The new commandments of climate change strategy

The new commandments of climate change strategy

Stephen Hale

The new commandments of climate change strategyhow to cut emissions and win elections too

Stephen Hale

Published under Green Alliance’s Political Leadership theme, which focuses on securing political action to tackle climate change and other environmental problems.

The views expressed in this publication remain those of the individual author alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Green Alliance or its partners.

£5ISBN 978-1-905869-35-0

AcknowledgementsThis pamphlet draws heavily on my experiences over the past four years as director of Green Alliance, and my work prior to that focusing on climate change in government and business. It has been influenced by discussions with colleagues, friends and indeed adversaries. Many thanks to all of them.

I would specifically like to thank the staff of Green Alliance for their feedback on an early draft of this publication, and for their support and challenge in our work on a host of related issues. Thank you to Hannah Kyrke-Smith and Zoë Chambers for their research support, and to Hannah in particular for editing support also. The sole responsibility for the version that follows is of course mine alone.

My love and thanks as always to Zoë, Ella and Daniel.

About the authorStephen Hale has been director of Green Alliance since 2006, and a trustee of the development charity Christian Aid from 2007-10. Prior to joining Green Alliance he worked as an adviser to UK government ministers on UK and international climate change and other environmental issues from 2002–06, and as an adviser to companies on social and environmental issues. From May 2010 he takes up a new role at Oxfam International, as deputy advocacy and campaigns director.

Green AllianceGreen Alliance is one of the UK’s most influential environmental organisations, and was awarded Think Tank of the Year in the 2009 Public Affairs News awards. Our aim is to make environmental solutions a priority in British politics. We work with a range of partners in the third sector, the private sector and in other areas.

36 Buckingham Palace Road, London SW1W 0RE020 7233 7433 fax: 020 7233 [email protected]

Green Alliance is a registered charity no 1045395Company limited by guarantee (England and Wales) 3037633

Published by Green Alliance, April 2010Designed by Howdy and printed by Park Lane Press

1The new commandments of climate change strategy

1. From policy to strategy 4

2. What is difficult about this? 8

3. Climate change strategy begins abroad 13

4. Political characteristics of successful national action 21

5. National policy frameworks 26

6. Making it happen: processes and people 30

7. Conclusion 34

Contents© Green Alliance 2010

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The new commandments of climate change strategy

The new commandments of climate change strategy 2 3

National policy frameworks

8. Ensure private capital is invested in success

9. Regulation for innovation

10. Get smart about public spending

Making it happen: processes and people

11. Organise for success

12. Only leaders can do this

Climate change strategy begins abroad

1. Widen the circle of support for action

2. Act together now on finance and technology

3. Make promises you can’t break

Political characteristics of successful national action

4. Carpe diem: focus on economic opportunities

5. Secure early wins - and celebrate them

6. Find the losers and help them

7. Let’s come together: support community

and third sector mobilisation

The new commandments of climate change strategy4

1. From policy to strategy‘10 days to save the world’ said the New Statesman. ‘11 days to save the world’ said Prospect. ‘12 days to save the world’ said The Independent.1 They were all wrong of course. Many more journalists, politicians and campaigners portrayed the UN Summit in Copenhagen as the defining moment in the struggle to avert catastrophic climate change. But the Copenhagen summit did not ‘save the world’. Indeed some reports of the outcome presented it virtually as the end of the world.2 In truth it was neither.

Every UN summit suffers from this hyperbole. For many the show simply goes on. The focus of many is already shifting to the next summit, in Cancun, Mexico in November 2010.3 But the tendency to over-hype these events is a highly dangerous misreading of the challenges ahead. The disappointing outcome of the Copenhagen summit must be the trigger for a fundamental reappraisal of how we can avert catastrophic climate change. We need to rethink our approach to both global negotiations and national action.

We’re rapidly running out of time to find a smarter approach that will avert catastrophic climate change. We have just five to ten years to ensure that global emissions peak and then begin to decline rapidly. This is a struggle that matters more than any other. The future prosperity, security and survival of millions is at stake. Economic losses due to climate change already amount to more than $100 billion per year. Severe heat waves, forest fires, floods and storms will be responsible for as many as 500,000 deaths a year by 2030. 25 million people are likely to be displaced if emissions are not brought under control.4

The negotiation and ratification of an ambitious, effective and adequately financed global treaty is an essential component of a successful strategy. But a treaty is not a pre-condition for successful action, and even a comprehensive global agreement must not be confused with success. We have invested too much hope in global processes. Neither the Copenhagen summit, the Cancun negotiations or their successors will determine the fate of our planet. A global agreement simply makes success possible.

The recent history of the Kyoto Protocol shows that the real challenge is implementation, not negotiation. This cannot await the final outcome of global negotiations. We must pursue domestic and international action in tandem, if we are to succeed.

Too many countries failed by some margin to achieve the commitments they made under the Kyoto Protocol. Canadian emissions in 2007 were 26 per cent above the 1990 total, and Spanish greenhouse gas emissions in the same year were 53.5 per cent above 1990 levels.5 Many other countries will also fail to achieve their targets. But all developed country governments and the major emerging economies will acquire challenging new commitments to deep cuts in emissions in the final global agreement. Some have already done so: the commitments of Japan and Australia are already challenging.6 So the real challenge is to ensure that

From policy to strategy 5

the Copenhagen Accord and a final treaty are accompanied by a step change in the scale and quality of action by all governments.

In most cases we now have the knowledge and commitment to achieve this. We have a plethora of examples of success in different sectors and circumstances on which to draw. Our understanding of the policy frameworks needed to deliver is much improved, after 20 years of experience. The commitment and awareness of both our leaders and the general public is far greater post-Copenhagen than it was in the aftermath of Kyoto, as evidenced by the presence of over a hundred world leaders in Copenhagen and polling data from all the key countries.7 But there is a risk that the confusion of Copenhagen will sap the energy of our political leaders, and that they will focus on priorities and policies that do not deliver.

So the critical task for 2010 and beyond is to develop successful national strategies that make an ambitious and effective global agreement possible. These will need to contain effective policy frameworks, build international trust and, critically, also secure the far deeper public support for action that will make these strategies politically sustainable. This pamphlet focuses on how developed countries can succeed in that task. It is this that will determine whether the negotiations of 2009-10 result in action to avert catastrophic climate change, and secure our prosperity and security.

The crucial role of national governmentsWe all have a part to play. Success or failure will depend on many millions of individual decisions by businesses, individuals and others. But it is national governments that hold the levers that will determine whether we succeed or fail. They control the regulation, taxation and public expenditure that shape the actions of both businesses and individuals.

There are some partial exceptions to this. In countries such as the US and Canada, some of the key levers for action are at state and regional level. In Europe, climate, energy and, to a lesser extent, transport policies are increasingly influenced by regional policy processes. But nation states remain the critical sources of power and action.

Government strategies really matter. High quality strategies transform the fortunes of countries and the quality of life of their citizens, while poor strategies blight the lives of those they are intended to assist.8

The stakes are particularly high in relation to climate change. This is a global challenge, on which depend the future prosperity, security and ultimate survival of us all. We all have a huge shared interest in high quality and effective strategies being developed and successfully delivered by all economies with significant emissions.

“the disappointing outcome of the Copenhagen summit must be the trigger for a fundamental reappraisal of how we can avert catastrophic climate change”

“the critical task for 2010 and beyond is to develop successful national strategies that make an ambitious and effective global agreement possible”


We’re not currently on track for a happy ending. Despite a sometimes bewildering array of policies and initiatives, the national response of individual countries to the scientific evidence has often been inadequate.

Some countries, such as the UK, have been relatively successful. But even in these cases progress has not kept pace with that demanded by the science, particularly when the emissions associated with aviation, shipping and imports are taken into account.9 As a result, global emissions rose by 25 per cent between 1990 and 2004.

The science is abundantly clear. We need to stabilise greenhouse gas levels at 350-450 parts per million to give ourselves a high probability of limiting average global temperature rise to 2-2.4 degrees centigrade.10 This will require global emissions to peak and decline in the next five to ten years. To achieve this, we will need to make emissions cuts in the UK and other developed countries of 25 to 40 per cent by 2020.

Yet the most recent projections by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predict an increase in global emissions of 25 to 90 per cent between 2000 and 2030.11 Analysis conducted by Project Catalyst suggests that the targets put forward in the Copenhagen Accord would lead to an average rise in global temperatures of three degrees even in the high-abatement scenario, and very severe impacts of climate change.12

Learning from recent experienceThis is perhaps the most complex policy challenge that national governments have ever faced. We need to engage and incentivise an enormous number of institutions and actors. Local and regional government, businesses, communities and individuals all have to be persuaded to play their role. Climate change demands action across the silos of national government. It is little wonder that we have struggled initially to design a framework of this complexity. Climate change has been an issue for national governments for almost 20 years, since the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development agreed the Framework Convention on climate change, which led to the Kyoto Protocol.13 Climate change policy was a marginal issue for much of that time. Our governments have relatively little experience to draw on and, at present, very limited capacity to meet this challenge.

But the growing prominence of climate change in political and public debate now makes success possible. Climate change has, in recent years, increasingly been the focus of attention at the highest levels in the key teams surrounding national leaders and ministries of finance. The proliferation of policy and experience of the last few years gives us much more real world evidence to draw on.

From policy to strategy 7

Looking aheadSo the immediate priority is to identify the key characteristics of successful national climate change mitigation strategies. There is far too little thought being given to this critical issue. Too many ministers and officials are working long hours on new initiatives without a clear strategic framework for action.

Many politicians blame civil society for the slow progress we are making, and call on the pressure groups already active on climate change to do more. As I have argued elsewhere there is far more that the voluntary sector can and must do to strengthen the social foundations for action.14 With the right approach, national governments can build public support for action far more quickly by addressing the concerns of those who fear change and providing the incentives needed to persuade businesses and individuals to act. So chapters three to six of this pamphlet outline twelve commandments for any national government mitigation strategy. Each will of course need to be designed to reflect the particular challenges of that country. If followed, these commandments will make it possible to design successful national policy programmes. They cover four key areas: the role of international action; ways to maximise political support for action; the role of different policy instruments; and finally, the structures, processes and skills needed to develop and deliver successfully.

But first, we need a clear diagnosis of the lessons of experience and the obstacles facing national governments. We are on a steep learning curve. The stakes are extraordinarily high. It’s time to move from policy to strategy.

