AUTHOR: STEVEN L . SOLNICK, Columbia Universit y

TITLE: DEFINING AND MEASURING FEDERALISM IN RUSSIA :A METHODOLOGICAL CRITIQUE

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Defining and Measuring Federalism in Russia :

A Methodological Critiqu e

by Steven L . Solnick

Department of Political Scienc e

Columbia Universit y

New York, NY 10027

SLS27 @COLUMBIA .EDU

Submitted to the National Council for Soviet and East European Research

in partial fulfillment of Contract # 810-08

May, 1996

Solnick . "Defining and Measuring Federalism . . ." p . 2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY '

Assessing the development of center-periphery relations in Russia requires a n

effective definition of "federalism ." To be considered effective, any definition must captur e

the elements of federalism that are central to its appeal in other states, and must als o

facilitate systematic measurement over time .

A federal state is defined as "two levels of government ruling the same land an d

people, each having at least one area of action in which it is guaranteed autonomy ." A

"jurisdictional" conception of federalism focuses on which "areas of action" are in th e

purview of central and regional governments . This critical characteristic of federal system s

fails to be captured by two common approaches to their study : fiscal and constitutional-legal .

Studies of "fiscal federalism" cannot reliably distinguish between omnipresent distributiona l

struggles and more fundamental battles for jurisdictional autonomy . Studies based on

constitutional and legal documents, on the other hand, often conflate powers claimed b y

different levels of government and powers actually exercised by these governments .

A jurisdictional focus requires a direct examination of the division of responsibilitie s

between levels of government, and the degree of policy discord or coordination . The first o f

a series of annual surveys of Russian regional officials was recently completed to begin

tracking the evolution of Russian federalism . Preliminary results of this first survey will be

discussed in subsequent reports to the Council .

'This is the first of three reports from an ongoing research project analyzing and tracing changesin Russian federalism (center/periphery relations), from which additional reports are anticipated throug hJune 30, 1967 . [NCSEER Note]

Solnick. "Defining and Measuring Federalism . . ." p .3

Russia represents the world's largest experiment with federal government, at least i n

terms of area. Unlike the Soviet authoritarian state, the quasi-democratic post-Soviet Russia n

regime has exhibited some signs of real devolution of power from the center to the regional level .

To assess whether this devolution of power is significant, observers must begin to think mor e

systematically about the salience of alternative measures of "federalism ." This analysis critiques

two prevailing approaches to measuring "federalism" in Russia: fiscal and legal-constitutional

analyses . I conclude by advocating

a direct study of jurisdictional conflicts .

"Federalism" in Russia : Definition and Significance

According to Riker, a federal state consists of two levels of government ruling the sam e

land and people, each having at least one area of action in which it is guaranteed autonomy . '

Riker draws an important distinction between "centralized" and "peripheralized" federal systems .

In a centralized federal state, most functions are performed by the national authorities ; in a

peripheralized federal state, the federal center is sharply constrained . Riker argues that

centralized federal systems are more likely to survive centrifugal pressures, but are also mor e

likely to see regional autonomy trampled by expanding federal authority . Peripheralized federal

states, on the other hand, are more likely to succumb to regional conflict or even civil war .

Different state structures also have very different distributional consequences : centralized

federalisms are more likely to be able to redistribute resources to poorer subjects, while regiona l

disparities (and, consequently, inter-regional tensions) are likely to be greater in peripheralize d

systems .

Riker's definition emphasizes political and administrative aspects of federalism. In

contemporary Russia, these elements of state structure have been at the heart of the politica l

struggle since the collapse of Communism . In return for their acceptance of the 1992 Federatio n

1 William Riker, Federalism : Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little, Brown and Co ., 1964), esp . p . 11 .See also Riker, "Federalism," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds ., The Handbook of Political Science, v . 5(Reading, MA : Addison Wesley, 1975) . In this later review article, Riker defines federalism as a division o fjurisdiction between national and regional governments such that each "has some activities over which it has fina ldecisions ."

Solnick. "Defining and Measuring Federalism . . ." p . 4

Treaties, for instance, several republics won special deals : Bashkortostan demanded a specia l

appendix granting it addition control over its foreign trade while Sakha gained additiona l

property rights over natural resources . 2 Since 1992 . other republics and regions have pressed fo r

the right to control appointments or election of sub-national officials (especially in the judicial .

prosecutorial, and media branches, but including the election of regional governors), limit inter -

regional trade, unilaterally adjust tax rates, establish territorial "citizenship," nullify federa l

legislation, and even control the stationing of conscripts drafted from their territory . 3

