The Myth of Authenticity: Benefits of a Clearly-Defined Self to Confused

Antidepressant Users

By

Samantha J. Kilpack

April 22, 2014

A thesis submitted to the Department of Philosophy of Westminster College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

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Samantha J. Kilpack PHIL 490 Dr. Nick More 4/22/14

The Myth of Authenticity: Benefits of a Clearly-Defined Self to Confused Antidepressant Users

The use of antidepressants is a growing phenomenon, and the decision to use

them has significant consequences for how one perceives their selfhood and its

authenticity, or lack thereof. Antidepressant users often express feelings of guilt,

confusion, and/or uncertainty about who they really are, and wonder whether their true

selves are masked or revealed by the antidepressants.1 This paper will explore the nature

of the self and the role that antidepressants play in the authenticity of that self in order to

alleviate such concerns for antidepressant users and to remove the social stigma of

antidepressant use. This is important because there is a growing moral ideal of

authenticity, especially in Western culture, which urges us to cultivate our individuality

and be the most authentic possible version of ourselves. Opponents of antidepressants

have viewed them as “a threat to an ‘un-enhanced’ and ‘un-drugged’ self which is lost

and ambiguously obscured by the drugs.” Proponents, on the other hand, claim that

antidepressants “free us so that we can encounter the world as it is and we can be given

back our ‘self’ and what is most our own,” thereby restoring “the self which was masked

by the pathology.”2

                                                                                                               1 See, for example, Giovanni Frazzetto, "Antidepressants and the Multiplicity of Authentic Selves," History of the Human Sciences 20, no. 3 (08, 2007), 149-154.

2 Ibid., 151.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

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People have different conceptions of the self; therefore, they have different ideas

of how antidepressants affect that self. In this paper I will illustrate this by applying

antidepressants to five different theories of self, including my own. I propose a definition

of self that, if adopted, can provide peace of mind to antidepressant users who are

concerned about how authentic they are while taking them. I argue that the self is a

person as the object of reflective and introspective thought, and the result of a

complicated, fluid mix of genes, culture, physiology, and experience that form the ways

in which people view, evaluate, and experience themselves. It is also not only a person,

but the experience of being a person separate from other people; the experience of being

the person that has been affected in such a way by the things listed above. Due to the

fluidity of the self, then, antidepressants have no essential, “natural,” or “authentic” self

to affect in the sense that these concepts imply a static self. Rather, authenticity is just as

dynamic as the self, and therefore an irrelevant measure of the self, as I will later show.

Our memory tells us, though, that the self does persist through time despite the changes it

endures, as I know that I am the same person who was traumatized by pulling a stink bug

out of her shoe as a child. This view of the self renders the confusion, identity crisis, and

feelings of guilt and confusion that a growing number of people experience when taking

antidepressants unnecessary, and the stigma unwarranted.

There is no shortage of research on the effects of antidepressants on the self. The

first thing to be done to address this topic is to define the self in order to establish how

antidepressants may affect it. The biggest obstacle to evaluating the literature, however,

is the variety of different conceptions of the self and the conflation of terms for the self.

Many authors use terms such as self, identity, ego, and/or personhood interchangeably

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

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without defining them, which comes at the cost of imprecision and confusion. Marlene

Benjamin exemplifies this problem in her essay about mental illness and self. In

explaining how antidepressants, depression, and her experience in a psychiatric ward

have affected her, she uses the terms self, identity, and character interchangeably and

without defining any of them, but claims that they, as concepts, are tenuous and built on

weak grounds. This tells her readers very little about the “disordered self” that mental

illness has affected despite the fact that the title of her essay leads us to believe

otherwise.3 Having no consistent meaning of self renders it impossible to have a cohesive

discussion about the relationship between antidepressants and self. Additionally, with a

few exceptions, authors do not seem to address one another and have a discussion about

the topic; rather, most articles regarding antidepressants and self seem to be either

isolated from one another or talking past each other.

Another complicating issue with this topic is the fact that multiple fields engage

in the discussion and have different focuses. Philosophy, sociology, and psychology/

psychiatry have different ways of conceiving of the self. While this is primarily a

philosophy paper, all of these fields have significance to a philosophical discussion of

antidepressants and self. Sociology calls attention to the fact that the use of

antidepressants is a cultural phenomenon, and the society in which we live affects the

ways we view cultural phenomena and philosophical ideas such as that of the self.

Psychiatry also clearly and inextricably links pill and personhood. While psychiatry

explains how antidepressants affect one’s view of one’s own self as a result of the

medication, sociology can explain how society affects the ways in which one views

                                                                                                               3 Marlene Benjamin, "The Disordered Self: Philosophy, Memoir, and Mental Illness," (1-9).

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oneself as a result of social pressures. In these ways, both psychiatry and sociology can

add depth to a philosophical discussion of the ways in which antidepressants affect, or do

not affect, the self.

I will begin a review of the literature with a discussion of the self before adding

the antidepressant dimension to the discussion. I will first discuss four different

philosophical views of the self: those of Rene Descartes, David Hume, Martin Heidegger,

and Charles Taylor, before moving on to a sociological conception of selfhood. I will

then outline some contributions to the topic of how antidepressants affect the self. This

will put me in a position to point out the limitations of the existing literature and

contextualize my own contribution to the discussion and its importance. Following the

literature review, I will be able to enter the discussion by applying antidepressants to

these different conceptions of the self, and my own, to show how they would affect each

one.

Rene Descartes’ theory of self does not include the word ‘self.’ Because of the

reflexive nature of the “I,” he used it to denote the mind (which he does not distinguish

from the soul, but used these terms interchangeably), and he considered the mind to be

the essence of one’s consciousness and, therefore, existence. He viewed the entire human

body (which is material, and therefore does not include the immaterial soul), however, as

a physiological machine, while thoughts are “mental acts of the rational soul that remain

in the soul and are not coded in the brain at all.”4 He did, however, believe in the union of

the body and the mind, and claimed that thoughts still affect human behavior via his

                                                                                                               4 Raymond Martin and John Barresi, The Rise and Fall of Soul and Self (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 129.

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(erroneous) physiological theory.5 Speaking more to the link between mind and body, the

immaterial soul directly experiences all bodily experience.6 He maintained the distinction

between body and mind, but also claimed that “each human soul, or mind, is so

intimately connected to its own body as to form with it a separate substance of a third

sort” that brings about changes in both body and mind through their interaction in the

pineal gland, part of his aforementioned physiological theory.7 Finally, he proposed that

only beings with nonmaterial souls, or minds, could have consciousness in the full sense

because all thought, which can only be the product of a mind, is necessarily reflexive.8

This means that to think is to be aware of one’s thinking, and therefore one’s existence.

Hence, “I think; therefore, I am.” Overall, Descartes views the self as an immaterial

mind/soul that exists independently of one’s body, but the mind and body compose “a

certain unity” such that they affect one another.

David Hume contradicts Descartes by positing that the self does not exist at all.

He believed that time creates change to the extent that the substantiality and persistence

of anything, including the self, is illusory.9 But because many perceptions resemble one

another, we mistakenly “forge a succession of perceptions into a persisting object.”10 The

reason for this, he claims, is that we easily imagine that a perception persists when

successive perceptions resemble each other, and we have a strong propensity to

                                                                                                               5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., 130.

8 Ibid., 128.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.,153.

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unknowingly make this mistake.11 In the case of the self, part of the problem for him was

that people often imagine that the self partly consists of “some unifying substance, such

as a soul, or some unifying mode, such as life or consciousness.”12 Even if we did have

some sort of unifying substance, its “continued existence after our bodily deaths would be

irrelevant unless it were attended with consciousness and memory,” which he claims is

unlikely.13 Ultimately, he maintains, our conception of self is created by the imaginary

links we create between our perceptions of people at different points in time.14 Time is

indeed important to the self and creates significant changes; however, I believe that

Hume goes astray by claiming that the self does not exist because it changes so often.15

Martin Heidegger re-asserts the existence of the self, but in a way distinct from

and opposed to Descartes and Hume. He believed that language was a significant barrier

to understanding ourselves because we differentiate between self and world, when really,

“self and world are not two entities, like subject and object;”16 rather, the self is a

dynamic system of physical, social, and historical interrelationships of meanings or

signification that must be seen in terms of temporality and situatedness. Humans are “not

only enmeshed in, but are constituted of”17 these relationships. Self is not only being, but

                                                                                                               11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., 153-154.

13 Ibid., 155.

14 Ibid.

15 I will return to this point.

16 Ibid., 234.

17 Ibid.

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“being-in-the-world,”18 and Heidegger sought to erase the distinction between person and

world. Heidegger makes use of the word Dasein, meaning existence (literally, being-

there), but he argues that Dasein is not only existence, but also an awareness, a “making

intelligible”19 of our condition and the structure of our being. Dasein is the true structure

of the self and “affords the only true access that we have to ourselves.”20 Without

understanding Dasein, we exist and understand inauthentically. In using the word Dasein

in this way, Heidegger attempted to break down the language barrier that prevents us

from understanding ourselves authentically. In sum, Heidegger maintained that the self is

an understanding of our condition as being made up of both the world and our bodies, the

relationship between which is constantly changing to actualize new selves.

