The Northern Expedition: to be United or not United?

7/30/2019 The Northern Expedition: to be United or not United?

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The Northern Expedition:to be United or not United?GOVT 451

Esther Chung

Final Paper


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Introduction

The paper argues that the Northern Expedition is a successful campaign strictly in the

military sense, but is a failure in terms of political unity of the warring factions. The Northern

Expedition sheds light upon the divisions among military coalitions in 19th century China,

whether they are between the warlords or within the United Front of the expedition. The

expedition may have started out grandly with a united expeditionary force posed against the

divided group of warlords, but ended in flimsy conclusions as to who conquered China.

Judging solely upon the military descriptions of this paper, the expedition may appear

successful. However, when the extant factions within the warlords, within the United Front,

and within the second KMT forces (Collective Armies) after the split are examined, it is clear

that the Northern Expedition is filled with self-fulfilling purposes and narrow-minded leaders.

The paper is divided into three sections: the initial period of United Front against the divided

warlords; the middle period of split within the United Front; the final period of divided KMT

against divided warlords. Each section first describes the campaign in its military tactics and

details, and is followed by a critique that suggests the reasons for the divisions. The paper

examines three divisions and the reasons vary, but an overarching theme in the divisions is

the self-interest of each party overpowering the need to unify China. As a result, the Northern

Expedition begins with warring factions and ends with a civil war.

There are a few disclaimers that the reader must be aware of. The Northern

Expedition is a two year campaign but is vast in its details from small skirmishes to major

battles. The paper focuses on mostly major battles that depict the division within the warlords

or within the United Front and how these differences affected the outcomes. With that said,

much of the military details of the campaign branch from the source of Donald A. Jordan,

because the extant books written on the Northern Expedition alone with such high level of

details are scarce.

1

Most of Jordans sources are based on original Chinese records, so I leave

the rest of the judgment to the readers. Throughout the paper, the term KMT and NRA are

used sometimes to substitute the term expeditionary force, the coalition of CCP and KMT.

This is because the Northern Expedition is known to be a KMT-led movement in Chinese

sources, and both the CCP and KMT leaders have agreed that in the United Front, the CCP

1Also suggested source: Harold R. Isaacs The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution. If Chinese-savvy, then Bei fa

zhan shi / [bian zhu zhe Guo fang bu shi zheng ju], / [], [Taibei] : Guo fang bushi zheng ju, Min guo 48 [1959], [] : , 48 [1959].


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members would enter the NRA as individuals, not as CCP-representatives.2

Background

The story begins with the birth of Republic of China and the fall of last imperial

dynasty in China. After the Revolution of 1911 establishing Republic of China, the Qing

dynasty fell in 1912 with the abdication of prince Pu-yi. Although Sun Yat-sen was the

original president of the republic, he gave the title to Yuan in exchange for his convincing the

Puyi to abdicate. Yuan was a man with military influence and connection with Qing, which

Sun needed to stabilize China after the revolution.3 However, soon Yuan and Sun became

enemies over the issue of selling Chinese assets to foreigners for funds. Sun was outraged at

Yuan for committing the same crime that the Manchu practiced. Sun and Yuan split here, and

Sun and his nationalist party had to flee before Yuans vast connection with provincial and

local armies. But as Yuan himself tried to rise as emperor of China, there was a general

uproar and he was overthrown. He died quietly in 1916. Yuans legacy was that he had

allowed provincial and local military leaders to rise to power as he promoted a Tuchun or

military governor system. While neglecting an establishment of strong imperial army, Yuan

legitimized all forces as long as they sent their revenues to Peking.4 Thus the age of warring

states began.

Sun Yat-sen, having founded Tengmenghui (United League) in 19055, and having

harbored the dream to democratize China as early as 1894,6 did not give up so easily. In 1918,

he was called back to establish a government in Canton by Hakka general, Chen Chiung-

ming.7 Though Suns life was endangered twice in this alliance when Chen disagreed with

Sun, Sun was able to establish his Canton government by 1923.8 By this time, Russia began

to talk with Sun about alliance without introducing Communism to China, 9 and Sun sought

options to democratize China by seeking support in Western countries.

10

But withoutrealizing his National Revolution, Sun died in 1925, leaving the project to Chiang Kai-shek.

2Chinese Wikipedia, Northern Expedition (20 Nov 2011), translated into English

[accessed 01 Nov 2012].3

Wikipedia, Yuan Shikai (22 Nov 2012), [accessed 23 Nov 2012] .4

William Morwood, Duel for the Middle Kingdom, (New York, NY: Everest House, 1980). p.67.5

Ibid., p.31.6

Ibid., p.30.7

Ibid., p.79.8

Ibid., p.84.9 Ibid., p.85.10

Ibid., p.86.


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Sun had established before his death the United Front between the CCP and the KMT, and it

was now Chiangs project to realize Suns dream through the military campaign, the Northern

Expedition. The objective of the expedition was to drive out the warlords and unify China, as

it is evident in the Central Executive Committee (CEC) meeting:

The hardships of the workers, peasants, merchants, and students and the

suffering of all under the oppressive imperialists and warlords; the peace and

unification of China called for by Sun Yat-sen; the gathering of the National

Assembly ruined by Tuan Chi-jui; all demand the elimination of Wu Pei-fu

and completion of national unification.11

However this objective to unify China was not the common intention of all parties involved

in the expedition. For one, the warlords were divided amongst themselves based on their

regional identities as well as personal ambitions. The United Front did not share in the stated

objective, for the CCP leaders harbored different intentions in joining the KMT. 12 Thus in

expounding upon the Northern Expedition, the paper will examine sequentially the division

within the warlords, between CCP and KMT, and the result of divided warlords warring

against a divided front. Although there are moments of unity in the United Front and the

Northern Expedition, the campaign is largely characterized by the divisions, as the issuing of

civil war right after the expedition evinces.

Initial period of the expedition

Hunan and Hupeh

The initial period of the expedition was wrought with divisions within the warlords.

In other words, the initial period of the expedition was an era of successful military

campaigns of the expeditionary force against the warlords. As the National Revolutionary

Army (NRA) was in its nascent stage, it had to count on the weakness of the warlords ratherthan their own strength.13 The expedition began with the launch into the Hunan province in

11 Ko-ming wen hsien [Revolutionary documents], edited by Lo Chia-lun, (Taipei: Historical Materials Editing

Committee of the Party History of the KMT), from 1950 onward as a series. Vol.12, p.831. in Donald A. Jordan,

The Northern Expedition: Chinas National Revolution of 1926-1928, (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawai,

1976), p.64.12

As the CCP leader when the United Front was formed, Chen Du-xiu joined the coalition with intention to

infiltrate KMT and to turn it over for CCPs advantage; KMT leader Sun Yat-sen allowed the coalition with the

condition of CCP joining the KMT as individuals to be taken under KMT leadership, not with a group identity of

the CCP; Chiang Kai-shek follows Suns example and never quite trusts the coalition with the CCP when he

becomes the leader of the KMT and the expedition.13

Donald A. Jordan, p.67.


