheenhancedtheory,whenIutter“TheSunexists,”thecontentof

myjudgmentisthestateofaffairs,orthe‘Sun’sexistence,’andtheobjectistheSun.

WhenIusethename“table”toexpresssomementalcontent,thiscontentisdifferent

thantheobjectIamreferringto,sincetheobjectmayormaynotexist,althoughthe

content(thePresentedassuch)necessarilyexists.

Inthistheory,theintentionalcontentplaystheroleofamediator,whatBrentano

callssometimesasense(Sinn),sometimesameaning(Bedeutung).Brentano’sSinneare

mentalentitiesofaspecialkind:theymediateobjects,moreorlessdeterminately,

similarlytothewayinwhichnamesmoreorlessdeterminatelynameanobject.The

Sinnearenotthecontentofintuitivepresentations,sinceintuitivepresentationsareby

naturepresentationsoffullydeterminatecontent.Rather,theyarethecontentof

abstractpresentations.Tosomeextent,Brentano’sconceptionofSinneintheenhanced

theoryofintentionalityprefiguresFrege’sconceptofsenseinFrege(1892).

Thereisticversion.Whatkindofentities,then,arethephysicalphenomena(alsocalled

‘contents’or‘objects’)accordingtothebasictheory?OntheaccountthatBrentano

offeredinhislaterself-criticisms,heconceivedthemasentitieswithalesserkindof

existence,sometimesdescribedastheir“intentionalinexistence.”Onthisview,they

wereconsideredasirrealia,inoppositiontorealexistingentities.Inthebasictheory,

intentionalitywasthusarelationshipbetweenarealentityandanunrealentity.

Sinceitisnotsystematicallydevelopedinhismanuscripts,itishardtosee

exactlywhatkindofentitiesstandastargetsintheenhancedtheory.SinceBrentano

acceptedobjectlesspresentationsbackthen,thenitwouldmakegoodsensetosee

29

externalobjectsasthetargetofintentionalacts,mediatedbytheact’scorrelate:the

intentionalcontent.Buteveninthiscase,theenhancedtheorydoesnotprovidea

comprehensiveaccountofintentionality,whichwouldberelationalincasesofexisting

objects,althoughallowingfornon-relationalcases,e.g.,inthecasesofthepresentation

ofthegodJupiterorofagoldenmountain.68

Brentanoshiftedhisviewonthenatureofintentionalityaround1904.Thefirst

twotheoriesdescribedintentionalityintermsofatwo-orthree-termrelationship.The

lasttheory,whichisoftencalledreism,isbasedonthecontraryontheideathat

intentionalityisaspecialkindofrelation(infact,notarelationinthepropersenseof

theterm),whichinallcasesrequiresafoundation(Fundament),butwhichdoesnot

requireanexistingterminusoftherelation.Accordingtothebasictheory,mydesirefor

anicecreamisarelationbetweenanactandaninternalentity;ontheenhancedtheory,

itisathree-termrelationbetweenmydesire,therepresentedobject,andtheicecream

(whichmayormaynotexist).Inreism,intentionalityisspelledoutintermsofa

foundation(e.g.,“ice-cream-Wisher”thatIpresentinrecto)whichhasaterminusin

obliquo(e.g.,anicecream).The“terminusinobliquo,”however,hasnoontological

power:itissimplyanaspectoftheWisherorthewayinwhichtheWisherwishes

(e.g.,aswishingice-creamily).69Inthisway,Brentanocanavoidanontological

commitmenttointentionalentitiesbyprovidingatheoryofintentionalitythatholds

equallyforallpresentations.

Husserl’saccountsofintentionality.Letusreturnnowforamomentto

Brentano’senhancedtheory.MorethanitsconnectionwithFrege,itisthelinkto

Husserl’stheoryofintentionalitythatseemsmostinteresting.Theenhancedtheorythat

Brentanodevelopedmostlybetweenthe1870sandthe1890sstronglyemphasizesthe

distinctionbetweencontentandobjectincaseswherenamesorstatementsare

asserted,andclearlystatesthatinsomecases,anameexpressesapresentation’s

contentbutdoesnotnameanyobject.Thisdoesnotnecessarilymeanthatthe

distinctionbetweencontentandobjectonlyholdsforactsofmeaning,70butitisatleast

truethatactsofmeaningarethecasesthatmostclearlydisclosethisdistinction.Inthis68 The lack of comprehensiveness of the enhanced theory also affected his account of truth from the same period, which has been characterized recently as a “deflationist account” (Brandl 2017). 69 This is also why Brentano’s reistic theory is often described as an adverbial theory of intentionality. See Chisholm (1957) and Chrudzimski and Smith (2004). 70 Münch (2004, p. 222 fn) suggests such a view.

30

respect,Husserl’sideathatdirectednesstowardanobjectisnothingbutapropertyof

actsofmeaning,asdevelopedintheLogicalInvestigationsandinlinewithHusserl

(1991a/1999),followsandradicalizesBrentano’senhancedtheorywhereinactsof

meaningsimplyhighlightthedistinctionbetweencontentandobject.Buildingonboth

BrentanoandBolzano,HusserldefendedthethesisinHusserl(1991a/1999)thatthere

areobjectlesspresentations(likethepresentationofthegodJupiter,orofagolden

mountain).Intentionalityinthiscontextisapropertyofthecontentofmeaning

(Meinen)something,andisnotconceivedasarelationatall.AsHusserlputsitinthe

LogicalInvestigations,IdonotpresentJupiterdifferentlythanIpresentBismarck:since

intentionalityisapropertyofthecontentofmeaningsomething,bothactsare

intentionalinthesamesense.Asaconsequenceofthisview,itseemsthatthenon-

existenceofthegodJupiterhasnothingtodowithintentionality.Generalizingthis

consequencewouldleadtotheviewthatactsofmeaningarequitedistinctinkindfrom

actsofreference.

AnotherimportantcomponentofHusserl’searlyaccountofintentionality,which

isabsentfromBrentano’senhancedtheory,isthatmeaningactsinstantiateideal

species.Thisrelationshipofinstantiationiswhatallowsfortheobjectivityofmeaning.

Around1908,Husserl’sviewsonthetheoryofmeaningchangedconsiderably.In

hislecturesonthistopic(Husserl1986),heintroducesthedistinctionbetween“phansic

meaning”[phansischeBedeutung],whichistheBedeutungofmeaningacts

(Meinungsakte)intermsofspecies,andthe“ontic”or“phenomenological”meaning,

whichis“theintentionalobjectasmeant.”Thisdistinctionseemstoremediatetothe

consequencesoftheearliertheoryexposedabove.Inactsofmeaning(Meinen),

expressedforinstancebymyutterancesaboutJupiter,thereisaBedeutungwhichis

instantiatedinmyact;butpriortothisthereisanonticcorrelateoftheact,the

“thought-ofJupiter”,whichistheobject-as-intended.Husserlsometimescallsthistype

ofentitya“noematicsense,”andlater,in1913,simplythe“noema.”

IfHusserl’stheoryofintentionalityintheLogicalInvestigationshasoftenbeen

describedasanadverbialtheory,foritsrejectionoftherelationalinterpretationof

intentionality(whereinthereareobjectlesspresentations)anditscharacterizationof

intentionalityasapropertyofactsofmeaning(Meinen),thenoematictheoryoftheIdeas

seemstobringbackarelationalconceptionofintentionality,independentlyofwhether

weconceiveofthenoemaasanobjectfromaperspective(Drummond1990)orassome

kindofFregeansense(Føllesdal1969;SmithandMacIntyre1982).Ineithercase,

31

however,thenoemaplaystheroleofthecorrelateinasensewhichisreminiscentof

Brentano’sintentionalcorrelatesintheenhancedtheory.

