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ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops Mainz, 11th - 16th March 2013

11 - The EU Policies for Disaster Prevention, Relief and Post-Disaster Reconstruction The L'Aquila Earthquake: assessing the EU and Italian intervention Anna Longhini Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane

Abstract This paper aims at analysing under an empirical perspective the institutional response to the earthquake that stroke the town of L’Aquila and its Province in April 2009, with a particular focus on the role played by the European Union during the aftermath. Analysing the response given to this disaster is relevant since the L'Aquila earthquake has been the hugest disaster happened since EU Solidarity Fund entered into force in 2002. The earthquake was qualified as a “major natural disaster” under the Solidarity Fund Regulation, consequently awarding the highest grant ever allocated. The first part of this paper addresses the three fundamental steps that should be implemented in any disaster policy that is prevention, relief and reconstruction both at a State and at the EU level. Lately, it will also point out the most common limitations in disaster intervention that usually emerge when the money spent is not managed to answer efficiently to the disaster’s real needs. In the case of L’Aquila, the biggest amount of money coming from the EU Solidarity Fund - about 350 millions of Euro – has been allocated to a new housing project. However the micro level analysis of this intervention reveals that the European Union and Italian interventions’ did not take into any account local communities’ actual needs, not in the early aftermath of earthquake or during the reconstruction phase. As it was in the case of the Prevention phase, also the Reconstruction intervention, which was not aimed at rebuilding the city but at fabricating temporary housing, was the result of a top-down decision-making process with no space for citizens' involvement and participation. What emerged is that the response to the natural disaster turned into a big political failure. 1. Introduction Political context of the disaster: L’Aquila and the Civil Protection system of power. “Stay on this earthquake thing because we have to start full throttle, there’s not an earthquake everyday”. “I know” (laughing). “God forbid, poor people”. "Vabbuò." “This morning at 3.30 am I was laughing in the bed”. "Me too." 15:34 pm, 6 April 2009: This is part of the wiretapping presented during the investigation set up by the Florence‘s Prosecutor on the G8 procurement. In the phone call the entrepreneur Pierfrancesco Gagliardi called his brother-in-law Francesco De Vito Piscicelli, former technical Director of the enterprise Opere pubbliche e ambiente Spa (Public procurement and Environment) in Rome, and investigated for corruption. It is not unusual for natural disasters to suffer from policy implementation and efficiency problems,

such as the mismanagement of resources, the lack of aid coordination, poor relations with local

communities1. The case of the L’Aquila earthquake is no exception. Actually, the first thing it

should be kept into account when addressing the case of the earthquake that stroke the city of

                                                                                                               1 F. Attinà (edited by), The Politics and Policies of Relief, Aid and Reconstruction: Contrasting approaches to disasters and emergencies, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2012, p. 12.

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L’Aquila - the administrative centre of Abruzzo, one of the 20 Regions of Italy– is that what

happened it is not only related to policies for disaster prevention, relief and post-disaster

reconstruction but also to politics.

According to Alexander 2, to date there has been some reluctance in considering the political and

policy implications in this disaster from an academic point of view. This is probably due to the fact

that scholars seem to prefer not to generate inconvenient hypothesis, or not to take any position

regarding what has happened in the disaster. Nevertheless, in a very manifest and undeniable way,

the implementation of disaster policies in L’Aquila have been deeply connected with politics as a

way of exerting power. More specifically, L’Aquila earthquake shows to what extent a natural

disaster can result to be a window of opportunity for exercising and showing the struggle of power

that lags behind politics. Furthermore, this disaster proved to be a useful proof to asses the balance

of power existing among national institutions at different levels of government.

This system of power dates back to 2001, when the Italian Civil Protection (Protezione Civile, P.C.)

was established and Mr. Guido Bertolaso 3, who managed the entire emergency in L’Aquila, was

nominated Director. Before 7 September 2001 the Italian Civil Protection was an independent

agency, including the national Fire Brigade and the National Seismic Association, dealing with

national emergencies such as earthquakes or flooding. As a result of the D.L. 343 of 2001, the

Italian Civil Protection started dealing also with the so-called “big events” 4. As for provision 5:

“The President of the Council of Ministers or the appointed Interior Minister determines the civil protection policies, has the power of issuing decrees for civil protection, promotes and coordinates the activities of the central and local administrations of State, regions, provinces, municipalities, national and local authorities and any other institution and public and private organization within national borders, that are aimed at protecting the integrity of life, property, settlements and environment from harm or risk of damage from natural disasters, catastrophes and other big events which result in serious risk” This means that the new regulation allowed the Civil Protection to manage huge amount of money

also to regard of the organisation of the so-called “Big Events” 5. Figure 1 shows a list of all the Big

Events in the period 2001-2011. The main aim of this decision was to manage simultaneously these

                                                                                                               2 D. E. Alexander, “The L'Aquila Earthquake of 6 April 2009 and Italian Government Policy on Disaster Response”, Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research, 2:4, 2010, p. 326. 3 Guido Bertolaso was the Head of the Civil Protection Department - Dipartimento di Protezione Civile (DPC) from 2001 until 2010. 4 The Court of Auditors gave the definition of "big events" in the resolution no. 5/2010/P, 4 March 2010, introducing a restrictive interpretation of D. L. n. 343/2001: http://www.professioni-imprese24.ilsole24ore.com/professioni24/pa/news/dpa_castiglione.html 5 This system has been further challenged. As a matter of fact, the law 24 March 2012, n. 27 about “big events” and their management has been amended and these provisions are no more under the control of the Civil Protection.