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1926. Throughout these initial phases of the campaign, two military tactics come into play: 1)

the strategy to attack one warlord at a time and to utilize the warlords internal divisions for

the benefit of the expeditionary forces; 2) the strategy to portray KMT and expeditionary

forces as the legitimate national party and force. As these tactics were successfully launched

in the initial period, more warlords joined the NRA initiative to save themselves, and the

locals joined the expeditionary forces to participate in the national cause.

The background context of Hunan explicates why the expedition chose to begin with

Hunan. Prior to 1926, Hunan was a region filled with northern Chinese warlords. There were

constant conflicts between the native subordinates and the regional overlords.14 This allowed

the KMT to manipulate one warlord against another within the province during the campaign.

As Hunan was a mountainous region and a hard area to penetrate with direct, all-out military

attack, the KMT resorted to such a manipulation.

As an example of warlords division, there was a native-subordinate and northern

Chinese warlord rivalry between Chao Heng-ti and Wu Pei-fu, and between Chao and his

own subordinates. Under the jurisdiction Chao, there were Yeh Kai-hsin, Tang Sheng-chih,

and Ho Yao-tsu as the Hunanese division commanders.15 Chao relied on Yeh Kai-hsin the

most, and tried to wield his power in the region by using Yeh to check the other commanders

power. The KMT saw through this division and utilized it to the fullest. The KMT had inner

connections in the region through a KMT member, Tan Yen-kai. 16 Tan maintained his force

of 15,000 Hunanese troops in Kwangtung, and was a man worth of KMT trust, for he had

expressed coinciding personal ideology with that of the KMT. In addition to Tan, the KMT

also had Liu Wen-tao, Chen Ming-shu, and Pai Chung-hsi as insiders into Hunan, for they

had personal connections with Tang Sheng-chih.17 There were connections even on the

highest level of military commanders, between Chiang himself and Chao Heng-ti. It is

recorded that Chiang even telegrammed Chao a week before the July 1926 beginning of theexpedition and pleaded to reunite in the new national movement that would strengthen

China against her enemies.18 All these diplomatic communications were made to avoid any

bloody battles over the mountain passes near the Yangtze basin.

14Ibid., p.68.

15Ibid., p.70.

16Tan was placed in Hunan after the Revolution of 1911, and but was forced into exile by the northern

warlords. Ibid.17

The KMT also had Cheng Chien, commander of the NRAs Sixth Army, who was a classmate of Ho Tao-tsu,

another Hunanese commander. Ibid.18

Ibid., p.71.


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The KMT began to manipulate the division between Chao and Tang. Because Tang,

like many local warlords, hoarded his income from taxing his area, he was not happy when

Chao ordered his Hunanese divisions to send the local taxes they collected to the Hunan

capital, Changsha.19 Disgruntled Tang listened to KMT persuasions and they agreed to an

alliance on February 24, 1926.20 When Tang attacked Chao, with Wu Pei-fu conveniently out

of the scene,21 Chao had to make a run. Chao fled out of Changsha, into the north. 22 The

KMT jumped into the conflict, to create further divisions, by criticizing Wu Pei-fu and

carrying out propaganda against him and on the northern warlords on February 25 and 26. 23

On June 2, Tang made the alliance official by accepting Chiangs offer to become the

commander of the Eighth Army in the NRA.24 Soon, Tang received the official title as

governor of Hunan through KMTs National Government.25 This was a moment when the

self-interests of both the former warlord Tang and the KMT government met and produced a

joint action. Though successful here, the warlord-KMT coalition did not last throughout the

expedition, as the paper will explain further later.

What is also worthy of note here is that the KMT government acted as the

legitimate government with power to bestow titles and rights of governorship to the

friendly warlords (Tactic #2 mentioned in the introduction to the initial period examination).

Thus, by utilizing the regional breaches between the overlord and divisional warlords, and

portraying itself as the source of national leadership, the KMT forces were able to penetrate

Hunan strategically, minimizing casualties and saving the troops for battles in the future.

19To get to the military forces logistics, Tang Sheng-chih had 9,000-man division in the Hsiang valley. Tang also

possessed 27 of Hunans 75 tax-collection districts. This would mean a minimum income of $800,000 monthly,

in addition to the income the provincial lead and zinc mines brought at $90,000 monthly. Plus, there was the

special tax on opium collected in his districts, meaning he had additional income of $1 million monthly. And

lastly there was the monthly allocation from the provincial government for Tangs division calculating into

$240,000. In U.S. Changsha Consul C.D. Meinhardt to State Department, March 12, 1925, SD 893.00/7319, MF

329-51, in Chinese dollars then valued at approximately 2/U.S. dollar. In Donald A. Jordan, p.71.20

Ibid., p.72.21

Wu Pei-fu was engaged in North China against the forces of Feng Yu-xiang. Ibid.22

Ibid., p.72.23

Ibid. The KMT sent forces to aid Tang, but the NRA was still outnumbered greatly in southern Hunan. Once

Wu Pei-fus battles in the north ended with expulsion Feng Yu-hsiang in April 1926, Tang had to recall his

regimens form northern Hunan, evacuate his forces from Changsha, and return to his valley.24

Ibid. Tang then soon moved up the divisional command to become an army command in the NRA< and his

regimental commanders then moved up to become division commanders. This is actually a warlord practice

that the NRA adopted for the rest of the era of the Northern Expedition.25

Ibid., p.74.


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This tactic is at play once the expedition turns offensive on July 9, 1926. 27 From late

June to early July, the NRA moved out of Canton and placed its troops along the Lien River

and the Lu River. Along the Lien River, the Kwangsi troops of the Seventh Army and the

Hunanese forces of Tang Sheng-chih were stationed. Along the Lu River, there were two

Fourth Army divisions, an Independent Regiment from Canton, and a remainder of forces of

Tang.28 In this battle between the NRA-Tang coalition and the northern warlords forces, the

presence of Tang with the coalition force gave them legitimacy in the eyes of the local

26Donald, A. Jordan.

27Ibid., p.73. The NRA Fourth Army division under Chang Fa-kuei and Cheng Ming-shu arrived at the front of

the battle against Wu Pei-fu. At this time, Wu was still preoccupied with fights in the North China.28

Ibid.


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Hunanese.29 The NRA is seen as the source of legitimate leadership in the eyes of the locals

throughout the expedition, as the local peasants also joined the NRA in the Mi-lo River

campaign. As the Fourth and Sixth army crossed the Mi-lo River, and cut across the

Yeuhchous railroad into Wuhan,30 the railroad workers took up the nationalist cause and cut

the rail and telegraph lines to hinder the northern warlords retreat from Yeuhchou.31 The

locals saw the NRA as a legitimate force in the area, not just another foreign invasion.

The Lien and Lu River battle formation also reveals how the NRA avoided attacking

all the warlords at the same time (Tactic #1). On July 5, 1929, the Seventh and Eighth Armies

broke through the river lines, and then the Fourth Army on the right side joined in the battle,

taking the NRA through the river lines to Changsha.32 But throughout these battles, the NRA

was careful not to instigate Sun Chuan-fang, who was the overlord of the Kiangsi province,

bordering the eastern Hunan region. On July 11, the Lien-Lu River battle was successful and

the warlords fled north.