Riker's definition is not wholly administrative, however . 4 The puzzle posed by Riker' s

theory is why centralization of power in federations leads more often to stable federal system s

and not, ultimately, to the atrophy of sub-national rights and powers . In Riker's theory, political

parties with roots at the local level provide the institutional balance to administrative dominatio n

by the center. In Russia, however, political parties have remained anemic . The survival of

federalism in Russia, therefore, should be associated with 1) limited centralization of politica l

power (an exception to the usual weakness of peripheralized federalisms) ; or 2) consolidation o f

political parties (confirming Riker's theory) 5 ; or 3) the emergence of alternative institutions t o

prevent the "overawing" of regions by the center . 6

Riker's definition of federalism, which I adopt here, neglects several elements o f

federalism that have been the focus of many other avenues of research . Since the emphasis is o n

power and policy — "areas of action" in which levels of government are guaranteed autonom y

2 Darrell Slider, "Federalism . Discord and Accommodation : Intergovernmental Affairs in Post-Soviet Russia," i nJeffry Hahn and Theodore Friedgut, eds ., Local Politics in Post-Soviet Russia (Armonk: M.E.Sharpe, 1994), p .247 .

3 Many of these jurisdictional disputes have come to light in the protracted process of drafting constitutions for theconstituent republics, and "charters" for the regions . The process continues as of this writing, with no end in sight .For a useful mid-course overview, see "Analiticheskii obzor konstitutsii respublik vkhodiashchikh v sosta vRossiiskoi Federatsii, " Rossiiskaia federatsiia no .21, 1994 .

4 See Chapter 3 of Federalism .

5 Ways in which local elections might spur the regional development of political parties are considered in Peter C .Ordeshook and Olga Shvetsova, "If Hamilton and Madison Were Merely Lucky, What Hope is There for Russia nFederalism?" manuscript, April 1995 .

6 For example, the role of an independent judiciary as guarantor of states' rights (drawing on the experience o fBritain, Canada and the United States) is developed in Jenna Bednar, William Eskridge, and John Ferejohn, " APolitical Theory of Federalism," manuscript, February I995 . The authors do not extend the argument to Russia ,though much Russian legal analysis of federalism has examined the (still weak) role of the Constitutional Court .

Solnick . "Defining and Measuring Federalism . . ." p .5

— this usage pays relatively little heed to formal structures . or to social phenomena. or to

ideologies.7 More significantly, the jurisdictional emphasis has little to say about the role o f

democratic processes or ideology in Russia . Riker, for instance, included the Soviet Union in hi s

list of federalisms, arguing that the mere fact that its federalism fails to prevent tyranny shoul d

not lead to casting it out of the class of federalisms ." 8

Why focus so exclusively on the relationship between levels of governmen t

administration, with so little regard to the nature of those entities? In part, this limited focus i s

dictated by positive theories of federalism, which address the consequences of federal structure .

These contemporary theories link federalism with three systemic outcomes relevant to post -

Soviet Russia : systemic stability, ethnic peace, and economic growth .

The stability and longevity of federal systems was actually Riker's chief focus in hi s

analysis . Two governments seeking to govern the same land and people is the essence of Riker' s

concept of federalism, but it is also the heart of a common definition of revolution . 9 In Riker' s

theory, therefore, the critical ingredient for the emergence of a stable federalism is th e

establishment of a federal "bargain" between national and sub-national leaders over the divisio n

of power. Though Riker sees the federal bargain as a response to external threats, studies o f

state-building in early modern Europe and in empires have revealed negotiated cooptation o f

peripheral groups by the center to be a prevalent route to state (or imperial ) consolidation.10

Federal bargaining, in a real sense, is a modern manifestation of this process, and it represents a

basic approach to state consolidation for post-Soviet Russia .

7 For a broad discussion of the usages of federalism as a concept, see Daniel Elazar, Exploring Federalism(Tuscaloosa, AL: Univ. of Alabama, 1987) .

8 Riker, Federalism, p . 40.

9 This is Charles Tilly's "multiple sovereignty' view of revolutions .

10 An elite cooptation bargaining model for the Soviet space was developed by David Laitin in "The Nationa lUprisings in the Soviet Union," World Politics (October 1991) . For some examples of the negotiated state-makin gin early modern Europe, see James Given, State and Society in Medieval Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,I990) ; or Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994) .For a comparable analysis of Ottoman state-building, see Karen Barkey, From Bandits to Bureaucrats (Ithaca :Cornell University Press, I994)

Solnick. "Defining and Measuring Federalism . . . p . 6

Other studies have emphasized the potential role for federal-type solutions to problems of

real or latent ethnic conflict . 11 Despite the spectacular failure of Yugoslav federalism and the

disintegration of the Soviet Union . federal arrangements are still invoked to provide autonom y

for minority groups in multi-national states . As I note above, the multi-national character of th e

Russian Federation provides a primary justification for maintenance of the federal system, a t

least for the ethnic homelands. Since autonomy over a discreet area of social, economic, o r

political life is the objective of such arrangements, the jurisdictional definition derived fro m

Riker again provides an appropriate focus .

