8/7/2019 The Korea Crisis

1/8

Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC

The Korea CrisisAuthor(s): Victor D. Cha and David C. KangSource: Foreign Policy, No. 136 (May - Jun., 2003), pp. 20-24+26+28Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLCStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3183619

Accessed: 11/01/2010 06:32

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=wpni.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLCis collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend

access to Foreign Policy.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/stable/3183619?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=wpnihttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=wpnihttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/3183619?origin=JSTOR-pdf

8/7/2019 The Korea Crisis

2/8

THINKAA A I IN

By Victor D. Cha and David C. Kang

THEKORENorth Korea is not crazy,nearcollapse,nor about to start a war. But itis dangerous,not to mentiondangerouslymisunderstood.DefusingthethreatthatNorthKoreaposesto itsneighborsand theworld will requireless bluster,more patience,and a willingnesson the part of the UnitedStatesto probeandunderstandthe truesources of the North's conduct.

" N o r t h K o r e a Be longs i n t h e ' A x i s o f E v i l " 'No.The only link between North Korea andIran and Iraq, the other two members of the "axisof evil" identified by President George W. Bush inhis 2002 State of the Union speech, is financial.North Korea has sold missile technology to Iran,as it has to a number of countries, including U.S.allies Pakistan and Egypt. Unlike the original Axispowers, Japan, Germany, and Italy, which werejoined formally by the Tripartite Pact of 1940,North Korea, Iran, and Iraq do not coordinate or

work together beyond the sale of goods to oneanother. Furthermore, North Korea does notshare any religious, ideological, or strategic goalswith Iran and Iraq. North Korea's concerns focussolely on the peninsula and do not extend to theMiddle East. Although it does nasty things likesell drugs and make counterfeit money, NorthKorea has not engaged in terrorism in the last 16years, and there has never been any link, nor anysuggested, between North Korea and al Qaeda.Iran, Iraq, and North Korea do share somecommon traits, the main one being an adversarialrelationship with the United States. They are alsoauthoritarian, have allegedly supported or spon-sored terrorism, and have programs to developweapons of mass destruction.However, using thoselattercriteria,severalother countries could fit in theaxis. Why not U.S. allies Pakistan or Saudi Arabia,for example?

VictorD. Cha is associateprofessorof governmentand D.S.Song-Koreafoundation chair at Georgetown University'sEdmundWalshSchoolof ForeignService.David C. Kangisassociateprofessorof governmentandadjunctassociatepro-fessorat the TuckSchoolof Businessat DartmouthCollege.Theyare coauthorsof NuclearNorth Korea:A Debate OnEngagementStrategies(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,forthcoming).20 FOREIGN POLICY

8/7/2019 The Korea Crisis

3/8

"KimJong I I I s C r a z y ,Unpredictable,a n d Undeterrable"

Wrong. KimJong Il isas rationalandcalculatingas he is brutal. Dictatorsgenerallywant to survive,and Kimis no exception.He has not launcheda war,becausehe has good reason to think he would facefatal opposition from the United States and SouthKorea.In fact, like his fatherKim I1Sung,Kim hasclearlyshown he is deterrable:North Korea has notstarteda war in five decades.Dictators do not survive without sophisticatedpolitical skills. Kim has maintained power despiteintelligenceassessmentsthat his leadershipwould notsurvivethe death of his fatherin July 1994. And hehas endured despite famine, floods, economic col-lapse,nuclearcrises,the loss of two majorpatronsinRussiaand China,andU.S. pressure.There has beenno palaceor militarycoup, no extensivesocialunrest,no obvious chaos in the military,and no wholesale

purgeof variousofficials.Moreover,Kim'sdecisiontoproceed with North Korea'stentative and measuredeconomic reforms is further proof that, howevermorally repugnanthe may be, he is also quite capa-ble of assessingcosts and benefits.But his rationality does not make him any lessdangerous. Under Kim's rule, North Korea hasengaged in a coercive bargaining strategy designedto ratchetup a crisiswith the United States. Provo-cations such as test-firing missiles, shadowing spyplanes, and walking away from treaties can grabattention and even force the United States and itsallies to provide inducements persuading NorthKorea back from the brink. A risky approach, per-haps-but rational, too. If you have little to nego-tiate with, it makes sense to leveragethe status quofor maximum bargaining advantage.