The NRA strategies were successful in its manipulation of warlords division. As the

NRA strength grew, there were increasing cases of warlord defection. After the victory, NRA

grew in strength and marched to the Mi-lo River.33 By August 1926, Chiangs force and

various commanders of KMT gathered in Hengyang with 100,000 troops of NRA.34 At this

time some warlords band-wagoned to NRA, such as warlords Peng Hang-chang and Wang

Tien-pei, who were convinced by the NRA victory across the Lien-Lu line and joined in.

After the Mi-lo River campaign, the Kiangsi warlord Sun Chuan-fang was threatened with his

subordinates defections.35

29 Ibid., p.75. Allegedly, the Hunan peasants would hide the produce from their supply masters to prevent

them from supporting Wu Pei-fus forces. There are also records by the South China Morning Post that loca l

Hunanese joined the NRA.30

Ibid, p.78.31

Ibid. Again, evidence that the KMT cause was perceived by the people as legitimate.32

Ibid., p.75.33

Ibid. The march to the Milo River proved arduous as the soldiers were overtaken by cholera. A Second Army

advisor pictures what it was like during the march: Sometimes there are no provisions, my colleagues tear off

some sort of grass, chew it and are fu ll.34

Ibid., p.76.35

Ibid., p.78. Also, to make matters worse for the northern warlords,Wu could not come to direct aid even

though he had his naval base in the region because he could not command it until after the battles in the north

subsided.


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36

As the KMT pushed the battle into Wuhan, the warlords mistrust and defection

among themselves wore down the warlords coalition from within. The NRA destroyed Wus

defensive forces one by one, despite their strong barricades along the Ting-szu Bridge. After

taking the bridge, the NRA advanced to the Hosheng Bridge, which was under personal

command of Wu Pei-fu. Wu, taking command, initially appeared to engage the NRA with

strong counterattack across the bridge, but due to his focus on offensive rather than defensive

tactics, Wu lost the bridge to the NRAs flanking tactic. By August 30, 1929, Wus Hunan and

Hupeh troops began their retreat up north. As Wu lost two bridgeheads and 8,000 troops, he

sent his pleas to Sun Chuan-fang of Kiangsi for reinforcement. Again, warlords were divided

here. Even though Wu had called upon Sun before to flank the NRA and engage it in Hunan,

Sun did not offer up his aid immediately. Taking advantage of Suns hesitation, the NRA

strengthened its fortification along the Kiangsi flank.37 The records suggest that secret

negotiations existed between KMT and Sun. There are even allegations that a pact was

reached between Chiang Kai-shek and Sun, wherein the NRA would take Changsha while

Sun can then freely engage with Chang Tso-lin in Shantung. Although Sun ended up aiding

Wus forces, his 200,000 troops were led by different provincial authorities and was not an

effective force.38


37 Ibid., p.79.38

Ibid., p.82.


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Making matters worse for Wu, Liu Tso-lung defected. Liu was in charge of artillery

battalions in the Hanyang perimeter, one of Wus two main forces. As Wu retreated from

Hunan and southern Hupeh, the NRA and Wus forces clashed in Hanyang.39 The NRA was

having difficulties breaching Wus fortified regions, but the battle turned around with Lius

defection.40 Wu further retreated into Wuchang, Hupehs capital, and the battle waged on for

a month there.41 Thus, the KMT strategy of creating alliances with warlords and focusing

their attack on one warlord at a time created the division within the warlord group and proved

successful in the initial campaign period.

Kiangsi and the East Route

In the Hunan and Hupeh campaigns, the two main strategies of targeting one warlord

at a time and utilizing warlords internal division, and winning the popular support by

portraying the expeditionary forces as legitimate national force led to success of the

expedition in its initial period. This was also the case for the campaigns in Kaingsi and East

Route. For the purpose of this paper, this section will only flesh out how the military tactics

were used similarly for the advantage of the expeditionary forces.42

39Ibid., p.81.

40 South China Morning Post(16 September 1926). In Donald A Jordan, p.81.

41 Donald A. Jordan, p.81.42

For greater detail into military records, consult Donald A Jordan, p.83-106.


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43

After successful campaigns in Hunan and Hupeh, Chiang decided Kiangsi as the next

isolated target of the Northern Expedition Kiangsi was the area of warlord Sun Chuang-fang.

Despite the communications between Sun Chuan-fang and Chiang Kai-shek, Sun had made

up his mind to aid Wu. The offensive move into Kiangsi was critical at this early juncture of

the expedition, because if the expeditionary forces could not march beyond Hunan and Hupeh,

then it would be isolated in the region, with impending threats from Kwangtung.



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44 45

At this time, Sun Chuan-fang had his army composed of five provinces of Kiangsu,

Anhui, Kiangsi, Chekiang, and Fukien.46 But the loyalties of the provincial forces to Sun

were questionable. Noticing this, Chiang again utilized the KMT tactic of dividing his

enemies and conquering one at a time. Initially, it was too easy for Chiang: at the battle in

Wuchang, key forces under Sun gave in on October 10, 1926, by voluntarily opening the city

gates to the NRA forces after days of stalemate.47

Chiang then noticed the division between Sun and the Chekiang warlords Hsia Chao,

Chou Feng-chi, and Chen Yi.48 As the expeditionary forces moved into Kiangsi, the KMT

offered Hsia a position in KMT in exchange for defection against Sun.49 The KMT also

promised Hsia provincial autonomy. Plus, Chiang Kai-shek and Hsia were fellow military

men who once trained together at the Chekiang Military Academy.50 Hsia accepted the KMT

offer and became the provisional chairman of the Provincial Government Committee and

44 Donald, A. Jordan.45

Ibid.46

Donald A. Jordan, p.85.47

Ibid., p.86.48

Since in the days of the Qing Empire, Chekiang was an area wrought with independence riots. Once Sun

Chuan-fang took over the area with somewhat cordial accord with the three warlords, he made a mistake in

not listening to their calls for autonomy. When Sun moved on with his troops to Nanking after his victories in

Chekiang, Hsia assumed Sun would grant Chekiang back to Hsias supervision. However, when Hsia created the

declaration of autonomy and a constitution, Sun sent his forces back into Chekiang, revoked the constitution,

and established one of his men as the military governor. Such crude tactics did not sit well with the warlords,

and the expeditionary forces used this weak link against Sun. Ibid., p.86-91.49

North China Herald(Shanghai) (October 23 and 30, 1926). Reuter reports from Canton dated Oct 19 and 23.

South China Morning Post(Oct 21 and 28, 1926), p.8. In Donald A Jordan, p.90.50

Donald A. Jordan. p.90.


