The making of paranormal belief: history, discourse and the object of belief

RUNNING HEAD: THE MAKING OF PARANORMAL BELIEF: A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 1

THE MAKING OF PARANORMAL BELIEF: HISTORY, DISCOURSE

ANALYSIS AND THE OBJECT OF BELIEF

by

Lewis White

0179503

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the BSc Psychology.

Design, execution and analysis all my own work.

Supervised by Dr Peter Lamont

7983 words

THE MAKING OF PARANORMAL BELIEF: A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 2

Abstract

The present study presents a discursive analysis of a cognitive phenomenon, paranormal beliefs. A

discursive psychological approach to belief highlights that an important component of the

cognitivist work has been how the object of paranormal belief has been defined in formal study.

Using discourse analysis, as developed as a method in the history of psychology, this problem is

explored through analysis of published scales. The findings highlight three rhetorical themes that

are deployed in the academic discourse: how the relationship between science and the

paranormal, the term used to denote the object of belief, is portrayed; how the validity and

characteristics of belief are constructed; and how justification of the scope of the object of belief is

presented. This comprises empirical evidence of the common rhetoric employed by believers and

disbelievers to present their psychological knowledge as objective; and yet it would appear that

distinct rhetorical strategies are deployed in order to construct the object of belief in ways that are

reflective of researchers own beliefs. Consideration is given to the implications of the present

findings, and it is argued that for psychology to be become increasingly valid and valuable,

discourse analysts and psychological historians should be more strident in their critiques of

mainstream psychology, with confidence in the implications of their empirical evidence.

Keywords: discourse analysis, paranormal belief, history of psychology, psychological objects,

empiricist repertoire


The Making of Paranormal Belief: History, Discourse Analysis, and the Object of

Belief

Introduction

It would appear a self-evident fact that there are many people out there who would

profess, with varying degrees of conviction, to believe in the existence of phenomena that would

be widely considered as fairly extraordinary – for instance, the most recently available UK polling

data puts belief in haunted houses at 40% (Lyons, 1st Nov, 2005). The scientific literature tends to

refer to such phenomena as paranormal, and operationalises beliefs as paranormal belief (PB);

however there is by no means consensus on the defining criteria or scope of such a term.

Over the past century there has been an evolving body of work seeking to explore the

nature and development of such belief, and the present investigation seeks to contribute to this

endeavour. Rather than presupposing what qualifies as paranormal and thus what a paranormal

belief comprises however, the focus will be on how psychologists themselves have conceptualised

and defined this construct. This will be accomplished through a discursive analysis of how

psychologists have constructed the object of belief, in other words what psychologists define as

the real world events and phenomena that people are orienting towards when they express belief.

By drawing on the theoretical and empirical work of three distinct traditions: the psychology and

parapsychology of paranormal belief (e.g. Irwin, 2009); the historiography of psychology (e.g.

Danziger, 2010); and discursive psychology (e.g. Potter, 1996); and particularly the synthetic

perspective outlined by Lamont (2013); one can explore the discursive themes that have

characterised how the object of belief is constructed. It is hoped this will contribute to a more

sophisticated understanding of the role of reflexivity and subjectivity in scientific work, with

particular reference to the paranormal belief literature but with implications applicable to

psychology as a whole.


What is ‘paranormal belief’.

The following literature review will outline the existing research into paranormal beliefs. In

traditional discursive style (Willig, 2008), the first section will offer an outline of the existing

psychological research. This will be followed by a consideration of the critique that discursive

psychology has to offer an understanding of PB, before reviewing some of the more recent

discursive literature directly exploring how people talk about and express belief in events

considered to be extraordinary or paranormal. A historical perspective will be adopted throughout,

for a historical perspective highlights the role of reflexivity, and facilitates insight into the almost

invisible and socially entrenched assumptions underpinning just what paranormal beliefs are

thought to be (Smith, 2010). To paraphrase Lamont (2013), psychological knowledge is not only

the study of people’s thoughts and behaviours; it is the product of people’s thoughts and

behaviours.

Constructing a psychological object.

One of the basic requirements for an adequate history of psychology is that it should

not tend to be a history of some unitary thing called, ‘psychology’. Studying psychology

is essentially studying the history

of how psychological objects were constituted. (Danziger, quoted in Brock, 2010, p. 4)

Only recently has the term ‘paranormal beliefs’ come to be broadly accepted as the

nomenclature of choice for what Danziger (2001) has called the psychological object; over the

years terms such as extraordinary or anomalous have been used more or less interchangeably to

describe the same discursive object, and research into specific areas such as belief in superstition

or ESP is commonly subsumed under this banner (Irwin, 2009). The intention therefore is not to


paint a picture of the development of a unitary field, but rather to briefly recount the traditions

that have come to be widely considered as comprising the paranormal belief research literature.

Paranormal belief investigations have generally reflected mainstream social psychology, and

have adopted the quantitative approach which utilises questionnaires as measurement tools and

statistical tests as analysis, with cognitive psychology the conceptual framework upon which

theorising about belief is based (Irwin & Watt, 2007). The development of the field therefore has

tended to be seen as reliant upon the development of more statistically reliable assessment

methods which yield valid and repeatable factor analyses (Thalbourne, 1995; Tobayck, 2004; Irwin,

2009).

The first scale commonly considered to be measuring what has been called a paranormal

belief was Minot’s (1887) report to the American Society for Psychical Research documenting a

survey of people’s superstitions. The effort did not stimulate any subsequent research however,

and thus many regard Nixon’s Superstition Scale (1925) as the first step in establishing a coherent

field of study (Gilliland, 1930; Otis & Alcock, 1982; Irwin, 2009). Note that there had been several

published investigations into superstitious belief beforehand (e.g. Conklin, 1919), however Nixon’s

was the first to develop a defined measurement tool which thus had a specified object of belief. A

program of study was then initiated, largely amongst educators concerned about what they

perceived to be ‘unfounded beliefs’ (Lundeen & Caldwell, 1930), that indeed arguably exists to this

day – see the recent publication of the Exeter Superstitions Questionnaire designed for use in

secondary schools (Preece & Baxter, 2000). From around the 1940’s onwards however, there was

a new program of research into beliefs which are generally considered to come under the heading

of paranormal belief, belief in extrasensory perception.