" N o r t h K o r e a P o s e s D i r e c t NuclearT h r e a t to t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s "

Calm down. Whatsparkedthe currentcrisisover North Korea'snuclear intentions were revela-tions last October that Pyongyang has pursued asecretprogramto produce highly enriched uraniumthat could be used to make nuclear bombs. Thateffort violated the Agreed Framework negotiatedbetween North Korea and the Clinton administra-tion in 1994, under which the North had agreedtofreeze its nuclear programand accept internationalinspections in return for fuel oil shipments and,eventually, two "proliferation-resistant" nuclearreactors. The October revelations prompted a stiffU.S. responsethat includeda cutoff of fuel oil deliv-eries. North Korea, meanwhile, has kicked outinternationalinspectors,withdrawn from the Non-ProliferationTreaty,and begun to restartits nuclearreactors-prompting fears that the country willsoon have much more than the one or two bombs'worth of nuclear material typically cited by U.S.intelligence analysts.

But lost amidall the alarm and blusteris the real-ity that the logic of deterrencewill prevail even ifNorth Korea develops and deploys a nuclear force.North Koreapursuesnuclearweapons not for lever-age but for the same reason that other highly vul-nerable nations arm themselves:to deter an adver-sary, in this case a superpower that is armed withnuclear weapons. But even if the North developsnuclear weapons, the threat of a devastating U.S.response will prevent it from ever using them-afterall, unlike shadowy terroristcells, nations can-not hide from a retaliatory strike.What about the North's missile threat? Someanalysts claim that North Korea already possessesa long-rangenuclear missile capability.That's false.The longest-range missile currently deployed byNorth Korea is the No Dong missile, which cancarry a 1,500-pound payload approximately 800miles. However, North Korea has reportedlytestedthe No Dong only once. The untestedTaepo Dong 2

MAY IJUNE 2003 21

8/7/2019 The Korea Crisis

4/8

ThinkAgainjcan potentially carry a several hundred-poundpayload between 6,000 and 9,000 miles-farenough to reach the West Coast of the UnitedStates.Butwithout adequatetesting,sucha nuclearmissile would be highly unreliable.

The fact is, North Korea could blow up ter-rorist bombs in downtown Seoul every week if ithad the desire to do so. It could smugglea nucleardevice into Japan, given the extensive network ofKoreansin that countrywith ties to the North. Forthat matter,why should North Korea develop anexpensive ballistic missile to shoot at the UnitedStateswhen smugglinga nuclearweapon in a ship-ping container would be so much easier?The pri-maryvalue of the North's missiles is as a military

deterrent,not as an offensive weapon.The only nuclearthreatto theUnited StatesfromNorthKoreais indirect,inthepotentialtransferof suchcapabilitiesto thirdparties.Pyongyanghas shown noaversionto sellingweaponsto anyonewith the hardcurrencyor barterto pay for them. North Koreannuclearweaponsor fissilematerialhiddenin tens ofthousandsof undergroundcaveswouldlikelygo unde-tected even by the most intrusiveinspections.But atransferof nuclearmaterialwould be a riskyproposi-tion for a regimethat values survivalabove all else.Giventhepreemptivemind-setof apost-September11UnitedStates,the North would have to be confidentthat any transfer would escape U.S. detection andthereforethe threatof a massiveU.S.retaliation.

