The Opposite of Control: A Deweyan Perspective on

Intrinsic Motivation in “After 3” Technology Programs

Published in Computing in Human Behavior, 16, 313-338, 2000.

David Wong, Michigan State University

Becky Packard, Mount Holyoke College

Mark Girod, Michigan State University

Kevin Pugh, Michigan State University

Address all correspondence to:

David Wong, 440 Erickson Hall, College of Education, Michigan State University,

East Lansing, MI 48824-1034

Co-authors:

Becky Wai-Ling Packard, Dept. of Psychology and Education, Mount Holyoke

College, South Hadley, MA 01075

Mark Girod, Erickson Hall, College of Education, Michigan State University, East

Lansing, MI 48824-1034

Kevin Pugh, Erickson Hall, College of Education, Michigan State University, East

Lansing, MI 48824-1034

Abstract

A central feature of the design of many “After 3” technology programs is the

assumption that student learning and motivation requires that they have choice

and control of their activity. Similarly, the dominant cognitive-rational perspective

of motivation portrays effective learners as having control of themselves and their

environment. In this article, we build on Dewey’s (1934) aesthetics and

epistemology – as most fully developed in “Art as Experience” - to suggest that to

be deeply engaged in learning, to be truly moved, requires not only control, but

also the “opposite of control.” In “Art as Experience” Dewey proposed that

aesthetic experience – compelling, transformative experience – requires doing

(acting on the world), reflection (standing back from the world), and undergoing

(being acted upon by the world). Furthermore, grasping the meaning of these

experiences emerges through a qualitative sense in addition to intentional

analysis and reflection. Thus, intrinsic motivation, or what we shall call

transformative experience, finds a balance between control and its opposite. We

elaborate our conception of the “opposite of control” and discuss how this idea

helps us appreciate heretofore unilluminated qualities of intrinsic motivation in

“After 3” technology programs.

The importance of learner control in “After 3” technology programs

A common belief to which several successful “After 3” programs subscribe is that

participants should be given a large degree of personal freedom - freedom to

choose what, how, and to what degree. For example, the Computer Clubhouse

Network centered in the Media lab at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

describes their purpose as being to…

encourage participants to discover their interests and apply their own ideas.

Given the support and freedom to pursue their own ideas, young people get

beyond their disinterest and apathy about learning, and develop the internal

motivation to learn and grow (The Computer Clubhouse, 1999).

Similarly, the role of student control and choice is central in the rationale for the

5th Dimensions program developed at the Laboratory of Comparative Human

Cognition (LCHC) at the University of California at San Diego.

The first step in participating in the Fifth Dimension begins with children

deciding on a goal(s) for engaging in Fifth Dimension activities.  Next, children

must decide where they will begin their journey in the Maze.

Activities must allow children a substantial element of personal choice and

self-direction within an overall structure designed to promote all participants’

development of level of expertise (5th Dimensions Clearinghouse, 1999).

The program that we have observed and discuss in this article Kids Learning in

Computer Klubhouses (KLICK!). KLICK! is an “After 3,” technology-rich,

community learning center designed to support adolescent and adult learning

using the latest in computer technology and resources. KLICK! currently serves

ten middle schools and their communities in both rural and urban areas

throughout the state of Michigan. These schools were targeted as those

potentially "isolated," in their lack of technology or lack of community support and

successful outreach.

KLICK! is another example of an “After 3” program designed around ideas of

student choice, interests, and personal freedom. According to Yong Zhao,

KLICK! project designer and director,

Kids define what learning should be like. Rarely are kids afforded the

legitimacy to decide how and what to learn. Largely, adults decide that

agenda. We provide access and assistance, kids bring personal interests

and ideas (Zhao, 1999).

KLICK! attempts to provide students virtually unrestricted access to technology,

resources, and support and let them decide how to use these as partners in

learning. Expertise and scaffolding comes from adult members of KLICK!, other

student participants both within their local clubhouse or at other sites around the

state, on-line help materials, as well as the staff at Michigan State University.

KLICK! kids can learn as much or as little as they choose of whatever they

choose. Some kids choose to only play games and they are not discouraged to

do so. Choice is critical, in fact, evaluation studies suggest that without it, a

KLICK! clubhouse struggles.

One of the most successful KLICK! clubhouses is at a small school located in

rural northwest Michigan. The two local site coordinators have let the metaphor

of 'clubhouse' guide their actions and management style. Says one of the

coordinators,

We want kids to feel like this (clubhouse) is their place. It belongs to them

and they can use it however they'd like. My job is to make sure access is

provided fairly, that nothing gets destroyed, and to provide whatever expertise

I can - if they ask.

"Freedom to learn" and "choice" have not emerged as the guiding principles in all

the clubhouses. The site coordinator at one of the struggling KLICK! clubhouse

has treated it as an extension of the regular school day. She used formal training

activities, limited access to certain software and peripherals, and employed a

timeline to guide the 'administration' of her 'curriculum.' Unfortunately, student

participation at this clubhouse has dwindled to just a few kids.

Control and theories of motivation and learning

Research on technology and motivation

The belief that student control is a critical element of motivation and learning

found in the design and practice of “After 3” programs is grounded in the

theoretical and empirical work on motivation and technology. We turn to a large

review piece on technology and learning by the Cognition and Technology Group

at Vanderbilt University (CTGV, 1996) to cite a few examples of the role of

learner choice and control.

Lepper (1989; Lepper & Cordova, 1992) has been the central figure in work on

the relationship between motivation and technology. His research supports the

idea that control – along with fantasy, curiosity, and challenge – is a critical

feature in what makes particular technologies intrinsically motivating.

Collins (1996) has contrasted the view of motivation associated with CAI to a

view of motivation associated with educational technologies based on principles

of constructivism. Whereas the former focuses on embellishment as the source

of motivation, the latter focuses on authentic activity as the source of motivation.

From a constructivist perspective, motivation is often associated with the

opportunity to find meaning and relevance in an activity, the opportunity to be

self-determining and self-regulating, and opportunity to engage in problem

solving. Hence, authentic activity is often advocated because it provides the

needed motivational conditions: i.e. “real-word” problems or situations and open-

ended problem solving task which allows for self-regulation, self-determination,

and choice. Examples of such work include simulation programs, such as

SimCity which allows students to experience what it’s like to run a city (Bransford

& Stein, 1993); exploratory programs, such as Geometer’s Sketchpad which

allows students to explore geometric relationships by manipulating geometric

figures (Jackiw, 1991); programming software, such as Logo which allows

students to construct their own computer programs; and problem solving

programs, such as The Jasper Series which allows to students to try to solve the

reality-based problem of getting an injured eagle to safety (CTGV, 1992).

Various researchers have reported that students show high levels of interest

when engaged in these authentic tasks (CTGV, 1996).

