The neuroscience of social understanding John Barresi Dalhousie University The Matching Problem of...
1
The neuroscience of social understanding John Barresi Dalhousie University The Matching Problem of Social Understanding The Matching Problem of Social Understanding How can we attribute the How can we attribute the same meaning same meaning to actions of other individuals that we to actions of other individuals that we attribute to our own actions, when the attribute to our own actions, when the first-person information first-person information that we have of that we have of our own actions is our own actions is radically different radically different from the from the third-person information third-person information that we that we have of the actions of others? have of the actions of others? Three Theories of “Theories of Mind” (ToM) Three Theories of “Theories of Mind” (ToM) • Theory Theory (TT) Theory Theory (TT) - (e.g., Carruthers, Fodor, Gopnik, Leslie, Perner; - (e.g., Carruthers, Fodor, Gopnik, Leslie, Perner; Baron-Cohen, Frith & Frith) Baron-Cohen, Frith & Frith) • Simulation Theory (ST) Simulation Theory (ST) - (e.g., Gordon, Goldman, Harris; Gallese & Goldman) - (e.g., Gordon, Goldman, Harris; Gallese & Goldman) • Intentional Relations Theory (IRT) Intentional Relations Theory (IRT) - (Barresi & Moore, “Intentional - (Barresi & Moore, “Intentional relations and social understanding,” relations and social understanding,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences Behavioral and Brain Sciences , 1996, 19: 107- , 1996, 19: 107- 54 54 ; e.g., Decety, Iacoboni, Jeannerod ; e.g., Decety, Iacoboni, Jeannerod) Two Theories and the Matching Problem Two Theories and the Matching Problem • Theory Theory Theory Theory - According to TT, we have According to TT, we have no special knowledge of self no special knowledge of self , and must , and must use a single abstract - possibly innate - conceptual system to understand our use a single abstract - possibly innate - conceptual system to understand our own as well as others’ minds. own as well as others’ minds. • Simulation Theory Simulation Theory - - According to ST, each of us has According to ST, each of us has direct knowledge of our own direct knowledge of our own minds minds , and we can use this knowledge to model or simulate other minds , and we can use this knowledge to model or simulate other minds . . • The Matching Problem The Matching Problem - N - N either TT nor ST provides an adequate account of how either TT nor ST provides an adequate account of how we ever come to apply the same concepts to self and other, given the we ever come to apply the same concepts to self and other, given the difference difference between our between our 1 st st -perso -perso n n access access to our own minds and our to our own minds and our 3rd-person access 3rd-person access to the to the minds of others. minds of others. A Solution to the Matching Problem A Solution to the Matching Problem • Somehow we Somehow we ‘ match match’ the the 1st-person 1st-person information of our information of our own own actions to the actions to the 3rd- 3rd- person person information of the same actions by information of the same actions by others others. • And we can And we can access access that same meaning using 1st -person information in the case that same meaning using 1st -person information in the case of self, and 3rd - person information in the case of the other. of self, and 3rd - person information in the case of the other. Evaluation of Theory Theory: Positive aspects of the theory Evaluation of Theory Theory: Positive aspects of the theory. • TToM works fairly well on standard ToM tasks involving stories or videos. The pSTS TToM works fairly well on standard ToM tasks involving stories or videos. The pSTS (TPJ) which is typically involved in the complex analysis of biological motion fits (TPJ) which is typically involved in the complex analysis of biological motion fits the idea that TT is predominantly based on 3rd-person information, that can also be the idea that TT is predominantly based on 3rd-person information, that can also be applied to self. applied to self. • The Anterior Paracingulate (MPFC) has been interpreted as involving “decoupling” The Anterior Paracingulate (MPFC) has been interpreted as involving “decoupling” of second-order representations, and here applies to self and other, again fitting of second-order representations, and here applies to self and other, again fitting the theory. the theory. Evaluation of Theory Theory: Negative aspects of the theory Evaluation of Theory Theory: Negative aspects of the theory • When we consider emotional intentional relations and action intentional relations When we consider emotional intentional relations and action intentional relations TT breaks down: TT breaks down: • For emotional understanding, empathy seems an important factor and degree of For emotional understanding, empathy seems an important factor and degree of empathy correlates with responses in Anterior Insula and ACC areas typically empathy correlates with responses in Anterior Insula and ACC areas typically associated with self-awareness of body state associated with self-awareness of body state • However, even findings apparently congruent to TT do not entirely fit the theory However, even findings apparently congruent to TT do not entirely fit the theory as Inf. Parietal (TPJ) shows hemisphere differences, and the MPFC may be more self as Inf. Parietal (TPJ) shows hemisphere