The Napoleonic Wars: A Watershed in Spanish History? Leandro … · 2018-04-24 · 2 Introduction...
Transcript of The Napoleonic Wars: A Watershed in Spanish History? Leandro … · 2018-04-24 · 2 Introduction...
European
Historical
Economics
Society
EHES WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMIC HISTORY | NO. 130
The Napoleonic Wars: A Watershed in Spanish History?
Leandro Prados de la Escosura
Universidad Carlos III and CEPR
Carlos Santiago-Caballero
Universidad Carlos III
APRIL 2018
EHES Working Paper | No. 130|April 2018
The Napoleonic Wars: A Watershed in Spanish History?*
Leandro Prados de la Escosura
Universidad Carlos III and CEPR
Carlos Santiago-Caballero
Universidad Carlos III
Abstract
The Napoleonic Wars had dramatic consequences for Spain’s economy. The Peninsular War had higher
demographic impact than any other military conflict, including civil wars, in the modern era. Farmers
suffered confiscation of their crops and destruction of their main capital asset, livestock. The shrinking
demand, the disruption of international and domestic trade, and the shortage of inputs hampered industry
and services. The loss of the American colonies, a by-product of the French invasion, seriously harmed
absolutism. In the long run, however, the Napoleonic Wars triggered the dismantling of Ancien Régime
institutions and interest groups. Freed from their constraints, the country started a long and painful
transition towards the liberal society. The Napoleonic Wars may be deemed, then, a watershed in
Spanish history.
JEL classification: E02, F54, N13, N43
Keywords: Napoleonic Wars, Peninsular War, Spain, Institutional Change, Growth.
*We gratefully acknowledge participants in the Waterloo Network and, in particular, its convenor, Patrick O’Brien, Jaime Reis,
and Alejandra Irigoin, for their comments and suggestions.
Notice
The material presented in the EHES Working Paper Series is property of the author(s) and should be quoted as such.
The views expressed in this Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the EHES or
its members
2
Introduction
TheNapoleonicWarsareusuallydepictedasamajorjunctureinEuropean
history.Historians’assessmentsofthePeninsularWar(1808-1814)tendtoemphasise
itsnegativeimpact.Inthisessay,wesurveytheshort-termeffectsofwarbutlookalso
atitslongrunconsequences.TheFrenchinvasionhadsevereconsequencesforthe
economyofSpainintheshortrun.TheactionsofFrenchandAlliedarmieshada
higherdemographicimpact,largerthananyothermilitaryconflict,includingcivilwars,
inSpanishmodernhistory.Confiscationsofcropsanddestructionoflivestockhindered
agriculture,whileshrinkingdemand,disruptedtrade,andinputsshortagehampered
industryandservices.Moreover,thelossoftheAmericanmainlandcolonies,aby-
productoftheFrenchinvasion,severelyharmedabsolutism,challengingitsviability.In
thelongrun,however,theNapoleonicWarscontributedtotheremovalofAncien
Régimeinstitutionsandinterestgroups.Asthecountryfreedfromtheirconstraints,a
farfromsmoothtransitiontowardsaliberalsocietywasinitiated.TheNapoleonic
Warsmaybedeemed,then,awatershedinSpanishhistory.
I.Theshort-runimpact
TheinvasionofSpainbytheNapoleonicarmieswasinitiallyapeacefulprocess
thattookplacewiththecompleteagreementoftheSpanishauthorities.1However,as
soonasNapoleonforcedCharlesIV’sabdication,insurrectionbrokeup,startingin
Asturiasandquicklyspreadingthroughoutthecountry.Bythen,Napoleonhadalready
stationedlargecontingentsofsoldiersinkeypointsofSpainandwasreadytoface
Spanishandalliedforcesintheupcomingwar.Howlargewasthedamageinflictedon
theeconomy?Thedirecteffectsofthewararehardtoreckon.Inthefollowing
paragraphswewillsurveyitsimpactondifferentsocialandeconomicdimensions.
1OnMarch16th1808,CharlesIVissuedaproclamation,“Breathcalmly:knowthatthearmyofmygoodallytheemperoroftheFrenchpassesthroughmykingdomwithideasofpeaceandfriendship.Itspurposeismovingtothepointsthreatenedbyanenemylanding…”(QueipodeLlano,2008:1202).
3
Population
LossesduetomilitaryoperationsinSpain,amajorbattlegroundofthe
NapoleonicWars,havebeenestimatedaround300,000(Urlanis,1971),probablya
figureonthehighside.Mostofthecasualtiestookplace,however,amongthecivilian
population.Theconfiscationoffood,theviolenceofNapoleonicandAlliedarmies,and
thespreadofdiseases,aslargecontingentsofsoldiersmovingalloverthecountry,
wereitsmaincauses.Thereareabundantexamples.IntheshireofValdeorras,only
oneninthoftheSpanishcasualtiesweremilitary(Canales,2017).Frenchtroops
followedaveryclearstrategyindealingwithlocalresistance,namelybloodbathand
terrortoavoidfurtherinsurrections.Afterthesiege,Zaragozawascompletely
destroyedand54,000peoplelosttheirlives(Gates,1987:129).Equallybrutalwerethe
siegesofBadajoz,CiudadRodrigoorthecompletedestructionofSanSebastianatthe
handsoftheAlliedforces.
Figure1:MonthlyMortalityintheCitiesofAlbaceteandAvila,1807-1816(Jan-Dec1807=100)Source:Santiago-Caballero(2017).
Howtheviolenceexertedoncivilianpopulationsincreasedmortalityratescan
beexemplifiedbycomparingthecasesofAvila,whereresistancetotheFrenchtroops
wasmoderate,andAlbacete,sackedseveraltimesduringthewarasoccupationwas
4
resisted(Figure1).WhileinÁvilamortalityremainedatthesamelevelbeforeand
afterthewar,exceptduringthesecondoccupationbytheFrencharmyin1812-13,in
Albacete,mortalityincreasedbymorethan50percentin1808-09and1811-13.2
Thenegativeeffectsofthewarwerealsoclearinthemarriagestrategiesofthe
populationinAlbaceteandAvila.Figure2showstheevolutionofmarriagesinboth
citiesbetween1801and1819.Therapidincreaseduringthefirstyearsofthecentury
sufferedasuddenstopfollowedbyareversalatthebeginningofthewarwiththe
numberofmarriagesdecreasingby35percentbetween1808and1814.Figure2also
showstheimportanceofthewarindirectmid-termeffectsasthereductionoffertility,
aconsequenceofyoungmalecasualties.
Figure2:MarriagesintheCitiesofAlbaceteandAvila,1801-19(5-yearmovingave.1801=100)Source:Santiago-Caballero(2017).
Moresignificantare,perhaps,thelossesresultingfromdeviationsfromthe
demographictrend.Fraser(2006)suggestedthatSpain’spotentialpopulation
decreasedbyaround0.8millioninhabitantsduringthefirstfifteenyearsofthe
nineteenthcentury,althoughthecasualtiesofthewardidnotexceed375,000.
Canales(2017)reckonsthatexcessmortalityreached0.6millionduring1809-13.Such2AsSánchezAlbornoz(1911)wrote,“duringthisperiodwhenmostoftheSpanishcitiesadorntheirhistorywithheroicdeeds,notasingleoneiscarriedoutintheAvilaoftheLoyalistsandtheKnights,asingleactthatwouldmadetheAvulensesofthattimeworthydescendantsofthehidalgosfrommedievalAvila”.
5
figuresarenotfarapartfromcontemporaryestimatessuggestinganoverallwartollof
aboutonemillion(MuñozMaldonado,1833).PérezMoreda(1985,2010)considers
thisfigureplausible,provideditincludestheeffectsofthesubsistencecrisisof
1803/05onthenumberofbirths.Thus,addingupdirectcasualtiesandlossesresulting
fromexcessmortalityatotallossofnearlyonemillioncanbeputforward.
Figure3:MortalityinSpanishRegions,1800-1815(1800-1815=100).Source:Canales(2017)
Theregionalconsequencesofthewarwereunevenlydistributed.Inthesouth
andtheinterior,mostoftheincreaseinmortalitytookplacebeforethewar,asa
resultofthesubsistencecrisisof1803/05,whileitwasintheperipherywherethe
effectswereconsiderablylargerduringtheconflict,particularlyinCataloniaandthe
northernregions(Figure3).Madridwasespeciallyhitin1812,asconsequenceofthe
hungerproducedbythelowharvestsof1811andthesupplydifficultiesproblems
duringthewar(Fraser,2006:203).Thus,thoseregionsthathadalreadyexperienceda
significantpopulationcontractionduringtheprevioussubsistencecrisissuffereda
milderdemographicimpactduringthePeninsularWar.