Consciousness

Besidestheintentionalthesis,thesecondmostimportantthesisinBrentano’s

psychologyisbasedonafurtherconstitutivecharacteristicofmentalphenomena,

namelythefactthatonlymentalphenomenaareinnerlyperceived(Brentano

1874/2015:118f/95f).ThegistofthisideaisclearlyexpressedinthePsychology:

“thepresentationofthesoundandthepresentationofthepresentationofthesoundformasinglementalphenomenon,itisonlybyconsideringitinitsrelationtotwodifferentobjects,oneofwhichisaphysicalphenomenonandtheotheramentalphenomenon,thatwedivideitconceptuallyintotwopresentations.Inthesamementalphenomenoninwhichthesoundispresenttoourmindswesimultaneouslyapprehendthementalphenomenonitself.”(Brentano1874/2015:167/132).

The“apprehension”(Erfassen)ofthementalphenomenonitselfiswhatBrentanocalls

consciousnessorinnerconsciousness.Asthesoundisco-present(withthemental

phenomenonitself)inourapprehension,consciousnessimpliesintentionality,which

meansthatthereisnoconsciousnessofanactwhichisnotalreadydirectedtowardsan

object.Butsinceintentionalityandconsciousnessarebothessentialfeaturesofmental

acts,theimplicationworkstheotherwayaroundaswell:thereisnointentional

directednessofanactwhichisnotitselfconscious.ThisalsoexplainsBrentano’s

particularpositionontheunconscious:since,inourexperience,therearenointentional

actswhicharenotconscious,andsincethereisnoconsciousnessofanactwhichisnot

alreadyintentional,thenthereisno“unconsciousconsciousness,”althoughtheideaof

annon-consciousintentionalactinvolvesnocontradiction.Nevertheless,intentionality

andconsciousnessareco-extensive.

Brentano’s“apprehension”isdouble:ineverymentalphenomenon,we

apprehendtheobjectofthementalphenomenonand,incidentally(enparergo)the

mentalphenomenonitself.Itwouldbewrong,however,toconsidertheapprehensionas

anelementdistinctfromthementalphenomenonitself:inpresentingthetable,the

primaryobjectofmyactisthetable,andthesecondaryobjectisthepresentingitself.

Anobjectionthatmightberaisedtosuchatheoryisthatitmayinvolvean

infiniteregress.Ifmypresentationofthesoundisconsciousbecauseofmypresentation

32

ofthepresentationofthesound,whatmakesthepresentationofthepresentationofthe

sounditselfconscious?Brentanohimselfreactedtothisobjectionbyunderliningthe

factthata)bothbelongtoonesingleandindivisiblementalact,andthatb)throughits

existence,thepresentationofthesound‘inwardlycontributes’totheexistenceofthe

presentationofthepresentationofthesound(Brentano1874/2015:167/132).

Thereforetheregressdoesnotevenbegin,sincethepresentationofthesoundis

“intertwined”(verwoben)withthepresentationofitspresentation.Andsincethe

existenceoftheformercontributestotheexistenceofthelatter(butnottheotherway

around),theobjection,accordingtowhichthelattermakestheformerconscious,does

notseemtoapply.

Theintimateintertwiningbetweenthepresentationofthesoundandthe

presentationofthatpresentationevokedbyBrentanoisanessentialpartofhis

conceptionoftheunityofconsciousnessandofthevariousmereologicaldependency

relationsamongpartsofthemental.Therelationshipbetweenthepresentationofthe

soundandthepresentationofthepresentationofthesoundisaone-sideddistinctional

separability:youmayhave,theoreticallyor“distinctionally,”apresentationofthesound

withoutapresentationofthepresentationofthesound,atleastinsofarasthisnotion

doesnotinvolveacontradiction.Butthereverseisnotthecase.Here,“distinctional”

meansthattheone-sidedseparabilityisnotfoundintheactsthemselves,butinour

descriptionofthem.Incontrast,realone-sideddetachabilityisinvolvedintherelation

betweenapresentationofthesoundandajudgmentacknowledgingtheexistenceofthe

soundorafeelingofpleasureonhearingthesound.Youmayhaveapresentationofthe

soundwithoutfeelingpleasureaboutthesound,butyoucannottakepleasureinthe

soundwithoutpresentingit.Thesedifferentdependencerelationsbetweenpartsofthe

mentalarethebasisofwhatBrentanodescribesasthe“unityofconsciousness,”i.e.,the

fact“thatallmentalphenomenawhichoccurwithinussimultaneouslysuchasseeing

andhearing,thinking,judgingandreasoning,lovingandhating,desiringandshunning,

etc.,nomatterhowdifferenttheymaybe,allbelongtooneunitaryrealityonlyifthey

areinwardlyperceivedasexistingtogether”(1874/2015:126/101).

InaninfluentialobjectiontoBrentano’saccountofconsciousness,Husserlpoints

outthatitseemsimplausibletosaythatwhenIseeahouse,whatIamawareofismy

presentationofsensorycontents(Husserl1901a,237).Tobesure,sensorycontentsare

experienced,buttheyarepresenttoconsciousnessonlytotheextentthattheyserveas

avehiclefortheperceptionofobjects,notasobjectsofinnerperception.Thisisinline

33

withHusserl’scritiqueofBrentano’sconceptofintentionalityaccordingtowhich

sensationsarenotintentional,sincetheydonotprovideuswithobjects(seeabove).

Thisdoesnotmean,however,thatHusserlconsiderssensorycontentsnottobepartof

consciousness:rather,theideaisthatsensorycontentsareexperiencedasintrinsically

subjective,andinfactnotas‘contents’atall,butasphenomenologicalandreal(reelle)

constituentsofexperiences.

Itmustbesaid,however,thatHusserl’sobjectionisnotcompletelyfairto

Brentano’saccount,asBrentanoneverarguedthattheinnerperceptionofamental

phenomenon(sayapresenting)takesthispresentingasanobjectinthesamesenseas

thepresentationitselfhasanobject.Callingthem‘primary’and‘secondary’objectsis

definitivelyasuboptimalchoice.Nevertheless,inthiscontextHusserl’spointhasthe

meritofforcefullystressingthisdifference:thesubjectiveconstituentsofexperiencedo

notstandbeforeusasobjects.

AnotherinterestingfeatureofHusserl’sconceptofconsciousnessthatcontrasts

withBrentano’saccountisthedistinctionbetweentheepistemicauthorityofinner

perceptionanditsadequateness.FollowingBrentano,Husserlholdsthatonlyinner

perceptionisevidentandcantherebyprovidethegroundsforsecureknowledge.Outer

perception,incontrast,canonlygiveusprobableknowledge.Brentanoseesthe

epistemicauthorityofinnerperceptionasconstitutiveofconsciousness:onhisview,

sinceonlymentalphenomenaaregivenastheyare,Iamonlyconsciousof(i.e.,Ican

innerlyperceiveonly)mentalphenomena,andnot,e.g.,ofphysicalhappeningsinmy

body,houses,orchairs.AnimportantconsequenceofthisaccountisthatIamconscious

onlyofwhatevermentalphenomenonisoccurringnow:thereisnoproper

consciousnessofatemporallyextendedobject,temporallyextendedmentalprocesses,

orsimplypastexperiences.ForHusserl,incontrast,theallegedepistemicauthorityof

innerperceptionconstrainsouranalysesofconsciousexperiencesfartoomuch,

requiringustodiscardahugevarietyofexperienceswhichareobviouslyconsciousina

phenomenologicallyrelevantsense,suchashearingasong,thinkingabouta

mathematicalproblem,rememberingone’schild'sfirstfootsteps,seeingatrainpassby,

enjoyingacigar,feelingtheurgentneedtosneeze,etc.Theseexperiences,Husserl

contends,donothavethesameepistemicauthorityasthoseinvolvingamental

phenomenonthatisoccurringnow,buttheystilldisplaysomeadequacytowhatisgiven

inthem,whathealsocallstheir“presentness.”

