The moral self: A review and integration of the...

The moral self: A review and integration ofthe literature

PETER L. JENNINGS1*,†, MARIE S. MITCHELL2† AND SEAN T. HANNAH3

1Leavey School of Business, Santa Clara University, Santa Clara, California, U.S.A.2Terry College of Business, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia, U.S.A.3School of Business, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, U.S.A.

Summary The role of the self in moral functioning has gained considerable theoretical and empirical attention over thelast 25 years. A general consensus has emerged that the self plays a vital role in individuals’ moral agency.This surge of research produced a proliferation of constructs related to the moral self, each grounded indiverse theoretical perspectives. Although this work has advanced our understanding of moral thought andbehavior, there has also been a lack of clarity as to the nature and functioning of the moral self. We reviewand synthesize empirical research related to the moral self and provide an integrative framework to increaseconceptual coherence among the various relevant constructs. We then discuss emerging opportunities andfuture directions for research on the moral self as well as implications for behavioral ethics in organizationalcontexts. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Keywords: moral self; moral identity centrality; moral judgment disposition; self-conscious moralorientation; self-conscious moral emotions; moral strength; moral functioning

The corruption and scandals that have plagued organizations in recent years have prompted significant interest in thestudy of ethical work behavior. Accounting for human moral functioning and behavior, however, has proven to be acomplex and difficult problem. Initial research relied heavily on Kohlberg’s (1969) cognitive moral developmenttheory, which emphasizes the importance of moral reasoning to explain ethical behavior. Indeed, research has shownthat cognitive moral development predicts moral behavior (see Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006 for a review) butthat the strength of these effects varies considerably and is modest at best (Blasi, 1980). This weak and inconsistentrelationship between moral judgment and moral behavior is known as the “judgment–action gap” (Walker, 2004, p. 1).This judgment–action gap motivated the search for more comprehensive theoretical frameworks in which moral psy-chologists (e.g., Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004) and, recently, organizational behavior ethics researchers (e.g., Treviñoet al., 2006), have focused on the moral self as the key to explaining the complexity of human moral functioning.We propose that a deeper understanding of what constitutes the moral self, and its development is essential to advancingresearch on ethical behavior in morally complex and challenging organizational contexts.Scholarly interest in the moral self traces back to Aristotle who expounded a holistic concept of the moral self

grounded in character and virtue (Solomon, 1992). Yet, it was only after Blasi (1983) introduced his “self model”of moral functioning that the topic gained momentum. Blasi sought to bridge the judgment–action gap by proposingthat moral action results from the integration of morality into one’s sense of self (e.g., Erikson, 1964). A person has amoral self to the extent that moral notions (e.g., moral values, ideals, goals, and concerns) are central to self-understanding (Blasi, 1993), which motivates felt responsibility to behave consistent with those notions. Blasi’smodel has proven to be foundational for moral self theory and launched the post-Kohlbergian era of scholarlywork (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2005). A surge of research followed (e.g., Aquino & Reed,2002; Haidt, 2001; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004). However, this work is not integrated into a holistic framework,

*Correspondence to: Peter L. Jennings, Leavy School of Business, Department of Management, Santa Clara University, 500 El Camino Real,Santa Clara, CA 95053, U.S.A. E-mail: [email protected]†Note that these authors are listed alphabetically and contributed equally.

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Received 02 May 2012

Revised 10 December 2013, Accepted 10 December 2013

Journal of Organizational Behavior, J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/job.1919

The

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which has created ambiguity about the nature of the moral self. Reviews (Hardy & Carlo, 2005; Narvaez &Lapsley, 2009; Shao, Aquino, & Freeman, 2008) and edited books (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Narvaez &Lapsley, 2009) have consolidated some aspects of this literature, but a review surveying empirical researchand its significance to ethical behavior in organizations is lacking.Our review seeks to bring clarity to the state of knowledge about the moral self and provide directions for future

research. We begin with an overview of the theory of the moral self and review empirical work that has explicitlyexamined the moral self as a focal construct. Our goals are to capture the main empirical findings associated withthe moral self that are relevant to organizations and synthesize these findings into an integrative framework. We alsodiscuss emerging opportunities and future research directions, with an emphasis on the implications for the nature ofthe moral self and its functioning in organizational contexts.

Theory of the Moral Self

Moral self research is based on the Aristotelian premise that morality is a characteristic of a person and not simply aresult of abstract moral reasoning (Blasi, 1993; Solomon, 1992). Morality is understood to be at the heart of what itmeans to be a person (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009). The moral self is concerned with the morality of selfhood (thequalities by virtue of which a person is oneself) that implicates both who a person is (a person’s sense of self andidentity based on deeply felt concerns, commitments, and attachments) and how a person acts (a person’s character-istic ways of thinking, feeling, and regulating behavior; Baumeister, 1987; Solomon, 1992). These ideas follow anontological tradition in moral philosophy and psychology, which posit that the self involves both a private dimen-sion rooted in the core of one’s being and a public dimension manifested in an orientation to be true to oneself inaction (Erikson, 1964; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975; James, 1892/2001; Schlenker, 1980; Solomon, 1992).Thus, moral self research has focused on explaining (i) how morality is internalized into a person’s sense of self,which we refer to as the “having” side of the moral self, and (ii) how that internalized morality influences cognitiveand affective self-regulatory capacities that govern decisions and behavior, which we refer to as the “doing” side ofthe moral self.The “having” side of the moral self is cognitively and socially constructed (Bandura, 1991; Harter, 1999). Social

construction occurs through roles, practices, and interpersonal interactions within the social-moral context in whicha person is embedded, such as family, community, or organization (Harter, 1999; Hunter, 2000). Cognitive construc-tion occurs through individuals’ beliefs about their self (i.e., self-concepts and identities) on the basis of socialinteractions that bring meaning to their experiences (Harter, 1999). When these socially and cognitively constructedbeliefs are based on morality, a person is understood as “having” a moral self.The “doing” side of the moral self emerges when these moral beliefs invoke self-relevant cognitions, evaluations,

emotions, and regulatory processes that motivate moral action (Aquino & Freeman, 2009). The “doing” side under-scores the executive agency of the self to take responsibility, make decisions, initiate actions, and exert control overitself and the environment (Baumeister, 1998). Without this executive function, the moral self would be a “merehelpless spectator of events, of minimal use or importance” (Baumeister, 1998, p. 680). Cognitive and affectiveself-regulatory capacities are essential to agency, governing nearly all the self’s activities, especially thoseconcerning morality (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994; Carver & Scheier, 1981; Higgins, 1996). As such,the “doing” side of the moral self has been described as a self-regulatory mechanism that motivates moral action(e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1984; Erikson, 1964; Hart, Atkins, & Ford, 1998).In sum, this “having” and “doing” conceptualization of the moral self implies that the moral self is not a stand-

alone construct or variable but is a complex amalgam of moral constructs and processes, wherein self-defining moralbeliefs, orientations, and dispositions implicate cognitive and affective self-regulatory capacities essential to moralaction. This holistic understanding reflects an emerging trend in both moral psychology (Narvaez & Lapsley,2009) and self psychology more generally (Baumeister, 1998; Leary & Tangney, 2012). Consistent with these ideas,

P. L JENNINGS ET AL.

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. (2014)DOI: 10.1002/job

we define the moral self as a complex system of self-defining moral attributes involving moral beliefs, orientations,dispositions, and cognitive and affective capacities that engage regulatory focus toward moral behavior.

Review of Empirical Research on the Moral Self

To be as comprehensive of the published empirical work as possible, we searched abstracts of published articlesappearing in EBSCO and ABI Inform databases, using search terms derived from our moral self definition and fur-ther targeted studies referring to one of the terms “moral” or “ethic.” Our review of the empirical research revealsfive categories of moral self constructs (moral centrality, moral judgment disposition, self-conscious moral orienta-tion, self-conscious moral emotions, and moral strength), which we depict in an emergent process model of themoral self (Figure 1). Below, we describe the five categories of moral self constructs and then summarize empiricalwork examining them. Our review describes research that empirically tested the specific constructs that fit within ourmoral self definition and does not include results of correlates outside of these moral self variables.

Emergent moral self constructs

The five categories of moral self constructs are as follows: (i) moral centrality (the degree to which morality is piv-otal to one’s self-understanding; e.g., moral identity and moral self-concept); (ii) moral judgment disposition (thestable tendency to take a specific moral perspective in decisions and action; e.g., ethical ideology and ethical predis-position); (iii) self-conscious moral orientation (an orientation to perceive and reflect on moral implications of one’sexperiences; e.g., moral attentiveness and moral sensitivity); (iv) self-conscious moral emotions (the degree to which

Figure 1. Synopsis of empirical work on the moral self

THE MORAL SELF


morality evokes evaluative and affective aspects of the self; e.g., guilt, shame and pride); and (v) moral strength (thedegree to which morality is an enduring quality that provides the capacity and conation [impetus to act] to achievemoral ends; e.g., moral potency and moral character).Constructs associated with moral centrality have received the most research attention in emergent moral self the-

ory. Constructs included in the other four categories are less researched and less frequently associated with moralself theory but nonetheless capture important aspects of the moral self. In particular, constructs associated with moraljudgment disposition and self-conscious moral orientation tend to emphasize the “having” side, as they involve theinternalization of morality into a person’s sense of self and identity. Constructs associated with self-conscious moralemotions and moral strength emphasize the “doing” side, or moral agency. Although these five categories are notlikely all-inclusive, they are the most prevalent in the literature. We describe each category and the constructsaligned within them.

Moral centralityA large body of research has explored how central morality and being a moral person are to one’s self-concept(Table 1). Although a number of constructs and labels for moral centrality have emerged (e.g., moral identity andmoral self-concept), each involve the degree to which moral qualities, concerns, commitments, or goals are signif-icant definitional components of the self. Much of this literature on moral centrality (approximately 70 percent of theempirical work) has adopted Aquino and Reed’s (2002) concept of moral identity, defined as “a self-conception or-ganized around a set of moral traits” (p. 1424). Consistent with the having and doing bases of the moral self, theirapproach offers two moral identity dimensions: internalization (or the degree to which moral traits, such as beingcaring, compassionate, and fair, are central to one’s self-concept) and symbolization (or the degree to which suchmoral traits are reflected in choices and actions). The internationalization dimension aligns with the “having” sideof the moral self, whereas the symbolization dimension aligns with the “doing” side of the moral self.

Moral judgment dispositionMoral judgment disposition refers to how morality is internalized into a person’s self-concept to form a distinctmoral perspective that informs moral judgments. We review three types of moral dispositions: (i) ethical ideology(Forsyth, 1980), (ii) ethical predisposition (Brady & Wheeler, 1996), and (iii) moral communion (Schwartz,1992) (Table 2). Each of these constructs derives from different philosophical and theoretical traditions. For in-stance, ethical ideology describes a tendency to adopt ideal or relative principles in moral decisions (Forsyth,1980). Idealism reflects a “right” course of action—an absolute ethical solution—in all situations. Relativism reflectsa consideration for contextualizing ethical judgments and action choices. These two axis create four “types” of eth-ical ideologies: (i) situationism (relying on context analysis to assess morally questionable actions), (ii) absolutism(relying on universal moral principles), (iii) subjectivism (relying on personal values), and (iv) exceptionism (under-standing exceptions apply, instead of moral absolutes). Alternatively, Brady and Wheeler (1996) proposed thatethical predispositions represent ethical “lenses,” or the tendency to rely on utilitarianism or formalism in decisions.Utilitarianism reflects a reliance on considering consequences in ethical processing, whereas formalism reflects areliance on rules, principles, and guidelines. Last, in his work on cultural values, Schwartz (1992) proposed thatindividuals may hold a tendency to advance the interests of others, called a moral communion.

Self-conscious moral orientationSelf-conscious moral orientation refers to the internalization of moral notions that invokes a sensitivity or respon-siveness to moral implications in ethical and moral issues (Morton, Worthley, Testerman, & Mahoney, 2006;Reynolds, 2006; Sparks & Hunt, 1998). We review research related to two self-conscious moral orientations: moralsensitivity and moral attentiveness (Table 3). Moral sensitivity represents a general orientation toward moral impli-cations on the basis of past decisions and behaviors (Morton et al., 2006; Sparks & Hunt, 1998). Moral attentivenessis “the extent to which one chronically perceives and considers morality and moral elements in his or her experi-ences” (Reynolds, 2008, p. 1028). Reynolds (2008) found that there are two dimensions of moral attentiveness:



Table

1.Empiricalworkon

moral

centrality.

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

self

variable(s)

Other

variables

studiedon

outcom

esOutcomevariables

ofthemoral

self

Aquinoand

Becker(2005)

Neutralization

strategies,

self-concept

theory,theories

oftheself

Experim

ent;192

MBA

students

Moral

attributes

(Z)

Psychological

distress

(IV)

Neutralization

Ethical

clim

ate(IV)

-Denigratio

nMoral

consequences

(IV)

-Minim

ization

Lying

(IV)

Aquino

etal.(2009)

Social-cognitive

theory

(SCT),

theories

ofself,

andmoral

identity

Study

1:Experim

ent;

92undergraduate

business

students

Internalizationmoral

identity

(Z)

Moral

prim

e(IV)

Intentionto

donate

money

Study

2:Experim

ent;

55undergraduate

business

students

Financial

prim

e(Z)

Intentionto

lie

Study

3:Experim

ent;

224undergraduate

business

students

Rew

ardsize

(Z)

Study

4:Experim

ent;

33undergraduate

business

students

Feedbackon

others’

choices(Z)

Aquino

etal.(2011)

Theoriesof

emotion(m

oral

elevation)

andtheself

(self-regulatio

nandmoral

identity)

Study

1:Experim

ent;

436undergraduate

students

Moral

identity

Actsof

uncommon

goodness

(Z)

Prosocialbehavioral

intentions

Study

2:reflectio

nsurvey;443Ipsos

panelists

-Internalization

(IV)

Moral

elevation

(M)

Prosocialbehaviors

Study

3:Experim

ent;63

undergraduatestudents

-Sym

bolization

(IV)

-Money

allocation

Study

4:Experim

ent;129

undergraduate

students

-Donations

Aquinoand

Reed(2002)

SCT,theories

ofself,and

moral

identity

Study

1:Instrument

developm

ent;EFA

sample:

363

undergraduatestudents;

CFA

sample:

347alum

ni,

working

adults

Moral

identity

-Internalization(IV)

-Sym

bolization(IV)

Volunteerism

Intrinsic

satisfactionto

volunteering

(Contin

ues)

THE MORAL SELF


Table

1.(Contin

ued)

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

self

variable(s)

Other

variables

studiedon

outcom

es

Outcome

variablesof

the

moral

self

Study

2:Convergent

valid

ity:124


Study

3:Nom

ologicaland

discriminantvalid

ity:55

master’sstudent.

Perceived

freedom

ofvolunteering

Study

4:Cross-sectio

nal,

single-sourcesurvey

study;

160high

school

students

Depth

ofinvolvem

entto

volunteering

Study

5:Cross-sectio

nal,

single-sourcesurvey

study;

330undergraduate

students

Donation

behavior

Study

6:tim

e-lagged,

single-sourcesurvey

study;

145high

school

students

Aquino

etal.(2007)

Theoriesof

self,

neutralization,

moral

disengagem

ent

Study

1:Reflectio

n-based

cross-sectional,single-

source

survey

study;

104

university

employees


identity

(Z)

Moral

disengagem

ent(IV

)Intent

topunish

wrongdoer

Study

2:Experim

ent;69

undergraduates,

administrativestaff,and

community

mem

bers

ofNEU.S.A.

Negative

emotions

Barriga

etal.(2001)

Theoriesof

moral

judgmentand

moral

self-concept

Cross-sectio

nalsurvey;

193undergraduate

students

Moralself-

relevance(IV)

Moral

judgment(IV)

Antisocial

behavior

Self-serving

cognitive

distortio

n(IV)

Gender(IV)



Table

1.(Contin

ued)

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

self

variable(s)

Other

variables

studiedon

outcom

es

Outcome

variablesof

the

moral

self

Brebels

etal.(2011)

Theoriesof

the

self,self-

regulatio

n,and

moral

identity

Study

1:Experim

ent;68


Moral

identity

(internalizationand

symbolization

combined)

(IV)

Regulatoryfocus

Procedural

justice

enactm

ent

Study

2:Cross-sectio

nal,

single-sourcesurvey;270

organizatio

nalsupervisors

-Promotion-

focused

(Z)

Study

3:Cross-sectio

nal,

single-sourcesurvey

with

multip

lesources(focal

andcoworker);103

employee–cow

orker

matched

dyads

-Prevention-

focused

(Z)

Caldw

elland

Moberg(2007)

Theoriesof

moral

imagination,

the

self,and

moral

identity

Scenario-based

experiment;164


Moral

identity

(internalizationand

symbolization

combined)

(Z)

Ethicalcultu

re(IV)

Moral

imagination

Christensen,

Brayden,

Dietrich,

McL

aughlin

,andSherrod

(1994)

Theoriesof

self

(self-esteem

and

self-concept)

Tim

e-lagged,single-

source

survey;609

wom

enwho

received

prenatal

care

atahospital

Moralself-concept(IV)

Self-concept

dimensions(IV)

Neglect

ofbirthedchild

-Physical

Physicalabuse

ofbirthedchild

-Personal

-Fam

ily-Social

Total

confl

ict(IV)

Socialidentity

(IV)

Self-satisfaction

(IV)

Maladjustment(IV)

Psychosis

(IV)

Personality

disorder

(IV)

Neurosis(IV)

Deviant

signs(IV)

Defensive

positiv

e(IV)

Integrationindex

score(IV)

(Contin

ues)

THE MORAL SELF


Table

1.(Contin

ued)

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

self

variable(s)

Other

variables

studiedon

outcom

es

Outcome

variablesof

the

moral

self

Conway

and

Gaw

ronski

(2013)

Theoriesof

moral

judgmentand

disassociatio

n

Study

1only:Scenario-

basedexperiment;112



identity

(IV)

Empathy

(IV)

Deontological

inclination

Perspectiv

etaking

(IV)

Utilitarian

inclination

Needfor

cognition

(IV)

Faith

inintuition

(IV)

Religiosity

(IV)

Conway

and

Peetz

(2012)

Theoriesof

moral

licensing

andthe

moral

self

Scenario-based

experiment;151American

MechanicalTurk

participants

Moral

identityvs.

immoral

identity

(IV)

Personal

identity

(Z)

Donation

intention

Côtéet

al.