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commander of the Eighteenth Army in the NRA.51 Unfortunately, the first KMT alliance

with one of the three warlords ended abruptly. Sun, who somehow knew of Hsias defection

plan,52 captured and decapitated Hsia.53

Nevertheless, the KMT continued its support for Chekiang autonomy.54 Despite

Suns proposal to allow independence of Chekiang, Chou Feng-chi defected to the NRA on

December 11, 1926. Following Chou, Chen Yi then defected to NRA on December 17. Chou

earned his position in the NRA as the field commander for the operations in Chekiang, and

Chen Yi became the commander of the Nineteenth Army of the NRA. 55 And Chiang Kai-

shek, perhaps realizing that granting autonomy to the warlords regions is the only way to

keep the warlords on his side, made the wise choice of honoring Chekiang independence

officially:

Then, on the Nineteenth [of December, 1926], the Shanghai convention

announced that Chekiang was independent of Suns United Provinces, and

that it was an autonomous province, which would: 1) implement self-

government for Chekiang with provincial personnel; 2) oppose militarists

who might seek to carve out their own autonomous areas56

Sun then sought out another alliance, this time with Meng Chao-yueh. With Meng,

Sun captured Chen Yi and seemed to have regained Chekiang by January 1927. Then the

NRA and Suns forces clashed at Lanchi and Chinhua, resulting in Suns defeat.57 At Tunglu,

on Februray 11, 1927, Mengs forces were also defeated. Suns forces began to pull back

toward Hangchow.58 By February 23, most of Suns forces retreated into Shanghai, behind

the Hangchow-Shanghai rail line.59 It was another successful divide and conquer moment

of the united expeditionary forces against the warlords. In the initial period, the expeditionary

51 Ibid., p.91.52

There are allegations that Chen Yi, rival of Hsia, had tipped Sun off. Ibid., p.90.53

Ibid., p.91.54

The KMT integrated the All-Chekiang Association with the Affiliated Association of Kaingsu, Chekiang, and

Anhui. The association called for self-rule of the provinces. U.S. Shanghai Consul C.E. Gauss to the Secretary of

State, December 6, 1926 (893.00/7990), in which Gauss interpreted the movement as one coordinated by the

KMT to weaken Suns hold on the United Provinces. See also Hsien-tai shih-liao [Contemporary historical

materials]. Vols. 3 and 4. Shanghai: Hai Tien Publishing Society, 1934, p.174-176. In Donald A. Jordan, p.100.55

Donald A. Jordan, p.102.56

For more information, see Donald A. Jordan, p.102.57

Suns commanding officers of a brigade, regiment, and three battalions, and 2,000 soldiers were killed in this

battle. Ibid., p.103.58 Ibid., p.104.59

Ibid., p.105.


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force took Hunan, Hupeh, and Kiangsi successfully through manipulation of warlord

defections.

Critique: Warlord politics

A topic worthy of note here is the nature of warlords defections. The reason why the

initial stages of the expedition were successful was because the warlords remained divided in

their coalitions. It is interesting to know that the three warlords of Chekiang who chose to

defect against Sun actually once defected toward him in the earlier civil war era of the region.

Then the reader may ask why the warlords had to defect constantly? The answer lies in the

regional identity and self-interest of the warlords. Lucian Pye writes in his book about

warlord politics, that it is dangerous for a leader, an overlord, to depend entirely on the

subordinate warlords.60 Because Sun Chuan-fang was an outsider to the three warlords who

have grown up and attended the Chekiang Military Academy, Suns aggressive rule did not

suit well the regional warlords. The case is similar with Meng Chao-yueh, Suns field

commander. Meng was also an outsider in the region and could not cooperate with the Fukein

units.61 On the other hand, Chiang Kai-shek, with his background rooted in the Chekiang

Military Academy, and his group of nationalist armies with a seemingly legitimate cause must

have been a more attractive choice for the warlords.

However, the similar origins did not necessarily guarantee a stalwart warlord trust, as

seen through the speech of Chou Feng-chi, one of the Chekiang warlords who defected to

Chiang: neither the Northern Army nor the Southern Army were his friends and that any

who invaded Chekiang automatically became his enemy62 An example of warlord

defection against Chiang is Tang Sheng-chihs defection under Russias prodding. In spring

of 1927, when the split between KMT right and left was flagrant, Tang defected against

Chiang, taking warlord Li Tsung-jen, a Guangxi warlord and a KMT general, as well.

63

Tangwas one of the warlords in the initial period of Northern Expedition who cooperated with

Chiang and allowed the NRA to enter the Hunan province. Thus, the nature of warlord

politics in seeking ones self-interest first could be used for the expeditions advantage but

could also hurt the expedition when the warlord found a better alternative than what the

60Lucian Pye, Warlord Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Modernization of Republican China, (New York, NY:

Praeger Publishers, 1971), p.48.61

Donald A. Jordan, p.104.62 Shen Pao (26 November, 1926), in Donald A. Jordan, p.100.63

Donald A. Jordan. p.113.


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expedition promised him.

Another theory states that the political setting of constant flux of threats and alliances

after the fall of Qing dynasty shaped the narrow worldview of the warlords and their divisive

behaviors.64 Many of these theories point to how divided the warlords were during the

warring states period and during the expedition. As the expeditionary forces remained united

in its initial phase, they were able to exploit their opponents division and lead successful

campaigns in Hunan, Hupeh, and Kiangsi. However, once this seemingly united coalition of

the expeditionary forces started to fall apart, the expedition stumbled.

Middle period of the expedition

Shanghai: the split

If the campaigns at Hunan, Hupeh, Kiangsi, and Chekiang were wrought with

warlords divisions and KMT manipulations of the internal conflicts, then Shanghai campaign

was when the situation reversed: internal division within the expeditionary forces came into

light during this campaign. The expedition suffered in the division between the CCP-Russia

bloc and the KMT right, as the prerogatives of the groups diverged.

Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT-right wanted to avoid an addition of military conflict

with the foreigners in Shanghai, and focus on one enemy at a timea strategy which has

worked well in the expedition so far. On the other side, the CCP-Russia bloc and the KMT-

left wanted to use the anti-foreign uprisings of the masses to drive out all foreigners out of

China and begin a proletariat movement. Though the concept of unifying China was shared,

the two blocs differed in their strategy.65

64Lucian Pye.

65Chen Kung-po, of KMT-left, head of provincial finance department at Wuhan in 1927, wrote: There was

nothing then that influenced the order and finances of the rear more than the strikes. What the KMT needed

there was stability, but what the CCP needed was strikesLocal order, stability, and sources of revenuethose

were the affairs of the KMT, not the concerns of the CCP. Chen Kung-po, Hang feng chi[Collection of the northwind]s. 4

thed. (Shanghai: Association of Local Government, 1945), p.103-104. In Donald A. Jordan, p.221.


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66

By February of 1927, trouble began with the CCP-organized National General Labor

Union (GLU), as the union began to assassinate Chinese and foreign industrialists in

Shanghai.67 The CCP saw great opportunity in the anti-foreign rebellions in that they could

be used for instigating proletariat movements. In its diverging tactics and goal, the CCP made

clear its intention to separate the KMT party from within, as it labeled Chiang as the KMT-

right, naturally encouraging the division between Chiangs leadership and the KMT-left and

right. The CCP grew bolder in criticizing Chiang, by verbally accusing Chiang of having

secret alliances with the warlords and the Japanese imperialists.68 Russia aided the CCP

efforts by attempting to replace Chiang with General Tang Sheng-chih, the Hunanese warlord

who defected to NRA earlier in the expedition.