6
Agriculture
ThePeninsularWarhaddeepandwidespreadeffectsontheagriculturalsector.
PlunderingandconfiscationsbyFrenchandAlliedarmiesimposedaconsiderabletoll
onproducers.ThewaralsoaffectedAncienRégimeinstitutionsthathadconditioned
thesecularbehaviouroffarmersandpeasants.
NapoleonictroopsreliedonsuppliesfromFrancetocarryouttheirmilitary
operations,butguerrillaattackstosupplylinesforcedrequisitionsfromlocal
producers(Gates,1987:41).TheBritishexpeditionaryforcealsoreliedonrequisitions
thoughpromisedtopayfortheexpropriatedgoods.3
Confiscationsoflivestockwereparticularlysignificantandhadtwomain
effects,namely,thelossofasourceofproteinsconsumption,astheamountofmeat
anddairyproductsconsumedbythepopulationfell,andthereductionthecapital
stockusedforploughingandtransportationthatsurelyhadalongerimpact.War
taxationalsohadaconfiscatoryeffect.InCatalonia,forexample,theFrench
administrationcollectedmorethan100millionRealesthatwerepaidbysellingland
andlivestock.
ThewaralsoimpactedontheAncienRégimeinstitutions.Forexample,the
tithe,areligioustaxthat,inprinciple,represented10percentoftotalproduction,was
repealed.Moreover,municipallawsrestrictinglandcultivationstoppedbeingenforced
duringthewar.Sincetheearlyeighteenthcentury,demographicexpansiondemand
hadbeenmetbyincreasingagriculturalproductionattheextensivemargin(Santiago-
Caballero,2013).RelaxingcontrolsduringtheFrenchoccupationintensifiedthistrend
(LlopisAgelán,2010).
Inaddition,desamortización,namely,confiscationandpublicsaleofland
propertyofreligiousandcommunalinstitutions,tookplaceduringJosephBonaparte’s
ruleinordertofinancetheFrencharmy(RuedaHernanz,1997).Althoughthearea
affectedwaslimitedandconfiscationwaspartiallyrevertedafterthewar,the
3However,thiscompensationwasoftenfutile,astheownerhadtotraveltoLisbonandveryoftenwaitforweekstoreceivethemoney,somanyofthemsoldthebillstointermediarieswhoboughtthematconsiderableratesofdiscount(Fraser,2006:761).
7
transformationofcommonsandchurchlandsintoprivatepropertywasirreversible.
Thiswasnotthefirstepisodeofdisentailment,however,asaprevious
desamortizaciónhadtakenplacein1798,asawayoffundingthewarsagainstthe
FrenchRepublicandtheUnitedKingdom(Herr,1971,1989).
Assessingtheimpactofwaronagriculturalproductionpresentsachallenge.
Historiansoftenusetithepaymentstodrawtrendsinoutputbutitspaymentbecame
erraticand,insomecases,non-existentduringthePeninsularWar(Álvarez-Nogalet
al.,2016).Ademandfunctionapproachprovidesanalternativeestimateofagricultural
consumptionperheadover1780-1820(Figure4).Aseverecontractionisobserved
duringthewarfollowedbyaquickrecovery.
Figure4:RealAgriculturalConsumptionperHead,1780-1820[1790/99=100)Source:Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura(2013)
Outputinpreindustrialagriculturewashighlydependentonclimateconditions
andtheNapoleonicWarsbelongtoaperiodofclimaticinstability.TheMaldáAnomaly
oroscillation,thatincreasedsimultaneouslydroughtsandfloods,coincidedwiththe
firstDaltonMinimum-aphaseoflowsolarradiationbetween1790and1830-,andthe
eruptionoftheTamboravolcanoin1815,thatroseatmosphericCO2concentration,
8
bringingwithithighclimaticirregularityandhydrologicextremes.Theseclimatic
anomalieswerematchedbyintenseoutputfluctuations(BarriendosandLlasat,2003;
Barrera-EscodaandLlasat,2015).
Figure5showsagriculturaloutputandseasonalrainfallanomalies–namely,
yearlydeviationsfromthehistoricalaveragerelativetothestandarddeviation-.An
inverseassociationbetweenoutputandrainfallvariationscanbepredicated,withwet
periodsassociatedtonegativeoutputfluctuations.
Figure5:AgriculturalOutputandPrecipitationAnomalies1500-1855.Sources:Agriculturaloutput,Álvarez-Nogaletal.(2016);Precipitation,Rodrigoetal.(1999).
Theexogenousshockbroughtbythewarandclimaticanomaliesimpactedon
thereturnstofactorsofproduction.Theextensionoflandundercultivationdepressed
landrents,thatfellbynearly50percentbetween1808and1812andneverre-gained
pre-warlevels(Figure6).Realwagessufferedamoreintensereductionduringthewar
butreturnedtopre-warlevelsby1817.
9
Figure6:RealLandRentandWageRates,1780-1820(1790/99=100)Source:Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura(2013)
Figure7:InequalityTrends:RealLandRent/WageRateratio,1780-1820(1790/99=100)Source:Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura(2013)
10
Comparinglandrentsandrealwagesalsohelpustodrawtrendsinincome
distribution.Therationaleisthataslandismoreunevenlydistributedthanlabourand
averagereturnsusuallyhigherforlandownersthanforworkers,thelandrent-wage
ratioprovidesameasureofchangesinincomeinequality.Adecliningtendencysince
1800isobservedthattheendofthewardidnotrevert,exceptfortwopeaksduring
thepre-warsubsistencecrisis(1804)andinthePeninsularWar(1812)(Figure7).
Industry
Theeffectsofwarontheindustrialsectorincludedthereductionofinternal
andexternaldemand,scarcityofinputs,andheavytaxation.Inaddition,producers
facedunrestrictedcompetitionofFrenchandBritishgoods.
Forexample,inthewoollenfactoryofAstudillo,oneofthemaincentresof
textileproductioninOldCastile,thepriceofwoolmorethantripledbetween1808and
1814.Therequisitionofanimalsandtheincreaseoftransportcostswereprobably
behindthesechanges,whiletheinvasionofcommonmunicipallandsandtheirusefor
cultivationalsoreducedtheavailablepasturestofeedsheep.Producerswereforced
tocutdownpricesandprofitmargins(HernándezGarcía,2004:171).
Figure8:InputsBoughtbyErasmodeGómina’sCottonTextileCompany(1802-04=100)Source:Sánchez(2010)
11
Inthecaseofthecottonindustry,mainlylocatedinCatalonia,inputsscarcity
severelyrestrictedproduction.Forexample,ErasmodeGómina’sfactoryinBarcelona
interruptedinputspurchases(cottonanddyes)duringthePeninsularWar(Figure8).
HeaviertaxationtofinancethewareffortbybothFrenchandAlliedauthorities
drainedresourcesfromproductiveactivitiesandreducedincentivesforeconomic
activity.InAstudillo,textileproducerswerechargedwithadditionaltaxesforthecity
topaytheFrenchinvaders(HernándezGarcía,2004:162).InMurcia,aftertheFrench
tookthecityonApril25th1810,GeneralSebastianiobtainedaransomof34,560
Realesfornotsackingthecitythatwasmainlypaidbylocalbusinesses(Melendreras
Gimeno,2000:64).
Theso-calledRoyalFactories(RealesFábricas)alsosufferedtheeffectsofthe
warandneverrecovered.Theyhadbeenestablishedtoreducetheimportationof
valuablegoodssuchasporcelain,glass,andfinetextilesandtoupgradethe
technologiesusedbylocalproducers(LaForce,1965).However,theirimpactremained
limitedandtheypracticallyceasedtoexistaftertheendofthePeninsularWar(Benaul
andSánchez,2004).TheRoyalFactorieswerealsoanobjectiveforbothsides,likethe
factoryofPorcelaininMadridthatwascompletelydestroyedbyEnglishtroopsbefore
leavingthecapitalin1812(MartínezCaviró,1973).
Althoughtheimmediateeffectsofthewarwereprobablysimilaracross
industries,whiletraditionalindustriescollapsed,modernindustriescontinuedtoadopt
newtechnologies.Therecovery,however,wasnotimmediateandintheCatalan
cottonindustrypre-war(1783-97)nominallevelsofinvestmentwereonlymetinthe
1830s(Sánchez,2000:502).
Anadditionalproblemfordomesticindustrybroughtbythewarwasahigh
levelofsmuggling.Netimportsexperiencedexponentialgrowthduringthewar,and
one-thirdweresmuggledthroughGibraltarandPortugal(cottontextilesandtobacco,
inparticular)(Figure9).Inaddition,theNapoleonicauthoritiesallowedFrenchtraders
tofloodSpainwithFrenchproducts.