(2011)

Theoriesof

emotionregulatio

n,theself,and

moral

identity

Scenario-basedsurvey:

131undergraduate

students

Moral

identity

(internalizationand

symbolization

combined)

(IV)

Emotional

regulatio

nknow

ledge(Z)

Prosocial

behavior

Danielset

al.

(2011)

SCT,theories

ofself,and

self-

consistency

Cross-sectio

nal,single-

source

scenario-based

survey;155working

adults(recruitedfrom

Craigslistandcurrentand

recent

MBA

andMA

graduates)

Moral

identity

Ethical

cultu

re(Z)

Ethical

sensitivity

Internalization

(IV)

Sym

bolization

(IV)

Ethicalsensitivity

(DV)

DeC

elleset

al.

(2012)

Theoriesof

power,

self-interest,the

self,and

moral

identity

Study

1:Scenario-based

experiment;173working

adults(recruitedfrom

Qualtrics.com)


identity

(Z)

Pow

er(IV)

Self-interested

behavior

Study

2:Experim

ent;102




Table

1.(Contin

ued)

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

self

variable(s)

Other

variables

studiedon

outcom

es

Outcome

variablesof

the

moral

self

Detertet

al.

(2008)

SCT,theories

ofmoral

disengagem

ent,

moral

agency,the

self,and

moral

identity

Multi-wave(3

timeperiods),


business

andeducation



identity

(IV)

Empathy

(IV)

Unethical

decision

making

Traitcynicism

(IV)

Changein

locus

ofcontrol(IV)

Internal

locusof

control(IV)

Pow

erlocusof

control(IV)

Moral

disengagem

ent(

M)

Doron

etal.

(2012)

Theoriesof

self,

self-perception,

andcognitive

theory

Study

1:Experim

ent;43

undergraduates

Moral

self-

perceptio

ns(IV)

Self-relevant

inform

ation

(Z)

Physical

contam

ination

concerns

Study

2:Experim

ent;150

community

participants

Study

3:Experim

ent;86

community

participants

Frimer

and

Walker(2009)

Theoriesof

self-

interest,theself,

moral

centrality,

andmoral

judgment

Multi-wave(3

timeperiods),

single-sourcesurvey

and

interview

(codingprocedures

for

somevariables);191students

recruitedfrom

public

postingin

studentclubs

Moral

centrality

Moral

behavior

(coded)

-Com

munal

values

(IV)

-Agenticvalues

(IV)

Grubisicand

Goic(1998)

Tim

e-separated,

single-source

survey;2248

undergraduate

studentsfrom

24institu

tions

from

14countries

Country

status

(intransitio

nor

not)

Ethical

values

(DV)

Ethical

values

(Contin

ues)

THE MORAL SELF


Table

1.(Contin

ued)

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

self

variable(s)

Other

variables

studiedon

outcom

es

Outcome

variablesof

the

moral

self

Hardy

etal.

(2010)

Theoriesof

psychological

distance,the

self,

andmoral

identity

Cross-sectio

nal,single-

source

survey;1059

high

school

students

Parentin

gstyle

Moral

identity

Social

dominance

orientation

-Autonom

ygrantin

g(IV)

-Internalization

(IV)

Circleof

moral

regard

-Responsiveness(IV)

-Sym

bolization

(IV)

-Dem

andingness

(IV)

Hardy

etal.

(2012)

Theoriesof

social

control,theself,

moral

identity,

and

moral

cognitions

Cross-sectio

nal,single-

source

survey;502

secondaryschool

students

Religious

commitm

ent(IV)


identity

(M)

Empathy

Religious

involvem

ent(Z)

Aggression

Haynes(1990)

Theoriesof

self

andself-concept

Cross-sectio

nal,single-

source

survey;6

0teachers

of14

2random

lyselected

middleschool

child

ren


Self-concept

dimensions(IV)

Classroom

behavior

-Physical

Group

participation

-Personal

Attitude

toward

authority

-Fam

ily-Social

Johnston

and

Krettenauer

(2011)

Theoriesof

emotion,

theself,

andmoral

self

Vignette-style

interview;

205adolescents


Moral

norm

regarded

emotions

(IV)

Antisocial

behavior

Moral

norm

disregarded

emotions

(IV)

Prosocial

behavior

Jordan

etal.

(2011)

Theoriesof

self-

completion,

social

cognition,the

self,

andmoral

identity

Recollection-based,

cross-

sectional,single-source

survey;61

MBA

students

Recalled(coded)

moral

behavior

Moral

identity

-Internalization

(IV)

-Sym

bolization

(IV)

Kavussanu

etal.

(2012)

Theoriesof

the

self,m

oralidentity,

andem

otion

Exp

erim

ent,using

emotivepictures;94

athletes


identity

(IV)

Evokedem

otion

(pleasant,

unpleasant,and

neutral)

(Z)

Startle

reactio

nPain-related

reactio

n



Table

1.(Contin

ued)

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

self

variable(s)

Other

variables

studiedon

outcom

es

Outcome

variablesof

the

moral

self

Kochanska,

Gross,L

in,and

Nichols(2002)

Theoriesof

socialization,

the

self,and

self-

developm

ent

Tim

e-lagged,m

ulti-source

surveys/interviews(coded

observations);112

mothers

with

their

newborn

child

ren

(recruitedviaan

adin

the

community

)

Fear(IV)

Moral

self

(DV)

Moral

self

Mother’spower-

assertive

discipline(IV)

Guilt

(IV)

Kochanska

etal.

(2010)

Theoriesof

the

self,self-

developm

ent,and

moral

self

Longitudinalstudyof

two-parent

families

with

infants(recruitedviaad

incommunity

),assessments

madeat

25,3

8,52,6

7,and80

months.Across

each,N

varied

from

43to

100families.

Observatio

nscoded

Moral

self

(IV)

Internalizationof

motherandfather

rules(IV)

Socialization

Empathetic

concernforeach

parent

(IV)

Kouchaki

(2011)

Theoriesof

self,

self-concept,and

moral

self

Study

2only:Scenario-

basedexperiment;190


Credentialsof

applicant(IV)


identity

(IV)

Willingnessto

express

prejudice

Ethnicity

ofapplicant(IV)

Krettenauerand

Johnston

(2011)

Moral

emotions

theory

and

principles

ofmoral

self

Cross-sectio

nal,single

source,scenario-based

survey;155teenagers,

grades

7through11,w

ithasampleof

50undergraduatestudents

Self-im

portance

ofmoral

values

(IV)

Context

type

Guilt

Guilt

(DV)

-Prosocial

actio

n(IV)

Pride

Pride

(DV)

-Tem

ptation

(IV)

Other

emotions

(embarrassm

ent,

fear,sadness,

happiness,

anger,and

satisfaction)

-Antisocial(IV)

Positive

ornegativ

eem

otion

(Contin

ues)

THE MORAL SELF


Table

1.(Contin

ued)

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

self

variable(s)

Other

variables

studiedon

outcom

esOutcomevariables

ofthemoral

self

Kurpiset

al.

(2008)

Theoriesof

moral

judgment,the

moral

self,and

moral

commitm

ent

Scenario-based,

cross-

sectional,single-

source

survey;242

undergraduate

students

Religiosity

(IV)

Com

mitm

entto

moral

self-

improvem

ent(IV)

Importance

ofethics

Ethical

problem

recognition

Ethical

behavioral

intentions

Lee

etal.(2008)

Goaltheory,

theory

ofplanned

behavior

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-sourcesurvey;

491secondaryschool

studentsfrom

school

orclub

competitions

Moral

values

(IV)

Com

petence

values

(IV)

Prosocial

attitude

Antisocialattitude

Taskorientation

(M)

Ego

orientation

(M)

LuandChang

(2011)

Theoriesof

self,

moral

self,and

self-deceptio

n

Scenario-based,

cross-

sectional,single-

source

survey;160

undergraduate

students


Self-consciousness(Z)

Intentionto

help

with

outbenefitto

theself

Mayer

etal.

(2012)

Theoriesof

social

learning,m

oral

identity,

andsocial

cognition

Study

1:Multi-source,

cross-sectional

survey;em

ployees

andsupervisorsfrom

thesameworkunit

recruitedvia

convenient

sampling

technique;

data

for

137departments

(range

of1–5

employeeswith

ineach

department)but

included

only

units

with

3+response

sets;

finalN=115

Leadermoralidentity

Unit-levelperceived

ethicalleadership

(M)

Unethical

behavior

Study

2:Sam

edesign/

procedureas

Study

1;195departments(w

ith891em

ployeesand

195supervisors)

-Internalization

(IV)

Relationalconfl

ict

-Sym

bolization

(IV)



Table

1.(Contin

ued)

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

self

variable(s)

Other

variables

studiedon

outcom

esOutcomevariables

ofthemoral

self

McC

uddy

(2007)

Theoriesof

self

andself-

enhancem

ent

Scenario-based,

cross-sectional,

single-source

survey;388

undergraduate

students

Student

cheatin

g(IV)

Ethical

self-

enhancem

ent(D

V)

Ethical

self-

enhancem

ent

Ethical

norm

sof

cheatin

g(Z)

Other

students’

approvalofcheating(Z)

McFerranet

al.

(2010)

Theoriesof

moral

personality

,the

self,and

moral

identity

Study

1:Cross-

sectional,single-

source

survey;52

femaleem

ployeesof

mid-sized

speech

therapyservices

organizatio

n

Moral

identity

Moral

personality

(conscientiousness,

agreeablenessand

openness

toexperience

combined)

(IV)

Ethical

ideology

(Study

1DV)

Study

2:Cross-

sectional,single-

source

survey;145

undergraduate

students

-Internalization

(IV)

Ethical

ideology

(Study2M)

Citizenship

behavior

-Sym

bolization

(IV)

Propensity

tomorally

disengage

Ethical

ideology

(Study1DV)

Michaelidou

and

Hassan(2008)

Scenario-based,

cross-sectional,

single-source

survey;convenient

sampleof

222

shoppers

Ethicalself-identity(IV)

Foo

dsafety

concern

(IV)

Intent

topurchase

organicfood

Health

conscientiousness

(IV)

Organic

food

attitude(M

)

O’Fallonand

Butterfield

(2011)

Theoriesof

cognitive

moral

developm

entand

social

inform

ation

processing

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey;655

undergraduate

students


identity

(Z)

Cow

orkers

organizatio

nal

deviance

(IV)

Observers’

organizatio

nal

deviance

Needfor

affiliatio

n(Z)

Introversion

(Z)

Negative

relatio

nships

(Z)

(Contin

ues)

THE MORAL SELF


Table

1.(Contin

ued)

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

self

variable(s)

Other

variables

studiedon

outcom

esOutcomevariables

ofthemoral

self

Patrick

and

Gibbs

(2012)

Theoriesof

socialization,the

self,and

moral

identity

Multi-source

survey

design

();102

adolescentsandtheir

motherparticipated

Parentaldiscipline(IV)

Moral

identity

(DV)

Moral

identity

-Inductio

nPerceived

fairness

-Pow

erassertion

Experienceguilt

-Lovewith

draw

alPositive/negative

emotion

Peruginiand

Leone

(2009)

Theoriesof

moral

developm

ent

andjudgment,

andim

plicit

personality

Study

1:Experim

ent;46

undergraduates

Implicitmoral

self-

concept(IV)

Hon

esty–

humility

(IV)

Cheatingbehavior

Study

2:Scenario-

basedexperiment;

112individuals

Moral

temptation

intention

Moral

evaluatio

ns

Prattet

al.

(2003)

Theoriesof

socializationand

moral

reasoning

Tim

e-lagged,single-

source

survey;896

high

school

students

Com

munity

involvem

ent(IV)

Moral

qualities

ofself-ideal

(DV)

Moral

qualities

ofself-ideal

Parentalmoral

emphasis

(Z)

Ranceret

al.

(1992)

Theoriesof

the

self(self-esteem

andmoral

self-

concept)

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey;132

undergraduate

students

Moralself-esteem

(IV)

Effectance(IV)

Verbalaggression

Socialself-

esteem

(IV)

Bodyim

age(IV)

Defensive

self-

enhancem

ent(IV)

Reedand

Aquino(200

3)Theoriesof

the

self(m

oral

self-

conceptand

self-protection)

andmoral

identity

Study

1/Sample1:

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey;137

undergraduate

students

Moral

identity

In/out-group

(IV)

Circleof

moral

regard

Study

1/Sample2:

Tim

e-lagged,single-

source

survey;55

MBA

students

-Internalization

(IV)

-Sym

bolization

(IV)

American

identity

(IV)

Responsetype

(IV)

Willingto

exchange

resourcesPerceived

worthiness

Willingnessto

donate

Perceptions

ofacceptable

deaths

Moral

evaluatio

n



Table

1.(Contin

ued)

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

self

variable(s)

Other

variables

studiedon

outcom

esOutcomevariables

ofthemoral

self

Study

2:Scenario-based,

single-sourcesurvey

study;

75undergraduatestudents

Study

3:Scenario-based,

single-source,multi-wave

design,w

here

data

were

collected

5weeks

apartin

3phases;58

undergraduate

students

Study

4:Scenario-based

experiment,2-wavedesign,

where

data

werecollected

2monthsapart;85


Reedet

al.

(2007)

Theoryof

theself

andmoral

identity

Study

1a:Scenario-based,

cross-sectional,single-source

survey;242undergraduate

students

Moral

identity

Charitable

behavior

ofcompany

(IV)

Moral

evaluatio

n

Study

1b:Scenario-based

experiment;convenient

sampleof

58undergraduate

students,adm

inistrativestaff,

andlocalcommunity

residents

-Internalization

(Z)

Corporate

giving

type

(tim

eor

money)(IV)

Donation

preference

Study

2:Cross-sectio

nal,


full-tim

ealum

ni

-Sym

bolization

(Z)

Position

status

(IV)

Donationintention

Study

3:Scenario-based

experiment;convenient

sampleof

179undergraduate

students,adm

inistrativestaff,

andlocalcommunity

residents

Moral

organizatio

n(IV)

Charitablegiving

Cheatingbehavior

(Contin

ues)

THE MORAL SELF


Table

1.(Contin

ued)

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

self

variable(s)

Other

variables

studiedon

outcom

esOutcomevariables

ofthemoral

self

Reynolds(2008)

Study

1:Item

developm

entformoral

attentivenessmeasure:

cross-sectional,single-

source

survey;123


Moral

attentiveness

Correlates

(Study

2)

Study

2:Validity

evidence:241

undergraduates

-Perceptual(IV)

-Normlessness

Study

3:Cross-sectio

nal,


242managersrecruited

from

StudyResponse.

com

-Reflectiv

e(IV)

-Nurturance

Study

4:Cross-sectio

nal,


159MBA

students

Moral

identity

(DV)

-Moral

identity

Study

5:Cross-sectio

nal,


undergraduates

and81

MBAs

-Agreeableness

-Conscientiousness

Moral

behavior

Moral

awareness

Reynoldsand

Ceranic

(200

7)Theoriesof

moral

judgment,moral

self,and

moral

identity

Study

1:Cross-sectio

nal,


226undergraduate

students

Moral

identity

Consequentialist

moraljudgment(Z)

Charitablegiving

Study

2:Cross-sectio

nal,

single-sourcescenario-

basedsurvey;292

managersem

ployed

ina

varietyof

organizatio

nsrecruitedthrough

StudyResponse.com

-Internalization

(Z)

Formalistmoral

judgment(Z)

Cheatingbehavior

-Sym

bolization

(Z)

Behavioralintention



Table

1.(Contin

ued)

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

self

variable(s)

Other

variables

studiedon

outcom

es

Outcome

variablesof

the

moral

self

Rosenberg

(1987)

Theoryof

moral

values,p

ersonality

Scenario-based,

cross-

sectional,single-source

survey;1

42undergraduate

students

Moral

values

(IV)

Businessgoals(IV)

Ethical

behavioral

intentions

Rosenbloom

etal.(2009)

Theoriesof

self

andself-concept

Cross-sectio

nal,single-

source

survey;100



Gender(Z)

Reported

dangerousness

ofdriving

RuppandBell

(2010)

Theoriesof

deontic

justice,moral

self-

regulatio

n,and

self-interest

Experim

entandcoding

design;1

56undergraduate

students

Moralself-regulation

motives

(IV)

Retributiv

emotives

(IV)

Punishing

aharm

doer

Self-interested

motives

(IV)

Equality

motives

(IV)

Sachdevaet

al.

(2009)

Theoryof

moral

self-regulation

Study

1:Experim

ent,

recallsurvey

with

acoding

design;46


Positive

moral

traits

(e.g.,internalization

moral

identity

traits)(IV)

Donation

behavior

Study

2:Experim

ent,

recallsurvey

with

acoding

design;39


Negativemoral

trait(IV)

Cooperativ

ebehavior

Study

3:Experim

ent,

recallsurvey

with

acoding

design;46


Neutralm

oraltrait

(IV)

Sageet

al.