There was a swift rise to popularity, both within academia and the public, of experimental

parapsychology research around 1940. The focus of this work was investigations into ESP headed


by the likes of Rhine and others; however a prominent aspect was work into what became known

as the Sheep-Goat effect (e.g. Bhadra, 1966). This stimulated much research into developing tools

to asses belief in ESP, which even the strictest definitions of paranormal belief would include as an

aspect (Thalbourne & Haraldsson, 1980). Efforts to assess belief in ESP continued for the next few

decades, and again this project appears to continue to the present day, though the motivation

now more often appears to be to establish the dimensionality of ESP and it’s relation to a global

paranormal belief domain (Thalbourne, 1995). It’s worth making brief mention here of a few

attempts to investigate belief in UFO’s and extra-terrestrials, topics that are regularly discussed as

a potential object of paranormal belief (Tobayck & Milford, 1983). These studies followed the

upsurge in public interest in alien phenomena in the late fifties and early sixties, though there was

little communication between these endeavours and other work on beliefs in phenomena being

defined as paranormal until recently (Basterfield & Thalbourne, 2002; Irwin, 2009).

Around this time however, there began the first attempts to document belief conceived of

as a more abstract, global construct, and this is the perspective which is today used as the

dominant approach to studying paranormal beliefs. This initiative is believed to have arisen as a

result of the so called consciousness explosion in the late 60’s, when a variety of countercultural

beliefs became increasingly popular amongst the public (Irwin, 2009). Thus there was a burst of

influential scales in the early 80’s all superficially claiming to measure a global construct, variously

referred to as paranormal, supernatural or extraordinary belief (Randall & Desrosiers, 1980; Otis &

Alcock, 1982; Tobayck & Milford, 1983). This construct was assumed to be unidimensional, until

around the early 80’s when statistical evidence became overwhelmingly in favour of a multi-

dimensional, yet unitary, domain. Papers published before the multidimensional account was

widely accepted, where authors frame statistical outcomes so that they support the entirely

unfounded assumption of unidimensionality (e.g. Otis & Alcock, 1982), are a good example of the

extent to which researchers own assumptions about the psychological object they are studying


influence the psychological knowledge that research produces. One would think it likely that this

issue remains, albeit in a different guise. Finally it is largely this tradition, other than the previously

discussed exceptions, that dominates the paranormal belief literature today (e.g. Irwin, 2009).

One can therefore see how there does not appear to be one clear psychological object

amongst this literature (e.g. Irwin, 2009). What is clear however is that what researchers have

considered as the object of belief has varied enormously over the years, and it has been

dependent upon the conceptualisations of previous research and of lay beliefs arising in social

contexts.

Constructing psychologists.

In addition, a distinction that has had an enormous influence on how beliefs in paranormal

events are understood has been the division between parapsychologists and sceptics. Whilst one

shouldn’t overplay the dichotomy, it is certainly recognised across the field that it is valid to

distinguish two different trends (Lamont, 2013; Irwin, 2009). These two positions expressed two

sides of the on-going dispute over the reality of phenomena being called paranormal, and the

result was the construction of two qualitatively different kinds of psychological knowledge about

belief.

Sceptical researchers developed a psychology which emerged out of the growing concern

amongst the scientific community about what was seen as the rise in scientifically unfounded

beliefs, which had its roots in the work of the superstition researchers (Nixon, 1925; Otis & Alcock,

1982). In fact this tradition appeared to view paranormal belief almost as the new superstitions,

adopting the same perspective of a psychology of error. The ‘psychology of error’ is a phrase

introduced by Lamont (2007; cf. Bloor, 1991) which describes attempts to use psychology to

explain why people think or believe in the wrong things; what counts as wrong is of course


dependent on the opinions of the individual conducting the research and the society in which it is

conducted. An informal psychology of error predated the emergence of psychology as an

academic discipline and its influence is pervasive; superstition research and the sceptical

approaches to the study of paranormal belief reflected the fact that they saw these beliefs as

erroneous and socially and individually harmful (Lamont, 2013). This is arguably the dominant

approach to study; for example, one of the authors of the most widely used scale, the Paranormal

Belief Scale (PBS), was expounding on the dangers of paranormal beliefs in the Skeptical Enquirer

in the same year as its publication (Tobayck, 1983; Tobayck & Milford, 1983).

The parapsychologist tradition has quite distinct roots and different perspective on belief,

having come out of the experimental ESP work of the 50’s. Researchers more sympathetic to belief

in paranormal phenomena studied belief for an entirely different purpose, defined the object of

belief in entirely different ways and theorised about different aspect and dimensions of such belief.

Here the perspective was not a psychology of error, but rather belief was at times explicitly

portrayed as positive psychological trait (e.g. Thalbourne, 1995). The object of belief was not

nearly as inconsistent as is found in the work of sceptical researchers, for parapsychologist tend to

restrict paranormal belief to a smaller domain, as belief only in psi abilities such as ESP or

precognition for example (Van de Castle, 1955; Thalbourne & Haraldsson, 1980). These two

traditions emerged out of distinct social and discursive context and therefore constructed the

psychological knowledge they produced in different ways. The object of belief was for each of the

two groups a substantially different concept, as can be seen from even a cursory look at the

history.

Thus one can see how a brief review of the existing psychological research into paranormal

beliefs paints a picture of how the discursive object has developed through the interplay of what

Richards (2010) has called Psychology, the discipline, and psychology, the subject matter. What


researchers now consider as paranormal beliefs is widely considered to have had its own tradition,

emerging from the increasingly spiritual surroundings of late 1960’s, but it also has influential

precursors in the efforts of the parapsychologists who studied belief in ESP from the 40’s onwards,

and the educators who studied belief in superstition between the wars, and indeed the psychology

of error that predated both. What is considered as the object of belief, and thus the phenomena

that constitute a paranormal belief, is largely a product of the reflexive relationship between

psychologists, for example through the influence of previous research, and their subject matter, in

the form of social and cultural trends. Moreover, whilst of course each researchers set of beliefs

will be a complex and flexible arrangement, it is widely consented that there are two distinct type

of researcher into paranormal beliefs, who have constructed different types of psychological

knowledge.

