THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 1970–1975

THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 1970-1975

BY PETER BYRD*

DURING the recent past, academic interest in the study of govern- mental policy-making, articularly foreign policy, has focused on what might be termed tl!e ‘bureaucratic politics’ model

economic and technological cooperation, have been seen as de- politicizing politics. The penetration of plitical systems had earlier led some writers to develop a theory of political convergence.’ A general reconsideration of the role of political parties, including their role in the making of foreign policy, is overdue, although this article considers the problem from a rather different rspective, namely the impact of the common market issue on the LaEur party.

After terms for British membership of the Community were agreed by the Conservative government in July 1971, the Labour party regarded Britain’s membership as essentially provisional, await- ing both a renegotiation of the terms and a clear commitment by the British eople. During this period the European issue reflected,

party. But the correlation was never absolute. Before 1970 some left- wing MPs favoured membership, while a larger group on the right has opposed membership and sometimes received the support of the

ent imperatives Confnonting governments,

and exacer g ated, the underlying left-right divisions within the

elections because of their opposition to the market. of Labour policy towards Europe reveals the difficulties the party as if it were a cohesive whole. It is notorious

of Labour activists do not always coincide with the policies of the arliamentary party, the policies of the big trades

the National Executive Committee (NEC) which is largely elected by conference itself. Differences on Europe between these various

unions which B ominate conference, or, to a much lesser extent,

* apartment of Politics, Universit; of Warwick. The author would like to express thanks to David Mervin for is perceptive comments on an earlier draft of this article. and acknowledw the useful comments and criticisms made at the UACES conference.

”

1 See G. T. Allison, ‘Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis’, APSR,

2 See particularly W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth. 469

410 JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES

institutions, and the light that these throw on the respective roles of those institutions, will be considered in the conclusion.

The article is organized in two parts: a chronology of Labour policy from 1970, and a discussion of some points emerging from this history.

I . Labour and the Common Market, 1970-1975 (i) The common market as an issue in British politics The common market was not a major issue in the general election

of 1970. The icies of all three major parties a proximately

to an extent which led the lea ership to play down the significance of its policy of ap lying for membership. The electorate did not appear to regard t!e issue as important and in any case was not very sympathetic to member~hip.~

Between April and July 1970 sup rt for the policy of applying for membership amounted to only a E ut 20 per cent of the opinion samples, opposition to about 60 per cent. In 1966 and 1967, at the time of the revious a plication, support had been as high as 70 per cent. Since t R c f en it ha steadily declined. In 1970 Labour voters were marginally less enthusiastic than other voters, while women, voters in Scotland, Wales and the north-east, and social classes D and E were least enthusiastic. By July 1971 as the negotiations for membership by the Conservative government drew to a close, support had increased to about 25 per cent. When the terms were announced and triumphantly endorsed by the government, support rose sharply. During 1972 as the European Communities Bill was boing enacted and the Paris summit fanfared British entry, support reached over 40 per cent, only to fall away and stabilize at about 30-35 r cent. Support for the market amongst Labour voters was at roug r ily the national level until July 1971. Labour voters participated to some extent in the increased support when the terms were announced, despite the critical attitude of the par 7 ' s leadershir But after the leadership and the conference decisive y rcjected t e terms in thc autumn of 1971, Labour voters became inmively hostilc, with only about 20 per cent supporting the market. Attitudes in Britain, with a majority of Conservative voters favouring membership, have thus polarized along the traditional party cleavage. As the Labour government moved towards support for continued membership, albeit

The following figures are taken from the publications of Gallup and National Opinion Polls. Their findings generally agree and I take them to represent in general term1 the state of pub!ic opinion.

coincided, but e Labour par was internally divide B on the issue ,zp' 2

THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 1970-1971 471 on renegotiated terms, the views of its own supporters, both in and out of Parliament, came to constitute a real constraint on its freedom of manoeuvre.

