TITLE : THE EMERGENCE OF NEW ENTERPRISE INSTITUTION SIN POST-COMMUNIST POLAND : Trade Union Elites ,Marketization, and Inter-Union Relations

AUTHOR: DAVID OST ; Hobart and William Smith CollegesMARC WEINSTEIN ; Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS :

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DATE :

May 12, 199 5

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The work leading to this report was supported in part by contract funds proyided by the Nationa lCouncil for Soviet and East European Research, made ayailable by the U. S. Department of State under TitleVIII (the Soviet-Eastern European Research and Training Act of 1983, as amended) . The analysis andinterpretations contained in the report are those of the author(s).

SUMMARY

Nearly six years after the fall of communism, Central Europe remains in flux, th e

outcomes of its transition still uncertain . Fiscal and monetary policies have brough t

macroeconomic stability, but long-term prosperity depends on the creation of internationall y

competitive firms and the emergence of stable democratic norms . The free elections

introduced in these countries are a vital precondition for achieving these goals, but ultimat e

success will depend upon firm-level activity where both goods and consent are produced . Our

research attempts to understand this dynamic by examining the evolution of new enterprise

institutions in post-communist Poland .

Poland is a particularly important case because the Solidarity trade union has been i n

the unusual position of being able to shape labor market institutions and firm-leve l

labor/management relations by virtue of its key role in the democratic transition . In our firs t

report, therefore, we investigate the attitudes of trade unionists toward market reform ,

employee governance, and politics in general . Understanding the economic and politica l

orientation of shopfloor trade union activists is important for scholars and policy-maker s

alike. The egalitarian legacy of Solidarity prompted many observers to anticipate th e

emergence of a post-communist industrial relations system marked by strong and militan t

trade unionism . Some considered this a potential threat to the transition to a market

economy, as a militant labor force might seek to slow down reforms that are painful to unio n

members. Others saw strong unionism as a safeguard for easing the transition, arguing tha t

trade union support for the privatization program would legitimate the social costs, allowin g

marketization to proceed unhindered . Employers themselves were equally divided . Some

thought that union strength on the shopfloor would block managerial prerogatives : while

others saw a prestigious and well-organized labor movement as a valuable partner in th e

drive to improve labor productivity . Indeed, to a large extent, management's proclivity t o

either incorporate or exclude labor in the restructuring process is based on its belief in one o f

these two competing realities .

Our research directly addresses these issues . Drawing upon survey data from 170 unio n

leaders in 90 Polish enterprises, we find that contrary to widely-held expectations, trad e

unions in Poland are not very strong, union leaders are not very militant, and there is general

support among union elites for the transition to a market economy . Moreover, on many key

dimensions, the attitudes of trade union activists surveyed do not differ greatly according t o

union affiliation . In general, both Solidarity leaders and the leaders of the former

Communist-affiliated trade unions support the transition to a market economy .

In short, we found that most unions leaders :

• cite support for market reform as one of the main reasons for their involvemen tin union wor k

• Believe in the sanctity of property right s

• Doubt that strikes are beneficial to worker s

• Support direct foreign investment in Poland

• Support extensive managerial prerogatives and limited employee input in privat efirms

• Do not accept a "class struggle" model of politics, either inside the firm or i nsociety at large

The only point on which unionists tend to oppose free market policies is in their belie f

that government should take action to reduce pay differentials, which have widene d

dramatically in the post-communist period .

Are these optimistic findings? Yes and no . On the one hand, such attitudes suggest tha t

there is a solid foundation for building a new economy based on durable, cooperative labor-

management relations . On the other hand, the strong pro-market orientation of union leader s

may put them out of touch with their own rank-and-file, who are increasingly frustrated

about economic hardships . As noted above, over half of the unionists interviewed felt tha t

they were more pro-market than rank-and-file members . This raises the prospect that worker s

who lose out in the economic transition may turn against these leaders and their beliefs ,

perhaps embracing what one prescient observer already in 1989 saw as a "new Robespierre "

promising to take from the rich and give to the poor . Our research, which is limited to unio n

elites, does not shed light on the possibility of such a development, although low union

membership is already an indication of disagreements between union leaders and rank-and-

file . We mention the possibility, however, in order to caution against viewing trade unio n

elites' support for market reform as a guarantee of labor quiescence .