In chapter four of The Ethics of Authenticity, Charles Taylor introduces his own

view of self. He suggests that human life is “fundamentally dialogical [in] character,”21

but maintains the distinction between self and world, claiming that we can become full

human agents and define our identity (or self; he uses these terms interchangeably)

through modes of expression that are “always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle

against, the identities our significant others want to recognize in us.”22 For Taylor, we can

only define our identity against “horizons,” or “backgrounds of intelligibility,” which

determine what is relevant to one’s identity in a given society, and we cannot choose

                                                                                                               18 Ibid.

19 Ibid., 233

20 Ibid., 234

21 Charles Taylor, "Inescapable Horizons," in The Ethics of Authenticity [The Malaise of Modernity] (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1991), 31.

22 Ibid., 33.

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what these are.23 In other words, our culture and the significant people in our lives help to

shape our identities; to use Taylor’s example, the amount of hairs on my head does not

make up part of my identity because nobody cares how many hairs I have. Even if I

cared, nobody else would recognize that part of my identity—it is not intelligible in my

society and therefore is irrelevant to my identity. However, Taylor does emphasize the

importance of being original. He calls this idea “self-determining freedom,” which “is the

idea that I am free when I decide for myself what concerns me, rather than being shaped

by external influences.”24 But being original can only work to a certain degree, because

once an identity trait goes beyond the “horizon” of intelligibility, it becomes irrelevant.

Like Heidegger, Taylor recognizes interaction between person and world as an

important component of the development of the self. However, Heidegger includes no

other aspect than that, and in doing so he neglects several components of a definition of

self that I believe are important (for example, genes). Furthermore, Taylor establishes the

need to find what is significant in one’s difference from others, while Heidegger does not

concern himself with this issue, and would in fact disagree with this view because he

does not differentiate between self and world, “I” and “they.” Taylor’s “horizon” can be

compared to Heidegger’s Dasein: Horizons and Dasein are, for each of these

philosophers, what is necessary for determining and understanding the self.

                                                                                                               23 Ibid., 37. For a discussion of identity-relevant traits from a moral and legal standpoint, see section 9 of Michael Shapiro’s “The Identity of Identity: Moral and Legal Aspects of Technological Self-Transformation.”

24 Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity, 27.

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According to sociologists James Holstein and Jaber Gubrium, the self is a “project

of everyday life,”25 both “artfully agentic and culturally circumscribed. Never the mere

reflection of social responses, it is actively crafted in light of biographical particulars,

using culturally endorsed formats.”26 Despite their anecdote of an unremarkable, passive

girl in class who became confident and assertive and displayed a radical attitude change

after being treated as smart and interesting by her classmates,27 Holstein and Gubrium

hesitate to lay too much weight on the social influence of self by stressing the

significance of one’s own agency in self-determination. They share this concern with

Heidegger, to an extent: Heidegger believed that the world constantly shaped a self that

constantly evolved based on one’s choices, though unlike Heidegger, Holstein and

Gubrium maintain the distinction between self and world. These thinkers also all believed

in the multiplicity of selves, but in slightly different ways. For Holstein and Gubrium,

different selves are in “greater demand than ever” and emerge in different institutional

settings (school, work, family, church).28 Unlike these thinkers, I maintain the existence

of a single self whose essence as a unique, introspective person continues, but whose

roles, opinions, appearance, and experiences continually change, rather than multiple

selves that may actualize at different times.

Turning now to the self and its relationship to antidepressants, most of the

academic interest in this subject seems to have been spawned by psychiatrist Peter

                                                                                                               25 Jaber F. Gubrium and James A. Holstein, "Restorying the Self," in The Self we Live by: Narrative Identity in a Postmodern World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 13.

26 Ibid., 12.

27 Ibid., 6-8.

28 Ibid., 13.

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Kramer’s 1993 book Listening to Prozac, in which Kramer addresses the nature of

character and the mutability of the self. Although his work contains many case studies of

people who find themselves able to feel like their true selves after taking Prozac, Moira

Fracassa criticizes Kramer’s endorsement of the use of Prozac for social reasons: Kramer

enthusiastically helps his patients by merely making them the kinds of people that society

demands.29 Fracassa also claims that the practice of prescribing drugs to a patient and

then basing a diagnosis on the patient’s reaction suggests the “dangerous” view that “by

listening to biology, we can define the self.”30 This biological reductionism is problematic

because, according to Fracassa, the self is socially determined as well. The effects of

antidepressants on a purely biological self would be tremendous, but my conception of

self is much more multi-faceted and comes closer to Fracassa’s view that the self is

culturally determined as well. Fracassa specifically supports Elizabeth Wurtzel’s

sociological mindset and critical, measured support of antidepressants in her book Prozac

Nation, which argues that antidepressant use is connected to a cultural desire to explain

phenomena biologically. Also reviewing Listening to Prozac, sociologist Pauline Norris

takes note that society rewards certain traits (confidence, flexibility, quickness, energy)

over others,31 and Prozac can help bring about these traits. My conception of the self

includes the influence of culture and society, but I do not support the view that the

influences on the self are limited to society and biology. These authors fail to treat the

                                                                                                               29 Moira Fracassa, "Medicating the Self: The Roles of Science and Culture in the Construction of Prozac," Journal of Popular Culture 32, no. 4 (1999), 24-25.

30 Ibid., 24

31 Pauline Norris, "Listening to Prozac: A Psychiatrist Explores Antidepressant Drugs and the Remaking of the Shelf," New Zealand Sociology 10, no. 1 (05, 1995), 143.

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importance that experience, genetics, and one’s place in time and space hold to the

development and evolution of one’s self.

The argument that antidepressants are too often used to repair a social problem

rather than a pathological one is common among critics of antidepressants, and it has

significant implications for the self that arises from these social problems. While

antidepressants often seem to reveal the true self that was hidden by pathology, many

believe the self that is revealed is a creation of socially constructed norms that can create

depression and, when complied with, can alleviate it. In “Enhancement Technologies and

the Modern Self,” philosopher Carl Elliott shows how Charles Taylor’s work32 reveals the

often objectionable social roots of the demand for enhancement technologies, and how

focusing on using these technologies changes the individuals affected by larger social

problems, rather than addressing those problems themselves.33 Elliott emphasizes the

importance of understanding authenticity as a way to express a modern moral aspiration,

rather than as a literal description of the effects of a drug or procedure.34 In other words,

Elliott argues that authenticity, a common desire among antidepressant users, is sought

after by being true to a set of socially prescribed and desirable characteristics, rather than

being true to oneself independently of social expectations. He seems to suggest that the

self that is entirely culturally created is inauthentic.

The society that dictates which characteristics should be valued can create

depressed people if they do not live up to these standards. However, if we subscribe to a

                                                                                                               32 Taylor, Inescapable Horizons, 31

33 Carl Elliott, "Enhancement Technologies and the Modern Self," Journal of Medicine & Philosophy 36, no. 4 (04, 2011), 364-374.

34 Ibid., 371.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

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view of the self that encompasses the influence of biology and society, antidepressants

can bring about a self (perhaps a more confident, flexible, quick, and/or energetic self 35)

that makes people more happy and comfortable in that society. Charles Taylor would not

count this as an authentic self, however, and the cultural ideal of authenticity of self is

very real.36 If antidepressant users subscribe to this ideal, it can produce anxiety if they

view antidepressants as a compromise to their authentic selves, which they often do.37 If a

person takes antidepressants because they are unhappy with themselves due to their

(socially produced) feelings of not measuring up, in Taylor’s line of thinking, they are not

being their authentic selves because they are acting solely on a notion that is a result of

external influences; namely, social pressures. I, however, reject the notion of an

“inauthentic” self and instead assert that a self is always authentic, though it can be

shaped in different ways by one’s choices (for example, the choice to take

antidepressants).

Phenomenologist Frederik Svenaeus draws from the work of Thomas Fuchs on

how depression affects the self38 to create his version of the relationship between

antidepressants and the self. To him, Peter Kramer’s Listening to Prozac “lack[s] a

comprehensive understanding of what the term ‘self’ means in this context,”39 which

                                                                                                               35 Norris, “Listening to Prozac,” 143.

36 Taylor, Ethics of Authenticity, 28-29.

37 Frazzetto, Antidepressants and the Multiplicity of Authentic Selves, 152. See also: Fredrik Svenaeus, "Do Antidepressants Affect the Self? A Phenomenological Approach," Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 10, no. 2 (2007), 153-166.

38 Thomas Fuchs, "Corporealized and Disembodied Minds: A Phenomenological View of the Body in Melancholia and Schizophrenia," Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology 12, no. 2 (06, 2005), 95-107.

39 Fredrik Svenaeus, "Do Antidepressants Affect the Self? A Phenomenological Approach," Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 10, no. 2 (2007), 153-166.

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Svenaeus intends to remedy in his own paper. Following in the Heideggerian tradition, he

claims that the self emerges out of being-in-the-world, but also out of bodily resonance

and attunement.40 Svenaeus focuses on the body and its spatiality as a tool for

understanding the self; to him, resonance and attunement are terms for the body’s

“capacity to be affected by the world”41 that can help one feel at home in the world or,

potentially, make one feel estranged from the world if one is “out of tune.”42 Here, his

views diverge from Heidegger’s, as Svenaeus draws a distinction between self and world.