However, as has been noted, this is only one perspective on belief; one that has been heavily

influenced by the cognitivist paradigm within psychology, in which beliefs are conceptualised as

representing stable, internal cognitive domains, comprising a cognitive, affective and behavioural

component (Irwin, 2009; cf. Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Reber, 1995). There has been a growing

literature in the past two decades however which has looked at psychology from a discursive

perspective, and this would imply an entirely different conceptualisation and approach to belief in

apparently paranormal phenomena.

The discursive turn.

Discursive psychology (DP), as the now familiar story goes, was a project initiated by

Edwards and Potter in 1992, though its roots go further back. In the latter half of the last century

there was a general trend amongst various philosophers and sociologists to begin to look at

language as both socially constructed and constructive. Attention was turned to the rhetorical


arrangement of language and the social function it accomplished, rather than to what internal

psychological structure it might represent. Discourse analysis (DA), the methodology used in DP,

had been developed many years previously and had begun to be adopted in various branches of

the social sciences; working within the sociology of scientific knowledge, Gilbert and Mulkay’s

analysis of academic discourse at a biomedical conference in 1984 is commonly cited as an

influential starting point. What was new in Edwards and Potter (1992) – although note that the

essence of this approach can be found in Potter and Wetherell (1987) – was the application of

discourse analysis to psychological concepts.

Willig (2008) outlines five interlinked assumptions of the cognitivist paradigm that a

discursive psychology critiques, which provides a comprehensive account of the distinction

between the two approaches. Cognitive psychology assumes that language is representative of

cognition; that cognitions are based on perceptions; that an objective perception of reality is

possible; and that cognitive states are universal and stable. In contrast, a discursive approach

would treat language as a means through which individuals negotiate interaction with the social

environment. Analysts would appreciate that there are a multiplicity of perspectives of the world,

and that discursive contexts vary from individual to individual, from situation to situation.

Attitudes, beliefs, identities, and other such archetypal social psychological concepts are all

constructed discursive accomplishments in local interactional contexts.

Discourse and belief in extraordinary phenomena.

Fortunately, there is a body of work developing that is applying the insights of discourse to

paranormal studies (e.g. Wooffitt & Allistone, 2005; Lamont, Coelho & McKinlay, 2009). People

construct beliefs by expressing opinions about the authenticity of particular phenomena in

particular discursive contexts, thus the terminology paranormal belief appears largely redundant.


Whether or not an event is paranormal is always a matter of contention: people on both sides will

argue over the validity of facts, will frame the facts in certain ways, and will accept different

explanations as normal (Lamont, 2013). Pertinent variables will be, for instance, who qualifies as a

reliable source of expertise in judging fraud, what counts as acceptable levels of evidence and

what your prior convictions were.

Whether or not to express a belief about the authenticity of any given phenomena depends

on whether the person believes there to be an acceptable explanation. This involves making

judgements about the validity of evidence, about the reliability of expert witness, and upon the

inevitable framing of a situation that individual has in mind. To paraphrase Lamont (2013), people

can believe in one particular paranormal event and not believe in a similar other. Avowals of

disbelief require just as much discursive work as belief, for instance in framing ostensibly

paranormal events as rationally explainable, despite the fact that an ordinary explanation might

not exist at the time (Lamont et al., 2009). The object of belief will be different in every instance,

for example ask two people whether or not they believe in ESP and one might think of a

particularly convincing demonstration of mind reading they saw at the Edinburgh Fringe, but

remember it was a trick and say no. Whilst the other might consider themself as a sceptic,

someone who only ever expresses beliefs that have published scientific backing, and therefore cite

prominent psychologists as evidence (Bem, 2011), and conclude that they do believe.

Similar rhetorical work is found in the professional discourse around paranormal

phenomena. Discursive strategies are employed by psychics and mediums in an effort to manage

interactions with participants, or ‘sitters’ (Wooffitt, 2006). With particular reliance on what the

author calls three-part exchanges, paranormal knowledge is co-constructed by the practitioner

and the sitter working in discursive collaboration. Wooffitt and Allistone (2005) explore

communicative practises in parapsychological laboratory’s, looking at how claims about


anomalous conscious experience are managed in interactions between participants and

experimenters, involving orientation toward characterisations of the paranormal and use of a

psychological thesaurus (Potter, 1996). Thus a discursive methodology appears fruitful in all

realms of paranormal research, and findings paint a picture of the intricate discursive work,

highlighting commonalities in rhetorical strategies, that precedes any avowal of belief.

The present study.

The preceding literature review documents the history of the paranormal belief literature,

before exploring the insights and critiques that discursive psychology would bring to bear. From

this one can see that when not conceptualised as a universal, stable, cognitive structure; what

have been called paranormal beliefs appear far more complex. Beliefs are discursive

accomplishment, constructed in each unique rhetorical context and performing a particular social

function. Paranormal beliefs in particular require an added level of sophistication, as individuals

negotiate issues of evidence, expertise and fraud. There is more discursive research required to

detail both how this is accomplished, and how the reflexive construction of what people consider

to be paranormal beliefs is accomplished. The following analysis then, will explore how the object

of belief has been constructed in measurement scales and the textual discourse that accompanies

their publication. It is hoped that greater understanding of how the object of belief is defined will

enhance understanding of the psychological object of paranormal belief, and thus in the end our

understanding of the reflexive phenomenon of avowals of belief, and disbelief, in the paranormal.


Data and methods

The data set for the current analyses is the most prominent and widely used scales from

the past century that have been designed to assess the construct of paranormal belief, looking at

the textual discourse that accompanies the new scale in the published paper. It was theorised that

the discourse presented with a new scale would comprise the justification for its composition, and

therefore these papers would offer unique insight into the discursive work involved in

constructing the paranormal object of belief. The intention was to have as complete a data set as

possible (i.e. every formally published paranormal belief scale), thus papers were initially selected

due to their inclusion in the appendices of Irwin’s (2009) recent monograph reviewing all the

existing literature on PB. This was complemented by using other prominent papers identified in

other reviews (e.g. Irwin, 1993) and from the authors own research. These range from arguably

the first quantitative analysis of what we now call PB’s, Nixon’s Superstitions Scale (1925), to some

of the most recently published, and most widely used questionnaires, for instance Tobayck &

Milford’s PBS (1983). A full list is provided in the appendix for ease of access.

The method employed will be discourse analysis, which focuses on language as functional

and rhetorically constructed. However several subtly, and at times substantially, distinct variations

of DA have been advocated, thus a brief discussion contextualising the current method is merited.