differences, and the MPFC may be more self (or self & other) oriented. (or self & other) oriented. Evaluation of Simulation Theory: Positive aspects of the Evaluation of Simulation Theory: Positive aspects of the theory theory • Many of the findings for all three kinds of intentional relations seem to depend Many of the findings for all three kinds of intentional relations seem to depend on brain regions known to be intimately involved in self activity, thus activity in on brain regions known to be intimately involved in self activity, thus activity in these regions may be on loan for understanding others these regions may be on loan for understanding others • Empathy ratings correlate with activation for others in some of the regions Empathy ratings correlate with activation for others in some of the regions associated with self-consciousness associated with self-consciousness • Observing or thinking about others seems to activate these regions for simulations Observing or thinking about others seems to activate these regions for simulations Evaluation of Simulation Theory: Negative aspects of the Evaluation of Simulation Theory: Negative aspects of the theory theory • Activations in the APC or MPFC seem to respond equally to self and other, Activations in the APC or MPFC seem to respond equally to self and other, suggesting a more cognitive than empathic mechanism, similar to the “decoupling” suggesting a more cognitive than empathic mechanism, similar to the “decoupling” mechanism of TT, or Intentional Schema of IRT. mechanism of TT, or Intentional Schema of IRT. • The contrast between left and right hemisphere effects in the Inferior Parietal The contrast between left and right hemisphere effects in the Inferior Parietal (TPJ) - and possibly elsewhere (e.g., Anterior Insula) - suggest a self-other (TPJ) - and possibly elsewhere (e.g., Anterior Insula) - suggest a self-other differentiation that might involve distinct mechanisms for social understanding. differentiation that might involve distinct mechanisms for social understanding. Evaluation of Intentional Relations Theory: Positive aspects Evaluation of Intentional Relations Theory: Positive aspects of the theory of the theory • It is structured to make distinctions between: It is structured to make distinctions between: results associated with different brain regions. results associated with different brain regions. • First-person, 3rd-person and shared representations, which are also associated First-person, 3rd-person and shared representations, which are also associated with different brain regions. with different brain regions. • Levels of social understanding with phylo- and onto-genetic import Levels of social understanding with phylo- and onto-genetic import • It has been used by neuroscientists to interpret in a functional manner the It has been used by neuroscientists to interpret in a functional manner the different regions involved in imitation. different regions involved in imitation. Evaluation of Intentional Relations Theory: Negative aspects Evaluation of Intentional Relations Theory: Negative aspects of the theory of the theory • It is perhaps too flexible, particularly in its concept of an intentional schema It is perhaps too flexible, particularly in its concept of an intentional schema that can be used for any “matched” findings, regardless of the particular brain that can be used for any “matched” findings, regardless of the particular brain regions involved in the match. regions involved in the match. • It has not been explicitly tested against the alternative theories. It has not been explicitly tested against the alternative theories. Neuroscience using ToM tasks Neuroscience using ToM tasks • The focus of these studies is on determining brain regions functionally involved in the interpretation of complex stories of The focus of these studies is on determining brain regions functionally involved in the interpretation of complex stories of social interaction that are visually or verbally presented. Two brain regions are most active in these studies: 1) social interaction that are visually or verbally presented. Two brain regions are most active in these studies: 1) Posterior Posterior Superior Temporal Sulcus (pSTS) or the Temporal/Parietal Junction (TPJ) Superior Temporal Sulcus (pSTS) or the Temporal/Parietal Junction (TPJ) ; 2) ; 2) Medial Prefrontal (MPFC) or Anterior Paracingulate Medial Prefrontal (MPFC) or Anterior Paracingulate (APC) (APC). MPFC (or APC) pSTS (or TPJ) MPFC (or APC) pSTS (or TPJ) may provide “decoupled” may provide the may provide “decoupled” may provide the (2nd order) representations analysis and (2nd order) representations analysis and of intentional relations (IRs) representatlon of intentional relations (IRs) representatlon of IRs of IRs From Frith & Frith (2003) From Frith & Frith (2003) Regions for analysis and representation of self and Regions for analysis and representation of self and other overlap (from Decety and Sommerville, 2003) other overlap (from Decety and Sommerville, 2003) How TT can work for complex How TT can work for complex epistemic ToM tasks epistemic ToM tasks • pSTS (or TPJ) a pSTS (or TPJ) a nalyzes and represents animate activity and IRs based nalyzes and represents animate activity and IRs based mostly mostly on visual or 3rd person information. TT could avoid on visual or 3rd person information. TT could avoid the matching problem by positing that IRs of self and other are both analyzed in a behavioristic (or 3rd