This pattern of Labour op sition to the market must be set in

the market to rank as only the eighth most im rtant issue, althou h it did increase slightly as the election, a n r t h e negotiations kr membership, approached, During the 'Great Debate' on membership between July and November 1971 only 10-19 per cent of voters interviewed saw the market as the most important issue confronting the government. Since then the salience of the market has declined even further.

Opposition and lack of interest have to be set alongside i norance about the common market. In July 1971 NOP found $at only 13 per cent of respondents (and only 10 per cent of Labour voters) knew which countries belonged to the common market. Forty per cent of respondents know none of the issues involved in membership, and ignorance here was highest amongst Labour voters and those opposed to entry. Of those opposing entry, 96 per cent named prices as their reason, only 4 per cent named the issue of sovereignty.

the context of the salience o p" the issue. Early in 1970 NOP found

(ii) The evolution of Labour policy In June 1970 pro-marketeers were well entrenched in the Cabinet.

Roy Jenkins (Chancellor and de uty leader), Michael Stewart (Foreign Secretary) and Geor e T R omson (Minister in charge of

marketeers included Denis Healey (Defence), Tony Crosland (Local Government), Roy Mason (Trade), Harold Lever (Paymaster- General) and Cledwyn Hughes (Agriculture). These ministers varied in degree of commitment but supported the principle of entry on the basis of general acceptance of the Rome Treaty. Anti-marketeers included Barbara Castle (Em loyment), Peter Shore (without Port-

Thomas (Scottish and Welsh Secretaries) and possibly Tony Benn (Technology). These ministers were generally considered to oppose entry on the terms likely to be obtained and thus can be he!d to oppose the principle of entry. They had however accepted collective responsibility for the policy of applying for membership. A third group including Jim Callaghan (Home Secretary), and most impor- tantly Harold Wilson took a more pragmatic view and judged the value of membership in terms of the particular bargain which the negotiators might achieve. The principle of entry was, by implica- tion, accepted, but was subsumed undcr the practicalities of entry.

negotiations) occupied particu H arly strategic positions. Other pro-

folio), Fred Peart (Leader of t rl e Commons), Willie Ross and Georze

JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES 412

This roup held the balance between the two more strongly com-

These divisions, occurring also in the parliamentary party and outside parliament, were reflected in the electlon mani-

common market to the penultimate page and stressed the pragmatic nature of the application: We have applied for membership of the EEC and negotiations are due to start in a few weeks' time. These will be pressed with determination with the purpose of joining an enlarged community provided that British and essential Commonwealth interests can be protected. , . if satisfactory terms cannot be secured in the negotiations Britain will be able to stand on her own feet outside the Community.4

The party conference, meeting in the autumn after the general election defeat, endorsed without a card-vote a NEC resolution supporting membership on acceptable term^.^ But within the conference a groundswell of opposition, led by the trade unions, was rising. At the 1969 conference a Transport and General Workers Union resolution laying down very stiff conditions for acceptable terms had been accepted by the NEC without a card-vote. In 1970 the NEC o posed a resolution laying down even stiffer conditions,

The Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) was more sympathetic to the market. Premarketeers did well in elections for the Parlia- mentary Committee, the core of the shadow cabinet, and Wilson appointed Lever as chief spokesman on Europe. Jenkins easily brushed off challenges from left-win and centre anti-marketeers

issue was as decisive a factor in this contest as it became in 1972. Another ro-marketeer, Douglas Houghton, easily retained the

bench study group on Europe. The dramatic catalyst in party attitudes was the publication on

Jul 7, 1971 of the government's successfully concluded negotiations

cussed the terms but without passing any resolutions.6 But while opinion in the country, including Labour voters, was moving towards sup rt for entry, the NEC condemned the terms on July 28

mitte fi groups.

e joint NEC-Cabinet drafting committee relegated the

and secure 8. its defeat by only a tiny majority.

to retain the deputy-leadership, thoug E it is doubtful if the market

chairmans Ki p of the PLP and premarketeers dominated the back-

an B terms of entry. On July 17 a special one-day conference d i s

and calle r for a general election on the issue.' In September the

4 Now Brituin i s strong, let's mate it great to live in, May 27, 1970. 5Debate of November 30, 1970, The Labour Party Anatral Report 1970, p. 185 ff. 6 See report in The Sunday Times, July 18, 1971. 7 The Times, July 29, 1971.

THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 1970-1971 473

p conference overwhelmingly aprroved this statement and called o 2 e PLP to ‘unite wholehearted1 against the government and to reject its terms! At the request of x e NEC conference rejected both a resolution condemning the principle of entry and a resolution in favour of a referendum on the issue.

The disunity, particularly within the PLP, could not be disguised. On October 28, in defiance of conference and the whips, 68 MPs supported the government’s motion approvin the principle of entry

particular significance within the party. The success of the overnment’s motion had required the votes of the Labour rebels %xause the government itself suffered from a back-bench revolt, although of course Conservative rebels had anticipated a Labour revolt and could therefore vote against their government without too great a risk of its defeat. The vote must also be set in the context of a period of peculiarly sharp inter-party conflict. From the point of view of party solidarity against the government, the vote could hardly have come at a worse time; the vote was seen by many Labour activists simply as support for the Conservative overnment itself at a time when sblidarity was vital. Moreover, La %o ur activists and many MPs, including perhaps the leadership, had attributed the election defeat of 1970 to a failure b the leadership to heed the

The conference had made its views on Europe plain enough and, particularly in the constituency parties, there was sharp reaction against the ‘traitors’ of October 28. The conflict on Europe dominated the 1971 PLP elections. Jenkins retained the deputy-leadership only after a second ballot in which the votes of a centre, or just left of centre, candidate opposin entry were almost entirely switched

support from all MPs a ainst the overnment’s European ena ling

because pro-marketeers saw no obligation to support the government’s legislation. But the anti-marketeers had enjoyed enough success to carry the fight further. Wilson’s appointment of Shore as spokesman on Europe in place of Lever, with Foot leading the fight against the legislation, resulted in opposition to the legislation being couched in terms of an extended attack on the principle of entry rather than merely the terms. The results, intended or otherwise, of Wilson’s appointments encouraged the NEC to go further. On

on the terms obtained, and 20 MPs abstaine f . This vote assumed a

party-conference and to retain the con l dence of grass-roots activists.

to the left-win and anti-mar a eteer candidate. On Novem L r q the NEC approved a resolution callin

legislation? For a whie H this poicy P; % for maintained a fragile unity,

8 Debate of October 4, rg71, The Labow Pirrty Annual Report 197:. p. 114 ff, The Times, November 25, 1971.

414 JOURNAL. OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES

March 2, with Wilson, Callaghan and Jenkins all absent, the NEC recommended to the PLP the policy of a referendum as the only ‘practicable means’ of implementing conference decisions that the people should be consulted.’* The NEC had previously rejected a referendum, and the change was widely attributed to the growing influence of its chairman, Tony Benn, who now appeared set on a course of wooing the left. The anti-marketeers enjoyed a further success in the NEC when the post of general secre

European, but to Ron Hayward who was more acceptable to the left because of his views on the market.

The NEC policy on a referendum divided the PLP, where it was carried by only 129 votes to 96 with 50 abstentions. Pro-Europeans and even some others gravely doubted the wisdom of a referendum on both political and constitutional grounds. The shadow cabinet was also divided and endorsed the idea only at the price of Jenkins’ resignation on April 10, immediate1 followed by Lever and Thom- son. Short, a pro-marketeer, thougl less strongly committed than Jenkins and less identified with the right-wing, succeeded as deputy- leader (Short 111 votes, Foot 110, Crosland 61; Short 145 votes, Foot 116).

