The ontogeny and phylogeny of cultural cognition.
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Transcript of The ontogeny and phylogeny of cultural cognition.
The ontogeny and phylogeny of
cultural cognition
Some uniquely human abilities
• language
• artifacts and technology
• social practices and institutions
Some uniquely human abilities
• language
• artifacts and technology
• social practices and institutions
taking a walk together
pointing out interesting sights for others
holding a ladder steady for someone
playing a duet
meeting for lunch
planning a party
play
ing
card
sdriving in traffic
holding open a door for someone
showing your vacation photos
attending a
summer school
‘playing house’ with your kid
helping your kid with homework
going on a date
co-au
thorin
g a
pape
r
playing hide-and-seek
cooking dinner
together
All involve sharing and collaboration.
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll (2005)
All involve sharing and collaboration.
We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to
participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality.
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll (2005)
All involve sharing and collaboration.
We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to
participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality.
Two components:1) understanding of others’ goals and intentions
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll (2005)
All involve sharing and collaboration.
We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to
participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality.
Two components:1) understanding of others’ goals and intentions2) motivation to share psychological states with others
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll (2005)
• By 9-12 months, infants understand something about others’ goals and intentions.
• Young children with autism and chimpanzees may have (at least) some understanding of others’ goals.
• An understanding of others’ goals and intentions gives individuals a tremendous social advantage in terms of being able to explain and predict others’ behavior.
• But neither is enough to explain some interesting aspects of human cognition.
• In addition…
Sharing intentions
Understanding of others’ goals and intentions
ResultReality
failure
success
accident
stateof world
+ constraintsAction
GOAL
relevant skills,knowledge
INTENTION
Decision-makingrelevantreality
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll (2005)
Attention
Joint Attention
SHARED GOAL
relevant skills,knowledge
relevant reality
Decision-Making
JOINT INTENTION
SHARED GOAL
relevant reality
Decision-Making
JOINT INTENTION
relevant skills,knowledge
Sharing intentions
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll (2005)
Sharing and coordinating psychological states
– Motivation to share (joint emotions, attention, interest)
• ‘primary intersubjectivity’
• joint attention
• declarative pointing
– Collaboration (joint goals, intentions)
• role reversal
• helping
• cooperation and collaborative activities
Sharing and coordinating psychological states
– Motivation to share (joint emotions, attention, interest)
• ‘primary intersubjectivity’
• joint attention
• declarative pointing
– Collaboration (joint goals, intentions)
• role reversal
• helping
• cooperation and collaborative activities
Motivation to share in infants
• Early proto-conversations (early infancy; sharing emotions) (e.g., work by Rochat & Striano, Stern, Trevarthen)
Motivation to share in infants
• Early proto-conversations (early infancy)(e.g., work by Rochat & Striano, Stern, Trevarthen)
• Joint attention (by 9 months; sharing attention & interest; triadic) (e.g., work by Bakeman & Adamson, Tomasello, Trevarthen)
13-month-old infant in joint attentional engagement
Motivation to share in infants
• Early proto-conversations (early infancy)(e.g., work by Rochat & Striano, Stern, Trevarthen)
• Joint attention (by 9 months)
(e.g., work by Bakeman & Adamson, Tomasello, Trevarthen)
• Declarative gestures(e.g., work by Bates, Bruner, Camaioni, Lempers, Tomasello)
– shows (around 10 months)
– points (around 12 months)
3-year-old child pointing declaratively
Motivation to share in infants
• Early proto-conversations (early infancy)(e.g., work by Rochat & Striano, Stern, Trevarthen)
• Joint attention (by 9 months)
(e.g., work by Bakeman & Adamson, Tomasello, Trevarthen)
• Declarative gestures(e.g., work by Bates, Bruner, Camaioni, Lempers, Tomasello)
– shows (around 10 months)
– points (around 12 months)– Moore: not sharing, just attention to self
Liszkowski, Carpenter, Henning, Striano, & Tomasello (2004)
• 12-month-olds
• Toys were activated to elicit pointing. E reacted to infants’ points in one of four different ways:
– Ignore
– Look only to Event
– Look only to Face
– Joint Attention
Infants were most satisfied in the Joint Attention condition:
• in Joint Attention, they pointed more across trials
• in the other conditions, within trials, they repeated points more often.
12-month-olds point to share attention and interest.
# of trials with a point
Repeated pointing
Joint Attention + -Face - +Event - +Ignore
- +
Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello (in press)
When E misunderstands the infant’s referent, even if E reacts with excitement, 12-month-old infants repeat their pointing. Infants’ pointing is thus about specific objects or events, not just to obtain an adult reaction. (also evidence of collaborative communication: message repair)
Motivation to share in chimpanzees and children with autism
• Early proto-conversations: no (?) (autism: e.g., work by Hobson) (chimpanzees: Tomonaga et al.)