person) mode. the matching problem by positing that IRs of self and other are both analyzed in a behavioristic (or 3rd person) mode. MPFC (or MPFC (or APC), b APC), b ased on these analyses, and possibly using an innate ToM, could then provide “decoupled” (2nd order) representations of ased on these analyses, and possibly using an innate ToM, could then provide “decoupled” (2nd order) representations of intentional relations of agents, whether they be of self or other (or jointly self and other). intentional relations of agents, whether they be of self or other (or jointly self and other). A problem for TT that ST can handle A problem for TT that ST can handle • The MPFC (and perhaps the TPJ) is activated in cases of self-representation that The MPFC (and perhaps the TPJ) is activated in cases of self-representation that seem seem not to be based entirely on 3rd person not to be based entirely on 3rd person information about the self. information about the self. • Furthermore, the frontal region and other regions along the midline have been postulated to be part of a system for Furthermore, the frontal region and other regions along the midline have been postulated to be part of a system for representation & regulation of self. representation & regulation of self. • So, perhaps, the MPFC generates a 2nd order representation of other’s mental states, through prior association between a 3rd So, perhaps, the MPFC generates a 2nd order representation of other’s mental states, through prior association between a 3rd person behavioral analysis that applies somewhat equally to self and other in the TPJ and a simulation of 1st person components person behavioral analysis that applies somewhat equally to self and other in the TPJ and a simulation of 1st person components of mental states found in the rest of the self-system. of mental states found in the rest of the self-system. fMRI responses for fMRI responses for anticipated shock anticipated shock for self and other for self and other Empathic ability Empathic ability correlated with correlated with fMRI activity fMRI activity Green self Green self Red other Red other From Singer, et. al. (2004) From Singer, et. al. (2004) How ST can handle affective IRs better than TT How ST can handle affective IRs better than TT • The conscious “feeling self” regions of brain activity can not only anticipate and interpret affective IRs in self but also The conscious “feeling self” regions of brain activity can not only anticipate and interpret affective IRs in self but also in others (and in inanimate objects). in others (and in inanimate objects). • At the same time, sensory 1st person information, that may (or may not) be conscious, can be used to distinguish self from At the same time, sensory 1st person information, that may (or may not) be conscious, can be used to distinguish self from other. other. • Consistent with ST, dispositionally empathic individuals engage in more active “simulations” than less empathic individuals, a Consistent with ST, dispositionally empathic individuals engage in more active “simulations” than less empathic individuals, a finding not expected on TT’s more cognitive account. finding not expected on TT’s more cognitive account. IRT can handle both epistemic IRs and affective IRs IRT can handle both epistemic IRs and affective IRs at least as well as TT & ST. In addition, it provides, in the intentional at least as well as TT & ST. In addition, it provides, in the intentional schema, a concept that can be applied also to action IRs. schema, a concept that can be applied also to action IRs. Iacoboni, Kaplan & Wilson (in press) developed an account of imitation which Iacoboni, Kaplan & Wilson (in press) developed an account of imitation which explicitly uses IRT at the functional level of their model (see figures to right). explicitly uses IRT at the functional level of their model (see figures to right). Barresi, J., and Moore, C. (1996). Intentional relations and social understanding. Barresi, J., and Moore, C. (1996). Intentional relations and social understanding. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 19, 107–154. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 19, 107–154. Decety, J., & Sommerville, J. A. (2003). Shared representations between self and Decety, J., & Sommerville, J. A. (2003). Shared representations between self and other: a social cognitive neuroscience view. Trends Cogn Sci, 7(12), 527-533. other: a social cognitive neuroscience view. Trends Cogn Sci, 7(12), 527-533. Frith, U & Frith, C. (2003) Development and neurophysiology of mentalizing. Phil. Frith, U & Frith, C. (2003) Development and neurophysiology of mentalizing. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (2003) 358, 459–473. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (2003) 358, 459–473. Iacoboni, M., Kaplan, J. & Wilson, S. (in press) A neural architecture for imitation Iacoboni, M., Kaplan, J. & Wilson, S. (in press) A neural architecture for imitation and intentional relations. In: Nehaniv C, Dautenhahn K, editors. Imitation and social and intentional relations. In: Nehaniv C, Dautenhahn K, editors. Imitation and social learning in robots, humans and animals: Behavioural, social and communicative learning in robots, humans and animals: Behavioural, social and communicative dimensions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. dimensions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Singer,T., Seymour, B., O’Doherty, J., Kaube, H., Dolan, R., & Frith, C. (2004). Singer,T., Seymour, B., O’Doherty, J., Kaube, H., Dolan, R., & Frith, C. (2004). Empathy for pain Involves the Empathy for pain Involves the affective but not sensory components of pain. Science, 303, 1157-1162. affective but not sensory components of pain. Science, 303, 1157-1162. • Neuroscience research on social understanding provides a rich data base from which Neuroscience research on social understanding provides a rich data base from which to evaluate the three types of theories of ToM. to evaluate the three types of theories of ToM. • All three theories have something to offer in explaining empirical results and All three theories have something to offer in explaining empirical results and might be modified to fit current data. might be modified to fit current data. • Intentional relations theory – perhaps due to its flexibility - seems to find more Intentional relations theory – perhaps due to its flexibility - seems to find more support and fewer problems than TT or ST. support and fewer problems than TT or ST. • Further testing using contrasting predictions where possible between the theories Further testing using contrasting predictions where possible between the theories could lead to significant progress in determining how humans (and other organisms) could lead to significant progress in determining how humans (and other organisms) engage in social understanding. engage in social understanding. Intentional Relations (IRs) Intentional Relations (IRs) connect an agent (or agents) to an connect an agent (or agents) to an object through a relation existing in virtue of an agent’s sensorimotor, object through a relation existing in virtue of an agent’s sensorimotor, emotional/motivational and cognitive capacities. emotional/motivational and cognitive capacities. Examples of first order intentional relations Examples of first order intentional relations • Jamie chases the cat Jamie chases the cat ( action action) • Mackenzie fears the dog Mackenzie fears the dog ( emotion emotion) • Columbus sees land Columbus sees land ( epistemic epistemic) Examples of second order intentional relations Examples of second order intentional relations • Fiona thinks that she is in love with Colin. Fiona thinks that she is in love with Colin. • Fiona thinks that Mary is in love with Colin. Fiona thinks that Mary is in love with Colin. Fiona exhibits ‘social understanding’ of intentional relations of Fiona exhibits ‘social understanding’ of intentional relations of self and other. self and other. First Person Information First Person Information: P rovides an rovides an “inner” “inner” perspective of the IR, perspective of the IR, which which e mphasizes mphasizes the the object object and and IR IR to it, to it, while while deemphasiz eemphasiz ing ing information about information about agent agent. Third Person Information: Third Person Information: Provides an Provides an “outer” “outer” perspective of the IR, perspective of the IR, which which e mphasizes mphasizes the the agent agent of the IR, but of the IR, but deemphasizes deemphasizes information relating the information relating the agent to the agent to the object. object. Intentional Schema Intentional Schema • Is an Is an intermodal perceptual and conceptual structure intermodal perceptual and conceptual structure that can coordinate and that can coordinate and integrate first- and third-person sources of information about object- integrate first- and third-person sources of information about object- directed activities into representations that link agents to objects through directed activities into representations that link agents to objects through intentional relations. intentional relations. • It It combines the internal or ‘subjective’ aspect combines the internal or ‘subjective’ aspect of an agent’s intentional of an agent’s intentional orientation toward an object orientation toward an object with the external or ‘objective’ aspect with the external or ‘objective’ aspect of an of an agent’s behavioral activities. agent’s behavioral activities. Four levels of Four levels of S ocial ocial U nderstanding of nderstanding of Intentional Intentional Relations Relations • Level 1: Level 1: 1st-person 1st-person information of IRs information of IRs of self of self are are kept distinct kept distinct from from 3rd- 3rd- person person information of IRs of the information of IRs of the other other , so the intentional schema does not , so the intentional schema does not apply. apply. Background Intentional Relations Theory Neuroscience of Social Understanding Evaluation of Three Theories of Social Understanding Conclusions Bibliography
-
date post
20-Dec-2015 -
Category
Documents
-
view
212 -
download
0
Transcript of The neuroscience of social understanding John Barresi Dalhousie University The Matching Problem of...
The neuroscience of social understandingJohn Barresi
Dalhousie University
The Matching Problem of Social UnderstandingThe Matching Problem of Social Understanding How can we attribute the How can we attribute the same meaningsame meaning to actions of other individuals that we attribute to our own to actions of other individuals that we attribute to our own actions, when the actions, when the first-person informationfirst-person information that we have of our own actions is that we have of our own actions is radically different radically different from from the the third-person informationthird-person information that we have of the actions of others? that we have of the actions of others?