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Big Events and public works, and not just planning and organizing the events as such. This

translated in 6:

“The difficulties in the implementation of civil protections procedures emphasize the inability of central powers to intervene without repealing contracts. It is too simplistic saying that Bertolaso is the only one who can solve the problems in Italy since the others are disadvantaged because of those rules that other European countries (subjected to the same contract regulation) do not seem to fear”

Figure 1: List of “Grandi Eventi” – Big Events (2001-2011) and their costs where provided. Source: protezionecivile.it. It emerges that public funds aimed at the organisation of Big Events by the Civil Protection Department were devoted to three different activities. To sum up: 19 are religious events related to the Catholic Church (Pope’s visit to Italian cities, canonization’s rites, religious meetings, etc.); 6 are the sport events (two of which are sailing races whose impressive total costs add up to 71.531.935, 97 Euro; 2006 Turin Olympic Games are also included but costs were on the Municipality of Turin); 7 events are international meetings (including NATO, FAO, G8 summit and costs for the Italian European Semester within national borders).

                                                                                                               6 Lanfranco M., “C’era una volta la Protezione Civile”, LoSpaziodellaPolitica, 22 February 2010, available at: http://www.lospaziodellapolitica.com/2010/02/cera-una-volta-la-protezione-civile/

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This legislation substantially widens Prime Minister’s responsibilities. In the specific, it is the

Premier, or the Ministry of Interior on his behalf, together with local authorities, who defines the

planning of prevision and prevention plans, relief national programs and emergency measures

implementation. Moreover, the seismic national service, the national Commission for the prevision

and prevention of risks (Commissione Grandi Rischi) 7 and the Civil Protection’s operative

command function under the umbrella of the Premiership.

This description shed light on the huge changes the Civil Protection has gone through, turning it in

the keystone of a system of power where decisions are taken without previous expenses and budget

examinations, any control of the procurement law or avoiding parliamentary hearings. In turn, every

Civil Protection activity has been developed without constitutional checks, not even by the Corte

dei Conti (Courts of Auditors). This was the legal framework in which the aftermaths of L’Aquila

earthquake intervention has been managed. As for Alexander, this disaster “is a good example of a

moderate earthquake, albeit with immoderate effects”8.

The main aim of this study is to emphasise the importance of the political context in the framework

of the decisions taken during an emergency, that is before, during and after the crisis. As a matter of

facts, behind these decisions there is a defined political responsibility. In the l’Aquila crisis, the

fourth Berlusconi’s government was the first responsible for the decisions and choices taken.

However, the same responsibility falls to a lesser extent on another level government, the European

Union. The L’Aquila crisis further shows the weakness of the role played by Brussels in disasters

management, not only in preventing but also in supporting the reconstruction efforts, mainly

developed through the EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF), a specific policy instrument. A big part in the

decision of the allocation of this fund is transferred to the government of the member state, without

exerting almost any control from the above and making of the coordination between national and

supranational level an inefficient exercise. As a matter of fact, not only is the decision process on

the allocation of funds not shared between the two levels of government, but other stakeholders,

such as citizens, are also completely excluded and turn to be marginal actors. Against this

background it is possible to understand how the city “is likely to suffer problems with local

ownership, national/regional/municipal coordination, and corruption” 9. The complex political

environment has caused a total impasse in the reconstruction of the city of L’Aquila, which

                                                                                                               7 According to the D.L. 343/2001 “The national commission for the prevision and prevention of great risks is the technical-scientific advisory body inside the civil protection department. Taking part to its meetings does imply the provision of salary, compensations or any reimbursements. Commissions’s membership and managing rules are established by the Prime Minsiter with personal decree, on the intiviative of the Head of the Civil Protections, without any burden on public financing. ” 8 D. E. Alexander (2010; p. 327). 9 Ozerdem A, Rufini G., “L’Aquila’s reconstruction challenges: has Italy learned from its previous earthquake disasters?”, Disaster, 37:1, p. 119, 2013.

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consequently is currently paralyzed 10. The seriousness of such situation is further emphasized by

the fact that, after three years from the earthquake, the government of the former Prime Minister

Mario Monti placed the reconstruction of L’Aquila, and of its adjacent villages, on the top list of its

priorities 11. Against this background, this paper will analyse the prevention, emergency and

reconstruction policies that have been implemented at the national and supranational level during

the L’Aquila crisis. To this regard, the e-mail and face to face interviews to some important actors,

such as:

- a senior official working for Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti – Provveditorato

interregionale alla Opere Pubbliche per Lazio Abruzzo e Sardegna - “Sede coordinata

dell’Aquila”12;

- Johannes Wachter, EU Commission, Directorate-General for Regional Policy - EU

Solidarity Fund (EUSF) 13;

- Sara Vegni, ActionAid - L’Aquila coordinator and member of the town citizen’s association

“3:32”;

- a consultant in administrative Italian law.

The work counts also on various testimonies collected on the field as a result of several research

trips to L'Aquila and its adjacent villages since July 2009.