From a social constructivist perspective, motivation is often conceived of as

stemming from participation in a learning community (Greeno, Collins & Resnick,

1996). Hence, technologies designed to foster learning communities through the

support of collaborative knowledge construction and problem solving reflect the

idea that motivation comes from participation. A well known example of such

technologies is CSILE (computer support for knowledge-building communities)

(Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1994). CSILE is a computer system that fosters

collaborative knowledge construction among students. In doing so, it also

supports intentional, self-directed learning. Theoretically, students’ motivation to

learn in such an environment stems from their opportunity to participate in the

community and be self-directed.

Each of these perspectives on motivation and technology make reference to the

issue of choice, control, self-determination, or self-direction in some form or

another. The work on CAI suggest that adding choice to computer programs can

increase interest. The constructivist perspective argues that motivation stems

from opportunities to be self-determining and self-directed, and that computer

technologies which engage students in authentic tasks provide students with

these opportunities. Finally, the social constructivist perspective argues that

motivation can arise from participation in technology supported learning

communities which support intentional, self-directed learning.

Theories of motivation and learning

These perspectives on motivation and technology – especially with regard to the

role of learner control – pick up on long-held assumptions in general theories of

motivation and learning. The individuals’ ability to separate themselves from the

object or situation has been a central feature characterizing higher level

psychological functioning (for examples specific to motivation, see Deci, 1995;

Deci & Ryan, 1985; Nicholls, 1984; Pintrich & Schunk, 1996). Desirable learner

attributes such as objective thought, rational thought, reflection, and critical

thinking all describe individuals as “standing back” from the activity or object at

hand. The ability to set self apart from the world or the activity is related to

controlling both oneself and the activity – another key characteristic of higher

level functioning (Greeno, Collins, & Resnick, 1996). For example, metacognitive

theory posited a separate layer of cognition that can, then, operate on and

control regular cognition. How else could an individual control cognition without

being somehow separated from it? Even for Vygotsky (cf. 1978) – from the

socio-historic perspective, rather than the cognitive-rational perspective that has

dominated much work in motivation - the development of language is critical

because it functions as a tool for controlling thinking and action. For instance,

Vygotsky (1986) attached considerable significance to what he labeled “scientific”

concepts. Such concepts are important to Vygotsky because he believed that

their hierarchical, systematic nature, allowed a person to stand back

(decontextualize) and reflect on the concept; that is be able to separate the

concept from the object or event it refers to (Wertsch, 1985).

The cognitive perspective is, in large part, a response to more behaviorist,

extrinsic ways of thinking about motivation. Instead of being simply reactions to

environmental stimuli, cognitive theories portray human activity as being

thoughtful, planful, and, thus, under the control of the individual. Cognitive

theorists developed constructs firmly grounded in the idea of control to account

for differences in individual’s learning, motivation, attitude. The following are

some examples of these constructs:

- self-regulation, (Paris, S. G. & Newman, R. S., 1990; Pintrich, P. &

DeGroot, E. V., 1990);

- learned helplessness, (Dweck, C. S., 1975);

- mastery orientation, (Ames, C. & Archer, J., 1988);

- perceptions of competence and control, (Weiner, B.,1986);

- self-determination, DeCharms, R. (1976), Deci, E. L. (1980).

The opposite of control: A Deweyan perspective on learning

The importance of being able to step back from experience and to reflect, make

sense of it, and control it can not be disputed. Our concern is that attention to

this dimension of experience comes at the expense of attending to other vital

interactions between the person and the world. In this article, we build on

Dewey’s (1934) aesthetics and epistemology – as most fully developed in “Art as

Experience” - to suggest that to be deeply engaged in learning, to be truly moved

requires not only control, but also the “opposite of control. ” We will make the

point that transformative experience – our term for intrinsic motivation - can only

occur when the distance and distinction between person and world decreases,

rather than increases. Dewey writes,

The uniquely distinguishing feature of esthetic experience is exactly the fact

that no such distinction of self and object exists in it, since it is esthetic in the

degree in which organism and environment cooperate to institute an

experience in which the two are so fully integrated that each disappears

(Dewey, LW10:36).

The person can not step outside the experience – and, thus, can not control it in

the conventional sense. To do so would fundamentally change the experience.

We will argue that in a Deweyan account, learning and motivation can not be fully

understood from perspectives that position the individual separate from the

activity or world. We suggest that important qualities of motivation - its essence -

lie inside the experience of learning. That is, rather than just considering the

value of an experience from the outside, we suggest one must consider the value

of the experience itself.

Doing and reflecting: An incomplete and problematic portrait of learning

In education, “learning by doing” has become a popular one-line synopsis of

Dewey’s philosophy. Although action is central to Dewey’s epistemology, one

merely has to consider any example of mindless activity to see how this

characterization can only be either an incomplete or incorrect characterization of

Dewey’s perspective on learning. Mere “doing” does not assure learning. Most

educators realize this simple point and, as a result, recognize the importance of

the activity of reflection - a second element often associated with Dewey’s

perspective on learning. One learns by both doing something and then reflecting

upon what one has done. Many cognitive perspectives on learning are at a basic

level some elaboration of these two components and portray ideal learners or

learning environments as optimizing opportunities to do and reflect. For

example, the Fostering a Community of Learners (FCL) classrooms designed by

Brown and Campione (1990, 1994) emphasize “learning by doing” and

metacognitive reflection. Likewise, many of the technology environments

mentioned above (e.g. the Jasper series, CSILE) were designed to support

student action (exploration, problem solving, participation in a learning

community, etc.) and reflection.

The central role of doing and reflection finds abundant support in the recent

history of learning theories. In behaviorism, learning was a matter of developing

adaptive patterns of action-reaction associations. Little distinction was made

between the innate, reflexive qualities of animal behavior and human learning.

This image did not set well with theorist and practitioners who saw individuals as

having more freedom, control, individuality, and self-determination. (Skinner, the

preeminent behaviorist, contended that true control or freedom was an illusion).

With the rise of cognitive perspective, behavior was not simply a matter of

establishing action-reaction patterns, but was a purposeful activity directed by

meaning and the desire to make meaning. Knowledge and meaning were

constructions of the active, conscious mind with intentional action and careful

reflection as the core processes. Thus, learning was a matter of both doing and

thinking.

The problem of control: A brief digression into epistemology

The cognitive perspectives heavy reliance on the active, intentional mind as

being the constructor of meaning came at a cost, however. The more a theory

identifies individuals as the locus of meaning-making the greater its vulnerability

to nagging philosophical and psychological problems: foremost among them is

the question of how new knowledge emerges. Plato’s “Meno paradox” sums up

the issue:

You argue that a man cannot enquire either about that which he knows or

about that which he does not know; for if he knows, he has no need to

enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not now the very subject about

which he is to enquire. (Plato, 1949).

Thus, inasmuch as intentionality, control, choice, and rational thought are central

virtues in many images of the accomplished learner, they can also become

liabilities. The Meno paradox makes the point elegantly clear: since we can

never see, understand, or act in the world beyond the limits of our own habits,

preconceptions, and prejudices, how can we ever be transformed by our

experiences?