Based on our surveys, and on numerous other sources available to us, we believe tha t

market reform and liberal democracy are stable for the time being, but maintaining thi s

stability requires a sensitivity to labor grievances that not even unionists themselves alway s

express . With such sensitivity, Polish unions and managers should be able to channe l

industrial conflict into equitable solutions for employees and firms alike .

ii

The Emergence of New Enterprise Institutions in Post-Communist Poland :

Trade Union Elites, Marketization, and Inter-Union Relation s

David Ost & Marc Weinstein

Nearly six years after the fall of communism, Central Europe remains in flux, the

outcomes of its transition still uncertain. Fiscal and monetary policies have brough t

macroeconomic stability, but long-term prosperity depends on the creation of internationall y

competitive firms and the emergence of stable democratic norms . The free elections introduce d

in these countries are a vital precondition for achieving these goals, but ultimate success wil l

depend upon firm-level activity where both goods and consent are produced . Our research

attempts to understand this dynamic by examining the evolution of new enterprise institutions

in post-communist Poland .

Poland is a particularly important case because the Solidarity trade union has been in th e

unusual position of being able to shape labor market institutions and firm-leve l

labor/management relations by virtue of its key role in the democratic transition . In our firs t

report, therefore, we investigate the attitudes of trade unionists toward market reform .

employee governance, and politics in general . Understanding the economic and politica l

orientation of shopfloor trade union activists is important for scholars and policy-makers alike .

The egalitarian legacy of Solidarity prompted many observers to anticipate the emergence of a

post-communist industrial relations system marked by strong and militant trade unionism . Some

considered this a potential threat to the transition to a market economy, as a militant labo r

force might seek to slow down reforms that are painful to union members . Others saw strong

unionism as a safeguard for easing the transition, arguing that trade union support for th e

privatization program would legitimate the social costs, allowing marketization to procee d

unhindered . Employers themselves were equally divided . Some thought that union strength o n

the shopfloor would block managerial prerogatives ; while others saw a prestigious and well -

organized labor movement as a valuable partner in the drive to improve labor productivity .

Indeed, to a large extent, management's proclivity to either incorporate or exclude labor in th e

restructuring process is based on its belief in one of these two competing realities . '

Our research directly addresses these issues . Drawing upon survey data from 170 unio n

leaders in 90 Polish enterprises,' we find that contrary to widely-held expectations, trade

' For a complete discussion of divergent managerial strategies see Weinstein, Marc, and David Ost ,"Common aims, Divergent Paths: Emergent Human Resource Strategies in Post-Socialist Poland," forthcomin gNCSEER Research Report .

2See 38Appendix 1 on page 8, for a discussion of the research methodology and sampling frame .

1

unions in Poland are not very strong, union leaders are not very militant, and there is genera l

support among union elites for the transition to a market economy . Moreover, on many key

dimensions, the attitudes of trade union activists surveyed do not differ greatly according t o

union affiliation . In general, both Solidarity leaders and the leaders of the former Communist -

affiliated trade unions support the transition to a market economy .

In short, we found that most unions leaders :

• cite support for market reform as one of the main reasons for their involvement i nunion work

• Believe in the sanctity of property rights

• Doubt that strikes are beneficial to worker s

• Support direct foreign investment in Polan d

• Support extensive managerial prerogatives and limited employee input in privatefirms

• Do not accept a "class struggle" model of politics, either inside the firm or i nsociety at large

The only point on which unionists tend to oppose free market policies is in their belie f

that government should take action to reduce pay differentials, which have widene d

dramatically in the post-communist period .

INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUN D

Since the signing of the Round Table accords on April 5, 1989, the Polish industria l

relations system has been characterized by plural unionism . Polish employees could join o r

organize a trade union affiliated with a national confederation, a company union unaffiliate d

with a national confederation, or could choose not to join a union . As a response to th e

protracted struggle for free trade unionism in Poland, Polish law permits as few as te n

employees in any given firm to register a trade union organization .' Employees can als o

choose not to join a union, an option now exercised by approximately one-half of the industria l

workforce .