2. Disaster prevention Prevention vs Forecasting: bridging scientific knowledge to social learning “We have been accused of been psychotic and that we should have had a different, cooler approach.” Stefania Pezzopane – former President of the L’Aquila Province, Interview for La Repubblica, 18 April 2009 According to Grandori and Guagenti 14, in order for a civil protection system to respond to a crisis,

it is mandatory having a good “knowledge” in terms of:

- expertise, high qualified knowledge in both the scientific and technological field;

                                                                                                               10 To this reards, there has been an heated debate regarding the effective start of the recontruction phase. The Ministry for Territorial Reconstruction Fabrizio Barca, appointed by the Monti Government for dealing with L’Aquila recontructsion, anounced during an interview for the TV program Presa Diretta, boradcasted on Rai 3 on the 20th January 2013 that “the reconstruction will start on the 21th of March”. 11 http://www.coesioneterritoriale.gov.it/progetti/ricostruzionelaquila/ 12 Italian Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, L’Aquila office. 13 Official document about the EU financial contribution to the L’Aquila earthquake is available at: http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/resources/cms/documents/SISMA_ABRUZZO_NOTA_3104_14_01_2011.pdf 14 G. Grandori, E. Guagenti, Rischio sismico. Decidere in condizioni di incertezza, McGraw-Hill, Milan, 2012

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- social learning, the collective capability of responding to a natural disaster by translating the

scientific knowledge in efficient protection mechanisms.

The relation between who is called to act, the civil protection system, and those who provide the

decisions that enable the actions - the techno-scientific competence system – is crucial not only in

terms of the quality of the intervention, but also of the excellence of the action itself. To this

regards, the modalities through which the knowledge is transferred from the “expert” to the civil

society acquire a crucial importance. At the social level, it is equally important to have an efficient

transposition and coordination between civil society and the academia. According to Grandori and

Guagenti 15:

“In the last years, the debate about the role played by the Civil Protection has been closely linked to what has happened in L’Aquila before, during and after the earthquake crisis. There is a common sense of disdain regarding how things have been managed during the earthquake that hit Abruzzo in 2009. There has been a big loss in terms of credibility and trust toward the State especially in relations to its role in guaranteeing prevention, civil participation, and reconstruction both in economic and concrete terms. Besides, the opening of parliamentary inquiries on the role played by the leading élite of the Department of Civil Protection, together with the accusation of the entire system that had been put in place in L’Aquila, created a deep drift between citizens and institutions”. In the case of L’Aquila this relations has not worked for mainly two reasons:

1. Firstly, evidences emerging from the investigations on the conduct of the Civil Protection

leadership show that the relation between this organisation and the “experts” was not equal.

As a matter of facts, the latter were too exposed to political games, which tended to reject

any form of dissent, and consequently making them dependent on the political will. What

has prevailed has not been a direct accusation on what was the real situation on the ground16.

Consequently, there was a lack in the implementation of the even cheapest and most basilar

interventions (i.e. although the area was well known for having high level of seismic

activity, an emergency plan among the villages of the area was never developed 17) and it

was not even foreseen a regulation for the areas in which the population could have gathered

in the case of tremors18. Nonetheless, before the 6th of April there have been several distress

calls. Five days before the big tremor, the L’Aquila municipality sent an emergency note to

                                                                                                               15 Preface in G. Grandori, E. Guagenti (2012). 16 Since October 2008 a sequence of minor earthquakes began in the central Apennine mountains east and southeast of Rome (Pacor et al., 2009, quoted in D. E. Alexander, 2010) 17 http://www.6aprile.it/featured/2011/07/07/terremoto-torna-la-paura-a-l’aquila-mentre-resta-nel-nulla-il-piano-di-emergenza-del-comune.html 18 A very strong earth tremor preceded the one of the 6th April 2009 at 3:32 am. In several small towns, such as the village of Paganica, according to some witnesses Civil Protection officers encouraged many people to return to their homes.

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the Department of the Civil Protection (D.P.C.), to the regional Governor Gianni Chiodi, to

the regional council member for the Civil Protection Daniela Stati and finally to the

L’Aquila prefecture19 in which it asked to put in place the “state of emergency” since the

previous tremors had already caused severe damaged to both public and private buildings.

During my field trips in L’Aquila, after the earthquake, several people, most of them

belonging to the weakest classes, such as the elderlies, told me about their confusion when

they asked what to do in case of future tremors. The only indication givens by authorities,

the Commissione Grandi Rischi included (which is now under trial), was to stay at home. In

the weeks preceding the 6th of April, advising not to sleep at home was considered to be a

too alarmist advice, as the Presidente della Provincia dell'Aquila, Stefania Pezzopane20

witnessed: "The week between the 30th of March and the 5th of April has been crucial. We launched appeals while people, scared by tremors, went on the streets. We have been accused of been psychotic and that we should have had a cooler approach. Now it seems incredible that the big tremors on the 5th of April, before the tragedy, did not ring any bells. Many of those who are still alive slept in their cars that night. ”

2. Moreover, what has been missing was the social learning. The community was not able to

provide efficient protection measures and it was as people had entirely lost their historical

memory. They have been already victims of past earthquakes. According to several formal

interviews on the field many people considered highly unlikely that an earthquake could

have razed and entire city. Once a person told me: “An earth tremor was for us as common

as the rain is for everybody else. We were used to it since we were children and we were

even used to take jokes of those who got scared”. This environment, in which no prevention

policy has been implemented, not even as far as information is concerned, has prevented the

diffusion of even the most basic prevention measures.