These conflicts demoralized the whole party. Gallu found that

consistent since 1970 a ainst 31 per cent who thou ht it had been.”

man went so far as to argue that Wilson’s ‘very presence in Labour’s leadership pollutes the atmosphere of politics’.12 In June the market precipitated the final breach between the pro-market MP for Lin- coln, Dick Taverne, and his constituency party. Taverne’s appeal to the NEC was, predictably, re’ected, and Taverne resigned. In March 1973 he regained the seat, humiliating the Labour candidate, in a sensational by-election.

In an attempt to heal the wounds, the NEC produced a new policy in July 1972, namely renegotiating with the Community the terms accepted as the basis of British membership. Six particular areas for renegotiation were outlined, but the standards by which to judge whether renegotiation had been successful were not, and never have been, clearly defined. The NEC condemned the government for having agreed membership ‘without the consent of the British people’. If a Labour government could renegotiate successfully

went not to Gwyn Morgan, the leading candidate

44 per cent of Labour voters thought the party s policy K ad not been

Press criticism natural B y increased and the pro-La i o ur New States-

10 The Times, March 23, 1972. 1lPoll of March 1972. 12 New Statesman, May 26, 1972.

THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 1970-1g71 471 to its own satisfaction) it would consult the country

membership on the new terms by means of a neral election or ‘Consultative Referendum’. If renegotiation

. . . we shall not regard the Treaty obli ation as binding on us. We shall then put to the British people the reasons w % y we find the new terms unacceptable and consult them on the advisability of negotiating our withdrawal.”

This policy not only left to a Labour government the definition of success but had the attraction of postponing an o n conflict

to the pro-marketeers in implying a de ree of acce tance, or at least

conference there was some suspicion that Wilson was now appeasing licy was approved, a pro-market

Boilermakers’ Union resolution opposing parliamentary participa- tion in the European Assembly. The biggest shock to the NEC and Wilson was a hair’s breadth victory against a resolution calling for ‘complete opposition’ to the market (2,958,000 votes for, 3,076,000 votes against).14

The PLP endorsed the policy of non- articipation by 140 votes

Parliamentary Committee. Thus, the PLP maintained a less strident position on Europe than the Conference, whereas the new NEC elected by conference removed as chairman of its Inrernational Committee the ver mildly anti-marketeer (though also right-winger)

also left-winger) Ian Mikardo. After Britain joined the Community in January 1973 the salience

of the whole question seemed to be declining as attention focused on the radical character of the party’s domestic olicies. Discussion

the common market hardly figured as an issue and the 1972 conference policy was reaffirmed. Mrs. Williams easily came top of the women’s section of the NEC, and later, in the elections for the Parliamentary Committee, she again did well. Lever, who had re- entered the committee in 1972 after his resignation, retained his seat and Jenkins also stood again and came second. Thus in 1973 the

Eled,

on the principle of membership. The policy was indee r favourable

not outright rejection, of the principe 7 of mem k) ership. Thus at

reso & f ution was decisively rejecterand the NEC further agreed to a

to 5515 but pro-marketeers continued to B o well in elecbons for the

Joe Gormley, in r avour of the committed anti-marketeer (though

of Labour’s Programme for Britain dominated t R e 1973 conference,

remarketeers. The NEC

13 The Times, July 6, 1972. 14Dcbate of October 4, 1972, Report of the Annual Confrrence of the Labour

15 The Tzrn~s, December 14, 1972. Party ig72,.p. 175 ff.


arty be an to recover from the bitterness of 1972, although without Raving L a U y resolved the issue of membershi

the policy of renegotiation and consultation: In the general election of February 1974 tR’ e manifesto restated

British eople, then we shall be ready to play our full part in deve r ophg a new an B wider Europe.16

mediately prior to t K“ e election revealed that 31 per cent of the public

. . . it is the polic of the Labour party that, in view of the unique importance of the decision, t i! e people should have the right to decide the issue through a General Election or a Consultative Referendum. If these two tests are passed, a successful renegotiation and the expressed approval of the rnajorit of the

The continuing un pularity of the market (a Gallup sample im-

wanted to get out, 18 per cent to stay in, 43 per cent to stay in but to renegotiate terms) allowed the party to cover up its internal differences without too much difficulty and the market did not play a major role in the election. Enoch Powell’s defection from the Conservative party and his appeal to all opponents of the market to vote Labour probably stimulated greatest interest in the issue and may have contributed to Labour’s successes in the West Mid- lands.