34

Therearedifferentwaysofspellingoutwhat“presentness”means.Basedonthe

examplesmentionedabove,onepracticalwaytoillustratethisideaisthedescriptionof

time-consciousness.OnBrentano’saccount,thereisnotime-consciousnessproperly

speaking,butratheracontinuumofmentalphenomenarelatedtooneanotherby

“originaryassociation.”Thisdoesnotbelongassuchtotherealmofthemental,butisan

innateassociativefeaturewhichrelatesthecontentsofouterperceptionatdifferent

timestoeachother,andwhichgivesustheimpressionthatweperceiveamotion,a

figure,oranytemporallyextendedentity.Onthisaccount,time-consciousnessisonly

consciousnessatatime,butthankstooriginaryassociation,we“retain”pastcontentsat

agiventime.ThisisthebasicideabehindBrentano’saccountoftime-consciousness.71

Husserl’saccountoftime-consciousness(Husserl1966/1991)preservesthegist

ofBrentano’saccount–itsretentionalstructure–butalsoaddsanideaintroducedin

Stern(1897/2005),namelythat“mentaleventsthatplaythemselvesoutwithina

certainstretchoftimecanundercircumstancesformaunifiedandcomplexactof

consciousnessregardlessofthenon-simultaneityofindividualparts.Thatstretchof

timeoverwhichsuchamentalactcanbeextendedIcallitspresencetime(Präsenz-

Zeit)”(Stern1897/2005,pp.326-7/p.315).Husserl’sanalysisoftime-consciousness

combinesBrentano’sandStern’saccountsinthefollowingway:whilehearingcnow(at

t3)afterhavingheardbatt1andaatt0,Ihavei)aprimalimpression(Urimpression)of

caccompaniedbyii)retentionofbandaandiii)protentionofwhatIamabouttohear.

Thethreeelements(i)to(iii)areassuchmerelyarefinementofBrentano’sretentional

model.ThedifferencewithBrentano’saccountisthatthestructuredepictedby(i)to

(iii)isitselfnota“now-point,”asBrentanohasit,butshouldbeconsidereditselfasa

flow,alongthelinesofStern’saccount:“theretentionthatexists‘together’withthe

consciousnessofthenowisnot‘now,’isnotsimultaneouswiththenow,anditwould

makenosensetosaythatitis”(Husserl1962/1991:333/345-6).Husserl’spresentness

thereforeproposesanaccountoftheunityoftime-consciousness:namely,ofthe

intuitivelyplausibleideathatourexperienceofsuccessionisaunitary(andfully

conscious)phenomenon,andnotasuccessionofseparateexperiences.Thisideawould

goontoplayacentralroleinhislatertranscendentalphenomenology.

Emotionsandvalues

71 See Fréchette (2017a) for a more detailed account of the different features of this account.

35

Brentanodistinguishesbetweenthreeclassesofmentalphenomena:presentations,

judgments,andactsofloveandhate.Thelastclassencompassesemotions,volitions,

desires,andfeelings.Emotions(butthisalsoappliesbyextensiontotheother

phenomenainthisclass),likejudgments,havetwopolarlyopposedtypes:eitherwe

loveorwehateWienerMelange,inamannerthatissimilartothewayinwhichwe

eitheracknowledgeorrejectsomething’sexistence.Thepolarlyopposedtypesof

judging(acknowledging/rejecting)andemoting(loving/hating)aresimilarbecausein

bothcases,correctnessresp.incorrectnessareconstitutiveofthedefinitionofwhatis

true(correctacknowledgement)andwhatisgood(correctlove).ThismakesBrentano’s

accountofemotionsanevaluativeaccountofthefollowingsort:i)emotionsaremental

actswhichconstitutivelyinvolveavaluingoftheirintentionalobject(asgoodorbad),ii)

thevalueofanemotionisfixedbyitscorrectnessorincorrectness,andiii)the

correctnessofanemotionisnothingbutits‘fittingness’withrespecttotheobject

intendedasvaluable.Myloveofcoffeeisavaluing,apositiontaking,apositiveemotion

towardscoffee:myemotionisvaluableiffitiscorrecttolovecoffeeanditiscorrectto

lovecoffeeiffthelovingfitsthecoffee(orinotherwords:iffcoffeeisworthyoflove).72

Howdowecometoknowthatcoffee,oranything,isworthyoflove?Before

answeringthisquestion,letusreturntoprinciple(e).Asmentionedabove,Brentano

seemstohavedefendedtwobasictheoriesofthenatureofcorrectness.Thefirsttheory

fullyembracesfeature(iii):itdescribescorrectnessasagenuinerelation,therelationof

fitting(Angemessenheit).Insomeplaces,Brentanoholdsthattherelationshipinvolvesa

deonticnorm(formyloveofcoffeetobeisformyloveofcoffeetobeasitoughtto

be73);butinmosttexts,hemaintainsthatitholdswithanobjectasvaluable:“incases

whereourbehaviour(Verhalten)iscorrectouremotioncorrespondstotheobject,isin

harmonywithitsvalue,andthat,ontheotherhand,incaseswhereourbehaviouris

wrong(verkehrt)itisopposed(widerspreche)toitsobject,isinarelationofdisharmony

withitsvalue”(Brentano1930/1966:25/14-5,translationmodified).

Thesecond,latertheoryofthenatureofcorrectnessproposesanimportantamendment

tofeature(iii),namely(iiia):thatthecorrectnessofanemotionisnotarelationofactual

72 Brentano (1889/1902, pp. 75-7/pp. 69-71; p. 17/pp. 11-2; 1930/1966, p. 25/pp. 14-5; 1959, p. 169; 1968, p. 141). 73 See Mulligan (forthcoming) for this specific account of fittingness exposed by Brentano in 1906. See also Fréchette (2015) on Kraus’ interpretation of this account.