“the immediate priority is to identify the key characteristics of successful national climate change mitigation strategies”


2. What is difficult about this?Despite our disappointing progress, there is remarkably little public or private reflection in the climate change policy community on the lessons we can learn from recent experience. We’re often so busy looking forward that we forget to look back.

Some of this history is unique. The rapid decline in emissions in Eastern Europe as a result of their virtual economic collapse following the fall of the Berlin Wall and their liberation15 is an experience we hope not to repeat. But much of the experience from the past 20 years of climate change policy is highly relevant to the future.

Public opinion has clearly been a significant factor, shaping political attitudes and the policy response to climate change. GlobeScan surveys on public attitudes to climate change in different countries show high public concern in all countries, rising in recent years.16 However, a more significant test of public attitudes is responses to specific policy options.17 Here there is far less support. This partly explains the limited appetite of most political leaders for action on climate change. It also suggests that leaders should have tapped far more effectively into the public’s concerns. So we need to identify the underlying causes of our modest responses so far.

These can be clustered into four main themes; policy failure, problems arising from the structures of government, issues related to politics and power, and challenges associated with the very nature of climate change.

Policy failureThe Stern review is widely accepted as the definitive assessment to-date of the challenge for policy-makers.18 It highlighted three key areas in which action is needed:– establishing a carbon price, through taxation,

trading and regulation;– policies to support the development of a range of

low carbon and high efficiency technologies on an urgent timescale; and

– removing barriers to behaviour change, particularly in relation to energy efficiency.

There is no room here to explore the strengths (and weaknesses) of this framework. The central issue to note here is that the policies developed in practice have rarely been as coherent as the principles outlined by Sir Nicholas Stern in his report.

Many policies have simply failed to deliver their projected emissions savings. Some have failed as a result of opposition that hindered implementation. Others have simply been failures of policy design. The emissions reductions achieved by many countries have been largely a by-product of systemic changes in particular economies (for example, the economic problems of Eastern Europe in the 1990s) or of policies introduced with very different motives (for example, the dash for gas in the UK).19 The European emissions trading scheme is a high-profile case of a policy where we are still on a steep learning curve. It is frequently hailed as the world’s most important climate change policy. Promoters of a US trading scheme have been quick to highlight its achievements. But there have been a catalogue of problems with the early years of the European scheme. The price signal has been relatively weak;

What is difficult about this? 9

there have been serious over-allocations of permits in many cases; there are no means to address falling demand, and the shortness of the first phases of the scheme have provided very short-term price signals.20 Each of these weaknesses was arguably inevitable in such a complex and new policy instrument.

Three recurring causes can be identified for these policy failures:

– Over-reliance on carbon markets. Carbon trading has at times appeared to be the panacea proposed for almost every market failure in carbon emissions. But some of the support for carbon trading has been tactical and disingenuous, and comes from groups who recognise that trading at least in the short- to medium-term does more to create opportunities for windfall profits than to drive investment in low carbon patterns of energy generation and travel.21 The critical challenge at present is to secure investment in low carbon energy and transport infrastructure, which will be needed to reduce emissions from the power sector to near zero by 2020-30. Carbon pricing does not currently secure this. Indeed, as the critics of trading have highlighted, at present our political leaders have every reason to ensure that it does not due to public hostility to rising energy prices.22 So taxation and regulation need to be given far greater weight in the policy response to climate change.

– Dependence on voluntarism. Too many countries have relied on overwhelmingly voluntary approaches, with predictably poor results. Canada’s failure has owed much to an overwhelming reliance on voluntary measures,23 and the same can be said of Japan.24 The European voluntary

agreement on cars is another classic example. Finalised in 1998, this agreement predictably failed to deliver the emissions reductions to which the car manufacturers had committed.25

– Failure to increase public spending. Increased public spending is an essential part of the policy mix. As Stern argued, a doubling of research and development is one essential element of the policy mix.26 But there are other important uses of public expenditure. In terms of domestic policy it is vital, given the limited public support for rising energy prices, that some of the energy efficiency and low carbon infrastructure we need is financed through public expenditure rather than consumer bills. There will also be significant spending commitments for developed countries, arising from their responsibility to assist developing countries with the costs of adaptation and mitigation, that flow from the historic emissions of developed countries.27

Paradoxically, strong demands for additional public spending have only emerged since the recession, from the many proponents of a low carbon fiscal stimulus and a Green New Deal.28 There was a significant low carbon focus to some of these spending packages.29 Given the tight fiscal constraint arising from the recent global recession, more creative solutions to some of these challenges will be needed.

“we’re often so busy looking forward that we forget to look back”

The new commandments of climate change strategy10 What is difficult about this? 11

association for European businesses, was a fierce and highly influential opponent of the European Union adopting a commitment to cut emissions by 30 per cent by 2020, for example, both before and during the Copenhagen summit.33 This lobbying is breathtakingly short-termist, given the potentially devastating impact of catastrophic climate change on our economies and businesses, to say nothing of humankind as a whole. It does not, of course, prevent politicians from acting. But in the face of such resistance, far greater public concern is needed to overcome these powerful influences.

Long timescales and distributed responsibilityThe final set of issues relates to the very nature of the climate change phenomenon, which is the most deep-rooted reason for of our inadequate responses to date. There are four aspects of this problem that make it difficult for the political system to address:

1. It is remote in time and placeClimate change does not respect national boundaries or political timescales. We would not have become dependent on fossil fuels if those responsible for climate change emissions were immediately affected by it. Of course, the impact of our emissions now will be devastating not for those that are responsible for these emissions, but for others in far away places several decades hence. Most of the general public, and almost all of the stakeholders within significant power and influence consider the case for action in relation to the potential impact on their attitudes and interests and not in response to the threat of a future climate ‘apocalypse’.34 By its very nature, climate change is a difficult issue to address within a culture that is overwhelmingly short-term in outlook.

2. Long time lag between new policy and falling emissionsThe timescale that matters to democratic politicians, above all others, is the length of time between one election and the next. The long-term benefit of falling emissions is several decades away, as outlined above. Even if politicians are persuaded that they will be rewarded for reduced emissions, the time lag between government action and resulting emissions reductions is also often long, and a further obstacle to action. A small number of policies can reduce emissions within a parliamentary term. Changes in national speed limits would have a rapid impact, as would changes in daylight hours in some countries.35 Energy efficiency programmes can also be scaled up within a parliamentary term, and lead to emissions cuts.36

But in most cases the time lag between commitment and outcome will be greater than the lifetime of a Parliament. For instance, the gap between the initial commitment to support carbon capture and storage (CCS) or any other new form of energy generation and the emissions cuts from this energy coming into production and displacing other sources is likely to be five to ten years. It typically takes two to three years to complete the consultation, policy-making and legislative processes needed to develop a framework that gives investors sufficient certainty to invest. Even with a widespread consensus on the technology and the appropriate policy framework (which rarely exists), CCS plants then need to be designed, secure planning permission, and be built before this policy will reduce emissions. In the case of high-speed rail as a means to reduce short-haul flights within or between countries, the time lag is likely to be 10-15 years.

Structures and division of responsibilities in governmentOne of the underlying causes of policy failures has been problems arising from existing structures of government. The following issues have frequently arisen:– Successful action on climate change requires

clarity on the respective roles of national, regional and local government. Each must have clear goals, and control over the resources and policy levers needed to enable them to achieve these goals. This has rarely been the case. In Canada, for example, regional government holds many of the levers needed for action but lacks any meaningful incentive to act.30

– Responsibility for action within national governments is necessarily widely distributed, among the many departments responsible for housing, energy, transport, fiscal and other areas of policy. Consistent action across government has rarely been forthcoming.

– Climate change strategies have typically been co-ordinated by ministers and officials of departments of the environment, who lack the authority to secure action across government. This has made it difficult to secure consistent attention from more powerful ministries and teams closest to heads of government.

Politics and powerThe causes of our slow progress are more deep-rooted than failures of policy design and government processes. They are, above all, political. The limited public demand for action has been noted. But there are deeper issues at play, with powerful vested interests resisting change at both national and international levels. The key issue here has been

corporate attitudes, and influence. Many businesses, particular in the energy and automotive sectors, were for many years vigorous opponents of climate change policy. These companies were hugely influential during the first decade of climate change policy, blocking action in many countries, and slowing progress in the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol.31

There has been a considerable shift in attitudes in recent years. Sectors such as investment and insurance, and some companies in other sectors, have emerged as strong supporters of action. Many others now accept the science of climate change, and express support in principle for government action.

However, businesses remain a primarily negative influence on climate change policy in many countries. Some are highlighting genuine competitive concerns, and the risk of carbon leakage to other countries. Many others are simply reflecting the tendency for business engagement in policy-making to be short-termist and negative. There are honourable exceptions to this, both in the positions of individual companies and the formation of progressive groups of companies such as the US Climate Action Partnership. It is clear, though, that the overall effect of business engagement in 2009 has been to slow the progress of action both in key countries and internationally.

Critically, they are proving highly influential in limiting the progress being made in the US, where corporate lobbyists spent around $45 million in 2009 lobbying against the Waxman-Markey bill.32 Business is also a strong opponent of action in many areas within the EU. Business Europe, the trade

The new commandments of climate change strategy12 Climate change strategy begins abroad 13

3. Climate change strategy begins abroad

The outcome of the negotiations in Copenhagen was a huge disappointment to all those who recognise the urgency of climate change, and the crucial importance of multilateral action. This chapter assesses the reasons for that outcome, makes the case for far greater international co-operation, and sets out the key elements of a successful future approach.

It contains the first three commandments for national governments. While national strategies will ultimately determine success or failure, the effectiveness and ambition of national action is significantly affected by the commitments of other governments. So it is vital to the interests of all that we secure a global framework for action on the scale necessary.

Making sense of CopenhagenThe US withdrawal from Kyoto in 1999 left the international community deeply divided, and made it impossible for eight long years to conduct meaningful global negotiations. In spite of this, Russian ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2004 gave the treaty sufficient international support to bring it into force, and established a legally binding global framework for action. European leadership was crucial during this period.

As US attitudes changed dramatically in 2008-09, countries such as Australia, Japan and China all engaged with renewed vigour and openness in international dialogue. In the run-up to Copenhagen, there was a significant increase in the commitment of almost all the key countries to global and domestic

action, and a succession of ministerial meetings to discuss the way forward.39 Many hoped for rapid agreement on an ambitious, effective and legally binding global treaty.