Immediately after Labour came back into office following the election, Callaghan was appointed as Foreign Secretary and chief renegotiator. He was to be assisted in the renegotiations by Shore, perhaps the most committed anti-marketeer in the Cabinet, and Roy Hattersley, Callaghan’s number two at the Foreign Office and a leading pro-marketeer. Since it was difficult to anticipate Shore and Hattersley agreeing on the outcome of the renegotiation, Calla- ghan’s role as a senior minister and avowed agnostic on the principle of membership was likely to be crucial. In addition, Callaghan’s personal restige in the party might play an im r t a n t role in per-

g e party to support continued members ip if renegotiation ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ % e d .

Mikardo succeeded Houghton as chairman of the PLP in an election in which the pro-market vote was divided between three candidates, an indication perhaps that other issues were becoming more decisive for MPs. A parliamentary liaison committee was established to maintain links between the government and back- benchers and the six elected back-benchers divided equally into pre and anti-marketeers.

By the election of October 1974 renegotiation was well under way although definite results had not yet emerged. The anti-marketers gained a tactical victory on the joint NEC-Cabinet manifesto com-

* 6 b b o u f s way out of the Crisis, February 8, 1974.

THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 1970-1975 477

mittee by adding two further commitments to the February manifesto, namely that consultation with the ople would take place within a year of the election, and would E considered as binding on the o~ernment. '~ The tactic of postponing conflict was thus

new phase of disagreement by stating that she would resign from active politics if the referendum went against membership. Wilson denied that a referendum was certain, though it was 'highly likely', and attempted to make this challenge to his policy into an electoral asset. The party, he argued, was indeed divided but so was the country, therefore the party represented the country better than the Conservatives whose leadership was committed to membership." On1 Jenkins was prepared to offer public support for Mrs. Williams,

of the country, whichever way it went. Following the election victory the delayed party conference

approved without a card-vote a NEC resolution callin for a refer-

difficulty in restraining the conference, which rightly suspected the government of moving towards support for continued membership. Against NEC wishes conference passed a further resolution de- mandin complete safeguards for parliamentary sovereignty and the hol ing of a syid party conference before the referendum to lay down party p" icy.

As the date or a final decision approached the issue began to assume greater importance; pro-marketers rallied behind one candidate in elections for the chairmanship of the PLP, thereby ensuring their success with the assistance of other centre and right- wing MPs. Pro-marketeers also dominated the liaison committee election when only two anti-marketeers just scraped home.

On December 7 Wilson stated for the first time that he would commend the terms to the British people if he thought they were right. This statement, coming immediately before the Paris summit of Communi leaders, appeared to smooth the path towards an

was being severely tested, and indeed breached. Benn issued a personal 'manifesto' a ainst the Community, provoking Wilson

commend them to the people, if necessary overruling the verdict of the special party c~nference.'~

inevitaby f: drawing to a close, and Mrs. Williams inaugurated the

whi P e anti-marketeers argued that they would accept the verdict

endum by October 1975. Short, speaking on behalf of ti e NEC, had

agreement wit 1 the Community. By this time collective responsibility

into declaring that if i e thought the terms were right he would

17 Britain wdl win with Labour, September 16, 1974. Is Thc Times, September 26, 1974. j9 Benn and Wilson statements i n The Guardinn, December 30, 1974.