12
Figure9:SpanishNetImportsfromtheRestoftheWorld(excl.SpanishAmerica),1783-1820:withandwithoutSmuggling(0001808Reales)Source:PradosdelaEscosura(1993)
Trade
Oneofthemostobviouseffectsofthewarwastheimmediatedisruptionof
bothinternalandinternationaltrade.Marketshadgraduallyintegratedduringthe
eighteenthcenturyasthefallofthepricedifferentialforwheatbetweencoastaland
interiorregionssuggests(LlopisAgelán,2010)(Figure10).Thewarprovokeda
reversal,andthereturntopre-PeninsularWarlevelsofintegrationhadtowaituntil
themid-nineteenthcentury(PeñaandSánchez-Albornoz,1983).Marketdisintegration
provednegativeforeconomicactivitybyincreasingtransportcostsandrestrictingthe
supplyofgoodstourbancentres(Ringrose,1970,1983).
Transportcostsincreasednotonlyduetorisinginsecuritybutalsobecauseof
theshortageofmanpower.Muleteerslargelycarriedoutinternaltrade,shortandmid-
distance,inparticular.FrenchandAlliedarmiesforcedmuleteerstosupplythem
reducing,therefore,regulartransportservices(Ros,1999:195).Furthermore,
13
guerrillas’confiscationofgrainsupplies,aswasthecaseofthoseaimedforMadridin
1813(Fraser,2006:697),providedanadditionalconstraintontrade.
Figure10:Marketintegration:averagewheatpricedifferentials(%) Source:LlopisAgelán(2010)
Internationaltradeincreasedduringtheeighteenthcentury,promoting
monetisationandmarketorientationatatimeofexpandingpopulationandrisingland
rents.ThistrendsufferedareversalduringtheNapoleonicWars.Fromthebeginning
ofthewarwithBritaininOctober1796,Spainmaintainedalmostnolinkwiththe
coloniesformorethantwodecades.TheFrenchinvasioncontractedtradefurtherand
triggeredthestruggleforindependenceinSpanishAmerica(GrafeandIrigoin,2012:
368).
Tradefelldramaticallyafterthewarbrokein1797,brieflyrecoveringafterthe
Amienspeace(1802)andshrankagainaswarresumed(1805-1808)(Figure11a).The
breakupofthePeninsularWarreducedrealdomesticexportsagain,thatreacheda
troughin1812,andkeptrealre-exportsatminimumlevels.Netimports,thatis,
retainedfordomesticconsumption,recoveredduringthewar(1809-11),largelydueto
allies’supplies,andexperiencedsteadydeclinethereafter.Relativetothesizeofthe
economy,thecontractionofthetradesectorisevenmoredramatic,withdomestic
exportsandnetimportsfallingafter1802andre-exportssince1793(Figure11b).
14
Figure11a:RealDomesticExports,NetImports,andRe-exports,1778-1820(1808Reales).Sources:Trade,PradosdelaEscosura(1993);GDP,Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura2013)
Figure11b:TradeShares:DomesticExports,NetImports,andRe-exports,1778-1820(%GDP)Sources:Trade,PradosdelaEscosura(1993);GDP,Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura(2013)
15
TradewithSpanishAmericancoloniesstimulatedindustryandservices,helped
byprotectionistlegislationthatmadeSpanishmanufacturesartificiallycompetitive.
Industrialexports,concentratedinafewsectors,textilesandfood-whichrepresented
morethanhalfofexportvaluein1792apeakyearininternationaltrade(36.6and
22.3%)-andpaperandiron(4.4and3.2%),andwereassociatedwithsomeexternal
economiesintheirregionsoforigin.Shipbuildinganditsassociateactivities(iron,
cordage,andtimberindustries)expanded,favouredbySpanishnavigationlaws.It
couldbesuggestedthat,atmost,exportsofdomesticmanufacturestothecolonies
madea5%contributiontoindustrialvalueaddedbeforetheNapoleonicWars(Prados
delaEscosura,1993).
Thecompositionofcolonialtradesuggeststhatthepossibilityofincreasing
productionbyreallocatingresourceswassmall,andthatmostgainspossiblyresulted
fromchangingconsumptionpatterns.By1792,over60%ofretainedimportsconsisted
ofcocoaandsugar.Furthermore,Spain'sdependenceonthecoloniesforraw
materialswasverysmall(rawcottonanddyestuffsonlyrepresented4%ofretained
importsin1792)(PradosdelaEscosura1993).Sincethesecolonialproductscould
havebeenacquiredoninternationalmarkets,gainsfromcolonialtradewouldonly
occurif,givencolonialrule,Spainacquiredthesamecommoditiesatlowerprices.
Furthermore,itcouldbesuggestedthatthelowdependenceoncolonialrawmaterials
providesameasureoftheweaknessofdomesticmanufacturing.IntheCatalancotton
textileindustry,Europeancottonyarnimportsweremoreimportantthancolonialraw
cottonimports,suggestinghowweakthespinningindustrywasatthetime.
Thesubsequentdeclineindomesticexports(one-fourthbetween1784/96and
1815/20)canbeattributedalmostexclusivelytothefallincolonialcommerce(which
shrankby60%).Theconsequencewastheendofthelong-standingequilibrium
distributionofdomesticexportsbetweenthecoloniesandEurope(roughlyone-third
andtwo-thirds,respectively),andtheestablishmentofanewdistributionthat
continuedthroughoutthenineteenthcentury(withforeignmarketsabsorbingfour-
fifths).Retainedimportsofcolonialgoodsfordomesticconsumption(whichhad
representedone-fifthoftotalretainedimports)fellto15%,butthiswasoffsetby
importsfromEurope.Thecollapseoftradewiththeempirewasparticularlysignificant
16
forservices(financial,insurance,transportation),asisrevealedbythecontractionof
realtotalre-exportsto40%ofthepre-warleveland,forthosetoLatinAmericaby
three-fourthsbetween1784/96and1815/20.TheSpanishbalanceoftradealsofelt
theeffectsofcolonialindependence.Beforethelossofempire,Spainhadadeficiton
currentaccountwithforeigncountriesthatwasbalancedbyacorrespondingsurplusin
colonialtrade.Withcolonialemancipationthisbalancingmechanismdisappeared,
withdeflationaryconsequencesforthedomesticeconomy.Fortunately,afavourable
termsoftrade–resultingfromanimprovementvis-à-visEurope,morethanmatching
adeteriorationwithrespecttothecolonies--increasedthepurchasingpowerperunit
ofexportsbynearly40%between1784/96and1815/20,allowingSpaintoavoid
furtherdeteriorationinthecurrentaccountbalance.
AroughestimateoftherealcosttoSpainofthelossofhercoloniescanbe
attempted,makingassumptionsfavourabletothegenerallyacceptedviewthatthe
losswassignificant(PradosdelaEscosura,1993).Thefirstassumptionisthatthe
productiveresourcesembodiedinexportablesdidnothavealternativeusesinthe
domesticeconomy.Asimilarassumptionismaderegardingtheservices(shipping,
insurance,mercantile)providedbySpanishsubjectsinthecolonialtrade.Incontrastto
thenon-colonialtrade,almosttotallycarriedonnon-Spanishships,Spanishcolonial
legislationensuredthatthecolonialtradeusedonlynationalshipping.Therefore,with
thedeclineofSpanishAmericantrade,adeclineinSpanishmaritimeservicesclosely
followed.Thelossinstaterevenuesduetothecessationofpreciousmetalshipments,
andthereductionofcustomsdutiesresultingfromcolonialindependence,werealso
takenintoaccount,theassumptionbeingthatpublicrevenuesfromthecolonieswere
productivelyusedinthedomesticeconomy.TheupperboundestimateofSpanish
lossesimpliedbytheseassumptionswasnotmorethan6%ofnationalincome.And
whileitcouldbearguedthattheprofitsfromcolonialtraderepresentedahigh
proportionofthefundsusedtofinanceinvestmentinSpain,anupperboundestimate
oftheircontributionmadetototalcapitalformationisbelow15%by1784/96.These
results,derivedwithinastaticframework,areconsistentwithPalma’s(2016)who,
usingadynamicmodelfindsthatintercontinentaltraderaisedrealwagesand
urbanizationby6.2%and3.9%,relativelylowfiguresinEuropeanperspective.
17
Finance
Inadditiontothecontractionofexternalpublicrevenues(customsrevenues
plusIndies’remittances),asaresultofthesharpdeclineofinternationalandcolonial
trade,thePeninsularWarrepresentedthecollapseofallgovernmentrevenuestoone-
fifthofpre-bellum(1784-96)levelandtoaboutone-tenthofitsrelativesize(Figure
12).