" N o r t h K o r e a D o e s N o t H o n o rInternational Agreements"

Mostly true. Heraldedfora halfcenturyasan outlaw state, North Korea has maintainedsome of its international commitments. It is amember of the Conference on Disarmament,Biological Weapons Convention, and GenevaProtocol. Afterthe attacksof September11, 2001,the country signed on to two U.N. antiterrorismprotocols. During the negotiations for the AgreedFramework,the United States requiredthe Northto improverelationswith South Korea.Pyongyangeventuallyrespondedby agreeingto a summit(justprior to Kim II Sung'sdeath). As of this writing.the North has also honored its 1999 ballisticmis-sile-testingmoratoriumfor four years.But the North also has a historyof engagingin

"strategicdeception"-signing agreementsto con-vey reliabilitybut purposefullycheatingon them toits own advantage.The historyof inter-Koreanrela-tions, for example, is littered with pacts thatPyongyang has not honored, including the 1992denuclearizationdeclarationin which North Koreaagreed to forgo developing nuclear and nuclear-reprocessingfacilities.The United Statesmay havebeen slow to implement the Agreed Framework,but the North is blatantlybreakingthe framework'sspirit, if not letter,with its covert uraniumenrich-ment program. But perhaps the best evidence ofstrategicdeception occurredin June 1950: On theeve of the Korean War,North Korea put forth amajor peace initiative to the South.

" N o r t h Korea's Polit ical a n d EconomicCol lapse I s Imminent"

Don't bet on it. Observershavepredict-ed an imminent North Korean collapse since thefall of the BerlinWall in 1989. The country's eco-nomic situation is desperate, but signs of politi-cal collapse are absent. The best indicator of

regime stability is that social control, howevervicious, remains solid. Although the flow ofrefugees from the North is increasing, there is nowidespread internal migration, and few observ-able signs of protest.22 FOREIGN POLICY

8/7/2019 The Korea Crisis

5/8

Some evidence suggests that North Korea isserious about normal political and economic rela-tions with South Korea and the rest of the world.By December2002, North Koreahad cleared landmines fromsections of the demilitarizedzone (DMZ)separating North and South Korea. Tracks arebeing connected on the Kyonggui Railway, whichwould run from South Korea through the westerncorridor of the DMZ into North Korea. Pyongyanghas also begunwork on a four-lanehighway on theeastern corridor as well. In July 2002, the centralgovernment formally abandoned the centrallyplanned economy and allowed prices and wages tobe set by the market. The governmenthas also cre-ated threespecialeconomic zones to exploit tourismand investment and amended its laws on foreignownership, land leases, and taxes and tariffs.

Althoughthese reforms have beenhaltingand onlymarginally successful, they are also becomingincreasingly hard to reverse.Though the regime appears resilient, there aretwo sources of potential fissures. First, the decid-edly mixed results of several recent initiatives byKim-among them, his decisions to lift price con-trols and to acknowledge North Korea's kidnap-ping of Japanese nationals in the 1970s-haveexposed "Dear Leader" to potential disgruntle-ment in the top ranks. Second, the process ofreform could create cracks in the regime's foun-dation. As Montesquieu observed, revolutionsdon't occur when the people's conditions are atrock bottom but when reform creates a spiral ofexpectationsthat spurs people to action againsttheold stultifying system.

" C h i n a H a s t h e M o s t Influenceo n N o r t h K o r e a "

Yes, but good luck getting the Chineseto use it. If a state's influence on North Korea ismerely a function of the North's materialdepend-ence on it, then China holds the trump cards.Seventy to 90 percent of North Korea's annualenergy supplies, roughly30 percentof its total out-side assistance, and 38 percent of its importsreportedlycome from China.Beijingplayeda quietbut critical role in inter-Koreandialogue leadingup to theJune2000 summit.It also influencedKimJong II and his decision to tentatively reform theNorth Korean economy by hosting Kim inShanghai in 2002 and backing the creation ofspecial economic zones.

Notwithstanding this close history, ChineseForeign Ministry officials deny any influence onNorth Korea, complaining that "North Koreadoesn't listen to us, it doesn't listen to anyone."ButChina's protestations largely reflect its unwilling-ness to put real pressure on its neighbor. China'straditional stake in North Korea has rested inkeeping the regime afloat as a geostrategic bufferagainstU.S. influence on China'sborder.It also hasno desire to provoke a regimecollapse that wouldsend millions of North Korean refugees floodingacross the border.