The problem seems airtight in its logic. For Dewey – along with Peirce and Kant

among others – the only way to get beyond logically intractable problems is to

question their fundamental assumptions. Dewey’s strategy is inventive and

daring. Prawat (in press) writes,

His goal, following Pierce, is to “change the metaphysical premise” regarding

the relation of mind and matter, restoring immediate qualities “to the rightful

position as qualities of inclusive situations” (Dewey, LW1: 203).

In other words, the first part of Dewey’s two-part strategy is to propose the

existence of some forms of meaning that are inherent in situations and largely

independent of a subject. In particular, Dewey discusses how situations can be

inherently doubtful or harmonious.

It is…a mistake to suppose that a situation is doubtful only in a ‘subjective’

sense…It is the situation that has these traits. We are doubtful because the

situation is inherently doubtful (Dewey, LW12: 109-110).

Dewey is claiming, then, that some forms of meaning – in an undeveloped form –

exist independent of the individual’s interpretive viewpoint. Thus, the

construction of understanding involves more than just prior knowledge and

biased observation as its starting materials. With this assertion, Dewey offers a

way to escape the circular logic of the Meno paradox. However, a critical

problem remains: even though meaning may exist independent of the individual,

a rational, intentional model of learning precludes the possibility that this meaning

can be perceived. That is, changing the nature of the world makes little

difference in the original problem if the individuals’ capacity to make meaning

remains the same.

Thus, the second part of Dewey’s strategy is to propose how the meaning

inherent in a situation can be directly perceived without being completely filtered

through prior knowledge, i.e. habits, preconceptions, and prejudices. Dewey

accomplishes this by elevating the role of non-conscious, non-rational processes

by the individual. Dewey refers to this process as having a “qualitative sense” of

a situation.

The sense of a thing… is an immediate and immanent meaning; it is meaning

which is itself felt or directly had (Dewey, LW1: 200).

Jackson explains this point:

What Dewey is saying is that we sense or feel the situation we are in without

thinking of it per se, without it becoming an object of reflection. (Jackson,

1998, p. 21)

For Dewey the process of meaning-making involves two kinds of awareness: (a)

a conscious, intentional, and reflective mode, and (b) a non-conscious, non-

rational, and non-linguistic mode. The qualitative sense of a situation is had

directly when we are totally immersed in an experience and "is not and cannot

be stated or made explicit." Dewey describes the interplay between the two as

beginning with a qualitative sense then developing to include – not to be replaced

by - a more explicit, reflective activity.

My theory of the relation of cognitive experiences to other modes of

experience is based upon the fact that connections exist in the most

immediate non-cognitive experience, and when the experienced situation

becomes problematic (i.e. discordant), the connections are developed into

distinctive objects of knowledge (i.e. logical relations), whether of common

sense or of science (Dewey, LW14: 33).

Jackson also provides a good description of the process:

At times…the feeling that a situation arouses is bafflement. Under those

circumstances the situation lacks coherence. In the extreme case we might

say that it makes no sense whatsoever. When those conditions hold, we are

led to search for elements and relations within the situation that will reveal its

meaning, thereby causing it to make sense (Jackson, 1998, p. 21).

In Dewey’s own words::

"When we are baffled by perplexing conditions, and finally hit upon a clew,

and everything falls into place, the whole thing suddenly, as we say, 'makes

sense.' (Dewey, LW1: 200)

Thus, the qualitative sense of a situation pervades throughout the process of

coming to understand by not only marking both the beginning and the end of

inquiry and but also serving as a reference point throughout.

Undergoing: The opposite of control

Dewey’s portrait of learning balances the individual acting upon the world with

the world acting back upon the individual. Thus, transformation requires not only

doing and reflection, but undergoing.

There is…an element of undergoing, of suffering in its large sense, in every

experience. Otherwise, there would be no taking in of what preceded

(Dewey, LW10:41).

The idea of undergoing is a vital - as vital as doing – and yet, it has been an

ignored or misinterpreted part of Dewey’s philosophy. What is meant by

“undergoing” and what does undergoing have to do with “suffering in its large

sense”? “To suffer” can mean to experience pain, but that is not the meaning

that Dewey has in mind. Rather, “to suffer” is to be acted upon by the world. For

Dewey, undergoing is the inextricable complement of acting upon the world. To

suffer is to be under the influence. As mentioned earlier, this element of

meaning-making is not developed much by most cognitive perspectives as they

tend to portray learning as under the learner’s physical or cognitive control.

Learning, at its best, is described as self-regulated, intentional, goal-directed, and

so on. For Dewey, however, transformative experience requires not only gaining

control, but also relinquishing control. One must let go – as much as possible -

one’s long held ways of seeing, doing, understanding, and feeling. The degree

that one undergoes, the degree that one can truly experience, is the degree that

one be open to the true nature of an outside influence.

Thus, for Dewey, intelligent activity finds a productive balance between

undergoing, doing, and reflection. Dewey uses a simple example to describe this

relationship:

There are conditions to be met without which an experience cannot come to

be. The outline of the common pattern is set by the fact that every experience

is the result of interaction between a live creature and some aspect of the

world in which he lives. A man does something; he lifts, let us say, a stone. In

consequence he undergoes, suffers, something: the weight, strain, texture of

the surface of the thing lifted. The properties thus undergone determine

further doing. The stone is too heavy or too angular, not solid enough; or else

the properties undergone show it is fit for the use for which it is intended. The

process continues until a mutual adaptation of the self and the object

emerges and that particular experience comes to a close. What is true of this

simple instance is true, as to form, of every experience. (Dewey, LW10: 43-44

)

In an experience, doing and undergoing cooperate to change the individual and

how the individual acts in world. Dewey’s prosaic example of lifting a rock

notwithstanding, in profound aesthetic experiences, nothing less than the very

essence of the individual is transformed. Aesthetic experiences inspire – the root

of inspire being the Latin spirare, which means to “breathe life into.” Such

profound engagement and transformation can not occur if the individual remains

at an emotional or cognitive distance from the world – a distance prerequisite for

conventional notions of control.

While undergoing and surrender may seem passive, particularly when contrasted

to doing, one can be certain that no part of Dewey’s view of intelligent activity is

passive (Dewey, 1934, 1938). Similarly, surrender or the opposite of control are

not the same as losing control.

The esthetic or undergoing phase of experience is receptive. It involves

surrender. But adequate yielding of the self is possibly only through a

controlled activity that may well be intense. In much of our intercourse with

our surroundings we withdraw; sometimes from fear, if only of expending

unduly our store of energy; sometimes from preoccupation with other

matters,22 as in the case of recognition. Perception is an act of the going-out

of energy in order to receive, not a withholding of energy. To steep ourselves

in a subject-matter we have first to plunge into it. When we are only passive

to a scene, it overwhelms us and, for lack of answering activity, we do not

perceive that which bears us down. We must summon energy and pitch it at a

responsive key in order to take in. (Dewey, LW10: 53).