However,between1808and1815,theBritishGovernmentmadeadvancesto
theSpanishauthoritiesinmoney,weapons,andsuppliesthatpartlyoffsetthefallin
publicrevenues.Thus,Spainreceived7.8millionSterlingassubsidypaymentsfrom
Britain(Sherwig,1969:362-8),alargerfigurethanthe5.2millionofficiallyestimated
(ParliamentaryPapers,1854XXXIX(469)).Spainneverrepaidthesesubsidies,
however,aswerecondonedinthepeacetreaties.
Figure12.TheEvolutionofPublicRevenues,1778-1820[MillionReales,1808prices)Source:PradosdelaEscosura(1993)
Thewaralsointroduceddistortionsinthemonetarysystem.Forexample,it
providedtheFrenchoccupationalauthoritieswithanopportunitytoextractprecious
metalsfromSpainviamonetarymanipulations.Frenchcurrencywasallowedto
18
circulateandtobeacceptedforpaymentsinSpain.AnadhocCommissionestablished
exchangeratesthatassignedthesamepurchasingpowertoFrenchcoinswithlower
intrinsicmetalliccontentthanSpanishones.Onaverage,thedifferentialwasabout10
percentforthemostcommonlyusedcoins(Vadillo,1846).Asaconsequence,in
occupiedterritoriesSpanishcoindisappearedandonlyFrenchcurrencycirculated
(QueipodeLlano,2010:1136).ThesituationwasnoteasilyreversedandFrenchcoins
werekeptincirculationafterthewar(Sardá,1948).The‘monetaryinvasion’notonly
impliedalossofsilver,butalsocontributedtomacroeconomicinstability.
Summingup
ThePeninsularWarhaddeepandnegativeeconomicconsequencesinSpain.
ThedemographicdirectandindirectimpactrepresentedadisasterforSpain,withthe
populationfallingonemillionshortofitspotentialanditsdirecteffectrepresenting
halfamillioncasualties,around5percentofthepopulation,morethandoublingthe
relativelossinthe1936-39CivilWar,andbecoming,hence,thebloodiestconflictin
Spain’smodernhistory.Theshort-termeffectsofwarinagriculturewereambiguous.
Onthepositiveside,thelackofenforcementofAncienRégimeinstitutions,including
avoidingthepaymentoftithes,allowproducerstoincreasecultivationandpaylower
landrents.Onthenegativeside,confiscationshitlivestockand,therefore,thestockof
capital.Thewarafflictedtheindustrialsectorindifferentways.Impoverished
populationreduceditsconsumption,militaryoperationsincreasedtransportcostsand
inputprices,andheaviertaxesdivertedcapitalfromproductiveinvestment.Services
werealsodisrupted;tradeinparticular,withinternationalexperiencedadramatic
collapse.Governmentrevenuescollapsedandtheoutflowofsilverhadadeflationary
impactontheeconomy.Asaconsequence,GDPperheadfellduringthePeninsular
Waranditsdeclinewasonlysurpassedbytheseveresubsistencecrisisof1803/05
(Figure13),eventhoughitseffectswereveryunevenlydistributedbeingthe
peripheralregionsthemoreafflictedones.
19
Figure13.RealGDPperhead,1780-1820[1790/99=100)Source:Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura(2013)
ThePeninsularWaralsosparkedthefightforindependenceinSpanishAmerica
andtheirinstitutionalconsequenceswerefarfromnegligible.Theempire
strengthenedabsolutistmonarchy.Colonialrevenuesallowedtheriseofastrong
politicalcentre,whichconcentratedpowerwithoutbeingdrawnintoextensive
bargainingwithitsmoreprominentsubjectsandinstitutions(YunCasalilla,1998).Prior
totheNapoleonicWars,Crownrevenuesofcolonialorigin(includingthesurplusfrom
colonialchestsandthosederivedfromcustomsduties)representedone-fourthofthe
total(Cuenca,1981),reducingthestateneedtoincreasetaxationonthemetropolis
population.Thus,itcanbearguedthatthecolonialempirehelpedtoconsolidateand
stabilisetraditionalinstitutionsandstructuresofpower.Theemancipationofthe
Americancoloniescontributed,therefore,totheendoftheAncienRegime(Fontana,
1991),andopenedthewaytotheliberalrevolution.
20
II.TheLiberalRevolution
Theliberalrevolutionbroughtwithitaredefinitionofpropertyrightsthatchangedthe
populationstatusfromsubjectstocitizensequalbeforethelaw,theliberalizationof
commodityandfactormarkets,andtheParliamentarycontrolofpublicrevenuesand
expenditure.Itwas,nonetheless,alongprocessfraughtwithdifficultiesandpartial
reversals.
Animportantstepintheredefinitionofpropertyrightswasthecreationofthe
modernCodeofCommercein1829,whichconcentratedallthefiguresincommercial
mattersinasinglelegalinstrumentandprovidedjudgeswithaunifiedlegalframework
tooperate,reducinguncertaintyandtransactioncosts.TheCodeofCommerce,the
creationoftheBankofSanFernando,andtheestablishmentofthestockmarketin
Madridin1831,providedtheinstitutionaltransformationofthefinancialsystem
(Tedde,1994;Artola,1983:307).
Anotherstepregardedintellectualproperty.Afterashort-livedapatentactin
1820,thelegislationthatregulatedinnovationspropertyrightswasintroducedin1826
(SáizGonzález,1995:90).Thenumberofpatentsrosesteadily,especiallybetween
1843and1864(SaizGonzález,1996:14).
Theliberalizationofcommodityandfactormarketsimpliedmajorchanges.The
gradualsuppressionofthereligioustax,thetithe,increaseddisposableincome.The
tithewashalvedin1821,andthoughformallyabolishedin1837,thefinancial
constraintsduringtheFirstCarlistWardelayeditsdefinitiveeliminationuntil1841.
Furthermore,in1834,theinternalmarketforprimaryproductswasliberalisedand
taxesontheexportationofgrainsexportssuppressed(Artola,1983:297.
Theguildsthatrestrictedparticipationofnon-affiliatesandwomeninindustrial
activitieswerealsosuppressed.In1813theCadizParliamentaryAssembly(Cortes)
decreedthatestablishingafactoryorcarryingoutanindustriousactivitydidnot
requiredthepreviousapproval,ormembership,ofanyguild(RealDecreto8thJune
1813).However,in1814,theabsolutistgovernmentrepealedthedecree,andthe
21
eliminationofguildsprivilegeswasonlyeffectivesincethemid-1830s(R.D.20th
January1834and6thDecember1836).
Theliberalizationofthelandmarketincludedtheeliminationofmayorazgo(an
institutionthatcontemplatedthepossibilityofaddingnewassets,butwhoseproperty
couldnotbealienatedordistributedininheritance)andthedisentailmentofland,
(desamortización),thatimpliedtheconfiscationandsaleofecclesiastical,communal,
andpublicland.Thechangefrommayorazgoandentailedpropertytoabsolute
propertyreducedtransactioncosts,increasedtheamountoflandinthemarket,and
providedanincentiveforitsexploitation.Thedesamortizaciónwasalsomotivatedby
government’sneedtoincreaseitsrevenues.While‘old’taxesdisappeared,broadening
thefiscalbasewasdifficult,-asthedelayed1845fiscalreformsuggests-,atatimeof
raisingdemandforpublicservicesamongthenewcitizens(Tedde,1994;Comín,1988,
1990).
Thenewlandpropertyrightsimpliedtheabolitionoftheprivilegesenjoyedby
theMesta.Theseprivilegeshadimposedseverelimitationsontheabilityof
landownerstoenclosetheirproperties(GarcíaMartín,1988:123).Thelawspassedin
1813,andreinstatedin1834,explicitlyallowinglandenclosuresandreinforcingthe
owners’propertyrights.
Theredefinitionoflandpropertyrightswasfarfromasmoothprocess.For
example,ithasbeenarguedthattheuppernobilitytookadvantageofaweakstateto
transformtheirjurisdictionalrightsovergiventerritoriesintolandrights,implyingthe
expropriationoftheirlegitimateowners,thelocalpeasants(Moxó,1965).
Astreamoftheliteraturehasclaimedthatthedisentailmentdidnotchange
thestructureoflandpropertyasonlythealreadyaffluentcouldaffordbuyingnew
property(Herr,1971,1989).Acarefulassessmentofawideliteratureleads,
nonetheless,tomixedresults,aspropertybecamemorewidespreadinsomeregions
butnoinothers(RuedaHernanz,1985,1997).