We now know that this will take longer than we had hoped. But Copenhagen did reach agreement in some important areas. Table one on the following page outlines the essential characteristics of a global framework to avert catastrophic climate change, and the position on these key issues in the aftermath of Copenhagen.

Yet the success of these actions will in the short-term be masked by short-term variations caused by factors such as weather and energy prices. Long-term emissions trends are likely to take three to five years to discern, as reflected in the carbon budgets periods eventually agreed as part of the UK’s Climate Change Act. This time lag is a major disincentive to political action. The challenge therefore is to develop policies that secure emissions reduction in the medium-term, but create public support and political capital in the shorter-term and are thus more attractive to politicians. The concept of the Green New Deal, and the low carbon spending in President Obama’s fiscal stimulus package and other public expenditure programmes launched in response to the 2008-09 recession, are classic examples of this.37

3. Highly distributed responsibility for the problem Responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions is extraordinarily distributed in society. The emissions of all countries are ultimately determined by countless individual decisions, as the public make daily decisions on journeys to work, energy use in the home, holiday and leisure travel and in other areas. These decisions are of course shaped by the availability and price of ‘low carbon’ and ‘high carbon’ choices. Action by government is crucial in determining whether low carbon options are

available and attractive. Governments can go further, not simply creating incentives but also directly shifting the energy generation mix, and setting standards for operators in housing and transport. But to do so successfully, they must ensure that these regulations and incentives affect a very wide range of businesses and organisations.

4. Climate change as an environmental issueFinally, the characterisation of climate change as an environmental issue has marginalised a problem that is profoundly economic and social as well as environmental. Even now, climate change is primarily covered in the media by environment correspondents, primarily the subject of campaigning by environmental groups, and the responsibility in government of environment ministers.38 This framing is shifting rapidly, as other campaigning groups mobilise on climate change, political leaders are increasingly active, and awareness grows of the economic implications of climate change. But it has significantly weakened the engagement of politicians and the public who are not engaged by other environmental causes, and limited the speed with which climate change has been mainstreamed in public and political debate.

ConclusionThese four themes cover the key issues and lessons from climate change policy over the past 15-20 years. The circumstances of individual governments and thus the appropriate political strategy and policy framework will clearly vary hugely. To be successful, all national governments must design strategies that overcome the barriers that are limiting progress.

“the challenge therefore is to develop policies that secure emissions reduction in the medium-term, but create public support and political capital in the shorter-term and are thus more attractive to politicians”


too many heads of state currently perceive climate change to be an issue that must ultimately come second to concerns over their economies and energy security, rather than recognising the powerful synergies between these concerns and a stable climate.

Limited public demandChapter two outlined the longer-term obstacles to leadership on climate change. But the summit highlighted a particular issue. The dominant voice in the run-up to the summit in almost all countries was that of environmental and development NGOs. They placed a crucial role in mobilising public awareness and pressure for action. Without them, the summit would not have been attended by world leaders or made the progress it did. But the environmental and moral international case is not persuading sufficiently large sections of the general public. Too many powerful stakeholders remain unconvinced. The business community, above all, has been overwhelmingly hostile or passive given the issues at stake.

Stronger public demand for national and international action would clearly dramatically improve the prospects for an ambitious and effective treaty. I have written at length elsewhere about how this might be created from below.44 But chapter four will show that there is far more that politicians can do to secure this support more quickly.

The prospects for an international breakthrough in 2010 are poor, after the chaos of Copenhagen. But effective global action is essential if we are to succeed. In the past, a treaty has often been seen as a pre-requisite for action. But we now need to reverse this, and to secure a rapid increase in international co-operation in advance of a final treaty. The remainder of this chapter outlines the three main elements of the approach to international action that should now be adopted by national governments.

There were three main reasons for the disappointing outcome shown in table one above:

ProcessThe United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) consensus process has again proved agonisingly unwieldy. The summit and the preparatory meetings early in 2009 were all characterised by lengthy disputes over process that were astutely manipulated by those who did not want to see a strong outcome. We must find more effective ways to build international trust and resolve differences of opinion. Prior to Copenhagen there

were attempts to use both the G20 and the Major Economies Forum for this purpose, but neither had the trust of all the key parties. As a result, far too much was left to Copenhagen. We need to tackle this quickly, if we are to avoid a further erosion of trust.

Weak political leadershipThe final outcome cannot be blamed primarily on failures of process. Copenhagen was the world’s first negotiation amongst heads of state that was specifically dedicated to climate change. Their presence was evidence of the profile that climate change now has. Yet the final analysis showed that

Table one: Key characteristics of global treaty, and position post Copenhagen40

Characteristic Outcome Short-term prospects

Ambition: are targets consistent with the scale of the threat?

Poor: reference to need to keep average temperature rise below two degrees centrigrade but no national targets consistent with this.41

Low: international talks likely to progress slowly in 2010. Increased domestic support for action needed in key countries.

Ambition: is there sufficient finance? Positive: commitment in principle to $30 billion for 2010-12 in ‘fast-start’ finance, and call to mobilise $100 billion for adaptation and mitigation by 2020.

Uncertain: quantity, quality and additionality of short-term finance unclear at present. High-Level Advisory group on mobilising climate change resources to consider longer-term financing.42

Fair: what protection for the poorest? Poor: very little detail on finance and policy for adaptation in the Copenhagen Accord.43

Uncertain: closely linked to financing for adaptation.

Binding: what status? Poor: The Accord has no legal status within UNFCCC.

Low prospects for a binding treaty in 2010.

Monitoring, reporting and verification Positive: The Accord calls for processes to measure, report and verify developed country emissions cuts and finance, as well as international measurement and verification of mitigation actions in developing countries that are financed by developed countries.

Positive: further progress possible here.

“Copenhagen was the world’s first negotiation amongst heads of state that was specifically dedicated to climate change”


on climate and development. The Secretary-General indicated in September 2009 that he planned to create this in early 2010, but there has been no progress on this since that time.

– Highlight the opportunities of the transition to a low carbon economy. New research on these opportunities should be commissioned to build the positive case for action, and persuade countries to support the action needed to grasp these opportunities. The G20 is one possible forum for this. But this needs to be done in such a way as to maximise the prospects for action, for instance by commissioning independent reports to the G20 that involve non-governmental stakeholders, with a commitment to ongoing work on the effectiveness of implementation.

– Create pressure on business to engage constructively. This could be done through multi-government initiatives that highlight the risks of the current approach to investment in low carbon industries, and more generally the potentially devastating impact of climate change on economies, and particular sectors. The business community should be making the case for multi-stakeholder commissions of national governments, businesses, the investment community and NGOs to assess these risks and highlight the business case for a more ambitious approach.

– Mobilise the security community. This influential constituency has begun to focus on climate change, as evidenced by a number of public reports and the debate on climate change at the UN Security Council.46 But there is much more that could be done to link the security and climate

change agendas, and thus accelerate the rate of action to prevent climate change. One way in which we can do this is by highlighting the risks of what has been called the ‘perfect storm’ of rising energy prices, water scarcity and food shortages. Evans and Stevens have proposed that the G20 commission an inter-agency report on this set of risks, and the actions that need to be taken to avert this potentially catastrophic scenario.47

Individual governments can also use their soft power to develop and implement public diplomacy strategies to strengthen support for action internationally. The UK government has led the way in this field. Their climate diplomacy programme has done much to strengthen support for action, above all through the Stern review.48 But many more such initiatives are needed. They must be collaborative and involve groups of governments if they are to secure widespread ownership and support, and to shift both the domestic and international politics of action on climate change. The challenge, in each case, is to build a shared awareness of the need for action among state and non-state actors, and a shared analysis of the appropriate collective response to a particular joint problem.

The second commandmentAct now on finance and technologyThe second commandment focuses on the vital importance of co-operation among national governments. The disappointing outcome of the Copenhagen summit makes this more vital than ever.

Over the past two years there has been a marked increase in rhetorical commitment to co-operation at a global level on climate change and in other areas.

The first commandmentWiden the circle of support for action Despite the enormity of the issues at stake, too few countries currently share an analysis of the problem and the need for collective action that is in line with the scientific evidence. We need to establish a far wider shared view of the urgency of this challenge if we are to succeed.

The prospects for this would be much improved if our political leaders were to come together to champion new initiatives to secure this. These must involve and command the support of countries of both North and South. With good diplomacy, the United Nations, G20, World Bank and others could all play a leading role in this in different ways. There are four areas where our political leaders must take the initiative and set an agenda for the future:

– Establish awareness of the human and economic costs of the current approach by commissioning and championing research on the impact of the Copenhagen Accord. Without an increase in ambition, these human and economic costs will be devastating to the prospects for prosperity and development in many countries. This analysis needs to be developed and shared by countries of North and South, to strengthen support for a more ambitious approach. Analysis of the potential economic impacts of the Copenhagen Accord on the global economy is the most obvious way to capture the attention of governments, and must be the subject of a new initiative with the right participants and credibility. But the human dimension must be equally prominent. One way to highlight this and secure support for further action would be to create a UN High-Level Panel

Table two: Benefits of global and regional action Stakeholder Overall case for action Economic benefits of action

Political leaders

– Opportunity to avert global threat with very severe impacts for individual states

– Public recognition and support for global leadership

– Public more likely to support national action

– Lower business and public resistance to national action

– Avoid lock-in to high emissions in the future, from both high carbon infrastructure and forests

Business – Global threat with potentially severe economic impacts

– Consistency of regulation and other policies in different countries

– Higher public support for corporate action

– Lower costs of technology discovery and deployment

– Lower costs of regulatory compliance

General public – Opportunity to avert global threat with very severe impacts for individual states

– Far higher public support for national action, once other countries seen to act45

– Lower costs of national action (in energy bills, public spending)


contribution to reducing emissions, and provide a blueprint for a scaled-up effort in the future. Upfront capacity-building (‘readiness’) costs have been estimated to be up to $4 billion over five years for 40 forest nations. However, in their 2009 Options Assessment Report, REDD state that “to make substantial progress toward a 2020 goal of halving global deforestation, Phase 2, starting in 2010, should include internationally binding financial commitments from industrialised countries at a suggested level of $2 billion per year, increasing to $10 billion per year in 2014”.51

– Agreement to demonstrate carbon capture and storage, a vital technology that needs global collaboration to overcome the significant costs of early deployment. EU and G20 agreement to a programme of pilot plants urgently needs to be turned into reality, through international agreement and new funding and regulation at national level.