Finally, Barry Weingast has recently argued that "market preserving federalism" ca n

stimulate economic growth by combining efficiency-enhancing sub-national competition wit h

central guarantees of property rights and free trade . 12 Weingast's definition also stresses th e

clear delineation of authority to each level of government, with each government autonomous i n

its own sphere. "Market preserving federalism," like Riker's federal bargain, unlinks federalis m

and democracy; the concept has recently been applied to China . 1 3

If we therefore accept a jurisdictional definition of federalism, we may begin to see k

explanations for whether a federal "bargain" is reached, how centralized or symmetrical th e

federation is, and how stable the resulting arrangement proves to be . Before we can begin to

consider causal hypotheses, however, the vexing problem of operationalization must b e

addressed . 1 4

11 See, for instance, Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies (New Haven : Yale, 1977) . Note also thediscussion by Daniel Elazar in "International and Comparative Federalism," PS : Political Science and Politics, (June1993) .

12 Barry Weingast, "Constitutions as Governance Structures : The Political Foundations of Secure Markets," Journa lof Institutional and Theoretical Economics 149 no. 1 (1993) : 286-320 .

13 Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian, and Barry Weingast, "Federalism Chinese Style : The Political Basis forEconomic Success in China," World Politics, October 1995 . .

14 I address the relationship between centralization and stability in "Center-Periphery Bargaining in Russia :Assessing Prospects for Federal Stability, " report to the NCSEER, May I996 .

Solnick. "Defining and Measuring Federalism . . . p . 7

Measuring" Federalism" in Russi a

The key to the jurisdictional conception of federalism is the degree of centralization .

Peripheralized federations, Riker argues, are not long lived, and excessively centralized one s

cease to be federal . Riker grappled with how to operationalize centralization on several

occasions. Ultimately, he rejected any direct examination of policy making or administrativ e

assignments as "imply[ing] nothing about the basic structure of federalism" since they may

simply be consequences of the particular technologies associated with different policy areas . 1 5

Instead, Riker opted for devising a "measure of disharmony" derived from the coordination o f

party control at both levels of government . 1 6

Unfortunately, in the Russian case, party development has been so anemic that thi s

measure is — for the present at least — virtually useless . Party identification of regiona l

politicians is difficult to ascertain and liable to change at a moment's notice . Regional governors

or republican presidents tend to run their own free-lance political machines, and national

alliances remain highly unstable. Perhaps most vexing, even the national government bears n o

clear party label .

Since Russia is still (despite the Soviet legacy) at a relatively early state of politica l

development, any attempt to measure centralization or peripheralization in the aggregate runs th e

risk of missing important regional variations . Indeed, the geographical variance of center -

regional relations may prove as significant in the long run as the longitudinal variance . Russia

may be evolving into a part-unitary (the Russian oblasts) and part-federal (the ethnic republics )

state that might be neither uniformly centralized nor truly peripheralized . Any useful measure o f

15 Federalism, pp . 127-129 . See also William Riker and Ronald Schaps, "Disharmony in Federal Government," an dWilliam Paul Alexander, "The Measurement of American Federalism," both in Riker, ed . The Development ofAmerican Federalism (Norwell, MA: Kluwer, 1987).

16 Since Riker was proposing that party structure was the primary guarantee of state autonomy, this scheme ran therisk of using an independent variable as a measure of the dependent variable .

Solnick. "Defining and Measuring Federalism . . ." p . 8

federalism must capture not only the aggregate balance of power between center and regions, bu t

also the degree of asymmetry in the federal arrangements .1 7

In the absence of a developed party system (or an established Constitutional Court) .

jurisdictional coordination or conflict has been studied in Russia through two chief approaches :

fiscal federalism and constitutional development . Though each offers useful insights, both ru n

the risk of reification .

Fiscal Federalism

The World Bank and others have attempted to capture Russian federal dynamics throug h

the Russian budget .' 8 Common dependent variables for such analyses include the percentage o f

taxes collected in the region that are spent at the regional level (i .e ., the tax retention rate), the ne t

flow of interbudgetary transfers from the region to the center (i .e ., tax remittances net of retaine d

taxes, subsidies, loans and other subventions from the center), net per capita regional budge t

expenditures, and the share of Federal transfers in the overall budget of each region .