(2006)

Theoriesof

the

self,m

oralidentity,

andgoal

orientation

Cross-sectio

nal,single-

source

survey;210male

footballplayers,recruited

from

clubsand

competitions


identity

(IV)

Taskgoal

orientation

(Z)

Prosocial

functio

ning

Ego

goal

orientation

(Z)

Prosocial

judgments

Antisocial

functio

ning

Antisocial

judgments

(Contin

ues)

THE MORAL SELF


Table

1.(Contin

ued)

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

self

variable(s)

Other

variables

studiedon

outcom

es

Outcome

variablesof

the

moral

self

Skarlicki

and

Rupp(2010)

Dualprocessing

theories,d

eontic

justice,theories

oftheself,and

moral

identity

Scenarioexperiment;

185managersenrolledin

anexecutiveMBA

program

Sym

bolizationmoral

identity

(Z)

Supervisor

mistreatm

ent(IV)

Retaliatory

intentions

Experientialor

ratio

nalprim

e(Z)

Skarlicki

etal.

(2008)

Retaliatio

nand

deontic

justice

principles,theories

oftheself,and

moral

identity

Cross-sectio

nal,single-

source

survey

that

adoptedcriticalincident

technique;

performance

was

provided

byhuman

resourcesof

the

company;358custom

erservicerepresentativ

esem

ployed

inacallcenter

Moral

identity

Customer

interpersonal

injustice(IV)

Jobperformance

-Internalization

(Z)

Customer-directed

sabotage

(M)

-Sym

bolization

(Z)

StetsandCarter

(2011)

Theoriesof

theself

andmoral

identity

Study

1:Cross-sectio

nal,


545undergraduate

students


identity

(IV)

Taskability

(Z)

Perceptions

ofim

moral

behavior

Study

2:Experim

ent;

with

samestudentsas

Study

1

Moral

identity

discrepancy

(IV)

Positive/

negativ

eem

otion

StetsandCarter

(2012)

Control

system

sapproach

ofidentitytheory

Tim

e-lagged,single-

source

survey;369


Moral

identity

Moral

meaning

s(IV)

Guilt

-Internalization

(IV)

Feelin

gsrule

(IV)

Shame

-Sym

bolization

(IV)

Moral

identity

discrepancy

(M)

Shame(D

V)

Moralbehavior

(M)

Guilt

(DV)

Van

derW

aland

deGraaf

(2006)

Cross-sectio

nal,single-

source

survey;778

managersfrom

public

organizatio

nsand500

managersfrom

private

organizatio

ns

Employer

type

(public

orprivatesector)(IV)

Moralself-image(D

V)

Moral

self-

image



Table

1.(Contin

ued)

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

self

variable(s)

Other

variablesstudied

onoutcom

esOutcomevariables

ofthemoral

self

Vitellet

al.

(2009)

Self-regulatio

ntheory,theoriesof

self-control,the

self,and

moral

identity

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey;110

undergraduate

students

Religiosity

Moral

identity

Moral

identity

-Intrinsic

(IV)

-Internalization

(DV)

-Internalization

-Extrinsic

(IV)

-Sym

bolization

(DV)

-Sym

bolization

Vitellet

al.

(2011)

Moral

justificatio

nandratio

nalization

principles,theories

oftheself,and

moral

identity

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey;2

05business

practitioners

recruitedfrom

arand

omsampleof

2500

from

anatio

nal

commercially

provided

mailin

glist

Moral

identity

Institu

tionalization

Moral

justificatio

n-Internalization(IV)

-Implicit

(IV)

-Sym

bolization(IV)

-Explicit

(IV)

Religiosity

-Intrinsic

(IV)

-Extrinsic

(IV)

Weichun

etal.(2011)

Transform

ational

leadership

theory,

theories

oftheself

andmoral

identity

Study

1:672

participantsfrom

research

panel

(Zoomerang.com);

336casesused

totestexploratory

factor

structureof

moral

identity

measure;336cases

used

totest

predictio

ns

Transform

ational

leadership

Moralidentity(D

V)

Moral

identity

Study

2:Scenario-

basedexperiment;

215teachers

from

severalp

ublic

school

system

sparticipated

inweb-based

experiment

Transactio

nal

leadership

(Contin

ues)

THE MORAL SELF


Table

1.(Contin

ued)

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

self

variable(s)

Other

variables

studiedon

outcom

esOutcomevariables

ofthemoral

self

Winterich,

Aquino,

etal.(2013)

Social-cognitive

theory;theories

oftheselfandmoral

identity

Study

1:Experim

ental

survey;2

93adultsfrom

anonlin

eresearch

panelin

U.S.A.

Recognitio

nof

prosocialbehavior

Moral

identity

Prosocial

behavior

Study

2:Experim

ental

survey;2

31adultsfrom

onlin

eresearch

panelin

U.S.A.

-Internalization(Z)

-Sym

bolization(Z)

Winterich,

Mittal,

etal.(2013)

Social-cognitive

theory,consumer

identitytheory,

theories

oftheself

andmoral

identity

Study

1:Experim

ental

survey;4

10adultsfrom

anonlin

eresearch

panelin

U.S.A.

Moral

identity

Recognitio

nof

donatio

nbehavior

Donationbehavior

Study

2:Experim

ental

survey;1

97adultsfrom

onlin

eresearch

panelin

U.S.A.

-Internalization

(Z)

-General

recognition

(IV)

Study

3:Experim

ental

survey;2

67adultsfrom

anonlin

eresearch

panelin

U.S.A.

-Sym

bolization

(Z)

-Priv

ate

recognition

(IV)

-Public

recognition

(IV)

Winterich

etal.(2009)

Socialidentity

theory;theories

oftheselfandmoral

identity

Study

1:Scenario-

basedexperiment;143

undergraduates

Internalization

moral

identity

(IV)

Inclusionof

other

inself

(M)

Donationintention

Study

2:Scenario-

basedexperiment;258

undergraduates

Genderidentity

(Z)

Study

3:Scenario-

basedexperiment;233

adultsfrom

anonlin

emarketin

gresearch

panelacross

theU.S.A.

Donationgroup

type

(Z)

Note:

Moral

selfvariablesthat

also

representdependentvariablesin

thestudiesareindicatedwith

theDV

designationandarerepeated

inthe“dependent

variable”column.

IV=independentvariable;DV=dependentvariable;M

=mediatorvariable;Z=moderator

variable.



Table

2.Empiricalworkon

moral

judgmentdisposition.

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

self

variable(s)

Other

variables

studiedon

outcom

es

Outcome

variablesof

themoral

self

Angelidisand

Ibrahim

(2011)

Principlesof

emotional

intelligenceand

ethicalideology

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey;344

managersenrolled

inexecutiveMBA

program

from

5universities

Ethical

ideology

(IV)

Emotional

intelligence

Brady

and

Wheeler

(1996)

Principlesof

ethicaldisposition

andethical

decision

making

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source,

scenario-based

survey;141

employeesof

large

financialinstitu

tion

Ethical

predispositio

nCharacter

trait

-Utilitarianism

(IV)

-Formalism

(IV)

Forsyth

(1980)

Individual

differences

principles,

theories

ofmoral

selfand

moral

thought

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey;108

undergraduate

students

Ethical

ideology

(IV)

Ethical

attitude

Forsyth

(1985)

Individual

differences

principles,

theories

ofmoral

selfand

moral

thought

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source,

scenario-based

survey;64

undergraduate

students

Ethical

ideology

(IV)

Consequence

type

(IV)

Moral

judgment

Moral

standard

(IV)

Conform

ityto

norm

s(IV)

Forsyth

(1993)

Individual

differences

principles,

theories

ofmoral

selfand

moral

thought

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source,

scenario-based

survey;164

undergraduate

students

Ethical

ideology

(IV)

Motivetype

(IV)

Selfevaluatio

nOutcometype

(IV)

Self-esteem

Gender(IV)

Cognitiv

ereactio

ns

(Contin

ues)

THE MORAL SELF


Table

2.(Contin

ued)

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

self

variable(s)

Other

variables

studiedon

outcom

es

Outcome

variablesof

themoral

self

Frimer

etal.

(2011)

Principlesof

agency

and

moral

personality

Cross-sectio

nal,

criticalincident/

recollection-based,

single-source

survey;111

studentsrecruited

from

studentclubs

Com

munionmoral

orientation

(IV)

Agency

orientation

(IV)

Evaluationof

moral

exem

plar

Luzadisand

Gerhardt(2011)

Goalorientation

theory,p

rinciples

ofethicalideology

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey;321

undergraduate

students

Ethical

ideology

Goalorientation

-Idealism

(IV)

-Learninggoal

-Relativism

(IV)

-Perform

ance-

approach

goal

-Perform

ance-

avoidancegoal

Marta

etal.(2012)

Principlesof

ethicalideology

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey;453

individuals

(recruitedmem

bers

from

theAmerican

Marketin

gAssociatio

n)

Corporate

ethical

values

(IV)

Ethical

ideology

Ethical

intentions

-Idealism

(Z)

-Relativism

(Z)

McFerran

etal.(2010)

Theoriesof

moral

personality

,the

self,

andmoral

identity

Study

1:Cross-

sectional,single-

source

survey;52

femaleem

ployees

ofmid-sized

speech

therapy

services

organizatio

n

Moral

identity

Moral

personality

(conscientiousness,

agreeableness,and

openness

toexperience

combined)

(IV)

Ethical

ideology

(Study1DV)

Study

2:Cross-

sectional,single-

source

survey;145

undergraduate

students

-Internalization

(IV)

Ethical

ideology

(Study2M)

Citizenshipbehavior

-Sym

bolization

(IV)

Propensity

tomorally

disengage

Ethical

ideology

(Study1DV)



Reynolds(2006)

Principlesof

moral

awareness,moral

intensity

,and

ethical

predispositio

ns

Study

1:Scenario-

basedexperiment;

120MBA

students

Presenceof

harm

(IV)

Ethical

predispositio

nMoral

awareness

Study

2:Scenario-

basedexperiment;

33MBA

students

Norm

violation

(IV)

-Utilitarianism

(Z)

-Formalism

(Z)

Ruiz-Palom

ino

andMartin

ez-

Cañas

(201

1)

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey;525

employeesfrom

largebranch

offices

ofbankingand

insurance

companies

Relativistic

ethical

ideology

(IV,Z)

Ethical

policies(IV)

Ethical

behavioral

intentions

Ethical

leadership

(IV)

Schminke

(1997)

Principlesof

gender

andmorality

and

ethicalp

redispositions

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source,

scenario-based

experiment;

convenient

sample

of175full-tim

emanagersand

undergraduate

students

Ethical

predispositio

nDecisionfram

eagreem

ent

-Utilitarianism

(IV)

-Formalism

(IV)

Schminke

(2001)

Structure

theory

and

principles

ofethical

predispositio

ns

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey;209

employeesfrom

avarietyof

industries

with

intheMidwestern

U.S.A.who

were

recruitedfrom

the

author’s

College

Board

ofAdvisors

Organizational

size

(IV)

Ethical

predispositio

nEthical

predispositio

nOrganizational

structure

-Utilitarianism

(DV)

-Utilitarianism

-Participation

(IV)

-Formalism

(DV)

-Formalism

-Authority

hierarchy

(IV)

-Formalism

(IV)

Schminke

etal.

(1997)

Theoriesof

organizatio

naljustice

andprinciples

ofethicalp

redispositions

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey;209

employeesfrom

11prim

arily

Procedural

fairness

(IV)

Ethical

predispositio

nProceduraljustice

perceptio

nsOutcome

fairness

(IV)

-Utilitarianism

(Z)

Distributivejustice

perceptio

ns-Formalism

(Z)

(Contin

ues)

THE MORAL SELF


Table

2.(Contin

ued)

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

self

variable(s)

Other

variables

studiedon

outcom

es

Outcome

variablesof

themoral

self

Midwestern

organizatio

ns,

recruitedthrough

theauthors’

College

ofBoard

ofAdvisors

Schminke

and

Wells(1999)

Principlesof

ethical

predispositio

ns,g

roup

processes,and

leadership

style

Tim

e-lagged,

single-source

survey;117

graduate

and

undergraduate

students

Leadershipstyle

Changein

ethical

predispositio

nChangein

ethical

predispositio

n-Initiatin

g(IV)

-Utilitarianism

(DV)

-Utilitarianism

-Consideration

(IV)

-Formalism

(DV)

-Formalism

Group

-Cohesiveness(IV)

-Perform

ance

(IV)

Singhapakdi

etal.(2001)

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source,

scenario-based

survey;453

individuals

recruitedfrom

anAmerican

Marketin

gAssociatio

nmem

bership

mailin

glist

Country

(Australianvs.

American)

Ethical

ideology

Ethical

ideology

-Idealism

(DV)

-Idealism

-Relativism

(DV)

-Relativism

Perceptions

ofethicalproblem

Intent

toresolve

problem

Corporate

ethicalvalues

Sparksand

Hunt(1998)

Ethical

decision-

makingtheory

and

principles

ofethical

sensitivity

Ethical

ideology:

relativ

ism

(IV)

Subject

type

(IV)

Ethical

sensitivity

Ethicalsensitivity

(DV)

Researchcourse

(IV)

Socialization

-Organizational(IV)

-Professional(IV)

Perspectiv

etaking

(IV)

Emotional

contagion

(IV)

Treise,Weigold,

Conna,and

Garrison(1994)

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey;292

Ethical

ideology

Evaluationprogram

contentforchild

ren

Idealism

(IV)

Relativism

(IV)



participants

recruitedfrom

alargemallin

southeastern

U.S.A.

Walkerand

Frimer

(2007)

Theoriesof

moral

developm

ent,moral

actio

n,personality

principles

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey

andfollo

w-

upinterview

(which

was

coded);

267moral

exem

plarswho

wererecipientsof

anatio

nalaw

ard

Com

munionmoral

orientation

(IV)

Agency

orientation

(IV)

Evaluationof

moral

exem

plar

Nurturing

personality

(IV)

Generative

personality

(IV)

Optim

istic

personality

(IV)

Walkeret

al.

(2010)

Situ

ationalist

perspectiveof

social

psychology,

personality

principles

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey

andfollo

w-

upinterview

(which

was

coded);

50moral

exem

plarswho

wererecipientsof

anatio

nalaw

ard

Com

munionmoral

orientation

(IV)

Agency

orientation

(IV)

Evaluationof

moral

exem

plar

Wilson

(2003)

Socialdominance

theory,p

rinciples

ofethicalideology

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey;160

undergraduate

students

Ethical

ideology

Gender(IV)

Socialdominance

orientation

-Idealism

(IV)

Age

(IV)

-Relativism

(IV)

Yetmar

and

Eastm

an(2000)

Principlesof

ethical

sensitivity,ethical

ideology,and

ethical

decision

making

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey;870

Certifi

edPublic

Accountants

recruitedfrom

the

Institu

tefor

Certifi

edPublic

Accountants

Ethical

ideology

Roleconfl

ict(IV)

Ethical

evaluatio

n-Idealism

(IV)

Roleam

biguity

(IV)

-Relativism

(IV)

Jobsatisfaction

(IV)

Professional

commitm

ent(IV)

Zhang

and

Gow

an(2012)

Person-organizatio

nfittheory

and

Study

1:Cross-

sectional,

single-source,

Perceived

company

performance

Ethical

predispositio

nApplicantattractio

nto

theorganizatio

n

(Contin

ues)

THE MORAL SELF


Table

2.(Contin

ued)

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

self

variable(s)

Other

variables

studiedon

outcom

es

Outcome

variablesof

themoral

self

principles

ofethical

predispositio

nscenario-based

survey;201

undergraduate

students

Study

2:Cross-

sectional,

single-source,

scenario-based

survey;66

undergraduate

students

-Economic

(IV)

-Utilitarianism

(Z)

Probabilityof

acceptingthe

joboffer

-Legal

(IV)

-Formalism

(Z)

-Social

responsibility(IV)

Machiavellianism

(IV)

Note:

Moral

selfvariablesthat

also



theDV


inthe“dependent

variable”column.



variable.



Table

3.Empiricalworkon

self-conscious

moral

orientation.

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

selfvariable(s)

Other

variables

studiedon

outcom

esOutcomevariables

ofthemoral

self

Ameenet

al.

(1996)

Socialization

principles

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source,

scenario-based

survey;285

undergraduate

students

Gender(IV)

Ethical

sensitivity

toquestio

nable

activ

ities

(DV)

Ethicalsensitivity

toquestio

nable

activ

ities

Blodgettetal.

(2001)

Ethical

decision-

makingtheory

and

principles

ofcultu

raldifferences

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source,

scenario-based

survey;from

TaiwaneseandU.S.

managersfrom

12differentcompanies

in3cities

Pow

erdistance

(IV)

Ethical

sensitivity

for

Ethical

sensitivity

Uncertainty

avoidance(IV)

-The

company

(DV)

-For

thecompany

Individualism

(IV)

-Customers(D

V)

-For

custom

ers

-Com

petitors(D

V)

-For

competitors

-Colleagues(D

V)

-For

colleagues

Lützénet

al.

(2010)

Stresstheory;

principles

ofethicalclim

ateand

moral

sensitivity

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey;49

nurses

from

aconvenient

sample

Moral

sensitivity

(IV)

Moral

clim

ate(IV)

Moral

stress

Mortonet

al.