36

fitting,butratheritissimplyexperiencedassuch,itmanifestsitselfascorrect:74“the

conceptofcorrectnessismademanifesttousinpreciselythewayinwhichother

conceptsaremademanifesttous.Weconsideramultiplicityofthingseachofwhich

exemplifiestheconceptandwedirectourattentionuponwhatthesethingshavein

common.WheneverIperceivethatIjudgewithevidenceIamawareofmyselfas

someonewhoisjudgingcorrectly….Andnow,sofarasthecorrectnessofouremotive

attitudesisconcerned,wefindthatthesituationiscompletelyanalogous....Onecan

neverfindthecriterionofcorrectnessinanadaequatioreietintellectusvelamoris:itcan

befoundonlyinthoseattitudeswhichweknowwithimmediateevidencetobe

correct.”75

LikeMartyandMeinong,HusserlacceptedallthecomponentsofBrentano’saccountof

emotionsandvaluesalreadymentionedbutrearrangestheminasignificantlydifferent

way,amendingfeature(iii)in(iiib):thecorrectnessofanemotionisgroundedinastate

ofvalue(Wertverhalt).ThisamendedfeaturewasalsotheonepreferredbyMarty,but

alsobymanyearlyrealistphenomenologistssuchasReinachandDaubert.Inanalogy

withstatesofaffairswhicharethecorrectness-makersoftruejudgments,statesofvalue

are‘value-makers’ofcorrectemotings.76

PsychologismandAnti-Psychologism

InconsideringthespecificityofHusserl’sphenomenologywithrespecttoBrentano’s

philosophicalprogrammeingeneral,anditscontrastwithBrentano’sfiveprinciples

describedaboveinparticular,theimportanceofHusserl’sstrongrealismregardingthe

objectsofintentionalacts–exemplifiedhereinhisaccountofvalue–shouldnotbe

underestimated.Inordertocapturemorepreciselythisspecificity,herewewilllookat

hiscritiqueofpsychologismintheLogicalInvestigations.Thiscritiquelargelyshaped

discussiononphenomenologyintheschoolofBrentanoatthebeginningofthe

20thcentury.Itwasalsodeterminantinthelaterpositioningofphenomenologyasa

74 Chisholm (1986, p. 53) uses precisely Brentano’s late theory to show that Brentano’s account of emotion is an account of fitting attitudes. We might indeed reword (iiia) in order to keep the fitting relation, for instance by saying that an emotion is correct iff “it is appropriate, or fitting, for me to feel this strong pro-attitude toward this experience” (see also Feldman and Feldman 2015, and similarly Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004). Mulligan (forthcoming) makes a convincing case that attributing a fitting attitude theory to the late Brentano is “wrong or highly misleading.” The main reason is that Brentano’s late reism aims to reject the relational conception of intentionality. Since emotions are intentional acts, it is reasonable to think that their correctness should not be considered in relational terms. 75 Letter from Brentano to Kraus (1916), quoted in Chisholm (1966, pp. 399-400) 76 See Husserl (1988). On Husserl and normative grounding, see Mulligan (forthcoming-b).

37

“purephilosophy,”alongwithNeo-KantianismandLebensphilosophie,andinopposition

tothenewlyemergingexperimentalpsychology.

Asmentionedearlier(section1),itwasinitiallyhisexchangewithFrege,butalso

Frege’sreviewofhisPhilosophyofArithmetics,whichconvincedHusserlofthe

shortcomingsofhisBrentanianaccountofarithmetics.Inanutshell,Fregearguedthat

Husserl’slackofadistinctionbetweenconceptandobjectmadeitimpossibleforhimto

distinguishbetweenthesubjectiveandtheobjective,andbetweenthemarksofan

objectandthepropertiesofaconcept.Ifnumbersaresubjectivecontentsof

presentation,thenHusserl’sBrentanianaccountofarithmeticswouldfailtogivea

properaccountofidentity,whichchallengesnotonlytheobjectivityofarithmetic,but

alsotheideathatthedistinctionbetweensenseandreferenceisobjective.

In1928,HusserlconcededtohisstudentBoyce-GibsonthatFrege’scritique“hit

thenailonthehead,”77whichrecallsthequotefromGoetheatthebeginningofthe

Prolegomena.AnotherimportantinfluenceinHusserl’searlycritiqueofpsychologismis

tobefoundinBolzano,whoHusserlcreditsforshowinghimtheimportanceofobjective

ideas(Vorstellungenansich)andpropositionsinthemselves(Sätzeansich)forthe

developmentofapurelogic(Husserl2002:298-99).Lotzewasalsoanimportant

influenceonthedevelopmentofHusserl’spurelogic(seeHusserl1979,p.156).

Husserl’scritiqueoflogicasapracticalandnormativediscipline(asub-discipline

ofpsychology)intheProlegomenaisbasedontheideathatnormativedisciplinesarein

anycaseatleastpartlygroundedintheoreticaldisciplines:“Everynormative

propositionof,e.g.,theform‘AnAshouldbeB’impliesthetheoreticalproposition‘Only

anAwhichisBhasthepropertiesC’,inwhich‘C’servestoindicatetheconstitutive

contentofthestandard-settingpredicate‘good’(e.g.,pleasure,knowledge,…)Thenew

propositionispurelytheoretical:itcontainsnotraceofthethoughtofnormativity”

(Husserl1900/2001a:48/38).

TheProlegomenaalsooffersadetailedcritiqueoftheconsequencesof

psychologisminlogic,mostnotablyontheproblematicinterpretationoflogical

principles(likethelawofnon-contradiction)andofthelawsofsyllogisticsin

psychologicalterms,aswellastherelativismimpliedbypsychologism.Thebookhada

centralinfluenceonthedevelopmentofanti-psychologisminGermanphilosophy77 See Spiegelberg (1971, p. 66) and (1982, p. 151). A similar affirmation is reported in Føllesdal (1982, p. 53) who mentions a discussion he had with Ingarden: “He [Roman Ingarden] told me that he once asked Husserl whether Frege had influenced him, and Husserl answered ‘Freges Bedeutung war entscheidend’.”

38

between1901and1920,withreactionsfromSchlicktotheNeo-KantiansKroner,

Windelband,andRickert.

IntheschoolofBrentano,Husserl’scritiqueofpsychologismwasreceivedwith

mitigatedfeelings.In1904,MeinongopenlyagreedwithHusserlinhisTheoryofObjects:

“theentiretenoroftheLogicalInvestigations,aswellasmanyoftheparticular

statementsthatarecontainedinit,convincesonethat,despitecertaindifferencesin

detail(atpresentunavoidable),theauthor’sgoalisthesameasourown”(Meinong

1904/1960:22/94).Someyearslater,inFunctionsandProducts(Funktionenund

Gebilde),Twardowski(1914/1999a)alsofollowedHusserl’scritiqueofpsychologismin

histheoryofGebilde,asdidHusserl’sownmentorinHalle,CarlStumpf,in

ErscheinungenundpsychischeFunktionen(1907).

BrentanohimselfremainedhighlycriticalofHusserl’schargeagainst

psychologism,seeinghimselfasthetargetofunjustaccusations.Themainmotivation

forBrentano’sreactionlayinHusserl’sargumentsagainsttheconceptionoflogicasa

technique(Kunstlehre),asapracticalsubdisciplineofpsychology,whichistheaccount

oflogicthatBrentanodefendedinhislectures.Husserlcorroboratedthisreactioninhis

reminiscencesofBrentano,inwhichherecallsthatdespitemanyefforts,heand

Brentano“didnotreachanyagreement[onHusserl’sformerfightagainst

psychologism]”(Husserl1919/1976,p.166/p.54).Butthechargeanditsreceptionby

Brentano,andtherebythedisagreementbetweenBrentanoandHusserlon

psychologism,isbasedonadoublemisunderstanding.