• Joint attention: no (autism: e.g., work by Carpenter, Charman, Dawson, Mundy, Wetherby)
(chimpanzees: e.g., Bard & Vauclair, Tomasello & Carpenter)
• Declarative gestures: no (autism: e.g., work by Baron-Cohen, Carpenter, Loveland, Mundy, Sigman)
(chimpanzees: e.g., Gomez, Tomasello & Carpenter)
Sharing and coordinating intentions
– Motivation to share• ‘primary intersubjectivity’
• joint attention
• declarative pointing
– Collaboration
Collaboration
Bratman (1992): 1. shared goal: each participant has the goal that
we (in mutual knowledge) do X together
2. coordination of plans/intentions. This requires that:
• each participant understands both roles of the interaction (so can reverse roles if needed) and
• each can help the other with his role if needed.
Sharing and coordinating intentions
– Motivation to share• ‘primary intersubjectivity’
• joint attention
• declarative pointing
– Collaboration• role reversal
• helping
• cooperation and collaborative activities
Carpenter, Tomasello, & Striano (2005); Tomasello & Carpenter (2005)
• 12- and 18-month-olds, children with autism, chimpanzees
• E performed one role of an action and had S perform the other, e.g.,:• E hid a toy for S to find, or
• E held out a plate for S to place a toy on it.
• Test: E gave the object(s) for the other role to S and waited.
• Does S perform E’s previous role (hiding or offering) toward E (while looking at her)?
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
12 mos 18 mos Chimpanzees Autism DD
% o
f S
s w
ho h
id w
ith lo
ok to
E
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
12 mos 18 mos Chimpanzees
% o
f Ss w
ho o
ffer
ed
with
look
to E
Hiding Task
Offering Task
* p=.053
Infants sometimes reversed roles (hid the toy for E or held out the plate for her) and looked to E.
Children with autism and chimpanzees sometimes performed these actions but did so without looks to E.
They may have been reversing at an action, rather than a psychological level. (see also work by Hobson)
Sharing and coordinating intentions
– Motivation to share• ‘primary intersubjectivity’• joint attention• declarative pointing
– Collaboration• role reversal
• helping (see also Kuhlmeier, Wynn, & Bloom, 2003) • cooperation and collaborative activities
Liszkowski, Carpenter, Striano, & Tomasello (2006)
12- and 18-month-olds
• Infants watched E repeat an action (e.g., punching holes) with a target object.
• The target and a distractor object were displaced.
• E began looking around.
Infants pointed to help the adult by informing her about the location of the object she was looking for.
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
12 months 18 months
Pro
port
ion
of tr
ials
with
poi
ntTarget Distractor
Warneken & Tomasello (2006): 18-month-old infant
Warneken & Tomasello (2006): nursery-reared chimpanzee
Warneken & Tomasello (2006)
• 18-month-olds help instrumentally, in many different situations
• chimpanzees: only when E reached– but other positive results for chimpanzees too
• helping doesn’t necessarily involve a shared goal: understanding other’s individual goal is sufficient
Sharing and coordinating intentions
– Motivation to share• ‘primary intersubjectivity’
• joint attention
• declarative pointing
– Collaboration• role reversal
• helping
• cooperation and collaborative activities
Sharing and coordinating intentions
– Motivation to share• ‘primary intersubjectivity’
• joint attention
• declarative pointing
– Collaboration• role reversal
• helping
• cooperation and collaborative activities– communication (Clark, 1997; Golinkoff, 1993; Sperber & Wilson, 1986; Tomasello et
al., 2005, submitted)
Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello (2005); Hare & Tomasello (2004)
• 14- to 24-month-olds,
chimpanzees
• E hid a toy/food in one of two opaque containers.
• E indicated the toy’s location by pointing or gazing ostensively at the correct container.
Infants pass this test.
Chimpanzees do not use cooperative/communicative (pointing) cues but do use competitive (reaching) ones.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
14 months 18 months 24 months
Mean
% c
orr
ect
resp
on
ses +
/- S
E
Gaze
Point
Infants
Chimpanzees
Sharing and coordinating intentions
– Motivation to share• ‘primary intersubjectivity’• joint attention• declarative pointing
– Collaboration• role reversal• helping• cooperation and collaborative activities
– communication
– instrumental
Problem-Solving Play
Parallel
RolesTube with Handles
Trampoline
Complementary
RolesElevator Double Tube
trampoline
double tubeelevator
tube with handles
Warneken, Chen, & Tomasello (2006); Liebal et al. (in prep.)