Recently,theviewthattheabsolutepropertyoflandbroughtbytheliberal
revolutionledtoefficiencygains(GarcíaSanz,1985)hasbeenchallengedbysome
22
historianswhoarguethattheeliminationofcommunalpropertyrepresentedaheavy
blowtopeasants’livingstandards,asitonlybenefittedasmallelitewhilelocal
communitieswereunderminedbymarketincentives(BeltránTapia,2015).The
negativeassessmentoftheliberalreformshasaforerunnerintheviewthathavingto
paytaxesincashandsellingtheiroutputinthemarket,atatimeofdeflation,made
peasantsworseoff(Fontana,1978;Torras,1976).Supportfortheanti-liberal(Carlist)
reactionbypeasantsandlownobility,seemstohavebeenfuelledbytheuncertainty
ofpropertyrightsandthelackofpublicgoods(pósitos4,hospitals,etc.)thatthechurch
andotherinstitutionshadprovidedintheAncienRégime,andthenewliberalregime
couldnolongerafford,asgovernmentrevenueswereusuallybehindexpenditures.
Wecould,therefore,concludethattheinstitutionalchangesthatstartedwith
andfollowedthePeninsularWarwerepartoftheliberalreforms.Waractedasa
catalystforthedevelopmentofliberaleconomicpolicies,evenunderabsolutistrule.
Theconsequenceswerenewpropertyrights,reducedinformationandtransaction
costs,andincomere-distribution.
III.Thelong-runimpact
Sofarthefocushasbeenontheshort-termconsequencesoftheNapoleonic
Wars.However,thelongrunconsequences,largelyneglectedbyhistorians,deserve
consideration.Aglanceatthepost-NapoleonicWarserarevealsadistinctive
behaviour,whencomparedtothepre-warera,foranydimensionofsocialand
economicactivity.Thus,over1820-60demographicexpansionacceleratednearly
doublingitspaceinthesecondhalfoftheeighteenthcentury(from0.42to0.76%
yearly)(PérezMoreda,1999:8),whichimpliedthat,by1860,thesizeofthe
populationwas50%percentlargerthanin1787.
4Municipalinstitutions,destinedtostorecerealsfortheirloantothepeasantsintimesofscarcity.
23
Figure14Population,1530-1857Sources:Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura(2007)
Furthermore,thedistributionofthepopulationalsovaried.Fromageographic
perspective,thetendencytoconcentrateonthePeninsula’speripheryintensified.
Moresignificantfromaneconomicpointofviewwastheincreaseintherateof
urbanizationintheearlynineteenthcentury(0.4%).Thus,ifwelookattheadjusted
rateurbanization-namely,theshareofpopulationlivingintowns5,000andover,and
thatexcludethoselivingonagriculture-,itshowsthat,in1857,almostone-fourthof
thepopulation(23.2%)livedoutsideanddidnotdependuponagricultureasitsmeans
ofsubsistence,asignificantimprovementoverthelevelin1787(17.4)(Álvarez-Nogal
andPradosdelaEscosura,2007).
24
Figure15AdjustedUrbanizationRates(lesspopulationlivingonagriculture)1530-1857Sources:Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura(2007)
Agriculturalconsumptionperpersonincreasedduringthe1820s,fallingduring
theCarlistWar(1833-39)and,then,exhibitedagrowingtrenduntiltheearly1850s
(Figure16).Fromalongrunperspective,theearlynineteenthcenturyrepresentsa
breakinthedecliningtrendofconsumptionperheadthatimprovedatyearlyrateof
0.33percentbetweenthe1810sandthe1850s(Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura,
2013).Itisworthnotingalsothat,afterthePeninsularWar,therewasashiftupwards
inthelevelofefficiency(totalfactorproductivity)inagriculture,asevidencefor
AndalusiaandOldCastileshows.
25
Figure16RealConsumptionperheadinAgriculture,1815-1850(1850/9=100)Sources:Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura(2013)
Figure17TotalFactorProductivityinAgriculture,1760-1860(1790/9=100)Sources:Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura(2007)
26
Theincreaseinthevarietyofgoodsandservicesprovidedbythemarketand
thereformoflandpropertyrightsthatbroadenedaccesstoproperty,favouredanew
scenarioinwhichincreasingrealwagerateswentupalonganintensificationofwork.5
Thus,duringthefirsthalfofthenineteenthcenturywhileeconomicallyactive
populationinagriculturemultipliedby1.5,theareaofcultivatedlanddidby2.4
(BringasGutiérrez,2000:86).
Asregardsmanufacturing,althoughtheimmediateeffectsofthewarwere
probablysimilaracrossindustries(reduceddemand,scarcityofinputs,high
transportationcostsandheavytaxation),whiletraditionalindustriescollapsed,
modernindustriescontinuedtoadoptnewtechnologies.Similarly,thelong-term
consequencesforindustryofthelossofthecoloniesdependedontheflexibilityand
dynamicnatureoftheindustryconcerned.
Thedeclineinexportsafterthelossofthecoloniesillustratesthelackof
competitivenessofSpanishindustries,astheycouldnotoffertheLatinAmerican
consumereitherthepricesorthequalityofherWesternEuropeancompetitors,
specificallyGreatBritain.Forexample,theBasqueironandsteelindustry(whichsold
atleastathirdofitsoutputtocolonialmarketsattheendoftheeighteenthcentury)
becameuncompetitivefromthe1770sonward.Asimilarsituationcharacterisedthe
Valenciasilkindustry.Betweenthe1790sandthe1820snetexportsofrawsilkrose
whilenetimportsofsilktextilesincreased.Catalanshippingwasyetanotherindustry
whichhadgrownundercolonialprotectionandsufferedafterwards.However,cotton
textilesdevelopedfurtheroncethecolonialmarkethadbeenlost.Afterthewarthe
productionoftextilesinCataloniarecoveredandmechanized,aprocessthatwas
particularlyintenseinspinning,whichabsorbedthreequartersoftheincreasein
investmentafter1814(Sánchez,2000:502).AsFigure18shows,thenumbersof
water-framesandmulesincreased(inthousands)from12.9in1807to77.3in1829
and622.9in1850.Thesemachinesrepresentedjust13percentofallspinningframes
in1807butrosetorepresentmorethan77percentby1850(Sánchez,2000:508).As
Rosés(1998)hasshown,intheCatalancottonindustry,thelevelofhumancapital5Thus,by1850,economicallyactivepopulationinagricultureworkedanaverageof240daysperyear(GarcíaSanz,1979-80)comparedtoaround170daysintheeighteenthcentury(Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura,2013).
27
allowedtheadaptationofforeigntechnologies,whileefficiencygainsinspinningand
weavingcontributedone-fourthandone-third,respectively,oftheincreasedinoutput
between1830and1860.
Figure18:InvestmentinCatalanCottonTextiles,1760-1840(1760-1771=100) Source:Sánchez(2000)
Themorecompetitiveandflexiblesectorsoftheeconomyeventuallyadapted
tonewcircumstances,particularlycommercialagriculture,whichturnedtowards
growingmarketsinWesternEurope.FranceandBritainbecametheleadingmarkets
forSpanishexports,accountingformorethanhalfofSpain'ssalesabroaduntiltheend
ofthenineteenthcentury.ThetermsoftrademovedfavourablyforSpanishprimary
producers.Technologicalprogressloweredthepricesofindustrialgoodsandgrowing
demandraisedagriculturalprices.Asaresult,thepurchasingpowerintermsof
importsperunitofexportstrebled(Figure19).Meanwhile,LatinAmericanmarkets
neverrecovertherelevancetheyhadbeforeemancipationabsorbing,atbest,afourth
ofallexportsfromSpain,andmostinCuba.
28
Figure19TermsofTradebetweenSpainandBritain,1784-1857(1854=100).Sources:PradosdelaEscosura(1994)
Onthewhole,theeconomyexpandedsteadilyduringtheearlynineteenth
century,exceptduringCarlistWar(1833-1839),andthepopulationexpansionwas
accompaniedbyasustainedincreaseinGDPperhead.Suchbehaviourthat,insome
Europeancountries,wouldbedeemedastheovercomingoftheMalthusiantrapwas
notthecaseinSpain,afrontiereconomy,inwhichpopulationandpercapitaincome
hadevolvedalongsideovertime(Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura,2013).The
noveltywasthatbothpopulationandpercapitaGDPgrowthhadintensified,with
yearlyratesof0.7and0.4%,respectively,compared,forexample,to0.4and0.1%
duringtheeighteenthcentury.
Onthedownside,despiteexhibitingfastergrowthandhigherlevelsofper
capitaincomethaneverbefore,SpainfellgraduallybehindnorthwesternEuropean
countries(BritainandFrance,inparticular)(Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura,
2013:23).