Thus, Dewey uses intriguing phrases such as “to go out in order to receive,” “to

plunge in in order to steep,” or "to take in" to emphasize the distinctly active

essence of undergoing or the opposite of control. The opposite of control is not

to be lifeless, to be devoid of mind, body, or spirit. In fact, in transformative

experience, relinquishing control increases, rather than decreases, the sense of

being alive.

Undergoing, anticipation, consummation

Csikszentmihalyi calls it flow; Dewey calls it “an experience.” These are

descriptions of optimal engagement – the kinds of engagement that we strive to

create for our students. How are control and its opposite part of Dewey’s notion

of an experience? Jackson, referring to Dewey’s “Art as Experience” explains

what deep engagement in art can illuminate:

The arts, above all, teach us something about what it means to undergo

an experience. Successful encounters with art objects and performances

offer a set of standards by which to judge ordinary experiences. Such art-

centered experiences are distinguished by their unity and wholeness.

They are consummatory. They are accompanied by feelings of fulfillment

and satisfaction. They are self-sufficient and meaningful. They do not

point beyond themselves. Lesser forms of experiencing, by way of

contrast, contain but fragments, mere shards, of what Dewey would call

an experience (Jackson, 1998, p. 124).

Therefore, ordinary experience is something that merely happens: an occurrence

occupying space and time. By contrast, an experience is an event. As an event,

an experience moves forward in time. It flows over time and, more importantly,

this flow has a unity to it: “every successive part flows freely, without seam and

without unfilled blanks, into what ensues” (Dewey, LW10: 36). In addition, this

flow builds upon itself toward a completion such that the experience “is so

rounded out that its close is a consummation and not a cessation” (Dewey,

LW10: 35). By contrast, in ordinary experience, things happen one thing after

another: it is a succession of occurrences, rather than an unfolding event.

Experiences are dramatic events complete with a plot, tension, characters, and

setting. As a drama, there is coherence and development in the plot as it moves

toward consummation. The end of the story is a consummation, rather than a

cessation, because it brings coherence to the variety of elements that constitute

the event.

…we have an experience when the material experienced runs its course to

fulfillment. Then and then only is it integrated within and demarcated in the

general stream of experience from other experiences. A piece of work is

finished in a way that is satisfactory; a problem receives its solution; a game

is played through; a situation, whether that of eating a meal, playing a game

of chess, carrying on a conversation, writing a book, or taking part in a

political campaign, is so rounded out that its close is a consummation and not

a cessation. Such an experience is a whole and carries with it its own

individualizing quality and self-sufficiency. It is an experience. (Dewey,

LW10:35).

Finally, while the consummation may or may not be pleasurable, it is always

anticipated.

This consummation, moreover, does not wait in consciousness for the whole

undertaking to be finished. It is anticipated throughout and is recurrently

savored with special intensity. (Dewey, LW10:55).

Aesthetic experience, “intrinsic” motivation, and interest

The anticipation of consummation is significant to our discussion because it

reveals how Dewey may have described what we call intrinsic motivation. The

field of motivation has historically considered intrinsic motivation as either related

to an innate need for developing competence ( Piaget, 1952; White, 1959), a

need for feeling self-determining or to be the locus of causation (deCharms,

1976; Deci & Ryan, 1985), or, at a more generic level, a desire to perform a task

for “its own sake” rather than for external reasons. Constructs such as the need

for competence and self-determination direct our attention to the inner needs of

the individual, while the “doing something for its own sake” perspective places

the motive for motivation somewhere in the task or object, somewhere out in the

world (Prawat, 1998). In other words, there is confusion as to whether the

source of intrinsic motivation lies in individual (needs) or the world (task).

A distinctive feature Dewey’s philosophical project was his aversion for dualistic

thinking that creates the either/or choices between individual and the world (cf.

Dewey, 1938). Dewey’s account of aesthetic experiences illustrate that what is

deeply engaging about such experiences is the unfolding drama of the give and

take between individual and world. The drama is an event, a Deweyan

“situation,” that exists only in the transaction between person and world. Literary

theorist and Deweyan scholar Louise Rosenblatt describes transaction using the

example of poetry. “The poem is not an object but an event, a lived-through

process or experience” (Rosenblatt, 1978, p. 35). The poem is evoked - it comes

into existence - during the transaction between reader and text. The idea of

transaction is central to much of Dewey’s philosophy and reflects his effort to

locate meaning in thoughtful action rather than “in the head” or “out in the world.”

One of the consequences of construing experience as “an event” is that

motivation and interest become characteristics of this special transaction, rather

than of the person or the world. Dewey encourages us to consider motivation

and interest as the energy that is the rush toward consummation. The drama of

inquiry is motivation; it is interest.

Thus, while the source of motivation may be thought of as either in the person or

in the world, we are prompted to see it also as a quality inherent to the activity.

As a result, Dewey presents a provocative vision of how motivation can be truly

“intrinsic.” All of a sudden, the well-worn phrase “learning for learning’s sake”

takes on a fuller, more tangible meaning. Similarly, Dewey shines new light on

Hidi’s well-known distinction between individual and situational interest

(Hidi,1990; Hidi & Baird, 1988). Following his emphasis on transactional nature

of aesthetic experience, Dewey embeds interest within the event of learning and

not in the individual, the setting, or some combination of the two. Interest, like

the event, is seen as a transactive entity that exists only in the interaction

between individual and setting. When we take seriously that motivation and

interest are inherent qualities of a dramatic event, we then begin to consider

more closely the nature of drama and how learning can be made more dramatic

in the same way as a great play is dramatic.

Operationalizing the opposite of control:

Qualities of transformative experience

We now leave the discussion of the role of the opposite of control in

transformative experiences and turn our attention to the challenge of making

these ideas practical for research and practice. Since transformative experience

is an interplay of the “giving out and taking in” of energy, of doing and

undergoing, we operationalize key qualities of both control and its opposite.

What would constitute evidence of either, and where might we look for evidence?

The most direct evidence might be found in participants’ descriptions of their

experiences from the “After 3” technology programs. Questions such as “Tell

me what it’s like for you when you were work on that web page” might prove

illuminating. More likely to be useful would be to encourage students to

reconstruct their experience by using a story genre. The story form may be more

likely to capture the interplay of doing and undergoing in a dramatic experience.

Key phrases to look out for might include:

Opposite: language of being acted on

e.g. I was swept away, it drew me in, it came to/hit/dawned on me, it took me

by surprise,

Control: language of intentional action by participants on the world or on

themselves, e.g. I did/made that, I decided/chose to

Anticipation and reflection

As discussed earlier, most models of accomplished learners feature the ability to

maintain a critical distance between themselves and the subject (i.e. their

behavior, phenomena in the world, their own cognitive activity). This distance

may be spatial (from a different place) or temporal (at a later time). The ability to

control requires separating individuals from whatever they are interacting. One

of the important processes afforded by this distance is reflection - i.e. stepping

back and considering what has happened (see Flavell, Garner, or Markman for

excellent treatments of executive control and metacognition).

The opposite of control requires a reduction of the distance between subject and

object and for individuals to participate inside the activity rather than observing

from outside. The complement of reflection is anticipation. Transformative

experience requires both an anticipative and a reflective epistemological stance.