– Agreement to double spending on research and development to support a diverse portfolio of technologies, as proposed by the Stern review.

Regional co-operationIn regions with a history of co-operation, the prospects for achieving national emissions targets in many sectors would be much enhanced by increased co-operation on areas such as the development and deployment of technologies, low carbon energy grids and transport systems, and common standards for products and fuel efficiency.

Europe is particularly well placed to develop a shared strategy. It has the processes and levers available to reduce the economic costs for all. There is a very real danger that Europe retreats post Copenhagen. But it has every political and economic incentive to rebuild a shared agenda and a leadership role. Above all, this must involve accelerating action within the EU, alongside meeting its financing commitments and prioritising collaboration with progressive countries.52 The new EU strategy that will be adopted formally in June 2010, currently titled ‘Europe 2020: a strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’, must be the means by which Europe makes climate change an integral part of its future strategy.53

European priorities include:– Focusing on low carbon growth within the EU,

acting on a commitment to cut emissions by 30 per cent by 2020 and pursuing opportunities for global competitive advantage;

– Agreeing sectoral strategies to achieve this, focusing in particular on energy efficiency, the power sector, and Europe’s energy and transport infrastructure;

– Using the EU budget review to make climate change a central focus of EU spending; and

– Meeting its financing commitments and building international partnerships with progressive countries such as Brazil, India and Mexico.

The G8 and the Major Economies Forum have set shared goals and agreed in principle to act together on issues such as carbon capture and storage and renewable energy. But these discussions have not so far led to meaningful co-operation on anything like the necessary scale. For example, international discussions on carbon capture and storage, a crucial technology in the global response to climate change, have still not led to the construction of a single large-scale CCS plant. Yet the international Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum has been meeting annually for seven years, and the EU and G8 have both agreed in principle to secure up to 15 plants by 2015 and 20 plants by 2010 (!) respectively.49

The European Union has been the forum for some of the most effective co-operation to-date. The EU has collaborated both in setting national and sectoral targets, and in policies to deliver on these targets. This co-operation began prior to the Kyoto Protocol, but has increased markedly since 2007 as concerns over energy security increased the willingness of EU counties to co-operate on energy policy. The renewable energy targets agreed by EU leaders in 2007 are the most notable result of this growing commitment.

Success will require much greater co-operation at both global and regional levels. Given the scale of challenges ahead, co-operation will be needed in many areas, alongside the competition for markets that is an inevitable part of the transition to a global low carbon economy. The two key areas are in securing investment in widespread deployment of the key first stage technologies needed to tackle climate change, and international co-operation to meet the financial commitments made in

Copenhagen. This latter issue is critical to building international trust over the next two years. The funds pledged in the Copenhagen Accord must be spent to good effect and build confidence in countries of both North and South. New sources of finance must be agreed if climate change funding is to be sustained and additional to spending on international development.

Global co-operation Four areas are particularly important, at a global level:

– Fast-start finance. The Copenhagen Accord included agreement to $30 billion in financing for the period 2010-12. This is a very significant increase in the funding to-date, and a vital opportunity both to reduce emissions and to support countries in their adaptation efforts. Countries will need to co-operate in all aspects of this, agreeing how these funds should be disbursed, ensuring that they are well spent, and also identifying new sources of future funding. Without success in this area, a long-term global agreement is very unlikely to emerge.

– Reducing emissions from deforestation. 17 per cent of global emissions in 2004 were a result of deforestation and forest degradation.50 There was a strong political commitment from all countries in Copenhagen to take early action to stem this loss of forests and the associated emissions, by offering incentives to developing country governments and forest communities to halt this trend. The practical difficulties of this are considerable, but by acting together governments with a high level of forest cover and donor countries could make a rapid

“there is a very real danger that Europe retreats post Copenhagen. But it has every political and economic incentive to rebuild a shared agenda and a leadership role”


The third commandmentMake promises you can’t breakThirdly, national governments should use the global processes on climate change to ensure that all countries make binding commitments to action.

A legally binding global treaty is a central element of this. Each national government committed to action on climate change must use the full range of its diplomatic and political influencing powers to make the case for this, and to build the coalition of support needed to secure it. This currently excludes some key countries, in particular the US, China and India. All have argued that a legally binding treaty is not needed and that a political and operational agreement is a more achievable end. This view is mistaken. A legally binding treaty, ratified by national governments, is essential precisely because it binds nations together much more strongly, provides a much clearer signal to investors, and contains far stronger mechanisms for monitoring and reporting.

But a legally binding treaty is not sufficient. We also need to establish a far more effective institutional framework. Recent international negotiations have severely neglected the vital importance of the institutional framework for delivery. Alex Evans has written persuasively on this theme.54 He has made the case for annual reporting by an independent institution along the lines of a Central Bank, and enforcement mechanisms that would make carbon default a major risk for nation states. Of course these objectives currently look out of reach. The Copenhagen Accord contains a proposed streamlined mechanism for reporting national emissions, by comparison to the reporting and monitoring procedures established under the Kyoto Protocol.55

But Evans suggests a number of short-term initiatives to open up the space for the creation of these institutions, such as a G20 study on the long-term institutions for tackling climate change, and an annual scientific report from the IPCC to increase the profile of the science of climate change. These ideas and others are vital to creating a global regime that drives national delivery after the negotiations have concluded.

ConclusionClimate change is one of a family of pressing global challenges, such as nuclear proliferation and international development, that will require far greater international co-operation if they are to be tackled effectively. Despite recent setbacks, the election of President Obama makes success possible after the rugged unilateralism and resistance of the Bush presidencies. 2009 has been a difficult year. Success is still possible. There has been a rapid increase in international co-operation over the past twelve months. But in the aftermath of Copenhagen, leaders must move rapidly to establish a shared view of the urgent need for action, co-operate to cut the economic costs for all countries, and work towards a legally binding treaty.

“leaders must move rapidly to establish a shared view of the urgent need for action, co-operate to cut the economic costs for all countries, and work towards a legally binding treaty”

Political characteristics of successful national action 21

4. Political characteristics of successful national actionClimate change is, above all, a political problem. We know a great deal now about the science of climate change, we have a mix of technologies to tackle it within reach, and we are increasingly clear about the policies that would help to deploy them. But we have not yet created the social foundations that will compel our politicians to act consistently. Politicians argue that this is primarily a challenge for the voluntary sector. In truth their actions can do this far more quickly. This chapter outlines how well-designed government strategies can rapidly secure far greater public support for further action.

The recurring theme of this chapter is the critical importance of designing climate change strategies and policies that meet the economic and social objectives of governments and society, as well as reducing emissions. The failure to integrate these issues, and the perception that they are in conflict, has been a key cause of the limited political support for climate change policy.

In the longer term of course, unless we manage this transition successfully, catastrophic climate change will have a devastating impact on our economies, and be most damaging to the poorest countries and the poorest in our societies. But climate change policy must reduce emissions, create jobs and be socially equitable in the short-term. This is by no means straightforward, but it is eminently possible. Unless this is achieved, national governments will be unable to tell a convincing story to their electorates of the benefits of ambitious climate change policy.

The fourth commandmentCarpe diem: focus on economic opportunitiesThe public, stakeholder and political debate in many countries is currently shaped by perceptions that an ambitious climate change policy will be expensive, involving costs and sacrifice. This debate can and must be subsumed into one focused on how countries can best seize the opportunities arising from climate change policy.

This can only be achieved with the commitment of those parts of government that lead on economic and social policies. Those in government responsible for economic and industrial policy will need to be persuaded to play a leadership role in climate change policy. There are some risks to this approach of course. These departments have other long-established priorities, and in many cases have regarded or indeed continue to regard climate change policy primarily as a threat to their objectives. It will require decisive political leadership in order to succeed, and may not be possible in the short-term in all countries.

There are a number of compelling examples of countries adopting this approach, and securing substantial gains as a result. Denmark set out to lead the world in wind turbine production, and now

“those in government responsible for economic and industrial policy will need to be persuaded to play a leadership role in climate change policy”


approximately half of the installed 40,000 MW globally are turbines produced by Danish manufacturers.56 In 2008 the sector directly employed 28,400 people57 in a country with a population of 5.5 million, and in some areas wind has become the number one employer.58 Britain had just 25,000 jobs in the renewables industry in 2007. Similarly, Germany created 200,000 jobs and a significant export market through an ambitious approach to renewable energy, and in particular through their early adoption of a feed-in tariff.59 Many other countries have primarily regarded the low carbon economy as a threat rather than an opportunity, and have failed to seize opportunities of this kind.

But there are other more surprising examples of failure. The UK has a comparatively wide-ranging climate change policy. By some estimates it has a total of 881,000 green jobs.60 But the UK’s focus on short-term costs has meant that they have achieved very little export and manufacturing success. Competitive advantage must be a deliberate strategy if countries are to succeed in creating this. More recently the UK has sought to adopt this approach, as evidenced by the UK’s low carbon industrial strategy.61

The opportunities here go well beyond energy and industrial policy, and high-skilled jobs. A successful framework for the transition to a low carbon economy will also require significant employment, for instance, in energy efficiency. But there are limits to the scale of the potential employment that will be directly created, and other industries may be endangered by this transition, as we will consider later in this chapter. So the scale of the opportunities

that arise, particularly in the short-term, should not be exaggerated. But the political opportunity to highlight, secure and celebrate wealth creation and employment from the low carbon transition is there to be grasped.

The fifth commandmentSecure early wins – and celebrate them This commandment concerns the vital importance of early successes in an ambitious and effective climate change policy. Chapter two highlighted the political difficulties that arise from the long time lag between carbon emissions and their damaging impacts, and even more importantly between action by government and reduced emissions. Successful national climate change strategies must deliver on the political timescale that matters, within a single parliamentary term. Without this, even the best-designed long-term strategy is very likely to be derailed.