A different set of Chinese interests may nowcome to the fore. Beijing opposes nuclearweaponson the Koreanpeninsula and delivereda dressing-down to North Koreanembassyofficials in Beijingin January about the country's cheating on theAgreed Framework. For China, nothing goodcomes from a nuclear North Korea. Such an out-come could prompt Japan to move from merelydevelopingmissile defensecapabilitiesto acquiringballistic missiles or nuclearweapons. And Taiwanmight also cross the nuclear threshold if the coun-try's leaders see North Korea successfully guaran-teeingitssecuritythisway.Whilethe rest of Asiapro-vides China'seconomic lifeblood, Beijingcontinuesto throwgood money,food, and fuel down a ratholein North Koreawith littleprospectof majorreform.Chinese policy may change under a new cadreof leaders such as President Hu Jintao who areless wedded to the Cold War relationship withPyongyang,which used to be characterizedas closeas "lips and teeth." Or more likely, Beijing'shesi-tation to intervenemay be tactical, as it waits forthe United States to do the heavy liftingwith NorthKorea (despiteBush'srhetoricto the contrary)andthen swoops in to help close the deal and maximizeits influence.

MAY IJUNE 2003 23

8/7/2019 The Korea Crisis

6/8

ThinkAgain

" T h e D M Z I s t h e ScariestP l a c e i n t h e W o r l d "

Yes, if looks could kill. When for-mer U.S. President Bill Clinton called the borderbetween the two Koreas the world's scariestplace, he was referring to the massive forwarddeployment of North Korean forces around theDMZand the shaky foundations of the 50-year-old armistice-not peace treaty-that still keepsthe peace between the two former combatants.Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, therehave been more than 1,400 incidents across theDMZ, resulting in the deaths of 899 NorthKoreans, 394 South Koreans, and 90 U.S. sol-diers. Tensions have been so high that in 1976 theUnited States mobilized bombers and an aircraftcarrier battle group to trim one tree in the DMZ.The deployments and operational battle plans onboth sides suggest that if a major outbreak of vio-lence were to start, a rapid escalation of hostili-ties would likely ensue.In practice, however, no such outbreak hasoccurred.North Korea has faced both a determinedSouth Korean military,and more important, U.S.military deploymentsthat at theirheight comprised100,000 troops and nuclear-tippedLance missiles

and eventodayinclude37,000 troops, nuclear-capa-ble airbases,and naval facilitiesthat guaranteeU.S.involvementin any Koreanconflict.The balance of power has held becauseanywarwould have disastrousconsequencesfor both sides.Seoul andPyongyangare less than 150 milesapart-closer than New York is to Washington,D.C. Seoulis 30 miles from the DMZand easilywithin reach ofNorth Korea'sartillerytubes. FormerCommanderofU.S Forces Korea Gen. GaryLuck estimatedthat awar on the Koreanpeninsulawould cost $1 trillionin economicdamageandresultin 1 millioncasualties,including52,000 U.S.militarycasualties.As one wargamerdescribed,the deathtoll on the North Koreansidewould be akinto a "holocaust,"andKimJongI1andhis 1,000 closestgeneralswould surelyfacedeathor imprisonment.As a result,both sideshave movedcautiouslyand avoidedmajormilitarymobilizationsthat could spiralout of control.Ironicallyenough,as for the DMZitself,althoughbristlingwith barbedwireandsown with landmines,it has also become a remarkable nature preservestretchingacross the peninsulathat is home to wildbirds and a trove of other rarespecies.