Rational meaning-making, whether inductive or deductive, is largely a reflective,

past-oriented process. By contrast, during transformative experiences, students

are motivated by a sense of anticipation of what is possible and yet to be.

Anticipation captures the pulling-forward sensation of an experience. During

transformative experiences, students are motivated by a sense of what is to

come next. Dewey writes,

In most intellectual work, in all save those flashes that are distinctly esthetic,

we have to go backwards; we have consciously to retrace previous steps and

to recall distinctly particular facts and ideas. Getting ahead in thought is

dependent upon these conscious excursions of memory into the past…. Only

when esthetic perception is interrupted (whether by lapse on the part of artist

or perceiver) are we compelled to turn back, say in seeing a play on the

stage, to ask ourselves what went before in order to get the thread of

movement. What is retained from the past is embedded within what is now

perceived and so embedded that, by its compression there, it forces the mind

to stretch forward to what is coming (Dewey, LW10: 187).

From the anticipative stance, learners allow themselves to be carried forth by an

idea or suggestion (undergoing). The realm of the possible emerges only when a

person acts “as if” something were true. “As if” is a suggestion that affords

imagination. To behave “as if” is an invitation to temporarily suspend disbelief –

to rest the critical eye so that one may dwell fully in a new experience.

Skepticism and analysis too soon disrupts the having of a new aesthetic

experience. In order to appreciate the world from a different perspective, we

have to leave our familiar post. It is impossible to see fully from two different

vistas at the same time.

It would be a mistake, however, to think that “as if” is an invitation to ignore our

past experience or to engage in idle fantasy. The critical, logical eye can not rest

forever, nor should it. This is where the anticipative and reflective stances come

together. Given that experiences change as a consequence of believing an idea

to be true, the task is to consider whether we find that new experience more or

less useful than our current experiences. Thus, from an anticipative perspective,

to learn is to fully experience the consequences (or imagine the consequences)

of being in a world as if an idea were true.

We imagine students being pulled forward in an experience. As in a good play or

story, there is a sense of drama or anticipation of what is yet to come. Like

Csikszentmihalyi's concept of "flow", students lose a sense of time and are pulled

forward in the experience, not wanting the experience to end. What might be

considered evidence for reflection and anticipation?

Anticipation: future-oriented descriptions, consideration of the possible, what

is yet to be.

E.g.: I was hoping/expecting/looking forward to, I was wondering what was

going happen next

Reflection: past-oriented descriptions, consideration of what has already

happened.

E.g.: I was doing well/poorly, I realized/figured out/saw that…

Reflection and anticipation: reflective comments that reveal, in retrospect, that

anticipation had taken place.

E.g.: it did/didn’t turn out as I was hoping/expecting, I was surprised/relieved

Transformative experience: The nature of the “self”

The role of self has figured prominently in contemporary perspectives on

motivation and learning. Terms such as “perceptions of (self) competence and

control of (self and situation),” “self-efficacy” and “self-regulation” are important

constructs in accounts of motivation and learning. One might be led to assume

that in the midst undergoing when experiencing the opposite of control that the

self disappears or is abandoned as in Zen Buddhism (see Gaskins (in press) for

an account of how Zen applies to motivation). Indeed, Dewey’s own description

of aesthetic experience seems to suggest this:

Instead of signifying being shut up within one's own private feelings and

sensations, ... experience signifies active and alert commerce with the world;

at its height it signifies complete interpenetration of self and the world of

objects and events (Dewey, LW10: 25).

Although there is complete interpenetration of self and world, the self does not

dissolve. In fact, as paradoxical as it may seem, the unity of the individual and

world is accompanied by a more distinct definition of each. Dewey describes

elements can become both more integrated and distinctive during an experience:

In a work of art, different acts, episodes, occurrences melt and fuse into

unity, and yet do not disappear and lose their own character as they do so -

just as in a genial conversation there is a continuous interchange and

blending, and yet each speaker not only retains his own character but

manifests it more clearly than is his wont. (Dewey, LW10: 36-37).

Thus, in the process of undergoing, where the learner is experiencing the

opposite of control, the self finds a special kind of existence. In passionate

activity, there is keen consciousness of one’s self and ones’ actions without

being self-conscious. Jackson (1998) refers to writer Annie Dillard’s thoughts on

this point:

Consciousness itself does not hinder living in the present. In fact, it is only to

a heightened awareness that the great door to the present opens at all. Even

a certain amount of interior verbalization is helpful to enforce the memory of

whatever it is that is taking place. … Self-consciousness, however, does

hinder the experience of the present. It is the one instrument that unplugs all

the rest. So long as I lose myself in a tree, say, I can scent its leafy breath or

estimate its board feet of lumber, I can draw its fruits or boil tea on its

branches, and the tree stays alive. But the second I become aware of myself

at any of these activities-looking over my own shoulder, as it were-the tree

vanishes, uprooted from the spot and flung out of sight as if it had never

grown. (Dillard 1974, p. 81)

The nature of the self is difficult to describe for it seems full of paradoxes. We

identify several different qualities that characterize an awareness of self during

transformative experiences.

Event awareness vs. self or world awareness. An aesthetic experience is an

event, a coherent happening created in the transaction between the individual

and the world. Thus, participants’ attention during an experience is directed

toward the drama of the event – the dynamic interplay between self and world -

rather that to either what is occurring in the world, or what is going on with one’s

self. This distinction does not really map directly on to differences between

control and its opposite since awareness of event is requires both control (doing)

and the opposite of control (undergoing). However, it does remind us that the

self is an important part of the event and raises questions about how, then,

Dewey would have us think about the role of the self when undergoing the

opposite of control.

Self-awareness vs. self-evaluative. To undergo is to suffer the consequences of

one’s actions. It is to take in the world directly with a minimum of prejudging and

filtering. Recall that this kind of direct communication with the world is vital to

Dewey’s view on how individuals can ever be transformed by their experiences.

In powerful experiences, students can imagine new ideas and let go of

themselves enough to surrender to new ideas. We suggest that in surrendering

to new ideas, students can imagine themselves as different kinds of people

during the experience. As Csikszentmihalyi (1996) writes:

In flow we are too involved in what we are doing to care about protecting the

ego. Yet after an episode of flow is over, we generally emerge from it with a

stronger self-concept; we know that we have succeeded in meeting a difficult

challenge. We might even feel that we have stepped out of the boundaries of

the ego and have become part, at least temporarily, of a larger entity. The

musician feels at one with the harmony of the cosmos, the athlete moves at

one with the team, the reader of a novel lives for a few hours in a different

reality. Paradoxically, the self expands through acts of self-forgetfulness (pg.

112-113).

In other words, when we become different kinds of people, we temporarily stop

thinking about who we have been in order to imagine ourselves in new ways.