Unfortunately, the Russian budgetary system is in such a state of confusion (compounded by the

high rate of inflation) that these figures seem susceptible to almost infinite manipulation b y

parties wishing to voice a grievance.19

One dominant theme that has clearly emerged from Russian and Western analyses is tha t

the present system is inequitable . According to one study, only 10% of subsidies of regional

budgets from the center goes to territories facing severe environmental or climatic hardships (i .e . ,

to regions where the center should be expected to offset natural disadvantages) . The remaining

90% go to republics like Sakha, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, whose per capita incomes ar e

17 See "Asymmetries in Russian Federal Bargaining," report to the NCSEER . May 1996 .

18 Christine Wallich, ed . Russia and the Challenge of Fiscal Federalism (Washington, D .C . : The World Bank,1994) . See also the interesting statistical analysis of the I992 Russian state budget by Daniel Triesman ("Th ePolitics of Fiscal Federalism in Post-Soviet Russia ." paper presented to the I995 APSA Annual Meeting) as well a sthe Russian analyses cited below .

19 See, for instance . Philippe LeHouerou, "Decentralization and Fiscal Disparities Among Regions of the RussianFederation," EDP-138, The World Bank, January I994 . The role of inflation in frustrating comparisons isparticularly vexing . A region that concentrated all of its payments in the fourth quarter, for insance, may claim th esame annualized per capita tax payments to Moscow as a region making steady monthy remittances, but would hav eactually paid far less in real terms .

Solnick, "Defining and Measuring Federalism . . ." p . 9

above the national average. The resulting sense of injustice is captured in one author's rhetorica l

climax : "Why should Ulianovsk oblast' have to pay back one quarter of its legal revenues, if as a

result its per capita budget is two-thirds that of neighboring Tatarstan?" 2 0

It is far from clear, however, who is actually winning and who is losing from Moscow' s

manipulation of fiscal policy . Attempts to sort out the chief beneficiaries of Moscow's larges s

(or weakness) are highly sensitive to the choice of indicator. Consider the tax retention rate :

1992 figures ranged from 38% to 100%, and 1994 figures ranged from 52% to 100% . 21 If we

look instead at the net revenue transfers to the regions (i .e., subsidies and subventions minus ta x

remittances), we get a different set of winners and losers . 22 Yet another picture emerges if on e

considers not just Federal subsidies . but also preferential tax sharing arrangements; in this case 8

territories with per capita regional budgets above the national norm in 1992 emerge as ne t

recipients of Federal subsidies while ten territories with per capita regional budgets below th e

national average emerge as net donors . 23

The variation in fiscal measures of federalism suggests the danger of using any one

measure to capture center-periphery dynamics . Table 1 (see end of paper) shows the top ten

"winners" and "losers" according to a number of measures of fiscal policy in 1992, 1994 an d

1995, as well as the regions most and least dependent on funds from Moscow to finance thei r

regional budgets . Though some relation among these variables is evident, so too are the danger s

of using any single fiscal indicator as the sole guide to federal dynamics .

The relationship among various fiscal measures of federalism is also described in Table 2 ,

which shows the paired correlations between various common indicators . As this table suggests ,

the correlation between various budgetary fiscal indicators (federal share of budget, ne t

20 Oksana Dmitrieva, "Political Games Around the Budget," Moskovskie novosti, no . 28, I993, pp . 8-9 .

21 L . Smirniagin, "The Federation : Processes from Below," Rossiiskie vesti, 26 June I993, p .2 (FBIS-USR-93-090pp17-19) ; Aleksei Lavrov, "Russian Budget Federalism : First Steps, First Results," Segodnia . 7 June I995 (FBIS -SOV-95-125-S) . Lavrov is a deputy to Smirniagin, and these sets of figures are likely to be more comparable tha nmost .

22 L. Smirniagin, "Political Federalism versus Economic Federalism, " Segodniia, 25 June I993 p .2 (FBIS-USR-93 -089 pp54-57 )

23 Dmitrieva, "Political Games Around the Budget"

Solnick. "Defining and Measuring Federalism . . ." p . 1 0

interbudget flow, tax retention rate) is strong and significant, but the measures are far fro m

interchangeable .