There have been substantial debates on the boundaries of forms of DA and several analysts have

attempted to distinguish categories. Whilst there is by no means consensus, there are likely not

more than six (Wetherell, 2001) .

The most common categorisation however is between Foucaultian discourse analysis and

discursive psychology (Parker, 1997; Willig, 2008). In that respect, the current method falls into

the latter category and remains relatively faithful to the original outline of discursive psychology

(Edwards & Potter, 1992). It will follow the perspective and conceptualisation outlined recently by

Lamont (2007), who developed the use of DA as a method in the history of psychology.


Methodologically this involves following a slightly tweaked version of the approach laid out by

Willig (2008), in order to make it more appropriate for historical analysis of texts, for example

through a focus on rhetorical strategies facilitated by a closer reading of the text (Lamont, 2007).

In approach it is thus akin to other psychological textual analyses (e.g. Wallwork & Dixon, 2004)

and historical work on paranormal psychology (e.g. Lamont et al., 2009). Rather than seeing a text

as a representation of a past reality, the method attends to how objects within the text are

constructed and the function this accomplishes. The analyses then should focus on outlining, and

providing empirical evidence for, the rhetorical themes that facilitate the function of the text.

Note that the historical context of a text is relevant only so far as it is oriented to in the text.

Analysis

One can simply note that the psychology of paranormal belief has, in fundamental and

significant ways, both reflected and affected the beliefs it has purported to study.

(Lamont, 2013, p. 353)

The above quote encapsulates the underlying perspective of the proceeding analysis, which

will explore the discursive themes affecting how psychology has constructed the object of

paranormal belief. In all of the papers the authors have attempted to operationalise paranormal

belief and develop measurement scales to assess its structure and operation. In the process of

doing so they have constructed the object of belief as phenomena that are inherently outside the

boundaries of scientific enquiry, or inside them as a legitimate topic of study. They have presented

such belief as erroneous and tied up with harmful cognition and behaviours, or as potentially

correct with connotations of creative and intellectual ability; and they have presented these

constructions as justified as scientific and objective, employing empiricist repertoires to achieve a


level of intellectual authority and respectability. These three broad themes can be seen in the

following extracts, and note that for the first two themes there appears to be two distinct ways in

which they are deployed.

The making of the paranormal: constructing boundaries.

The object of beliefs is what has been called paranormal phenomena, and we can see from

these extracts how an important recurring theme has been the construction of the boundaries of

two categories, science and what has been called paranormal, and the manner in which the

relationship between these categories is chosen to be presented.

Paranormal and science as mutually exclusive categories.

Extract 1: In general it seems likely that if the list were submitted to a group of

psychologists there would be less than 1% of unqualified affirmative answers. The

difference between that small percent and the averages for the groups which were

secured to take part in this investigation may serve as a rough indicator of the present

prevalence of unscientific beliefs among the educated members of our population.

(Nixon, 1925, p. 420)

Extract 2: For measurement purposes, supernaturalism was conceptualised as

representing a continuum of belief, with faith in science reflected by low scores and

faith in the supernatural reflected in high scores. (Randall & Desrosiers, 1980, p. 494)

Extract 3: Psychologists have traditionally paid little attention to paranormal beliefs.

From the turn of the century to the 1930’s, the empirical studies in this area were

primarily devoted to cataloguing superstitions and documenting their prevalence. It


was widely assumed by early researchers that mandatory education would dispel

unfounded, non-scientific, beliefs. (Otis & Alcock, 1982, p.77)

In extracts 1 to 3, one can see how the authors’ construct the paranormal, and thus the

boundaries of the object of belief, as antagonistic to science. Thus Nixon refers to these as

‘unscientific beliefs’ (extract 1); Randall and Desrosiers tell us that ‘faith in supernaturalism’ and

‘faith in science’ are opposing poles of a ‘continuum of belief’ (extract 2); and Otis and Alcock

begin by denoting their object as ‘paranormal belief’ before going on to refer to ‘superstitions’ and

‘unfounded, non-scientific, beliefs’ in the same paragraph, thus portraying all three objects as

synonymous (extract 3).

Presenting the object of belief as beyond the boundaries of science allows the authors to

construct these phenomena as therefore illegitimate and to be endorsed only by those without

the appropriate skills or knowledge to assess them. One can see this in the way Nixon advances

the deliberately moderate claim that ‘psychologists’, who would comprise a category with

entitlement to the expertise to judge validity, wouldn’t score higher than ‘1% of unqualified’

answers, which is then repeated for emphasis as ‘that small percent’ (extract 1). Moreover, the

use of footing (Goffman, 1981), ‘in general it seems likely’, portraying the claim as reasonable and

consensual; and the deployment of category entitlement (Potter, 1996), allow the author to

present his account as factual and uncontroversial. Randall and Desrosiers achieve the same effect

by portraying ‘faith in science’, and thus in an authoritative source of knowledge, as at the

opposite end of a spectrum to a position which would endorse the object of belief, ‘faith in the

supernatural’, thus denigrating the legitimacy of supernatural belief (extract 2). Not only do Otis

and Alcock tell us that ‘psychologists’, again drawing on the category of psychologist as those with

appropriate scientific knowledge and expertise, have ‘paid little attention’ to PB’s, delegitimising

the object of belief from the outset; they then reiterate this point by claiming that belief would


not persist past ‘mandatory education’, implying that the most basic level of education is contrary

to expressing belief in the paranormal, a claim which is footed as ‘widely assumed by early

researchers’, to enhance its impact (extract 3).

Paranormal as a project of science.

Extract 4: To each of the two groups of subjects, Mr Petrof [the experimenter] gave a

brief introductory talk on parapsychology which included explanations of telepathy,

clairvoyance, and similar terms. The attitude scale was then administered and

collected by the experimenter. (Van de Castle & White, 1955, p. 174)

Extract 5: One of the important areas of investigation in the field of parapsychology is

the relationship between the attitude of the subject and his ESP performance, which

may include not only his attitude toward ESP, but also his attitude toward the

experimenter, his attitude toward the experimental situation, and his theoretical

interest in ESP. (Bhadra, 1966, p. 1)

In extracts 4 and 5 there appears to be something different going on. Again the relationship

between the categories of paranormal and science is the relevant feature, however this time the

object of belief is constructed as a legitimate scientific phenomena. Van de Castle and White

present the attitude scale as related to the topics of ‘telepathy, clairvoyance, and similar terms’

which are topics of ‘parapsychology’ (extract 4). Bhadra explicitly states how ‘attitude toward ESP’

is one of several ‘important areas’ in ‘parapsychology’ (extract 5). These authors come from the

parapsychological tradition themselves, and so would be orienting to this term as representing a

valid scientific enterprise. In doing so they legitimise the object of belief by portraying it as akin to


other scientific phenomena, such as the human brain or the solar system, and it is in this sense the

dichotomous opposite of the rhetoric being deployed in extract 1 to 3.