• 18- and 24-month-olds, chimpanzees (and children with autism)
• Social and instrumental games
• E1 & E2 demonstrate how to operate the apparatus.
• E1 cooperates with the child to perform the joint activity.
• E1 refrains from the activity for 15 seconds.
Warneken, Chen, & Tomasello (2006)
Warneken, Chen, & Tomasello (2006)
By 18 months, infants are able to cooperate with an adult to achieve a joint goal.
• When the adult stopped playing his role, children communicatively requested his continued participation.
• New results: at least by 2 years, children do this even in tasks in which they could achieve the goal individually (Gräfenhein, Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, in prep.)
Chimpanzees (and children with autism) showed far less coordination of roles and no communicative requests for their partner’s continued participation.• Chimpanzees showed no interest in the social games.
Sharing and coordinating intentions
– Motivation to share• ‘primary intersubjectivity’• joint attention• declarative pointing
– Collaboration• role reversal• helping• cooperation and collaborative activities
– communication – instrumental– pretense
Pretense
• Pretend play is (probably) uniquely human.
• It is often collaborative (shared goal, roles, etc.).• Some consider it to be the earliest form of true collective
intentionality in infancy (Rakoczy, 2006).
• It sets the stage for later collective beliefs (money, marriage, government…).
Summary
• In addition to their understanding of others’ goals and intentions, infants demonstrate:
1. the motivation to share psychological states with others
and
2. ability to cooperate and coordinate intentions with others.
• Chimpanzees and children with autism do not show evidence of either of these additional motivations or abilities.
Where does it come from?
• Primates are competitive. Humans in addition are cooperative – they evolved skills and motivations for collaborating.
(a sketchy)
Phylogenetic hypothesis
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll (2005)
• Primates are competitive. Humans in addition are cooperative – they evolved skills and motivations for collaborating.
• How?– Individuals or groups who could collaborate more effectively
had a selective advantage (more food, better shelter & protection, etc.).
(a sketchy)
Phylogenetic hypothesis
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll (2005)
• Primates are competitive. Humans in addition are cooperative – they evolved skills and motivations for collaborating.
• How?– Individuals or groups who could collaborate more effectively
had a selective advantage (more food, better shelter & protection, etc.).
• The abilities to share and collaborate made language and other cultural learning and creation possible.
(a sketchy)
Phylogenetic hypothesis
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll (2005)
• Primates are competitive. Humans in addition are cooperative – they evolved skills and motivations for collaborating.
• How?– Individuals or groups who could collaborate more effectively
had a selective advantage (more food, better shelter & protection, etc.).
• The abilities to share and collaborate made language and other cultural learning and creation possible.
• Over cultural-historical time, repeated, habitual instances of sharing intentions resulted in social practices and institutions (e.g., marriage, money, government).
(a sketchy)
Phylogenetic hypothesis
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll (2005)
• Two interweaving lines of development:1. understanding of goals and intentions
2. motivation to share psychological states and activities
(a sketchy)
Ontogenetic hypothesis
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll (2005)
• Two interweaving lines of development:1. understanding of goals and intentions
2. motivation to share psychological states and activities
• The motivation to share transforms the understanding intentions line, resulting in shared collaborative activities.
(a sketchy)
Ontogenetic hypothesis
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll (2005)
Understanding intentions line:
Emotions → Goals → Intentions
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll (2005)
Understanding intentions line:
Emotions → Goals → Intentions
Sharing motivation line:
+
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll (2005)
Understanding intentions line:
Emotions → Goals → Intentions
Sharing motivation line:
Product: Proto-conversations
(3 months)
+
=
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll (2005)
Understanding intentions line:
Emotions → Goals → Intentions
Sharing motivation line:
Product: Proto- →conversations
(3 months)
Shared goals(9 months)
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll (2005)
Understanding intentions line:
Emotions → Goals → Intentions
Sharing motivation line:
Product: Proto- →conversations
(3 months)
Shared goals →(9 months)
Collaboration(14 months)
Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll (2005)
Individualistic(chimpanzees, children with
autism)
Collaborative(1-year-old+ infants)
gaze following joint attention
social learning instructed learning
social manipulation cooperative communication
group activity collaboration
Tomasello & Carpenter (in press)
Take-home message
• What is unique about human cultural cognition is the motivation to share and the ability to collaborate.
• The interaction of:– a biological adaptation– cultural-historical processes, and– individual development
results in uniquely human abilities ranging from language to taking a walk together, all of which involve shared intentionality.