The government established sometime in the autumn of 1974 a committee to prepare the necessary legislation for the referendum. The committee, consisting of Callaghan, Jenkins, Short and Elwyn Jones the Lord Chancellor, favoured the pro-marketeers and delayed

any legislation until the outcome of renegotiation The overnment also committed themselves to the

conference policy of kolding a referendum even if renegotiation failed in order to prepare for withdrawal. On January 23, 1975, Wilson announced to the Commons that the referendum would be held and that the overnment would declare its support or rejection

announce that ministers would not be held collectively responsible for the decision and would be free to campaign for or against membership during the period of the referendum.2o

The government considered whether to specify a minimum turn- out for the referendum:’ but in its White Paper on the referendum settled for a simple majority of votes cast, merely adding that the government were ‘confident’ of an ‘adequate’ poll, and conscious of the need for the verdict to be ‘clear and conclusive’.22 At the NEC on January 21 Callaghan had argued that it would be necessary to ublish separately the results for Scotland, Wales and Northern

fudged’.23 The White Paper rejected both counting the result on a constituency basis, as favoured by the anti-marketeers, and also Callaghan’s county by county basis and settled for a single UK count. However, a subsequent vote in the House of Commons en- sured that results would be announced on a county basis. The White Paper compromised on the wording of the ballot paper by avoiding a reference to the government’s verdict on the terms. But the ballot paper would use the phrase ‘stay in’ rather than ‘be’ a member of the Community, though the anti-marketeers criticized this on the grounds that people would favour the status quo.

The renegotiation was concluded at the Dublin summit in March, and Wilson announced his government’s support for continued membership on the new terms, although with seven Cabinet ministers dissenting from the official majority position (Benn, Castle, Foot, Ross, Shore, John Silkin, Varley). The government predictably failed to persuade either the NEC or the special party conference to approve its policy. Moreover, a majority of the PLP

of the terms whic a they had been able to achieve and went on to

Ire P and, these results ‘could be guessed anyway and should not be

20 The Times, January 24, 1975. 21 Statement by Wilson to PLP, The Guardian, February 6, 1975. z2 Referendum on UK membership of the European Community, Cmnd. 59’5,

23 The Guardian, January 22, 1975. February 26, 1975,

THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, q170-197y 479

also rejected the overnment’s policy which obtained parliamentary

On March 26 the NEC had favoured an official party cam aign

party members and the party bureaucracy. On April 30 the leading anti-marketeers in the NEC returned to the attack after their two- to-one victory at the special conference called to discuss the renegotiation. They were dissuaded by the General Secretary, and the party machine remained in a position of uneasy neutrality as the referendum campaign began.

approval on Apri B g only with Conservative and Liberal support.

in favour of withdrawal, although with the right of dissent P or all

2. Conclusions Five general points emerge from the above narrative :

(i) It is possible to argue that the party leadership, particularly the parliamentary leadership, has been consistent in its attitude towards the common market since I 70. The 1964-70 Labour

terms of the particular economic terms of entry and justified membership primarily as a political proposition. The economic advan- tages of membership had alwa s appeared finely balanced against

political proposition then the emphasis on renegotiation of the terms, while consistent with the earlier period, remained somewhat anomalous, because the terms could clearly not be fundamentally altered. The economic context of renegotiation differed from the

riod of healthy balance of payments surpluses in 1970-71. The &gaining threat of withdrawal declined in credibility, and the economic concessions to be gained by renegotiation, for instance contributions to the Community budget, appeared minute when set alon side the overall payments deficit. But the concessions were

itself so strongly to securing an improvement in the terms. The overnments of the Community continued to favour British mem-

Lrship, though rhaps less strongly than in 1971. The Labour party

from the social democratic parties of the Community, particularly the ruling German social democratic arty with whom the British

while anti-marketeers have distinguished between the members of the Community and the Community itself (particularly the Com- mission) and have perhaps felt less attracted towards the social

government had both evaluated the a 1 vantage of membership in

the disadvantages. If members K ip were still judged in 1974 as a

clear P y of great political importance after the party had committed

has been somew r at embarrassed by the support for its membership

part traditionally has perhaps its c f osest continental links. Prc- mar l eteers have emphasized this element of comradely solidarity,


democratic, as opposed to left-wing socialist, nature of the German Party.