When students are passionately engaged, they have the opportunity to try on

"possible selves" as well as the new ideas. Markus and Nurius (1986) suggest,

our self-conceptions are not confined to the present and include who we were,

who we would like to become, and who we fear becoming. Cross and Markus

(1991) write, "As individuals choose among tasks or actions and as they persist

or withdraw from these tasks or actions, they are often guided by a sense, an

image, or a conception of what is possible for them" (pg. 232). These images of

possibility are motivating and sustain students' participation in an activity. For

example, these authors contrast the motivating difference between a student who

sees herself as someone "who plays the piano" to a student who sees herself as

"a pianist", with the latter's musician self being more motivating to the student.

Powerful experiences can provide opportunities to not only imagine ideas but

also to try on possible selves and become motivated by such possibilities.

Thus, to be transformed by an event demands a degree of openness, honesty,

and courage. The natural tendencies to be critical, to interpret – more accurately

- to prejudge or reinterpret, and to close oneself off to things that are

uncomfortable must be suspended, at least temporarily. The transformative

event reveals something about the person and the person must, therefore, be

ready to perceive. In these situations, the self is opening rather than closing,

describing rather than evaluating, increasing rather than decreasing possibilities,

transforming rather than confirming.

opposite: describing activity, reactions, opening and expanding

control: evaluating, closing and narrowing, signifying, labeling, evaluating, or

describing what I was doing vs. what was happening

Summary: Transformation and the opposite of control

Thus far we have built on Dewey’s aesthetics and epistemology – as most fully

developed in “Art as Experience” - to suggest that to be deeply engaged in

learning, to be truly moved, requires not only control, but also the “opposite of

control.” Dewey proposed that aesthetic experience – compelling, transformative

experience – requires doing (acting on the world), reflection (standing back from

the world), and undergoing (being acted upon by the world). Furthermore,

grasping the meaning of these experiences emerges through a qualitative sense

in addition through intentional analysis and reflection. Thus, intrinsic motivation,

or what we have called transformative experience, finds a balance between

control and its opposite. We elaborated and operationalized our conception of

the “opposite of control” and now discuss how this idea helps us appreciate

heretofore unilluminated qualities of intrinsic motivation in “After 3” technology

programs.

Observations from an “After 3” program

KLICK! students spend time, voluntarily, at the computer clubhouse building

webpages,

surfing the Internet, chatting on-line, filming and editing digital movies, and

playing games. A KLICK! clubhouse is filled with networked computers,

scanners, digital cameras, laser printers, and a server, as well as the latest

software to manage and edit digital video, author web pages, and chat

interactively with other clubhouse sites around the state. At any given time, there

are numerous projects and activities going on in a clubhouse. Many KLICKers

enjoy building personal web pages, making web sites for businesses, filming and

editing digital movies, creating PowerPoint presentations, and even "burning"

their products onto CD-ROM. Several KLICK!-wide projects exist too like a

KLICK! internal newspaper called The Password Express, video game

competitions, and webpage design contests. More and more participants are

being recruited for their technology expertise to serve their local school and

community through service and training activities.

The program in a small rural school in northwest Michigan is doing particularly

well run. The room is organized and well equipped, the supervisors are

enthusiastic and generous with their time. Even more impressive is the number

of students who choose to come to this after school program and forego other

activities. They are eager to arrive, engaged while they were in the room, and

leave late. With no grades and no obvious material reward, this seemed like a

classic example of intrinsically motivated behavior. What can our discussion of

Deweyan transformative experiences add to our analysis of this situation? We

focus our analysis on three popular kinds of activities: games, on-line chat, and

webpage building.

Games: Doing, undergoing, transformation

Students playing computer games seems to suggest a prototypical example of

Csikszentmihalyi’s flow. The concentration is intense; time passes but outside

the notice of the students. Games are designed so players can find the optimum

match between the challenge of the game and the player’s skill. If flow is

optimal experience, then these gamers seem to be in the flow. The question that

comes easily to mind, however, is to what degree is optimal experience optimal

educational experience? Since transformation is synonymous with education,

and since undergoing is necessary for transformation, it is worth investigating the

nature of undergoing in these gaming activities.

In both Dewey and Csikszentmihalyi’s image of worthwhile experience, the

joining of doing and undergoing, i.e. action and consequence, plays a critical

role. In compelling experiences, action is tuned to preceding and subsequent

consequences. How the individual acts on the world and how the world acts on

the individual makes all the difference in the nature of the experience. For

example, rock climbing or winter snow camping are thrilling precisely because

the critical link between what one does and what the world does. In activities that

are less physically dramatic, such as flyfishing, the direct and immediate

connection between action and consequence is no less central to the thrill of the

experience. As in gaming, the direct link between action and consequence is

often permeated with feelings of sharpness, focus, intensity, and, paradoxically,

calm.

Despite attaining “optimal performance” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990), Dewey would

question the extent that doing and undergoing of gaming leads to a

transformation of perception or meaning. We begin by re-examining what we

have been labeling the doing and undergoing of gaming does, in fact,

corresponds to the highly particular meanings that Dewey had in mind.

For Dewey, doing is planful, rather than reflexive, activity. Arcade style games,

subversively known as “twitch games,” require action based more on reflex and

speed than thought and intent. To take one’s time to plan and reflect is often

antithetical to good gaming strategy. Similarly, undergoing is active

transformation, rather than passive reception. Watching TV is often a non-

transformative activity, not because the TV acts on the person, not because the

person just sits there, but because there is usually no undergoing in any real

sense.

Unfortunately, there is often not much to be gained, by anyone under any

circumstance, from computer games. The potential for transformation, for deep

undergoing, is simply not part of the game’s basic substance. Unlike important

works of art, well-made television shows, or good teaching, the intent and design

of many games is to merely engage, rather than engage by transforming, the

audience.

For those games that do offer the potential for transformation through worthwhile

ideas, the important question concerns how the nature of the student-game

interaction works for and against the creating of a transformative experience. As

mentioned earlier, undergoing can be painful or at least difficult and, as such, it

can be aversive. To meet with a new idea, a strange way of seeing familiar

things, is the beginning of the drama of aesthetic experiences. One comes upon

an idea and gets a sense of the possibility of a new way of seeing things.

Dwelling on this sense takes time, honesty, and courage. Then, to act upon this

sense, to explore the possibility by doing something also requires openness and

willingness. The inquiry of ideas and new possibilities constitutes the drama of

the aesthetic experience.

Does the typical game experience offer these opportunities? Perhaps. While

there may be important ideas and there may be action and consequence, it is

critical to consider to what degree these elements are interconnected with and

interdependent on each other. Too frequently, the drama (action and

consequence) of the game has little to do with the unfolding inquiry – i.e. the

exploration and subsequent development - of the idea.

Our analysis, so far, suggests that while playing computer games are designed

to tightly co-join action/consequence and, thus, lead to intense “flow”

experiences, there is question as to whether students are transformed by these

activities. On the one hand, there seems to be little in the way of “substance” in

the games that could function as the basis for transformative experience. On the

other hand, if we direct our analysis away from the details of the game, away

from the students’ pointing and clicking on the screen, and toward the nature of

the students themselves as they play the game, we might feel differently about

whether students are transformed or not. What did we see when we tried to

characterized the nature of the “self” in these students?