A.G.A.T (Associazione Geografica per l’Ambiente e il Territorio 21), is still monitoring the

situation of the emergency in L’Aquila after the earthquake 22. Part of this research is based on 140

questionnaires that where distributed to a sample of the population in August 2011. Part of this poll

was aimed at understanding citizen preparedness to a seismic event. When asked “In the case of a

strong earthquake, would you know what to do before, during and after the tremor?” only the 56%

                                                                                                               19 http://www.repubblica.it/2009/04/sezioni/cronaca/sisma-aquila-7/allarme-sindaco/allarme-sindaco.html 20 Ibidem 21 Geographical Association for Environment and Land 22 F. Nebbia, “Tre anni dopo il terremoto a L’Aquila: il monitoraggio di una emergenza che continua”, A.G.A.T., Associazione Geografica per l’Ambiente e il Territorio, Atti 16a Conferenza Nazionale ASITA - Fiera di Vicenza, 6-9 November 2012

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of people interviewed replied “yes”. Although the percentage exceeds the 50%, it has nevertheless

not to be considered sufficient. As a matter of fact, there were too many hesitant answers and as

many as the 20% of the interviewed answered “no” and the 6% “absolutely not”. According to

Nebbia23:

“This means that on 50 people interviewed, 13 do not know what to do in case of earthquake, a number that is still to high since these are prevention measure that should be widely known. This number is still too high since the main aim is making the entire citizenship aware of what the right procedures to implement in case of earthquake are. It is also important to note that the 88% of people interviewed are in favour of the financing of training and courses for seismic education in junior high schools ” According to Baiocchi e Dominici24, earthquakes are not a new phenomenon in the L'Aquila area:

“Earthquakes have always characterised the history of L’Aquila, which lies on the bed of an ancient lake which amplifies the seismicity of the ground. […] on the 22th of January 1349 an earthquake hit the city, causing 800 victims. Later, events were registered in 1452, 1461, 1501 and 1646. On the 3rd of February 1703 a new earthquake hit the town, causing more that 3000 losses . […]. The most dramatic event of L’Aquila history was on the 31st of July 1786, in which there were 6000 deaths. The fore last earthquake, scaling 5, was in 1958, June 26”.

The role played by the State in terms of prevention has been minimal, as confirmed by the

following interview. An engineer at the Ministry of Infrastructure, Public Works interregional

office for Lazio, Abruzzo and Sardinia and “coordination office for L’Aquila” answered some

question regarding their duties before, during and after the earthquake 25. The work this office

develops is particularly relevant since this body deals only with public housing, according to the

law (this office is in charge of implementing the programs planned) or through agreements with

funding recipients (as the L’Aquila municipality and the University). Overall, almost 65 people

work in the L’Aquila office (3 executives, 4 engineers, 20 surveyors and 30 office workers, a part

from the supporting staff). When asked about what the main prevention policies have been, the

official answered: “Prevention? Unfortunately, not much. Before the 6th of April we did some

seismic verifications on few buildings (as police stations in L’Aquila, Pescara and Teramo). The

outcome was negative, however costs of adaptations were too high (in the case of Teramo the total

amount was about 2,5 millions of Euro).” “And now – I asked – what has changed in terms of

prevention?”. The officer replied “Actually not much. Some measures are currently underway in

some schools, however paradoxically these are ‘non-structural’ interventions (such as ceilings),

which do not deal to the overall security of the structure of the building”.

                                                                                                               23 F. Nebbia (2012; p. 7). 24 Baiocchi, Dominici, “Cartografia storica della città dell’Aquila come supporto allo studio di edifici danneggiati dal sisma”, Atti 16a Conferenza Nazionale ASITA, Fiera di Vicenza, 6-9 November 2012 25 Interview of the 29 January 2013, L’Aquila.

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In terms of prevention policies, the L’Aquila case study confirm at least two hypothesis:

a) There is a general inclination at allocating funds only after the occurrence of a tragedy,

rather then during the prevention phase. Much of the money allocated by the Civil

Protection Department for “Big Events” between 2001 and 2010 confirms that prevention

policies depend mainly on the political will rather than the lack of funds for such policies.

b) The difference between prevention and prevision is deeply blurred 26. Although scientists

agree on the fact that it is impossible to forecast an earthquake, there is no much awareness

in terms of prevention, as the Global Risk Miyamoto team states in the report “L’Aquila,

Italy Earthquake Journal”. This group published this document after having visited the

L’Aquila region in April 2009:

“I would like to emphasize that the structural deficiencies identified for both new and historical structures in our survey are found worldwide. We have experienced and will continue to experience similar structural failures even in advanced earthquake engineering countries like the United States and Japan. There are many pre-1980 non-ductile concrete structures, older unreinforced masonry buildings, facilities with un-braced non-structural elements, and inadequate earthquake engineering. Historical structures should be strengthened to protect our heritage and culture. Strengthening is so much more cost effective than post earthquake repair. It also saves lives. Public and private sector earthquake risk reduction is essential to reduce both human and financial catastrophes.”

3. Disaster relief The phase in which crucial decisions were taken “[…] My husband looks at me with wide open eyes and says "hurry hurry hurry ... let’s get out of here." My mother says: “go and save yourselves, I'll stay with Dad”. I could not believe it. In a few seconds I had to decide whether to rescue my son or to stay and try to rescue my father. I rescued my son”. "I was not afraid of earthquakes. Prior to 6 April I had the illusion that one could dominate emotions and remain rational. During the months before April 6, I joked about this with many people. [...] " Evidences from the web site Permanent Observatory of the quake aftermath: http://www.osservatoriosuldoposisma.com/abruzzo/il-filo-della-memoria/abruzzo

L’Aquila earthquake occurred on Monday 6 April 2009 at 3:32 am. It measure 6.3 on the Moment

Magnitude Scale and according to Akinci 27 “the main shock has been recorded by fifty-eight

accelerometric stations: the highest number of digital recordings ever obtained in Italy for a single

                                                                                                               26 The process against Italy’s national “Commissione Grandi Rischi” is entirely based on this distinction. To better understand this case see: http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/2012/10/22/the-laquila-verdict-a-judgment-not-against-science-but-against-a-failure-of-science-communication/ 27 A. Akinci, L. Malagnini and F. Sabetta, “Strong Ground Motion Characteristics from the 6 April 2009 L’Aquila earthquake, Italy.”, Soil Dynamics and Earthquake Engineering, 30:5, 2010, pp. 320–335.