For any analysis of federalism, determining who wins and who loses from the budge t

wars is not the same thing as assessing the degree to which the system is federal . Distributional

(or pork-barrel) politics are not the same as jurisdictional politics . Among all the measures o f

fiscal federalism discussed above, the most salient to a study of federalism may be the federa l

share in regional budgets : presumably regions depending on Moscow for only a small share o f

their budgets will be more capable of asserting their independence from the center . 2 4

It is particularly puzzling, therefore, that the federal share of regional budgets seems t o

show no significant correlation with more direct measures of policy assertiveness . Table Two

includes two such policy proxies : deviation of food prices from the federal norm, and regional

differences in the rate of transformation of state enterprises into joint stock companies . Given

federal policy, food prices significantly lower than the national norm probably indicate som e

degree of regional subsidization or price controls, which in turn necessitates certain

(unconstitutional) restraints on trade . Likewise, the pace of enterprises undergoin g

"corporatization" in 1993 in preparation for privatization was often sensitive to the level o f

cooperation between regional and federal authorities . Both measures, therefore, can be used to

suggest the degree of autonomy of regional administrations, but neither is significantly correlated

with fiscal indicators . 2 5

In fact, interpretation of Russian budget figures is almost impossibly difficult if one

attempts to move from basic "winner-loser" judgments to more systemic conclusions about

centralization or peripheralization . To begin with, the consolidated state budget often fails t o

capture the ad hoc pork-barrel agreements between regional authorities and Moscow officials . 2 6

24 For a more complete picture, the measure needs to be combined with regional budget balances .25 LeHouerou ("Decentralization and Fiscal Disparities . . ." p . 17) also found no significant correlation between foo dsubsidies and budget revenues using 1992 budget figures .26 In I992-93, there were at least 32 particular decrees providing fiscal benefits to specific regions . Alexei Lavrov ,a budget specialist in for the President's Analytical Center, complained to me that none of these agreements wer eaccurately reflected in the budget, and that a chief recommendation of the Analytical Center was that all future inter-

Solnick . "Defining and Measuring Federalism . . ." p . 1 1

Further, regions can be granted direct and indirect subsidies through a wide variety o f

instruments, from published government decrees to unpublished decisions issued in the bowel s

of various Moscow ministries . 27 Finally, the regional distribution of expenditures within the

federal budget is not captured by inter-budgetary statistics and remains a mystery even to budge t

analysts within the Presidential administration . 2 8

Even officially published budgetary figures can pose vexing problems of interpretation .

Regional policies financed by regional budgets are not necessarily more autonomous than

regional policies financed by the federal budget (as the current American debate over unfunde d

mandates demonstrates) . Similarly, net flows from the federal to the regional level can sugges t

either a powerful region able to win special subventions . or a poor region in need of heavy

subsidization . 29 Even proxy measures of regional policy — like food subsidies or investmen t

levels — cannot distinguish between regional authorities who are capable of pursuing policies a t

odds with federal objectives, and those sharing the policy goals of the center .

Constitutional Perspectives

Since the 1989-91 "War of Laws" under Mikhail Gorbachev — when all-Union, Union -

republic and local authorities passed legislative and constitutional documents entirely at cross -

purposes — the significance of legal and constitutional maneuvering has been difficult to

unravel . Since 1991, for instance, analysts have focused on the constitutional rights and power s

of subnational units (especially as enumerated in Articles 71-73 of the 1993 Constitution) th e

budgetay transfers be conducted exclusively through formal budgetary channels (interview with author, Novembe rI994) . Lavrov's June 1995 article ("Russian Budgetary Federalism. . .") suggests the practice of "lobbying behind th escenes" continues .

27 According to Lavrov (interview with author, November 1994), there was no comprehensive compilation o fraspriazheniia issued by Federal ministries affecting specific regions .

28 Aleksei Lavrov, "Why subsidized regions voted for the Communists," Rossiiskie vesti, I0 April 1996, p .III .

29 Triesman suggests that political assertiveness is more significant than economic need for explaining 199 2interbudgetary flows ("The Politics of Fiscal Federalism. . .") . LeHouerou, however, found that recipients of highlevels of federal subsidies in I992 had experienced sharp declines in regional budget revenues over the previousyear . ("Decentralization and Fiscal Disparities . . ." p . I6)

Solnick . "Defining and Measuring Federalism . .." p . 1 2

development of an independent judiciary, and the development of republican constitutions an d

regional charters . 3 0

While these approaches illuminate important mechanisms in the overall struggle ove r

federalism . none solves the problem of actually measuring the centralization or peripheralizatio n

of state powers . Article 72 of the Russian Constitution, for instance, enumerates a list of "share d

responsibilities" that -- combined with the exclusively federal powers listed in Article 71 - -

leaves hardly any functions in the clear and exclusive purview of subnational governments . 31 A

federal law to clarify which shared powers reside at the regional level has consistently failed t o

clear the State Duma. Some republics and regions have reacted to this formulation by claimin g

certain exclusive rights in their own constitutions, but it is far from clear which have acted o n

these claims . Many have been using the passage of their own constitutions chiefly as a ste p

toward forcing Moscow to enter into ad hoc negotiations.32 Beginning with Tatarstan in

February 1994, negotiations over conflicting jurisdictional claims have thus far produced thirtee n

extra-constitutional "treaties" delimiting spheres of power . (See Table 3 )