Three Theories of “Theories of Mind” (ToM)Three Theories of “Theories of Mind” (ToM)•Theory Theory (TT) Theory Theory (TT) - (e.g., Carruthers, Fodor, Gopnik, Leslie, Perner; Baron-Cohen, Frith & Frith)- (e.g., Carruthers, Fodor, Gopnik, Leslie, Perner; Baron-Cohen, Frith & Frith)•Simulation Theory (ST)Simulation Theory (ST) - (e.g., Gordon, Goldman, Harris; Gallese & Goldman) - (e.g., Gordon, Goldman, Harris; Gallese & Goldman)•Intentional Relations Theory (IRT)Intentional Relations Theory (IRT) - (Barresi & Moore, “Intentional relations and social understanding,” - (Barresi & Moore, “Intentional relations and social understanding,” Behavioral and Brain SciencesBehavioral and Brain Sciences, 1996, 19: 107-54, 1996, 19: 107-54; e.g., Decety, Iacoboni, Jeannerod; e.g., Decety, Iacoboni, Jeannerod))
Two Theories and the Matching ProblemTwo Theories and the Matching Problem•Theory TheoryTheory Theory - According to TT, we have According to TT, we have no special knowledge of selfno special knowledge of self, and must use a single , and must use a single abstract - possibly innate - conceptual system to understand our own as well as others’ minds. abstract - possibly innate - conceptual system to understand our own as well as others’ minds. •Simulation Theory Simulation Theory - - According to ST, each of us has According to ST, each of us has direct knowledge of our own mindsdirect knowledge of our own minds, and we , and we can use this knowledge to model or simulate other mindscan use this knowledge to model or simulate other minds. . •The Matching ProblemThe Matching Problem - N - Neither TT nor ST provides an adequate account of how we ever come to either TT nor ST provides an adequate account of how we ever come to apply the same concepts to self and other, given the apply the same concepts to self and other, given the differencedifference between our between our 11stst-perso-person n accessaccess to our to our own minds and our own minds and our 3rd-person access3rd-person access to the minds of others. to the minds of others.
A Solution to the Matching ProblemA Solution to the Matching Problem•Somehow we Somehow we ‘‘matchmatch’’ the the 1st-person1st-person information of our information of our ownown actions to the actions to the 3rd-person3rd-person information of information of the same actions by the same actions by othersothers..•Given this matching process, we can give the Given this matching process, we can give the same meaningsame meaning to an action whether it is produced by self to an action whether it is produced by self or other.or other.•And we can And we can accessaccess that same meaning using 1st -person information in the case of self, and 3rd - that same meaning using 1st -person information in the case of self, and 3rd - person information in the case of the other.person information in the case of the other.
Evaluation of Theory Theory: Positive aspects of the theoryEvaluation of Theory Theory: Positive aspects of the theory..•TToM works fairly well on standard ToM tasks involving stories or videos. The pSTS (TPJ) which is typically TToM works fairly well on standard ToM tasks involving stories or videos. The pSTS (TPJ) which is typically involved in the complex analysis of biological motion fits the idea that TT is predominantly based on 3rd-person involved in the complex analysis of biological motion fits the idea that TT is predominantly based on 3rd-person information, that can also be applied to self. information, that can also be applied to self. •The Anterior Paracingulate (MPFC) has been interpreted as involving “decoupling” of second-order The Anterior Paracingulate (MPFC) has been interpreted as involving “decoupling” of second-order representations, and here applies to self and other, again fitting the theory.representations, and here applies to self and other, again fitting the theory.
Evaluation of Theory Theory: Negative aspects of the theoryEvaluation of Theory Theory: Negative aspects of the theory•When we consider emotional intentional relations and action intentional relations TT breaks down: When we consider emotional intentional relations and action intentional relations TT breaks down:
•For emotional understanding, empathy seems an important factor and degree of empathy correlates with For emotional understanding, empathy seems an important factor and degree of empathy correlates with responses in Anterior Insula and ACC areas typically associated with self-awareness of body stateresponses in Anterior Insula and ACC areas typically associated with self-awareness of body state
•However, even findings apparently congruent to TT do not entirely fit the theory as Inf. Parietal (TPJ) shows However, even findings apparently congruent to TT do not entirely fit the theory as Inf. Parietal (TPJ) shows hemisphere differences, and the MPFC may be more self (or self & other) oriented.hemisphere differences, and the MPFC may be more self (or self & other) oriented.