When one is “out of tune,” the self cannot develop because it cannot truly connect with

the world on which it depends, which creates depression. By altering the concentrations

of neurotransmitters in the synapses of the brain, antidepressants alter bodily resonance in

ways that make new forms of transcendence to the world possible.43

Though I agree that we must acknowledge the importance of our temporality and

situatedness in terms of our selfhood (to use Heideggerian terms, though Taylor values

these in his own words), there is more to the self than that: by “temporality and

situatedness,” Heidegger seems to mean spatial and temporal location, to the exclusion of

biological and genetic composition, which, I argue, carry significant weight in one’s

selfhood. Taylor orients his theory of self in terms of culture and significant others, also

to the exclusion of biology and genetics. And while I support Peter Kramer’s view that

biology significantly impacts our selves, there is more to it than that as well, as his focus

                                                                                                               40 Ibid., 156.

41 Ibid., 160.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid., 162. Svenaeus uses transcendence in the same way that Heidegger uses Dasein: as a form of awareness of our connectedness to the world.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

14

on biology largely ignores the factors that Heidegger and Taylor stressed, factors that I

believe to be important to the self. All of these thinkers have brought up significant

aspects of self, but none presents a complete picture. My definition of the self

encompasses all of the factors pinpointed by other philosophers.

The long history of interest in the self testifies to the importance of this topic to

human beings, and the growth of depression and the prevalence of antidepressants have

added a new dimension and urgency to the question of the nature of the self.

Unfortunately, a lack of clarity has severely impaired this discussion. Fracassa, Norris,

Frazzetto, Benjamin, Elliott, and several other authors neglect to define the self in their

works,44 rendering their analysis of the effects of antidepressants incommensurable,

which hinders the discussion on this vital topic. Descartes, Hume, Heidegger, Holstein

and Gubrium, and Taylor, on the other hand, provide excellent definitions of self, each of

which is both similar and distinct from my own, that will help me to make intelligible

claims about the effects of antidepressants on the self. Svenaeus was the only author I

came across who provided an adequate definition of self and applied antidepressants to it

in a meaningful way. In this sense, his work is exemplary.

In this paper I hope to provide the grounds for a more commensurable discussion

about self and antidepressants by example: by outlining several views of the self,

including my own, then applying antidepressants to each of these conceptions of self, I

will illustrate the clarity that becomes possible when selfhood is defined before analyzing

its interaction with antidepressants. Before getting deeper into this discussion, however, I

                                                                                                               44 See, for example, Gloria Dura-Vila and Victor Dura-Vila, "Reply to Gold and Olin: Antidepressants and the Identity of Persons," Transcultural Psychiatry 47, no. 2 (2010), 322-334.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

15

will pause to give a brief overview of the function of antidepressants and the condition

that they treat.

The academic and clinical communities seem to generally agree that depression is

a real concern, and not necessarily something that can be overcome without the use of

antidepressants. According to the DSM-IV, major depressive disorder is characterized by

some or all of the following symptoms for at least two weeks: a pervasive and persistent

depressed or irritable mood, decreased interest or pleasure in activities, changes in

weight, appetite, sleep, and/or activity, fatigue, feelings of guilt or worthlessness,

decreased concentration, and suicidality.45 Diagnosis is based on the patient’s self-

reported experiences, behavior reported by relatives or friends, and a mental status

examination.46 Antidepressants can alleviate these symptoms and restore normal

functioning to patients. The most commonly used antidepressants, selective serotonin

reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), are believed to increase levels of serotonin, a substance in

the brain believed to be a contributor to feelings of happiness and well-being.

Unfortunately, it is not known what causes depression, and there is no laboratory test for

it. Psychologists consider depression to be a mood disorder, and antidepressants work

biologically to re-elevate one’s mood. 47

For the next section of my paper, I will apply antidepressants to the theories of

self of Descartes, Hume, Heidegger, and Taylor. The point is not to show how these                                                                                                                45 DSM-IV, "Diagnostic Criteria for Major Depressive Disorder and Depressive Episodes," Project Safety Net, http://www.psnpaloalto.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Depression-Diagnostic-Criteria-and-Severity-Rating.pdf

46 Ibid.

47 For a fascinating phenomenological characterization of depression, see Thomas Fuchs, "Corporealized and Disembodied Minds: A Phenomenological View of the Body in Melancholia and Schizophrenia," Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology 12, no. 2 (06, 2005), 95-107.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

16

philosophers did or would have felt about depression or antidepressants. Rather, it is to

show how different conceptions of self can affect one’s views on antidepressant use,

using four philosophers as examples. I chose each one because of how different each is

from the next, thereby giving a variety of resulting attitudes toward antidepressants.

Descartes justified his conception of the self as an immaterial mind that exists

independently of one’s body in several ways in his Meditations on First Philosophy.48 He

says that although he has a clear and distinct idea of himself as a “thinking and

unextended thing,” he possesses a distinct idea of the body as an “extended and

unthinking thing,” so he must be “entirely and truly distinct from [his] body, and may

exist without it” because one cannot be both extended and unextended, thinking and

unthinking; therefore there must be two separate entities. He further justifies his claim by

arguing that the mind is indivisible and that the body is divisible:

For in truth, when I consider the mind, that is, when I consider myself in so far only as I am a thinking thing, I can distinguish in myself no parts, but I very clearly discern that I am somewhat absolutely one and entire; and although the whole mind seems to be united to the whole body, yet, when a foot, an arm, or any other part is cut off, I am conscious that nothing has been taken from my mind…

Because one thing cannot be both divisible and indivisible, Descartes claims that the

mind and the body must be separate entities.

Mind and body, he held, do not hold the relationship of a sailor to a ship, but

intermingle with one another, “so that I and the body form a unit.”49 To illustrate his

point, he explained that when “our bodies are being stimulated, we feel that something

                                                                                                               48 Unless otherwise specified, this section derives from Rene Descartes, "Meditation VI: Of the Existence of Material Things, and of the Real Distinction between the Mind and Body of Man," http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/descartes/meditations/Meditation6.html (2014).

49 Barressi and Martin, Soul and Self, 130.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

17

has happened to us, rather than merely think that it has happened to our bodies.”50 He

instead suggested that, although separate entities, the “mind and body compose a certain

unity” and that they are so intimately linked with each other that they affect each other.

Thoughts from the soul, he claimed, affect one’s bodily behavior, and bodily sensations

are “directly experienced by the immaterial soul.”51 Descartes’ conception of the unity of

body and self suggests an experience of self that is predominantly internal and perhaps

phenomenological, as one’s own experience of bodily sensations informs the experiencer

of the uniqueness of their own consciousness and offers a distinction between their

experiences and those of another.

Although Descartes conceptualized the self in terms of our essence as thinking

beings, he did not see the brain as the same organ responsible for thinking and feeling

that we know it to be today; instead, for Descartes, thinking comes from the mind (soul),

not the brain (which makes sense, given that, for Descartes, thoughts and the soul that

produces them are both immaterial things). However, he assumed that, although the mind

and the body are separate entities, they interact, communicate, and affect one another

through the pineal gland, a small organ located in the brain, which he also believed to

house the soul (which is a separate but immaterial entity residing within the body).52

Because of Descartes’ erroneous physiological theory involving, among other

things, the pineal gland, the Cartesian view of the self has been rendered obsolete in this                                                                                                                50 Ibid., 131.

51 Ibid., 127.

52 Descartes believed that emotions, or “passions,” were sensitive movements that the soul experienced due to its union with the body, and “melancholy” (depression) was a corruption of the emotions preventable by the soul keeping such dysfunctions under control. Therefore, Descartes probably viewed depression as a disease of the soul. See Francisco López-Muñoz et al., "Sadness as a Passion of the Soul: A Psychopathological Consideration of the Cartesian Concept of Melancholy," Brain Research Bulletin 85, no. 1 (04/25, 2011), 42-53.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

18

way. However, Cartesian dualism is very much alive and we can easily work with it in a

contemporary setting. Although we know that the pineal gland does not exist as Descartes

understood it, we can still assume, as many do, that the soul and the body are connected.

Antidepressants therefore work, though in varying degrees depending on one’s beliefs, in

a mechanistic and physiological way. Antidepressants are, of course, material things, so

they at least begin to effect change through the material part of one’s existence: through

the body. Where antidepressants would really matter, however, would seem to be the

soul, as that is the source of one’s identity and essence. For Descartes, antidepressants

would travel through the body, to the pineal gland, and finally to the soul. Not in a

physical way, I might add; but rather, the changes that antidepressants produce in the

brain and body would be “directly experienced”53 by the soul through the pineal gland,

though Descartes does not address the mechanism by which this would happen. But I

repeat: the pineal gland is not necessary for this theory to be relevant today. Many people

believe that the soul and the body are connected, regardless of the logistics of the

phenomenon. Moreover, like Descartes, they believe soul and body to be separate,

separable, and quite different kinds of things.