As these students engage in the action of the game, they have to behave in ways

that may be new for them. Sometimes, the game require students to be ultra

aggressive, destructive, and ruthless - it’s kill or be killed, man. In other sports-

oriented games, students must take on the role of superstar players. One

student player claims to imagine himself as the player asking himself what he

would do in certain situations and then trying to play as he would - or as Michael

Jordan would - or as another of his many basketball heroes might. Despite the

incredible pretense required by both of these games situations (e.g. I am Rambo,

or I am Michael Jordan), students slip into these roles willingly and without

apparent self-consciousness – we have seen neither fleeting glimpses of

embarrassment nor overblown displays of machismo. Thus, while they played,

students’ selves were transformed. They let themselves undergo, more or less

completely, and became different.

Thus, the issue of games and transformation is not so clear. If thinking, feeling,

and acting constitute a large part of who we are, then it did seem as if students

were transformed for awhile. What is less clear is the distinction between

temporary and enduring transformation. Does the students’ malevolent and

destructive ways carry outward beyond the game? Most of us would like to think

that these behaviors are context specific, that students know the difference

between the world of games and the world they live in. Turkle (1995) comes up

with a similar conclusion in her discussion of multi-user domains (MUD) where

individuals take on new identities, ways of talking, and “acting” in cyberspace

and, yet, go on to live fairly normal lives in the outside world.

This position becomes easily problematic, however, as we think about the

educative potential of technology. Just as we believe that sphere of influence of

games is limited, we also believe in the boundless educative potential of

computer programs. Our hopeful rhetoric asserts that computers can provide

powerful transformative experiences to educate all students. The confusion and

paradox of these two positions is obvious.

What is to be said, then, of the influence of media/technology on students’ lives?

We seem to hope there is an influence, but only a positive one. Is this a tenable

position? Can we have it both ways? The question of whether or not technology

transforms seems misguided. We should skip that question and instead move to

more productive questions such as when and how much can games transform,

and how can we increase the likelihood that transformation will occur.

Chat rooms: Anticipating a transformed self

Another popular activity we observed in this "After 3" program was on-line chat.

Students had found various “teen” sites and were busily exchanging notes back

and forth. We watched over their shoulders as they chatted and noticed that the

“conversation” in the chatrooms did not seem to make a whole lot of sense.

Much chat consisted of short phrases, often in slang or coded language. An

excerpt from a chat between members of different KLICK! clubhouses:

'Da Man: What up all?

Firebaby: What are you guys going to write about this week?

Lisa: BARF!!!!

'Da Man: Who 'da man????

Terry: dry cleaner web site

'Da Man: Who talked about the movie they were making last week?

Firebaby: We're making web pages for a realty company.

Lisa: BARF!!!!

What is to be made of this, particularly in light of our discussion of the opposite of

control? To begin, on-line chatting is what might be considered highly motivated

behavior. Students voluntarily choose this activity (here choice is a quality of

motivated activity, not its cause as it is more often portrayed), their engagement

is sustained and focused, and their engagement is not contingent on any

apparent extrinsic rewards.

One student described how, depending on her mood, she would either adopt a

different personality for her web chatting telling lies about herself, her likes and

dislikes, even her geographic location, age, and gender. Other times she would

be completely honest with her chatters telling them exactly who she was

sometimes offering a great deal of personal information. It seemed as if the

element of meeting new people, experimenting with various identities, and not

knowing what was true and what was fake was most exciting.

The technology of chatrooms affords participants the opportunity to interact with

others without the constraints inherent in face-to-face communication.

Considerations such as a student’s physical appearance, outward dress, peer

groups, and personal history are all ambiguous, fabricated, or unavailable.

Thus, in chatrooms, the nature of students’ self is central to the activity. From an

observer’s notes:

At KLICK! Summer Leadership Camp I watched as two kids who had become

friends on-line met in person for the first time. One was from a small, rural

school - the other a large urban school. One was black - the other white.

You could see it on their faces when they met…'You're Jasmine!' and 'This

can't be Racquelle!' I had to wonder if these two ever would have connected if

not for chat" (quote from observer).

In some sense, they are more self-conscious as they have to think about whom

they want to be. In another, they can be less self-conscious as they are liberated

from usual physical or social cues that prompt self-consciousness. To make

progress on this issue, it is useful to combine ideas from the discussion of self

with reflection/anticipation distinction. Hence, the difference might be described

by the difference between a reflective and anticipative stance toward the self. In

a reflective stance, students’ attention is directed toward whom they’ve been and

what that has to do with what is presently taking place. In an anticipative stance,

attention is directed on who students would like to become and what that has to

do with what is presently taking place ( Cross & Marcus, 1991; Marcus & Nurius,

1986; Packard, 1999).

The difference is not absolute. Dewey would have us remember that how we

think about the future is grounded largely, but not entirely, in our past

experiences. The difference is one of perspective and interpretation: the present

can be a product derived from what has preceded it, or the present can be an

idea to be tried out, a possibility to be explored.

Our observations suggest that students are creating modified (not completely

different) selves for the chat environment. The modified self is an idea, a

possibility to be tested. They venture out by choosing a name, saying

something, interacting with others. Then, they see how the world responds. It is

out of their hands as they wait for responses. They are not interacting with old

friends who know them, who respond in predictable ways. In ways that confirm

who they are or have been. In the chat world, they open themselves to new

experiences. They relinquish the familiar, the comfortable, the control.

Web page building: Finding coherence, rather than control

Web page design and construction is another popular activity at the KLICK! sites.

Web authoring is a common "starter activity" within KLICK! and is considered to

be a fundamental activity for "KLICK! technology literacy." Surveys from the first

year of the program indicate that 70% of all KLICK! kids have engaged in some

degree of web authoring, planning, and construction. Not only were students

designing personal pages, but also pages for others. For example, in the

particular site we observed, students were investing large amounts of time and

energy building pages for local businesses.

Although many different factors might be discussed (e.g. authenticity of the task,

connection and participation with a broader community), we direct our analysis

toward the role of undergoing and the opposite of control to understand why

building web pages is engaging. Conventional perspectives would cite this

activity as a good example of how mastery and its attainment are inherently

motivating. Constructs such as mastery learning, achievement motivation, and

mastery goal orientation all emerge from the assumption that doing well at a task

is and should be worthwhile in itself. Furthermore, in Weiner (1986) and others’

image of the ideal learner, the perception that one can control and perform with

competence in a situation is at the foundation. Thus, it can be proposed that

students find web-page building compelling because they feel a high, or at least

an increasing, degree of control, competence, mastery, or achievement.

These two students’ comments seem to reflect the need for mastery and control:

I like building web pages because you can do whatever you want. I can

change the background, add pictures, and make links to anything else I want.

Whenever I build a website I feel so good about it. It's such a good feeling to

be able to stand back and say, 'I made that' or 'this website looks that way

and does these things because I made it that way.' That's a cool feeling. I

feel good about myself.