The making of belief: constructing validity.

Another theme that has pervaded attempts to define the object of belief is how the

presentation of belief is constructed, in other words how the object of belief has been portrayed

as either a correct or an erroneous belief, and through that how believers and disbelievers

themselves have been characterised.

Belief as erroneous and harmful.

Extract 6: It is generally believed that education reduces the superstitions and

prejudices of any person or of any people. (Gilliland, 1930, p. 472)

Extract 7: Although men of science are quite skeptical about paranormal investigations,

public scrutiny of the supernatural is not nearly so strict. People in general rely more

on personal experience rather than experimental evidence. Thus, despite scientific

controversy, various degrees of acceptance of the supernatural still endure. (Randall &

Desrosiers, 1980, p. 493)

Extract 8: Paranormal beliefs appear to have implications for personality functioning,

especially that which concerns locus of control, death threat, self-concept, inference

making, dogmatism, and irrational beliefs (Tobayck & Milford, 1983, p. 1036)


Extract 9: There is evidence to support the hypothesis that strong believers and

experiencers in paranormal phenomena tend to be fantasy-prone individuals.

(Gallagher, Kumar & Pekala, 1994, p. 405-406)

In extracts 6 to 9 the authors cast the object of belief as erroneous: Gilliland presents belief

in superstition as synonymous with biased reason, as ‘superstition and prejudices’ are presented

as a homogenous category (extract 6); Randall and Desrosiers tells us that ‘despite scientific

controversy’, beliefs ‘still endure’ (extract 7); Tobayck and Milford state that paranormal beliefs

are related to ‘inference making, dogmatism, and irrational beliefs’, all implying erroneous

judgement (extract 8); and Gallagher et al. portray belief as fantastical thinking, again implying

irrational thinking, as they claim believers ‘tend to be fantasy-prone individuals’ (extract 9).

In the process of framing the object of belief as erroneous, the authors paint a picture of

beliefs as harmful, and of believers as possessing negative characteristics. This can be seen

throughout the extracts, as firstly Gilliland asserts that ‘education reduces […] superstitions and

prejudices’, thus casting believers as ignorant; this claim is generalised in order to appear as if a

universal truth as the author states it is true ‘of any person or of any people’ (extract 6). Randall

and Desrosiers portray belief as a result of inadequate assessment of evidence on the part of

believers: those who might believe, the ‘people in general’, rely on ‘personal experience’ and their

‘scrutiny’ of paranormal phenomena is ‘not nearly so strict’; this in stark contrast to the ‘men of

science’, whose scrutiny it is meant to imply is so strict, and who are therefore ‘quite skeptical’

and must use ‘experimental evidence’ (extract 7). And finally, Tobayck and Milford don’t just cast

beliefs as products of erroneous judgements but as having ‘implications for personality functioning’

in general, in such crucial areas as ‘locus of control, death threat, self-concept’ (extract 8).

In these extracts, the claims are presented carefully through the use of softeners, as such

non-extreme generalisations can be rhetorically stronger than extreme case formulations


(Edwards, 2000), which would seem factually inappropriate in empirical discourse. In this instance

they allow researchers to advance sceptical and pejorative claims about paranormal belief whilst

maintaining objectivity. Thus Gillilands claim ‘is generally believed (extract 6), Tobayck and Milford

assert that paranormal beliefs ‘appear to have implications’ (extract 8); and Gallagher et al.

suggest ‘there is evidence to support’ (extract 9).

Belief as potentially correct and beneficial.

Extract 10: In the case of Ss, accepting the theoretical possibility of the paranormal,

the experience of taking the test appears to result in a rise in ESP scoring level which is

positively related to adjustment status as shown by the test. (Schmeidler & Murphy,

1946, p. 275)

Extract 11: Such people [disbelievers] simply cannot mentally conceive of or imagine

the existence of ESP, PK or life-after-death. That this is not as way-out as it sounds at

first is suggested by research showing that compared with believers in psi, disbelievers

are less creative with regard both to their personalities and their achievements. They

are also less ‘fantasy-prone’ – a variable that is also associated with creativity. Indeed,

Hearne found that 50 self-styled mediums and psychics were more imaginative than

the average. If disbelievers are less likely to have a vivid fantasy life and are less

creative, then it follows that they may also be less imaginative or able to conceive in an

intellectual sense, and consequently should experience difficulty in conceiving of or

imagining other unusual or bizarre scenarios whether or not they have anything to do

with psi. (Thalbourne, 1995, p. 234)


Conversely, in extracts 10 and 11 belief is portrayed as a positive accomplishment with

potential benefits. Schmeidler and Murphy state plainly that subjects ‘accepting the theoretical

possibility of the paranormal’ are associated with a ‘rise in ESP scoring’ (extract 10), which they

would orient towards as ability verified by scientific investigation. Thalbourne takes a more

cautious approach, by presenting disbelief as negative and thus disbelievers as ‘less creative’, a

characteristic most people would orient to as desirable to some extent, and ‘less ‘fantasy prone’’,

a variable he imbues with value by stating its association with creativity (extract 11).