The Constitution of Tuva, for instance, contains 12 distinct contradictions of the Russia n

Constitution, according to Vladimir Suge-Maadyr, Tuva's "ambassador" to the federa l

government in Moscow . 33 The most significant of these include a nullification of the federa l

constitution's guarantee that land would be privatized, and the right to overrule a federal

30 See, for instance, Edward W. Walker, "Designing Center-Region Relations in the new Russia," East EuropeanConstitutional Review, Winter 1995; Erik Hoffmann, "Challenges to Viable Constitutionalism," The Harrima nReview (November 1994) ; Robert Sharlet, "The Prospects for Federalism in Russian Constitutional Politics," Publiu sv .24 n .21 (Spring 1994) ; and Peter C. Ordeshook and Olga Shvetsova, "Russia, Federalism and Political Stability "manuscript, March 1995 .

31 To be more precise, while Article 71 enumerates Federal powers and Article 72 lists shared powers, Article 7 3simply reserves all remaining functions for the subjects of the fedeation . Many legal observers claim, with som emerit, that Article 72 is so encyclopedic that the reserve clause is effectively worthless .

32 The Consitution of Tuva, for instance, contains 12 distinct cotradictions of the Russian Constitution, according t oVladimir Suge-Maadyr, Tuva's "ambassador" to the federal government in Moscow (interview with author ,November 1994) . The most signficant of these included a nullification of the federal constitution's guarantee tha tland would be privatized, and the right to over-rule a federal declaration of a State of Emergency, the right t oappoint their own prosecutor and judges and to veto top military appointments in the republic . Suge-Maadyrblithely explained that these contradictions would be resolved by a "reconciliation commission" along the lines o fthe Tatarstan model . Meanwhile, however, Tuva's "unconsitutional" constitution was fully in force .

33 Interview with the author, Moscow, November I994 .

Solnick . "Defining and Measuring Federalism . . ." p . 1 3

declaration of a State of Emergency, the right to appoint their own prosecutor and judges and t o

veto top military appointments in the republic . Suge-Maadyr calmly asserted that thes e

contradictions would be resolved by a "reconciliation commission" along the lines of the

Tatarstan model . 34 Meanwhile, however, Tuva's "unconstitutional" constitution was fully i n

force .

Even more troublesome than blatant contradictions between Basic Laws at differen t

levels, post-Soviet practice has yet to demonstrate that Constitutional guarantees are — in th e

parlance of positive political economy — "credible ." The 1993 Constitution took the place o f

one that was unilaterally discarded by the president . and the process of drafting the 1993

Constitution was dominated as much by institutional conflict between the executive an d

legislative branches as between subjects of the federation . The September confrontation betwee n

these branches demonstrated the fragility of the Constitutional Court, and few institutiona l

guarantees have been put in place since October 1993 to suggest its performance in any incipien t

federal showdown would be any more forceful . Its 1995 ruling on the constitutionality of the

President's ruling on Chechnya revealed an apparent acceptance of the sweeping powers of th e

Presidency, and showed little indication of an eagerness to actively arbitrate between levels o f

government. 3 5

Finally, just as regions and republics may claim powers that they cannot in fact exercis e

(like the right to name their own prosecutor), some regional administrators may wield powers fa r

greater than any legal document would suggest . The Presidents of Sakha and Kalmykia flirte d

with holding referendums that would extend their terms in office until the end of the century . 3 6

The heads of Sakha and Tiumen' derive considerable power from their right to independentl y

market fixed shares of their regions' considerable resources ; this right was granted b y

34 However eighteen months later, Tuva has yet to receive any Tatarstan-style treaty .

35 Several legislators had challenged the President's right to send troops to Chechnya . While the case was framedmore as a question of legislative-executive powers rather than national-sub-national jurisdiction, the regions exert fa rmore power in the legislative branch that over the Presidency .

36 OMRI Daily Digest, 18 August 1995 .

Solnick, "Defining and Measuring Federalism . . ." p . I 4

Presidential decree, not by constitutional principle . 37 Likewise, several governors have sharply

limited the right of producers to ship goods outside their provinces, in direct contradiction of th e

federal constitution . 3 8

Conclusion

These brief illustrations suggest that if we seek to measure the jurisdictional aspect o f

federalism, in line with Riker's definition, there is no substitute for directly examining contro l

over discrete policy areas. Riker's concern that such an approach would be skewed by the

technologies associated with different policy areas can be addressed by working comparativel y

across the federation, examining how the same policy issues are handled in different regions .

We might then be able to directly evaluate whether those regions receiving distributiona l

privileges or claiming greater rights on paper were actually exercising real autonomy from th e

center .