" T h e Clinton Administration'sPoliciesT o w a r d N o r t h K o r e a F a i l e d "

No. The North's breach of the AgreedFrameworkmay make Clinton'spolicies look inef-fective, but consider the counterfactualproposi-tion. If Clinton had not succeededin freezingNorthKorea's main nuclear facilities at Yongbyon fornine years,North Korea would today have enoughplutonium for at least 30 nuclear weapons ratherthan one or two bombs' worth.Clinton's engagement with North Korea alsoprovided a useful test of North Korean intentionsand expectations.Previously,the United States hadlittle sense of the North's interest in swapping itsproliferation threat for external assistance. True,the debate between hawks and doves over this

question still has a "he said, she said"quality to it:Hawks see North Korea'sviolations of the AgreedFrameworkas evidenceof the North's lackof inter-est in such a deal;doves see those same violationsas a reaction to the U.S. failure to fulfill the frame-work and still believePyongyangwill give up nukesin return for outside supportof economic reform.But now there is a baseline or "data"for a debatethat previously took place at a theological andideological level. BeforeClinton, therewas also noway to use leverage on a country with which theUnited States had next to no contact for fivedecades. Since 1994, the North has gained food,fuel, economic assistance, and diplomatic rela-

24 FOREIGN POLICY

8/7/2019 The Korea Crisis

7/8

[ ThinkAgain]tions not justwith South Korea but also Japan,theEuropean Union, Australia, Canada, and others.Ironically, Clinton's carrots have become Bush's

sticks, enabling the latter to pursue a harder-linepolicy by threatening to withhold what was oncepreviously promised.

" T h e B u s h AdministrationC a u s e d t h eCurren t C r i s i s "

No. Bush's"axis of evil"speechand his professedloathing of Kim may have exacerbatedthe currentcrisis,but they certainlydid not cause it.First, North Korea started its covert uraniumenrichmentprogramfor nuclearweaponslong beforeBush took office. As far back as 1997, Pakistaninuclearscientistswere shuttlingto Pyongyang,pro-viding technologyfor uraniumenrichmentin returnfor North Korean missile systems.Second,priorto theOctober2002 revelationsanddespiteBush'soccasionalnegativestatementson NorthKorea,the United Stateshad offereda stringof con-sistentassurancesat lower levelsthat it would pursuesomeform of engagement.These assurancesincludedthe creationof a packageof new incentivesand theexpressedwillingnessto meet"anytime,any place,andwithoutpreconditions."Inaddition,the Bushadmin-istrationabandonedseveralinitiativescitedasattemptsto derailNorth Koreanengagement-revisionof theAgreedFrameworkanda pushforconventionalforcereductions-after theyprovedto be nonstarterswith

U.S. allies. Comparedwith the Clinton administra-tion'seffusiveadvancesto NorthKorea,Bush'saggres-siveposturingwas portrayedby some mediaas a dra-maticshift,butthe U.S.predispositionforengagementremained.The North Koreans'response?Theyrefusedto engagein directbilateraldialoguewith the UnitedStates,accusingWashingtonof high-handedness.Third,thereis nodenyingtheharderturninbothU.S.statementsandpolicyafterOctober2002. NorthKorea'sperceptionof thepreemptivelanguageintheBushadmin-istration'snew nationalsecuritystrategyand nuclearposturereviewcouldonlyhaveheightenedNorthKore-ans' worst fears.But Bush'sunconditionalrefusaltotalk with North Koreadidn't createthe crisis. TheadministrationbelievesNorth Koreastandsso far out-side the non-proliferationregimethat negotiatingitsreturnwould be tantamount to blackmail.ShouldPyongyangfirstmake compliancegestures,however,thenthe UnitedStateswould bewillingto discussincen-tivesincludingsecurityassurances,energy,andeconomicassistance.Soundslike a negotiatingpositionto us.