Thus both extracts accomplish a construction of belief as a positive possession. In doing so, it

allows the authors to portray the object of belief as potentially correct, and belief as beneficial to

the individual. One can see this in Schmeidler and Murphy who choose to also mention the link

between increased ‘adjustment status’, a positive personality trait, and belief, as it is ‘positively

related’ to ‘ESP scoring’ (extract 10); this the authors make clear is true of subjects ‘accepting the

theoretical possibility of the paranormal’, which phrases belief in its most minimal and

uncontroversial form. Moreover, use of the word ‘accepting’ gives the impression of believers as

those that are capable of belief; and implies that paranormal phenomena will exist regardless of

whether or not individuals accept it. Thalbourne meanwhile, deploys some careful discourse in

order to advance the claim that disbelievers are ‘less imaginative or able to conceive in an

intellectual sense’, casting belief as available only to those with the intellectual ability to

understand it (extract 11). The claim is made plainly at first in an assertive tone, ‘simply cannot

mentally conceive of or imagine’, followed by a reframing of the claim in more reasonable terms;

this is introduced by the extreme case formulation ‘not as way-out as it sounds at first’, in order to

defend against potential challenges of bias (Pomerantz, 1986). Thus the author allows himself to

make a bold claim that is framed as legitimate, which is then softened by the use of ‘it follows’,

which suggests it is self-evident, and the repeated use of probabilistic auxiliary verbs such as ‘may

also’, ‘should experience’. Both authors therefore, in the process of constructing the image of


belief and believers portray it as not just potentially, but very possibly, correct; and present

believers as those with the intellectual and emotional capability to do so.

The making of psychology: constructing justification of scope.

Extract 12: It will be observed that the ideas here expressed range from some which

are quite apparently pure superstitions to some that would occasion considerable

discussion among a group of scientific men. It was the intention to make use of ideas

which in the main have had the stamp of disapproval placed upon them by modern

investigators (Nixon, 1925, p. 419-420)

Extract 13: The intention in the construction of the supernaturalism scale was to have

the scale reflect a broad spectrum of popularly held supernatural beliefs. As a result,

the items of the scale were statements of opinion concerning commonly experienced

paranormal phenomena (Randall & Desrosiers, 1980, p.493)

Extract 14: However, the actual structure of paranormal belief in the population

remains an empirical question. A more valid procedure in the construction of a

paranormal belief-assessment instrument might be first, to assess the structure of

paranormal belief in a sample and, second, to base the construction of an assessment

instrument on the paranormal belief structure obtained in that sample. This

investigation reports on the construction of a scale designed to measure degree of

belief in paranormal phenomena based on this recommended strategy. This

investigation began with an item pool designed to assess a wide variety of paranormal

beliefs. This item pool was administered to a sample of subjects. Then, on the basis of

findings from factor analysis, the dimensions comprising the structure of paranormal


belief in the sample were identified. Next, a paranormal scale was constructed that

included items representing each of the major independent dimensions found to

compose paranormal belief structure. (Tobayck & Milford, 1983, p.1030)

Extract 15: The EBI was designed to survey beliefs in various unusual and so-called

paranormal phenomena. While some items were based on previous questionnaires,

others were examples of popular paranormal and extraordinary beliefs, which have

received considerable attention in the media. (Otis & Alcock, 1982, p. 78)

Here we can see how the researchers have gone about justifying the boundaries of the

object of belief that has been constructed in the presented scale. Common throughout is a

reliance on the empiricist repertoire (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984). It provides the performative

function of conveying how intellectually legitimate and scientific the focus of discourse is, and is

often deployed in particularly controversial areas of science in order to emphasise the empiricist

credentials of oneself (Burchell, 2007). In this instance, in the context of the widely recognised

diversity and near incoherence of the term paranormal belief (Irwin, 1993), authors attempt to

inoculate themselves against potential accusations by asserting the validity of the current

definition (Potter, 1996).

One can see this in extracts 12-15 in a number of different ways; most notably by the style of

grammar used, known as grammatical impersonality (Potter, 1996), that involves an overt lack of

human agents and passive impersonal construction that makes no explicit mention of the authors

actions interpretations and commitments. Nixon states that ‘it was the intention’ to define the

scope as he does, but not explicitly his intention (extract 12). It is ‘as a result’ of ‘the intention’, not

overtly their attention that the boundaries of Randall and Desrosiers’ object of belief are as they

are (extract 13). Tobayck and Milford start three consecutive sentences with ‘this’ and tell us that


their scale ‘was constructed’, just as Otis and Alcock’s ‘was designed’, but not by whom. This could

also be said to be a form of stake inoculation (Potter, 1996), as by portraying the motivation

behind the scale construction as ascribed to an impersonal neutral empiricist, the authors position

themselves as ready to combat potential accusations of bias by minimising their own subjective

stake.

In addition to the use of a common, empirical grammatical style, authors consistently try to

demonstrate the range of potential items from which the current scale items have been selected,

attempting to convey that the scale has been constructed using the broadest possible starting

range. Thus we see Nixon telling the reader that ‘the ideas here expressed range from’ across the

total spectrum of potential paranormal beliefs, which he implies by stating they’ve been chosen

from between the two extremities of ‘pure superstition’ to those ‘that would occasion

considerable discussion’. Randall and Desrosiers scale was designed to ‘reflect a broad spectrum’

of beliefs; Tobayck and Milford’s item pool was ‘designed to assess a wide variety of paranormal

beliefs’. In doing this, authors have used appeals to others, as consensus warranting is a reliable

way of presenting subjective accounts as fact (Potter, 1996; Hilton, Snuth & Alicke, 1988), and to

their own expertise as attempts to validate their claims. We can see this in Nixon, who justifies the

boundaries of his range as ‘quite apparently’ in one instance, thus claiming self-evidency, and as

occasioning discussion amongst ‘a group of scientific men’, deployed as the highest source of

authority on the matter. Randall and Desrosiers meanwhile, invoke public support for their range,

as they claim there drawn from ‘popularly held supernatural beliefs’. Whilst Otis and Alcock cite

not just public support, ‘popular paranormal and extraordinary beliefs’, but claim endorsement of

preceding empirical work, ‘previous questionnaires’, and the national press, ‘considerable

attention in the media’.

Tobayck and Milford go a step further in asserting the empirical validity of their scale. Firstly

they precede the justification of their scale with the claim that an empirical approach is currently


lacking. They outline ‘a more valid approach’ to constructing a measurement tool; this, it is made

clear, in the face of the knowledge that an appropriate definition ‘remains an empirical question’.

The authors then clearly assert that they provide just such an empirical solution, almost as a form

of empirical rhetorical questioning. They do this not only through the use of grammatical

impersonality, but through the characterisation of their approach as following universal

procedural rules (Potter, 1996). Thus the authors spell out an account of the standard

methodology in experimental social psychology: they constructed a pilot questionnaire based on

an ‘item pool designed to assess a wide variety of paranormal beliefs’, then ‘on the basis’ of a

‘factor analysis’, the ‘dimensions’ ‘were identified’ and ‘a paranormal belief scale was constructed’.

