The verdict that Zimbabwe’s fast track land reform has insufficiently attained it’s objectives at a procrastinated or late stage carries more of an unjustifiable theory than the practical situation only visible to critical political thinkers than the layman. To give a detailed account of this survey it is of paramount importance to define what is meant by ‘’Fast track land reform’’?. This was a land distribution policy by the government of the independent Zimbabwe. Such a policy borrowed its origins from the armed struggle of the country. Then championed by the Lancaster House agreement warranting the willing buyer and seller principle in post independent Zimbabwe. Britain also pledged to also pour in financial aid to this policy as a means of enhancing the treaty’s reconciliation terms. Notable among the successes of this reform is the achievement of a armed struggle objective ‘’Black empowerment’’ and its self-sufficient economy creating character. However this write-up will also give some critics which affirm the view that the land reform achieved ‘’too little , too late’’. This may be highlighted through socio-economical pitfalls of this policy to be explicitly tackled in this literal piece.

It is a half baked argument to postulate that the fast track land reform achieved ’’ too little , too late’’ . The big question is who determines a sovereign policy as ‘’ little or great’’?. This is because such evaluations must be comparatively based, but well in Africa Zimbabwe was the first country to establish such a policy. Then you would thus question the value of this assertion so as to whether it is genuine or it’s imperialist oriented. It should not be forgotten that the west has always been tirelessly working towards the under-development of Africa as noted through Walter Rodney’s observations in his book How Europe under-developed Africa:1973. To further reveal that this is a Western

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antagonist opinion it is important to bring into light England ‘s infidelity to honour to the Lancaster House terms. This is expressed in an extract of a letter addressed to Kumbirai Kangayi (Minister of Agriculture in 1997) by the British state secretary for international development.

‘’I should make it clear that we do not accept that Britain has a special responsibility to meet costs of land purchasing in Zimbabwe.

We are a new government from a diverse background without links to the other colonial interests’’

So this is proof enough to indicate that such an assessment is imperialist oriented and factually deficient. Moreover there is no visible statistics in Africa to evaluate Zimbabwe’s land reform as this policy was solely taken by Zimbabwe and then later followed by South Africa and Namibia in a raw and compromised fashion. Hence no evaluation to be implored thus leaving echoing scholarly sentiments ‘’How ‘’little’’ is this ‘’little’’ achievement attributed to the fast track land reform of sovereign Zimbabwe.

The fast track land reform substantiated an early and vast achievement of tackling the land question in Zimbabwe. This is because by so doing the government of Zimbabwe was fulfilling the aims of its armed struggle in terms of Black empowerment. This was symbolized by the Lancaster terms which summed up the issue of land redistribution to the Black majority. Furthermore, that on its own purely classified Zimbabwe as an independent state. As cited in the Pan –Africanist creed of Kwame Nkrumah stating that African independence can fully attained when Africans have direct control over their wealth. This is because the

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opposite of such would be mere political freedom and not independence in its authentic nature. Therefore such philosophies were the driving force of the post Rhodesian government and by implementing such in their policy through the fast track reform it became evident that great was the achievement of their struggle. Then making it would be insanity to under-estimate this policy for achieving too little, too late.

Statistical evidence largely bears the fact that Zimbabwe’s fast track has been a success in terms of cubing the economic pandemic imposed on the Black population by the 1930 Land Apportionment Act. Contrary to the colonial poverty inducing strategies, the land reform program managed to secure 50 000 square kilometres of land in 1998 for the African population. This was in accordance with the Land Reform and Resettlement Program Phase (ii). Having seen the success of this policy the ‘’White dominated’’ Commercial Farmers Union (C.F.U.) voluntary pledged to sell 15 000 square kilometres of commercial land to the Zimbabwean government.

In year 2000 the Zimbabwean government embarked on a more radical policy which saw former veterans invade commercial farmers. Then the government announced its new policy of the A1 and A2 farm schemes. With the A1 scheme people were to be resettled on non-commercial lands, the A2 catered for the commercial farmers. It was through this policy that the government seized approximately 110 000 square metres of land. That on its own greatly depicts the greater extent which the fast track land reform has achieved so much than the anticipated ‘’too little too late’’ assessment of this policy.

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Moreover it must be noted that by so doing the government addressed the issue of food security. It should not also be forgotten that through such a policy the government terminated the ills of the 1930 land Apportionment Act that championed the poverty. As it made the African majority to be settled in the desertified Gwai-Shangane reserves. Therefore the fast track reform addressed the issue of food security. As a result giving less room for critics stating that this program was ‘’too little,too late’’.