In March 1996, I completed the first round of a survey or regional officials designed t o

measure "federalism" in this direct manner. In collaboration with Russian researchers at the

Russian Political Science Association, 116 employees of regional administrations in 48 region s

were asked about federal and regional roles in personnel appointments, budgetary, tax and trad e

policy, social policy, inter-regional cooperation, and regulation of education, media, an d

commerce. Respondents were also asked about mechanisms for resolving center-periphery

conflicts . The survey will be repeated annually (if possible) to track changes in regiona l

jurisdictional autonomy. Preliminary results of this first survey will be discussed in a subsequen t

report to the Council .

37 Tiumen' was initially granted control over 20% of its oil and gas output (Slider, "Federalism, Discord . . .," p . 251) .Sakha's control over it's gold output was reportedly hiked from 12-15%, and over diamonds from 20-25%, as theresult of a "secret" Yeltsin decree that accompanied tthe June 29 signing of a bilateral treaty between the republi cand Moscow (Reuters Textline, 25 July I995) .

38 Slider cites the case of Voronezh, which limited the export of 35 goods ("Federalism, Discord . . .," p . 251) . Lessblatantly, Ulianovsk oblast' guaranteed its citizens the lowest food prces in the federation by forcing manufacturer son its territory to sell the oblast' administration a share of their output at below-market prices ; these goods were the nbartered for basic foodstuffs, or sold to finance food subsidies . To insure that only Ulianovsk residents benefittedfrom this scheme, subsidized goods were strictly rationed by coupon . (Author's inteview with Gennadii Savinov .permanent representative of the Ulianovsk administration to the Russian President, November 1994) .

Solnick, "Defining and Measuring Federalism . . ." p . 1 5

Table la: "Winners" and "Losers" in Fiscal Policy, 1992 3 9(Republics in Boldface )

1992 Net Budget Flow 1992 per cap budget

per cap, KRbls) expend. (KRbls )

** "Winners" * *Sakha (83 .6)MagadanTiumen 'Kamchatk aSakhalinKareliaTatarsta nMurmanskBashkortosta nTuva (21 .5 )

Komi (-59)North OssetiaTuvaTatarsta nDagesta n

Irkutsk

KalmykiaKareliaBuriatiaKamchatka (-2 .4)

* *

Tiumen' (64 .9 )Samar aYaroslavl 'Moscow CityNizhnii NovgorodPerm'MagadanBelgoro d

Ul'ianovskKursk (14 .8)

"Losers" * *Chech-Ingush (5 )Stavropo lPenzaTver 'Moscow Ob lKalugaBryanskVoronezhKrasnodarKar.-Cherkessia (9 .8 )

"Sources : I995 figures from Aleksei Lavrov, "Why subsidized regions voted for the Communists," Rossiiskievesti, 10 April I996, p.III ; 1994 figures from Alexei Lavrov, "Russian Budget Federalism : First Steps, FirstResults," Segodnya 7 June I995 (FBIS-SOV-95-125-S) ; 1992 budget flows are from L . Smirniagin, "PoliticalFederalism versus Economic Federalism," Segodniia, 25 June 1993 p .2 (FBIS-USR-93-089 pp54-57) ; I992expenditure levels are from Philippe LeHouerou, "Decentralization and Fiscal Disparities Among Regions of theRussian Federation," EDP-138, The World Bank, January 1994 . 1992 Budget Flow figures are incomplete (missingAdygea, Birobijan, Khakassia, Altai Republic . Karachai-Cherkassia) . 1994 and 95 figures figures omit Chechnya;1995 figures also omit Ingushetia . These tables also omit the 10 Autonomous Okrugs and Birobijan, which tend t obe sparsely populated and are dually subordinated (to neighboring oblasts as well as the federal center) . TheAutonomous Okrugs merit a separate analysis .

Solnick. "Defining and Measuring Federalism . . . p . 1 6

Table lb: "Winners" and "Losers " in Fiscal Policy, 199 4(Republics in Boldface )

1994 Tax RetentionRate (percent)

1994 Net Budget Flowto Center (per cap ,

KRbls)

1994 Fed Share ofRegional Budge t (percent

)

** "Winners" **

** Low **

Sakha (100)

Tuva (-991)Karelia

Altai Repu bIngushetia

MagadanBashkortostan

IngushetiaDagestan

Kahnyki aTatarstan

DagestanTuva

Kamchatk aAltai Repub

Kabard .-BalkariaKabard .-Balkaria

North OssetiaKemerovo (82)

Kar.-Cherkessia (-246)

Sakha (1 )BashkortostanSverdloskNizhnii NovgorodSt .Petersburg cit ySamaraKrasnoiars kYaroslavl 'Tatarsta nCheliabinsk (10)