Since the Cartesian self is the soul, antidepressant users with a Cartesian view of

self could quite plausibly feel confused or guilty about what they are doing to their body,

because bodily experience affects the soul. As Descartes does not characterize the self

beyond its nature as an immaterial mind, he leaves the self’s mutability open to

interpretation, and whether one interprets the self as permanent or as mutable, unpleasant

consequences are probable: to one who assumes the natural permanence of the self,                                                                                                                53 Barresi and Martin, Soul and Self, 127.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

19

taking antidepressants could be viewed as morally wrong as an unnatural corruption of

the self, causing feelings of guilt. To one who assumes the mutability of the self, taking

antidepressants could cause confusion as to which self, medicated or unmedicated, is the

true self, and this confusion would not result from any moral concern. In spite of

Descartes’ ambiguity on this topic, he placed tremendous weight on the power of the

mind to discover truth much more reliably than the body and senses (“for it is, as appears

to me, the office of the mind alone, and not of the composite whole of mind and body, to

discern the truth…”).54 Presumably Descartes would not want to alter the mind when it is

so crucial to our understanding of the nature of the world, of ourselves, and of the divine;

therefore, the mind should be considered sacred to Cartesians. Furthermore, in regards to

our contemporary cultural ideal of authenticity, altering the very essence of one’s being

(via the body) could endanger one’s pursuit of this ideal and generate considerable

criticism from its proponents, causing further feelings of guilt and confusion.

However, if one believes (as Descartes likely did55) that depression is a disease of

the soul, what better remedy than antidepressants, if they will affect the soul as well?

Under this circumstance, too, however, Cartesian antidepressant users who believe in a

naturally permanent self could feel guilty for taking antidepressants. There are other

options that could remedy the soul while preserving its integrity—things such as talk

therapy or philosophy could comprise a treatment that takes place entirely in the soul, as

it involves only an unextended, immaterial substance: rational thought. Our culture often

views taking antidepressants as “taking the easy way out” and treating one’s condition

                                                                                                               54 Descartes, “Meditation VI”.

55 See footnote 56.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

20

without any real, hard work because talk therapy or philosophy presumably requires

considerably more effort than taking a pill.

In sum, Descartes believed that the soul and the body are separate entities that are

nonetheless connected and affect one another. Our essence, and the idea of the “self,”

reside in the soul, as it is where all rational thought occurs, which is what sets us as

humans apart from other living and nonliving things. Antidepressants begin their effects

in the body but also affect the soul, and therefore the self, which is something that people

either want understand, or leave entirely intact (or both). Therefore, a Cartesian view of

the self allows for the possibility that antidepressant users could feel guilty and conflicted

about their decision.

I argue, unlike Descartes, that the body is part of the self and part of the “I.”

Descartes claims that the mind is indivisible and the body is divisible because when a

part of the body is cut off, one is “conscious that nothing has been taken from [their]

mind,” so the mind and body must be separate entities. If one loses, for example, their

arm, nothing is taken from their mind. But neither is anything taken from their legs or

their nose, and both are considered by Descartes to be parts of a single but divisible thing.

Therefore, his example does not effectively show that the mind and body are separate.

Furthermore, while Descartes refuted the claim that the mind and body are related as a

sailor to a ship because he wanted to show that they are actually connected, the same

metaphor can argue that they are not merely connected, but rather, a single entity.

Descartes himself claimed that they form a “unit,”56 but although what he meant was that

the two parts maintain their identities, as people do in a marriage, the metaphor provides

                                                                                                               56 Barresi and Martin, Soul and Self, 130.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

21

no reason that their combination could not form an altogether new entity, such as when

water mixes with Kool-Aid powder. While I do not argue that mind and body lose their

individual identities because of their oneness, I do argue that a more intimate connection

exists between the two than Descartes realizes. The fact that we say things like, “I am

fat,” rather than, “My body is fat” suggests that we feel a certain oneness with our

body—so much so that we intuitively know it to be a part of our self and our essence,

rather than a separate entity from it, even if we are unaware of this knowledge. I argue

that the ways in which we experience our bodies easily affects the way we think about

and experience ourselves. Being, for example, overweight often affects one’s self-worth,

ability to perform certain tasks, and even one’s social circle, all of which affect one’s

experience of self. Our body is therefore crucial to the experience and development of the

self.

Turning now to Hume, he claims in A Treatise of Human Nature that the self is

“nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other

with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement.”57 Whether due

to the resemblance, causation, or contiguity of successive perceptions, we mistakenly

conceive of them as a single entity. He proposes that the mind is a fictional construction

and compares it to a theatre in which actors—“perceptions [that] successively make their

appearance”—are what we might call the traditional self. In other words, the successive

perceptions we experience are like actors on a stage that “pass, re-pass, glide away, and

mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations.” We are not seeing a single person

on the stage, but a series of actors that we mistake for, or accept as, a single entity, and                                                                                                                57 Unless otherwise specified, this section derives from David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Project Gutenberg, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4705/4705-h/4705-h.htm (accessed 3/24, 2014).

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

22

this applies whether we are looking at ourselves or at another. Paradoxically, he does

suggest that there is an introspective “I” doing the viewing, but he claims that this, too, is

only a perception. He reasons:

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other…. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist.

Though this mental performance has an audience, he leaves the nature of this audience

rather unclear. More problematically, the mind in which this mental performance occurs,

according to Hume, does not exist, “nor have we the most distant notion of the place,

where these scenes are represented, or of the materials, of which it is compos’d.” He does

not elaborate on this gap in his reasoning, and overall, Hume’s metaphor is quite vague

and leaves his readers with seemingly more questions than answers.

Hume claims that in our forging of successive perceptions “we often feign some

new and unintelligible principle, that connects the objects together, and prevents their

interruption or variation,” and this is where we “run into the notion of a soul, and self.”

By comparing the soul instead to a republic, however, Hume attempts to prove otherwise:

the continuity of a republic depends on the relations among, not the persistence of, its

parts.58 He discusses an example of a church that is destroyed and rebuilt of different

materials:

Here neither the form nor materials are the same, nor is there any thing common to the two objects, but their relation to the inhabitants of the parish; and yet this alone is sufficient to make us denominate them the same. But we must observe, that in these cases the first object is in a manner annihilated before the second comes into existence; by which means, we are never presented in any one point of time with the idea of difference and multiplicity; and for that reason are less

                                                                                                               58 Barresi and Martin, Soul and Self, 154.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

23

scrupulous in calling them the same.59

This scenario illustrates the mistake that we make in identifying human selves, as well.

For example, because Smith is always changing, we cannot assume that the Smith we

perceive is the same Smith we may have known five years ago, or seen five minutes ago.

In another metaphor, Hume compares the soul (or self; he uses these terms

synonymously) to a republic: the members of the republic (the successive perceptions

that we forge into a single entity) are united by their relationship to the government (or

one’s relationship to the memory of previous self perceptions) and give rise to other

persons (or perceptions), who propagate the same republic (or self conception) in the

incessant changes of its parts. “And as the same individual republic may not only change

its members, but also its laws and constitutions; in like manner the same person may vary

his character and disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his

identity. Whatever changes he endures, his several parts are still connected by the relation

of causation.” For republic and person alike, contiguity, resemblance, and causation

create the misconception that their identity remains constant. Hume’s problem with this

mistake is that he considered even the smallest change to a mass of matter as a

destruction of its identity as a whole. When the laws of a republic change, Hume would

consider it to be a new republic; when a person’s ideas change, a new person is formed.

In his words, “an oak, that grows from a small plant to a large tree is still [considered to

be] the same oak; tho’ there be not one particle of matter, or figure of its parts the same.”

Similarly problematic to Hume, infants undergo constant change as they grow into adults,

yet are misrecognized as an “uninterrupted” whole. Human beings do indeed constantly

                                                                                                               59 Hume, Treatise.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

24

change, even in material makeup, as does the church that is destroyed and rebuilt in

Hume’s example, but a persistent name masks this flux.

The responsibility for forging these connections between perceptions, according

to Hume, lies with the memory. If we had no memory, we would have no recollection of

previous perceptions of our self, and would therefore have no basis on which to build a

persisting identity. The memory creates a connection between the person doing the

remembering and the person in the memory because they resemble and succeed one

another. Yet like everything else, presumably, the brain is in constant flux as new

memories are added, but Hume does not address why a brain would relate such personal,

self-referential, and meaningful memories to the person doing the remembering if the

person in the memory is literally a different person from the one doing the remembering.

Memories are not only recollections of past events, but often carry with them emotional

valence. Why would our present selves experience, for example, embarrassment at

something that a different person did in the past? This is a weak point in Hume’s

argument that he does not address.

However, I posit that if the self truly does not exist, as Hume claims, we must still

assume the existence of some sort of self for practical reasons, and it is likely that Hume

recognized this because, although he considers it a mistake, he himself still calls the small

plant that grew into an oak the same oak. Strictly speaking, one cannot plausibly live

their life assuming that everything they encounter is something utterly new and foreign;

we would be forced to introduce ourselves repeatedly to people we’ve already met, and

we would live in constant fear and tension not having any idea how any given entity may

behave at any moment. Without assuming that my dog is the same friendly and well-

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

25

behaved dog I had yesterday, I would be perpetually nervous that he would bite me, and I

would have to constantly babysit him to ensure that he wouldn’t urinate on the carpet. It

would be incredibly time consuming, inefficient, and unproductive to live this way.