3Dziennik Ustaw, Number 55, position 234 .

2

As might be expected, the low barriers to trade union organizing has led to the creation

of several hundred trade unions. Most, however, are extremely small . Despite thi s

proliferation, two national confederations with pre-1989 origins still predominate . The first i s

the All Poland National Trade Union (OPZZ) . Created in 1983 after the formal lifting o f

martial law, OPZZ was closely affiliated with the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) unti l

the PZPR's dissolution in 1990, and since that time has been closely associated with the post -

communist successor to the PZPR, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) . The other main

confederation is NSZZ Solidarity, which was re-legalized in 1989 after an eight-year hiatus .

Though reliable data on national membership is unavailable, the national leadership of OPZ Z

claims 2 .5 million members and NSZZ Solidarity claims 2 .0 million members .

At the national level, the relationship between these competing confederations i s

acrimonious . A central point of contention between the two unions has been the disposition o f

Solidarity assets that were seized by martial law authorities in December 1981 and were

subsequently given to OPZZ upon its creation in 1983 . Indicative of this tension is Solidarity

refusal to sit at the same table with OPZZ representatives during government-trade unio n

negotiations, or at meetings of the Tripartite Commission, which includes busines s

representatives . As will be seen, the tensions and conflicts between the national leaderships of

OPZZ and Solidarity are largely absent in inter-union relationships at the enterprise level .

SAMPLE

As part of a broader study investigating emerging firm-level human resourc e

management strategies in Poland, we administered surveys in May-June 1994 to leaders of th e

two largest trade union organizations in a sample of 95 manufacturing firms . The sample was

drawn from firms in towns and cities throughout Poland and included firms with a variety of

different ownership structures . The final sample included 31 state-owned firms, 22 Stat e

Treasury firms, 5 20 domestic privatized firms, and 22 foreign-owned privatized firms . In 66

of these firms, the two largest trade unions were Solidarity and OPZZ ; in 15 firms, Solidarity

and an unaffiliated firm-level union were the largest unions . Solidarity was the sole

representative in only one enterprise, whereas OPZZ was the sole representative in seven firm s

4We also administered surveys to the enterprise manager and to the employee representative on the firm' sgoverning body ; those results will be discussed in subsequent reports .

'State Treasury firms (also known as "commercialized firms") are state-owned enterprises whose assets hav ebeen transferred from a government ministry to the State Treasury . With this property transformation, the firm' sworkers council is replaced by a supervisory board . This ownership form is intended to be transitional on the pat hto the firm's privatization .

3

(Table 1, page 11) . In no firms did an OPZZ-affiliated union and an independent union exis t

side by side . This reflects the fact that most independent trade unions were formerly affiliated

with OPZZ, choosing to disassociate only in the post-communist period . In four firms ,

employees had no trade union representation . Altogether, we interviewed 82 Solidarit y

officials, 73 OPZZ officials, and 15 unaffiliated union officials . '

In total, 82 .4% of the respondents are either the chair or vice-chair of their trade union' s

factory committee (Table 2, page 11) . Slightly more than one-third of our Solidarity

representatives held leadership positions in the trade union during its formative period in 1980-81 ;

nearly half of the others (45 .2% of OPZZ leaders and 53 .3% of unaffiliated union leaders) had

been active in OPZZ from 1983-89 . The high percentage of former OPZZ activists amon g

contemporary non-Solidarity unions indicate that these unions have common institutional roots i n

the pro-Communist labor organizations of the past . Additionally, 44.6% of the OPZZ sample wer e

members of the PZPR, confirming the continuity between the current OPZZ organization and th e

pre-1990 OPZZ . Whereas there are distinct differences among our respondents in terms of pas t

organizational memberships, there are few important differences in their educational level, age ,

and tenure with the firm . Solidarity leaders, however, did tend to be somewhat better educate d

than OPZZ leaders, and slightly less well-educated than the leaders of unaffiliated unions . The

average age of the respondents is 44 .2% and average tenure with the firm is 20.9 years ; 82.9 %

of the combined sample are men .