(ii) The PLP has consisted of three more or less well defined groups on the common market issue. Opposition to the market is based primarily on the left wing, although it includes members of the centre and the right wing. The pro-marketeers (with a focus in the Labour Committee for Europe) are now confined entirely to the right-wing, although without including the whole right-wing. The leadership of the party has emphasized the importance of the terms of membership. This can be interpreted as a compromise between the two committed groups which are themselves represented within the leadership. The strength of Wilson’s position depends less on back-benchers’ evaluation of the terms than on their loyalty to the leadership. Conversely, Wilson’s concern with the terms can be interpreted less as an obsession about the details of renegotiation than as part of his determination to produce a policy which will keep the party together and prevent really damaging conflict. In this sense the third group might in fact be considered as two overlapping groups: those concerned primarily with the terms, and those concerned primarily with the impact of the issue on the party.

(iii) The common market issue has clearly stimulated internal conflict within the Labour party. This conflict ought to be seen from two, overlapping, rspectives : conflict between institutions within

Neither mode of conflict was created by the common market, but the issue has highlighted and exacerbated them.

Institutional conflict is built in to the party because there are two distinct power bases. One power structure is represented by the party conference and the NEC, which is responsible for party policy between elections, and within which there has been a general scepti- cism and hostility towards the market.

The PLP represents an almost totally distinct power structure. MPs do not vote at conferences and they elect their own leadership -the leader and deputy-leader and, in times of opposition, the Parliamentary Committee. MPs are ultimately accountable not to conference but to their own local Labour party which selected them. Once selected, it is difficult but not impossible for local parties to refuse to readopt their MP.

The PLP ‘implements’ and ‘interprets’ policy decided at conference, but has always rejected dictation by conference. There is thus a potential conflict between the authority of conference and the PLP. Politically the conference has recently been dominated by

the party, and con A” ict between the left and right wings of the party.

THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 1970-197j 481

a left-wing alliance of constituency parties and trades unions, while the right-wing (and premarket group) has retained its influence in the PLP. In any case the PLP is much less subject to shifts of policy, and personnel, than the conference.

There are of course liaison procedures and committees. Although the NEC is elected by conference, except the leader and deputy- leader who are automatically members, it usually contains a majority of MPs (mostly left-wing). To coordinate European policy the 1972 conference established a joint NEC/PLP committee. The NEC side was dominated by anti-marketers, the PLP reflected all three roups

this committee was replaced by a committee appointed by the NEC alone from its home and international committees. Here one pro- marketeer (Roy Hattersley, who was not in fact a member of the NEC) was confronted by anti-marketeers from the trades unions, the back-benches of the PLP and the government. After the committee leaked to the press memoranda from Trans rt House criti-

attend the committee. He argued that collective responsibility to government came before responsibility to the party committee. After the 1974 conference a further joint liaison committee, this time between the government and the NEC, was established to which Wilson appointed 5 members, carefully balancing pro- and anti- marketeers (Callaghan, Hattersley, Short, Foot, Shore).

One further conflict within the party, partly of an institutional character, should be noted. Within the UK, support for membership has been consistently lower in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ire- land than in England. This could be ex lained partly in terms of greater Conservative support in Englantf and greater Labour sup port in Wales and Scotland (rather different arguments apply in Northern Ireland). But in addition to this the Labour party in Wales and Scotland, particularly Scotland, has been hostile to the common market. This can be explained not merely in terms of distance from the metropolitan centre, the need to compete with the Nationalists and other local factors, but also in terms of a real fear that membership might tend to dissolve the ties holding together the UK. The Labour party in Scotland thus o poses the declaration of separate referendum results for Scothi$ and the hostility of the Scottish Secretary Willie Ross to the market has been couched in muted terms, perhaps in deference to his strong support for the AngleScottish Union and government policies emphasizing the unity of the UK. Thus there are regionally based institutional conflicts within the party.