Fortunately for Chiang, the period up to March of 1927 proved successful in terms of

military conquests. Chiang reacted to CCP-Russia accusations by requesting Borodin out of

China in February 26,69 and continued the NRA expedition as best as he could. The warlords

defections to the NRA continued to aid the movement. Under Sun Chuan-fang, there was

Chen Tiao-yuan who was a classmate of Sun at Tokyos Shinkan Gakko, and also

Commander in Chief of Suns Anui forces. As Chen was debating to defect to NRA, one of


67Donald A. Jordan, p.109. These unions were not created just to diverge with the plan of KMTs. They were

originally created in a joint effort with KMT against Sun Chuan-fangs forces.68 Ibid., p.111.69

Ibid., p.112.


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his forces with Liu Pao-ti defected on February 20. This defection opened up the pass of

Chimen, and the NRA entered Anhui. Within two weeks, Chen himself defected, providing

the NRA with his Yangtze forces, a brigade of Wang Pu, and the rest of the Hunan Army with

Yeh Kai-hsin.70 With this defection, the NRA took the city of Hofei. 71 Another defection

came with Pi Shu-cheng, who was negotiating with a KMT officer Niu Yung-chien on

handing over Shanghai. In addition, Yang Shu-chuang, Suns admiral, defected to NRA and

brought his fleet over to the expeditionary forces. With these defections, the NRA was able to

capture city of Soochow, and the area from Changchou to Henglin by March 21, 1927.72 The

Chekiang units also continued to aid Chiang by moving toward Sungchiang and Lake Tai to

entrap Suns forces.73

But after March 1927, the internal conflict within the expeditionary force emerged

more clearly, halting the progress of the Northern Expedition. The effect of the internal

conflict on the Northern Expedition is reflected in the defeats of NRA during April 1927.

After the capture of Pengpu in early April, the momentum of military success in Anhui and

Kiangsu died out. The northern warlords coalition, Ankuochun, pushed back the NRA

southward from the Tientsin-Pukou railroad, pushing the NRA forces 100 miles through

Kiangsu and Anhui, back to Yangtze. The fact that these defeats in April of 1927 are left out

in the official military history of the expedition emphasizes the low morale of the time.74

In actual, the internal division was budding as early as the spring of 1926, when the

Central Executive Committee (CEC) in Wuhanmainly ran by the CCP75abolished

Chiang Kai-sheks posts.76 Such political tension intensified in the spring of 1927, as

Wuhans CCP-led GLU clashed with the National Labor Union of KMT.77 Chiang, becoming

more aware of the negative effects of the division within the KMT party, issued a statement to

his generals to prevent further defection to CCP: there should be no intra-Party conflict

70Ibid., p.113.

71Ibid., p.114.

72Ibid., p.115.

73Ibid., p.110.

74Ibid., p. 125.

75At the time, Hsu Chien and Teng Yen-ta were executives of CEC in Wuhan; they were known to be highly

responsive to the CCP-Russia bloc. Ibid., p.119.76

Chiangs Ministry of the Military was replaced by Wuhans Military Council, which also usurped Chiangs

Commander in Chiefs authority of allocating the output of arsenals to the armies. Chiangs authority in military

education was also taken away, preventing further production of loyal junior officer corps under Chiang. Finally,

with the removal of Chen Ming-shu, a supporter of Chiang, the CCP was sending out signals of division to the

rest of the loyal generals to Chiang. Ibid., p.119.77

Ibid., p.122.


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until the military operation has been completed and that everyone should support the C-in-C

[Commander in Chief] until a discussion of the matters involved can be held.78 Despite his

efforts, the infighting between the KMT and CCP sector of the United Front only exacerbated

over time, leading to more clashes in Canton, and in Chenchiang, Kiangsu in the second week

of April, 1927.79

The situation worsened as the CCP instigated Japans anger by leading a GLU riot

against the Japanese concession in Hankow.80 The CCP aggressions against areas of foreign

concession were not helping the KMT objective in leading a controlled Northern Expedition.

As the NRA took Shanghai, Chiang had to guarantee security to areas of foreign concessions

because he feared foreign intervention would stall the Northern Expedition even more.81

Finishing the Northern Expedition was the foremost priority to Chiang. When the CCP

continued to thwart his attempts to unify China and drive out the warlords, Chiang eventually

chose the purge card: the Shanghai massacre of 1927. But one purge could not blot out a

whole group of CCP infiltrators in the KMT system. Chiang now had two more enemies to

fight in addition to the warlords: the CCP members and the foreigners. After the split of the

United Front became more defined in the middle period of the expedition, the NRA

movement stalled.82

Critique: Why division at this point, not earlier?

If the United Front efforts were so successful in the initial period of the expedition, one

may wonder why the CCP and KMT decided to split during this expedition despite the

obvious costs to the expedition efforts. The answer lies in the nature of coalition: the United

Front is a misnomer in the sense that there was never an intention for a united effort on the

78 Kuowen chou-pao [National news weekly]. Shanghai and Tientsin: Kuowen Chou-pao Soc., (April 10, 1927),

n.p. In Donald A. Jordan, p.122.79

Donald A. Jordan. p.123.80

South China Morning Post (20 Apr 1927), p.12. In Donald A. Jordan, p.127.81

The NRA voiced this determination in April 1927:

The purpose of the military operations of the Northern Expedition is to establish a nation

governed by the people and to get rid of the warlords. Our army occupied Hunan, Kaingsi,

Hupeh, Fukien, Chekiang, Anhui, and other provinces and the unification of the entire

nation will be accomplished soon. The Party Armys success is the victory of the people In

accordance with international morality we shall guard the lives and property of foreigners.

We have occupied Shanghai by more than force. We request that consuls inform your

nationals to carry on your activities as usual and order the marines not to misunderstand

our motives and not to carry out means to obstruct our revolutionary cause.

South China Morning Post(8 April 1927), p.12. In Donald A. Jordan, p.116.82



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level of political leadership of the CCP and KMT. Though the coalition may have begun with

good tidings externally, by the time of the expedition, Chiang Kai-shek consented to the

coalition with the plan of achieving a KMT-led unification of China, and the CCP shook

hands while holding to its own plan of leading a labor movement throughout China. Both

leaderships were not ready to settle for anything less. But at the time, the coalition was

essential for both parties as the CCP lacked military power and the KMT lacked financial

sponsor for its expedition. In sum, the coalition was inevitable in the sense that each party

could offer what the other did not have, but the split was built in the pact in that the two

parties started out with different intentions in leading the coalition.