(2006)

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey;149

medical

students

Spiritual

maturity

(IV)

Moral

sensitivity

(M)

Moral

reasoning

Ozdogan

and

Eser(2007)

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey;667

undergraduate

students

Gender(IV)

Ethical

sensitivity

(DV)

Ethical

sensitivity

College

major

(IV)

Age

(IV)

Grade

(IV)

Fam

ilyincome(IV)

School

ownership

(IV)

(Contin

ues)

THE MORAL SELF


Table

3.(Contin

ued)

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

selfvariable(s)

Other

variables

studiedon

outcom

esOutcomevariables

ofthemoral

self

Reynolds

(2008)

Study

1:Item

developm

entfor

moral

attentiveness

measure:cross-

sectional,single-

source

survey;123

undergraduate

students

Moral

attentiveness

Correlates

Study

2:Validity

evidence:241

undergraduates

-Perceptual(IV)

-Normlessness

Study

3:Cross-

sectional,single-

source

survey;

242managers

recruitedfrom

StudyResponse.com

-Reflectiv

e(IV)

-Nurturance

Study

4:Cross-

sectional,single-

source

survey;159

MBA

students

-Moral

identity

Study

5:Cross-

sectional,single-

source

survey;74

undergraduates

and81

MBAs

-Agreeableness

-Conscientiousness

Moral

behavior

Moral

awareness

Sparksand

Hunt(1998)

Ethical

decision-

makingtheory

andprinciples

ofethicalsensitivity

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey;188

marketin

gresearch

practitioners

recruitedfrom

the

mem

bershipof

the

American

Marketin

gAssociatio

n

Student

vs.

practitioner(IV)

Ethical

ideology:

relativ

ism

(IV)

Ethical

sensitivity

Coursein

marketin

gresearch

(IV)

Ethical

sensitivity

(DV)

Organizational

socialization

(IV)

Professional

socialization

(IV)

Perspectiv

etaking

(IV)

Emotional

contagion

(IV)



Whitakerand

Godwin

(2013)

Social-cognitive

theory

andprinciples

ofmoralim

agination

Cross-sectio

nal,

multi-source

data;

162supervisor–

subordinatedyads;

subordinates

were

undergraduate

studentsworking

atleastpart-tim

eand

provided

perm

ission

fortheresearchers

tocontacttheir

supervisors;the

subordinatesurvey

was

scenario-based;

supervisorsreported

onsubordinate

creativ

ity

Moral

attentiveness(IV)

Employee

creativ

ity(Z)

Moral

imagination

Wurthmann

(2013)

Social-cognitive

theory

andprinciples

ofcognitive

moral

developm

ent

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey;224

undergraduate

students

Educatio

nin

business

ethics

(IV)

Moral

attentiveness

Perceptions

ofthe

role

ofethics

and

social

responsibility

-Reflectiv

e(M

)

-Perceptual(M

)

Note:

Moral

selfvariablesthat

also



theDV


inthe“dependent

variable”column.



variable.

THE MORAL SELF


perceptual moral attentiveness (“a perceptual aspect in which information is automatically colored as it is encoun-tered” [p. 1028] by individuals’ experiences) and reflective moral attentiveness (“a more intentional reflective aspectby which the individual uses morality to reflect on and examine experience” [p. 1028]).

Self-conscious moral emotionsAlthough there are different families of moral emotions, such as other-condemning emotions of anger and disgust,self-conscious moral emotions are uniquely tied to the moral self because they occur when people judge themselvesrelative to their internalized moral standards (Haidt, 2003; Leary & Tangney, 2012). Like other moral emotions, self-conscious moral emotions emerge from situations in which others are at risk or are harmed (Haidt, 2003). However,self-conscious moral emotions derive from self-reflection on the moral acceptability of one’s anticipated or engagedbehavior. These self-reflective processes can occur consciously or intuitively, beneath the level of awareness (Haidt,2003; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). The focus on self-reflection and monitoring makes these emotions anintegral part of the moral self (Tangney et al., 2007). Although these emotions are important to one’s sense of selfand identity (i.e., the “having” side; Peterson & Seligman, 2004), when experienced, they motivate and regulatebehavior (i.e., the “doing” side; Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). We review four primary self-conscious moralemotions: guilt, shame, pride, and embarrassment (Table 4). Guilt is experienced when one is the cause or antici-pated cause of others’ suffering or harm. Shame is experienced by a self-appraised wrong or defect with one’s senseof self. Pride is experienced when the person “is responsible for a socially valued outcome or for being a sociallyvalued person” (Mascolo & Fischer, 1995, p. 66). Embarrassment is experienced when aspects of one’s self andsocial identity are damaged or threatened.

Moral strengthMoral strength is the capacity and conation (impetus to act) to achieve moral ends and is a category associated withthe “doing” side of the moral self. For instance, moral character reflects individuals’ enduring moral qualities thatpromote upholding moral principles (Narvaez, Lapsley, Hagele, & Lasky, 2006). Other moral strength constructsinclude moral attitudes (Jackson et al., 2008), moral confidence (Krettenauer & Eichler, 2006), moral chronicity(Narvaez et al., 2006), and moral conviction (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Recent work has examined moralpotency (Hannah & Avolio, 2010; Hannah, Avolio, & May, 2011), which is a psychological state involving a senseof ownership over the moral aspects of one’s environment (moral ownership), reinforced by beliefs in the ability toact to achieve moral purposes in that domain (moral efficacy), and the courage to perform ethically in the face ofadversity and persevere through challenges (moral courage). Research has also assessed individuals’ duty orienta-tion, which is a state-like volitional orientation to loyally serve and faithfully support other members of the group,to strive and sacrifice to accomplish the tasks and missions of the group, and to honor its codes and principles(Hannah, Jennings, Bluhm, Peng, & Schaubroeck, 2013). Each of these moral strength concepts reflects the intensitywith which individuals rely on and seek to integrate moral notions in their behavior (Table 5).

Antecedents of the moral self

Moral self theory (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1984) draws from self-regulation and social-cognition principles(Bandura, 1991, 1999; Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996) to explain how the moral self is basedon individual characteristics and social interactions with others. In other words, central factors of the person and so-cial interactions with others that have moral implications accentuate morality in one’s sense of self. Thus, we reviewempirical work on individual characteristics and social factors as antecedents of the moral self.

Individual characteristicsResearchers have attempted to understand how certain individual characteristics mold one’s sense of morality.Although research suggests that age does not influence moral centrality (Krettenauer, 2011), culture-dependent



Table

4.Empiricalworkon

self-conscious

moral

emotions.

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

self

variable(s)

Other

variables

studiedon

outcom

es

Outcome

variablesof

the

moral

self

Cohen

(201

0)Moral

emotion

theory

Study

2only:

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

scenario-based

survey;172MBA

students

Guilt

(IV)

Empathy

(IV)

Intentionto

engage

inunethical

behavior

Shame(IV)

Perspectiv

e-taking

(IV)

Cohen

etal.

(2011)

Moral

emotion

theory

Study

1:Item

generatio

nof

moral

emotions

measure:

cross-sectional,

single-source,

scenario-based

survey;291

undergraduate

students

Guilt

(IV)

Unethical

business

decision

Study

2:Validity

testof

measure:

cross-sectional,

single-source

scenario-based

survey;862adults

from

natio

nwide

onlin

esubjectpool

Guiltrepair

(IV)

Illegalbehavior

Study

3:Experim

ent;56

MBA

students

Shame(IV)

Deceptio

nShame–

with

draw

al(IV)

Rum

ination

Depressive

symptom

sUnethical

bargaining

behavior

deHooge

etal.(2008)

Moral

emotion

theory

Study

1:Experim

ent;132

undergraduate

students

Imagined

sham

e(IV)

Emotion

influence

Prosocial

behavior

Study

2:Critical

incident

experiment;135

undergraduate

students

Recalledsham

e(IV)

-Exogenous

Prosocial

tendency

Experienced

sham

e(IV)

Induced

sham

e(IV)

-Endogenous

Socialvalue

orientation

(Contin

ues)

THE MORAL SELF


Table

4.(Contin

ued)

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

self

variable(s)

Other

variables

studiedon

outcom

es

Outcome

variablesof

the

moral

self

Study

3:Experim

ent;163

undergraduate

students

Study

4:Scenario-

basedexperiment;

150undergraduate

students

deHooge

etal.(2007)

Moral

emotion

theory

and

gametheory

Experim

ent;142

undergraduate

students

Guilt

(IV)

Prosocial

orproself

orientation

(Z)

Cooperatio

nShame(IV)

Cooperatio

ntendency

Else-Quest

etal.(2012)

Moral

emotions

andem

otion

theory

Meta-analysisof

22,665

articles

Gender(IV)

Guilt

(DV)

Guilt

Ethnicity

(IV)

Shame(D

V)

Shame

Age

(IV)

Authentic

pride(D

V)

Authentic

pride

Measure

scale

type

(IV)

Hubristic

pride(D

V)

Hubristic

pride

Dom

ainof

emotion

(IV)

Embarrassm

ent(D

V)

Embarrassm

ent

Ferguson

etal.(1991)

Moral

emotion

theory

and

principles

ofchild

developm

ent

Interview

methodology;24

fifth-gradechild

ren

Norm

violation

Guilt

(DV)

Guilt

-Moral

transgression(IV)

Shame(D

V)

Shame

-Social

blunder(IV)

Fromson(2006)

Theoriesof

moral

emotion

andstress

Cross-sectio

nal,

sing

le-source

survey

using

criticalincident

technique;

98undergraduate

stud

ents

Recountingself-

discrepancy

conditions(IV)

Guilt

(DV)

Guilt

Shame(D

V)

Shame



Gausel

etal.(2012)

Moral

emotion

theory;theoriesof

theself(e.g.,

need

tobelong,

self-concept)

Cross-sectio

nal,

sing

le-source

survey;379

participants

Appraisal

Shame(IV)

Feltrejection

(IV)

Shame

-Concern

for

condem

natio

nof

in-group

(IV)

Felt

inferiority

(IV)

With

draw

al

-In-group

defect

(IV)

Contributionto

victim

s(M

)

Prosocial

restitu

tion

In-group

identifi

catio

n(IV)

Ghatavi

etal.

(2002)

Moral

emotion

theory

Cross-sectio

nal,

sing

le-source

survey;56

outpatientswith

either

acurrentor

pastmajor

depressive

episode

Current

depression

(IV)

State

guilt

(DV)

State

guilt

Past

depression

(IV)

Traitguilt

(DV)

Traitguilt

Moral

standards(D

V)

Moral

standards

State

sham

e(D

V)

State

sham

e

State

guilt

(DV)

State

guilt

State

pride(D

V)

State

pride

Giner-Sorolla

andEspinosa

(2011)

Moral

emotions

theory

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey;86

undergraduate

students

Anger

(IV)

State

guilt

(DV)

State

guilt

Disgust

(IV)

Traitguilt

(DV)

Traitguilt

Grasm

icket

al.

(1993)

Moral

emotion

theory,d

eterrence

theory,and

theory

ofsocial

system

s

Tim

e-lagged

(collected

in1982

and1990),single-

source

survey;330

adultsfrom

annual

survey

ofadults

from

Departm

ent

ofSociology

atthe

University

ofOklahom

a

Shameassociated

drunk

driving

(IV)

Pastself-

reported

drunk

driving

(IV)

Self-reported

drunkdriving

Holmqvist

(2008)

Moral

emotion

theory

and

psychopathy

theory

Interview

methodology,

coding

responses;

47youngcrim

inal

offenders,treated

byinstitu

tions

managed

bythe

NationalBoard

ofInstitu

tionalCare

Psychopathy

(IV)

Shame(D

V)

Joy

(IV)

Shameof

crim

inal

behavior

Sadness

(IV)

Anger

(IV)

Fright(IV)

(Contin

ues)

THE MORAL SELF


Table

4.(Contin

ued)

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

self

variable(s)

Other

variables

studiedon

outcom

es

Outcome

variablesof

the

moral

self

HongandChiu

(1992)

Psychological

theory

related

toem

otion

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey;321

undergraduate

students

Violatin

gmoral

norm

(IV)

Guilt

(DV)

Guilt

Personal

inadequacy

(IV)

Shame(D

V)

Shame

Presenceof

others

(IV)

Personal

responsibilityfor

violation

(IV)

Kim

and

Johnson(2013)

Moral

emotion

theory

and

principles

ofcultu

ral

differences

Cross-sectio

nal,

single

source

scenario-based

survey;355

undergraduate

students

Pride

(IV)

Anger

(IV)

Purchase

intentionfora

social-cause

product

Guilt

(IV)

Empathy

(IV)

Elevatio

n(IV)

National

origin

(Z)

Independentself-

construal(Z)

Interdependent

self-construal

(Z)

Kochanska,

Gross,L

in,and

Nichols(2002)

Theoriesof

socialization,

the

self,and

self-

developm

ent

Tim

e-lagged,

multi-source

surveys/

interviews(coded

observations);112

mothers

with

their

newborn

child

ren

(recruitedviaan

adin

thecommunity

)

Pow

er-assertiv

emotherparenting

style(IV)

Moral

self

(DV)

Development

oftheself

Guilt

(IV)

Ruleviolation

Konstam

etal.(2001)

Moral

emotion

theory

and

principles

offorgiveness

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey,u

sing

criticalincident

orrecalltechnique;

148graduate

students

Guilt

(IV)

Anger

(IV)

Forgiveness

Shame(IV)

Empathy

(IV)

Pride

(IV)

Perspectiv

e-taking

(IV)

Detachm

ent

process(IV)

Gender(Z)



Krettenauerand

Johnston

(2011)

Moral

emotions

theory

and

principles

ofmoral

self

Cross-sectio

nal,

sing

lesource,

scenario-based

survey;155

teenagers,grades

7through11,w

itha

sampleof

50undergraduate

stud

ents

Context

type

Guilt

(DV)

Guilt

-Prosocial

actio

n(IV)

Pride

(DV)

Pride

-Tem

ptation

(IV)

Self-im

portance

ofmoral

values

(Z)

Other

emotions

(embarrassm

ent,

fear,sadness,

happiness,anger,

satisfaction)

-Antisocial(IV)

Emotion

Laible,Eye,and

Carlo

(2008)

Theoriesof

moral

emotion,

emotion

regulatio

n,andmoral

developm

ent

Cross-sectio

nal,

single

source,

scenario-based

survey;113

adolescents(ages

14–18years)

from

twopublic

high

schools

Parentin

gstyle(IV)

Guilt

(IV)

Emotion

regulatio

n(IV)

Prosocial

behavior

Shame(IV)

Empathy

(IV)

Moral

conduct

Anger

(IV)

McD

anielet

al.

(2010)

Theoriesof

moral

emotion

andmoral

developm

ent

Cross-sectio

nal,

sing

le-source

survey;258

undergraduate

stud

ents

Spirituality

(IV)

Guilt

(DV)

Guilt

Fam

ilyinteractions

(IV)

Shame(D

V)

Shame

Empathy

Mollet

al.

(2011)

Moral

emotion

theory

Clin

ical

observations

and

functio

nal

magnetic

resonanceim

aging

design,integratin

gamoral

sentim

ent

task;33

patients

referred

toby

specialistsin

alarger

observationalstudy

attheclinical

center

ofthe

NationalInstitu

tes

ofHealth

intram

ural

program

Dam

ageto

frontopolar

cortextand

spectalarea

(IV)

Prosocial

moral

emotion(e.g.,

guilt,p

ity,

embarrassm

ent)

(DV)

Prosocial

moral

emotion(e.g.,

guilt,p

ity,and

embarrassm

ent)

(Contin

ues)

THE MORAL SELF


Table

4.(Contin

ued)

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

self

variable(s)

Other

variables

studiedon

outcom

es

Outcome

variablesof

the

moral

self

Murrayet

al.

(2007)

Principlesof

spiritu

ality

andsexuality

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey;176

undergraduateand

graduate

students

Sexual

attitude(IV)

Guilt

(IV)

Highrisk

sex

Spirituality

(IV)

Shame(IV)

Sex

afteralcohol

consum

ption

Sense

ofalienatio

nfrom

God

(IV)

Sex

with

multip

lepartners

Olth

ofet

al.

(2004)

Moral

emotions

theory

Interview-based

scenarios;206

child

renfrom

3elem

entary

and2

secondaryschools

Emotion-evoking

event(action

vs.identity

threat)(IV)

Guilt

(DV)

Guilt

Shame(D

V)

Shame

Rooset

al.

(2011)

Moral

emotions

theory

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey;384

fourth-

andfifth-grade

students

Gender(IV)

Guilt

(DV)

Guilt

Aggressionlevel

towardpeers(IV)

Shame(D

V)

Shame

Peerwitn

ess(IV)

Pride

(DV)

Pride

Victim

disposition

(sad,

angryor

neutral)

(IV)

Anger

Rothschild

etal.(2012)

Psychoanalytic

theory

Study

1:Scenario-

basedexperiment;

114undergraduate

students

Threattype

Guilt

(IV)

Personal

control(IV)

Scapegoating

Study

2:Not

applicable

toreview

Value

threat

(IV)

Environmental

advocacy

Study

3:Scenario-

basedexperiment;

64undergraduate

students

Control

threat

(IV)

Nothreat

(IV)

Viable

scapegoatin

gtarget

available(IV)

Non-viable

scapegoatin

gtarget

available(IV)



StetsandCarter

(2012)

Control

system

sapproach

ofidentitytheory

Tim

e-lagged,

single-source

survey;369

undergraduate

students

Moral

meanings(IV)

Moral

identity

Moral

identity

discrepancy

(M)

Guilt

Feelin

gsrule

(IV)

-Internalization

(IV)

Moral

behavior

(M)

Shame

-Sym

bolization

(IV)

Guilt

(DV)

Shame(D

V)

Stuew

iget

al.