Discussion

Context and comment.

The empirical examples given above highlight discursive themes that pervade attempts in

the psychology of paranormal belief to define an object of belief. In the first two themes,

constructing the relationship between paranormal and science and constructing the validity and

connotations of belief, it is apparent that extracts can be divided based on the manner in which

the themes are deployed. This corresponds nicely, if unsurprisingly, with the position of the

researchers themselves on paranormal belief: thus it appears those who believe paranormal

phenomena do exist (parapsychologists) construct the object of belief as legitimate scientific

phenomena that may be potentially correct, and portray believers as creatively and intellectually

skilled; those who believe they do not (sceptics) construct the object of belief as outside the

boundaries of knowable phenomena and as always erroneous, casting believers as uneducated

and as a danger to themselves. One would suggest that a concrete finding from the present


analyses is that believers and non-believer, or parapsychologists and sceptics, employ distinct

discursive strategies to construct the object of belief as a reflection of their own beliefs.

Moreover, Lamont (2007) has detailed how debates over the paranormal have often

comprised boundary work over what is and is not science (Gieryn, 1983). One can see the same

process here, as in the process of asserting their definitions researchers have defined what

qualifies as a legitimate topic of science: parapsychologists employ discursive resources and

narrow scopes to place their objects of belief within the boundaries; whereas sceptics define

paranormal as by definition outside the boundary of science, and thus any phenomenon included

in the object of belief is therefore outside it. Northcote (2007) refers to researchers doing such

work as arbiters of scientific truth, for to a lay public these researchers would represent sources of

expertise in what science qualified as true, which is a powerful influence for individuals trying to

determine what they believe and whether their experiences are real.

The third theme was common to both groups, and was the use of an empiricist repertoire.

Again this is not a surprise, for research has documented extensive use of empiricist repertoires

not only in interview settings (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984), but in scientific spoken and written

discourse across the social sciences (Duszak, 1997; Potter, 1996). It seems apparent that, when it

comes down to justifying the scope of the items to be included in a questionnaire and therefore

indirectly constructing the definition of the object of belief to be measured, researchers adopt the

traditional governing rhetoric of written science. In particular the authors deploy expressions of

impersonality in order to appear objectivity and they portray justification as emerging naturally

from the widely held beliefs of one’s own culture. They employ a variety of rhetorical techniques

and devices, such as footing and consensus warranting, building up the authority and reaffirming

the legitimacy of each researchers own approach. It seems unsurprising that we find the most

comprehensive use of empiricist constructions, describing methods as following universal

procedural rules, in Tobayck and Milford (1983), whose PBS is the most widely used and influential


scale. The text has therefore successfully performed the function of convincing others of the PBS’

legitimacy. Yet over three decades later there is yet to be any consensus on the structural

composition of this constructed domain (Lange, Irwin & Houran, 2001; Tobayck, 2004), let alone

understanding of the phenomena itself, which highlights the berth between rhetoric and

understanding.

Implications for psychology of paranormal belief.

One possible response to the lack of anything near consensus in the paranormal belief field,

and the near incoherence in what is meant by the term paranormal belief, would be to suggest

that there isn’t just one question being answered. It seems clear to the present author, both from

the analysis and from a comprehensive reading of the literature, that there are two different

projects that have come under the heading of paranormal belief studies.

One is that of the sceptics, those who express the belief that there will always be an ordinary

explanation (Lamont, 2013). Their intention appears not to be to understand paranormal belief, to

wonder, as Lamont (2007) suggests, ‘how people come to the conclusion that they do’ (p. 19).

Rather it appears they are actually trying to answer the question of why people believe in

scientifically unfounded phenomena: see Irwin’s (2009) recent operationalization of ‘scientifically

unacceptable beliefs’. Perhaps a better alternative approach for sceptical researchers, seeking to

explore the route of unscientific beliefs, would be to return to the point raised by Lamont. Adopt a

discursive approach and start looking at how people have come to the conclusion to express

scientifically unsupported beliefs; ample scholarship, detailed previously, already exists on the

topic.

On the other hand are the parapsychologists, those who express the belief that there might

at least sometimes be phenomena that require extraordinary explanations. Their intention


appears to be not to question belief, but rather to attempt to understand belief as a causal

variable of ESP. Researchers are concerned with constructing scales to select participants for tests

(Schmeidler & Murphy, 1946; Bhadra, 1966), and in establishing the boundaries of paranormal

(Thalbourne, 1995). Thus the overall project of the parapsychologists appears to be to answer the

question, ‘Are paranormal phenomena real?’ and the lack of serious engagement with the science

by mainstream psychology doesn’t indicate much success. Rather, perhaps recent calls for a

discursive parapsychology and the many empirical and legitimacy benefits it might bring are timely,

and should merit serious consideration (Wooffitt & Allistone, 2005)

Implications for discursive psychology.

In addition to the implications for the study of belief outlined above, the present study

provides information to inform paranormal belief studies within discursive psychology. First, as

some researchers have done (Lamont, 2013), find new terminology, as talking of ‘paranormal

belief’ as an abstract universal is largely redundant. Thus Lamont talks of extraordinary belief,

which avoids the cognitivist baggage and the inherent relation to science. One could go a step

further and suggest discussing expressions of extraordinary belief in order to shed any implication

of universality. The fundamental point of the discursive literature seems to be that beliefs,

especially with regard to such controversial phenomena as those meriting labelling as paranormal,

are always situated. Note that this is not to say that findings about correlations and causal models

are irrelevant for they are self-evidently informative; they may also provide excellent source

material for researchers looking for discursive factors to explore, for instance in talk about

perceptions of control over one’s own life (e.g. Randall & Desrosiers, 1980).

Second, the use of empiricist repertoires in the present analyses is indicative of a general

trend across the sciences, which likely pervades discursive psychology report writing as well.