Firstly, the external factors led the two parties toward each other. The CCP was

formally organized in July 1921. By the time the Northern Expedition began in 1926, CCP

was but a fledging organization. The Russian leadership was aware of the lack of

organization structure in the CCP and encouraged the CCP to build a coalition with the KMT

movement.83 Once the CCP followed the Russian advice, they did experience a spurt of

growth through the Northern Expedition. In 1922, the CCP had around 200 to 300

members.84 With the expeditions passing of Hunan, the CCP grew exponentially.85 From

May to August of 1926, the Kwangtung Peasants Association alone increased by 75,000.86

On the other hand, the KMT was in need of financial sponsor. After founding the

party, Sun Yat-sen sought aids in foreign sponsors, mainly in the western hemisphere.87 But

after many rejections, he had to settle with aid from Russia. And what Russia wanted at the

time was for KMT to build a coalition with the CCP. Sun had no choice but to appease the

Russian leadership.

But when each partys motivation behind the coalition is examined, it becomes

obvious that both sides never trusted each other as allies. The Russian leadership, with its

strong ties with the CCP,

88

had encouraged the coalition but under the condition that it beonly temporary:

83Lyman P. Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History, (Stanford: Stanford

University Press, 1967).84

Ibid.,p.22.85

Jordan A Donald, p.111.86

Ibid., p.216.87

In 1923, Sun approached Jacob Gould Schurman, the American Minister to China with a proposition: would

the United States take China in and help its democratization process? Sun suggested that the U.S. can take

China under its umbrella for a period of five years or so to teach China how to run business and industry. This

would mean democratization of 400 million people, a quarter of the earths population. The idea was scoffed

at in his time. Suns proposal was rejected and thenceforth Sun kept to his Russian ally. William Morwood, p.86.88

Lyman P. Van Slyke, p.11.


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we, as Communists, should support the bourgeois movement of liberation

in the colonies only if these are really revolutionary, when those who

represent these movements would not oppose us in our efforts to educate and

organize the peasantry and the masses of exploited people in general in the

revolutionary spirit. When this is impossible, the Communists must oppose

the reformist bourgeoisie.89

Further evidence is found in the thoughts of the CCP leader, Chen Tu-hsiu (at the Fourth

Congress, 1922 November, Moscow):

Starting from the premise that in order to exterminate imperialism in China

an anti-imperialistic united front will have to be erected, our party has

decided to form a united front with the national-revolutionary party, the

Kuomintang. The nature of this united front will be expressed in the fact that

we, under our own names and as single individuals, will join the party. The

reason for it is twofold. In the first place, we want to propagandize many

organized workers in the national-revolutionary party and win them over for

us. In the second place, we can only fight imperialism if we combine our

forces, the forces of the petty bourgeoisie and the proletariat. We intend to

compete with this party in regard to the winning of the masses by means of

organization and propaganda. If we do not join this party we shall remain

isolated, and we shall preach a Communism which holds great and noble

ideas, but one which the masses do not followIf we join the party, we shall

be able to show the masses that we too are for revolutionary democracy, but

that for us revolutionary democracy is only a means to an endWe shall be

able to gather the masses around us and split the Kuomintang.90

If the CCP came into the coalition with a split in the future in mind, then the KMT

came with a determination to treat the CCP factors as its subordinates. Sun Yat-sen agreed to

the coalition only under the agreement that no soldier under KMT leadership will be

representing a different party other than the KMT.91 Thus Sun agreed to the coalition only

89Eudin, Xenia J., and Robert C. North, eds. Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927: A Documentary Survey,

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), p.66. In Lyman P. Van Slyke, p.12.90

Eudin, Xenia J., and Robert C. North, eds. Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927: A Documentary Survey,

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), p.151. In Lyman P. Van Slyke, p.18.91

William Morwood.


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when the CCP members would join the coalition as individuals, not as CCP-representatives.

When Chiang Kai-shek took the KMT leadership after Suns death, he followed his

predecessors example of not trusting the CCP factors. In the Second Kuomintang Congress

in January 1926, Chiang voted to limit the CCP membership in the committees to one third of

the total membership of the KMT.92 In the March 20 coup, Chiang appeared to have been

aware of the Communist plot to divide KMT and conquer from within, as he wrote in his

manuscript:

I sensed a Communist Plotthey would then send me as a prisoner to Russia

via Vladivostok, thereby removing the major obstacle to their scheme of

using the National Revolution as a medium for setting up a dictatorship of

the proletariat.93

Thus the KMT leadership was aware of CCP intentions, if only vaguely, and did not trust

them as their equals.

Such inherent split then became evident once the two parties grew in power both

militarily and financially through the expedition. Once the CCP started to strengthen through

the expedition, its plan to divide the KMT became bolder. The CCP Strike Committee s

declaration in November 1926 shows such a change of attitude:

now that the power of the National Revolution has reached the Yangtze, it

is time to change the methods we use against the imperialists. Our new

policy is a change from a blockade to a boycott by the entire nation, from our

own strike to a united national effort. It is not time to prepare for a new

struggle.94

Using the KMT structure and the Northern Expedition, the CCP agitators and organizers

fanned out ahead of the expeditionary forces to gain the masss support.95 Once the CCP had

infiltrated within the KMT

96

and had grown its base for mass support, it boldly instigated

92Ibid., p.109.

93Chiang Chung-cheng (Chiang Kai-shek), Soviet Russia in China: A Summing-Up at Seventy, (New York, NY:

Farrar, Straus, and Cudahy, 1957), p.39.94

Kuowen chou-pao [National news weekly]. Shanghai and Tientsin, Soc., (7 November 1926), n. p. In Donald

A Jordan.95

Lyman P. Van Slyke, p.22.96

In 1924, at the First Kuomintang Congress, three Communists were elected to the KMT Central Execdtuive

Committee (CEC), and six others were alternative members. In 1926, at the Second Kuomintang Congress,

seven Communists were members of the CEC (out of 35 total), and 24 were alternative members. The

Communists also headed the Organization and Peasant Departments, and acted as secretaries or deputies in

the Propaganda, Labor, Youth, Overseas, Merchant, and Womens Departments. In Lyman P. Van Slyke,p.24.The infiltration was most notorious in the political department of NRA: according to a Russian author, in March


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strikes and mass uprisings during the Northern Expedition, jeopardizing the coalition.

Similar to the CCP behavior, once the KMT forces strengthened with successes in the

Northern Expedition, the KMT tolerance of CCP strikes decreased. In the initial stages, when

the CCP strikes against the foreign concessions or in Canton seemed to get out of hand,

Chiang issued telegrams appealing its cease. Chiang was hesitant in leading an open attack

against the CCP because it would also mean the end of alliance with Russia and its financial

resources.97 But by 1927 when the expedition has seen its success in the initial campaigns in

Hunan, Hupeh, and Kiangsi, Chiang could choose violent purge to end the hindering to the

expedition once and for all.

The coalition was inevitable due to the external strains on the parties, but with the

diverging motivations, the coalition did not last throughout the expedition as both parties

gained more power over successful military campaigns. One irony and theme about the

coalition is that while the expeditionary forces were busy manipulating the warlords internal

division, the CCP was actually applying the same strategy to the KMT, instigating left and

right divisions within the nationalist party. During the final stage of the expedition, the NRA

continued the march north, and led a successful military campaign. However, under the layer

of military cooperation, the rivalries between different political entities remained unresolved.