29
Figure20.RealGDPperhead,1815-1850[1850/59=100)Source:Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura(2013)
Howwasthisprogressdistributed?Realwageratesincreasedinthe1820s,but
forthe1825trough,fellsteadilyduringtheCarlistWar,andrecoveredthroughthe
1840s(Figure21).Reallandrents,inturn,rosetothebeginningoftheCarlistwar
showingadecliningtendencythereafter.Theratiobetweenlandrentsandwages
providesameasureofincomedistributionthatsuggestsalong-termdeclinein
inequalitypunctuated,nonetheless,byreversalsin1825andatthebeginningandend
oftheCarlistWar(Figure22).
30
Figure21:Reallandrentandwages,1815-1850(1790/99=100)Source:Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura(2013)
Figure22:InequalityTrends:RealLandRent/WageRateratio,1815-1845(1790/99=100)Source:Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura(2013)
31
TheNapoleonicWars:aWatershed?
Theempiricalevidenceonthepost–wareramarshalledheresuggeststhatthe
NapoleonicWarsconstitutedadefiningmomentinSpanishhistory.Itcouldbe
objected,however,thatthismightsimplybeanexpostergopropterhocargument.
Therelevantquestionseemstobe:intheabsenceofwar,wouldtheEnlightenment
elitehavecarriedoutthereformoftheabsolutiststate,initiatingagradualtransition
towardsaliberalsociety?Theliteratureoffersexamplesthatprovidesupporttothis
hypothesis,i.e.,thesoundpublicfinancesofCharlesIVpriortothewar(Barbierand
Klein,1985Cuenca,1981;Merino,1987;Tedde,1990);Spain’sintegrationinthe
internationalfinancialworld,withCadizandMadridstockexchangescloselyconnected
withthoseofAmsterdam,London,andParis(Tedde,1988);Spain’sactiveinvolvement
intheAnglo-Frenchtradeliberalizationplansofthe1780s,neverimplementedasthe
warbrokeoff(Ehrman,1962).Besides,thebestmindsofSpanishEnlightenment,such
asJovellanosandCampomanes,wereacquaintedwiththeliberalideasspreading
throughoutWesternEurope(Anes,1995;deCastro,1996;Llombart,1992).However,
therearealsoargumentsagainstthehypothesis.Thecolonialempirereinforced
absolutismandonlythewarbroughtittoanend,challengingtheviabilityofthe
AncienRégime(YunCasalilla,1998).Moreover,thedifficultiesandreversalsfacedby
theliberalreformersmilitateagainstasuccessfulgradualtransitionfromabsolutismto
liberalismintheabsenceofwar.
Pursuingtheselinesofenquiryandposingtheadequatecounterfactuals
represent,however,acompleteresearchprogrammewaybeyondthescopeofthis
essay.Asacompromiseandprovisionalsolutionwecanputourhypothesistoa
statisticaltest.Theexerciseconsistsoftestingwhethertherearestructuralbreaksin
theseriesoftheeconomicvariablespreviouslydiscussed.Ofcourse,suchanexercise
fallsshortofaproperhistoricalexplanationbut,ifthestatisticaltestcastsapositive
result,theimplicationisthatourproposednarrativeisnotfarfetched.
Thus,wehavetestedourseriesofrealGDPpercapita,agricultural
consumption,wages,landrents,therent/wageratio,andagriculturalpricesfor
structuralbreaks,eitherinthetrendorthelevel,over1750-1850.Acaveatisneeded.
32
Ratherthanexogenouslychoosingthedatesatwhichtheseriesaretestedfor
structuralbreaks,weallowedthedatatoendogenouslyidentifywherethebreak(if
therewasany)appeared.
AstherecouldbemorethanjustonestructuralbreakweusedtheClemente-
Montañés-Reyesunitrootteststhatallowustoestablishtheexistenceofoneortwo
structuralbreaks.6Table1summarisestheresults.InthecaseofLandRentandthe
Rent/WageRatioonlyonestructuralbreakwasfoundand,therefore,thespecifictest
designedtoidentifyonlyonebreakwaspreferred.
Table1StructuralBreaksinMainEconomicVariables,1750-1850
Coefficient Year1 Coefficient Year2PerCapitaGDP 4.1*** 1783 9.8*** 1814AgriculturalConsumptionperHead 9.6*** 1762 6.0*** 1817AgriculturalPricesPrices 7.5*** 1785 -6.2*** 1811Wages -15.8*** 1761 22.7*** 1818LandRent -14.6*** 1809Rent/WageRatio -18.8*** 1811
Note:***statisticalsignificantat1%;**at5%;*at10%;
ThebreaksfoundbeforethewarshowanincreaseinpercapitaGDPgrowth,
butalsodecreasingwages,increasinginequality,fallingagriculturalconsumptionper
person,andariseagriculturalprices.Afterthewar,percapitaGDPgrowthaccelerated
withabreakpointaround1814,similartothecaseofrealwagesthatalsoincreased
rapidlyaftertheconflict,withabreakaround1818.Theendofthewaralsomeantan
improvementinagriculture,withconsumptionexpandingandpricesdecreasing,asthe
breakpointsaround1817and1811,respectively,show,whilelandrentshoweda
decreaseatthebeginningoftheFrenchinvasionwithabreakpointaround1809.
Inequalitymeasuresalsodeclinedwiththebeginningofthewar,showingabreak
pointfortheRent/Wageratioaround1811.
Usingthestructuralbreakpointslocatedintheseries,wecannowcomputethe
trendsofthedifferentvariablesbeforethewarandextrapolatethemtothepost-war
periodandcompare,then,thecounterfactualvaluestotheactualones.Thisway,we
6Wecomputedtwodifferentspecificationsofthetests,butfinallyoptedfortheinnovationaloutlierunitroottestthatallowsformoregradualchangesratherthanfortheadditiveoutlierunitroot,whichismoreadequatetocapturingverysuddenvariationsintheseries(Clementeetal.,1998).
33
cangetacrudeideaofwhetherthewarrepresentedadiscontinuityineconomic
trends.
Table2MainEconomicVariables:Post-warCounterfactualandActualLevels
Counterfactual Actual %Change %YearlyRate YearPerCapitaGDP 883 985 12 0,3 1850AgriculturalConsumptionperhead 83 107 29 0,7 1850AgriculturalPrices 196 82 -58 -2.5 1850Wages 71 171 139 2.5 1850LandRent 96 67 -30 -1.2 1845Rent/WageRatio 128 44 -66 -3.6 1845
Table2presentstheactualandcounterfactualvaluesattheendofthe
consideredperiodandtheimpliedchangewithrespecttothepre-wartrend
projection.WecanobservethatGDPpercapitalevelswere12percenthigherbymid-
nineteenthcenturythanwhattheywouldhavebeenhadpre-wartrendsprevailed.
Also,realwageswere139percenthigherandlandrents30percentlower.Therewas
alsoanimprovementinthecaseofinequality,astheRent/Wageratiothatwastwo-
thirdslowerthanthepre-warprojectedvalue.Agriculturalconsumptionperhead
increasedbynearlyone-thirdandpricesmorethanhalvedcomparedtothepredicted
levelswithpre-wartrends.
Thus,itcansuggestedthattherewereimportantgainsthatwouldnothave
beenachievedhadpre-wartrendspersistedintheearlynineteenthcenturyandthat,
consequently,thewarrepresentedadefiningmomentfortheSpanisheconomy.
IV.Conclusions
TheeconomicconsequencesofthePeninsularWarinSpainwereclearly
negativeintheshortterm.Theimmediatedemographiceffectsofthewarwereharder
thananyotherconflictinthehistoryofthecountry.Agriculturewasaffectedin
differentways.Whileforcedexpropriationshadaclearnegativeeffect,theelimination
oftheAncienRégimecontrolsmadepossibletoincreaseproductionandprovideda
moreflexibleinstitutionalframeworkfavouringeconomicgrowth.Industrywas
34
hamperedbytheimpoverishmentofthepopulationandthedisruptionoftradethat
increasedthecostofinputs.Warrepresentedaheavyblowfortraditionaland
inefficientindustries.Internationaltradesufferedaseverecontraction.GDPperhead
fellduringthePeninsularWar,withitseffectsunevenlydistributed.
ThelossoftheAmericasmainlandcolonies,anotherby-productofthe
NapoleonicWars,hadshort-runnegativeeffectsoncapitalformation,trade,and
manufacturingindustry,andGovernmentrevenues,buttheoverallimpactonGDPwas
muchlowerthanpreviouslyassumedinqualitativeassessments,andconcentratedin
particularregionsandeconomicsectors.Moreover,ifadirectlinkcouldbeestablished
betweenSpanishAmericaindependenceandthefalloftheAncienRégime,thelossof
thecolonieswouldhavecontributedsignificantlytothetransitiontoliberalismin
Spain.