(2010)

Moral

emotions

theory

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey;Sam

ple1:

250undergraduate

students;S

ample2:

234early

adolescents;

Sam

ple3:

507

pre-

andpost-trial

inmates

held

ina

metropolitan

area

county

jail;

Sam

ple

4:250at-riskyouth

inmiddle

adolescence

Guilt

(IV)

Externalization

ofblam

e(M

)Aggression

Shame(IV)

Empathetic

concern

(M)

Stuew

iget

al.(2009)

Moral

emotion

theory

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey;368

pre-

andpost-trail

inmates

held

in1000-bed

metropolitan

area

county

jail

Guilt

proneness(IV)

Sym

ptom

sof

alcohol

dependence

(IV)

HIV

status

Shame

proneness(IV)

Risky

needle

use

Risky

sexual

behavior

Tangney

(1991)

Moral

emotion

theory

Study

1:Cross-

sectional,single-

source

survey;101

undergraduate

students

Empathy

(IV)

Guilt

(IV)

Study

2:Cross-

sectional,single-

source

survey;97

undergraduate

students

Cognitiv

eem

pathy

(IV)

Shame(IV)

(Contin

ues)

THE MORAL SELF


Table

4.(Contin

ued)

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

self

variable(s)

Other

variables

studiedon

outcom

es

Outcome

variablesof

the

moral

self

Study

3:Cross-

sectional,single-

source

survey;213

undergraduate

students

Emotional

responsiveness

(IV)

Study

4:Cross-

sectional,single-

source

survey;241

undergraduate

students

Affectiv

ecue

discrimination

(IV)

Perspectiv

etaking

(IV)

Fantasy

(IV)

Personal

distress

(IV)

Externalization

(IV)

Detachm

ent(IV)

Tangney

etal.(1996)

Moral

emotions

theory

Cross-sectio

nal,

single

source,

criticalincident

recallsurvey;182

undergraduate

students

Guilt

(IV)

Affectiv

eem

otional

reactio

nsShame(IV)

Self-report

perceptio

ns

Embarrassm

ent(IV)

Socialcontext

perceptio

ns

Note:

Moral

selfvariablesthat

also



theDV


inthe“dependent

variable”column.



variable.



Table

5.Empiricalworkon

moral

strength.

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

self

variable(s)

Other

variables

studiedon

outcom

es

Outcome

variablesof

themoral

self

Hannahand

Avolio

(2010)

Theoriesof

theself

andself-regulation,

andprinciples

ofmoral

judgment

andpotency

Cross-sectio

nal,

multi-source

survey;

2572

U.S.A

rmy

soldiers

assigned

to295squads

with

approxim

ately9

soldiers

persquad

Moral

potency

Adherence

toArm

yvalues

-Moral

courage(IV)

Intentionto

reportothers’

unethicalacts

-Moral

efficacy

(IV)

Tolerance

for

mistreatm

ent

ofothers

-Moralow

nership

(IV)

Tolerance

for

torture

Confrontin

gwrongdoers

Hannah,

Avolio

,andWalum

bwa

(2011)

Social-cognitive

theory

andprinciples

ofauthentic

leadership

Tim

e-lagged,single-

source

survey;162

soldiers

attending

atraining

program

atamajor

U.S.

Arm

yschool

Authentic

leadership

(IV)

Displaysof

moral

courage(M

)Ethical

behavior

Prosocial

behavior

Hannah,

Jennings,

Bluhm

,Peng,

and

Schaubroeck

(2013)

Principlesof

moral

philo

sophy,

virtue

ethics,d

eonance,

andreactance

Study

1/Sam

ple

1a:Cross-sectio

nal,


2937

activ

eduty

soldiers

inthe

U.S.A

rmy

Ethical

leadership

(IV)

Dutyorientation

(M)

Organizational

deviance

Study

1/Sam

ple1b:

Cross-sectio

nal,


2937

activ

eduty

soldiers

inthe

U.S.A

rmy

Transform

ational

leadership

(IV)

Ethical

behavior

Study

1/Sam

ple2:

Cross-sectio

nal,


4043

U.S.A

rmy

NationalGuard

and

3383

U.S.A

rmy

Reservists

(Contin

ues)

THE MORAL SELF


Table

5.(Contin

ued)

Study

Theoryused

Researchdesign

Antecedentsof

themoral

self

Moral

self

variable(s)

Other

variables

studiedon

outcom

es

Outcome

variablesof

themoral

self

Study

2/Sam

ple3:

Cross-sectio

nal,

single-source

survey;2953

civilian

(non-m

ilitary)federal

employeesof

U.S.

government

Study

3/Sam

ple4:

Tim

e-lagged,single-

source

survey;229

full-tim

eem

ployees,

recruitedthrough

Empanelsurvey

service

Study

4/Sam

ple6:

Tim

e-lagged,single-

source

survey;376

soldiers

assigned

toU.S.A

rmyDivision

inNEU.S.A.

Study

5/Sam

ple5:

Tim

e-lagged,single-

source

survey;218

soldiertrainees

from

U.S.A

rmy

Hannahet

al.

(2013)

Social-cognitive

theory

andprinciples

ofmoral

agency

Cross-sectio

nal,

multi-source

survey;

1582

U.S.A

rmy

soldiers

assigned

to24

3squads;only

squads

with

atleast4mem

bers

wereincluded

inanalyses

Abusive

supervision

(IV)

Moral

courage(M

)Identifi

catio

nwith

organizatio

nal

values

(M)

Mistreatm

entof

non-combatants

Workunitabusive

supervision

(IV)

Intentionto

reportothers’

unethicalacts

Jackson

etal.(2008)

Principlesof

cultu

raldifferences

Cross-sectio

nal,


602public

school

youths

Country

(China

vs.

U.S.A.)

(IV)

Moral

attitude

Gender(IV)

Acceptability

ofmoral

onlin

ebehavior



Krettenauerand

Eichler

(2006)

Principlesof

moral

emotionandchild

developm

ent

Sem

i-structured

interviewspresentin

gparticipantswith

vignettes;200

adolescents

Meta-ethicalstance/

judgment(IV)

Con

fidencein

moral

judgment(D

V)

Self-attributed

moral

emotions

(IV)

Con

fidencein

moral

judgment

Delinquent

behavior

Narvaez

etal.

(2006)

Socialinform

ation

processing

and

social-cognitiv

etheory

Study

1:Experim

ent;

254undergraduate

students

Moral

inference(IV)

Moral

chronicity

(IV)

Processingstyle(Z)

Recallabout

ethicalbehavior

Study

2:Scenario-

basedexperiment;

120undergraduate

students

Decisionprobe(Z)

Tim

eto

make

inferenceof

behavior

Skitka

etal.(2005)

Principlesof

moral

convictio

nor

mandatesandattitude

strength

theory

Study

1:Cross-sec-

tional,single-source,

scenario-based

exper-

iment;91

individuals

who

wererecruited

from

public

places

(e.g.,airport,bus

term

inal,and

Amtrak

station)

Moral

convictio

n(IV)

Sourcetype

(friendvs.d

istant

relatio

nship)

(Z)

Socialdistance

from

attitudinally

dissim

ilarother

Study

2:Cross-

sectional,single-

source,scenario-

basedexperiment;82

individualswho

were

recruitedfrom

public

places

(e.g.,airport,

busterm

inal,and

Amtrak

station)

Physicaldistance

from

attitudinally

dissim

ilarother

Study

3:Experim

ent;

80undergraduate

students

Intoleranceof

dissim

ilarother

Note:

Moral

selfvariablesthat

also



theDV


inthe“dependent

variable”column.



variable.

THE MORAL SELF


dispositional traits do.1 For example, Eastern cultures and cultural characteristics (e.g., power distance and uncer-tainty avoidance) more strongly influence moral self constructs (e.g., ethical ideology, Singhapakdi, Marta, Rao,& Cicic, 2001; moral attitudes, Jackson et al., 2008; moral sensitivity, Blodgett, Lu, Rose, & Vitell, 2001) thanWestern cultures and cultural characteristics (e.g., individualism/masculinity). A review of the influence ofindividual differences on the moral self suggests that individual differences have implications for behavioral ethicsin multi-cultural workplaces, especially given widespread globalization and increasingly frequent interactionsbetween organizations’ members across cultures.Gender has also been widely studied. Socialization principles suggest that women should be more concerned with

others and so they are generally stereotyped as having stronger moral qualities than men. Some research supportsthese ideas, showing that women are more ethically sensitive than men (Ameen, Guffey, & McMillan, 1996;Ozdogan & Eser, 2007) and experience guilt and shame more so than men, who are more likely to experience pride(Roos, Salmivalli, & Hodges, 2011). However, a meta-analysis (Else-Quest, Higgins, Allison, & Morton, 2012)demonstrated that such stereotypes lack robustness in terms of self-conscious moral emotions. Results revealedsmall gender differences for guilt and shame, yet gender similarities for embarrassment, authentic pride, and hubris-tic pride. This meta-analysis also revealed that gender differences depend on ethnicity (stronger gender effects forWhite samples), the type of measure used (stronger gender effects for trait versus state scales, rather than measuresbased on situations or scenarios), and the domain of the emotion (e.g., body, sex, and food). Thus, results suggestthat the influence of gender on the moral self is nuanced.Further, studies have shown that an actor’s past behavior and experienced emotions more strongly influence the

“doing” side than the “having” side of the moral self. For instance, moral inferences strengthen moral chronicity(Narvaez et al., 2006). Further, Pratt, Hunsberger, Pancer, and Alisat (2003) found that community involvementenhances individuals’ moral self-ideals (a moral centrality concept). However, our review of research examiningmoral identity highlighted differences in effects. For instance, Jordan, Mullen, and Murnighan (2011) found thatrecalling past moral acts positively influenced individuals’ symbolization moral identity (i.e., the “doing” side)and recalling past immoral acts negatively influenced symbolization moral identity; however, the results suggestrecalling either past moral or immoral acts does not influence internalization moral identity (i.e., the “having” side).Jordan et al. (2011) concluded that their work demonstrates the compensatory nature of past (im)moral behavior.Because symbolization represents the “doing” side of the moral self, these findings suggest that individuals seekto maintain consistent self-images with their past behavior. Specifically, moral recollections strengthen the moralself, whereas immoral recollections engender a stronger sense of incompleteness, which increases moral strivings.These findings imply that organizational socialization programs and cultures that promote ethical behaviors earlyin members’ tenure might influence self-consistency motives and moral striving.Research has found that self-conscious moral emotions—another active, “doing” aspect of the moral self—are also

strongly influenced by behavior. Unethical actions (I did something bad) have been shown to invoke guilt, but acts thatreflect poorly on one’s identity (I am bad) invoke shame (e.g., Ferguson, Stegge, & Damhuis, 1991; Fromson, 2006;Hong & Chiu, 1992; Olthof, Ferguson, Bloemers, & Deij, 2004; Rothschild, Landau, Sullivan, & Keefer, 2012; Stets& Carter, 2012; Tangney, 1991). Further, prosocial acts following a moral transgression have been found to invokepride but not guilt (Krettenauer & Johnston, 2011), and in considering moral norm violations, anger invokes guiltwhereas disgust invokes shame (Giner-Sorolla & Espinosa, 2011). Research has shown a similar pattern in groups:an appraisal of the in-group as holding a moral defect predicts felt shame (Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2012).Differences in the “having” and “doing” side of the moral self have also emerged on the influence of religiosity, the

degree to which an individual actively adheres to a religion (Allport & Ross, 1967). Religiosity as a general trait hasbeen found to influence moral self “having” constructs (i.e., moral centrality, Kurpis, Beqiri, & Helgeson, 2008; moralsensitivity, Morton et al., 2006) and “doing” constructs (guilt, McDaniel, Grice, & Eason, 2010; Murray, Ciarrocchi, &

1We recognize that culture is generally considered a social context that influences individuals’ behavioral tendencies. However, we address thesespecific studies within the set of antecedents that focus on individual characteristics because they specifically examine personality traits associatedwith cultural differences (e.g., power distance and individualism).



Murray-Swank, 2007; shame, Murray et al., 2007). However, when more active versus passive religiosity concepts areexamined, differences emerge. For instance, religious commitment, but not religious involvement, has been shown topositively influence internalization moral identity (Hardy, Walker, Rackham, & Olsen, 2012). Further, Vitell et al.(2009) examined intrinsic religiosity (inherent goals of the person’s religious tradition) and extrinsic religiosity (utilitar-ian motivations underlying the person’s religious behavior). They found that intrinsic religiosity positively influencedboth dimensions of moral identity, whereas extrinsic religiosity negatively influenced only internalization. They alsofound that self-control did not mediate the effects on internalization but fully mediated the negative effects of extrinsicreligiosity on moral identity symbolization. They concluded that extrinsic religiosity depletes one’s self-control, whichexplains its negative influence on symbolic moral action. As approximately 84 percent of the world’s population and,therefore, labor pool formally identifies with a religion (PewResearch, 2012), organizational researchers should furtherinvestigate the differential effects of religiosity on the moral self.A last category of antecedents involves individuals’mental health, which has been shown to influence the “doing”

side of the moral self. For instance, Ghatavi, Nicolson, MacDonald, Osher, and Levitt (2002) found that individualswho were highly depressed experienced more enduring emotions of guilt and shame, and lower levels of pride. Theyalso found that trait guilt was not influenced by depression. Work in this area has yet to investigate whether and howmental impairments influence how individuals define themselves morally (the “having” side).

Social factorsSome work in social psychology has focused on various non-work social influences of the moral self (e.g., parents,Hardy, Bhattacharjee, Reed, & Aquino, 2010; socialization, Pratt et al., 2003; college coursework, Ozdogan & Eser,2007), but limited research attention has been given to organizational antecedents. This work has highlighted the influ-ence of organizational context on both the “having” and “doing” sides of the moral self. For example, research hasshown that perceptions of ethical culture positively influence employees’ moral efficacy (Schaubroeck, Hannah,et al., 2012) and that employees who experience ethics-oriented socialization are more ethically sensitive (Sparks &Hunt, 1998). Organizational structure has also been shown to influence ethical predispositions (Schminke, 2001). In par-ticular, more mechanistic and rigid structures, rather than organic and flatter structures, positively influence employees’level of formalism and utilitarianism. Similarly, employees within public rather than private organizations have beenfound to hold stronger moral self-images (Van der Wal & de Graaf, 2006). Further, Kouchaki (2011) found that knowl-edge about past non-prejudicial hiring actions made by other members of an individual’s group enhanced individuals’internalization moral identity, which then gave them moral license to act immorally in future hiring actions.Finally, leaders are a strong influence. Studies have shown that positive and ethical leader behaviors strengthen

different aspects of employees’ moral self, whereas negative and unethical leader behaviors weaken employees’moral self. For example, the literature suggests that leaders’ initiating and consideration styles strengthen followers’utilitarianism and formalism tendencies (Schminke & Wells, 1999), authentic leadership positively influencesfollowers’ moral courage (Hannah, Avolio, & Walumbwa, 2011), ethical and transformational leadership positivelyinfluences followers’ duty orientation (Hannah, Jennings, et al., 2013), ethical leadership increases followers’ moralefficacy (Schaubroeck, Hannah, et al., 2012), and transformational and transactional leadership positively influencesinternalization moral identity, with transformational leadership having a stronger influence (Weichun, Riggio,Avolio, & Sosik, 2011). Conversely, abusive leader behavior has been shown to deplete followers’ moral courageand their internalization of organizational values (Hannah, Schaubroeck et al., 2013).

Summary of the antecedents to the moral selfResearch supports the premise that individual and social factors influence and shape the moral self. The findingsreviewed show that ethical aspects of the social context, social role models, and behavioral norms strengthen both the“having” and “doing” sides of the moral self. However, we found a distinct pattern in the literature associated withthe influence of individual characteristics.When characteristics involve how individuals define themselves (e.g., gender,cultural background, and culture), such factors influence the “having” side of the moral self (i.e., internalized aspects ofmoral centrality, moral judgment disposition, and self-conscious moral orientation) and more weakly influence the

THE MORAL SELF


“doing” side of the moral self (i.e., self-conscious moral emotions). In contrast, individuals’ engaged behavior, emo-tions, active experiences, and context more strongly influence the “doing” side of the moral self (i.e., symbolizationmoral identity, self-conscious moral emotions, and moral strength). Thus, the findings align with moral self theory(Aquino & Freeman, 2009; Bandura, 1991; Harter, 1999). The construction of the “having” side of the moral self seemsto be more strongly influenced by self-defining characteristics and through social interactions. The construction of the“doing” side of the moral self is also influenced by social interactions but seems to be more strongly influenced byself-relevant cognitions and evaluations in terms of agentic experiences.At first glance, our review suggests that the “doing” side of the moral self is more malleable to organizations, in

that organizational decision makers can create contexts (e.g., structures, climate, and leader or coworker rolemodels) that can influence and strengthen employees’ moral self. However, we believe that it is important to high-light other work on individuals’ traits, such as the Protestant Work Ethic (see Furnham, 1984, for a review) andspirituality (see Karakas, 2010, for a recent review), which suggest that such traits, especially those linking Protes-tant Work Ethic and religiosity to work, highly influence organizational outcomes. Further, it may also be thatdifferent aspects of organizational life indirectly influence the moral self through specific characteristics of anindividual. For instance, Ghatavi et al. (2002) demonstrated that depression made it less likely for individuals toexperience moral emotions—emotions needed to stimulate more ethical choices and behavior when facing ethicaldilemmas. These findings, along with the general literature on mental health and work (see Warr, 2007, for areview), suggest that organizations can influence employees’ mental health (e.g., depression) by way of workplacestressors. Such findings suggest that a more refined understanding is needed of how organizations influence thevarious individual characteristics that impair or facilitate the self-regulatory functioning of the moral self.We note, however, that our conclusions concerning the antecedents of the moral self should be considered in light

of the fact that the studies we review hold a static and variable-centric approach to examining the moral self. That is,studies have not examined how the “having” and “doing” side of the moral self influence each other or whether theyhold reciprocal effects. Such a dynamic approach is needed to better understand the underlying mechanisms andprocesses associated with the construction and functioning of the moral self.