These early wins should include policies that deliver tangible benefits to the general public, and others that are less tangible but popular with the electorate. They will of course vary greatly according to the political circumstances of the country and the time. The list below illustrates the type of measures that could be introduced:– higher fuel efficiency standards, in response to

concerns over dependence on oil imports;

“successful national climate change strategies must deliver on the political timescale that matters, within a single parliamentary term”


– energy efficiency programmes that cut bills and create jobs;

– real-time displays and smart meters in the home, providing a new technology to households that increases their awareness of energy use and helps them to cut bills;

– public transport improvements, which enable individuals to make short journeys more quickly and comfortably.

Some of these policies will deliver significant emissions reductions, and might be chosen by government irrespective of their political impact. Others will provide relatively marginal savings, and might easily be ignored by government processes that typically prioritise measures that provide significant savings. They are no less important for that. Government climate change strategies must contain policies that motivate and engage the public.

Alongside these short-term policies, it is vital that governments enable the public to judge whether they are on track for national medium-term emissions targets, by setting and publicising short-term indicators of progress. Governments and the public currently lack a meaningful way to assess this. Short-term goals and indicators of progress would enable both governments and their electorates to know whether they are winning, and create internal pressure within governments that is often lacking due to the long time lags between action and emissions reduction. The Committee on Climate

Change, created by the UK government in 2008, has made the most comprehensive attempt yet to do this. Their 2009 annual report proposes a set of indicators for short-term progress, against which the efforts of government can be assessed. In relation to different types of renewable energy, for instance, their report proposes the amount of investment and the level of energy production contained in planning applications as effective short-term indicators for whether the UK will meet its renewable energy targets.62

The sixth commandmentFind the losers - and help themThe sixth commandment concerns the need to develop policy frameworks that are socially just, and which tackle the potentially significant impacts of climate change policy on both the poor and businesses in certain sectors. There is a strong moral case for this, given the inequity of imposing proportionately higher costs on those less able to pay both environmental taxes and energy bills. There is also a strong political case for this, as an inequitable approach is very likely to lead to public opposition. The case for a socially just approach has been championed by, among others, progressive sections of the trade union movement. The International Trade Union Congress has been making the case for a Just Transition during the recent international climate change negotiations.63 The distributional impacts of climate change policy are potentially quite high, unless mitigated through careful policy design. Energy prices and environmental taxes on transport in particular are the key issues here.

In the UK for instance, the Committee on Climate Change estimated that the impact of meeting carbon

“government climate change strategies must contain policies that motivate and engage the public”


budgets could increase electricity prices by 25 per cent and put an additional 1.7 million people in fuel poverty by 2022.64 These are very significant impacts, which demand attention from either an equity or political perspective.

The climate change case for transport taxation has tended to attract much more attention in many countries, as a result of the high visibility of these taxes. But the evidence here is relatively mixed. Opponents of aviation taxes have frequently argued that new aviation taxes are socially regressive.65 But in reality the poorest in our societies do not actually fly, and ‘The Freedom to Fly’ campaigns appeal primarily to middle class concerns. There are similar issues with motoring taxes, as it is the poorest in our societies who benefit most from public transport.

Fortunately a number of studies have shown that careful analysis and policy design can successfully address these potential equity implications.66 For instance, in environmental taxation the impact of higher energy prices can be addressed through a combination of ambitious and well-targeted energy efficiency policies, accompanied by social tariffs. Energy efficiency measures alone will not be sufficient, since the poor are likely to take some of this gain in warmer homes.

The need for a just transition also applies in particular to high carbon industrial sectors that are to varying degrees genuinely threatened by the transition to a low carbon economy. Many sectors claim that these impacts will be significant. Their claims are often overstated. But there are a number of sectors for whom energy is a significant input and who are exposed to international competition, for

whom there are some real competitive effects. Analysis of the potential impacts of the EU emissions trading scheme, for instance, have highlighted the potential impact on sectors including aluminium, cement and basic iron and steel.67 For both moral and political reasons, it is vital that governments enable these businesses and other groups and individuals whose livelihoods are associated with high carbon emissions to make a successful transition to low carbon industrial activity.

The seventh commandmentLet’s come together: support community and third sector mobilisationThis pamphlet is focused on the leadership that governments can provide. This leadership will not succeed if it is confined to providing incentives and setting regulations at a national level. Chapter six will consider the role of regional and local government. But leadership in the voluntary sector is also essential, both nationally and critically also at a community level.

Governments must empower national voluntary sector organisations and community groups to act, mobilising their members and supporters amongst whom they have the trust and reach needed to achieve change and to deliver solutions that will work in their localities. There is abundant evidence that people are neither willing nor able to take decisive action alone on an issue of this scale and complexity. But they will very often do so if they have opportunities to act in concert with other like-minded people.

A surge in collective commitment and action among voluntary sector groups has already occurred in


recent years, as evidenced by the rapid spread of climate change concern from the environmental community to faith and development groups, trade unions, and community groups.68 This trend must be sustained. Commitment and leadership by these groups will be crucial in securing the social foundations for action by governments as well as widespread behaviour change.

Some aspects of this shift can only come ‘from below’. But governments can play an important role in encouraging this, as outlined in the report of a recent UK task force of which I was co-chair.69 For instance they can pursue their objectives in relation to behaviour change on energy efficiency, transport and in other areas in partnership with third sector organisations. This is more likely to be effective than national information campaigns on climate change, and will build the capacity and commitment of voluntary sector groups.

Without the social changes that these groups can help to bring about, even strong incentives for individuals to act as part of a well-designed national framework may well not produce a sufficient collective shift in behaviour. Conversely these groups can influence social norms and accelerate changing public attitudes and behaviour, opening up space for our political leaders to take further action.

ConclusionThis chapter has outlined four essential political ingredients of a successful climate change strategy. There is far less attention given to these issues than to the challenges of policy design. Yet they are of paramount importance, and failure can actually be far more damaging. Whilst policy failure can be assessed and new approaches introduced, a failure to anticipate public concern can lead to public resistance and apathy and a lasting public resentment that is far harder to overturn.

“governments must empower national voluntary sector organisations and community groups to act”


5. National policy frameworksNational policy frameworks cannot be downloaded and applied by national governments. They must be specifically designed for particular national circumstances. But the past twenty years provide some hugely important lessons about how we can design effective policy frameworks - and the mistakes to avoid. Chapter two highlighted three of the most common mistakes: an over-reliance on voluntarism and on carbon trading, and a failure to recognise the importance of public finance. This chapter builds on that analysis. It outlines three commandments for the successful design of national strategies, which apply in very different circumstances.

These commandments do not include emissions trading, which has been widely proclaimed as the pre-eminent policy tool for tackling climate change. The potential for carbon trading to play a central role in the short- to medium-term has been substantially over-stated, not least because of the preference for market instruments and the enthusiasm of those keen to profit from a new trading market.70

A market price for carbon may prove in the longer-term to be the centre-piece of the policy framework at both international and national levels. But carbon trading will not deliver the shift in investment and emissions that we need to make in the next five to ten critical years. The challenge for policy-making in this period is to establish a framework that persuades energy generators and others to invest in the large-scale deployment of low carbon technology and infrastructure needed to secure longer-term emissions reductions. Emissions trading schemes have not yet, and in the short-term will not, provide a sufficiently high or long-term price signal to drive this investment.

Indeed their political architects will wish to ensure that they do not do so. As Nordhaus and Shellenberger have argued, the crucial flaw in trading schemes is that they are bad politics.71 By their nature, they are designed to drive up prices. As such, they create fear and resistance in many of the affected industries amongst both employers and employees. If they were to provide a sufficiently strong price signal to mobilise investors, the political backlash against this would be so strong that it would lead to action to weaken the scheme and the price signal. So the three key commandments in the years ahead relate to securing private investment, using regulation to drive innovation, and the adequate and effective use of public expenditure.

The eighth commandment Ensure private capital is invested in success The carbon emissions of our economies are largely shaped by the nature of our energy and transport infrastructure. Our power stations, pipeline networks, roads and public transport systems determine the carbon intensity of our power systems and (to a slightly lesser extent given the potential for varying emissions from the vehicle fleet) the availability of low carbon transport options for both businesses and individuals.

This infrastructure is of course the legacy of many decades of investment. Power stations, for instance, have a lifetime of 30-50 years. So the task of establishing a low carbon energy and transport infrastructure is hugely pressing. Fortunately, from a carbon perspective, our existing infrastructure (energy in particular) is in urgent need of new investment in many countries. For example the total

National policy frameworks 27

infrastructure investment needed in the UK has been estimated as £434 billion for 2010-2020, with £162 billion needed to meet the UK’s energy goals by 2025.72 There is therefore a very pressing need and opportunity to replace our existing infrastructure with one fit for the 21st century and a low carbon economy.

The current recession makes it all the more important to secure this investment, given the potential for wealth and employment creation. However it has also substantially raised the cost of private capital, and made it more difficult to secure this. So there is a compelling case for new institutions to lower the cost of capital.73

The European Investment Bank has played this role to some extent in recent years. But the scale of the need and the particular national circumstances in different countries create a compelling need to establish dedicated institutions for this purpose in countries where they do not currently exist. In the UK this is now recognised by all three political parties, though their proposals vary on vital issues such as the level of finance available to a new institution.

The ninth commandment Regulation for innovationA well-designed regulatory framework will be a critical ingredient in any successful national policy framework. The dominant public debate on regulation focuses on the costs and burdens of regulation, in climate change as well in other areas. There has been a highly effective effort by private sector interests and free marketers to frame regulation as a bureaucratic and costly constraint on wealth creation and employment in the private

sector. Poorly-designed regulation can indeed be costly and ineffective. But well-designed regulation will reduce the collective cost of action, stimulate innovation, and play a critical role in securing investment in low carbon technology and infrastructure.74

The debate on standard setting is often dominated by those who argue that regulations should be set on the basis of existing technologies. But the evidence suggests that regulation can be used to drive innovation and investment, and thus can actually lower the long-term costs of action. Crucially, well-designed regulation of this kind can also deliver the broader social and economic benefits that were identified as important in chapter three. Industrial regulation can create lasting economic benefits arising from innovation, whilst product and fuel regulation can drive efficiency and reduce costs for motorists and product users. Four examples of the potential for regulation to drive innovation and deliver multiple benefits are outlined below.