** "Losers" ** ** High * *

Yaroslavl' (52) Moscow City (724) Ingushetia (91 )Ul'ianovsk Samara DagestanSamara Yaroslavl' Altai RepubRyazan St.Petersburg Kalmyki aSt.Petersburg Sverdlosk TuvaPerm' Nizhnii Novgorod Kabardino-Balkari aMoscow Obl Krasnoiarsk North Osseti aNizhnii Novgorod Moscow Obl Karachai-Cherkessi aBelgorod Perm' AdygeaVladimir (60) Cheliabinsk (293) Magadan (54 )Komi (tie )Moscow City (tie)

Solnick . "Defining and Measuring Federalism . . ." p . 1 7

Table lc: "Winners" and "Losers " in Fiscal Policy, 199 5(Republics in Boldface )

1995 Tax Retention 1995 Net Budget Flow 1995 Fed Share ofRegional Budge tRate (percent) to Center per cap,

(percent )KRbls)

** "Winners" ** ** Low * *

Sakha (100) Tuva (-1245) Bashkortostan (0.2 )Dagestan Altai Repub St .Petersburg cityBuriatia Kalmykia TatarstanKabardino-Balkaria Dagestan KrasnoiarskTatarstan North Ossetia Nizhnii NovgorodKhakassia Kabardino-Balkaria LipetskTuva Kamchatka SamaraBashkortostan Sakha Sverdlos kKemerovo Mari-El Yaroslavl 'Kamchatka(74) Buriatia (-248) Ryazan

Cheliabinsk (4 )

** "Losers" ** ** High * *

Moscow Obl (51) Moscow City (2817) Tuva (79 )Nizhnii Novgorod Samara Altai Repu bSamara St .Petersburg city KalmykiaYaroslavl' Tomsk DagestanPerm' Yaroslavl' Karachai-Cherkessia

Moscow City Sverdlosk Kabardino-BalkariaSt .Petersburg city Perm' KostromaKalmykia Moscow Obl AdygeaSverdlosk Komi North OssetiaTomsk (57) Krasnoiarsk (1038) Altai Krai (39)

Solnick . "Defining and Measuring Federalism . .. p. 1 8

Table 2 : Bi-Variate Correlation Coefficients for Fiscal Measures ofFederalism40

VariablesFEDBUD95 TAXRET95 NETFLO95 I FEDBUD94

TAXRET94 NETFLO94 NETFLO92

FOOD94Price of 19-good foo d

basket (8/94, Russian Fe d= 100)

.06 .34** - .10

.002 .17 - .22 - .07

RESTRUC93% of enterprises slated fo r

privatization that hadreorganized by 10/93

.06 - .08 - .10

.02 - .11 - .07 .1 5

FEDBUD95Federa1 Share of Regional

Budget (1995 . %)

.47** -.57**

.95** .57** - .58** -.39**

TAXRET95

Share of total 1995 taxesretained by each region

-

I

- .56**

- .49** - .77** - .28** -.30**

- - .56** -.34** .64** .36* *NETFLO95Net Interbudetary Flow t oMoscow (1995 . per cap )

FEDBUD94Federal Share of Regiona 1

Budget (1994 . %)

.57** -.53** -36**

TAXRET94Share of total 1994 taxesretained by each region

- - .34** -.39**

- .38* *NETFLO94Net Interbudetary Flow toMoscow (1994 . per cap)

-NETFLO92Net Interbudetary Flow toMoscow (1992 . per cap)

* Signif at < .05

** Signif at < .0 I

40 Sources : For budget indicators, see notes to Table 1 . Food prices are from Sotsio-ekonomicheskoe polozhenieRossii, lanv .-Sen. 1994 (Roskomstat, I994) . Privatization indicators are from Darrell Slider, "Privatization inRussia's Regions," Post-Soviet Affairs v.I0, n .4 (I994) . Coefficients are Pearsons, 2-tailed .

Solnick. "Defining and Measuring Federalism . . . p.1 9

Table3:Federation Subjects Signing Bilateral Treaties with theCenter41

Bashkortostan

3 Au ' 94North Osseti aSakha- -

' BuriatiaUdmurtiaKaliningrad obl.

Sverdlovsk obi .Krasnodar krai

30 Jan 96Orenburg obl . 30 Jan 96

3 Komi

20 Mar 96Khabarovsk krai

23 Mar 9529 Jun 95 -11 Jul 9517 Oct 9512 Jan 9612 Jan 96

24 April 96

41 Source : Russian press reports .

* The treaty with Orenburg was preceded by an intergovernmental agreement signed on December 11, 1995, i nadvance of the Duma elections . The agreement was signed by Prime Minsiter Chernomyrdin, whose political base i sin Orenburg .