The Macroeconomic Effects of Trade Tariffs: Revisiting the ...€¦ · •Currency peg: •Big drop...

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The Macroeconomic Effects of Trade Tariffs: Revisiting the Lerner Symmetry Result Jesper Linde and Andrea Pescatori EC March 2018 1 The views expressed herein are those of the author and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management".

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  • The Macroeconomic Effects of Trade Tariffs: Revisiting the Lerner Symmetry Result Jesper Linde and Andrea Pescatori

    EC March 2018

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    The views expressed herein are those of the author and should not be attributed to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management".

  • Motivation

    • Recent policy proposals include a border adjustment tax (BAT)

    • Debate strongly influenced by an old trade theory result (Lerner 1936):

    • The exchange rate appreciates (at same rate) • No effect on real allocation and other prices

    • How general is the result? • What deviations are quantitatively relevant?

    Import tariff + (equal rate) export subsidy

    (Lerner Symmetry Theorem)

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  • What we do

    We use a medium-scale two-country DSGE model (SIGMA) to analyze and *quantify*:

    • The effects of Import tariffs and export subsidies (Lerner symmetry result) • The role of international asset markets and risk sharing • The role of exchange rate adjustment and currency pegs • The role of anticipation • The role of alternative pricing mechanisms

    • Trade wars • CM vs IM • Full symmetric retaliation

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  • Literature

    Trade literature:

    No uncertainty: Two goods environment, Lerner (1936); multiple goods, McKinnon (1966), Grossman (1980);

    Symmetry breaks down: permanent vs. transitory, Razin and Svensson (1983); Dynamic, RE: Eichengreen (1981,1983)

    Previous trade theory results can be overturned when tariffs are uncertain

    (Tariff) Uncertainty: Stockman and Dellas (1986) the role of asset markets Barari Lapan (1993);

    More recently:

    DSGE model, Erceg et al (2017), Amiti et al (2017) – Barbiero et al (2017),

    Theory: Costinot Werning (2017)

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  • Features of the Model

    • Medium-scale quantitative DSGE model calibrated to match US data

    • Two (identical) countries

    • Capital accumulation, financial accelerator, liquidity constrained households

    • Trade: Home bias in consumption and investment RER not constant (even with LOP)

    • Sticky prices and wages (alternative pricing regimes) • LCP: sticky import prices (low exchange rate pass-through to import prices)

    • LCP: pre- or post- tax (tariff/subsidy) pricing (alternative pricing)

    • PCP: sticky export prices (full exchange rate pass-through to import prices)

    • Real rigidities: consumption habit, investment and import and export adjustment costs

    • trade assumed balanced in steady state (Costinot & Werning: not relevant for symmetry)

    N.B.: LCP = local-currency invoicing; dollar-invoicing: LCP and PCP* 5

  • The Lerner Symmetry Result

    • With post-tax pricing, Lerner symmetry holds exactly independently of

    • nominal rigidities (sticky import/export prices, sticky wages, LCP or PCP)

    • Real rigidities (investment, import/export adjustment costs, habit, liquidity constraint agents)

    • Financial accelerator

    • Monetary policy rule (except reacting to exchange rate)

    • Country size

    • Intuition:

    • If import tariff and export subsidy have (move by) the same rate

    • Full exchange rate adjustment offsets both the import tariff and export subsidy’s distortions (i.e., the ToT is unchanged)

    • Assumption TB =0: No fiscal implications

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  • Lerner Theorem: Mechanics

    Deviations from LOP Home country Foreign country Import Phillips curve (Local Currency Pricing)

    USD per foreign currency: up USD depreciation

    Foreign export prices in foreign units

    Foreign marginal costs 7

  • Lerner Theorem: Mechanics

    Deviations from LOP Home country Foreign country Import Phillips curve

    Import tariff

    Export subs.