Inthelongrun,theNapoleonicWarstriggeredacomplextransitionfroman
absolutistempiretoamodernnation.Theliberalreformsredefinedpropertyrights,
makingallcitizensequalbeforethelaw,freedcommodityandfactormarkets,and
introducednewlegislationandregulationofeconomicactivities.Moreover,liberalism
representedcontroloftheexecutivethroughtheparliament.Thelong-term
consequenceswereamoreefficientallocationofresourcesandsustainedeconomic
growth.Needlesstosay,seriousobstaclesemergedontheway,withcivilwarsand
militarytakeoversasmajorsetbacksthatdeferredthetransition.Onthewhole,the
NapoleonicWarsmaybedepictedwatershed.
35
References
Álvarez-Nogal,C.andL.PradosdelaEscosura(2007),“TheDeclineofSpain(1500-1850):ConjecturalEstimates”,EuropeanReviewofEconomicHistory11(3):319-366Álvarez-Nogal,C.andL.PradosdelaEscosura(2013),“TheRiseandDeclineofSpain,1270-1850”,EconomicHistoryReview66(1):1-37
Álvarez-Nogal,C.,L.PradosdelaEscosura,andC.Santiago-Caballero(2016),“SpanishAgricultureintheLittleDivergence”,EuropeanReviewofEconomicHistory20(4):452-477.
Anes,G.(1970)“LaagriculturaespañoladesdecomienzosdelsigloXIXhasta1868:algunosproblemas”inSchwartzGirón,P.(ed.)EnsayosSobrelaeconomíaespañolaamediadosdelSigloXIX,Madrid:Ariel,pp.235-263.
Anes,G.(1995),LaLeyAgraria,Madrid:Alianza.
Artola,M.(1983),AntiguoRégimenyRevoluciónLiberal,Barcelona:Ariel.
Barbier,J.A.andH.S.Klein(1985),“Lasprioridadesdeunmonarcailustrado:elgastopúblicobajoelreinadodeCarlosIV”,RevistadeHistoriaEconómicaIII(3):473-495.
Barrera-Escoda,A.,andLlasat,M.C.(2015),“EvolvingfloodpatternsinaMediterraneanregion(1301-2012)andclimaticfactors-thecaseofCatalonia”,HydrologyandEarthSystemSciences,19(1):465-483
Barriendos,M.andLlasat,M.C(2003),“TheCaseofthe`Maldá'AnomalyintheWesternMediterraneanBasin(AD1760–1800):AnExampleofaStrongClimaticVariability”,ClimaticChange61:191-216.
BeltránTapia,F.(2015),“CommonsandtheStandardofLivingDebateinSpain,1860–1930”,Cliometrica9:27-48.
Benaul,J.M.,&Sánchez,A.(2004),“EllegadoindustrialdelAntiguoRégimen,inE.Llopis(ed.)EllegadodelAntiguoRégimenenEspaña,Barcelona:Crítica,pp.187-228.
BringasGutiérrez,M.A.(2000),Laproductividaddelosfactoresenlaagriculturaespañola(1752-1935),Madrid:BancodeEspaña,EstudiosdeHistoriaEconómica39.
Canales,E.(2018)“1808-1814:demografíayGuerraenEspaña”.Retrievedfromhttps://previa.uclm.es/ab/humanidades/profesores/descarga/manuel_ortiz/crisisregimen.pdf
Castro,C.de(1996),Campomanes.Estadoyreformismoilustrado.Madrid:Alianza
Clemente,J.,Montañés,A.,andReyes,M.(1998),"TestingforaUnitRootinVariableswithaDoubleChangeintheMean”,EconomicsLetters,59(2):75-182
Comín,F.(1988),HaciendayEconomíaenlaEspañaContemporánea,1800-1936,Madrid:InstitutodeEstudiosFiscales.
36
Comín,F.(1990),LascuentasdelaHaciendapreliberalenEspaña(1800-1855),Madrid:BancodeEspaña,EstudiosdeHistoriaEconómica19.Cuenca,J.(1981),“IngresosnetosdelEstadoespañol,1788-1820“;HaciendaPúblicaEspañola69:183-208.
DomínguezBascón,P.(1998)“LadesamortizaciónrústicayurbanadeJoséBonaparteenlaPrefecturadeCórdoba:(provinciasdeCórdobaySevilla)”BoletíndelaRealAcademiadeCórdobadeCiencias,BellasLetrasyNoblesArtes,Nº.134,1998,págs.179-204
Erhman,J.(1962),TheBritishGovernmentandCommercialNegotiationswithEurope,1783-1793,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Fontana,J.(1971),Laquiebradelamonarquíaabsoluta,1814-1820,Barcelona:Ariel.
Fontana,J. (1978),LacrisisagrariadecomienzosdelsigloXIXysusrepercusionesenEspaña,HaciendaPúblicaEspañola,55:177-190.
Fontana,J.(1991),“LacrisiscolonialenlacrisisdelAntiguoRégimenespañol”,inH.Bonilla,(ed.),ElsistemacolonialenlaAméricaespañola,Barcelona:Ariel,pp.305-20.
Fraser,R.(2006),LaMalditaGuerradeEspaña:HistoriaSocialdelaGuerradelaIndependencia,1808-1814,Barcelona:Crítica.
GarcíaMartín,P.(1988),LaganaderíamesteñaenlaEspañaborbónica(1700-1836),Madrid:SecretaríaGeneralTécnica,MinisteriodeAgricultura,PescayAlimentación.
GarcíaSanz,A.(1979-80),“JornalesagrícolasypresupuestofamiliarcampesinoenEspañaamediadosdelsigloXIX,AnalesdelCUNEF,pp.49-71.
GarcíaSanz,A.(1985),“Crisisdelaagriculturatradicionalyrevoluciónliberal(1800-1850)”inA.GarcíaSanzandR.Garrabou(eds.),HistoriaagrariadelaEspañacontemporánea.I.CambiosocialynuevasformasdepropiedadBarcelona:Crítica,pp.7-99.
Gates,D.(1985),TheSpanishUlcer:AHistoryOfPeninsularWar,London:Allen&Unwin.Grafe,R.andA.Irigoin,(2012),“AStakeholderEmpire:thePoliticalEconomyofSpanishImperialRuleinAmerica”,EconomicHistoryReview65(2):609–651.
HernándezGarcía,R.(2007),“LaGuerradeIndependenciaysuincidenciaenlafábricatextildeAstudillo”Investigacioneshistóricas:Épocamodernaycontemporánea24:159-176
Herr,R.(1971),“Haciaelderrumbedelantiguorégimen:crisisfiscalydesamortizaciónbajoCarlosIV”,MonedayCrédito,118:37-100.
37
Herr,R.(1989),RuralChangeandRoyalFinancesinSpainattheEndoftheOldRegime.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.LaForce,J.Clayburn(1965),TheDevelopmentoftheSpanishTextileIndustry,1750-1800,BerkeleyandLosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.
LLombartRosa,V.(1992),Campomanes,economistaypolíticodeCarlosIII,Madrid:Alianza.
LlopisAgelán,E.(2010),“ElimpactodelaGuerradelaIndependenciaenlaagriculturaespañola”,InLaParraLópez,E.(ed.,)LaguerradeNapoleónenEspaña:Reacciones,Imágenes,Consecuencias,Alicante:UniversidaddeAlicante,pp.333-378.
Llopis,Agelán,E.(2002),“LacrisisdelAntiguoRégimenylarevoluciónliberal(1790-1840)”,inComín,F.,Hernández,M.andLlopis,E.(eds.),HistoriaEconómicadeEspañaSiglosX-XX,Barcelona:Crítica,pp.165-202.
MartínezCaviró,Balbina(1973),PorcelanaDelBuenRetiro:EsculturaVolumen49deArtesyArtistas.Colecciónartesyartista,.Madrid:CSIC.
MelendrerasGimeno,M.D.C.(2000),LaEconomíaenMurciaDurantelaGuerradelaIndependencia,Murcia:UniversidaddeMurcia.
Merino,J.P.(1987),LascuentasdelaAdministraciónCentralespañola,1750-1820,Madrid:InstitutodeEstudiosFiscales,Monografía50.
Moxó,S.de(1965),LadisolucióndelrégimenseñorialenEspaña,Madrid:CSIC.
MuñozMaldonado,J.(1833),HistoriapolíticaymilitardelaGuerradelaIndependenciadeEspaña,Madrid,ImprentadeD.JoséPalacios,3vols.