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earthquake. […] Very high values of peak ground acceleration were recorded near L’Aquila town

centre (5 stations at zero distance from the fault) with a station reaching at 0.63g value 28.” It was

the deadliest earthquake in Italy since the Irpinia one in 1980 (in the Campania Region), when a 6.9

magnitude earthquake killed more than 2,900 people. In L’Aquila, 308 people died in the main

shock, 202 of which in the metropolitan area, and about 1500 were injured. Despite its moderate

strength, the earthquake had a devastating impact on the medieval city of L’Aquila and on its

surrounding villages – especially Onna, where 40 people died. The Global Risk Miyamoto

estimated in 2009 the overall damage caused by the earthquake at about USD 16 billion.

The Civil Protection rescue intervention worked perfectly, so that it can be compared to a military

operation. According to Alexander 29:

“Response to the disaster was rapid and involved the same concept of ‘overwhelming force’ that was so effective in subduing Saddam Hussein in Iraq during the invasion of 2003. The Italian Government’s policy on the issue of immediate disaster response was to ensure the good functioning of operations by encouraging a massive reaction involving huge amounts of resources. This was perhaps decided since the main trauma hospital in the area had suffered major structural damage (concentrated, unfortunately, on the Accident & Emergency reception area). Within 24 hours the hospital was completely replaced by the first of two field hospitals that arrived in the area. Meanwhile, early management of casualties was largely in the hands of the Italian armed forces, which employed ‘Medival’ aerial evacuation techniques to remove seriously injured patients to hospitals outside the disaster area.

Figure 2: L’Aquila earthquake area: location map and distribution of deaths. Source: D. E. Alexander (2010; p. 327).

According to data provided by the Civil Protection during the first 48 hours of the crisis, almost

28,000 people were assisted, and between April and May this number raised up to 67,500 people.

On 6 April, the Prime Minister declared the state of emergency, which had already been demanded

by the Municipality of L'Aquila before the devastating main shock, and appointed the Head of Civil                                                                                                                28 According to the Whole Building Design Guide - National Institute of Building Sciences in the US, a 0.50g value is very high and only well-designed buildings can survive if the duration of the shock is short. Further details are available at: http://www.wbdg.org/resources/seismic_design.php 29 D. E. Alexander (2010; p. 331).

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Protection, Mr. Guido Bertolaso, as representative commissioner until December 2009. His

mandate was further extended until January 31, 2010 30. Civil Protection’s data resulting from

seismic conformity standard checks performed on private and public buildings in the L'Aquila

crater from April 8 to November 3, 2009 proved that out of a total of 78,289, half of the buildings

were damaged. In particular:

- the 48,6% of 75,949 private buildings has been considered usable as residential building and

classified with the letter “A”; 14,2% was classified “B” or “C”; 25,1% was classified as “E” 31;

- the 50,4% of 2.340 public buildings resulted usable as habitations and classified with the letter

“A”, 23% was classified “B” or “C”, 17,3% were not usable and classified as “E”.

In the immediate aftermaths of the tremor, however, almost anyone - even those whose houses had

been assessed as fit for habitation or not damaged – returned to their homes. During the entire relief

phase, there have been frequent aftershocks, which related to the series of earthquakes that started

in October 2008 in the central Apennine mountains on the east and southeast of Rome and that

continued until summer 2009. Given the seriousness and the extent of damages suffered by public

and private buildings, the primary need during the relief phase was finding a shelter for the

population affected by the earthquake. Since the night of April 7, part of the population found

refuge in the numerous hotels on the Adriatic coast of Abruzzo, near Pescara, while others found

shelter in some of the 171 tent camps set up by the Civil Protection. Others got themselves

organised independently. According to Alexander 32: “Sixty thousand buildings were seriously damaged, including San Salvatore, the regional hospital and main trauma centre (Casarotti et al., 2009). In total, 67 500 people were left homeless. Roughly a third was temporarily rehoused in hotels on the Adriatic Sea coast of Abruzzo and about a third were accommodated in 171 tent camps. Most of the others found alternative accommodation on their own initiative.”

The EU's role in this phase has primarily translated in the allocation of substantial financial

resources 33. About 50 million Euros from the EU Solidarity Fund 34 have been used for first

                                                                                                               30 On the 1st February 2010 Gianni Chiodi, President of the Abruzzo Region, was nominated Commissioner of Reconstruction. This was the beginning of a partial reversal of the previous situation, in which powers returned from the national government to the local level. 31 In the aftermath of the earthquake, houses have been classified according to their damages with letters A, B, C, E, F. 32 D. E. Alexander (2010; p. 326) 33 The first information about the potential allocation of an extraordinary amount of money by the EU is dated June 15, 2009: http://www.adnkronos.com/IGN/News/Cronaca/?id=3.0.3427974570 34 According to the EU Commission, the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF) was set up to respond to major natural disasters and responded to the principle of European solidarity to disaster-stricken regions within Europe. The Fund was created in response to the severe flooding in Central Europe during summer of 2002. Since then, it has been

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response and emergency activities together with the provision of health care to the population.