Consequences of the moral self

Research exploring the consequences of the moral self has integrated moral self theory (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002;Blasi, 1984) with principles about social identity (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979), self-regulation, and social cognition(e.g., Bandura, 1991, 1999). The general premise of these theories is that individuals seek to maintain consistencywith their moral self-concepts and, thus, are motivated to align their behavior in various situations with the principlesof morality they hold. We review work on three categories of consequences: (i) decision making and motivationalstates, (ii) behavioral intentions and behavior, and (iii) emotions.

Decision making and motivational statesResearch on decision making and motivational states explains how the moral self inspires an individual to be a moralperson. One general finding is that the moral self heightens the salience of moral principles and ethical characteris-tics of a situation. For example, research has found that reflective moral attentiveness, moral awareness, idealism,and moral identity (both internalization and symbolization) enhance moral sensitivity (Daniels, Diddams, & VanDuzer, 2011; Reynolds, 2008; Sparks & Hunt, 1998) and attention to moral issues (Reynolds, 2008). Further, studieshave shown that moral sensitivity positively relates to moral stress (Lützén, Blom, Ewalds-Kvist, & Winch, 2010).Although one study failed to find a significant influence of the moral self (i.e., ethical ideology, Yetmar &

Eastman, 2000) on ethical decision making, most studies have. For instance, internalization moral identity has beenfound to positively influence deontological and utilitarian moral judgments (Conway & Gawronski, 2013) andethical beliefs (McFerran, Aquino, & Duffy, 2010). Further, research has found that moral judgment disposition(measured in various ways; Brady & Wheeler, 1996; Fisher, Woodbine, & Fullerton, 2003; Forsyth, 1980, 1985;



McFerran et al., 2010; Schminke, 1997) and moral sensitivity (Morton et al., 2006) positively relate to moral reason-ing and ethical judgments.Studies have shown that moral self constructs also influence motivational states. For instance, moral attentiveness

is positively related to moral imagination, particularly for employees who are more creative (Whitaker & Godwin,2013). Research on moral judgment dispositions has shown that, compared with idealists, relativists (given theirfocus on aspects of the situation and rejection of moral absolutes) are more goal-oriented (Luzadis & Gerhardt,2011). Studies on moral communion have shown that individuals holding both communion and agency, given thisbalance of both an “other” and “self” focus, are more likely to construe critical life events redemptively, are morefrequently identified as helpers, and report more secure attachments (Frimer, Walker, Dunlop, Lee, & Riches,2011; Walker & Frimer, 2007; Walker, Frimer, & Dunlop, 2010). Last, research on self-conscious moral emotions(Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996) has shown that experienced shame heightens a sense of isolation andinferiority, motivating individuals to hide and be less motivated to admit wrongdoing, whereas experienced guiltand shame enhance responsibility and regret for moral transgressions.Further, studies have found that moral centrality influences how individuals perceive and accept others. Moral

centrality heightens individuals’ concern for others (Doron, Sar-El, & Mikulincer, 2012; Hardy et al., 2010), makesindividuals more effective at socializing (Kochanska, Koenig, Barry, Kim, & Yoon, 2010), and decreases socialdominance orientation (Hardy et al., 2010). Similarly, Reed and Aquino (2003) found that internalization moralidentity (but not symbolization) increases individuals’ moral regard for and willingness to exchange resources with,and donate to, out-group members, and that it lessens desires to wish harm to out-group members. Last, research hasshown that moral centrality impairs antisocial attitudes and enhances prosocial attitudes (Lee, Whitehead,Ntoumanis, & Hatzigeorgiadis, 2008; Sage, Kavussanu, & Duda, 2006).

Behaviors and behavioral intentionsMoral self theory suggests that individuals with a strong moral self are more inclined to act ethically and refrain fromunethical behavior. Yet, consistent support for this premise has only been found with constructs associated with the“having” side of the moral self (i.e., commitment to moral self, internalization moral identity, moral values, moraljudgment dispositions, and perceptual moral attentiveness).For instance, although only a small number of studies have examined the influence of moral self constructs using data

fromworking adults (i.e., Brebels, De Cremer, Van Dijke, & Van Hiel, 2011; Hannah&Avolio, 2010; Hannah, Avolio,&Walumbwa, 2011; Hannah, Jennings, et al., 2013; Hannah, Schaubroeck, et al., 2013;Mayer, Aquino, Greenbaum, &Kuenzi, 2012; Reynolds, 2008; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007; McFerran et al., 2010; Vitell, Keith, & Mathur, 2011), byand large, empirical findings have shown that “having” moral self constructs motivate ethical and prosocial intentionsand behavior. In particular, research has found that “having” moral self-concepts positively influence cooperativebehavior (Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009), discomfort with others being harmed (Kavussanu, Willoughby, & Ring,2012), donations and donation intentions (Aquino, McFerran, & Laven, 2011; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Conway & Peetz,2012; Reed & Aquino, 2003; Sachdeva et al., 2009; Winterich, Mittal, & Ross, 2009), ethical behavior and intentions(Aquino et al., 2011; Frimer &Walker, 2009; Gausel et al., 2012; Johnston &Krettenauer, 2011; Konstam, Chernoff, &Deveney, 2001; Kurpis et al., 2008; Lu & Chang, 2011; Michaelidou & Hassan, 2008; Reynolds, 2008; Reynolds &Ceranic, 2007; Rosenberg, 1987; Stets & Carter, 2012; Stuewig, Tangney, Heigel, Harty, &McCloskey, 2010; Stuewig,Tangney, Mashek, Forkner, & Dearing, 2009), organizational citizenship behavior (McFerran et al., 2010), andvolunteerism (Aquino & Reed, 2002). However, “having”moral self constructs have been found to negatively influenceunethical and counterproductive intentions and behavior, such as aggression (Hardy et al., 2012; Rancer, Kosberg, &Silvestri, 1992), antisocial behavior (Barriga, Morrison, Liau, & Gibbs, 2001; Johnston & Krettenauer, 2011),dangerous driving (Rosenbloom, Ben-Eliyahu, & Nemrodov, 2009), retaliation (Rupp & Bell, 2010), social dominancebehavior (Wilson, 2003), and intentions for and engagement in unethical behavior (Mayer et al., 2012; Perugini &Leone, 2009; Sachdeva et al., 2009; Stets & Carter, 2011).Less consistent empirical findings emerged for research investigating the influence of “doing” side moral self

constructs on behaviors and intentions. A relatively steady pattern of results demonstrated that self-conscious moral

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emotions (i.e., guilt and pride) and moral strength (i.e., moral chronicity and moral character) positively influenceethical behavior and intentions (Cohen, 2010; De Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2007; Kim & Johnson,2013; Narvaez et al., 2006) and negatively influence unethical and counterproductive behavior and intentions (e.g.,self-reported drunk driving, Grasmick, Bursik, & Arneklev, 1993; scapegoating, Rothschild et al., 2012). Still,researchers have found that the effects of self-conscious moral emotions are contingent on moderating and mediatingfactors. For instance, Cohen, Wolf, Panter, and Insko (2011) examined measurement differences in guilt and shameon the basis of negative self-evaluation (NSE) measures and action tendency measures. Both guilt measures werehighly correlated and negatively influenced unethical decision making. Both shame measures were positively relatedto poor psychological functioning (e.g., neuroticism, personal distress, and low self-esteem), but they were weaklycorrelated with one another, and effects on unethical decision making did not converge. Shame-NSE was negativelyrelated to unethical decision making, whereas shame-action tendency was not. Further, de Hooge, Breugelmans, andZeelenberg (2008) predicted and found that experiencing shame motivated prosocial behavior when that felt shamewas relevant for the decision at hand, whereas when shame was not relevant, the effects did not hold.Regarding moral strength, Hannah and colleagues (Hannah & Avolio, 2010; Hannah et al., 2011; Hannah,

Schaubroeck, et al., 2013) found the effects of moral strength depend on leaders’ behavior. For instance, the effectsof moral potency (i.e., moral ownership, moral efficacy, and moral courage) on subjects’ adherence to organizationalvalues, intentions to report others’ (un)ethical acts, and tolerance for mistreating others depends on whether leadersare engaged in ethical acts (Hannah & Avolio, 2010). Further, moral courage has been found to mediate the effectsof leader behaviors (authentic leadership, Hannah et al., 2011; abusive supervision, Hannah, Schaubroeck, et al.,2013) on followers’ ethical and unethical behaviors. Research has also found that followers’ duty orientationmediates the positive relationships between ethical and transformational leadership and ethical behavior, as wellas the negative relationships between ethical and transformational leadership and workplace deviance (Hannah,Jennings, et al., 2013).Differing effects on behaviors and intentions have appeared for moral identity, however, depending on how moral

identity is conceptualized and whether moderators and mediators are considered. For example, Reynolds andCeranic (2007) found that symbolization, but not internalization, influenced charitable giving. Other work hasrevealed non-significant effects for symbolization on prosocial and ethical intentions and behavior (donations anddonation intentions, Aquino et al., 2011; Reed & Aquino, 2003; prosocial intentions, Aquino et al., 2011; organiza-tional citizenship behavior, McFerran et al., 2010). Further, when internalization and symbolization were combinedinto a moral identity composite, the effects did not influence ethical and prosocial behavior unless moderators wereconsidered (e.g., regulatory focus, Brebels et al., 2011; emotion-regulation knowledge, Côté, DeCelles, McCarthy,Van Kleef, & Hideg, 2011). For instance, Reynolds and Ceranic (2007) found that internalization moral identity hadpositive effects on moral behavior and decisions for individuals high in consequentialism or low in formalism, butnegative effects on moral behavior and decisions for individuals low in consequentialism or high in formalism.Mayer et al. (2012) found that internalization (not symbolization) directly influenced unethical behavior and conflict,whereas internalization and symbolization only marginally (p< .10) and indirectly (via the mediator, ethical leadership)influenced those outcomes.

The moral (dis)engagement of behaviors and behavioral intentions. Within the research examining behavior andbehavioral intentions, some scholars have examined the relationship between the moral self and moral disengage-ment. Moral disengagement occurs when individuals use cognitive strategies to “disengage” from moral principles,allowing unethical behavior to occur without self-sanction (Bandura, 1991, 1999). Empirical work has shown thatthe “having” side of the moral self deters moral disengagement, whereas the “doing” side of the moral self canenhance it. Specifically, internalization moral identity and moral judgment dispositions (i.e., idealism compared withrelativism) negatively influence moral disengagement (Aquino, Reed, Thau, & Freeman, 2007; Detert, Treviño, &Sweitzer, 2008; McFerran et al., 2010). In addition, Detert et al. (2008) found that internalization indirectly andnegatively influenced unethical decision making, as mediated by moral disengagement propensity. However, Vitellet al. (2011) found that whereas internalization lessened moral disengagement, symbolization made it more likely.



Similarly, Skitka et al. (2005) found that moral conviction gave individuals’ license to act badly: individuals with astrong moral conviction socially and physically distanced themselves from attitudinally dissimilar others and weremore intolerant of attitudinally dissimilar others in both intimate (e.g., friend) and distant relationships (e.g., ownerof a store that one frequents). They also found that strong moral convictions lessened individuals’ good will, coop-erativeness, and ability to generate procedural solutions to resolve disagreements.By contrast, Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim, and Felps (2009) examined the effects of internalization moral identity

on individuals’ moral “engagement.” Results showed that internalization moral identity positively influenced theaccessibility of individuals’ moral self-concepts, which was positively associated with ethical behavioral intentions(i.e., charitable donations and contributions to public goods) and negatively influenced unethical behavioralintentions (i.e., lying). Situational context also moderated the effects: Priming moral traits strengthened the effects,whereas financial incentives for unethical acts weakened them.

EmotionsOnly a handful of studies have examined the influence of moral self constructs on emotions. In general, this researchhas shown that constructs centering on the “having” side of the moral self (i.e., self-importance of moral values,internalization moral identity, and level of idealism) enhance individuals’ emotional intelligence (Angelidis &Ibrahim, 2011) and increase the likelihood they will experience self-conscious moral emotions (e.g., guilt and pride,Krettenauer & Johnston, 2011) and other-oriented moral emotions (e.g., empathy; Hardy et al., 2012). Other work,however, has found more nuanced effects. For instance, Stets and Carter (2011, 2012) found that moral identity self-discrepancy (self-ratings of moral identity lower than manipulated ratings) provoked negative emotion (Stets &Carter, 2011) and guilt and shame (Stets & Carter, 2012). Further, Aquino et al. (2011) found that high levels ofmoral identity internalization (but not symbolization) strengthened the positive effects of acts of uncommon moralgoodness on moral elevation (a surge of emotions involving admiration and warmth), which in turn motivatedprosocial behavior.

Summary of the consequences of the moral selfOverall, researchers have demonstrated that the moral self exerts a significant influence on a variety of outcomes.Individuals with a strong moral self are more attentive to and motivated to act and make decisions that are ethical.Various moral self constructs also invoke a variety of emotional reactions and strengthen emotional intelligence.Our review suggests that considering moderators and mediators can offer a richer understanding of the effects ofthe moral self. The most notable differences were those between the “having” versus “doing” side of the moralself, specifically for research using Aquino and Reed’s conceptualization and measure of moral identity. Usingthis measure, internalization was positively and consistently related to ethical behaviors and intentions and con-sistently negatively related to unethical and counterproductive behaviors and intentions. Conversely, differencesemerged for symbolization moral identity. When internalization and symbolization were combined into a com-posite measure of moral identity, significant results did not emerge unless moderators were considered (e.g., reg-ulatory focus, self-control, group norms, and ethical leadership). The review also highlights some dysfunctionalaspects of the “doing” side. That is, symbolization moral identity (Vitell et al., 2011) and moral conviction(Skitka et al., 2005) may enable moral licensing, whereby individuals feel justified to behave unethically.Our review also suggests measurement matters. “Having” side constructs hold a more consistent relationship

with attitudes, motives, behavior, and intentions. This makes sense, given the types of moral characteristics thatalign with individuals’ self-conceptions, such as being a caring and compassionate person or someone who is ide-alistic or morally sensitive. Yet, the “doing” side should also be influential, particularly because this side of themoral self involves agency. Of the research on the “doing” side reviewed, studies examining self-conscious moralemotions and moral strength demonstrated that these constructs hold more consistent effects on consequencesthan has moral identity symbolization. The review also shows that self-conscious moral emotions have a stronginfluence on individuals’ attitudes, motives, and behaviors; however, the effects could be bounded by moderators.Similarly, moral strength constructs also have a strong influence on attitudes, motives, and behaviors to achieve

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moral agency, with these effects influenced by moderating or mediating processes. Consistent results were alsofound for moral strength constructs of moral potency and duty orientation on various ethical outcomes across mul-tiple organizational field studies. This research suggests that these forms of moral strength exert strong influenceon behavior by bolstering the “doing” side of the moral self.Primary differences and inconsistent results emerged when researchers examined the “doing” side of moral iden-

tity using Aquino and Reed’s (2002) symbolization moral identity measure. Emphasis on the use of this measure isunderstandable, as it is the dominant moral identity model in the literature. The measure, however, asks whetherparticipants purchase products, wear clothes, and engage in activities characteristic of moral traits (e.g., being caring,compassionate, and fair). These acts may not be the best representation of moral engagement, or they may representmore superficial and less potent motives associated with moral self-presentation in organizations. Because moreconsistent findings were found with self-conscious moral emotions and moral strength, these types of constructsmay have stronger motivational effects.Last, it is important to note that although theoretical models emphasize the process dynamics of the moral self in

which the “having” side informs the “doing” side, research has yet to adequately explore these relationships. Indeed,some studies we review suggest there may be recursive effects across the “having” and “doing” sides of the moralself (e.g., Giner-Sorolla & Espinosa, 2011; Morton et al., 2006). We encourage researchers to examine the processesby which self-defining moral orientations and dispositions affect (and, in turn, may be affected by) the cognitive andaffective self-regulatory capacities for moral action.

The moral self as a moderator variable

In general, research has shown that contexts that reinforce ethical behavior (e.g., ethical culture, Caldwell & Moberg,2007; charitable giving by an organization; Reed, Aquino, & Levy, 2007; recognition of donation behavior, Winterich,Mittal, & Aquino, 2013; priming moral context, Aquino et al., 2009; recognition of a focal actor’s prosocial behavior,Winterich, Aquino, Mittal, & Swartz, 2013) generally influence ethical behavior, particularly for individuals withgreater moral centrality. Contexts that impair self-regulatory functioning or heighten self-interest fuel unethical behavior(observed coworker unethical behavior, O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2011; power, DeCelles, DeRue, Margolis, & Ceranic,2012; primed self-interest, Skarlicki & Rupp, 2010; mistreatment, Skarlicki, van Jaarsveld, & Walker, 2008), particu-larly for those with lower moral centrality. Additionally, Hannah and Avolio (2010) found that dimensions of moralstrength can reinforce one another: The positive effects of moral ownership on ethical behavior were further enhancedfor individuals with stronger moral courage; individuals high in both moral courage and moral ownership were morelikely to confront others for their unethical acts.Last, research has shown that moral judgment dispositions hold a strong influence on individuals’ reactions to

various moral dilemmas. For example, Reynolds (2006) found that whereas both utilitarianism and formalismincrease moral awareness, formalists were more apt than utilitarians to recognize norm violations and harmagainst others. Schminke, Ambrose, and Noel (1997) found that formalism made individuals more sensitive toprocedural justice issues (issues involving the fairness of decision-making processes) and utilitarianism madeindividuals more sensitive to distributive justice issues (issues involving the fairness of decision outcomes).Moreover, moral judgment disposition moderates the effects of organizational contexts on behaviors and inten-tions, although results are not always consistent. Although Marta et al. (2012) found that relativism strengthened(and idealism weakened) the relationship between perceived corporate ethical values and workers’ ethical inten-tions, Ruiz-Palomino and Martinez-Cañas (2011) found relativism weakened (and idealism strengthened) theeffect of corporate formal ethical policies on employees’ ethical intentions, and they also found that the effectof ethical leadership on employees’ ethical behavioral intentions was stronger for relativists. Last, Zhang andGowan (2012) found that high formalism strengthened the positive effects of both legal corporate social respon-sibility (CSR) and ethical CSR activities on job applicant attraction, whereas utilitarianism weakened the effectsof economic CSR on job applicant attraction.