In our analysis, however, we see these comments as evidence for something

different. We believe Dewey would hesitate to equate intrinsic motivation with

mastery because it tends to emphasize external, rather than internal and external

qualities, of experience. Dewey would find the concept of mastery, from many

perspectives, to be narrowly instrumental: that is, the value of mastery is often

derived from the practical matters it enables. Mastery enables us to do certain

things that, in turn, are valuable.

Dewey contends that education should not only enable students to

accomplish things, but also to accomplish things in a certain way. The

beautiful, the good, and the meaningful are all qualities bound to the internal,

as well as the external, nature of an activity. If the goal of education were

simply to help people accomplish things, then not much attention need be

paid to the nature experience within the doing and accomplishing. However,

as we have pointed out, Dewey insists on the value of both in aesthetic

experiences. Thus, while two objects - one artistic, one merely technically

proficient - may appear the same, the experience that yielded them would be

different. For Dewey, this is a difference that matters.

As for other perspectives that predispose human beings with an innate need for

mastery, Dewey would likely argue that mastery emerges not from within the

individual, but from the interaction between individual and world. Dewey would

probably take a similar tact when considering the current emphasis on control as

a central quality in intrinsic motivation. As discussed earlier, the concept of

control places the individual outside and separate from the world. By contrast, at

the heart of Dewey’s aesthetics, the individual is connected in doing and

undergoing with the world. We argue that the essence of intrinsic motivation – its

value, if you prefer - can be found in the intimacy of this connection.

Dewey would remind us that the basis of the aesthetic experience, whether

engaged in creating or appreciating art, scientific problem solving, or web-page

design, is the development and anticipation of unity: the forming of a whole from

disparate parts. In other words, in an experience we look forward to a sense of

increased coherence (Prawat, in press). Coherence or unity is the basis of

meaning, ethics, aesthetics, and spirituality; its absence is the basis for

confusion, discord, and loss. Thus, people seek coherence, wholeness, and

unity, not just control. The experience of developing coherence is felt as an

expanding of one’s capacity as a human being. To be able to live more fully to

one’s potential, not the perception of control or mastery, exhilarates. Dewey

makes this point clearly:

Experience to the degree that it is experience is heightened vitality. (Dewey,

LW10: 19).

Look at some other comments from students. Although they may be seen as

evidence of control and mastery, they can also be seen as evidence for the thrill

of creating, an activity imbued with the striving for greater coherence.

Creating something is what I love. I get to make my pages look however I

want. That's what's cool .

I was hired by a Nature Center to build them a web site. It was cool because

they didn't really know anything about computers and they let me totally

design the site. I got to decide how it would look, what features it should have

- they just told me what words to write.

The technology of web-building facilitates this feeling of development and growth.

To take part in this transformation of what they are capable of – which means a

transformation of both who they are and the world around them – is the “raison

d’être” of web-page building. One student described most exciting things about

webpage building as the opportunities to create something of his own design and

to fiddle around with features and appearances until he found a combination of

effects, options, and styles that suited both him and the needs of the web site.

Particular qualities of webpage building deserve attention. As mentioned in a

previous section, the computer technology helps to bring action with

consequence in close connection. Students can try things, click the “Preview in

Browser” button, and see what happens. Upon seeing what happens, they can

then try something new in response. The linking of action and consequence is

due directly to the ease of alternating between the webpage editor and browser.

This critical quality enables the transformative activity to flow and development,

to build toward consummation. If action and consequence were to become

disjoint, then hypotheses could not be tested, and results could not be responded

to. The activity would cease to rush along as an unfolding event as it was

drained of dramatic tension and would crumble into a series of loosely

sequenced occurrences. The computer technology (hardware and software)

allow ready pursuit of questions such as “will it work” and “what happens if…?”

Similarly, unlike many “real-life” activities, technology activities such as webpage

construction incur virtually no material costs to students. The cost of doing

something repeatedly or slowly is the same as doing something once or quickly.

Therefore, reducing the constraints of having to perform efficiently and correctly

opens up the possibilities for exploration and risk taking. One student

commented, "That's what's so cool about computers. If you make a mistake you

can just change it - it's so easy." Thus, the emphasis shifts from getting it right

(attaining mastery) to getting better (increasing capacity). As the cost of making

errors is reduced and students are more willing to make errors, they are more

willing to suffer the consequences of their actions. In other words, they are more

willing to experience the opposite of control and to undergo the influence of the

world.

Conclusion: An expanded view of control, learning, and technology

The central role of control and choice in the rationale of various “After 3”

programs is based on the assumption that students will be most motivated when

given opportunities to pursue activities that interest them. Our discussion of

Dewey suggests that interest is not only something students bring to a situation,

but is a quality inherent to the situation itself. For Dewey, the important kind of

interest is that which emerges in the drama of the activity, rather than that which

is brought and external to the experience. In aesthetic experiences, the

development and anticipation of greater coherence and capacity is inherently

interesting.

In this light, whether students choose initially to engage in an activity or not is, to

some extent, unrelated to the intrinsic qualities of the experience. The issue of

control and choice is more salient when as individuals consider whether or not to

continue in an experience as it emerges – that is, the extent that they choose to

open themselves, to take in, to suffer, to experience the opposite of control. In

very few cases is the undergoing an inevitable feature of a situation. There is

always choice and control about whether one wishes to be transformed by in an

experience.

Thus, our Deweyan analysis of "After 3" programs has generated an alternative

perspective for considering the role of control in learning. Yes, these programs

do offer students control over the activities they engage, but there are more

interesting issues of control to consider. To begin, giving students choice of what

they do has little to do with technology – many other instructional programs

feature student choice and have nothing to do with technology. By contrast, the

interesting issues about control that we conclude with has everything to do with

technology. Technologies such as games, on-line chat, and webpage building

enable students to control the intensity and rate of undergoing. In technology

environments, students can stop, start, go faster or slower – they can control the

relationship between action and consequence, and between doing and

undergoing, to a greater degree than in “real” life environments. From the notes

of an observer watching a student, who likes to experiment with different

identities while chatting on-line:

Sometimes this student would quit chatting with people who make her

uncomfortable. One of her on-line friends kept asking her about boys - she

didn't want to talk about boys so she just quit.

To undergo the consequences of one’s actions is not easy. To relinquish control

in the process of opening oneself fully is a risk. It is a risk, however, that must be

taken if any real learning is to occur. Uncertainty and risk are key to

transformation, drama, inquiry, and creativity. By the same token, uncertainty is

at the dark heart of confusion and fear. Technology helps students with this

apparent paradox by providing both the opportunities for risk-taking and the

ability to manage this risk. The chat and game technologies create environments

to take the risk of undergoing intense, potentially transformative, experiences.

Students can pause, leave, and begin again if the experience becomes too

intense or aversive. While it may be true some students may never fully engage

in deep experiences because technology allows them to exit so readily, it is also

true that many students may never consider engaging deeply unless they had

these “technological reassurances.”

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