– Emissions performance standards. In contrast to emissions trading, there are a number of ways in which regulation can be used to drive low carbon investment in the power sector in the short- to medium-term. Low carbon obligations on energy suppliers and forward contracts to deliver carbon emissions reductions are two options that have been put forward. There is increasing support for a third option, of using emissions performance standards (alongside financing support) to create a market framework with the necessary incentives and regulatory structures.75 This has been done to good effect in California, and is now a strong policy option both for the US as a whole and for


the UK. These standards could be used to set standards for power generation for generating companies or for an individual plant.

– Product standards. These are a classic means for both national governments and regional bodies such as the EU to drive innovation. Regulation has been used by some countries to drive innovation and create export opportunities – the Japanese ‘top-runner’ approach, whereby the most efficient product on the market becomes the standard all similar products must meet by a specified date, is a good example. In the EU, the Ecodesign of Energy Using Products Directive is setting minimum standards for a wide range of products, covering nearly half of all EU CO

2 emissions. Ambitious

standards for boilers and water heaters alone could reduce CO

2 emissions by 200 million tonnes a

year by 2020 – the same as taking half of western European cars off the road.76 At a national government level, standards can be set above the minimum level, or for products without EU minimum standards, by embedding them in public procurement processes.

– Transport fuel efficiency standards. There has been extensive commentary of the slow pace of efficiency improvements in vehicles, and associated emissions. At the EU level for example, targets set under voluntary agreements with car manufacturers have failed and have had to be replaced with legally binding targets to ensure progress is made. But there is significant regional variation in fuel efficiency standards. In addition, manufacturers in Europe and the US remain overwhelmingly opposed to higher standards, despite the potential gains for consumers. As a

result of extensive lobbying in the EU from the motor industry, the mandatory emissions standards for new passenger vehicles are significantly less stretching than under the original voluntary targets.77

– Construction standards. The UK now leads the way here, having set a stretching target of zero emissions from new housing by 2016. While some house builders remain deeply hostile to this, it is driving significant innovation in the sector that is expected to cut the costs of compliance, create opportunities for UK business, and ultimately of course dramatically reduce the heating costs to future households.78

The tenth commandment Get smart about public spending The majority of the spending needed to meet our climate change objectives will be private investment rather than public expenditure. But there are some significant public expenditure costs associated with the transition to a low carbon economy. The reluctance of many governments to act on this and the tight fiscal constraints on governments as a result of the current recession make this a necessary third and final commandment in relation to national policy frameworks.

Some of this expenditure is needed for public expenditure in areas where there is no real possibility of private funding. This includes domestic public investment in areas such as public transport, research, development and deployment costs for new technology, and the public cost of securing private investment through institutions and regulations considered in the seventh commandment

National policy frameworks 29

above. But there are also areas where the state could avoid public expenditure by passing on costs (through energy bills for example), but where this would generate adverse public reaction and a public expenditure route is more politically attractive option. There are also substantial public expenditure commitments for developed countries arising from their commitment to support adaptation programmes in developing countries, pledges that must be met to secure the interests of all countries.

However it does not follow that this will necessarily lead to an increase in total public expenditure. There are ample opportunities to cut spending on high carbon spending programmes, at national level and for European countries within the EU budget.79 There are also opportunities to commit funds from new policy mechanisms such as the auctioning of emissions trading permits and / or a financial transaction tax to low carbon public expenditure, as Oxfam and many others have argued.80

The commandments outlined above are a major challenge to the existing policy framework in all developed countries. We will not succeed without substantial reform of these frameworks. But it will require strong political leadership and institutional capacity to make this shift. This takes us to the final commandments of climate change strategy, concerning implementation.


6. Making it happen: processes and peopleGood strategies can only be created and successfully delivered with strong leadership at both the political level and in the institutions of government. The best of intentions can be defeated (and often are) by a lack of institutional capacity, poor alignment of targets and powers, and by weak political leadership. This final chapter focuses on the challenges of delivery, and outlines the last two commandments of climate change strategy.

The eleventh commandment Organise for success This commandment is essentially an enabling one. It concerns the need for national government to establish the structures, capacity, skills, and relationships to design and implement effective climate change strategy. The design and delivery of climate change strategy has been characterised by a wide variety of failures, for reasons assessed in chapter two. There are three key attributes that national governments must have to successfully design and deliver climate change strategy.

Align sub-national targets and powersNational governments hold many of the levers of action. But success cannot be willed from the centre. An effective national framework for action will need to include a substantial devolution of targets, and the powers and resources needed to achieve these, to regional and local tiers of government, and indeed to communities. The appropriate mix of action at these levels will clearly vary according to national circumstance. But this decision must be taken consciously, so as to align the targets, powers and incentives at each of these levels. Few (if any) countries have done this effectively.

In Canada, the provinces have long had control over coal, forests and other natural resources within their territory, and access to the revenues from exploitation of these resources. They have also had a very strong influence over a series of national reviews as to how Canada should achieve its Kyoto Protocol target. But they have not had any meaningful incentives to contribute to achieving this target. The result has been virtual stasis. Canada is likely to overshoot its Kyoto target by around 33.8 per cent.81 To succeed in the future, Canada’s strategy will have to agree the comparative role and contribution of national and regional action, and create sufficient incentives for the provinces to play their full part in delivering on national targets.

The need for alignment in targets and powers is just as pressing at local level. In the UK, the role of local authorities in tackling climate change has never been clearly defined. Action at local level is currently patchy and overwhelmingly ineffective, despite

“good strategies can only be created and successfully delivered with strong leadership at both the political level and in the institutions of government”

Making it happen: processes and people 31

pockets of good practice on specific issues. Two thirds of local authorities have recently signed up to a performance indicator on carbon emissions in their locality, National Indicator 186.82 But this target has not been accompanied by new powers and incentives that they will need to achieve this target. This will be vital to success, in the UK and elsewhere.

This issue also looms large at supra-national level, within the European Union. The EU negotiates an overall target at global level, and shares it between countries on the basis of their relative ability to act. But far greater clarity is needed on the comparative importance of EU versus national policy, if these targets are to be consistently met by individual countries. Action at national level is too often deferred in the hope that EU action will be agreed, and in other instances EU policy actually contributes to increased emissions.83 The EU already exerts strong influence over the ability of countries to meet national targets, through policies at the EU level on transport, energy, housing, products and other areas. But the lessons of the past 15 years must be learned now. The EU must develop an over-arching strategy in particular for the power sector, and for emissions standards in relation to transport fuels and product standards, where they can make a substantial and quantifiable contribution to national targets. Without it, the prospects for delivery by individual EU countries will be far poorer.

Access, skills and experience The core leadership team must have the capacity, skills, experience and access to develop a strategy that can succeed. They must be capable of developing an approach that will empower and incentivise the many actors within and beyond government that have a part to play.

This is very rarely the case at present. National climate change strategies remain overwhelmingly the preserve of career civil servants, who are often highly experienced in producing national strategies but poorly equipped to assess whether they will deliver on the ground. These teams must have direct experience and good relationships with the sectors that their strategy is designed to affect, in particular investors, businesses and local and regional tiers of government.

The core team must also have sufficient access and influence in government to successfully negotiate and ensure implementation of the strategy across government, by securing agreement at political level and overseeing action at the operational level. Again, this is very rarely the case at present. Climate change policy in almost all countries is driven from departments of the environment. This will almost certainly mean locating this team at the heart of government, with direct access to the head of government, or in some cases his / her nominee where the head of government does not traditionally play a leading role in policy.

“the core leadership team must have the capacity, skills, experience and access to develop a strategy that can succeed”


Learn fast A willingness to adapt is particularly important for climate change policy, given the relative immaturity of our knowledge and the many actors involved. Governments must be ready to amend their approaches in the light of external economic and social changes, new evidence on the impact of existing policy at national level, and new experience from other countries.

Two examples will demonstrate the importance of this point. First, the sudden onset of economic recession in 2008 and the associated high cost of capital have made it imperative for governments to review how they can incentivise and secure low carbon investment at reasonable cost. Few have so far done so with sufficient vigour or urgency, though the case for a Green Investment Bank now seems increasingly recognised in the UK.84 Looking back, the experience of all countries that have introduced a feed-in tariff for renewable energy suggests that this is the best means to secure investment. Yet the UK has failed until very recently to learn this lesson, and having sunk considerable investment through the Renewables Obligation (RO), some now express concern that a major policy change at this late stage would actually constrain future investment.85

The twelfth commandmentOnly leaders can do this At long last, many heads of government became personally engaged in discussions on climate change in 2009, thanks to public pressure and the focus on climate change internationally in the G20 and elsewhere in the run-up to the Copenhagen summit. Over a hundred heads of government were present in Copenhagen, far more than had attended any previous climate change summit.86

But these discussions simply led to (non-binding) promises of future action. The recent history of the Kyoto Protocol contains many examples of commitments made by leaders, but not followed through. The failure of President Clinton to secure US ratification is the most obvious example.87 This was exceptional, since all other developed countries bar Australia did ratify the treaty. But many of those who did ratify were equally culpable, and their heads of government failed to focus on the action needed to deliver on their Kyoto commitments. The Canadian example is particularly instructive. The Protocol was negotiated and ratified by a (departing) leader, Prime Minister Chrétien in December 2002.88 But he lacked the authority to secure domestic action, post ratification.

So the final commandment concerns the need for climate change strategy and action to be personally led by heads of government. The previous eleven commandments outlined in this pamphlet will only be successfully implemented with consistent leadership by heads of government. Their involvement is essential for (at least) three reasons:

“any national strategy that seeks to mobilise the public, businesses and others will be severely undermined without a clear commitment to leadership from the top”

Making it happen: processes and people 33

– From an external perspective, it is vital in order to demonstrate the commitment of government to both the general public and influential domestic stakeholders. They can raise the profile and establish a sense of urgency and opportunity that is vital for creating momentum and unlocking the engagement and commitment of these actors which will be needed to secure a step change in domestic action. Any national strategy that seeks to mobilise the public, businesses and others will be severely undermined without a clear commitment to leadership from the top.

– Internally, it is essential in order to develop effective strategies within governments that comply with the commandments. Action on climate change can be championed by many ministers, through new structures within government, and via internal targets such as those given to UK government departments through the Climate Change Act. But consistent action across the silos of government will only be secured if there is personal commitment from the head of government.

– Finally, heads of government will need to provide leadership internationally, in order to secure the ambitious and effective global agreement that is so urgently needed.