Summary of research on the moral self as a moderatorOur review suggests that the moral self (i.e., moral centrality, moral judgment disposition, and moral strength) serves toreinforce individuals’ ethical stance and enables them to react to different situations more effectively and ethically thanindividuals with a weaker moral self. Those with a strong moral self are also better able to refrain from reactingunethically and destructively across situations. Therefore, the findings show that the moral self motivates individualsto maintain self-consistency, regardless of whether, or how, they define themselves in terms of moral attributions (the“having” side of the moral self) or are motivated by agency (the “doing” side of the moral self).

Concluding thoughts on the empirical studies of the moral self

In general, research supports moral self theory by showing that factors critical to one’s self-definition shape howmorality becomes embedded into the self-concept and self-regulatory functioning, thereby engaging motivationfor self-consistency in moral notions. There were some notable trends, however, that emerged from our review.For instance, we found that the literature largely reflects a variable-centric approach. Even though we attemptedto synthesize this body of work into an integrative model (Figure 1), an unfortunate consequence of the vari-able-centric approach is fragmented findings that are difficult to translate into a dynamic and holistic understand-ing of the structure and functioning of the moral self. Additionally, we observed that the majority of the studies(about 70 percent) adopted Aquino and Reed’s (2002) conceptualization and measures of moral identity. This isnot surprising, given that this seminal work produced one of the first measures of the moral self. An over-reliance onthis conceptualization, however, neglects other aspects of the moral self. The moral content used in this measureemphasizes nine Kantian-like moral traits (being a caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hard-working, honest, and kind person). This limited range of moral content may mask insights about the moral self,particularly in contexts where other moral traits and content (e.g., honor, duty, and virtue) may be valued and impor-tant. A last noticeable trend is that the majority of the studies on the moral self have used samples other than full-timeworking employees or those in organizations. Considering the negative consequences that (un)ethical behavior yieldsto organizations (Treviño et al., 2006), clearly more work is needed using organization-based samples to examinehow organizational factors influence the moral self, as well as the implications of the moral self to behavioral ethicsin organizations. We elaborate on these trends and ideas below.

Emerging Opportunities and Future Directions for Moral Self Research

In this final section of our review, we highlight several emerging opportunities for future research on the moral self,including: (i) the need for more applied research in organizational contexts; (ii) the need for clarity on the “having”side of the moral self with regard to both its content and structure; (iii) the need for clarity on the “doing” side of themoral self with regard to the underlying motivational and regulatory processes; and (iv) the need for a moralintegrative and holistic understanding of the moral self.

Opportunities for research in organizational contexts

Arguably, the most pressing need is for more applied research on the moral self within organizations and with datafrom working adults. By and large, the majority of the studies conducted on the moral self use student samples orscenario studies. The work conducted within organizations or using employee samples suggests that organizationalfactors have a significant influence on employees’ moral self and that the moral self, in turn, significantly affectsorganizationally relevant outcomes. To this end, much of Aquino and colleagues’ research (e.g., Aquino & Becker,

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2005; Hardy et al., 2010; Mayer et al., 2012; Reed et al., 2007; Winterich, Mittal et al., 2013) has focused onidentifying organizationally relevant situational factors that influence moral identity. Although predominatelyconducted in laboratory settings, their research suggests that moral identity can be influenced by an array oforganizationally relevant factors (e.g., ethical climate, financial incentives, and recognition). Additionally, theirresearch highlights how organizations present employees with a variety of morally ambiguous situations that arefraught with conflict between self and organizational interests. Much more research is needed to better understandthe relationship between organizational factors and the moral self.To this point, some research has demonstrated that organizational factors may influence the moral self in unexpected

and, perhaps, detrimental ways. For instance, Schminke (2001) theorized that a strong work context (i.e., mechanisticstructure) would create little need for employees to rely on moral inclinations (their moral self), but he found the oppo-site. Other work has shown the “dark side” of the moral self, which suggests that some contexts may inhibit moral func-tioning and promote dysfunctional behaviors. For example, Skitka et al. (2005) and Vitell et al. (2011) found that astrong moral self, specifically aspects of the “doing” side (moral strength and symbolization moral identity), promoteda sense of superiority, causing intolerance of dissimilar others and impairing good will and cooperativeness. Thus, it ispossible that certain individuals (such as those who believe that they are morally superior or highly idealistic/absolutist)may be inflexible to employees or contexts that oppose their philosophical orientations. These dynamics may alsoexplain why employees sabotage other units or organizational outsiders. More work is needed to shed light on howaspects of organizations and relationships within it (viz. supervisors, coworkers, and customers) strengthen or weakenemployees’ moral self and make employees more or less apt to activate or rely on their moral self.Research is also needed to determine the implications of the moral self for the benefit of organizations beyond ethical

outcomes. Of particular interest is the influence of the moral self on organizational functioning, behaviors, andperformance. In our empirical review, only one study assessed job performance as an outcome (Skarlicki et al.,2008). However, this study did not examine the direct or indirect effects of the moral self on job performance;performance was considered as a distal outcome. Further, although a variety of studies have examined general prosocialacts, far less research examined prosocial work behavior, such as organizational citizenship behavior (see McFerranet al., 2010, for an exception).Last, we know relatively little about the effects of the moral self on collective processes or work outcomes (e.g.,

group-level performance and engagement; organization-level climate). As argued by Klein and Kozlowski (2000), itis important to consider phenomena at different levels of analysis because “findings at one level of analysis do notgeneralize neatly and exactly to other levels of analysis, except under very restrictive circumstances” (p. 213). To besure, very limited research attention has been given to aggregate level phenomena (e.g., Hannah, Schaubroeck, et al.,2013) and its impact on and consequence to moral self constructs.

Emerging opportunities on the “having” side of the moral self

Our review highlights the need for clarity on the “having” side of the moral self with regard to its content and structure.Specifically, researchers have relied on a narrow range of moral content (e.g., specific moral traits, values, principles,ideals, and goals) and a limited dimensional structure (e.g., internalization and symbolization). This narrow focusmay obscure or fail to reveal differences in the construction and functioning of the moral self across individuals.

How does the content of the moral self vary and influence moral functioning?Blasi (1984) emphasized that moral identities can vary in content. That is, moral notions (e.g., moral values, prin-ciples, and ideals) that constitute moral identity vary across individuals. Whereas one person may see being compas-sionate and helpful as central to his or her moral identity, another person may emphasize being fair and just, and yetanother being loyal, dutiful, and self-sacrificing. As our empirical review reveals, different moral judgment disposi-tions embody different moral content; ethical ideology assesses idealistic versus relativistic tendencies, whereas eth-ical predispositions assess utilitarian versus formalistic tendencies. Moreover, Aquino and Reed’s (2002) measures



focus only on a handful of Kantian traits (e.g., caring, compassionate). Blasi’s arguments suggest that a broaderrange of moral content should be considered in moral self research. In line with these ideas, Haidt (2008) describeda “great narrowing” in which the domain of morality has been reduced to a limited set of concerns related to harmand fairness. He asked researchers to consider a broader range of moral concerns that would include group-focusedmoralities related to loyalty and self-sacrifice, respect, and obedience to authority, as well as sanctity and physicaland spiritual wholesomeness. To Haidt’s point, some deontic traits, such as duty and loyalty, are not included inAquino and Reed’s measures but influence work motivation and behavior (Hannah, Jennings, et al., 2013; Shamir,1991). Certainly, employees are likely driven by moral concerns other than those concerning fairness and justice.As an alternative, Walker and colleagues (e.g., Walker & Hennig, 2004; Walker & Pitts, 1998) suggested that

different trait clusters represent different types of moral exemplars. They identified three distinct types of moralexemplars based on their structure of moral traits: Brave exemplars are identified by a structure that includesintrepid, confident, heroic–strong, dedicated, and self-sacrificial traits; care exemplars are identified by a structurethat includes loving–empathetic, altruistic, and honest–dependable traits; and just exemplars are identified by astructure that includes honest, fair, principled, rational, and conscientious traits. Indeed, the self is highly complexand includes more than traits, such as moral notions associated with social roles, autobiographical narratives, andgoal structures, that should be considered in future research on the moral self (Hill & Roberts, 2010; Lord, Hannah,& Jennings, 2011). Such clusters may inform social learning and role modeling effects of leaders in organizations.

How does the structure of the moral self vary and influence moral functioning?The structure of the moral self is more complex than the one or two dimensions reflected in the constructs wereviewed. Two distinctions are discussed below to extend thinking on the dimensional structure of the moral selfbeyond the current attention to internalization on the “having” side and symbolization on the “doing” side: (i)the distinction between the I-self and Me-self and (ii) the distinction between global and domain-specific moralself-concepts.

The I-self and Me-self distinction.William James (1892/2001) introduced an important distinction between the I-selfand Me-self, which has been overlooked in the moral self literature. The I-self refers to the mental presence of aperson’s sense of self (Harter, 1999). Constructs associated with the I-self are as follows: (i) self-awareness (theappreciation for internal states, needs, thoughts, and emotions); (ii) self-agency (the sense of authorship over one’sthoughts and actions); (iii) self-continuity (the sense of remaining the same person over time); and (iv) self-coherence(a stable sense of the self as a single, coherent, bounded entity) (Harter, 1999). The Me-self refers to perceptions,thoughts, feelings, and beliefs of oneself (Harter, 1999). Constructs associated with the Me-self are as follows: (i)self-knowledge (the beliefs of one’s self); (ii) self-concepts, self-identities, and self-schemas (conceptualizations ofone’s self); and (iii) self-evaluations (judgments about one’s value or worth as a person; e.g., self-esteem, self-worth,and self-efficacy; Baumeister, 1998).Our review shows that scholars have devoted attention to the Me-self, specifically self-concepts and identities,

such as Aquino and Reed’s (2002) model. Yet, aspects of the I-self have important implications for moral func-tioning. Blasi (1993) emphasized that people vary in both the degree to which moral notions are central to theirself-concept (Me-self) and the degree to which they experience morality within their subjective sense of self (I-self).A recent study on virtues and character strengths found the I-self to be central to moral strength (Peterson &Seligman, 2004). This subjective I-self experience entails (i) a sense of authenticity (“this is the real me”); (ii) a de-sire to act with character strength; (iii) a feeling of excitement and invigoration as opposed to exhaustion when usingthe strength; and (iv) positive self-feelings (e.g., subjective well-being, acceptance of oneself, and reverence for life).These subjective I-self experiences are thought to not only be associated with the “doing” side of the moral self (i.e.,moral strength) but are also intrinsic to, and a constituent of, the “having” side of the moral self. For instance, theymay be an important experiential aspect of moral centrality—that is, how the experience of morality becomes centralto one’s self-understanding.

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Further, aspects of the I-self hold promise for understanding the construction and development of the moral self.For example, developed capabilities in the I-self (e.g., self-awareness) directly influence the structure and content ofthe Me-self (e.g., self-knowledge) at any given developmental level (Harter, 1999). Thus, I-self processes andchanges are critical to how and why the content and structure of the Me-self changes. Contemporary developmentalpsychologists have, therefore, embraced I-self and Me-self distinctions as a framework for understanding thesereciprocal influences (Harter, 1999). To better understand the construction and functioning of the moral self,attention should be given to the I-self and its reciprocal and dynamic relationships with the Me-self.

Global versus domain-specific moral self. Considering how the content and structure of the moral self vary acrossdomains may also prove useful. Much of the work in our review focuses on the global nature of the moral self. Thisapproach assumes the following: (i) individuals possess a unified moral self that is distinct from other aspects of theself and (ii) the moral self can be more or less central to one’s overall sense of self and identity (Aquino et al., 2009).Although this unified approach is thought to be a defining characteristic of selfhood and moral selfhood (Baumeister,1998), it neglects how the content and structure of the moral self may change across domains, such as the multiplesocial roles a given individual may take on that are both within and external to his or her organization. To be sure,we reviewed research that showed that context influences the moral self, highlighting the possibility for the moralself to be influenced by domain-specific or situation-specific content and structure across social roles.Along these lines, Hannah et al. (2011) proposed a self-complexity approach (e.g., Linville, 1987; Woolfolk, Gara,

Allen, & Beaver, 2004) to moral identity, suggesting sub-identities compose moral identity. These sub-identities arebased on social roles, such as parent or manager, and are developed as people perform these roles over time (Markus& Wurf, 1987). Thus, sub-identities may consist of different forms of moral content. For example, Woolfolk et al.(2004) showed that ethics-related attributes (being honest, selfish, scornful, admirable, bad, dependable, and dishon-est) were represented to a greater or lesser extent across individuals’ various sub-identities. Emerging research alsoshows that individuals’ preferences, values, and ethical judgments and behaviors change when separate sub-identitiesare primed (LeBoeuf, Shafir, & Bayuk, 2010), including professional identities (Leavitt, Reynolds, Barnes,Schilpzand, & Hannah, 2012). Although the moral self may possess a certain global unity, it is also likely to be highlydifferentiated across domains (Markus &Wurf, 1987). A self-complexity approach to theorizing and operationalizingmoral identity may help explain why moral thought and behavior varies across situations, because of variance inwhich aspects of the moral self are activated in each situation (Hardy & Carlo, 2005).

Emerging opportunities on the “doing” side of the moral self

Our review also highlights the need for additional research to add clarity on the “doing” side of the moral self. A recentreview by Schaubroeck, Kim, and Peng (2012) highlights a suite of constructs important to understanding the motiva-tional and self-regulatory influence of the self on how people interact with their work environment. We focus on con-structs significant to the motivational and regulatory aspects of the moral self and ethical behavior in organizations.

How does the moral self motivate moral behavior?A key impetus for research on the moral self was to bridge the judgment–action gap (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004). This isparticularly important for organizational settings in which individuals may be at risk of losing their job, becoming os-tracized, or receiving threats for speaking up in support of their values, and in which it is often easier to “not rock theboat.”Muchmore work is needed to determine howmoral motivation operates in organizational contexts.We reviewedsome research that has addressed the relationship between the moral self and motivations (e.g., self-consistency, Jordanet al., 2011; Vitell et al., 2011; self-improvement, Kurpis et al., 2008). Other studies have investigated how moral iden-tity influences motivational states (e.g., moral elevation, Aquino et al., 2011; self-conscious emotions, Tangney et al.,1996). Still, given the significance of the moral self to moral motivation, it is surprising that little attention has beengiven to identifying and measuring specific motivations implicated by the moral self.



Self-motivations (Shamir, 1991) may assist with this goal, as they emerge directly from and reflect back on theself. The moral self does not function from a purely dispassionate and objective basis. Instead, the subjectiveexperience of and objective beliefs about the self and morality are subject to motivational as well as evaluativeand emotive forces (Baumeister, 1998). Moral self (cf. Bergman, 2004) and social psychology theories (cf.Baumeister, 1998; Leary & Tangney, 2012) highlight several self-motivations to consider.

Self-consistency. Blasi’s (1993) theory suggests that moral identity creates a psychological need to act consistentwith one’s moral principles and ideals. There are three dimensions of self-consistency: (i) consistency in the unityamong different aspects of the self-concept at a given point in time (Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1987), (ii) consis-tency in the continuity of the self-concept across a period (Turner, 1968), and (iii) consistency in the congruencebetween the self-concept and behavior—both in situ and chronically over time (Burke & Reitzes, 1981). To date,research has given some attention to consistency between the self-concept and behavior, but only in a limitedway. More research is required on this important self-motivation.

Authenticity. Prevailing work motivation theories assume that people are hedonistic and instrumentally oriented(Shamir, 1991). For example, VIE theory (valence, instrumentality, expectancy; Vroom, 1964) incorporates instru-mentality directly into the motivational calculus of the individual. Similarly, goal-setting theory (Locke & Latham,1990) directly builds on the idea that individuals are motivated by goals. A less pervasive assumption, but arguablymore central to moral functioning, is that people may also act non-instrumentally and be motivated to give authenticexpression of their moral self. This approach accounts for behaviors that are irrational, altruistic, and self-sacrificing(Strauss, 1969). The most extreme expressions are supererogatory acts, such as a soldier falling on a grenade to savecomrades. Such acts are difficult to explain by instrumental logic but can emerge from motives to engage in ethicalbehavior for the sake of others, a work unit, organization, or community (Shamir, 1991). Gecas (1986) furthersuggests that this “authenticity motive” reflects an individual’s real identity or true self. Such an authenticity motiveis inherent in conceptualizations of the moral self (cf. Aquino & Reed, 2002; Erikson, 1964; James, 1892/2001) butneeds explicit empirical attention in future research.