Therefore, we must feign some sort of persisting identity as a practical matter. This

makes Hume’s position a bit clearer, but it does not answer the question of why, if we are

truly only feigning a connection between perceptions, we would feel embarrassment for

something that another self did. Thus, his position on the self remains vague.

For the purposes of this paper, I will assume that contemporary people with a

Humean view of self recognize this necessity of a practical, if illusory, self, and do not

live their lives in the way described above.

A Humean conception of self, then, presents a radically different framework from

that of Descartes to which one may apply antidepressants. Within his theory,

antidepressants would have no bearing upon a soul or self, because they do not exist. The

effects they could have on one’s body would be seemingly inconsequential, as one does

not possess a single body, but rather, the changes that the body undergoes while taking

antidepressants would contribute to the incessant change already taking place that render

the body different from the one that immediately preceded it. On the other hand, the

successive bodies perceived will alter what one’s memory has for connecting, and the

practical self with which one identifies would indeed change, which may cause anxiety,

guilt, or confusion. But a true Humean would know that these connections are only

feigned, so this view of self does not attribute much importance to the maintenance of a

specific identity, nor does it lend much weight to the idea of a sacred self deserving of

preservation. Therefore, a contemporary antidepressant user holding a strictly Humean

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

26

view of the self would not likely be concerned with their decision to do so because they

would not believe that the person who took the antidepressants to be the same person that

feels their results, so they would also have no reason to feel conflicted about their identity

or its authenticity.

However, an antidepressant user would still undoubtedly feel the effects of the

antidepressants in one way or another, and although memory would create the impression

that the person who took the drug is the same person who experiences its effects, a

Humean antidepressant user would know this to be an illusion. This appears to be

beneficial to antidepressant users as it relieves them of guilt for their decision and it

allows them to believe that their essence remains unthreatened by antidepressants

because it does not exist. However, how would they cope with the fact that they are

feeling the results of something a past person has done to them? Again, Hume leaves this

unanswered.

With one’s existence being a succession of different selves, there is no pressure to

maintain one’s identity or to come to know oneself because the self’s constant change

would render the endeavor useless. However, having a Humean conception of self seems

to create confusion and anxiety in its own way by giving people first-person memories of

literally different people. I could posit that what Hume really means is that some part of

us does persist and we should just not take the idea of the self so seriously because of

how often it changes, which seems to be the only plausible explanation for the

unanswered question of memory. There is no evidence to support this, though, as he

spoke in quite literal terms throughout his work and gave no indication that he was

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

27

anything but serious.60  Antidepressants, then can provide much-needed psychological

relief without the guilt and confusion to a Humean depressive, but only if they can come

to grips with their first-person memories of endless people.

But there are further problems with Hume’s conception of self: it does not tell us

how different a self is from any other external object. When he defines the self as

“nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other

with an inconceivable rapidity,” he does not differentiate the self from other things we

perceive. Yet experiencing oneself is a different phenomenon than experiencing a table:

we experience how a table looks to us, and how it feels to the touch, but we do not

experience the table itself independently of our perception. We don’t know what it is to

be a table. He does talk about the role of memory in creating a link between past and

present selves, but memory also creates a link between past and present objects and

people other than oneself. Why is the experience of being oneself so different from our

experience of the external world? Like Descartes and Heidegger, I argue that being in

one’s own body and having one’s own mind is a unique experience because of its

reflexivity and subjectivity and its “sense of “always-being-my-own-being” and

“ownness.” We can reflect upon ourselves, and notice and account for changes in

ourselves.

Another problem lies with Hume’s republic metaphor in which he claims that a

person does not maintain a persistent identity, since they change in so many ways and so

often. I agree that we are constantly in flux, but this does not destroy our identities and

                                                                                                               60 To give one example of this, he quotes in his Treatise: “If any one, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection thinks he has a different notion of himself [than the one I suggest], I must confess I call reason no longer with him.”

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

28

create new ones. Hume does not characterize the successive perceptions that make up his

illusory self, but they are inconceivably rapid, as he says, which would seem to mean that

each self, so to speak, lasts only a miniscule amount of time before it is destroyed and

replaced by another. I argue instead that the self is changing, but continuous, and memory

allows us access to past versions of ourselves and lets us know that phenomenologically

we are the same person, if changed, that we were in the past, even if colloquially we

sometimes say that we are “different people” now than we were before. Hume did not

address why a brain would relate such personal, self-referential, and meaningful

memories to the person doing the remembering if the person in the memory is an

altogether different person from the one doing the remembering, which significantly

weakens his argument as well. The self is real and practical, while Hume’s conception

gives us no practical way to complete day-to-day activities and interactions by making

identities unnecessarily confusing and temporary.

Heidegger conceptualized the self as something much larger than any individual

person. For him, the self is a mode of being, which he called Dasein. He outlines this

concept in Being and Time. Although the 500-page book is devoted to explaining what it

means to exist, I will keep my analysis as simple, but as accurate, as possible.

Heidegger sought to erase the distinction between person and world. He argued

that they form a single entity, but that the world and the person constantly affect one

another. The world, in this sense, is not necessarily the earth, but rather, the group or

community or place in which one finds oneself at a particular time. Thus, the immediacy

of the things and people surrounding a person at a certain point in time constitutes their

world and, therefore, the possibility of selves they can actualize: “The everyday

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

29

possibilities of being of Da-sein are at the disposal of the whims of the others. These

others are not definite others. On the contrary, any other can represent them.”61 The

“others” he refers to are the people and relationships that occur in a world, and they are

not definite, meaning they vary between times and worlds. Alternatively phrased,

“[e]veryday Da-sein derives the pre-ontological interpretation of its being from the

nearest kind of being of the they.”62 This means that (in the inauthentic mode of being,

which I will explain momentarily) we determine who we are based on who and what

surrounds us.

Furthermore, “one belongs to the others oneself,”63 which illustrates the

connection Heidegger draws between a person and their world in the constitution of the

self. Although for him the “inauthentic” “they-self” is a mode of being characterized by

not distinguishing oneself from the others, the “authentic being [of] one’s self is not...a

state detached from the they, but is an existentiell [sic] modification of the they as an

essential existential.”64 In other words, the authentic self is not the annihilation of the

they-self, but a modification of it to include the awareness and distinction of oneself

amongst the crowd. One must be a part of, but acutely distinct from, the world in order to

exist authentically.

A sense of “always-being-my-own-being” is a central characteristic of Dasein, of

authentic existence. It is the awareness of one’s ownness, as distinct from the

                                                                                                               61 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996) 118-119.

62 Ibid., 121.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid., 122.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

30

inauthenticity of a consciousness in which one is lost in the crowd and unaware of one’s

individual existence. We tend to become so engrossed in everyday life, surrounded by

other people and things, that we lose consciousness of our very existence, and indeed

become aware of ourselves only as others see us. “The self of everyday Da-sein is the

they-self which we distinguish from the authentic self, the self which has explicitly

grasped itself.”65 But, he claims, “the inauthenticity of Da-sein does not signify a “lesser”

being or a “lower” degree of being.”66 Hence Heidegger merely describes what it means

to be, without ascribing any moral value to it. He postulates that we are all inauthentic

“initially,” and eventually come to be authentic once we understand Dasein, from which

point authenticity and inauthenticity alternate; but “Da-sein is the they and for the most

part it remains so,”67 since for most of our time we are not consciously aware of our

existence or of its nature as constitutively dependent on the surrounding world.

Furthermore, Heidegger believed in and emphasized the importance of choices in

the formation of the self: “he argues that our ordinary feelings of guilt bear witness to the

fact that as we make choices, we are always actualizing one possible self at the expense

of others.”68 For example, if I were to steal money from a friend, the guilt I would feel

would illustrate the possibility that I could have acted otherwise, and in so doing,

actualized a different self than the one I chose to actualize.69 Possibilities are an important

aspect of Heidegger’s idea of an “authentic” self. For Heidegger, “Da-sein is always its                                                                                                                65 Ibid., 121.

66 Ibid., 40.

67 Ibid., 121.

68 Barresi and Martin, Soul and Self, 234.

69 This also emphasizes how the self is a relation to the world rather than a separate entity in it.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

31

possibility. It does not ‘have’ that possibility only as a mere attribute of something

objectively present,”70 but the very awareness of different possibilities characterizes and

makes Dasein possible. “And because Da-sein is always essentially its possibility, it can

‘choose’ itself in its being.”71 To exist authentically, then, is to choose from among, and

perhaps create, these possibilities. In inauthentic existence, one’s possibilities are

determined by the others, the they, rather than by oneself. One is not aware of their

possibilities, and in their unawareness they let the others dictate their life.

By applying antidepressants to this conception of self, I will also put Heidegger’s

idea into a more accessible, everyday setting. According to him, the varied collection of

people and things in a person’s world make up their self and affect the possibility of

selves they can actualize. When I move around a room, for example, the furniture in that

room affects my self spatially because I cannot actualize a self that moves about the room

as if it were empty. I only have so many options as to which spatial self to actualize.