ConclusionThis chapter has outlined the final two commandments of climate change strategy. Earlier commandments have tackled complex issues of political strategy and policy design. These commandments have been outlined last; in many ways they’re the easiest to achieve. Our political leaders can make this happen, if they have the will to do so. Which of them is most likely to do so?


7. ConclusionThe twelve commandments outlined here provide the guiding principles for the development of successful national strategies, each of which will need to be designed with regard to particular economic, political and other circumstances.

But national strategies will also be strongly influenced by the political and ideological preferences of the party in power. Climate change policy is intrinsically political, with potentially significant and controversial impacts on markets, vested interests and individuals. Parties of left and right have tended to take different approaches and will continue to do so, drawing on different rationales for action and preferring different policy instruments. So is this task more likely to be achieved by parties of the left or right?

Climate change has divided left and right in recent years in some key countries. In both the US and Australia action on climate change has frequently been advocated by parties of the left, and opposed by parties of the right. Highlighting these examples, some on the left have argued that climate change is by its nature ‘an issue for the left’, since governments will need to be willing to use the full range of powers available to the state to tackle it successfully.89 But the left has no grounds for conceit or complacency. Once in power, parties of the left have frequently failed to achieve their emissions reduction goals.

There are also some notable examples of strong leadership by right-wing leaders, on occasion including President Sarkozy in France and Chancellor Merkel in Germany.90 The centre-right has in some instances made the case for action on climate change on the broader grounds of security, energy security

and economic opportunity, an approach which as argued earlier is vital to broadening the constituency of support for action. The Conservative energy and climate change spokesperson Greg Clark MP has been an influential advocate of this in the UK.91

Nevertheless, international experience to-date does show that parties of the left have shown greater concern and commitment to action.92 Parties of the right have typically needed greater persuasion of the science of climate change, the case for intervention in markets, and the need to influence individual behaviour.

So in most countries the left does look better placed at present to tackle this challenge. But parties of both left and right still have much work to do to develop an approach that will succeed. Neither has yet delivered consistently. The 12 commandments outlined here present opportunities and challenges to the ideologies of both sides. The right is less likely to be attracted by commandments six (equity) and nine (regulation for innovation), but more likely to support community and third sector mobilisation (commandment seven). Success will require determined leadership by political parties of all colours, and strong institutional capacity to design and deliver these strategies.

“climate change policy is intrinsically political, with potentially significant and controversial impacts on markets, vested interests and individuals”

Conclusion 35

But the conditions for success are now emerging. The Copenhagen summit has established climate change as a top tier issue for our political leaders. Public support for action remains greater than it has ever been, but it must be nurtured and strengthened by governments and others. This pamphlet has outlined how this can be done, and how parties can create a virtuous cycle of action by government and growing support for action. If it is done well, it will raise the bar for all parties and ensure that action is sustained through changes in government.

The task of developing and delivering national strategies that secure emissions reductions and increase public support for action is unquestionably the most important challenge for the current generation of politicians of left and right. It is a task that they must now confront and achieve.


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References 37

References1 New Statesman, 26 October 2009, 10 days to save the world. The Independent, 2 December 2009, Climate change special: 12 days to save the world. Prospect, 2009, 11 days to save the planet

2 George Monbiot, 18 December 2009, Copenhagen negotiators bicker and filibuster while the biosphere burns, Guardian. See also comments by John Sauven, Executive Director of Greenpeace UK: “The city of Copenhagen is a crime scene tonight, with the guilty men and women fleeing to the airport. There are no targets for carbon cuts and no agreement on a legally binding treaty”, www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8421935.stm

3 ENDS Daily, 21 December 2009, Hope turns to Mexico. Also see Yvo de Boer’s speech at the 8th Informal Meeting on Further Actions against Climate Change, March 2010, available at unfccc.int/files/press/statements/application/pdf/100302_speech_tokyo.pdf

4 Global Humanitarian Forum, 2009, Human Impact Report: the anatomy of a silent crisis.

5 European Environment Agency, 2009, GHG trends and projections in Spain

6 The Japanese government pledged prior to the Copenhagen summit to reduce emissions by 25 per cent from 1990 levels by 2020. The Australian government has committed to reduce Australia’s carbon emissions to “25 per cent below 2000 levels by 2020 if the world agrees to an ambitious global deal to stabilise levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at 450 parts per million CO

2 equivalent

or lower”, see www.climatechange.gov.au/en/government/national-targets.aspx

7 A December 2009 GlobeScan/BBC World Service poll conducted in 23 countries found that public

concern about climate change is at its highest level since GlobeScan began international tracking in 1998. Nearly two thirds of those polled now say climate change is a “very serious” problem. See www.globescan.com/news_archives/bbc2009_climate_change/

8 Geoff Mulgan, 2009, The Art of Public Strategy, Oxford University Press

9 UK greenhouse gas emissions fell by 16.4 per cent between 1990 and 2007, according to United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change calculations. But when aviation and shipping are taken into account, along with other consumption related emissions, these calculations reveal a 19 per cent increase in emissions. See Dieter Helm, Robin Smale and Jonathan Phillips, 2007, Too good to be true? The UK’s Climate Change Record, Oxford University

10 UNFCCC, 2007, Fact sheet: the need for mitigation

11 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2000, Special Report on emissions scenarios

12 Project Catalyst, February 2010, Taking stock – the emission levels implied by the pledges to the Copenhagen Accord, briefing paper, Climate Works Foundation and European Climate Foundation

13 The Conference reached conclusions on several significant environmental issues, including climate change. The Framework Convention on Climate Change represented a breakthrough of sorts at the time. But stronger commitments would have been made on renewable energy and other issues, without the opposition of the first President Bush. See for example Friends of the Earth briefing at www.foe.co.uk/resource/briefings/climate_change_summit.pdf


14 Stephen Hale, 2008, New Politics of climate change: why we are failing and how we will succeed, Green Alliance

15 See emissions reductions for Eastern European countries in UNFCCC, Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data: ghg.unfccc.int/

16 The number of people describing climate change as “very serious” rose from 49 to 61 per cent in 2003 to 2006. These figures were consistently high across countries. By 2006, 90 per cent or more of those questioned in 19 out of 30 countries agreed that climate change was “serious”. GlobeScan, 2006, Corporate Social Responsibility Monitor, GlobeScan

17 The UK is typical here. There is much less overt support for legislation such as environmental taxes, with suspicion of how the money will be used and the motive for action. Simon Dresner, Kate McGeevor, & Julia Tomei, 2007, Public Understanding Synthesis Report: A report to the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs by the Policy Studies Institute, London, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. There is also strong resistance to a

range of specific policies, from taxes on fuel to road-user charging and wind-farms. The prospect of road-user charging led to a petition being set up on the e-petitions section of the number10.gov.uk website. Submitted by Peter Roberts with a sign-up deadline of 20 February 2007, it said “We the undersigned petition the Prime Minister to scrap the planned vehicle tracking and road-pricing policy”. It received an unprecedented 1,811,424 signatures and made the national news, as well as prompting a response from the Prime Minister and Ministerial comment that the scale of the response indicates that further debate is needed on road-user charging. The petition can still be viewed at petitions.number10.gov.uk/traveltax/

18 Nicholas Stern, 2006, The economics of climate change: The Stern review, Cambridge University Press

19 UK Committee on Climate Change, ‘Emissions Trends’ – “UK CO

2 emissions from the power sector

fell by 16% from 205 MtCO2 in 1990 to 171 MtCO

2

in 2008 – this was driven by a switch from coal to gas in the 1990s, the so-called ‘dash for gas’”, www.theccc.org.uk/sectors/power/emissions-trends

Comparison of Base Period GHG Emission (CO2, N

2O, CH

4 in Gigagrams of CO

2 equivalent) with 2004

emission levels.

Country Base Period Reduction Target Base Period Emission, GgCO

2e/yr

1998 Emission % Change

Bulgaria 1988 8% 157,090 83,671 -49.0

Czech Republic 1990 8% 189,837 147,777 -25.0

Hungary 1985-87 6% 101,633 82,725 -31.8

Poland 1988 6% 564,286 402,477 -31.2

Romania 1989 8% 264,879 No data -41.0

Slovenia 1990 8% 19,212 No data -08.0

References 39

20 Sandbag, 2009, ETS S.O.S: Why the flagship ‘EU Emissions Trading Policy’ needs rescuing

21 Point Carbon, 2008, EU ETS Phase II – The potential and scale of windfall profits in the power sector, a report for WWF. This report estimated that the windfall or excess profits that will be made by energy firms in Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the UK during the second phase of the EU ETS are likely to be very high, “between 23 and 71 billion euros, in total, during the second period of the EU ETS.”

22 Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger have written extensively on this theme. See for instance The flawed logic of the cap-and-trade debate, Yale Environment 360, May 2009.

23 Kathryn Harrison, 2007, The Road not taken: climate change policy in Canada and the United States, Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 7, No. 4

24 Yves Tiberghien and Miranda Schreurs, 2007, High Noon in Japan: embedded symbolism and post 2001 Kyoto Protocol politics, Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 7, No. 4

25 A voluntary agreement signed in 1998 with the European, Japanese, and Korean car industries, in which they committed to reduce CO

2 emissions

from cars sold in the EU to an average 140 g/km by 2008 for European manufacturers and 2009 for Japanese and Korean ones. From 186 g/km in 1995, the average CO

2 emission has fallen to 163 g/km in

2004. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: “Implementing the Community Strategy to Reduce CO

2 emissions from Cars: Sixth annual

Communication on the effectiveness of the strategy” COM (2006) 463 final, available at ec.europa.eu/environment/co2/pdf/com_2006_463_en.pdf

26 Nicholas Stern, 2006, The economics of climate change: The Stern review. See page xix, Executive summary.

27 The Copenhagen Accord agreed to release $30 billion in fast-start finance for developing countries from 2010-12, and to establish a High-Level Commission on finance to identify how to secure annual contributions of $100 billion a year by 2020.