Evaluation of Simulation Theory: Positive aspects of the theoryEvaluation of Simulation Theory: Positive aspects of the theory•Many of the findings for all three kinds of intentional relations seem to depend on brain regions known to be Many of the findings for all three kinds of intentional relations seem to depend on brain regions known to be intimately involved in self activity, thus activity in these regions may be on loan for understanding othersintimately involved in self activity, thus activity in these regions may be on loan for understanding others•Empathy ratings correlate with activation for others in some of the regions associated with self-consciousnessEmpathy ratings correlate with activation for others in some of the regions associated with self-consciousness•Observing or thinking about others seems to activate these regions for simulationsObserving or thinking about others seems to activate these regions for simulations
Evaluation of Simulation Theory: Negative aspects of the theoryEvaluation of Simulation Theory: Negative aspects of the theory•Activations in the APC or MPFC seem to respond equally to self and other, suggesting a more cognitive than Activations in the APC or MPFC seem to respond equally to self and other, suggesting a more cognitive than empathic mechanism, similar to the “decoupling” mechanism of TT, or Intentional Schema of IRT.empathic mechanism, similar to the “decoupling” mechanism of TT, or Intentional Schema of IRT.•The contrast between left and right hemisphere effects in the Inferior Parietal (TPJ) - and possibly elsewhere The contrast between left and right hemisphere effects in the Inferior Parietal (TPJ) - and possibly elsewhere (e.g., Anterior Insula) - suggest a self-other differentiation that might involve distinct mechanisms for social (e.g., Anterior Insula) - suggest a self-other differentiation that might involve distinct mechanisms for social understanding.understanding.
Evaluation of Intentional Relations Theory: Positive aspects of the theoryEvaluation of Intentional Relations Theory: Positive aspects of the theory•It is structured to make distinctions between: It is structured to make distinctions between:
•Three kinds of intentional relations (action, emotion and epistemic), which match results associated with Three kinds of intentional relations (action, emotion and epistemic), which match results associated with different brain regions.different brain regions.•First-person, 3rd-person and shared representations, which are also associated with different brain regions.First-person, 3rd-person and shared representations, which are also associated with different brain regions.•Levels of social understanding with phylo- and onto-genetic importLevels of social understanding with phylo- and onto-genetic import
•It has been used by neuroscientists to interpret in a functional manner the different regions involved in imitation.It has been used by neuroscientists to interpret in a functional manner the different regions involved in imitation.
Evaluation of Intentional Relations Theory: Negative aspects of the theoryEvaluation of Intentional Relations Theory: Negative aspects of the theory•It is perhaps too flexible, particularly in its concept of an intentional schema that can be used for any “matched” It is perhaps too flexible, particularly in its concept of an intentional schema that can be used for any “matched” findings, regardless of the particular brain regions involved in the match. findings, regardless of the particular brain regions involved in the match. •It has not been explicitly tested against the alternative theories. It has not been explicitly tested against the alternative theories.
Neuroscience using ToM tasksNeuroscience using ToM tasks•The focus of these studies is on determining brain regions functionally involved in the interpretation of complex stories of social interaction that are visually or verbally The focus of these studies is on determining brain regions functionally involved in the interpretation of complex stories of social interaction that are visually or verbally presented. Two brain regions are most active in these studies: 1) presented. Two brain regions are most active in these studies: 1) Posterior Superior Temporal Sulcus (pSTS) or the Temporal/Parietal Junction (TPJ)Posterior Superior Temporal Sulcus (pSTS) or the Temporal/Parietal Junction (TPJ) ; 2) ; 2) Medial Prefrontal Medial Prefrontal (MPFC) or Anterior Paracingulate (APC)(MPFC) or Anterior Paracingulate (APC)..
MPFC (or APC) pSTS (or TPJ)MPFC (or APC) pSTS (or TPJ)may provide “decoupled” may provide the may provide “decoupled” may provide the (2nd order) representations analysis and (2nd order) representations analysis and of intentional relations (IRs) representatlonof intentional relations (IRs) representatlon
of IRsof IRs
From Frith & Frith (2003) Regions for analysis and representation of self and From Frith & Frith (2003) Regions for analysis and representation of self and other overlap (from Decety and Sommerville, 2003) other overlap (from Decety and Sommerville, 2003)
How TT can work for complex epistemic ToM tasksHow TT can work for complex epistemic ToM tasks•pSTS (or TPJ) apSTS (or TPJ) analyzes and represents animate activity and IRs based nalyzes and represents animate activity and IRs based mostlymostly on visual or 3rd person information. TT could avoid the matching problem by positing that on visual or 3rd person information. TT could avoid the matching problem by positing that IRs of self and other are both analyzed in a behavioristic (or 3rd person) mode. IRs of self and other are both analyzed in a behavioristic (or 3rd person) mode. MPFC (or APC), bMPFC (or APC), based on these analyses, and possibly using an innate ToM, could then ased on these analyses, and possibly using an innate ToM, could then provide “decoupled” (2nd order) representations of intentional relations of agents, whether they be of self or other (or jointly self and other).provide “decoupled” (2nd order) representations of intentional relations of agents, whether they be of self or other (or jointly self and other).