Antidepressants are also a part of one’s world, and their existence creates the possibility

of taking them, or of not taking them. To be authentic, a depressed person must be aware

of this possibility and make a decision. But would this decision itself affect the

authenticity of one’s self?

Although Heidegger did not use “authenticity” in the most conventional way, we

can still see its relevance in an everyday setting. The argument that authenticity comes

from being aware of one’s own self amongst the crowd and not solely based on our

surroundings seems to suggest that the self comes from within and without rather than

                                                                                                               70 Heidegger, Being and Time, 40.

71 Ibid.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

32

strictly from without. One must choose their mode of existence amongst many

possibilities. Heidegger may also mean that to exist authentically, we must, to some

extent, choose our possibilities themselves. For example, by rearranging the furniture in a

room, we are actualizing a different set of possibilities of motion about that room.

Inauthentic existence would be to allow the world to dictate the sets of possibilities we

have. Although choosing our possibilities in the context of antidepressants seems less

possible than in the context of furniture, one can still be aware of, and choose from, the

possibilities that are given. If one chooses to take antidepressants, one must be aware of

the influence of the outside world, in this case antidepressants, but also recognize one’s

self as separate and distinct from them. This means that one must recognize their identity

as a depressed person and be conscious of the effects of the antidepressants on their self,

including its future possibilities.

Since Heidegger does not ascribe moral value to the difference between

authenticity and inauthenticity, it seems that taking antidepressants would be morally

blameless regardless of whether or not one is acting authentically. Since he argues that

for the most part our existence is inauthentic anyway, we can discard any moral concern

in taking antidepressants.

However, as the others do constantly affect the self, one may run into the problem

of a negative perception of antidepressants, which would affect their self if that negativity

enters their world somehow, whether it is from a person or one’s culture. Even before one

is confronted with the choice of taking or not taking antidepressants, they will have

entered one’s world simply by one’s being aware of their existence. Most people will

have a pre-existing notion of antidepressants before the antidepressants enter their world

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

33

in a more concrete way. Even if there is no moral concern to being authentic, one may

perceive a moral concern in taking antidepressants, which may constrict one’s perceived

possibilities, and in this way, one is letting the world dictate their possibilities, rather than

creating them oneself. In other words, I may immediately dismiss, without thought, the

idea of taking antidepressants because of a negative perception caused by the they. If this

were the case, I would be existing inauthentically. Because I do not consider this

possibility, I am letting the world dictate what is possible for me, rather than choosing my

own possibilities and allowing for the possibility of taking them, even if I eventually

decide not to.

The Heideggerian worlds (surrounding places, people, cultures, etc.) in which we

find ourselves affect the possibilities of selves we can actualize; different worlds allow

for different possibilities. Heidegger’s position resembles my own because I argue that

the self is in constant flux, and to some degree, we control that flux, and he argues that

we can choose our worlds, which greatly affect our self. Heidegger’s claim that “worlds”

affect the self is quite similar to my claim that culture and other people affect the self, as

all of these things are part of Heidegger’s world.

However, I do not wish to erase the distinction between person and world as

Heidegger does. I concede that they do affect each other, and they occupy the same

space. But they are not one and the same. I live in and am a part of the world, and the

world affects me. Even if I were to leave the earth and travel through space, I would still

be entering a different world that would affect me, and my presence would affect that

world, if only spatially. Worlds are constantly changing and inescapable because we

always find ourselves in a world of some kind. Death may be an exception to this, as

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

34

death, for Heidegger, is the possibility of the impossibility of Dasein. For this reason,

person and world must be separable: even if one ceases to experience the world, the

world still continues its existence. One’s physical body remains in the world forever,

though not in the same form as when it was alive, so I do not agree that the world is

merely a subjective experience that ceases with loss of consciousness. Person and world

must be separable, though they have close ties.

Thinking about Heidegger’s particular use of the term ‘authenticity,’ though

problematic, can still yield beneficial results for antidepressant users. Today, authenticity

is typically understood as a certain realness and manner of being true to oneself while for

Heidegger, it is a consciousness of oneself as a distinct part of the larger world. The

subtle difference between the two is that an ‘authentic self’ is not one that acts according

to cultural ideas of innate individuality, but one that recognizes its distinctness from the

crowd. Seeing authenticity this way makes the idea of antidepressants possibly disturbing

one’s ‘authentic’ self nonsensical, because antidepressants would have the opposite

effect: antidepressants can help its users awaken from their inauthentic slumber and

become more conscious of their unique and distinct being. As antidepressants tend to

give this kind of clarity to its users, it may be seen as helping one achieve authenticity.

Despite the probable irrelevance of this atypical understanding of authenticity to

antidepressant users with a goal of authenticity in the traditional sense, this would still

seem to be a beneficial result.

Charles Taylor defines the self largely through the context of the “ethic of

authenticity,” which he calls a “powerful moral ideal that has come down to us”72 through

                                                                                                               72 Taylor, Ethics of Authenticity, 29.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

35

the history of our culture. This ethic of authenticity is grounded in the idea that one’s self

can only be articulated and discovered by the self-same person, and not by others. But the

“ideal of self-choice…couldn’t stand alone, because it requires a horizon of issues of

importance, which help define the respects in which self-making is significant.”73 Hence,

Taylor does not accept this ideal to be the only determining factor in the constitution and

development of the self. Though he acknowledges that there are certain ways of being

that are unique to each of us, he emphasizes the importance of those who matter to us—

George’s Herbert Mead’s “significant others”—in the formation of the self.74

Taylor’s self must first be defined against horizons (backgrounds of things that

matter in a given culture), and then by oneself within the context of these horizons. If we

attempt to define ourselves in ways that are not intelligible to our culture or significant

others, our identity will not be recognized.75 For example, if I tried to define myself by

the color of socks that I wear on a Monday, people would not recognize my identity. I

would first have to consider whether the color of socks one wears on a Monday is a

significant factor to one’s identity before I could try to define myself by it. If, on the

other hand, my culture were one in which the color of socks one wears on a Monday was

valuable and relevant, then whatever color I chose to wear would be a part of my identity.

But although I can choose what color of socks I wear on Mondays, I can’t choose

whether or not it matters, no matter how I may feel about the importance of my decision.

                                                                                                               73 Ibid., 39-40.

74 Ibid., 33.

75 Taylor uses “self,” “mind,” and “identity” interchangeably.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

36

So neither can I choose whether it really constitutes part of my identity. Horizons are not

chosen by individuals, Taylor claims, but “given” to us by our culture and surroundings.

Taylor also claims that in our “culture of authenticity,” there are “certain demands

inherent in the ideal of authenticity” that we must reconcile with the “dialogical feature of

our condition.”76 He writes:

We are expected to develop our own opinions, outlook, stances to things, to a considerable degree through solitary reflection. But this is not how things work with important issues, such as the definition of our identity. We define this always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the identities our significant others want to recognize in us.77

For example, a father may want his son to follow in his footsteps and be a successful

lawyer, and the son may fight this desire, begrudgingly starting law school but eventually

quitting to pursue his own dreams to be a therapist, forcing his father to see him as such,

and not as a future lawyer. Although Taylor claims that our identity is dependent upon

recognition, he also maintains that we define it, albeit within these parameters. However,

notice that despite forming our “opinions, outlook, and stances to things,” they do not

(necessarily) make up a part of the self: Taylor later outlines what he does consider

important to the self as the following: “history, nature, society, the demands of solidarity,

[and] everything but what I find in myself.”78 Although unclear, the idea seems to be this:

What we find within ourselves consist of things like our opinions and preferences, which

we don’t really choose; we rather just find ourselves drawn to them. Since we can’t

choose these things, they don’t significantly differentiate us from others. It is instead the

                                                                                                               76 Ibid., 35.

77 Ibid., 33.

78 Ibid., 40-41.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

37

things we are able to choose that matter to our identities, but only if the things we choose

have significance to some aspect of life beyond one’s inner life. Essentially, the things

that make up the self are the things that we choose, just by virtue of being chosen rather

than given. Choice is a horizon only against other horizons. The authentic self, then, may

be discovered by recognizing this fact and defining one’s self within this framework.

“Authenticity is not the enemy of demands that emanate from beyond the self; it supposes

such demands.”79

Finally, Taylor says that the self evolves and undergoes change, but persists

nonetheless. In his words,

Identities do in fact change, but we form them as the identity of a person who has partly lived and will complete the living of a whole life. I don’t define an identity for “me in 1991,” but rather try to give meaning to my life as it has been and as I project it further on the basis of what it has been.80

Hence, our memories and our ideas for the future enable the persistence and continuity of

the self through time. Horizons, again, partly determine “meaning” he refers to, without

which one cannot define their self.

In order to analyze the effects of antidepressants on a self within Taylor’s

framework, we must ask the question: Would taking antidepressants constitute a horizon

of significance? Although Taylor does not clearly define what counts as a horizon beyond

something that has “human significance,” the answer would seem to be yes: Although

depression, according to most, is not a choice, treating it with antidepressants is, so an

antidepressant user with a Taylorian conception of self would likely consider this to be

significant to their identity, and something that would be recognizable to others as such.                                                                                                                79 Ibid.