Resources made available by the EU 35, however, have mainly contributed to the creation of

housing facilities for people left homeless. In particular, almost 94 millions Euro have been

allocated for temporary housing (called “Map”) and schools modules (called “MUSP”), whilst 350

million were directed to the CASE project.

This project has caused much controversy. First, it was de facto introduced and imposed by the

Italian Government during the Council of Ministers of 23 April 2009, during the state of

emergency, without allowing any discussion with local actors, about that model of reconstruction.

The main aspect that emerged as highly questionable was the permanent characteristic of the

project. The C.A.S.E. project does not perfectly meets the criteria of the EU Solidarity Fund, which

is one of the main source of financing for such projects. As stated on the EUSF website 36 this

program should support the “temporary accommodation and emergency services to meet the

immediate needs of the population”. Moreover, since its start, this project has been de facto the only

reconstruction project ever implemented on the L'Aquila territory. The decision to build 19 New

Towns in the L'Aquila Province through the C.A.S.E. project, was taken together with the choice of

closing and militarising L’Aquila city centre, prohibiting access to its citizens for security reasons

by government decree. According to Alexander37: “L’Aquila has a millennial history and a very substantial concentration of historic buildings in its centre. The entire historical quarter of the city was cordoned off and access was exclusively allowed on the principle of good faith to individuals and groups accompanied by firemen and other officials with the task of manning the barricades. Residents of the inner city could only visit their homes for very brief periods, and strictly under fire service escort.”

The main conclusions as far as the disaster relief phase is concerned is that:

a) The centralization of power during the management of the emergency can result in a

successful intervention just after the disaster;

b) In the very first weeks after the disaster and during the state of emergency, this power’s

centralization can lead to top-down and closed decision-making process, which can have a

major impact later on. As the case of L'Aquila earthquake shows, decisions taken during the

emergency phase had a tremendous impact on the opportunity of rebuilding the city.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               used for 49 disasters covering a range of different catastrophic events including flooding, forest fires, earthquakes, storms and drought. 23 different European countries have so far been supported for an overall amount of more than 3.2 billion €. 35 The resources’ use was set between the National Civil Protection and the European Commission. The final agreement was signed on 19 November 2009. 36 http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/thefunds/solidarity/index_en.cfm 37 D. E. Alexander (2010; p. 326).

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Figure 3: Map of the RED ZONE in the city of L’Aquila. 4. Disaster reconstruction The New Towns vs The Old City “Earthquake country almost always looks the same beautiful ragged, but peaceful mountains. This was true in Sichuan, China; Sumatra, Indonesia; Romania, Japan, and California. Unfortunately, these peaceful places will turn to hell in an instance without warning.” H. Kit Miyamoto - L’Aquila, Italy Earthquake Journal - Global Risk Miyamoto “In L'Aquila, an extraordinary historical city, a great amount of time and money has been wasted to build suburbs, when the whole world goes towards the elimination of suburbs”, Renzo Piano, architect

The MICRODIS project studies the devastation caused by extreme events. The L’Aquila disaster

was part of this study 38. In the European Commission DG ENV News Alert Issue 268, released on

12 January 2012, the success of the early and massive response to the L’Aquila disaster is

emphasized, but it also acknowledged the fact that national response replaced the local response: “In Italy, civil protection encompasses emergency operation centres at all levels of governance, from national government to local municipal levels. However, the executive heads of civic protection are locally elected mayors of the country’s municipalities. […] more could have been done to improve local self-sufficiency and enable greater local participation, particularly in decisions about the medium to longer-term recovery of the area. Survivors of the earthquake were housed in tents for up to eight months after the event and then re-housed in buildings designed to be durable and able to withstand the impact of an earthquake. Despite being provided with all the basic necessities, these housing complexes tend to be remote from shops and other amenities”                                                                                                                38 The MICRODIS (Integrated Health Social and Economic Impacts of Extreme Events: Evidence, Methods and Tools) was supported by the European Commission under the Sixth Framework Programme. See: www.cred.be/project/microdis

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Many of Italian cities date back to the Medieval era. L’Aquila – a city that the tradition tells it is

made of 99 churches, 99 squares and 99 fountains - was a not an exception. Nevertheless, it was not

a very popular touristic destination, at least not as many Tuscan cities. This is probably due to its

geographical location, which makes difficult to bump into it. People have to plan in advance to visit

this city, since it is improbable to pass through it by chance. These factors should be bear in mind

when analysing the reconstruction of L’Aquila, since the mainstream Italian media have always

spread the message that the city has been rebuilt. Unfortunately, evidences prove that L’Aquila is

still destroyed and abandoned. Only very few pubs and some commercial activities have reopened

in the city centre. The L'Aquila’s reconstruction has not been the major focus of attention from the

beginning. If it was a tool to oppose to the Berlusconi government in a first phase, lately it also

meant to challenge the decisions of the Mayor of L’Aquila, Mr. Massimo Cialente (which belongs

to the Democratic Party). Therefore, the city has not only been divided only because of the

earthquake but also in its social environment. The Civil Protection Department, which - as we saw

- was directly under the direction of the Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri 39 had instead very

clear stand since the beginning. Together with the emergency management, Mr. Guido Bertolaso

immediately promoted the construction of 19 New Towns, the C.A.S.E. Project. As described in the

previous section, an important role in financing these new settlements came through the EU

Solidarity Fund. However, no one among the people I have interview so far in L’Aquila is aware of

the existence of this fund. Even the Ufficio alle Opere pubbliche 40 does not seem to know about it

and, as a matter of fact, it has never dealt with the C.A.S.E. project. Likely, Sara Vegni,

coordinator for ActionAid in L'Aquila and promoter of the local association “3:32” 41, did not have

any information about Fund. Sara told me42: “I did not know it. I thought that about a half of the

money was coming from private donations, while the other half from public funds. I am discovering

now that these are European funds.”