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  • Lerner Theorem: Mechanics

    Assume: deviations from LOP =0 Price stickiness irrelevant

    Assume the USD fully adjusts

    Exchange rate adjustment mechanism (UIP – consistent with IM) The “equilibrium” exchange rate adjusts, non need for interest rates to move! It is an equilibrium Long-term (equilibrium)

    exchange rate

    Equilibrium?

    Outside the mode: coordination problem (economists can help) 9

  • Figure 1: Tariff and subsidy: perfect symmetry

    Permanent and anticipated 10p.p. import tariff and export subsidy shock

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  • Deviations from Symmetry: alter. pricing mechanisms

    Lerner symmetry temporarily breaks down under pre-tax pricing (and sticky prices)

    LCP: low exchange rate pass-through on import prices (in both countries)

    • Pre-import tariff and pre-export subsidy pricing: both tariff and subsidy are like a sales tax (both full pass-through);

    • Pre-import tariff pricing: tariff is like a sales tax (full pass-through);

    Intuition: Asymmetric pass-through breaks the exchange rate offset on import prices

    Low pass-through

    full pass-through 11

  • Figure 5 Alternative pricing assumption

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  • Deviations from Symmetry: alter. exch. rate mechanisms

    Lerner symmetry permanently breaks down under

    • Complete markets

    • Wealth insured (no wealth effect from price distortions) …

    • … but price distortions remain

    Lerner symmetry temporarily breaks down under

    • Slow nominal exchange rate adjustment:

    • The exchange rate moves (appreciates) too slowly (or never: currency pegs)

    • Currency pegs affect world GDP

    • Anticipation of the trade policy shock

    • The exchange rate moves (appreciates) too early

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  • Lerner Theorem: Mechanics

    Anticipation Exchange rate moves in anticipation

    Slow exchange rate adjustment

    Same mechanics but past level slows down the adjustment

    UIP adj parameter

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  • Lerner Theorem: Mechanics

    Complete Asset Markets log-utility

    real rate differential “surprise”

    (real) UIP condition

    Dollar-expenditures equated across countries RER moves values not volumes insured

    Home bias, tariffs, … RER no constant

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  • Deviations from Lerner

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  • Deviations from Lerner: currency pegs

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  • Deviations from the Lerner Symmetry: complete markets

    Complete international asset markets

    • The first welfare theorem does not hold

    • CM do not guarantee efficiency

    • CM insure a wealth effect but do not fix price distortions

    • World GDP and trade unaffected (the pie does not change)

    • Lower welfare at home (lower consumption) higher output and TB

    • Nominal rigidities: short-run drop in output

    • Exchange rate adjustment only 60% of the shock

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  • Deviations from Lerner: Complete Markets

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  • Summary

    • Anticipation: • minor negative effect on home output; • global trade and output NOT affected

    • Gradual exchange rate adj: • modest output boom at home • global trade and output NOT affected

    • Currency peg: • Big drop in foreign output • Global trade and output decline

    • Complete markets (permanent effects): • Fall (increase) in domestic consumption (output) , eventually • Global trade/output NOT affected

    • Alter. Pricing: • Exchange rate under-shooting; domestic output temporarily gain

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  • Trade Wars

    Retaliation: 20 percent tariff in foreign country

    IM: foreign suffers the most

    CM: symmetric effects

    Symmetric retaliation: BAT in foreign country: No effects

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  • Trade Wars: Full retaliation

    Deviations from LOP Home country Foreign country Equilibrium SHOW TAUM=TAUM* TAUX=TAUX* - IN DIFF – INITIAL LEVELS DON’T MATTER

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  • Trade Wars: Asymmetric retaliation

    Deviations from LOP Home country Foreign country Equilibrium SHOW 2*TAUM=TAUM* TAUX=taum; TAUX*=0

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  • Trade Wars

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  • Figure 4: Trade Wars

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  • Summary

    • Fully symmetric retaliation: No effects

    • Retaliation: • Global trade and output fall

    • Both countries’ output drop

    • Permanent effects

    • Short-run dynamics determined by nominal rigidities

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