80 Ibid., 52-53.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

38

Antidepressants have been a hot topic for decades, which seems to speak to their human

significance. Hence, I will consider antidepressants as a horizon of significance. Now that

we have established that antidepressants constitute part of one’s identity, how do they

affect it from a Taylorian standpoint? One’s significant others and culture will shape, to a

large degree, how one feels about their decision.

American culture values independence, perseverance, and meritocracy, and some

see antidepressants as a threat to these values. Antidepressant users sometimes worry that

because they take antidepressants, they do not earn their accomplishments entirely on

their own if they are taking antidepressants, because the antidepressants helped them or

gave them an advantage, which threatens both meritocracy and independence. Moreover,

depression may be seen as something that can be dealt with through perseverance, and

drugs fly in the face of perseverance if one believes that drugs are an easy way out. These

cultural values affect the ways in which one’s significant others see them, so taking

antidepressants may have negative effects on one’s self-conception if those significant

others do not support the decision based on reasons culturally-defined or otherwise,

because “identity can be formed or malformed in our contact with significant others.”81

There is, of course, the possibility that others will be supportive of one’s decision

to take antidepressants. Advertisements for antidepressants can be found everywhere, and

a society that views many problems through a medical lens is more likely to accept the

problem of depression, and therefore the medical solution of antidepressants. Some

claim, however, that the invention of diseases follow the invention of cures: depression

was much more widely regarded as a medical problem after the invention of Prozac, and

                                                                                                               81 Ibid., 49.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

39

therefore depression is only a real issue because we call it so and because we can treat it.

If it can be treated, then it’s a problem, as the mentality goes. But from Taylor’s

perspective, the fact that it matters to our culture means that it matters to individuals and

their identity. We return to the issue then, of how it can affect these individuals.

Suppose a person decides to take antidepressants after visiting the prescribing

doctor or psychiatrist, who was accepting and supportive of his depression. But after

informing some of his friends and family of his decision, he begins to question it because

they don’t recognize his depression and don’t support his decision. 82 Their refusal to

recognize his identity as someone who is depressed and needs medical help can be

detrimental to his self-conception. As Taylor puts it, this refusal “can inflict damage on

those who are denied it, according to a widespread modern view. The projecting of an

inferior or demeaning image on another can actually distort and oppress, to the extent that

it is interiorized.”83 For example, women often interiorize cultural expectations of them

and begin to see, judge, and critique themselves through the eyes of others. Body

shaming is an effective advertising strategy for women’s weight loss because it makes

ordinary women feel inadequate for not living up to the cultural ideal of immaculate

beauty, thinness, and youth. Antidepressant users, then, are also susceptible to this

phenomenon if they find themselves with a particular group of people or belong to a

particular culture that stigmatizes antidepressants.

Overall, a Taylorian conception of self highly depends on one’s surroundings to

determine the effects of antidepressants on a self. Because of the susceptibility of the self

                                                                                                               82 For an excellent example of a misunderstanding of depression, see Allie Brosh, "Depression Part Two," http://hyperboleandahalf.blogspot.com/2013/05/depression-part-two.html (accessed 3/25, 2014).

83 Taylor, Ethics of Authenticity, 49-50.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

40

to surroundings, however, there is quite a danger of running into negative points of view

that can be psychologically damaging. In a culture that exalts authenticity and makes it a

moral standard, making the choice to take antidepressants, and thereby altering one’s way

of being, seems wrong to many people, often including the antidepressant users

themselves. This perceived wrongness causes, and in fact defines, feelings of guilt. This

is an obvious problem for antidepressant users who subscribe to this self-theory, and it’s

not the only problem Taylor’s theory of self has, both for antidepressant users and in and

of itself.

While Taylor abides by the standard, contemporary idea of authenticity as the

moral ideal of being true to oneself, I claim that authenticity is an irrelevant measure of

one’s self because authenticity is already embedded in every person’s every action. For

example, if I feel that I’m being fake or untrue to myself around certain people, I’m still

making the decision to pretend, and the decision to actualize that possibility over another

reveals something about my character and, therefore, my self. Being authentic is not

optional, but constant and unceasing; therefore, it would be a mistake to tell someone that

they are being inauthentic, or for a person to search for and strive to be their authentic

self. Taylor is wrong because he assumes that one can be inauthentic by acting out of

character, when actually, every endeavor and every choice and every action is authentic

by its very nature.

Though this conception of authenticity may not constitute a horizon of

significance for Taylor, and though I agree with Taylor that horizons play a role in the

development of the self, I argue that they are not necessary for defining the self because

one does not have to accept another’s self for it to be a true self. Feminist philosopher

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

41

bell hooks chooses not to capitalize her name, which goes against linguistic and cultural

rules. Naturally, hooks’ wishes to have her name in lowercase are not always heeded. But

even when she is not gratified, her unconventional choice still has meaning to her and

plays a significant part in how she views, defines, and evaluates herself, and as Taylor

claims and I concur, the self is largely self-defined. However, the self does not need to be

defined within the parameters that Taylor outlines; the self is affected by, but does not

depend on, recognition by others. I believe that he overstates the significance of

recognition by others in the development of the self.

Though Taylor emphasizes the effects of others on the self, he also acknowledges

that there are certain ways of being that are unique to each of us, which seems to be an

implicit acknowledgement that we have inherent qualities that are unique to us and

perhaps unchangeable. I include genes and one’s natural disposition in my theory of self,

and this could perhaps be what Taylor is referring to. I believe I am a naturally kind

person because in my daily life I do not consciously choose to be kind to people; it comes

easily and automatically. But to Taylor, this would not be a significant part of my identity

because I didn’t choose it. To me, however, this is still a significant part of my identity

because I see it as a defining factor of me, as do others. People choose their jobs, but this

is often based on one’s interests, which one does not choose either. Yet people often say

things like “I am a teacher” rather than “My occupation is teaching” because they identify

with their choices even though they’re driven by interests, which one cannot control. So,

choices actually go hand in hand with preferences, although we sometimes make choices

against our preferences and dispositions. Even when we do so, we are still being

authentic and these choices set us apart from the crowd in a significant way.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

42

As a whole, these philosophers’ theories of self neglect many important factors of

the self, though collectively they touch on nearly every aspect of my own conception of

self. A Cartesian self is an immaterial mind/soul that exists independently of one’s body,

but the mind and body compose “a certain unity” such that they affect one another. A

Humean self is illusory, a succession of different perceptions that we mistakenly forge

into a single entity, which we call a soul, mind, or self. An authentic Heideggerian self, or

Dasein, is a state of being in which one is explicitly aware of the nature of one’s

existence; that is, as a part of an always-changing world of which the self is composed

and from which the self is inseparable. Finally, Taylor posits that the self is dialogical,

largely self-made, and the result of choices, but also subject to the constraints of

“horizons” of significance; in other words, it is also culturally and socially defined. A

complete conception of self will include what it is, what affects it, and its relationship to

time, and none of these philosophers adequately include each of these aspects in their

theories.

I claim that a self is a person as the object of reflective and introspective thought.

It is the result of a collection of things that make up and affect the way we view

ourselves. In addition, a self depends on our ability to reflect on our existence and

differentiate our existence from that of others. As such, a self is subjective and personal;

only introspection affords us access to it, and no other person can experience, or define,

that particular self. Although the self is open to outside influence, its subjective nature

renders it essentially unknowable to others. If someone were to tell me that I am funny,

this could likely impact my view of my self; however, I may also disagree with that

assessment. Even if all my friends think I’m funny but I disagree, I am unlikely to truly

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

43

believe that I am funny because I don’t feel it within myself. I may be flattered by the

compliments and allow them their opinions, but if I don’t find myself funny, I can’t

change that by will. However, this conception of myself may change as I come to find

myself funny. In this case, my self would be funny after this change in self-perception

occurred, and not funny before. I can’t define myself as funny without actually believing

that I am funny. Conversely, I may think I’m hilarious, but if nobody else laughs at my

jokes, my conception of myself could change as a result. But whether or not my self is

funny is the result of my own thoughts, feelings, and ideas, and though other people may

have an idea about my wit or lack thereof, how they see my humor is a part of their self,

not mine.

In this way, our own thoughts and feelings create the self. These thoughts and

feelings manifest themselves in the brain and the brain is an integral part of our existence

and consciousness. Based on this knowledge, our self is an idea deeply connected to, if

not embedded in, the brain, which houses memories, genes, physiological processes,

emotions, thoughts, sensory perception, and almost endless information. It is important to

note, however, that people can be wrong about their self in certain respects. For example,

how would an alcoholic who believes that his drinking is under control fit into this model

of self? He may be engaged in self-deception here, but the self is not completely formed

by one’s own self-view. The self is formed and affected by multifarious influences.

Without delving into mereology, I claim that the self is a single, cohesive person,

but with many constitutive parts. One’s genes, physiology, experiences, and culture are

part of the self, as well as one’s past, present, and future. The self remains unified

throughout one’s lifetime, and one’s past is part of the self because it happened to this

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

44

unified self and it affected the present self. One’s future is part of the self in the way that

one imagines it. Thinking about one’s future is a present activity that affects the present

self, but it also impacts one’s future, often in significant ways. Because the self is an

entity unified through time, the past, present, and future are all important to it.