Palma,N.(2016),“SailingAwayfromMalthus:IntercontinentalTradeandEuropeanEconomicGrowth,1500–1800”,Cliometrica10:129-149.
Parker,A.(2015),“IncorrigibleRogues:TheBrutalisationofBritishSoldiersinthePeninsularWar1808-1814”,BritishJournalforMilitaryHistory1(3):42-59.
Peña,D.andN.Sánchez-Albornoz(1984)“WheatPricesinSpain,1857-1890:AnapplicationoftheBox-Jenkinsmethodology”,JournalofEuropeanEconomicHistory13(2):353-373.
PérezMoreda,V.(1985),LaevolucióndemográficaespañolaenelsigloXIX(1797-1930):tendenciasgeneralesycontrastesregionales»,enVV.AA.,Lapopolazioneitaliananell'Ottocento,Bologna,SIDES,pp.49-51
PérezMoreda,V.(1999),“PoblaciónyeconomíaenlaEspañadelossiglosXIXyXX”,inG.Anes(ed.),HistoriaEconómicadeEspaña,SiglosXIXyXX,Barcelona:GalaxiaGutemberg,pp.7-62.
38
PérezMoreda,V.(2010),"LascrisisdemográficasdelperiodonapoleónicoenEspaña”,inE.LaParraLópez(ed.),LaGuerradeNapoleónenEspaña.Reacciones,imágenes,consecuencias,Ed.UniversidaddeAlicante-CasadeVelázquez,Alicante,pp.305-332
PradosdelaEscosura,L.(1993)“LapérdidadelimperioysusconsecuenciaseconómicasenEspaña”,inL.PradosdelaEscosuraandAmaral,S.(eds.)Laindependenciaamericana:consecuenciaseconómicas,Madrid:Alianza,pp.253-300.
PradosdelaEscosura,L.(1994).“TermsofTradeandBackwardness:TestingthePrebischDoctrineforSpainandBritainDuringtheIndustrialization.”UniversidadCarlosIIIWorkingPapers.
QueipodeLlanoyRuizdeSaravia,J.M.(condedeTORENO)(1839,2008),Historiadellevantamiento,guerrayrevolucióndeEspaña,Madrid,ImprentadelDiario,3vols.
Ringrose,D.(1970),TransportationandEconomicStagnationinSpain,1750-1850,DurhamN.C.:DukeUniversityPress.
Ringrose,D.(1983),MadridandtheSpanishEconomy,1560-1850,BerkeleyandLosAngeles:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.
Rodrigo,F.S.,Esteban-Parra,M.J.,Pozo-Vázquez,D.,andCastro-Diez,Y.(1999),“A500-YearPrecipitationRecordinSouthernSpain”,InternationalJournalofClimatology19:1233–1253.
RosMassana,R.(1999),LaindustriatextillaneradeBéjar(1680-1850).Laformacióndeunenclaveindustrial,Valladolid:JuntadeCastillayLeón.
Rosés,J.R.(1998),“MeasuringtheContributionofHumanCapitaltotheDevelopmentoftheCatalanFactorySystem(1830–61),EuropeanReviewofEconomicHistory2:25-48
RuedaHernanz,G.(1986),LadesamortizacióndeMendizábalyEsparteroenEspaña,Madrid:Cátedra.
RuedaHernanz,G.(1997),LadesamortizaciónenEspaña:unbalance(1766-1924),Madrid:Arcolibros.
SaizGonzález,J.P.(1995),PropiedadIndustrialyRevoluciónLiberal:HistoriadelSistemaEspañoldePatentes(1759-1929),Madrid:OficinaEspañoladePatentes.
SaizGonzález,J.P.(1996),Laspatentesylaeconomíaespañola:(1826-1878),OficinaEspañoladePatentesyMarcas.Documentodetrabajo9606.
Sánchez-Albornoz,C.(1911),“Áviladesde1808hasta1814”,NuestroTiempo:519-540.
Sánchez,A.(2000),“Crisiseconómicayrespuestaempresarial.Losiniciosdelsistemafabrilenlaindustriaalgodoneracatalana,1797–1839”,RevistadeHistoriaEconómica18(3):485-523.
Santiago-Caballero,C.(2012),ProvincialgrainyieldsinSpain,1750-2009,FiguerolaInstitute,WorkingPapersinEconomicHistory12-04.
39
Santiago-Caballero,C.(2013),“TheRaininSpain?ClimateversusUrbanDemandasCausesofAgriculturalStagnationinEighteenthCenturySpain",EuropeanReviewofEconomicHistory17:452-470.
SardáDexeus,J.(1948),LapolíticamonetariaylasfluctuacionesdelaeconomíaespañolaenelsigloXIX,Madrid.InstitutoSanchodeMoncada,CSIC.
Simpson,J.(1989),“LaproducciónagrariayelconsumoespañolenelsigloXIX”,RevistadeHistoriaEconómicaVII(2):355-388.
Spain.CódigodeComercio1829. Retrievedfrom:http://fama2.us.es/fde/ocr/2006/codigoDeComercio1829.pdf
Spain.RealDecreto20thJanuary1834,declarandoquelasasociacionesgremialesnogozanfueroprivilegiado,yquenosepodráformarningunaquemonopoliceeltrabajo.Retrievedfrom:http://www.boe.es.
Spain.RealDecreto6thDecember1836,mandandoguardar,cumpliryejecutareldelasCórtesquerestableceotrodelasgeneralesyextraordinarias,fecha8deJuniode1813,porelqueordenaronlalibertadenelestablecimientodefábricasyejerciciodecualquieraindustriaútil.Retrievedfrom:http://www.boe.es.
Spain.RealDecretoCCLXII8thdeJune1813,sobreellibreestablecimientodefábricasyexerciciodequalquierindustriaútil.Retrievedfrom:http://www.cervantesvirtual.com.
Tedde,P.(1988),ElBancodeSanCarlos(1782-1829),Madrid:Alianza-BancodeEspaña.
Tedde,P.(1990),“PolíticafinancieraypolíticacomercialenelreinadodeCarlosIII”,inActasdelCongresoInternacional“CarlosIIIylaIlustración”,3vols.Madrid:SigloXXI,II,129-217.
Tedde,P.(1994),“CambioinstitucionalycambioeconómicoenlaEspañadelsigloXIX”,RevistadeHistoriaEconómicaXII(3):525-538.
TorrasElías,J.(1976),Liberalismoyrebeldíacampesina,1820-1823,Barcelona:Ariel.
Urlanis,B.(2011),Warsandpopulation,Moscow:Progress.
Vadillo,J.M.de(1846),ReflexionessobrelaurgenciaderemedioalosgravesmalesquehoysepadecenenEspañaporcausademuchasmonedasquecirculanenella,Cádiz:ImprentadeD.ManuelBosch.YunCasalilla,B.(1998),“TheAmericanEmpireandTheSpanishEconomy:AnInstitutionalPerspective”,RevistadeHistoriaEconómicaXVI(1):123-156.
European
Historical
Economics
Society
EHES Working Paper Series
Recent EHES Working Papers
2018
EHES 129
EHES 128
EHES 127
EHES 126
EHES 125
EHES 124
EHES 123
2017
EHES 121
A New Indicator for Describing Bull and Bear Markets
German Forero-Laverde
The long run impact of foreign direct investment, exports, imports and GDP:
evidence for Spain from an ARDL approach
Verónica Cañal-Fernández and Julio Tascón Fernández
Can Autocracy Promote Literacy? Evidence from a Cultural Alignment Success
Story
Nuno Palma and Jaime Reis
The Origins of the (Cooperative) Species: Raiffeisen Banking in the Netherlands,
1898–1909
Christopher L. Colvin, Stuart Henderson and John D. Turner
‘Getting to Denmark’: the Role of Elites for Development
Peter Sandholt Jensen, Markus Lampe, Paul Sharp and Christian Volmar
Skovsgaard
How to become a leader in an emerging new global market: The determinants of
French wine exports, 1848-1938
María Isabel Ayuda, Hugo Ferrer-Pérez and Vicente Pinilla
Still a long way to go: decomposing income inequality across Italy’s regions,
1871 – 2011
Gabriele Cappelli, Emanuele Felice, Julio Martínez-Galarraga and Daniel Tirado
Unreal Wages? Real Income and Economic Growth in England, 1260-1850
Jane Humphries and Jacob Weisdorf
All papers may be downloaded free of charge from: www.ehes.org The European Historical Economics Society is concerned with advancing education in European economic
history through study of European economies and economic history. The society is registered with the
Charity Commissioners of England and Wales number: 1052680