The EU Solidarity Fund granted financial aid for € 494 million to Italy for emergency operations in

the aftermath of the L'Aquila earthquake. About € 350 millions where allocated to the housing

project known as “Progetto Case”. I asked the Commission about who has been responsible for

taking the decision on how to spend the money. Johannes Wachter at the DG Regional Policy, who

works in the EU Solidarity Fund office, explained that 43: “The use of the money was laid down in

an implementation agreement between the Commission and the Italian authorities (the Dipartimento

                                                                                                               39 President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic 40 The Office for Public Works 41 This organisation has worked since the beginning of the earthquake aftermath in L’Aquila, and opposed many decisions made on the territory of L'Aquila. 42 Interview of the 30 January 2013, L’Aquila. 43 E-mail interview of the 29 January 2013.

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di Protezione Civile Nazionale) following their proposals which included the CASE project.” Any

provision could have prevented the Commission to take its decision. As a consultant in

administrative law who works at a law firm in Milan told me44: "Funds are awarded at the

Communitarian level, a practice that makes politics play a crucial role in the process. As a matter of

facts, the European Commission has a direct relation with the Council of Ministers of each Member

State for everything is related to support funds. Once funds are received, however, it is the Italian

law that comes into force, that is the Code of Public Contracts (Legislative Decree no. 163/06). The

process foresees that European funds flow into the Civil Protection Funds, which is also regulated

by a special law." However, as the official of the office for public works in L'Aquila noted in the

interview: "A derogation from the Code of Public Contracts (Legislative Decree no. 163/06 and

Presidential Decree 544/99) have been ratified in the very first phase of the emergency. It was only

when the emergency was over - in August 2011 – that everything returned to normality and all

operations have again been contracted through public tender."

According to Wachter the mechanism of coordination between the Commission and the P.C. works

as follows: “The Commission guaranteed that the Italian proposals were in line with the Solidarity

Fund Regulation, it supervised the use of the grant (with two visits on site and in Rome), it assessed

the Italian implementation report once the operations were completed and carried out a detailed ex-

post audit of the grant. The European court of auditors also carried out an audit.” Asked what was

the main contact with the Fund, he replied: “The Civil Protection Department was the main contact

with the Commission, they prepared the application and were the responsible authority for the

implementation of the grant. We were and still are in stable contact with them.”

This means that if any change will be introduced in the future in the process of allocating loans,

Member States’ governments will nevertheless be in charge of any decision regarding the money. In

the case of a devastating event, as the L'Aquila one, it would probably be more convenient to have a

greater awareness on how to implement the projects since it is clear that the allocation of money is

strictly connected with the political decisions on their use. As for L’Aquila, the decision to choose a

model of reconstruction was indeed a political choice. Against this background, there are at least

three different ways of analysing the issues emerged during the controversial process of the

reconstruction, which also involved how available funds have been distributed:

1. Reconstruction of the city vs. new buildings;

2. Reconstruction of the city centre vs. the outskirts;

3. Reconstruction of the main city vs. reconstruction of other small towns near L’Aquila.

                                                                                                               44 E-mail interview of the 31 January 2013.

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At the time of writing this paper, the last version of the Reconstruction Plan available on the

Municipality of L’Aquila 45 website is dated 9 February 2012. The plan envisages the

reconstruction of the historical centre of L'Aquila and of the towns nearby, consisting of an overall

area of 403 hectares (168 hectares belonging to the city and 235 hectares to the 49 fractions).

According to the data provided by the Municipality of L'Aquila, the 2009 population counted up to

72,988 inhabitants, 10,000 of which used to live in the historic city’s centre. In 2012, the number of

people of the entire crater housed outside their homes was 34,670, that is about 47% of the total

population. Among them more than 80% - about 28,533 - lives nearby L'Aquila.

Despite the promises, the situation in the L’Aquila city centre is stalled, but in order to verify

whether this was just my impression, I asked the Ministry official if and how his job changed in the

earthquake aftermath: "Immediately after the earthquake and on a personal level – he answered - it

was quite tough to dedicate my work mainly to the "damn" G8 and to the modernization of the

airport where world's leaders were to land, and not so much on the city’s reconstruction. A major

effort has been dedicated to improve roads infrastructures, which immediately after the earthquake

went completely out of control. It did not seem to live in a small provincial city but in Rome.

However, it was almost inevitable due the closure of the old town, which was the core of the life in

L'Aquila, and the displacement of the population in the outskirts. One of our priorities, perhaps

questionable, was the construction of roundabouts. Additionally - he continues - after the

earthquake our work has increased not only in terms of time, but also responsibility. Consequently,

the level of “risk" has increased, due to chaotic activities and with little chance of providing

efficient prevention mechanisms. We have also focused on making safe school buildings labelled

with letter "B" (means not badly damaged) through seismic safety checks. We intervened also on

several Police headquarters, converting some barracks in temporary housing for displaced persons

with the possibility of converting them back to university housing". When asked if he ever worked,

although to a smaller extent, on the C.A.S.E. project, since his office deals with public works, he

replied: "No, the C.A.S.E. project was exclusively managed by the Civil Protection."