Ontheonehand,Brentanodidnotseethemotivation(ordidnotacknowledge

thelegitimacy)ofHusserl’sattempttogroundthelawsoflogicinadisciplineof

mathematicalform(Husserl1900/2001a:222/138-140),whatHusserlcalls,in

referencetohiscolleaguefromHalleCantor,thepuretheoryofmultiplicities(reine

Mannigfaltigkeitslehre).ThisissimilartotherelationshipofLeibniz’scombinatoricsto

thefoundationofarithmetics,whichwouldleadtothefoundationofpurelogicandwith

ittoaunifiedtheoryofscience(Wissenschaftslehre)inspiredbyBolzano,encompassing

puregrammar(i.e.,thetheoryoftheaprioriformsofmeaningandthelawsoflogical

validity,whichallowsforaformalontology–i.e.,ascienceofobjectsingeneral),and

puretheoryofprobabilities.InBrentano’sviewin1905,suchastrategyinevitablyleads

toatheoryof“objectsofthoughtandtheircombinations”(Husserl1994,p.31).He

himselfdefendedthistheoryatsomepointinhiscareer(seeabove:theenhanced

theory),butabandoneditinhisreismasimplausible.

39

Ontheotherhand,HusserldidnotreallydojusticetoBrentano’sdescriptive

psychology,whichheassociatedinmanyplacestopsychologyasascienceoffacts,even

accusingBrentanointhisrespectofbeinganaturalist(Husserl1962/1977,p.37/p.26).

Tothecontrary,itisclearthatthelawsofBrentano’sdescriptivepsychologyareapriori

laws,andthatinhisaccountdescriptivepsychologyistoserveasabasisfora

characteristicauniversalis(Brentano1895:34).Inthisrespect,Husserl’s

phenomenologyandBrentano’sdescriptivepsychologyareequallyanti-psychologistic.

TheonlydifferenceintheirapproachliesinHusserl’sadvocacyofaPlatonisticstrategy

intheLogicalInvestigations,whichBrentanoconsideredunnecessary,grantedthe

distinctionbetweencausallaws(e.g.,ofgeneticpsychology)andessentiallaws(e.g.,of

descriptivepsychology).78

78 This chapter has been written with the support of the Austrian Science Foundation (FWF), Project number P-27215. Thanks to the editor John Shand for many helpful remarks, to Johannes L. Brandl and Kevin Mulligan for written comments on a previous version, and to Paul Reeve for linguistic revision.

40

BibliographyAhlman,E.(1926),DasnormativeMomentimBedeutungsbegriff,Helsingfors,DruckereiderFinnischen

LiteraturGesellschaft.Anonymous(1894),„DerFallBrentano“,DieGrenzboten,53,p.477and532-535.Anonymous(1894a),„ZumFalleBrentano“,DasVaterland,13.Dezember1894,pp.1-2Anonymous(1895),„DerFallBrentano“,inDerösterreichischeProtestant,vol.20,pp.26-26and67-70.Baumgartner,W.(2003)„FranzBrentano:‚GrossvaterderPhänomenologie’“StudiaPhaenomenologica3:

15-60.Baumgartner, W. (2013) “Franz Brentano’s Mereology”, in Fisette & Fréchette (eds), Themes from

Brentano,Amsterdam:Rodopi:227-245.Bergman,H.(1946),“BriefeFranzBrentanosanHugoBergman”,PhilosophyandPhenomenological

Research,7:83-158.Bolzano,B.(1837)Wissenschaftslehre(4vols).Sulzbach:SeidelscheBuchhandlung.Englishtranslation

(2014)TheoryofScience(4vols).Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Brandl,J.(2014),“Brentano’sTheoryofJudgment”,inStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/brentano-judgement/Brandl,J.(2017),“WasBrentanoanEarlyDeflationistaboutTruth?”,TheMonist,volume100,p.1-14.Brandl,J.(forthcoming)“Brentano’sRenewalofPhilosophy:ADouble-EdgedSword”inBrentanoStudien

15.Brentano,C.(1854)NachgelassenereligiöseSchriften,Munich:literatisch-artistischeAnstalt.Brentano, F. (1862/1975) Von denmannigfachen Bedeutungen des Seienden nach Aristoteles. Freiburg:

HerderscheVerlagshandlung.Englishtranslation(1975),OntheSeveralSensesofBeinginAristotle.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.

Brentano,F.(1866)AdDisputationemQuaThesesGratiosiPhilosophorumOrdinisConsensuEtAuctoritateProImpetrandaVeniaDocendiinAlmaUniversitateJulio-MaximilianaDefendet.Aschaffenburg:Schniper.

Brentano,F.(1867/1977a)DiePsychologiedesAristoteles.Mainz:Kirchheim.Englishtranslation(1977a)ThePsychologyofAristotle.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.

Brentano,F.(1867a)“GeschichtederkirchlichenWissenschaften.DasMittelalter”,inJ.A.Möhler(ed),Kirchengeschichte,Volume2,Regensburg:Manz:526-584.

Brentano,F.(1874/2015),PsychologievomempirischenStandpunkte,Leipzig:Duncker&Humblot.Englishtranslation(2015)PsychologyfromanempiricalStandpoint.London:Routledge.

Brentano,F.(1889),VomUrsprungsittlicherErkenntnis.Leipzig:Duncker&Humblot.Englishtranslation(1902),Theoriginoftheknowledgeofrightandwrong.Westminster:Constable&Co.

Brentano,F.(1895),MeineletztenWünschefürÖsterreich,Stuttgart:Cotta.Brentano,F.(1925),VersuchüberdieErkenntnis.Leipzig:Meiner.Brentano,Franz(1926/1988)DieVierPhasenderPhilosophie.Leipzig:Meiner.Englishtranslation(1988)

TheFourPhasesofPhilosophy.Amsterdam:Rodopi.Brentano,F.(1929),ÜberdieZukunftderPhilosophie,Leipzig:Meiner.Brentano,F.(1930/1966).WahrheitundEvidenz.FelixMeiner.EnglishTranslation:(1966)TheTrueand

theEvident.London:RoutledgeandKeganPaul.Brentano,F.(1952/1973).GrundlegungundAufbauderEthik.Francke.Englishtranslation(1973)The

FoundationandConstructionofEthics.London:Routledge.Brentano,F.(1959).GrundzügederÄsthetik.Francke.Brentano,F.(1969)„EinigeBemerkungenüberdieFrage:Isteszeitgemäß,dieUnfehlbarkeitdesPapstes

zudefinieren“,inT.Freudenberger(ed.),DieUniversitätWürzburgunddaserstevatikanischeKonzil.EinBeitragzurKirchen-undGeistesgeschichtedes19.Jahrhunderts.Neustadt:Degener&Co.407-437.

Brentano, F. (1982) Deskriptive Psychologie, Hamburg: Meiner. English Translation (1995) DescriptivePsychology.London:Routledge.

Brentano,F.(1987)GeschichtederPhilosophiederNeuzeit.Hamburg:Meiner.Brentano,F.(2016)“DieGesetzederWechselwirkungderNaturkräfteundihreBedeutungfürdie

Metaphysik“Brentano,F.(forthcoming),DeskriptivePsychologieundBeschreibendePhänomenologie.Vorlesungen

1887/88und1888/89.Dordrecht:Springer.Carnap,R.(1931)„ÜberwindungderMetaphysikdurchlogischeAnalysederSprache“,Erkenntnis,vol.2:

219-241.Carr,D.(2014),ExperienceandHistory.PhenomenologicalPerspectivesontheHistoricalWorld.Oxford:

OxfordUniversityPress.Cohen,J.andD.Moran(2012),TheHusserlDictionary.London:Continuum.