Empiricist repertoire’s denote vocabularies that people draw from when accounting for scientific

investigations, and facilitate communication about subjective belief and opinion in the language of

objective empiricism. In the most extreme characterisation of this, researchers are effectively

learning the language through which to advance their own opinion in a way in which it is received

by readers as objective fact; presenting subjectivity as objectivity. In this instance it is apparent

that researchers define the scope of paranormal belief dependent upon what their own beliefs are,

which others then take as fact, to a greater or lesser degree. Moreover, as has been demonstrated,

theories constructed using these scales will in turn will reflect the researchers belief (Lamont,

2012); and thus we have sceptical academics, generally middle class and well educated, advancing

theories portraying believers as cognitively deficient, socially marginal and poorly educated.

With respect to paranormal belief studies, this might not strike as particularly worrying;

however apply the same logic to the literature on intelligence or psychotherapy for example.

There is no obvious reason why these disciplines would be immune from the potentiality for

subjective judgements and interpretations to be presented as empirical fact. This appears to be a

considerable concern when referring to research that is used to assess educational and

employment opportunities, or to offer potentially lifesaving therapeutic advice. Perhaps if

discursive psychologists were more vocal about their criticisms of mainstream cognitive

psychology, and more vehement about the implications of their findings, we would not still have

researchers advancing accounts of intelligence that seem to a lay public racially sensitive, in the

sense that the fundamental claim is that people differ based on the colour of their skin (Rushton &

Jensen, 2006). Perhaps armed with empirical evidence, such as that presented here (and other

more comprehensive work), researchers will feel more confident in encouraging healthy criticism

within departments.

Critique.


Before concluding it’s worth making a few brief reflexive comments that don’t fit neatly in

anywhere else, but merit consideration. Firstly, a few critiques of the present work are relevant: to

begin with, the availability of parapsychological scales and papers was lacking (as can be observed

in the low number of extracts), and though this reflects the lack of researchers in the field as a

whole, it puts limitations on the reliability of conclusions to take from the present analyses. In

addition, though it seemed theoretically coherent to restrict analyses to textual discourse that

accompanied the introduction of new definitions of the object of belief, ultimately the present

author feels it would have been enriching to the analysis to broaden this out to any textual

discourse found in published texts that discusses the paranormal belief definition (e.g. Irwin, 1993),

without losing any of the strength of the empirical work.

Secondly, all of the work cited herein comes from either European or American researchers

(with the notable exception of Bhadra, 1966) and therefore we are likely presented with blinkered

perspective. This is not through choice; though scholarship appears to be developing outside the

Western world (e.g. Huang & Teng, 2009), highlighting substantial notable differences, there is

simply a lack of available literature. Whilst of course the methodology of DA ensures that findings

aren’t meant to be taken as generalisable, the current themes characterising construction of the

object of belief are representative of all the existing paranormal belief literature in the West. It

remains to be seen how applicable they might be to understanding belief in alternate cultures.

Thirdly, the majority of research comes from men; thus the critique’s that come from a

feminist epistemology and philosophy of science are likely valid here. For instance, believers have

been portrayed as irrational decision-makers, and possessing an unhelpfully subjective world-view;

which are some of the standard stereotypical misogynist claims about woman (Prokhovnik, 2002).

Additionally, it appears that sceptical researchers commonly cite believers as highly fantasy-prone,

creative and imaginative (Irwin, 2009). Further, it has long been known that woman tend to

believe in the paranormal more than men (Minot, 1887; Nixon, 1925; Otis & Alcock, 1980; Lyons,


1st Nov 2005). A core tenant of feminist epistemology is that academic research has consistently

denigrated ‘feminine’ cognitive styles and modes of thinking (Anderson, 2012). Empirical research

therefore is required to explore the potential role that sexism has played in constructing accounts

of paranormal belief.

Conclusions

In the present analyses there are three discursive themes that have been identified which

characterise how researchers go about defining the object of belief: how the relationship between

paranormal and science is described; how the validity of the object of belief and the profile of

believers is portrayed; and how justification for questionnaire scope is constructed. Moreover,

interestingly there appeared to be two distinct rhetorical practises occurring in each of the

extracts, which matched up with whether or not the researcher was themselves sceptical or not

about the reality of paranormal phenomena. This would suggest that the beliefs of researchers

have in some way determined the psychological knowledge that has been produced. Use of

empiricist repertoires in the presentation of justification and current findings was ubiquitous, and

with respect to paranormal belief literature, facilitates the presentation of such subjective

psychological knowledge.

Finally, the most critical conclusion to emerge from the current analyses is the need to

listen to the arguments of prominent discourse analysts and historians, and to continue the

development of a new paradigm of psychology along these routes. Rhetorical sophistication has

allowed bias and opinion to be presented as a field of science, and this is likely a universal problem.

In addition, there are critiques from critical and feminist perspectives that have not been

sufficiently considered. There is a pressing need for a psychology centred on subjectivity,

reflexivity and discourse and fortunately there is literature along such lines, widespread in


historiography and discursive psychology. It is imperative that these researchers, armed with

empirical evidence, are confident in their critiques and develop beyond the boundaries of niche

science.

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Appendix

Papers are presented in alphabetical order and are accessible either online, in which case links are

given, or in hard copy.

Bhadra, B. H. (1966). The relationship of test scores to belief in ESP. The Journal of Parapsychology,

30, 1-17

Gallagher, C., Kumar, V. K., and Pekala, R. J. (1994). The anomalous experiences inventory:

Reliability and validity. The Journal of Parapsychology, 58, 402-428

Gilliland, A. R. (1930). A study of the superstitions of college students. The Journal of Abnormal

and Social Psychology, 24(4), 472.

Granqvist, P., and Hagekull, B. (2001). Seeking security in the new age: On attachment and

emotional compensation. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 40(3), 527-545

Minot, C. S. (1887). First report of the Committee on Experimental Psychology (Prevalence of

superstitions). Proceedings of the American Society for Psychical Research, 1, 218-223.

Retrieved from http://www.iapsop.com/archive/materials/aspr_proceedings/ aspr_

proceedings_v1_1885-1889.pdf

Nixon, H. K. (1925). Popular answers to some psychological questions. The American Journal of

Psychology, 36(3), 418-423.

Otis, L. P., and Alcock, J. E. (1982). Factors affecting extraordinary belief. The Journal of Social

Psychology, 118(1), 77-85

Preece, P. F., & Baxter, J. H. (2000). Scepticism and gullibility: The superstitious and pseudo-

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The making of paranormal belief: history, discourse and the object of belief

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