Still in line with the above this policy deserves appraisal considering its role in creating a self-sufficient economy. This is due to its role as a tool to eliminate colonial dependency syndrome of the Black population. Who through this policy now ventured into both subsistence and commercial farming. Then definitely suggesting a total transfer of the means of production from the White to the Black skin. Indeed ridiculing the notion that the land policy when assessed was ‘’too little and too late’’

While this may be criticised as a ZANU-PF strategy to gain support in the face of the constitutional referendum antagonism as claimed by Lovemore Madhuku at that time. It is also justifiable to affirm this view on the side of constructive criticism in the sense that this was a trial point for ZANU-PF. However through this trial David proved that it is easy to defeat Goliath. In this case David is symbolic of Zimbabwe’s President who proved that the little African nationalism could still surplant Western bigotry typical of the biblical Goliath. Hence it is acceptable when the Egyptians and their pharaoh regard the aftermath of this policy as ‘’too little, too late’’ .While to Moses (Mugabe) and his followers(Land beneficial Zimbabweans) such is an achievement that

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shall be imprinted in the corrosion free rocks of history. For indeed it was a great achievement. Thus denouncing the view that Zimbabwe’s fast track land reform program was too little and too late an achievement.

The fast track land reform does not deserve to be regarded as a too little and too late an achievement. This comes into place if one considers the critics of this policy as they decide to ignore the fact that positive outcomes of this policy will not be an event, but shall be a process. This is because the government of Zimbabwe initiated this policy in the face of economic turmoil. In order to gain it’s economic independence fully as embodied in the creed of Nkrumah, stating that African freedom shall be true when Africans amass their wealth. In other words Zimbabwe had reached a political freedom transition therefore calling for the access to means of production implied complete independence. Just like the toil for political liberation which was not easy and so was to be the economic freedom struggle. An obvious fact was that this struggle was not going to come in an easy way. Hence this was a new political discourse which had its own struggles that laid ahead. Therefore it was named the ‘’Third chimrenga’’. As a result this policy must be given more time to take its correct shape than too be viewed as’’ too late and too late’’. For such is not an event but an evolution of the Zimbabwean political system from having freedom with no economic attachments to total destruction of the Western economic dependence.

However this write up will be half backed if it does not consider pitfalls of the fast track land policy affirming it to be a too little, too late type of a move. To justify this it ought to be mentioned that this policy never

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received adequate funding, that explains why the Zimbabwean government depended on the Lancaster Treaty proposal for the funding. Therefore such proofs of financial paralysis indicate the extent at which Zimbabwe was not ripe to take up such a fund demanding policy. Now when the Black farmers had settled in the farms the banks could not finance their loan proposals arguing that the farmers did not have collateral value attached to their financial pleas. Joseph Made who was the Minister of Agriculture and land resettlement by then tried to threaten commercial banks to aid farmers financially. Banks that did not comply with these terms were threatened to even face closure. The minister’s threats proved to be void then the banks responded by tightening their terms as they insisted that their monetary lending schemes were collateral value attached.

The Zimbabwean farmers’ subsidies were then terminated, hence more economic constraints for the farmers. The situation on the ground was worsened by the Governments of the West who imposed economic sanctions on Zimbabwe . This was a way of revenging the triumph of the fast track land reform programme. This meant more financial hardships for Zimbabwe’s newly resettled farmers. Again the coming of the inclusive government intensified the newly resettled farmers’ financial woes. This is because Tendai Biti the current minister of finance continues to offer a far less than insufficient allocation of funds to the Ministry of Agriculture and since commencing of the Inclusive government he has been silent on offering subsidies to the farmers. As a result disabling this ministry to rescue the country’s financially diseased farmers resettled under the A1 and A2 schemes. With the above truths it is justifiable to state that the fast track land reform program achieved ‘’too little, too late’’ if one considers this policy’s financial hiccups.

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According to the Early Famine Warning Network, the 2005-6 farming season was characterised by shortage of farming inputs. These included fertilisers, fuel and seed supply, Hence reflective of an inevitable famine whose cause the land policy failure. The suffering of the farmers to get adequate inputs in this case was then attributed to a government that imposed a policy it failed to improvise for. The effects of this famine prediction started to sharply materialise around the year 2007. Beyond reasonable doubt the land policy proved to be too little and too late an achievement

The effects of this policy reflected the extend at which Zimbabwe still under colonial economic domination. As unavoidable substantiated by Britain’s reciprocation through sanctions it imposed on Zimbabwe. Then economic an melt-down manifested presented in the form of a hyper-inflation. So this land policy gave the Zimbabweans the chance to see their government’s incompetence and how much it was economically bonded to its former oppressors and exploiters. Moreover indicating that Zimbabwe took a radical economic policy before the country was two feet upright to kick the colonial master’s economic priviledges. Hence justifying the view that the land policy was ‘’too little, too late’’ in terms of a fair policy assessment.

According to Patrick Bond ‘’the migration of the citizens was reflective of a lack of self-sufficiency of the country as it ignited a force whose destructions had self-injuring repercussions it could not cure.’’ Instead Zimbabwe was surposed to conduct such a policy when it could cub the economic consequences that could follow. Hence the work force the country began to find new economic prosperity

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avenues in the neighboring countries like South-Africa, Botswana and as far as England. Therefore justifying Moyo and Yero who state that Zimbabwe’s land policy was founded on sand and not firm ground.