Thus, with the end of the expedition entered the Chinese Civil War.

Final period of the expedition

Honan and Shantung

1926, there were 876 political workers in the NRA. About 75 percent of them were communists of members of

KMT-left, about 20 percent were careerists without principles, and the remaining 5 percent were members of

KMT-right. It is alleged that all communists received orders to penetrate the KMT and gain influence from

within. There is a slogan, A good communist is a good member of the Kuomintang nucleus. In C. Martin

Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923-1928, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1983),p.36.97

William Morwood, p.124.


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98

After the expeditionary force was split, the campaign was greatly hindered. The once

united expeditionary force struggled through the military campaigns, uniting only in times of

desperation. The KMT had two bases of KMT-left in Wuhan and KMT-right in Nanking. The

expedition continued nevertheless, recommencing its march north on May 10, 1927. The first

agenda was to reclaim Hofei. The NRA pushed toward Kiangsu and toward Lung-HaiRailroad.99 In the battles in Kiangsu and Anhui, the Ankuochun had superior weapons but the

NRA had greater mobility, which the NRA used to its advantage in capturing the essential

railroads stretching to the north. The NRA forces in Wuhan targeted the Honan province, and

tried to apply its tactic of dividing the warlords and winning warlords-sympathizers.

Fortunately, some of Wu Pei-fus army defected from the mountains in Honan. The combined

force of defectors and NRA then pushed the battle line beyond Yencheng. In addition, Feng

Yu-hsiang100 turned to aid the NRA against the CCP and the warlords. Feng provided

controls over the Lung-Hai railroad and Peking-Hankow railroad, the essential assets to

communication and support.101

Although warlord defections continued, the divided expeditionary force was allowing

more defeats than in the previous campaigns. Tang Sheng-chih, the warlord who defected to


99Donald A. Jordan, p.129.

100Feng was once a warlord of the Wu Pei-fus zhili faction, but he turned to aid Chiang in the Northern

Expedition, in September 1926. Feng Yuxiang Wikipedia, (26 Nov 2012),

[accessed 26 Nov 2012].101



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Chiang and then betrayed him by joining the CCP-Russia bloc, moved his troops toward

Anking, Anhui, where the NRA forces were stationed. The NRA forces disintegrated, and

Tang solidified his control in the area. As Chiang moved his troops to check Tangs

movement from Shantung, the Ankuochun attacked Shantung and regained Tenghsien,

Lincheng, and Tsaochuang along the Grand Canal route, as well as the Tientsin-Pu-kou

Railroad. Making matters worse, Sun Chuan-fang aided the warlords from the south, and the

NRA had to retreat from Suns 50,000 troop advancement into Pengpu on August 9, 1927.102

As the expedition began to suffer in its split, the KMT-right of Nanking and KMT-

left of Wuhan united in desperation.103 When the KMT forces of Nanking took many defeats,

meetings between the KMT in Wuhan and Nanking grew more frequent, starting from August

24, 1927. Meanwhile, the NRA continued to suffer losses: Feng Yu-hsiang fell in the clash

with Ankuochuns Honan flank and Sun Chuan-fang pounded the NRA forces on the Nanking

shore.104 Sun continued to move in offense, breaching Yangtze for a battle in Lung-tan. In

desperation, when Feng made his move into Shantung, Tan Yen-kai from Nanking contacted

Wang Ching-wei and Tang Sheng-chih of Wuhan for aid in the Anhui province. At this time,

Chiang had resigned his position as Commander in Chief of the NRA, to ameliorate the

KMT-left and right rivalry. The move worked, for the Wuhan KMT factors consented to a

coordinated action against the Ankuochun. By August 30, it was clear how effective the re-

united KMT forces could be, as the NRA tightened around Sun s troops in Lung-tan.

Defeating Suns 40,000 troops gathered in the Yangtze, the NRA tasted victory on August 31,

1927. It was a hard battle on both sides, as Suns forces fell from 11 divisions to 3 divisions,

and the NRA casualties totaled between 8,000 and 10,000.105 From here, the NRA offensive

divided into three sectors: one on route between Grand Canal and the Yellow Sea, one

marching north along the Shanghai-Nanking railroad, and one remaining in Anhui to check

Tang Sheng-chihs 25,000 troops from Wuhan.

106

The battle of Lung-tan against Sun showed how weak the expeditionary forces were

after its split and how they could manage to achieve victory if pushed to desperate measures

amongst defeats. The results are more astounding once the division within the NRA force is

102Ibid., p.136.

103In order to allow the re-united forces to function with neutrality, Chiang stepped down from Commander in

Chief position on August 12, 1927. In Donald A. Jordan, p.137.104

Ibid., p.138.105 Ibid., p.141.106

Ibid., p.142.


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evinced through a chart listing the different sectors within the NRA during the time of Lung-

tan battle.107 The different factors of the NRA also came together in desperation to defeat

Tangs forces in the western flank of NRA.108 Unfortunately, these ad-hoc unities did not last

to the end of the expedition. Despite Wang Ching-weis return to KMT after his alliances with

CCP and Russia, and Chiang Kai-sheks resumption into position as commander of the

expedition,109 the expedition faltered. It was not until February of 1928 that Chiang was able

to turn his attention to the expedition again after securing the KMT base in Nanking. The last

phase of the expedition was about to begin.

North China and Beijing

The last campaign of the Northern Expedition was carried out in a more anxious

manner than before as the KMT leadership led a decentralized NRA and as the Japanese

aggressions grew more frequent. The campaign was planned to sweep from north Kiangsu to

Peking in a three-month period. As the Commander in Chief, Chiang Kai-shek had to be

cautious to keep the neutral stance in leading different sectors of NRA. Although Chiang

stood as the suzerain, he had to grant autonomy to his four subordinates who controlled the

NRA forces, from thence called the Collective Armies (CA): the first CA located in lower

Yangtze basin included the forty army corps of Chiang from earlier NRA; the second CA

controlled Shensi, Honan, and parts of near northwest under control of Feng Yu-hsiang; the

third CA held Shansi, and was under control of Yen Hsi-shan; the fourth CA located astride

Kwangsi, Hunan, and Hupei was under control of Li Tsung-jen.110

At this time of spring in 1928, the Japanese Kwangtung Army presided in Tsinan,

with 3,000 troops, 2,000 Japanese civilians, and another 2,000 Japanese soldiers.111 The

clashes between the Japanese and retreating warlords or the CAs grew, instigating mass

uprisings and nationalist movements. The clashes were reminiscent of the time of CCP-instigated mass uprisings against foreign concessions. Chiang was afraid of external

interventions into the expedition again, and stressed the primary importance of internal

unification. The Propaganda department that used to be largely infiltrated by the CCP

107Ibid., p.140.

108Ibid., p.145.

109Ibid., p.147. Chiang continued his tactic of encouraging warlords defection in December 1927, by

dispatching Lu Ho-sheng into North China as secret agent to persuade warlords leaders and their subordinates

to defect from Ankuochun. Ibid., p.151.110 Ibid., p.153.111

Ibid., p.158.


