6 ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2018

Lassina Zerbo is the executive secretary of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization.

On October 7, the U.S. Department of

State issued a readout on Secretary

of State Mike Pompeo’s meetings in

Pyongyang indicating that North Korean leader

Kim Jong Un “invited inspectors to visit the

Punggye-ri nuclear test site to confirm that it

has been irreversibly dismantled.”1

The Nuclear Test Ban and the Verifiable Denuclearization of North Korea

By Lassina Zerbo

Subsequently, Pompeo was asked by

reporters when international nuclear

inspectors would be allowed onto the site.

Pompeo replied, “[A]s soon as we get it

logistically worked out, Chairman Kim

said he’s ready to allow them to come in,

and there’s a lot of logistics that will be

required to execute that, but when we

get them, we’ll put them on the ground.”

Pompeo had no comment to a follow-up

question on which organization would be

invited to conduct inspections.2

Some argue the Trump-Kim summit

statement in June was light on detail

about how to achieve denuclearization of

the Korean peninsula. Denuclearization,

the term itself, was not defined by the

parties to this statement and may indeed

have different interpretations. From

my perspective as executive secretary

of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Organization (CTBTO), it is a pity that

nothing explicit was included related

to ending nuclear testing, but the State

Department readout on the matter

is encouraging.

Verification is key to permanently

ending nuclear test explosions in North

Korea. At his press conference following

the Singapore summit with Kim, U.S.

President Donald Trump stated that

denuclearization would be verifiable. This

is important. Verifiable measures are at

the heart of lasting nuclear arms control,

nonproliferation, and disarmament.

It must be based on the best available

technologies, the best expertise, and the

most rigorous protocols.

North Korea, in destroying facilities

at its Punggye-ri test site on May 24,

aimed to show its commitment to

ending nuclear tests. Yet, the invited

international journalists who witnessed

the destruction from a distance are not

experts able to characterize and establish

a baseline of the current state of the

site. So although the declared closure is

welcome, those present lacked the skills

and necessary specialized equipment to

assess the activities that took place.

The CTBTO and its technological tools

are uniquely placed to provide adequate

verification and to monitor an end to

nuclear tests in North Korea. On the

technical side, the CTBTO can achieve this

through its competencies and capabilities

in remote monitoring via the International

Monitoring System (IMS), as well as

through expertise in in-field activities

and data collection gained through the

development of the On-site Inspection

element of the Comprehensive Test Ban

Treaty (CTBT) verification regime. The

IMS is already up and running and has

detected all six North Korean tests using

seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and

radionuclide technologies at its global

network of more than 300 facilities. After

each test conducted by North Korea,

7ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2018

A North Korean officer on May 24 explains to the invited international journalists the explosive demolition process undertaken to disable the Punggye-ri nuclear test facility. However, verification that the site is no longer usable for underground nuclear tests requires technical expertise and sophisticated analysis equipment. (Photo: News1-Dong-A Ilbo via Getty Images)

CTBT states-signatories received raw

data and analyzed products from the

International Data Centre (IDC) in a

timely and reliable manner.

The IMS is more than 90 percent

complete, and the IDC data processing

and analysis capacity continues to

improve and evolve on pace with

technological advancement. Two

integrated field exercises have proven

that the on-site inspection regime has

reached an advanced state of readiness.

Every nuclear test carried out by North

Korea has been detected with precision

and timeliness. Monitoring technologies

and data have made vital contributions

to disaster risk reduction and mitigation.

In addition, there are countless other

civil and scientific areas, such as climate

change studies and earth and atmospheric

sciences, where IMS data has proven to

have immense value.

Ongoing dialogue and negotiations

with Pyongyang have yielded important

gains for regional and international

security and stability. The CTBTO

stands ready, within its mandate, to

contribute to the process of verifiable

denuclearization if called on by its

states-signatories.

CTBTO MandateThe CTBTO’s mandate is to verify

compliance with the prohibition on

nuclear test explosions established by

the treaty. If requested, however,

the CTBTO could make available its

monitoring assets and expertise as

part of any internationally led process

to provide reliable verification of the

irreversible dismantlement of the test site

at Punggye-ri.

The CTBTO has the in-house expertise

and equipment ready to deploy

should states-signatories call for it. The

organization has developed considerable

proficiency in areas such as surveying

and in-field measurement that could

be of relevance to confirming the

closure of the Punggye-ri site. In-field

measurement techniques and equipment

that can be deployed include gamma

radiation monitoring and in-situ gamma

spectroscopy, environmental sampling,

passive seismological monitoring (micro-

arrays), magnetic and gravitational

field mapping, electrical conductivity

measurements, ground penetrating radar,

and airborne gamma spectroscopy and

multispectral imaging.

Without verification, the international

community could be left wondering

whether the tunnels, equipment, and

other related infrastructure could be

reconstituted with little delay should

negotiations on denuclearization and

peace come to a halt or an agreement

break down.

Specifically, concerning the verification

of test-site closures, the CTBTO can

potentially offer key operational

verification tasks starting with a site

characterization survey to ascertain and

document the state of the site after its

reported closure. The survey, including

8 ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2018

in-field measurements and environmental

sampling, would also provide a baseline

of the current state of the site.