5. Conclusions Moving towards a place-based approach in disaster management? Lessons learnt from a broken city "Sooner or later we will succeed to make it clear even to the other half of the city that you have always been on the other side." M. Fonzi, member of the Citizen’s committee “3.32” in reference to the fact that the Mayor of L’Aquila Mr. Massimo Cialente (Democratic Party) has never done anything to side with his own citizens against the decisions taken by Berlusconi and Bertolaso.

                                                                                                               45 http://www.comune.laquila.gov.it/pagina199_il-piano-di-ricostruzione.html

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All the promises that have been made with regard to the reconstruction of the city of L’Aquila still

have to be kept. This paper focuses on the analysis of the lapse of time starting at the beginning of

2009, that is basically when the seismic swarm that affected the area of L'Aquila began, reaching its

peak at night April 6, 2009, until the beginning of 2012, when the Monti Government appointed

Fabrizio Barca 46 as Minister for Territorial Cohesion, the office that should speed up the process of

the reconstruction in L'Aquila. It is still too early to assess whether the measures put in place lately

will trigger the real reconstruction process, for this reason the work of the Minister has not been

included in this work. As for now, the city of L'Aquila is still divided, fragmented, ruled by

decisions taken just immediately after the earthquake of 6 April 2009. According to the Aquilan

historian Raffaele Colapietra, interviewed in the film Radici 47 (Roots), "the society’s dissolution is

a unique feature of this earthquake." The coordination between different levels of government –

local, national and supra-national - as well as the dialogue between the key stakeholders involved in

the disaster response has been certainly missing during the management of the earthquake in

L'Aquila. Among others, famous architect Renzo Piano made its expertise available since the

beginning. In an interview with the weekly magazine L'Espresso 48 he commented on the senseless

work the Civic Protection developed in L'Aquila:

“"The city centre was closed following the military Civil Protection’s logic: all has been cordoned off like there was no difference among buildings with serious, medium and minimum damage. [...] People who have suffered minor or any damage have the right to return to their home. "

Among those excluded, however, there were not only skilled technicians whose skills could have

resulted extremely helpful, but also mainly citizens. Those people who were not affected by the

earthquake, nevertheless lost something really important as a result of the decisions taken. They lost

in fact their city, with the consequences of not having a city centre to live. Against this background,

the so-called “Place-based approach”, an approach that takes into account the environment in

which policies are implemented, is mainly what has been missed during the L’Aquila crisis. Place-

based policies for economic development differ from place-neutral policies, as the Barca Report 49

showed. This report describes two possible approaches towards local development. Such place-

based approach is important in development policies since, as Barca remarked:

                                                                                                               46 http://ilcentro.gelocal.it/laquila/cronaca/2012/01/28/news/monti-nomina-un-ministro-per-l-aquila-1.5034046 47 http://www.lucacococcetta.it/Sito/radici.html 48 E. Arosio, “L’Aquila che vorrei”, L’Espresso, 4 October 2012. 49 Barca F., “An Agenda for a Reformed Cohesion Policy. A place-based approach to meeting European Union challenges and expectations”, 2009. Free version is available at: http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/eeirpaper/eeri_5frp_5f2008_5f06.htm

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“When a policy for development is explicitly place-based, the risks can be identified and addressed through the effectiveness of the conditionality system, the focus on objectives and results, the discipline imposed by evaluation, the competence and credibility of an external authority and the potential for open public debate over the policy choices made.”

The political context in which the L’Aquila crisis took place did not facilitate the implementation of

this approach, nor any kind of dialogue between different stakeholders. The dialogue was rather

hampered favouring a top-down intervention. The L’Aquila case study works also as a tool for the

EU for meditating on its intervention strategies since no intervention is truly neutral. This is even

truer when the core decisions are blurred, and not shared among the population. To this regard, two

considerations catch the eyes:

- First, in humanitarian aid and disaster management there seems to be a huge

misunderstanding about the provision of funds, which cannot simply obviate to the way in

which they are spent;

- Secondly, the false belief that top-down decisions are more effective because taken in less

time should be uprooted. Many believe that top-down decisions, which exclude local

community, are more effective just because they are taken in a quicker way than those who

are shared and that require more time. If the former have a smaller impact in the short-term,

it is also true that the latter could have unforeseeable negative consequences in the long run.

In conclusion, we can now summarize the main points that can be derived from the case study of

the L'Aquila earthquake:

- Studying disasters policy means studying politics;

- There’s a tendency to provide funds after disasters happen, but not in the prevention phase;

- Disaster prevention is different from its forecasting. Much can be done if social learning is

improved through targeted policies, such as the policy instrument of exhortation;

- The power’s centralization in the hands of very few actors in the emergency management

can foster a successful intervention in the after-math of a disaster, but the actors involved in

managing the emergency should stop controlling further stages;

- Democratic participation in decision-making is probably essential in the long term. Many

institutional and non-institutional actors can play a key role in the disaster management. In

other words, “the key to risk and disaster management is governance” 50.

                                                                                                               50 Özerdem & Jacoby, 2006, quoted in D. E. Alexander (2010: p. 325).