41

Chisholm,R.(1957)Perceiving.Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress.Chisholm,R.(ed)(1960)RealismandtheBackgroundofPhenomenology,NewYork:Glencoe.Chisholm,R.(1966)„Brentano’sTheoryofCorrectandIncorrectEmotion“.RevueInternationalede

Philsoophie20:395-415.Chisholm,R.(1967)‘Intentionality’inEdwards,P.(ed),EncyclopediaofPhilosophy.London:Macmillan.Chisholm,R.(1986)BrentanoandIntrinsicValue.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Chrudzimski,A.(2004)BrentanosOntologie.Dordrecht:Springer.Chrudzimski,A.&B.Smith(2004),„Brentano’sOntology.FromConceptualismtoReism“,inD.Jacquette

(ed),CambridgeCompaniontoBrentano.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.Clausius,R.(1865)“ÜberverschiedenefürdieAnwendungbequemeFormenderHauptgleichungender

mechanischenWärmetheorie”,AnnalenderPhysik,Bd.123:353–400.Clemens,F.J.(1856)Descholasticorumsententialphilosophiamessetheologiaeancillamcommentatio,

Münster:AkademischerVerlagAschendorff.Clemens,F.J.(1859)„UnserStandpunktinderPhilosophie.“DerKatholik39(novaseria1):9-23;129-154.Dretske,F.(1969),SeeingandKnowing,Chicago:ChicagoUniversityPress.Drummond,J.(1990)HusserlianIntentionalityandNon-FoundationalRealism.NoemaandObject.

Dordrecht:Kluwer.DuBois-Reymond,E.(1872/1874)ÜberdieGrenzendesNaturerkennens,Leipzig:Veit.Englishtranslation

(1874),“TheLimitsofOurKnowledgeofNature”,PopularScienceMonthly,vol.5,17-32.Dummett,M(1988)UrsprüngederanalytischenPhilosophie.Frankfurt:Suhrkamp.Revisedandpublished

inEnglishas(1993)OriginsofAnalyticalPhilosophy.London:Duckworth.Ewing,A.C.(1947)TheDefinitionofGood.NewYork:MacMillan.Falckenberg,R.(1901).H.Lotze.DasLebenunddieEntstehungderSchriftennachdenBriefen.Stuttgart:

Frommanns.Feldman,R.andF.Feldman(2015)“RoderickChisholm”StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chisholm/FelsH.(1926)«FranzBrentanosreligiöseKrise»,Unitas.MonatsschriftdesVerbandesder

wissenschaftlichenkatholischenStudientenvereineUnitas67:161-163.Fisette,D.andG.Fréchette(eds),Àl’écoledeBrentano.DeWürzburgàVienne,Paris:Vrin.Føllesdal,D.(1969),“Husserl’sNotionofNoema”,JournalofPhilosophy,66,680-687.Føllesdal,D.(1982),„“Husserl’sConversionfromPsychologismandtheVorstellung-Meaning-Reference

Distinction:TwoSeparateIssues”,inDreyfus,H.L.(Hrsg.)Husserl,IntentionalityandCognitiveScience,Cambridge,MITPress,1982.

Fréchette,G.(2012)«FranzBrentanoinWürzburg:DieAnfängederdeskriptivenPsychologie»,inHistorischeAnalysentheoretischerundempirischerPsychologie(A.Stock,H.-P.BraunsetU.WolfradtHrsg.),Frankfurt,PeterLang,2012,S.91-106.

Fréchette,G.(2013),“Brentano’sThesis(revisited)”inD.FisetteandG.Fréchette(eds.),ThemesfromBrentano.Amsterdam:Rodopi.92-119.

Fréchette,G.(2013a),“SearchingfortheSelf:EarlyPhenomenologicalAccountsofSelf-ConsciousnessfromLotzetoScheler”,InternationalJournalofPhilosophicalStudies,vol.21no.5:654-679.

Fréchette,G(2015)„Lemomentnormatifdanslaphilosophieaustro-allemande“Philosophiques42:375-384.

Fréchette,G.(2015a),„StumpfonAbstraction“,inD.Fisette&R.Martinelli(eds.)PhilosophyfromanEmpiricalStandpoint:EssaysonCarlStumpf.Leiden:Brill:263-292.

Fréchette,G.(2016a),“BrentanoonSensoryIntentionality”,inStudiaPhilosophica,75:33-49.Fréchette,G.(2017a)«BrentanoonTime-Consciousness»,inU.Kriegel(ed.),RoutledgeCompaniontothe

SchoolofBrentano,London:Routledge:75-86.Fréchette,G.(forthcoming-a),„Einführung“,inBrentano,FAristotelesundseineWeltanschauung,

SämtlicheSchriftenBand5,BerlinDeGruyter.Fréchette,G.(forthcoming-b),„MartyonAbstraction“,inFréchette,G.andH.Taieb(forthcoming).Fréchette,G.andH.Taieb(forthcoming),“AntonMarty:FromMindtoLanguage”,inFréchetteandTaieb

(eds),MindandLanguage.ThePhilosophyofAntonMarty,Berlin:DeGruyter.Frege,G.(1892),“ÜberSinnundBedeutung”ZeitschriftfürPhilosophieundphilosophischeKritik,100:25-

50.Freudenberger,T.(ed.)(1969)DieUniversitätWürzburgunddaserstevatikanischeKonzil.EinBeitragzur

Kirchen-undGeistesgeschichtedes19.Jahrhunderts.Neustadt:Degener&Co.Gadamer,H.G.(1985)„WilhelmDiltheynach150Jahren(ZwischenRomantikundPositivismus.Ein

Diskussionsbeitrag)“.OrthE.W.(ed)(1985),DiltheyunddiePhilosophiederGegenwart.Freiburg:Alber:157-182.

Gadamer,H.-G.(1987)GesammelteWerkeBand3:Hegel,Husserl,Heidegger,Tübingen:Mohr.

42

Gilson,L.(1955),MéthodeetmétaphysiqueselonBrentano.Paris:Vrin.Haller,R.(1979)StudienzurösterreichischenPhilosophie.VariationenübereinThema,Amsterdam:

Rodopi.Haller,R.(1993)Neopositivismus:einehistorischeEinführungindiePhilosophiedesWienerKreises.

Darmstadt:WissenschaftlicheBuchgesellschaft.Hertling,G.(1919)ErinnerungenausmeinemLeben,t.1,München,VerlagderJos.Kösel’schenHoppenstedt,F.(1933).FranzBrentanosKantkritik.Kiel.Husserl,E.(1891/2003)PhilosophiederArithmetik.Halle:C.E.M.Pfeffer(RobertStricker).English

translation(2003),PhilosophyofArithmetic.Dordrecht:Springer.Husserl,E.(1900/2001a)LogischeUntersuchungen.Band1.ProlegomenazurreinenLogik.Halle:

Niemeyer.Quotedfromthesecondedition(1913)Englishtranslation:LogicalInvestigations.Vol.1.London:Routledge.

Husserl,E.(1901a)LogischeUntersuchungen,Vol.2/2.Halle:Niemeyer.Quotedfromthesecondedition(1921).Englishtranslation:LogicalInvestigations.Vol.2.London:Routledge.

Husserl,E.(1913/1983),IdeenzueinerreinenPhänomenologieundphänomenologischenPhilosophie.Halle:MaxNiemeyer.Englishtranslation(1983),IdeasPertainingtoaPurePhenomenologyandtoaPhenomenologicalPhilosophy:Dordrecht:Kluwer.