of opinion: pro, anti and agnostic. After the February 1974 e B ection

cizing the renegotiation policy, Wilson forba 8" e ministers to


(iv) The common market issue is essentially different from other conflicts which have arisen within the party over foreign policy. Conflict has always arisen whenever the ‘necessities’ of policy have bitten into the ‘core values’ of the party, for instance in relations with South Africa. The common market is different from those conflicts because it is not concerned either with far away places or with uestions of high policy such as defence, which have aroused

The common market issue involves, and is seen to involve, the whole electorate in bread and butter issues such as prices. European

licy occurs, to put it another way, at the blurred interface between Ereign and domestic politics and, considered as an issue of foreign policy, the common market penetrates to the heart of the political system. For the electorate as a whole the issue has certainly appeared to be less important than prices or industrial relations, but it is equally more important than previous disa reements a b u t forei n

R“ ard economic facts around which the political system revolves. Moreover, the deep conflict within the party makes it of perennial significance because it threatens the litical cohesion of the party and suggests radically new political a p“ ignments. This cannot be said of other post-war disagreements over foreign policy.

(v) The problem of ‘consulting’ the people has raised grave and unprecedented problems of a constitutional and political nature. The original policy of supporting a general election must be interpreted largely as an op sition’s attempt to embarrass the government, if only because party was too divided to fight an election on this issue. In any case an election supposedly fought on this issue might well be lost on quite another issue. It was argued by Healey as recently as the October 1974 election campaign that the government might call an election to obtain a mandate to leave the market if renegotiation did not roduce acceptable terms. This was hardly credible because, althougK such a policy would be welcomed by the trades unions and the con€erence/rank and file, and would moreover contrast the party with the policy of the Conservatives. a t least some pro-marketeers would not stand for the party on swh a platform. Of course, there was never any chance of the party fight- ing a general election in favour of the market.

The government has been in a most difficult situation, albeit one of its own making. Some ministers were inevitably going to oppose the renegotiated terms, and the policy of suspending collective responsibility, whiIe avoiding resignations before the referendum, reveals the extent of disunity within the government, quite apart

only t x e politically involved and the foreign policy elite.

icy which touched only the raw nerve o f conscience and not t R e

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from disunity within the rest of the party. Pro-marketeers in government and the PLP have very limited support from the party’s activists but their leaders are undoubtedly an electoral asset. Anti-market MPs are, to the extent that they are associated with the left-wing and union ‘militants’, perhaps an electoral liability, or at least an asset to be used with caution. The pro-marketeers’ weakness in the party has, in fact, given them some leverage on the leadership, because bereft of party sup rt they might actually have left the

The major problem facing the government lies in its relationship with the anti-market majority of the party, which in its ‘alternative posture’ as the left wing of the party has enjoyed un recedented successes since 1970, not only in conference but also in tR e PLP and government itself. The government entered the referendum campaign o posed by a majority of its MPs, the party conference, a re- vitalizec! NEC and the TUC. Unlike the pro-marketeers, the anti-marketeers can hardly leave the party; not only is there no- where else for them to go, but they can now reasonably claim to be the arty. If the anti-marketeers lose the referendum their anger

policies (to some extent this has already begun) at the very moment when the economic crisis may be forcing the government into an unpalatable deflationary policy. Relations between government and

arty would become worse and bridge-building operations to the Lft would tax even as skilful a tactician as Wilson. Indeed it might not be too fanciful to suggest that the crisis over the common market threatens the very coalition of ideas and interests that the Labour party encompasses.

government and the party i p“ the renegotiation had gone against them.

mi5 R t spill over into a more general attack on the government’s

THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 1970–1975

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