Self-evaluations and self-enhancement. Individuals are also motivated by the desire to maintain and enhance positiveself-evaluations (Baumeister, 1998). Self-evaluations (e.g., self-esteem) can be considered distinct from self-enhancement in that they rely on different evaluative standards. For example, Higgins et al. (1987) proposedthat self-evaluations are guided by “ought self” qualities of what a person believes she or he ought to possess,whereas self-enhancement is guided by an “ideal self” of qualities representing what a person aspires to pos-sess. The two types of evaluative standards are internalized as part of a person’s self-concept and suggest thatmoral behavior can be motivated by a desire to maintain and enhance positive self-evaluations relative to“ought” and “ideal” self-guides (Bandura, 1986).

Self-efficacy. Self-efficacy is a person’s beliefs about agentic capabilities (e.g., Bandura, 1986), and, specifically, themotivation to perceive oneself as a causal agent to bring influence on one’s own functioning and environment(Bandura, 2008). deCharms (1968) proposed that individuals strive to be “origins” of behavior, rather than “pawns”of impinging forces. Self-efficacy, then, motivates one to be efficacious or agentive, which some argue lies at theheart of the experience of the self (Erikson, 1964; Gecas, 1986; James, 1892/2001). Scholars have argued thatself-efficacy can exist as an aspect of moral self strength and be an important motivator of moral action (Mitchell& Palmer, 2010). Despite its potential significance, we identified only two studies that have examined it (Hannah& Avolio, 2010; Schaubroeck, Hannah, et al., 2012).

Self-presentation. Individuals are strongly motivated by the recognition and acknowledgement of others(Baumeister, 1998). People will rarely see themselves as a great artist, good leader, or moral person unless othersdo and provide affirming feedback. Indeed, individuals’ self-concepts are highly correlated with beliefs of how others

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perceive them (Baumeister, 1998). Self-presentational strategies are used to construct and socially validate one’ssense of self. For example, instrumental self-presentation involves impressing others to achieve an ulterior goal. Ex-emplification self-presentation involves convincing people that you are a good person. Expressive self-presentationinvolves making an impression on others to validate one’s true self (Baumeister, 1998). Testing such self-presentationmotives may help further explain the differential effects reviewed earlier, for example, between internalization andsymbolization of moral identity.These different self-motivations overlap somewhat, but each extend our understanding of the motivational

implications of the moral self. For instance, self-consistency is thought to dominate the more cognitive aspects ofthe self (Me-self), whereas self-expression and authenticity are thought to dominate the more affective aspects ofthe self (I-self) (Baumeister, 1998). Further, social psychology research suggests that self-enhancement is likely astronger motivator than self-consistency and that self-expression and authenticity could be strongest of all(Baumeister, 1998; Gecas, 1986). Also, just as the structure of the moral self may be multi-faceted, so are motiva-tions that derive from it. Nucci (2002) observed that people are typically motivated to moral action for multiple self-relevant reasons, suggesting that different self-motivations should be assessed in interaction. This is particularlyimportant as researchers study the moral self in dynamic and complex organizational contexts where, as notedearlier, an array of situational factors can evoke numerous forms of human motivation. In sum, much research isneeded before we fully understand the motivational dynamics associated with the moral self.

What factors contribute to successful moral self-regulation?Baumeister (1998) argued that the capacity to change and control oneself is one of the most fundamental, useful, andadaptive aspects of the self. Higgins (1996) further emphasized the sovereignty of self-regulation. To this end, themoral self has been described as a self-regulatory mechanism that motivates moral action (e.g., Aquino & Reed,2002; Blasi, 1984; Erikson, 1964; Hart et al., 1998).Research has examined facets of moral self-regulation (e.g., regulatory focus, Brebels et al., 2011; self-control,

Vitell et al., 2009; moral disengagement/engagement, Aquino et al., 2009; Detert et al., 2008). However, attentionto other self-regulatory capacities, such as those that contribute to moral self-regulation success and failure, would beuseful. Social psychology suggests that successful self-regulation requires (i) clear and viable standards, (ii) effectiveself-monitoring, and (iii) potency to act and create change. Failed self-regulation involves (i) confused or conflictingstandards, (ii) poor self-monitoring, or (iii) a lack of strength or capacity to produce change (Baumeister et al., 1994).These ideas may provide a basis for future research to enhance our understanding of the self-regulatory dynamics asso-ciated with the moral self.

Self-regulatory focus. The first two criteria for successful self-regulation involve clear and viable standards andeffective self-monitoring. Regulatory focus theory (RFT; Higgins, 1997) explains how people are motivated differ-ently depending on their desired end state. “Strong oughts” represent beliefs about duties, obligations, and respon-sibilities, and “strong ideals” represent hopes, wishes, and aspirations (Higgins, 1997). RFT proposes that the focusof self-regulation differs in relation to strong oughts versus strong ideals. Ought self-regulation involves a“prevention focus” or sensitivity to avoiding negative outcomes (Higgins, 1997), thereby promoting one to be pru-dent, precautionary, and vigilant in avoiding wrongdoing, mistakes, and omissions related to the desired end state(fulfilling duties, obligations, and responsibilities). Ideal self-regulation involves a “promotion focus” or sensitivityto achieving positive outcomes (Higgins, 1997, p. 1281), thereby promoting advancement, growth, and masterytoward achieving a desired end state (achieving virtue, aspirations, and excellence).RFT can inform moral self theory. The “ought selves” and “ideal selves” serve as two types of evaluative self-guides

or standards that may directly implicate and operate together with certain self-motivations (e.g., self-enhancement) andself-regulatory processes (e.g., self-regulatory focus). Research has not investigated how these and other aspects of themoral self, motivations, and self-regulation operate together as a system, as opposed to discrete variables. As organiza-tions impose role definitions, norms, and reward and punishment systems onmembers, more robust study of how strong



“oughts” and “ideals” operate on individuals is needed. Further, a study of ideal selves may inform why individualsdevelop into moral exemplars in organizations and may perform virtuous supererogatory acts that inspire others.

Self-regulatory strength. The ability to control and strengthen the self is a crucial resource for self-regulation.Scholars contend that self-regulation can involve strength, consistent with the concept of willpower (Baumeisteret al., 1994) and akin to muscular strength (e.g., Muraven, Baumeister, & Tice, 1999). That is, self-resources associatedwith moral action can be strengthened over time. In this view, impulses that emerge in response to temptation have acertain strength or intensity, and overcoming them requires a corresponding form of self-regulatory strength. Our reviewhighlights recent research focusing on moral strength (e.g., moral potency, moral character, moral attitude, moral con-fidence, and moral conviction) and shows patterns consistent with the strength approach to self-regulation; moralstrength constructs positively influence ethical behaviors and negatively influence unethical behaviors.There are three potential avenues to extend this work on self-regulatory strength to moral self theory. First, self-

regulation research suggests that it is a depletable (but renewable) capacity that operates much like a muscle (Bauer& Baumeister, 2011; Muraven et al., 1999). Like a muscle that grows tired and weak after exercise but strengthensover time with continued exercise, self-regulatory capacity can be strengthened as well with repeated exercise ofself-control. This differs from the perspective of self-regulation as a cybernetic control system, operating like a ther-mostat on the basis of feedback (Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1998). The strength model suggests that self-regulation canbe enhanced or depleted by interaction with personal and situational factors (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009). Indeed,organizational research has shown that organizational factors, such as abusive supervision (see Martinko, Harvey,Brees, & Mackey, 2013, for a review), can impair self-regulatory functioning, which prompt unethical and destruc-tive work behavior (e.g., Hannah, Schaubroeck et al., 2013; Thau & Mitchell, 2010). It would be useful for scholars toexplore how organizations can strengthen employees’ self-regulation through building the strength of their moral self.Second, the study of virtues and character strengths from positive psychology is also relevant. This work suggests

two dimensions of moral strength—negative and positive—operate through two self-regulatory routes that corre-spond to a prevention and promotion focus (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). In the negative dimension, characterstrengths enable a person to persevere and keep to one’s moral commitments despite obstacles, temptations, or con-fusing circumstances (Kupperman, 1991). This involves forms of moral strength and conation, such as moral disci-pline and moral self-control, which can override and restrain base impulses to limit moral distress, disorder, orcorruption (Baumeister, Gailliot, & Tice, 2009). In the positive dimension, character strength enables goal-directedpursuits of morally praiseworthy activities critical to moral fulfillment and flourishing (Peterson & Seligman, 2004).This involves positive forms of moral strength and conation (e.g., ego strength, moral courage, and moral efficacy)associated with realizing moral commitments. This research suggests that moral self-regulation involves dual nega-tive/prevention and positive/promotion modes of functioning (Bandura, 2008).Third, the experience of moral strength is closely associated with the I-self in that it involves the experience of

authenticity, excitement, consistency, and enthusiasm, as well as enhancement and well-being (Peterson &Seligman, 2004). These subjective experiences appear closely related to the self-motivations described earlierand, when combined with positive and negative self-regulatory modes, suggest a dynamic system-like linkageamong these different aspects of the moral self. Indeed, we believe that one of the most needed and promising linesof theory building will be to examine these system-like dynamics among moral self constructs. Such an integrativeapproach is consistent with an emerging theoretical trend toward a more holistic understanding of the moral self (cf.Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009), which we address next.

Toward a more holistic understanding of the moral self

We have framed the moral self as a set of self-relevant moral constructs that constitute a dynamic mode of function-ing. This holistic understanding of the moral self is considerably broader than those represented in our empiricalreview. There are two primary reasons to consider a more holistic approach to the moral self. First, differential

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effects in research findings exist across the “having” and “doing” side of the moral self. The “having” side—both thecontent and structure of the moral self—is multi-faceted and dynamic and may have a certain global unity as well asdomain-specific qualities. Understanding how these dimensions create differential effects requires examining howthey implicate motivational and regulatory aspects of the “doing” side of the moral self. Second, there are recursiveinteractions between the “having” and “doing” sides of the moral self. As noted earlier, both self-motivation andself-regulation of the “doing” side involve complex cognitive, emotive, and evaluative processes that influencethe “having” side of the moral self. This recursive functioning makes it somewhat artificial to separate the “having”side of who a person is from the “doing” side of how a person acts.

Integrative views of the moral selfMore integrative theories of the moral self have begun to emerge in the literature but are largely untested. Forexample, working from a “having” side perspective, McAdams (2009) provided a multi-level framework for themoral self that begins at Level 1 with broadband dispositional traits inherited from evolutionary design, advancesto Level 2 with socially learned dispositional traits that show cross-situational consistency and developmental con-tinuity, then transitions to Level 3 with characteristic adaptations that involve cognitive-affective self-regulatorymechanisms that are highly responsive to situational cues, and ends at Levels 4 and 5 where characteristic adapta-tions emerge into moral self-defining life narratives (Level 4) that are expressed differentially in broader socialand cultural contexts (Level 5). McAdams’ theory is noteworthy because it provides a multidisciplinary perspectivethat integrates the dispositional “having” side with the self-regulatory “doing” side of the moral self to account forboth cross-situational stability and variability (adaptability) of moral self functioning.Other theorists have started from a “doing” side perspective to build integrative frameworks on the basis of social

cognitive and information processing theories. For example, Narvaez (2008) provided what she calls a “triune ethicstheory” of the moral self that builds on a social-cognitive view of the moral self and incorporates insights frompersonality and evolutionary psychology, as well as from neuroscience. Her theory suggests a dynamic view ofthe moral self, expressed as three moral orientations rooted in evolved strata of the brain. These moral orientations(security, engagement, and imagination) can be dispositional or situationally activated, influencing perceptual process-ing and goal salience. Narvaez’s theory is noteworthy because it also integrates the “having” and “doing” sides of themoral self, accounts for cross-situational stability as well as variance, and emphasizes moral self-development, whichhas been neglected in extant empirical research. Hannah et al. (2011) also offered an integrative framework inclusive ofmoral cognition capacities (moral maturation, moral meta-cognitive ability, and moral identity complexity) and moralconation capacities (moral potency as described earlier). This framework attempts to describe the capacities needed toprocess ethical issues from the stage of moral awareness, through judgment, intention, and, ultimately, behavior.Thus, the trajectory of theorizing on the moral self is toward more integrative theoretical approaches that offer more

dynamic and holistic understandings. To date, the theoretical advances toward this end are far ahead of the empiricalresearch, which still uses a discrete variable-centric approach that fragments our understanding of the moral self. Yet,an integrative approach is critical to better understand behavioral ethics in the complexity of organizational settings.The mere making of a moral judgment does not inform why someone will attend to moral issues in the first place,why they will feel the need to act, or why they will overcome pressures and temptations to act unethically. Therefore,an integrative approach that provides a more holistic understanding is critical to resolving the judgment–action gap.To conclude this review, we briefly discuss two final topics that can inform a more holistic view of the moral self.

Evolutionary psychology and neuroscienceOrganizational researchers are increasingly drawing on evolutionary psychology and neuroscience to deepen our under-standing of the internal workings of organizational behavior phenomena, such as work attitudes, workplace discrimina-tion, and perceptions of fairness and organizational justice (Becker, Cropanzano, & Sanfey, 2011). These disciplineshave gained interest among moral self theorists in part because of Haidt and colleague’s (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Haidt &Joseph, 2004) social intuitionist model of moral self functioning. For parsimony, Haidt’s model was not included inour empirical review. However, this approach is compelling because it challenges long-held ontological and theoretical



assumptions about the nature of the moral self. The social intuitionist approach is similar to the social-cognitive ap-proach (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002) in that both allow for the automaticity of moral functioning but also differs in sig-nificant respects. First, it puts the locus of the moral self in innate moral intuitions derived from socio-biologicalprocesses instead of a cognitively constructed moral self-concept or identity derived through social interactions. Second,it posits that humans are equipped through biological and evolutionary inheritance with intuitive ethics—innate pre-paredness to feel flashes of approval or disapproval toward certain patterns of events involving others (Haidt & Joseph,2004). Whereas the social-cognitive approach emphasizes cognitively based self-regulatory mechanisms (e.g.,chronicity, activation of moral schemas), the social intuitionist approach emphasizes affective self-regulation (e.g.,moral intuitions and moral emotions). Third, the social intuitionist approach asserts that moral cognition follows ratherthan precedes moral behavior, in that moral reasoning rationalizes (im)moral judgments or behavior post hoc. Theseideas contrast withmany core ideas of moral self theory (e.g., Blasi, 1984). Some of the key research questions provokedby the social intuitionist approach (Moll, Oliveira-Souza, & Zahn, 2009) include the following: (i) How do cognitionand emotion interact to produce moral judgments and actions? (ii) To what extent do sophisticated moral capacities(e.g., moral centrality, moral judgment dispositions, self-conscious moral orientation, self-conscious moral emotions,and moral strength) rely on evolutionary-based motivational systems? (iii) What are the neural bases of moral knowl-edge, moral sentiments, and moral values? And (iv) how do biochemical and electrical activity in biological matter ofthe brain give rise to the sense of self and self-conscious moral orientation in the first place?

Cultural psychology and the moral selfOrganizational researchers have long recognized the importance of culture to how individuals form attachments tosocial groups, including social identities, involvement, commitment, loyalty, psychological contracts, and citizen-ship behavior (Beyer, Hannah, & Milton, 2000). Similarly, moral self theorists also recognize that culture plays apivotal role in the construction of the moral self, on the basis of the Aristotelian premise that morality is culturallysituated (Haidt, 2008; Hunter, 2000; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Solomon, 1992; Triandis, 1989). Although our em-pirical review highlights a few studies addressing the influence of culture on the moral self, research is needed touncover how cultural differences, including differences in organizational culture, influence the moral self, and, spe-cifically, its content and structure.In terms of moral content, morality is culturally relative and particularistic to certain societies, institutions, commu-

nities, and organizations (Hunter, 2000; Leavitt et al., 2012). Thus, variations in morality exist across cultures (andwithin cultures). Our review highlights that much research focus is given toWestern cultural notions of morality, whichtend to focus on a small set of moral concerns related to harm/care and justice/fairness (Haidt, 2008). Researchers shouldbroaden the scope and consider how other types of cultural moral content affect the moral self.In terms of the structure of the moral self, cultural psychology has shown that cultures vary in the relative empha-

sis they place on a variety of self-relevant factors (e.g., relative emphasis placed on the private versus the publicversus the collective self; Triandis, 1989; dimensions including individualism versus collectivism, complexityversus simplicity, and independence versus interdependence; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Thus, research shouldexamine how the structure of the moral self varies along cultural dimensions.

Conclusion

Over the last 25 years, the role of the self in moral functioning has gained increased theoretical and empirical atten-tion. Organizational behavior ethics researchers have taken an interest in the moral self as a way to better understandethical behavior in the workplace. Overall, our review of the empirical work supports the central thesis of moral selftheory, as findings show that the self generally plays a significant role in human moral functioning and ethicalbehavior. Yet, this growing body of research on the moral self has produced a diversity of constructs that, althoughinformative, have provided highly fragmented findings that contribute to a lack of clarity as to the essential natureand functioning of the moral self. Further, much of the literature has examined factors that influence the moral self

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and its influence outside of an organizational context. To continue to advance research on the moral self and itsimplications to organizations, future research needs to adopt a more process-oriented, multidisciplinary, and integra-tive approach, with specific focus on organizational and work contexts.

Author biographies

Peter L. Jennings is as an Assistant Professor of Management at the Leavey School of Business, Santa Clara Uni-versity. His current research focuses on the psychology of moral identity and character, and its significance to thepractice of leadership.Marie S. Mitchell is an Assistant Professor of Management in the Terry College of Business at the University ofGeorgia. Her research focuses on “dark,” destructive, and unethical behavior, examining antecedents and conse-quences of such behavior and which factors make these behaviors more or less likely.Sean Hannah is Professor of Management and the Wilson Chair of Business Ethics at Wake Forest UniversitySchool of Business and is a retired US Army Colonel. He studies exemplary forms of leadership as well as leaderand character development.

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THE MORAL SELF


The moral self: A review and integration of the...

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