Husserl,E.(1919/1976),“ErinnerungenanFranzBrentano”inO.Kraus(ed),FranzBrentano:ZurKenntnisseinesLebensundseinerLehre,Munich:Beck:151-167.Englishtranslationas“ReminiscencesofFranzBrentano”inL.McAlister(ed.),ThePhilosophyofFranzBrentano,London:Duckworth:47-55.

Husserl(1962/1991),ZurPhänomenologiedesinnerenZeitbewusstseins(1893-1917).DenHaag:MartinusNijhoff.Englishtranslation(1991):OnthePhenomenologyoftheConsciousnessofInternalTime(1893-1917).Dordrecht:Kluwer.

Husserl,E.(1966/1977),PhänomenologischePsychologie.Vorlesungen1925.DenHaag:MartinusNijhoff.Englishtranslation(1977):PhenomenologicalPsychology.Lectures,SummerSemester1925.TheHague:MartinusNijhoff.

Husserl,E.(1979)AufsätzeundRezensionen(1890–1910).TheHague:Nijhoff.Husserl,E.(1986)VorlesungenüberBedeutungslehre.Sommersemester1908.TheHague:MartinusNijhoff.Husserl,E.(1988)VorlesungenüberEthikundWertlehre1908-1914.Dordrecht:Kluwer.Husserl,E.(1991a/1999),„IntentionaleGegenstände“,BrentanoStudien3:177-202.Englishtranslation

(1999)„intentionalObjects“,inR.Rollinger(1999),Husserl’sPositionintheSchoolofBrentano.Dordrecht:Kluwer:251-284.

Husserl,E.(1994)BriefwechselBandI.DieBrentanoschule.Dordrecht:Kluwer.Husserl,E.(2002)LogischeUntersuchungen.Ergänzungsband.ErsterTeil.EntwürfezurUmarbeitungder

VI.UntersuchungundzurVorredefürdieNeuauflagederLogischenUntersuchungen(Sommer1913).Dordrecht:Springer.

Ingarden,R.(1969).“LeconceptdephilosophiechezFranzBrentano”,Archivesdephilosophie,vol.32,458-465;609-638.

Kraus,O.(ed)(1919),FranzBrentano:ZurKenntnisseinesLebensundseinerLehre,Munich:Beck.Kraus,O.(1937)DieWerttheorien.Brünn:Rohrer.Kraus,O(1931),„ÜberAllesundNichts“,PhilosophischeHefte,vol.2.Kriegel,U.(forthcoming),Brentano’sPhilosophicalSystem.Mind,Being,Value,Oxford:OxfordUniversity

Press.Lasaulx,E.(1856)NeuerVersucheineraltenaufdieWahrheitderThatsachengegründetenPhilosophie

derGeschichte.Literarisch-ArtistischeAnstaltderJ.G.Cotta'schenBuchhandlung,Munich.MacIntyre,R.andD.W.Smith(1982),HusserlandIntentionality:AStudyofMind,MeaningandLanguage.

Dordrecht:ReidelMeinong,A.(1899/1978),“ÜberGegenständehöhererOrdnungundderenVerhältniszurinneren

Wahrnehmung”,ZeitschriftfürPsychologieundPhysiologiederSinnesorgane,21:182-272.EnglishTranslation(1978)„OnObjectsofHigherOrderandTheirRelationshiptoInternalPerception“,inM.-L.SchubertKalsi(ed),AlexiusMeinongOnObjectsofHigherOrderandHusserl’sPhenomenology:TheHague:Nijhoff:137-208.

Mill,J.St.(1868)AugusteComteetlepositivisme.Paris:Baillière.Münch,D.(2004),“NeueszumfrühenBrentano”.GrazerPhilosophischeStudien67:209-225.Mulligan(1986),“Exactness,DescriptionandVariation:HowAustrianAnalyticPhilosophyWasDone”,in

Nyíri,J.C.(ed.),VonBolzanozuWittgenstein.TheTraditionofAustrianPhilosophy.Vienna:Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky:86-97.

43

Mulligan,K.(1989)“TheExpressionofExactness:ErnstMach,theBrentanistsandtheIdealofClarity”,in(ed.)RobertPynsent,DecadenceandInnovation.Austro-HungarianLifeandArtattheTurnoftheCentury.London:Weidenfeld&Nicolson:33–42.

Mulligan,K.(1990),“GenauigkeitundGeschwätz—GlossenzueinemparadigmatischenGegensatzinderPhilosophie”inHgb.H.BachmaierWien—ParadigmenderModerne,Amsterdam:Benjamins,209–236.

Mulligan,K.(1997)“Surl’Histoiredel’approcheanalytiquedel’histoiredelaphilosophie:deBolzanoetBrentanoàBennettetBarnes”,(Ed.)J.-M.Vienne,PhilosophieanalytiqueetHistoiredelaphilosophie,Paris:Vrin,61–103.

Mulligan,K.(2001)“Delaphilosophieautrichienneetdesaplace”,J.-P.Cometti&K.Mulliganeds.,LaPhilosophieautrichiennedeBolzanoàMusil.HistoireetActualité,Paris:Vrin,8–25.

Mulligan,K.(2012)Wittgensteinetlaphilosophieaustro-allemande,Paris:Vrin.Mulligan,K.(forthcoming)“IncorrectEmotionsinAncient,Austrian&ContemporaryPhilosophy”,Revue

PhilosophiquedelaFranceetdel’Étranger.Mulligan,K.(forthcoming-b)“LogicalNorms,LogicalTruths&(Normative)Grounding”,inS.RoskiandB.

Schnieder(eds),BolzanoandGrounding,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress.Oberkofler,G.(ed)(1989).FranzBrentano.BriefeanCarlStumpf1867–1917,Graz:AkademischeDruck-

undVerlaganstalt.Ogden,C.K.andRichards,I.A.(1923),TheMeaningofMeaning,London,KeganPaul,Trench,Trubner.Owen,G.E.L. (1960), “LogicandMataphysics inSomeEarlierWorksofAristotle”, in I.DuringandG.E.L.

Owen(eds),AristotleandPlatointheMid-FourthCentury.Goteborg:163-190.Rabinowicz,W.&Rønnow-Rasmussen,T.2004‘TheStrikeoftheDemon:OnFittingPro-attitudesand

Value,’Ethics,114,391-424.Rollinger,R.(2012),„Brentano’sPsychologyfromanempiricalStandpoint:Itsbackgroundand

conception“,inI.Tănăsescu(ed.)FranzBrentano’sMetaphysicsandPsychology,Bucharest:ZetaBooks.