A problem for TT that ST can handleA problem for TT that ST can handle•The MPFC (and perhaps the TPJ) is activated in cases of self-representation that The MPFC (and perhaps the TPJ) is activated in cases of self-representation that seemseem not to be based entirely on 3rd person information about the self. not to be based entirely on 3rd person information about the self. •Furthermore, the frontal region and other regions along the midline have been postulated to be part of a system for representation & regulation of self. Furthermore, the frontal region and other regions along the midline have been postulated to be part of a system for representation & regulation of self. •So, perhaps, the MPFC generates a 2nd order representation of other’s mental states, through prior association between a 3rd person behavioral analysis that applies So, perhaps, the MPFC generates a 2nd order representation of other’s mental states, through prior association between a 3rd person behavioral analysis that applies somewhat equally to self and other in the TPJ and a simulation of 1st person components of mental states found in the rest of the self-system.somewhat equally to self and other in the TPJ and a simulation of 1st person components of mental states found in the rest of the self-system.
fMRI responses forfMRI responses foranticipated shock anticipated shock for self and other Empathic abilityfor self and other Empathic ability correlated withcorrelated with fMRI activityfMRI activityGreen selfGreen selfRed otherRed other
From Singer, et. al. (2004)From Singer, et. al. (2004)How ST can handle affective IRs better than TTHow ST can handle affective IRs better than TT •The conscious “feeling self” regions of brain activity can not only anticipate and interpret affective IRs in self but also in others (and in inanimate objects). The conscious “feeling self” regions of brain activity can not only anticipate and interpret affective IRs in self but also in others (and in inanimate objects). •At the same time, sensory 1st person information, that may (or may not) be conscious, can be used to distinguish self from other.At the same time, sensory 1st person information, that may (or may not) be conscious, can be used to distinguish self from other.•Consistent with ST, dispositionally empathic individuals engage in more active “simulations” than less empathic individuals, a finding not expected on TT’s more cognitive Consistent with ST, dispositionally empathic individuals engage in more active “simulations” than less empathic individuals, a finding not expected on TT’s more cognitive account.account.
IRT can handle both epistemic IRs and affective IRsIRT can handle both epistemic IRs and affective IRsat least as well as TT & ST. In addition, it provides, in the intentionalat least as well as TT & ST. In addition, it provides, in the intentionalschema, a concept that can be applied also to action IRs.schema, a concept that can be applied also to action IRs.
Iacoboni, Kaplan & Wilson (in press) developed an account of imitation which Iacoboni, Kaplan & Wilson (in press) developed an account of imitation which explicitly uses IRT at the functional level of their model (see figures to right).explicitly uses IRT at the functional level of their model (see figures to right).
Figure to rightFigure to right: The neural architecture for imitation mapped onto the: The neural architecture for imitation mapped onto thefunctional elements of Intentional Relations Theory. Each box has three functional elements of Intentional Relations Theory. Each box has three types of descriptions: an anatomical description, a functional description, types of descriptions: an anatomical description, a functional description, and an icon representing Intentional Relations Theory.and an icon representing Intentional Relations Theory.
Barresi, J., and Moore, C. (1996). Intentional relations and social understanding. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Barresi, J., and Moore, C. (1996). Intentional relations and social understanding. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 19, 107–154.19, 107–154.Decety, J., & Sommerville, J. A. (2003). Shared representations between self and other: a social cognitive Decety, J., & Sommerville, J. A. (2003). Shared representations between self and other: a social cognitive neuroscience view. Trends Cogn Sci, 7(12), 527-533.neuroscience view. Trends Cogn Sci, 7(12), 527-533.Frith, U & Frith, C. (2003) Development and neurophysiology of mentalizing. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (2003) Frith, U & Frith, C. (2003) Development and neurophysiology of mentalizing. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B (2003) 358, 459–473.358, 459–473.Iacoboni, M., Kaplan, J. & Wilson, S. (in press) A neural architecture for imitation and intentional relations. In: Iacoboni, M., Kaplan, J. & Wilson, S. (in press) A neural architecture for imitation and intentional relations. In: Nehaniv C, Dautenhahn K, editors. Imitation and social learning in robots, humans and animals: Behavioural, social Nehaniv C, Dautenhahn K, editors. Imitation and social learning in robots, humans and animals: Behavioural, social and communicative dimensions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.and communicative dimensions. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Singer,T., Seymour, B., O’Doherty, J., Kaube, H., Dolan, R., & Frith, C. (2004). Empathy for pain Involves theSinger,T., Seymour, B., O’Doherty, J., Kaube, H., Dolan, R., & Frith, C. (2004). Empathy for pain Involves theaffective but not sensory components of pain. Science, 303, 1157-1162.affective but not sensory components of pain. Science, 303, 1157-1162.