The fast track land reform was a late and a little achievement of the government as some resettled individuals did not have commercial farming exposure and expertise, a majority of which were illiterate. In a closer analysis of this view it will be discovered the failure of harvests in securing food availability may have been catalyzed by this factor. Again the same miscalculation may be the cause for the failure of the tobacco harvests which saw the country’s large source foreign currency of yesterday giving meager returns. This was because the new farmers’ tobacco was of inferior standards as demanded by the tobacco auction floors. According to the British Tobacco Company’s Statistical proof the tobacco sector has been in this fracas since year 2002. Hence reflective of the new breed of farmers’ incompetence since the new land acquisition dating from year 2000. In return undermining the government’s policy to be justly attributed as ‘’too little, too late an achievement’’

The fast track land program may be also criticized as a policy that was indeed too late in addressing the objectives of liberation struggle. This is affirmed by the fact that the peak of this policy came 20 years after the country’s independence. Due to this the state’s critics like John Makumbe have stated that the land reform was targeted at eliminating the political consciousness of the Zimbabwean population that saw the early manifestations of the so-called Mugabe dictatorship. Among the great threats of this revolutionary tide that was to sweep through the

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country was the War Veterans’ plea for the regime’s implementation of constitutionalism. One would ask, What was the best way to silence them and subjugate them to this dictatorship?. ‘’land redistribution was the remedy!’’ . This explains why the Zimbabwean government licensed farm invasions by the war veterans, for it was a way of attracting their support as a party that was now lacking political savory and taste to its consumers.

Moreover this move can be also denounced in terms of its so-called Black empowerment motive. Instead it is just to label it as a campaign strategy by Zanu-PF in the face the mushrooming political groups. The most prominent being the Movement for Democratic Change(M.D.C) which advocated for regime change. Above all this party carried great colonial connotations as it was rumoured that its financial aid was from the West . So to maintain its power Zanu-PF had to buy people’s support through the fast track land reform. Another group which catalysed Zanu-PF ‘s insecurity was the National Constitutional Assembly led by the constitutional critic Lovemore Madhuku. The N.C.A pleaded for a constitutional referendum that was to bring what the N.C.A described as a people’s driven and imposed government. As a result of such intensifying political tension Zanu-Pf had to give the people some drug to create political slumber in the face of such intensifying opposition .

The fast track land reform proved to be too little and too late an achievement of the government as it did not cater for the farm workers. Moyo and Yero argue that 35-000 farm workers lost their jobs due to this exercise. Instead if the government had a mature economic policy it must have considered the welfare of its Black majority who lived in the farms. They could have been the first preference of the government in

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the land allocation process. However the opposite was true. As if that was not enough, the farm workers’ children were deprived of education. This was due to the closure of the farm schools that served as the sole academic sources of child education for the farm workers’ children.

Apart from education facilities the newly settled farmers were starved of other public goods such as adequate health facilities water and electricity supply. This was because such a process by the government was made randomly and unplanned as argued by Kinsey. Unlike in the time of the white settlers’ farm occupations the living standards of the workers were not of an inferior standard compared to the fast track reform resettlement era

Kinsey further champions the verdict that ‘’too little and too late’’ is a justified assessment of the fast track policy in Zimbabwe. As he states that this policy was not planned for, as he argues that the land distribution was not strongly determined on land size versus individual capability. This was revealed by the failing yields of the country after this launching program which suggests how much the new farm settlers had less agricultural skill and experise.

In a nutshell a fair assessment of Zimbabwe’s fast track land reform would not best described as ‘’too little, too late’’ . This is because of its abilities to do away with the colonial land allocation injustices. Moreover this policy championed self-sustainance to the Black population in terms of food security. Above all what could Zimbabwe’s independence be?, without any economic merits attached to it. Due to this, the land reform deserves more appraisals. However they are other pitfalls of this policy which may affirm the view that it achieved too little, too late. Among these pitfalls is the lack of; financing of the farmers by the state, adequate resources to help the farm workers

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displaced due to this policy. Again this policy also faces such criticism as it was regarded as a Zanu-PF campaign strategy to silence the opposition that intensified instigating for regime change and the implementation constitutionalism.

REFERENCE LIST

Early Famine network of Zimbabwe. ‘’ An early warning report on the 2006 crop season in Zimbabwe’’. Vol 12, February 2006. The government publisher, Harare.

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Human rights watch . ‘’Fast track land reform in Z imbabwe’’.vol 1, March 2002.

Human rights watch. ‘’Zimbabwe: fast track land reform.’’. Vol 14, March 2002

Kinsey B, H. 1984 . The strategies and tactics of agrarian reform. Resettlement and land policy in Zimbabwe. University of East Anglia, Norwich.

--- Lancaster House constitutional conference on Rhodesia. Washington D.C. George town. 1988

Land policy world bank. Development forum.http/www2.wBank.org.hm/.accessed on 11/03/2012

Letter to Kumbirai Kangayi. Claire Short, 5 November 1997

Moyana, H. 2002. The political economy of land in Zimbabwe. Mambo press, Gweru

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Rodney, W.1973. How Europe under-developed Africa. Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications, London

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