Ryle,G.(1929),„Heidegger’s‚SeinundZeit“,Mind,vol.38:355-370.Ryle,G.(1976),„DisgustedGrandfatherofPhenomenology“TimesHigherEducationSupplement,

September10:15.Sauer,W.(2000),“ErneuerungderPhilosophiaPerennis”,GrazerPhilosophischeStudien,vol.58:119-149.Scanlon,T.M.(1998),WhatWeOwetoEachOther,Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress.Schelling, F. (1802) “Fernere Darstellungen aus dem System der Philosophie”, in Neue Zeitschrift für

speculativePhysik,1.Band(1802),S.1–77(reprintedinSchelling(1859)).Schelling,F.(1859),SämtlicheWerke,ErsteAbteilung,VierterBand,Stuttgart,Cotta.Schnabel,F.(1937),DeutscheGeschichteim19.Jahrhundert.Band4:DiereligiösenKräfte.Freiburg:

Herder.Schoeps,H.-J.(1953).VorläuferSpenglers:StudienzumGeschichtspessimismusim19.Jahrhundert.Leiden:

Brill.Schödler,F.(1852),DasBuchderNatur,dieLehrenderPhysik,Astronomie,Chemie,Mineralogie,Geologie,

Physiologie,BotanikundZoologieumfassend,6thedition,Braunschweig,Vieweg&Sohn.Shields(1999),OrderinMultiplicity.HomonymyinthePhilosophyofAristotle.Oxford:ClarendonPress.Simons,P.(1986)“TheAnglo-AustrianAnalyticAxis”, inJ.C.Nyíri(ed.)VonBolzanozuWittgenstein.Zur

TraditionderösterreichischenPhilosophie.Vienna:Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky:98-107.Simons,P.(2000)“TheFourPhasesofPhilosophy:Brentano’sTheoryandAustria’sHistory”.TheMonist

83:68-88.Smith,B.(1981)“Theproductionofideas:NotesonAustrianIntellectualHistoryfromBolzanoto

Wittgenstein,inB.Smith(ed.)StructureandGestalt:PhilosophyandLiteratureinAustria-HungaryandherSuccessorStates.Amsterdam:Benjamins:211-234.

Smith,B.(1987)“TheSubstanceofBrentano’sOntology”,Topoi6/1:39-49.Smith,B.(1989)“Ontheoriginsofanalyticphilosophy”.GrazerphilosophischeStudien35:153-173.Smith,B.(1994)AustrianPhilosophy.TheLegacyofFranzBrentano.Chicago:OpenCourt.Smith,B.(1996)“TheNeurath-HallerThesis:AustriaandtheRiseofScientificPhilosophy,inK.Lehrerand

J.Marek(eds.),AustrianPhilosophyPastandPresent,Dordrecht,Kluwer,p.1-20.Spiegelberg,H.(1981)TheContextofthePhenomenologicalMovement.Dordrecht:Springer.Spiegelberg,H.(1982)ThePhenomenologicalMovement.AHistoricalIntroduction,3.ed,DenHaag,

MartinusNijhoff.Spiegelberg,H.(1971)“FromHusserltoHeidegger.ExcerptsFroma1928FreiburgDiarybyW.R.Boyce

Gibson”,inTheJournaloftheBritishSocietyforPhenomenology1:58–83.

44

Stern,W.(1897/2005)“PsychischePräsenzzeit”.ZeitschriftfürPsychologieundPhysiologiederSinnesorgane13:325-359.Englishtranslation(2005)„MentalPresence-Time“,TheNewYearbookforPhenomenologyandPhenomenologicalPhilosophy5:311-351.

Stöckl,A.(1870),LehrbuchderGeschichtederPhilosophie,Mainz:Kirchheim.Stölzle,R.(1904),ErnstvonLasaulx(1805-61),einLebensbild,Münster,AschendoffscheBuchhandlung.Stumpf,C.(1907)ErscheinungenundpsychischeFunktionen.Berlin:Reimer.Stumpf,C.(1908)DieWiedergeburtderPhilosophie.Leipzig:Barth.Stumpf,C.(1919/1976)“ErinnerungenanFranzBrentano”,inO.Kraus(ed),FranzBrentano:ZurKenntnis

seinesLebensundseinerLehre,Munich:Beck:87-149.Englishtranslation:“ReminiscencesofFranzBrentano”,inL.McAlister(ed.),ThePhilosophyofFranzBrentano,London:Duckworth,pp.10-46.

Stumpf,C.(1922),«FranzBrentano,ProfessorderPhilosophie,1838-1917»ChroustA.(ed.),LebensläufeausFranken,vol.2,Würzburg:Kabbitzsch&Mönnich:67-85.

Stumpf,C.(1924/1930)„Selbstdarstellung“inR.Schmidt(ed.),DiePhilosophiederGegenwartinSelbstdarstellungenVol.5.Leipzig:Meiner:205-265.Englishtranslationin(1930),„AutobiographyofCarlStumpf“,inMurchison,C.(ed.),HistoryofPsychologyinAutobiographyVol.1,Worcester:ClarkUniversityPress:389-441.

Thiele,J.(ed)1978,WissenschaftlicheKommunikation.DieKorrespondenzErnstMach,Kastellaun:Henn.Thomson,W. (1855), “OnMechanical Antecedents ofMotion,Heat, and Light” inReportof theTwenty-

FourthMeetingoftheBritishAssociationfortheAdvancementofScience,London:JohnMurray:59–62.

Twardowski,K.(1894/1977)ZurLehrevomInhaltundGegenstandderVorstellungen.EinepsychologischeUntersuchung.Vienna:Hölder.Englishtranslation(1977)OntheContentandObjectofPresentations.APsychologicalInvestigation.TheHague:MartinusNijhoff.

Twardowski(1996[1914]/1999a),“FunktionenundGebilde”Conceptus29(75),157-196.Englishtranslationin(1999a),„Onactionsandproducts“,inK.Twardowski,OnActions,ProductsandOtherTopicsinPhilosophy,Amsterdam:Rodopi:103-132.

Twardowski,K.(1991/1999),“Selbstdarstellung”,GrazerPhilosophischeStudien,vol.39,no.1:1-26.Englishtranslationin(1999),“Self-Portrait”,Twardowski,K.,OnActions,ProductsandOtherTopicsinPhilosophy,Amsterdam:Rodopi:41-64.

Utitz,E.(1954)«ErinnerungenanFranzBrentano»,WissenschaftlicheZeitschriftderMartin-LutherUniversitätHalle-Wittenberg,vol.4,n°1,1954,p.73-90.

VonMises,R. (1939/1951).KleinesLehrbuchdesPositivismus. DenHaag: Stockhum. English translation(1951):Positivism:AStudyinHumanUnderstanding.Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress.

Werle,J.(1989).FranzBrentanounddieZukunftderPhilosophie.Amsterdam:Rodopi.Whewell, W. (1847) The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded upon their History, Volume 1.

London:Parker.ArchiveMaterialsBrentano,F.(früheSchriften):FrüheSchriften.HoughtonLibrary,HarvardUniversity.Brentano,F.EL72:Logikkolleg1878/79.HoughtonLibrary,HarvardUniversity.Brentano,F.EL75:ZurLogik.AltesLogikkollegvor1874.HoughtonLibrary,HarvardUniversity.)Brentano,F.EL80:Logik(s.d)HoughtonLibrary,HarvardUniversity.Brentano,F.EL81:Fragmente(1875)HoughtonLibrary,HarvardUniversity.Brentano,F.PS48:ZurPsychognosie.Vorarbeiten.HoughtonLibrary,HarvardUniversity.Brentano,F.(1867b)Metaphysik.Vorlesung1867.HoughtonLibrary,HarvardUniversity.Brentano,F.(1873),BriefanMarty,31.März1873.HoughtonLibrary,Harvard.Brentano,F.(1886),BriefanMarty,8.April1886.HoughtonLibrary,Harvard.Brentano,F.(1886),BriefanMarty,22.Oktober1886.HoughtonLibrary,Harvard.Masaryk,T.(1877/78)BrentanosVorlesungenzurMetaphysik.MasarykArchives,Prague.Stumpf,C.(1930),BriefanKöhler,1.April1930.ArchivesoftheAmericanPhilosophicalSociety,

Philadelphia.