•Neuroscience research on social understanding provides a rich data base from which to evaluate the three Neuroscience research on social understanding provides a rich data base from which to evaluate the three types of theories of ToM. types of theories of ToM. •All three theories have something to offer in explaining empirical results and might be modified to fit current All three theories have something to offer in explaining empirical results and might be modified to fit current data.data.•Intentional relations theory – perhaps due to its flexibility - seems to find more support and fewer problems than Intentional relations theory – perhaps due to its flexibility - seems to find more support and fewer problems than TT or ST.TT or ST.•Further testing using contrasting predictions where possible between the theories could lead to significant Further testing using contrasting predictions where possible between the theories could lead to significant progress in determining how humans (and other organisms) engage in social understanding.progress in determining how humans (and other organisms) engage in social understanding.
Intentional Relations (IRs)Intentional Relations (IRs) connect an agent (or agents) to an object through a relation connect an agent (or agents) to an object through a relation existing in virtue of an agent’s sensorimotor, emotional/motivational and cognitive capacities.existing in virtue of an agent’s sensorimotor, emotional/motivational and cognitive capacities.
Examples of first order intentional relationsExamples of first order intentional relations •Jamie chases the cat Jamie chases the cat ((actionaction))•Mackenzie fears the dog Mackenzie fears the dog ((emotionemotion))•Columbus sees land Columbus sees land ((epistemicepistemic))
Examples of second order intentional relationsExamples of second order intentional relations •Fiona thinks that she is in love with Colin. Fiona thinks that she is in love with Colin. •Fiona thinks that Mary is in love with Colin.Fiona thinks that Mary is in love with Colin.
Fiona exhibits ‘social understanding’ of intentional relations of self and other.Fiona exhibits ‘social understanding’ of intentional relations of self and other.
First Person InformationFirst Person Information: PProvides anrovides an “inner”“inner” perspective of the IR, which perspective of the IR, which eemphasizesmphasizes the the objectobject and and IRIR to it,to it, while while ddeemphasizeemphasizinging information about information about agentagent..
Third Person Information:Third Person Information: Provides an Provides an “outer”“outer” perspective of the IR, which perspective of the IR, which eemphasizesmphasizes the the agentagent of the IR, but of the IR, but deemphasizesdeemphasizes information relating the agent to the information relating the agent to the object.object.
Intentional SchemaIntentional Schema•Is an Is an intermodal perceptual and conceptual structureintermodal perceptual and conceptual structure that can coordinate and integrate first- and that can coordinate and integrate first- and third-person sources of information about object-directed activities into representations that link agents to third-person sources of information about object-directed activities into representations that link agents to objects through intentional relations. objects through intentional relations. •It It combines the internal or ‘subjective’ aspectcombines the internal or ‘subjective’ aspect of an agent’s intentional orientation toward an object of an agent’s intentional orientation toward an object with the external or ‘objective’ aspectwith the external or ‘objective’ aspect of an agent’s behavioral activities. of an agent’s behavioral activities.
Four levels of Four levels of SSocial ocial UUnderstanding of nderstanding of Intentional RelationsIntentional Relations•Level 1: Level 1: 1st-person1st-person information of IRs information of IRs of selfof self are are kept distinctkept distinct from from 3rd-person3rd-person information of IRs of information of IRs of the the otherother, so the intentional schema does not apply. , so the intentional schema does not apply. •Level 2: Matching occurs between 1st-person information of self and 3rd-person information of other, Level 2: Matching occurs between 1st-person information of self and 3rd-person information of other, when both are in the same/similar IR. (when both are in the same/similar IR. (Understand shared IRsUnderstand shared IRs))•Level 3: Matching occurs between current 1st or 3rd person information and imagined co-ordinate Level 3: Matching occurs between current 1st or 3rd person information and imagined co-ordinate information of IRs. (information of IRs. (Understand embodied IRs of self or otherUnderstand embodied IRs of self or other))•Level 4: Matching occurs between imagined 1st and 3rd person information of IRs. (Level 4: Matching occurs between imagined 1st and 3rd person information of IRs. (Understand mental Understand mental states of self or otherstates of self or other))
Background
Intentional Relations Theory
Neuroscience of Social Understanding Evaluation of Three Theories of Social Understanding
Conclusions
Bibliography
![understanding social security retirement benefitsstorage.cloversites.com/oaktrustwealthmanagementllc... · [6] understanding social security retirement benefits beneficiaries entitled](https://static.fdocuments.us/doc/165x107/5ecdf7634b06a121be47b40e/understanding-social-security-retirement-6-understanding-social-security-retirement.jpg)