28 The Green New Deal Group, 2008, A Green New Deal, new economics foundation.

29 For information on the scale of the green spending in these stimulus packages, see HSBC, 2009, A climate for recovery – the colour of stimulus goes green

30 Kathryn Harrison, 2007, The road not taken: climate change policy in Canada and the United States, Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 7, No. 4

31 For over a decade, the Global Climate Coalition opposed governmental action on climate change, and claimed to represent six million companies. BP was the first to publicly break ranks with the Coalition, in 1997. Alex Evans and David Stevens, 2007, Climate Change: the state of the debate

32 www.redgreenandblue.org/2009/05/19/ a-bit-of-advice-on-waxman-markey-beware-the-lobbyists/

33 Business Europe Open Letter to Swedish Prime Minister, December 2009, published at http://212.3.246.117/docs/2/JCEEBOLDMHFME GDKFGAHGGJLPDBG9DPNED9LTE4Q/UNICEdocs/DLS/2009-02660-E.pdf

34 Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger, November 2009, Apocalypse Fatigue: losing the public on climate change, Yale Environment 360


35 Yu-Foong Chong, Elizabeth Garnsey, Simon Hill and Frederic Desobry, 2009, Daylight Saving, Electricity Demand and Emissions; Exploratory Studies from Great Britain, Department of Engineering, University of Cambridge

36 REF 2009 budget increase, also 2009 PBR spending on energy efficiency

37 HSBC, 2009, A climate for recovery – the colour of stimulus goes green

38 For example, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change has always been a meeting attended by environment ministers, until the presence of heads of state in Copenhagen in December 2009.

39 The Major Economies Forum met 6 times in 2009, seeking to establish common ground in the run-up to the Copenhagen Summit. The G20 discussed climate change on two occasions in 2009, and the Danish government convened a series of discussions at ministerial level.

40 Information on outcome adapted from Oxfam Briefing note, ‘Climate shame: get back to the table, an initial analysis of the Copenhagen climate talks’, 21 December 2009.

41 Project Catalyst, February 2010, Taking stock – the emission levels implied by the pledges to the Copenhagen Accord, briefing paper, Climate Works Foundation and European Climate Foundation

42 www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sga1223.doc.htm

43 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Copenhagen Accord, available at unfccc.int/home/items/5262.php

44 Stephen Hale, 2008, New Politics of climate change: why we are failing and how we will succeed, Green Alliance

45 Institute for Public Policy Research, 2009, Climate of Opinion Survey (unpublished)

46 UN Security Council Department of Public Information, 2007, Security Council Holds First-Ever Debate On Impact Of Climate Change On Peace, Security, Hearing Over 50 Speakers,

47 Alex Evans and David Stevens, 2009, Hitting Reboot: where next for climate after Copenhagen?, Managing Global Insecurity

48 See www.fco.gov.uk/en/global-issues/climate-change/

49 See www.cslforum.org/meetings/index. For information on the EU commitment in 2007 see register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/07/st07/st07224-re01.en07.pdf. For the 2008 G8 commitment see www.endseurope.com/15178

50 IPCC Working Group III, 2007, Contribution to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: Technical Summary

51 Johan Eliasch, 2008, Climate Change: Financing Global Forests (The Eliasch Review), Office of Climate Change. For a more recent estimate, see Daniel Zarin et al, 2009, REDD: An Options Assessment Report, prepared for the Government of Norway.

52 Nick Mabey, February 2010, Down but not out?, Green Alliance Inside Track Issue 24

53 European Commission, 2010, Europe 2020: a strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. Also see European Council conclusions from March 2010

References 41

at www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/113591.pdf

54 Alex Evans and David Stevens, 2009, An Institutional architecture for climate change

55 The Copenhagen Accord, Paragraph six, available at www.denmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/C41B62AB-4688-4ACE-BB7B-F6D2C8AAEC20/0/copenhagen_accord.pdf

56 Danish Wind Industry Association, 2010, ‘Industry’, see www.talentfactory.dk/en/industry.htm

57 Danish Energy Agency, 2009, Wind turbines in Denmark

58 Alasdair Cameron, 2009, Working with the wind: growing employment in the European and US wind power sectors

59 Ashley Seager, 23 July 2007, Germany sets shining example in providing a harvest for the world, Guardian, see www.guardian.co.uk/business/2007/jul/23/germany.greenbusiness

60 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2009, Towards a low-carbon economy: economic analysis and evidence for a low-carbon industrial strategy, BIS Economics paper no.1.

61 HM Government, July 2009, The UK low carbon industrial strategy, BERR and DECC

62 Committee on Climate Change, 2009, Meeting Carbon Budgets – the need for a step change, Progress report to Parliament.

63 International Trade Union Congress statement on climate change, www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/climat_EN_Final.pdf

64 Committee on climate change, 2008, Building a low carbon economy: the UK’s contribution to tackling climate change, TSO (Chapter 12)

65 Brenda Deen, November 2003, We all benefit from more air travel, The Guardian, available at www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2002/nov/03/greenpolitics.uk

66 Green Fiscal Commission , 2009, The Case for Green Fiscal Reform, final report. Also see earlier studies by Paul Ekins, including Reducing the impact of ‘green’ taxes and charges on low-income households, with Simon Dresner, 2004.

67 A 2008 Carbon Trust report stated that “production of lime and cement, and of basic iron and steel, stand out as far more carbon-cost-sensitive than other activities; paying €20/tCO

2 would increase their

production costs by more than 25% of GVA”, see Carbon Trust, 2008, EU ETS impacts on profitability and trade: a sector by sector analysis. Also see Michael Grubb and Karsten Neuhoff, 2006, Allocation and competitiveness in the EU emissions trading scheme: policy overview, Climate Policy, 6, 7-30

68 Joint ministerial and third sector task force, 2009, Shaping our future, HM Government

69 Joint ministerial and third sector task force, 2009, Shaping our future, HM Government

70 Rebekah Phillips (ed), July 2008, Is there more to life than trading?, Green Alliance.

71 Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger, 2009, The flawed logic of the cap-and-trade debate, Yale Environment 360, May 2009

72 Dieter Helm, 1st September 2009, The Challenge of Infrastructure Investment in Britain, chapter in

The new commandments of climate change strategy 43

86 See UNEP Press release, 7 December 2009, ‘Historic UN climate change conference kicks off in Copenhagen’, which states that 110 heads of state and government would be attending the conference at its conclusion. Available at www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=606&ArticleID=6394&l=en

87 The Byrd-Hagel Resolution in 1997 was passed by the Senate 95-0, agreeing that the US would not be a signatory of the Kyoto Protocol. See www.nationalcenter.org/KyotoSenate.html

88 Kathryn Harrison, 2007, The Road not taken: climate change policy in Canada and the United States, Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 7, No. 4

89 For instance, the then UK environment secretary David Miliband MP argued that ‘it is plausible to argue that unless parties of the centre-left address climate change, it will not be addressed’ in speech on re-green renewal to the Fabian Society, 14 December 2006, www.fabian-society.org.uk/speeches/red-green-renewal-the-future-of-new-labour

90 Chancellor Merkel’s commitment and record is highly varied, but she has been a powerful advocate on occasion internationally (notably in using Germany’s Presidency of the EU to secure agreement to EU targets on renewable energy in March 2007 – see press release 09.03.07, www.eu2007.de/en/News/Press_Releases/March/0312AAER.html) and domestically. President Sarkozy has also shown leadership in certain areas, for instance in convening ‘The Grenelle’ to develop a national strategy soon after he entered office. For more information, see www.legrenelle-environnement.fr/spip.php?rubrique112

91 The Conservative Party, 2010,‘Rebuilding Security: Conservative energy policy for an uncertain world’. See also ‘The low carbon economy – security, stability and green growth’, Conservative party policy green paper no. 8 (Jan 2009)

92 Kathryn Harrison and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom, 2007, The comparative politics of climate change, Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 7, No. 4


‘Delivering a 21st century infrastructure for Britain, co-authored with Ben Caldecott and James Wardlaw, published by Policy Exchange. In relation to energy investment, see Ernst and Young, 2009, Securing the UK’s Energy Future: Meeting the finance challenge.

73 Chris Hewett, October 2009, Establishing a green investment bank for the UK, Green Alliance

74 Aldersgate Group, 2008, Green Foundations 2009: The path to a vibrant economy, competitive advantage and sustainable prosperity

75 Chris Littlecott (ed), 2008, Last chance for coal: making carbon capture and storage a reality, Green Alliance

76 ECOS, 2010, The EU directive on the Ecodesign of Energy-Using Products: A crucial tool to meet European environmental goals, Introduction paper

77 The voluntary target was for average passenger vehicle sold in the EU to emit no more than 120g CO

2/km by 2012. The legally binding target now set

is 130g CO2/km, which does not have to be reached

until 2015.

78 See BusinessGreen, March 2009, ‘Green Building Council calls for “building MOTs”’, in which Paul King, the CEO of UK Green Building Council said “The Code for Sustainable Homes marked an important departure from all regulations and voluntary standards that went before, by setting a trajectory to zero carbon. This has resulted in an unprecedented level of innovation in the housebuilding sector. The Code for Sustainable Buildings should progressively drive up performance across the whole non-domestic building stock on a range of sustainability impacts and targets”, available at www.businessgreen.com/business-green/news/2237702/green-building-council-calls

79 Chris Hewett, February 2010, Cutting back on carbon spending, Green Alliance briefing. See also FOEE and CEE Bankwatch Network, 2007, ‘EU Cash in Climate Clash: How the EU funding plans are shaping up to fuel climate change’, Friends of the Earth Europe and CEE Bankwatch Network

80 For the latest information on the coalition of organisations supporting an international transaction tax see robinhoodtax.org.uk/who-we-are/

81 Environment Canada, 2007, Canada’s 2007 Greenhouse Gas Inventory – A Summary of Trends

82 NI 186 draws on estimates of CO2 emissions

consumed in local authority areas, and is the fifth most commonly selected indicator within local area agreements. See Audit Commission, 2009, Lofty Ambitions: the role of councils in reducing domestic CO

2

emissions

83 FOEE and CEE Bankwatch Network, 2007, ‘EU Cash in Climate Clash: How the EU funding plans are shaping up to fuel climate change’, Friends of the Earth Europe and CEE Bankwatch Network

84 Chris Hewett, October 2009, Establishing a green investment bank for the UK, Green Alliance

85 For example, RenewableUK has responded to Conservative proposals to replace the Renewable Obligation with a feed-in tariff scheme, by saying “The Renewable Obligation (RO) continues to be extremely successful in attracting investment to the whole of the renewable electricity sector, but particularly for wind developments…. this success should not be endangered through over-hasty policy making, nor should decisions on this vital topic be undertaken without fully understanding the needs of the industry”. See www.businessgreen.com/business-green/news/2261162/exclusive-tories-plan

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