This leads me to the next section of conceptualizing the self: what affects it?

Many things have the capacity to affect the self because everything we experience goes

through the brain. I will expand on several key factors that affect the self: genes, culture,

physiology, and experience. This list is by no means exhaustive, but it outlines what I see

as the main points of importance.

Genes affect many of our dispositions and personality traits that in turn influence

how we view ourselves. Although genes do not determine behavioral traits, they increase

the likelihood of the manifestation of those traits. Our behavioral traits, of course, affect

the way we see ourselves. I may view myself as careful, angry, or intelligent, and these

traits all have implications for those who either carry them or see themselves that way.

Genes can also affect the self in a more indirect way. They affect physical traits such as

skin color, which can influence how we view ourselves in several ways. Skin color

determines our susceptibility to skin cancer, which may affect our behavior in the

sunlight, which may also lead us to believe that we are cautious or careless or carefree.

Skin color also, when mixed with American culture, has significant implications on how

others view a person, and how one views oneself. Stereotypes accompany every race and

can be psychologically damaging.

The way a culture views an individual impacts that individual’s view of their self

significantly. To use a broad example, Western culture promotes individualism while

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

45

Eastern culture tends to promote communality and collectivism. Thus, Americans tend to

think of themselves as individual people with their own personal goals and will go to

great lengths to achieve them, even at the expense of friendships, family, romantic

relationships, and the community at large. On the other hand, someone from the Eastern

world is more likely to identify themselves in relation to those in their community, and

priority goes toward the group rather than themselves.

Physiology undoubtedly affects the self as well. Since antidepressants and the self

are the theme of this paper, I will use antidepressants to show how they affect the self

physiologically. Depressed people may think of themselves as, for example, pessimistic

because of the constant dissatisfaction in their lives. But taking antidepressants can alter

the brain’s chemistry in a way that allows a depressed person to see more positivity in the

world, thus changing their outlook not only on life, but on their self as well. Broadly

speaking, eating and exercising can also physiologically alter a person, even if only

temporarily, and can change how one views oneself, if only temporarily. One’s physical

appearance influences the self as well (this also applies to the genetics section), whether

one is indifferent to or heavily invested in it.

One’s life experiences and memories also affect the self, and the other people in

one’s life constitute a significant portion of this category. One’s upbringing, for example,

has a significant impact on the self, often into adulthood. Growing up in an abusive

household may damage one’s psyche and self-esteem; children whose parents teach them

good manners may adopt a polite disposition; travelling abroad may change one’s values;

being cheated on may make it hard to trust another; and an impoverished childhood may

instill frugality. All of these effects may last only a short while or last a lifetime, but they

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

46

all affect our self-conception, whether by affecting how we perceive our roles, our self-

worth, our values, or our traits.

Finally, a good theory of self must include the self’s relationship to time. On this

note, I argue two things: that the self is very susceptible to change, and that its essence

always remains the same. My explanation of the four factors above, I hope, have

effectively shown the malleability of the self. It is so malleable, in fact, that the ideal of

authenticity becomes irrelevant because changes are so frequent, natural, and often

unnoticed. The ideal of authenticity rests on the assumption that we have one permanent,

enduring self that has essential, unchanging properties. But the self’s essence does not

come from having certain traits that vary from person to person. Even though my tastes,

traits, appearance, genetic expression, and even my name may change, I still firmly

identify as the person who experiences the world as I do. With time comes many

changes, but through time the essence of the self is permanent; our memories and our

ideas for the future create this permanence through all of the changes the self endures.

The self is like a planet: though the earth constantly rotates and changes, it nevertheless

remains the same earth, though changed, as its location in time and space changes. I am

not suggesting that our change or movement is cyclical, but the metaphor shows how a

person can change and move while remaining essentially the same. To carry the metaphor

further, just as Earth has a center of gravity that holds everything together, our “center of

gravity” is our reflective and subjective introspection. Our ability to continually think

about ourselves, remember our past, and project our future allows for our continuity.

Even if that experience changes, I do not forget my past experiences, and the anticipation

of my continued existence propels my self into the future. “I will get married one day” is

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

47

quite a different statement than, “The person that I will be one day will be married, but I

will not.” The former is a projection of one’s continued self into the future, and the latter

discredits any connection between a present self and a future self, and regards change in a

Humean way. Because we typically say the former and not the latter, I am inclined to

believe that this way of thinking of the self comes habitually to us. Whether or not one

believes in life after death, the self continues at least throughout one’s lifespan on Earth;

the connection we feel with our bodies binds us to the physical world, and our brains

illuminate our essence as thinking things. Our consciousness may cease with death and

resume in a different form, but the self as we know it within the context of our lives on

Earth exists only with the body and ceases with the body.

Antidepressants are of some consequence to its users within my conception of self

for several reasons. For one, they will notice a change, for better or worse, in their

dispositions and moods; but this change can quickly grow. Though several categories of

things affect the self, they are all intimately connected with one another; for example,

with antidepressants typically comes an improved mood, which often results in an

improved outlook, which creates changes in ideas, perceptions, opinions, and demeanor,

all of which alter one’s experiences. Antidepressants create a chain reaction, and the

process begins physiologically. But this change, though perhaps greater in magnitude, is

no different in nature from, for example, eating a meal. A meal alters our physiology and

can improve our mood, and even the whole trajectory of our day, as can exercise or

meditation or a headache. We constantly undergo physiological change, and taking an

antidepressant each day is just part of that process for people with depression.

Furthermore, authenticity does not exist for selves because, as I showed earlier, it is

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

48

impossible to act inauthentically, so worry of inauthenticity as a result of this

physiological change is unwarranted.

Like any philosophical theory of the self, mine probably has its ambiguities. But

like any other philosophical idea, the self is elusive and difficult to define. The biggest

possible problem with my conception of self that I can see is that an antidepressant user

might say, “I feel inauthentic, like I’m not myself.” Although it is difficult to deny

another’s subjective experience of themselves, and although they may really feel this

way, they are actually misinterpreting their feelings. The antidepressant user simply

experiences a version of themselves, or a particular combination of the factors that affect

the self, that they find unpleasant. Because people have often spent many years feeling a

certain way (clinically depressed) before they began taking the medication, they feel

estranged from their previous self—the self they are used to experiencing. This novelty of

experience can be unsettling, but it usually passes. Antidepressants can take up to six

weeks to fully work, and in the meantime, the effects on the user’s mood are often quite

unpleasant and exacerbate the problem, so people often quit before the real positive

changes happen because of the discomfort they feel. The self, though a singular and

continuous thing, can go through drastic changes with antidepressants, creating the sense

of being a ‘new person;’ and because the self so easily changes, we may say that we have

different ‘versions’ of ourselves. These are not actually different selves: the

antidepressant self still has the same memories of childhood and of depression, but it has

greatly changed. I am not arguing that antidepressants are for everyone. Some people

truly prefer feeling the way they felt before, and that is fine. The point is that it is a matter

of preference, not of authenticity, and of choice, not of morality.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

49

In this paper I have posed a problem: people often feel guilty, anxious, and

confused about their ‘authentic self’ and the decision to take antidepressants. In

researching this topic, I found a surprising lack of clarity in most writers’ definitions of

self when discussing antidepressants. This creates a general incoherence in the discussion

and provides little help to someone with these concerns. Furthermore, expressing these

concerns often poses the issue as a moral problem (the ethic of authenticity), when it is

actually a definitional one. I have shown the ethic of authenticity to be irrelevant when

we properly define the self. The real problem is having assumed, vague, and inarticulate

conceptions of self that do not allow for a proper understanding of antidepressants, which

no doubt partly results from the inadequate clarity in the discussion. In treating five

definitions of self before explaining the effects of antidepressants on those selves, I have

shown the clarity that becomes possible in discussing this issue. Descartes, Hume,

Heidegger, and Taylor present theories of self, however, that range from incomplete to

inaccurate. My definition of self is comprehensive and allows peace of mind for the

segment of antidepressant users who are concerned with authenticity.

Understanding my conception of self, antidepressant users may come to feel no

guilt, shame, anxiety, or confusion, especially if these concerns come from accepting the

ideal of authenticity, which they often do. This conception of self can allow

antidepressant users to critically assess their situation with depression and antidepressants

and make whatever decisions they feel are best for their own self without the concern of

authenticity muddling their decisions. My conception of the self can alleviate concerns

about authenticity because I have shown authenticity to be irrelevant; it is impossible to

be inauthentic, no matter what we do. Depression is a biological, physiological, and

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

50

perhaps genetic, condition that is authentic in and of itself, and seeking relief

understandably appeals to its victims. Depending on one’s personality and how their self

has been affected throughout their life, one may or may not choose antidepressants as a

solution. But in the event that one does choose this route, concerns about authenticity are

baseless because antidepressants are merely another physiological influence on the self.

The decision to take them is as understandable and authentic as any other action we take

to seek a happier self.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           Kilpack

51

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