FINDING S

Attitudes Towards The Marketization Program

Though often dissatisfied with the outcomes of the market reform program .

representatives from Solidarity, OPZZ, and unaffiliated trade unions expressed moderate t o

strong support for the general principles of marketization and privatization . Indeed, more than

half of the Solidarity representatives, and over one-third of the others, cited support for marke t

reform and the desire to speed privatization as reasons for becoming active in the unio n

(Figure 1, page 12) . What is particularly revealing, especially for a country experiencin g

considerable economic difficulties, is the very low number of unionists citing opposition t o

market reform (noted in Figure 1 as "Fight Balcerowicz Program") as the reason for thei r

union involvement .

'We enjoyed an exceptionally large response rate . Survey data from trade union leaders were collected in al lbut two firms in which trade unions were present . In one firm, OPZZ and Solidarity declined to participate ; inanother, Solidarity declined to participate .

4

Most union officials, however, believed that the workers in their firms were less committe d

to market reform than they were . While more than three-quarters of the respondents expresse d

strong support for market reforms, they estimated that only about one-third to two-thirds of thei r

members felt the same way (Figure 2, page 12) . Solidarity representatives perceived the greates t

differences between their views and the attitudes of the workforce . Whereas 76 .8% of Solidarity

representatives expressed support for market reforms, only 38 .8% thought that workers share d

their views . This helps explain why so many Solidarity leaders believed that it was their

responsibility, as trade union leaders, to explain market reform program to their constituents . Such

views are not unique to Solidarity : most OPZZ and unaffiliated union officials also perceived

themselves as more pro-market than their members .

What about union militancy on the shopfloor? Our research does not confirm popular pres s

reports about the shopfloor militancy of Polish trade unions . Rather, we have found that unio n

officials are willing to grant management considerable leeway in governing enterprises . This

position is consistent with trade unionists' support for marketization in general, since the basis o f

the marketization program was the notion that the creation of "real" owners with a material stake

in the economic performance of firms was necessary for economic recovery . Given this goal . i t

is not surprising that pro-market Polish trade unionists were hesitant to assert their authority o n

strategic issues that might preclude the prerogative of owners . Despite a long Polish tradition of

strong employee councils -- indeed, with the end of communism in 1989, employee council s

elected by the workforce were formally responsible for all major decisions in state-owned firms ,

including hiring and firing the director -- only from one-fifth to one-third of our respondent s

believed that employee councils should even exist in private firms (Figure 3, page 13) .

A substantially higher number believe that worker councils should exist in state-owned firms ,

but even here they see their role largely as caretakers for "ownerless" state property, until the fir m

is privatized . Even in state-owned firms, unionists readily concede managerial control of the day -

to-day running of the enterprise . No more than one-fourth of the respondents thought that trade

unions should be stronger than management . Lack of militancy is also indicated by the wea k

support for strikes : only 20.8% of Solidarity officials and 34 .3% of OPZZ officials thought strike s

were useful in securing wage increases . The low support for strikes by Solidarity leaders is all th e

more notable given that the post-communist Democratic Left Alliance was in power at the tim e

of our survey, a factor likely to exacerbate strike-prone tendencies in Solidarity .

Political Orientatio n

One of the notable features so far has been the similarity in the market an d shopfloor

orientations of all trade union activists . While Solidarity representatives are more likel y than

5

OPZZ and unaffiliated trade unionists to have become union activists out of a desire to promot e

market reform, they all share largely comparable levels of support for marketization program . I t

is only when the discussion turns to political views that we see profound differences among th e

three groups of activists . Even here, however, only the differences concerning party loyalty an d

attitudes to the old regime are sharp . On the more important questions of government economi c

policy, we once again see similar pro-market views on the part of all trade unionists .

Five years after the fall of communism, 69 .5% of Solidarity representatives said that

"fighting communism" was an important reason they got involved in the union (Figure 4, pag e

13). The comparable figures for OPZZ and unaffiliated unionists are 8 .2% and 13 .3% ,

respectively . Similarly, 41 .5% of Solidarity representatives favor lustracja - the vetting of

individuals in order to keep former Communist functionaries out of key public positions -

compared to only 8 .2% of OPZZ representatives, and 20% of unaffiliated unionists . Nearly hal f

of the Solidarity activists favor barring former PZPR activists from top management positions :

compared to 5 .5% and 6 .7% for OPZZ and unaffiliated unionists .