Long-term verification could include

periodic site visits to compare to the

baseline, along with ongoing local

seismic monitoring, and ongoing remote

monitoring through the IMS. This is

what the CTBTO is capable of doing.

As the treaty is not yet in force, on-site

inspections cannot therefore take place

in line with its provisions, but the

potential indeed exists for utilizing

CTBT monitoring technologies and

inspection expertise.

Joining the CTBT The path to the verifiable denuclearization

of the Korean peninsula runs through

the CTBT. Any final agreement with

North Korea must include signature and

ratification of the treaty. The opportunity

to demonstrate to the world the value

of the treaty and efficacy of the most

sophisticated and far-reaching verification

regime ever devised should not be missed.

North Korea is not yet a signatory to

the treaty. If the country is serious about

confidence building, at the very least it

should match the United States’ signature

without delay. There is really no downside

to doing so. In fact, earlier this year,

North Korea’s permanent representative

to the Conference on Disarmament

announced that the North will “join

international disarmament efforts for

a total ban on nuclear tests.” This can

logically mean only one thing: joining

the CTBT.

Matching the United States by signing

the CTBT would be a powerful indication

of the willingness of North Korea’s

leadership to move toward verifiable

denuclearization. Taking this leap would

also contribute to the regime integrating

with the community of states who

already adhere to an international no-test

norm. It would contribute to bringing

North Korea back onto the world

stage as a responsible member of the

international community.

Joining the CTBT could be a precursor

to inviting the organization to view

the test site. This would not be without

precedent: other CTBT states-signatories

have invited the CTBTO to conduct

activities at other former nuclear weapons

test sites. The former Soviet test site at

Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan has hosted

a number of on-site inspection field tests

and exercises. The CTBTO was invited to

witness the closing of the French test sites

of Moruroa and Fangatayufa in 1999.

On September 25, the CTBTO

welcomed the ratification of the treaty

by Thailand and the signing by Tuvalu.

The CTBT now has 184 states-signatories

and 167 ratifying states. The support

and resolve by Thailand and Tuvalu

taking such actions have strengthened

global efforts to achieve a nuclear-test-

free world. With each signature and

ratification, there is a growing chorus

of voices demanding an end to nuclear

testing that becomes more and more

difficult to ignore.

The de facto norm against nuclear

testing underpinned by the CTBT is

stronger than ever. It continues to be

vital to international peace and security,

The CTBTO and its

technological tools are

uniquely placed to provide

adequate verification and to

monitor an end to nuclear

tests in North Korea.

Lassina Zerbo, executive secretary of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, at the ninth Ministerial Meeting of the Friends of the CTBT on September 27. (Photo: CTBTO)

9ARMS CONTROL TODAY November 2018

and although it may feel as if some

international institutions and regimes

are starting to fray, global support for

the treaty continues to rise. Yet, this

momentum cannot be sustained without

the unwavering support and commitment

by states-signatories.

In order to achieve the ultimate goal

of a world free of nuclear tests, it is

important to ensure that opportunities

are identified and acted on. Regrettably,

there have been missed opportunities

over the years where the CTBT, along

with the monitoring assets, expertise,

and infrastructure available at the

CTBTO, could have been used in

important ways to advance international

peace and security. During the high-

level UN Security Council meeting on

the nonprolifereration of weapons of

mass destruction on September 26, CTBT

supporters had the opportunity to make

a strong case for the treaty and its entry

into force. These are the stages and

platforms where they should consistently

ENDNOTES

1. Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Department

of State, “Secretary Pompeo's Meetings in

Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of

Korea,” October 7, 2018, https://www.state.

gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/10/286482.htm.

2. Michael Pompeo, “Remarks with Traveling

Press,” October 8, 2017, https://www.state.gov/

secretary/remarks/2018/10/286490.htm

3. Although 184 states have signed the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, eight Annex

2 states (China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel,

Pakistan, North Korea, and the United States)

need to complete their ratification procedures

before the treaty can enter into force.

4. Lassina Zerbo, Address to the Ninth

Friends of the CTBT Ministerial Meeting,

New York, September 27, 2018, https://

www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/

public_information/2018/Ministerial_Meeting/

Ninth_Friends_of_the_CTBT_Ministerial_

Meeting_Statement_by_ES_FINAL.pdf.

Japanese Foreign Minister, Taro Kono, co-chairs the ninth Ministerial Meeting of the Friends of the CTBT on September 27. The joint statement, organized by Japan, Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands and endorsed by other states, urges North Korea “to sign and ratify the CTBT as a matter of priority.” (Photo: CTBTO)

and emphatically promote the urgency

of the entry into force of the CTBT.

These are the moments to seize and act

on, not the moments to squander away

due to politics.

Unique OpportunityCurrent developments on the Korean

peninsula may provide a unique

opportunity for the CTBT. North Korea is

one of the eight remaining CTBT Annex

2 states, whose ratifications are needed

for entry into force.3 It is vital not to

miss this opportunity to demonstrate to

the world the value of the treaty and the

efficacy of one of the most sophisticated

and far-reaching verification regimes

ever devised.

All states, particularly North Korea,

should join in this historic journey to put

an end to nuclear tests through the entry

into force and universalization of the

CTBT. Together, we will ensure nuclear

tests become a relic of the past. By doing

so, we will put in place one of the most

practical and achievable elements of a

nuclear-weapons-free world.4