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members was restructured to be in direct subordinate relationship with the KMT

government, 112 and Chiang ordered the NRA to move through areas near Japanese

concessions as quickly as possible to avoid possible skirmishes with Japan.113

How much Chiang felt the need to finish the expedition speedily is implied in his

speech on April 7, 1928, that states the purpose of the expedition:

On this struggle depends whether the Party and nation will exist or die,

whether principles will win out or fail, whether the people are to prosper or

suffer, and whether our comrades flourish or fade. Observe discipline strictly,

follow orders, do not sacrifice wrongly, but do your best, stir up your spirit,

and accomplish what is needed. We must swear to remove the Fengtien

[Manchurian] and Shantung warlords, complete the national revolution, and

implement the Three Peoples Principles.

The tone of the speech is more urgent as it focuses on the party and its life or death situation,

which Chiang connects directly with the results of the expedition. The speech contrasts from

Chiangs speech in the Hunan campaign of 1926,114 where he was more focused on

independence of freedom of whole of China. As the expedition reached its end, Chiang

himself turned into a self-interested individual for the KMT party, rather than an overarching

figure representing the unification of China.

112Ibid., p.155.

113Ibid., p.160.

114 The importance of this fight is not only in that it will decide the fate of the warlords. But, whether or not

the Chinese nation and race can restore their freedom and independence hangs in the balance. In other words,

it is a struggle between the nation and the warlords, between the revolution and the anti-revolutionaries,

between the Three Peoples Principles and imperialism. All are to be decided now in this time of battleso as

to restore independence and freedom to our Chinese race. This is the speech Chiang Kai-shek gave to hisgenerals before the NRA attack on the Mi-lo line in the Hunan campaign, 1926. In Donald A. Jordan, p.76.


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115

With a certain sense of urgency in nearing the end of the expedition, the different

CAs and leaders united in the march to Peking. The First CA took Tehchou on May 13, 1928.

It then combined forces with Feng Yu-hsiang to move to Peking together. The Third CA

under Yen Hsi-shan made up the left wing of the movement north.116 On May 8, Yen took

Shuochou and pushed Ankuochun out of northern Shansi. By May 25, the Ankuochun was

pushed down out of Shansi highlands. With Yens Third CA bordering Shansi, Feng and his

Second CA could follow the Peking-Hankow Railroad. Yen and Feng met in Paoting and

attacked it together. The Ankuochun, preoccupied with Paoting, let open Chiang-chia-kou and

Nan-kou, the critical gates into Peking. The Ankuochun did not go without a fight. The

Ankuochun had superior firepower to NRA and effective rail communications, but the joint

attack of Feng and Yen was able to cut off the rail and highway crossroads critical to

Ankuochun offensive. 117 Once the CAs led a united attack against the warlords, the

expedition was successful, even if for a temporary period.

In moments of strong Ankuochun attack, the CAs only united stronger. From May 17

to 25, Chang Tso-lin of Ankuochun threw his 200,000 troops in counterattack. Braced

together, Li Tsung-jen came with his Fourth CA to aid Feng on the north of the Peking-

Hankow Railroad. After Yens opening of Nan-kou, the KMT attack recommenced on May

25.118 On May 28, the First CA moved to Tsangchou. The Ankuochun retreated to Ting River,


116Ibid., p.162.

117 Ibid., p.163.118

Ibid., p.164.


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the Wen-an swamp, and across the Grand Canal at Manchang. The CAs met with Feng at the

Lowei railroad station, and with Yen at the Shih-chia-chuang station. The final attack to

Peking was underway.

Once the united CAs made their advance, the warlords defaulted to their self-

interests and habit of preserving their own forces. The northern line was comprised of Chang

Tso-lin in the west, Sun Chuan-fang on the center, and Chang Tsung-chang on the east near

Tientsin. On June 3, 1928, Chang withdrew to Manchuria by train, choosing the Japanese

umbrella in the area. Then Sun withdrew from Ku-an on June 4, moving into Japanese Dairen.

On June 6, Yens CA moved into Peking in a relatively bloodless campaign.

The KMT tactic of persuading warlords to defect was also utilized in this last phase

of the expedition. Lu Ho-sheng of KMT has been working with northern warlords since

December of 1927. The tactic proved effective when General Hsu Yuan-chuan of the

Manchurian Sixty Army under Chang Tsung-chang in Tientsin defected on June 1928. Chang

could not retain Tientisn after the defection and withdrew.119 Unfortunately, Changs train

blew up near Mukden on June 4,120 allowing his son, Chang Hsueh-liang to come in power.

Despite the outcries of his fathers subordinates, the Chang junior shook hands with KMT as

his own forces were safe in Manchuria. The KMT national flag flew on Changs Mukden

headquarters on December 29, 1928.121

China was finally united.

Conclusion

Was China really united? On December 29 of 1928, the Northern Expedition may

have led a united force on its famous march from Canton to Peking and planted a flag in

Peking, but all it achieved was an external show of unification. After the expedition ended,

the warlords still emanated its presence throughout China. It is true that the expedition

overthrew the warlords Wu Pei-fu, Sun Chuan-fang, Chang Tsung-chang, and Chang Tso-lin.But in their place new factional struggle sprouted: the Nationalist government in lower

Yangtze valley, the Kwangsi clique of Hupei, Hunan, and Kwangsi, Feng Yu-hsiangs

Kuominchun in Shensi and Honan, stretching into Shantung and Hopei, Yen His-shan of

Shansi, with influences in Peking-Tientsin, and Chang Hsueh-liang with Manchurian generals

119Ibid., p.167.

120 There are allegations that the Japanese were involved in this incident.121

Ibid., p.168.


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in control of the northeast of China.122 In addition, the Northern Expedition must not be

mistaken to have touched every area of China. The expedition scarcely touched most of West

and Southwest China. Local leaders in Szechwan, Kweichow, and Yunnan were alive and

thriving. Even Kwangtung, home of the nationalist revolution, did not sit too closely with

Nanking by the end of the expedition.123

The northern expedition may have begun with the grand ideal of national unification

of China, but in the end it was an amalgamation of battles between different sectors of

military powers: warlords, KMT, CCP, and Japanese and foreign forces. Although the march

of expeditionary force from Canton to Beijing is impressive in its military feats, the

expedition showed how the CCP and KMT factors in the United Front harbored their self-

interests in realizing the leadership of their own party, how the warlords were primarily

concerned with their own respective areas well-being and failed to lead a prolonged

collective counterattack against the expedition, and how the Japanese and foreign forces only

complicated the expedition further with their own self-interests in carving up China. While

the military tactics of dividing the warlords worked for the advantage of the expeditionary

force, the expeditionary force itself split in its act to unify China, and it also failed to achieve

its objective in driving out the warlords and unifying China. The expedition may have been a

success strictly in its military feats, but in terms of unity of the actors involved in the

campaign, the expedition only etched the existing rivalries deeper.

122 C. Martin Wilbur,p.193.123

Ibid., p.194.


30/31

30

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The Northern Expedition: to be United or not United?

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