These are mostly symbolic issues, signals sent by union leaders to union members about th e

formers ' personal values and attitudes to the old regime . On questions of government economi c

policy, however, there is, as noted above, substantially less disagreement. All groups, for

example, express strong support for government action to encourage foreign investment (Figur e

5, page 14) About half of all unionists favor some form of incomes policy to reduce pa y

differentials, which have risen significantly in the last five years and have led to considerabl e

anxiety among the rank-and-file . This appears to be the most anti-market position taken by Polis h

trade unionists .

We find particularly striking that only about one-third of trade unionists believes that

workers constitute a separate class in Polish society . Even fewer believe that workers need thei r

own political party. Such beliefs help explain why unionists tend to advocate policies that are no t

narrowly based on the interest of blue collar wage employees who constitute the core of trad e

union support in Poland . Rather, trade union leaders tend to consider policy issues less as worke r

representatives than as engaged public citizens, and they tend to share the pro-market orientatio n

of so many activists in the post-communist period .

Despite the apparent agreement on broad political and class issues, there remains enormou s

polarization among the trade union groups with regards to party preferences . OPZZ and

unaffiliated unionists alone express strong support for the two `"post-communist" parties (thos e

with roots in the old system) . The SLD, the political successor to the PZPR, is strongly supporte d

by both OPZZ and unaffiliated trade unionists (74 .7% and 66.7%, respectively), but is strongl y

6

opposed by Solidarity (Figure 6, page 14) . A similar pattern prevails with respect to the Polis h

Peasant Party, the other officially sanctioned party under the communist system .

The political orientations of Solidarity activists are more complex . Apart from their distaste

for post-communist political parties, little seems to unite them . This is due to the fact that instead

of becoming a single political party, the Solidarity movement fragmented into a number o f

different parties . No party enjoys the support of even half of the Solidarity activists we

interviewed. These activists express their strongest support (about one-third) for the two mai n

liberal parties : the Democratic Union (UD) and the Liberal Democratic Congress, which hav e

been the most active supporters of "shock therapy ." (These parties have since united into a single

party called the Liberty Union, or UW.) In this regard, firm-level unionists part company wit h

the national Solidarity leaders, who have been strongly critical of both these parties . chiefly

because of the latter's secular orientation . (A UD government collapsed in June 1993 when

Solidarity withdrew its support .) The populist/nationalist Confederation for Polish Independenc e

and the socially conservative Christian National Party enjoy some support among Solidarity

representatives, while evoking strong opposition among OPZZ activists .

It should be noted, however, that the disagreements in party preference may not be s o

important, for both the post-communist SLD and post-Solidarity UW generally take the same pro -

market positions . When the SLD came to power in October 1993, it maintained the market

program of its predecessor .

Inter-union Relations

The differing political orientations do not lead to major differences on firm-level issues . Just

as local trade union activists tend to agree on broad issues of national economic strategy, they als o

tend to agree on the key issues facing the employees they represent . Our assessment here is base d

not only on the trade union responses, but on the responses of managers, as well . For example .

87 .2% of the managers surveyed said that the trade unions in their firms agreed with each othe r

on pay issues . Moreover, 60 .8% of the managers surveyed stated that the unions in their firms

generally got along well, while only 13 .2% noted many points of conflict between the unions

(Figure 7, page 15) . Though somewhat less optimistic in their appraisal of inter-union relations.

local unionists concurred with these general assessments . Given the strong differences with regard s

to political orientation and the legacies of political competition of the 1980s, the relatively good

relations at the local level between activists from competing national confederations underscore s

the potential space for labor/management collaboration .

7

CONCLUSIO N

Our study of the economic and political attitudes of local union activists shows that .

contrary to what many believe, organized labor in Poland is generally quite supportive of th e

transition to a market economy . It respects property rights, accepts managerial prerogative i n

private firms, and is often willing to moderate economic demands .

Is this an optimistic finding? Yes and no . On the one hand, such attitudes suggest tha t

there is a solid foundation for building a new economy based on durable, cooperative labor -

management relations . On the other hand, the strong pro-market orientation of union leader s

may put them out of touch with their own rank-and-file, who are increasingly frustrated abou t

economic hardships . As noted above, over half of the unionists interviewed felt that they wer e

more pro-market than rank-and-file members . This raises the prospect that workers who lose

out in the economic transition may turn against these leaders and their beliefs, perhap s

embracing what one prescient observer already in 1989 saw as a new Robespierre " promising

to take from the rich and give to the poor .' Our research, which is limited to union elites .

does not shed light on the possibility of such a development, although low union membership

is already an indication of disagreements between union leaders and rank-and-file . We mention

the possibility, however, in order to caution against viewing trade union elites' support for

market reform as a guarantee of labor quiescence .

Based on our surveys, and on numerous other sources available to us, we believe tha t

market reform and liberal democracy are stable for the time being, but maintaining thi s

stability requires a sensitivity to labor grievances that not even unionists themselves alway s

express . With such sensitivity, Polish unions and managers should be able to channel industria l

conflict into equitable solutions for employees and firms alike .

7Maciej Kozlowski, "Noworoczne Wrozby" (New Years' Prognoses), Tygodnik Powszechny, January, 8, 1989 .

8

Appendix 1

The sampling frame for the survey matches one state-owned firm with two privatize dfirms - one purchased by Polish investors and one purchased by foreign investors - accordin gto market and firm size. This sampling frame provides a broad picture of emergent trend sacross the Polish economy .

Sampling for the survey proceeded in two stages . First, using data from the Polish Agency forInternational Investment, we identified industrial enterprises that had been acquired by foreig nfirms whose equity stake was equal to or exceeded $1 .0 million. In February, 1994, thi spopulation consisted of 40 firms . After identifying 22 foreign-owned firms willing t oparticipate in the study, I proceeded to compile a list of comparably sized state-owned an ddomestic-owned privatized firms from the same four-digit industries represented in the sampl eof foreign-owned firms . From this list of firms, the Centrum Badania Opinii Spolecznej(CBOS) 8 contacted enterprise directors to gain their permission for participation in the study .Once this consent was received. CBOS administered a questionnaire to a representative of th eenterprise's management board (zarzad), leaders of the two largest trade unions in the firm, amember of the worker council presidium (in state-owned firms), and an employee member o fthe supervisory board (in privatized firms) . All respondents were asked a range of question sabout the breadth and frequency of management/trade union and worker council consultation a swell as a series of attitudinal questions concerning employee and trade union rights, employe emotivation, and the social responsibility of firms . Additionally, managers provided data abou tthe current and past pay and bonus structure of the enterprise, employment levels, an dtraining .

Post hoc analysis of data provided by zarzad representatives indicate that the final sampl econsists of 31 state-owned firms, 42 non-state sector domestic firms,' and 22 foreign-owne dfirms . 10 Data about ownership structure also provided information about the share distributio nof domestic non-state sector enterprises that is important in the subsequent analysis of firm -level human resource practices . Among this group of firms . 22 are commercialized enterprise sin which the State Treasury is the sole holder of the company's assets and 20 are enterprise s

8 CBOS is a state-owned public opinion polling company established in 1983 . The firm has extensive experienc ein general population and firm-level surveys . For a complete history of CBOS see Lena Kolarska-Bobinska ,"Wstep" (Introduction), in Barbara Badora, Lena Kolarska-Bobinska, Krzysztof Kosela, Andrzej Paczkowski, an dAntoni Sulek, (eds .) Spoleczenstwo I Wladza : Lat Osiemdziesiatvch w Badaniach CBOS. (Society and Authorities :The `80s in CBOS Studies), CBOS, Warsaw, 1994 .

The term "non-state sector" denotes firms that are owned by either the State Treasury or private shareholders .This terminology is preferred to the term "privatized" that is sometimes used to describe firms whose shares ar eowned either by the State Treasury or by private entities .

10The final sample consists of 95 firms . Two firms were dropped from the sample because later analysis showedthat these were never state-owned . An additional three firms were not included in the analysis because they wer eused as pilot sites . As a result of subsequent changes in the instrument, data from these firms were incomparabl eto those from the remaining firms in the sample .

9

that have private shareholders . The distribution of shares in this latter group indicates thatemployees hold a controlling in 13 of the 20 Polish privatized firms .

The sample of firms in each ownership category is largely representative o fmanufacturing firms from their respective populations . For the entire sample . average firm sizeis 791 employees (Table A.1) . Employment levels across ownership categories are largel ycomparable . Average employment in the sample of foreign-owned privatized firms is 872 an daverage employment levels in Polish state-owned, commercialized, and privatized firms ar e

649, 867 and 843, respectively .

Table A . 1

Firm Size by Ownership Category

Ownershlp Number of Small Medium Large AverageCategory Valid

Observations< 500Emp

500-200 0Emp

> 2000Emp

number ofEmployees

(s.d . )

State-owned 31 17 13 1 648 . 6(516.0 )

Commercialized 22 4 17 1 866 . 7(509.3 )

Domestic- 20 12 6 2 843 . 0Owned (1200.5 )

Foreign-owned 21 7 12 2 872 . 1(855.7 )

Total 94 40 48 6 791 . 0(778.8)

1 0

Table 1 - Trade Union Representation (number of firms )

Solidarity &

Solidarity &

OPZZ &

Only

Only

No Unio n

OPZZ

Unaffiliated

Unaffiliated Solidarity OPZZ

Representation

66

15

0

1

7

4

Table 2 - Characteristics of Respondents

NSZZ Solidarit yn= 82

OPZZn=73

Unaffiliatedn=15

Tota ln=170

Position in Union

Leader of FactoryCommitte e

Vice-Leader of FactoryCommitte e

Member of FactoryCommittee

65 . 9

18 . 3

15 .9

71 . 2

9 . 6

19 .2

60 . 0

20 . 0

20.0

67 . 7

14 . 7

17 . 6

Education

Basic or Technica l

Technical H S

H S

University

30 . 5

39 . 0

9 . 8

20 .7

15 . 1

53 . 4

19 . 2

12 .3

13 . 3

53 . 3

6 . 7

26 .7

22 . 4

46 . 5

13 . 5

17 . 6

Organizational Membership

Solidarity Leaderin 1980-8 1

OPZZ Leader i n1983-89

PZPR Member in 1989

34 . 1

0 . 0

1 .2

9 . 6

45 . 2

46 .6

13 . 3

53 . 3

26 .7

21 . 8

24. 1

22. 4

Other Demographic Attributes

Mal e

Ag e

Tenure with firm

91 . 5

43 . 9

20 .0

76 . 7

44 . 6

21 .3

66 .7

47 . 7

23.6

82 . 9

44 . 2

20 .9

1 1

Figure 1Market Support as Reason for Activis m

(percentage of respondents stating reaso nas "important " or "very important")

Support MarketReform

Spee dPrivatization

FightBalcerowicz

Program

Figure 2 Market Reform and TU Activity(percentage of respondents expressin g

"agreement or "strong agreement")

I Support

Worker sMarket Reforms

Support MarketReform

My Role is t oExplain Market

Reform

1 2

Figure 3Shopfloor Orientatio n

(percentage of respondents expressing"agreement or "strong agreement")

Strikes ar eNecessary fo rWage Gain s

Figure 4

Worker

Worker TUs should b eCouncil

Councils

stronger tha nneeded in

needed in Managemen tState Firms Private Firm s

Political Orientation(percentage of respondents expressin g

"agreement or "strong agreement")

Became Unio nActivist to

FightCommunism

Vetting o fCommunists

Needed

Forme rCommunists

Should not beTop Manager s

1 3

Figure 5Government Policy and Class Consciousness

(percentage of respondents expressing"agreement or "strong agreement" )

Figure 6Party Preferences

(percentage of respondents expressing"positive" or "strongly positive" preference )

14

Figure 7Inter-Union Relations

(percentage of respondents expressing agreement )

87 .2

TUs Agree Abou tPay

Many Points ofConflict bet TUs

Friendl yRelations bet

TU s

15