" T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s S h o u l d P u l l I t s T r o o p sO u t o f a n UngratefulS o u t h K o r e a "

Not yet. Massivedemonstrations,Molotov cock-tails hurledinto U.S. bases, and American soldiersstabbedon the streetsof Seoulhave stokedangerinCongressandon theop-edpagesof majornewspapersabout SouthKorea. As North Koreaappearson thenuclear brink, Americans are puzzled by thegroundswellof anti-Americanism.They cringe at ayoungergenerationof Koreanswho tellCBStelevision'sinvestigativeprogram6o Minutesthat Bush is morethreateningthan Kim,and they worryabout reportsthat SouthKorea'snewpresident,RohMoo-hyun,was

avowedlyanti-Americanin hisyoungerdays.Most Koreanshavecomplicatedfeelingsabout theUnitedStates.Someof them areanti-American,to besure,butmanyaregrateful.SouthKoreahashistoricallybeenone of thestrongestalliesof the UnitedStates.Yetit would be naive to dismiss the concernsof SouthKoreansaboutU.S.policyand the continuedpresenceof U.S. forcesasmerelyemotional.Imagine,for exam-ple,howWashingtoniansmightfeelaboutthe concreteeconomic impact of thousands of foreign soldiersmonopolizing prime real estate downtown in the

26 FOREIGN POLICY

8/7/2019 The Korea Crisis

8/8

ThinkAgain I

nation'scapital,as U.S. forcesdo in Seoul.Buthastywithdrawalof U.S. forces is hardlytheanswerto suchtrans-Pacificanxiety,particularlyastheU.S.-SouthKoreanallianceentersunchartedterritory.The North Koreanswould claimvictory,andthe Unit-edStateswouldlose influenceinone ofthemostdynam-ic economicregionsintheworld-an outcomeitneitherwantsnorcanafford.Inthelongterm,suchawithdrawalwouldalsopavethewayfor Chineseregionaldominance.Some SouthKoreansmightwelcome a largerroleforChina-a romanticand uninformednotionat best.Bet-tingon China,afterall,didnot make SouthKoreathe12thlargesteconomyandone of themost vibrantlib-

eraldemocraciesin theworld.Thealternativesto the alliancearenot appealingtoeitherSouthKoreansor Americans.Seoulwouldhaveto boost its relativelylow level of defensespending(which,atroughly3 percentofgrossdomesticproduct,is lessthanthatof Israeland SaudiArabia,forexample).Washingtonwouldrun the riskof jeopardizingitsmil-itarypresenceacrossEastAsia,as a U.S.withdrawalfromthepeninsularaisedquestionsaboutthe raisond'etreforkeepingitstroopsinJapan.A revisionin theU.S.mili-tary presencein Koreais likelywithin the next fiveyears,but withdrawalof thatpresenceandabrogationof its allianceare not. IIN

Want to Know More?IOn North Koreanhistory,the classic remainsChong-sikLee and RobertScalapino'sCommunismin Korea(Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1972). The best recenthistoryis Don Obderdor-fer's TheTwo Koreas(New York:BasicBooks, 2001). On North Korea'sleadership,one of the fewgood works is Dae-Sook Suh'sKimIl-Sung:TheNorth KoreanLeader (New York: Columbia Uni-versityPress,1988). The inaugurationspeechof SouthKorea'snew president,Roh Moo-hyun, canbe found on the Website of the KoreanInformationService.TheKoreanCentralNews AgencyWebsite offersthe North'sperspective,servedup zanyand fresh.

On U.S.-NorthKoreanrelations,seeSamuelKim's,ed.,NorthKoreanForeignRelationsin the Post-ColdWarEra(New York:OxfordUniversityPress,1998), LeonSigal'sDisarmingStrangers:NuclearDiplomacyWithNorthKorea(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1998), and MichaelMay's,ed.,"VerifyingtheAgreedFramework"(Livermore:CenterforGlobalSecurityResearch,April2001). Fora recentroundtablefeaturingthe views of 28 top Koreaexperts,see the February2003 reportof theTaskForceof U.S. KoreaPolicy,"TurningPoint in Korea:New Dangersand New Opportunitiesforthe UnitedStates,"availableon the Web siteof the CenterforInternationalPolicy.A d6jivu-inducingsnapshotof U.S.-North Koreanrelationscirca 1979 can be foundin journalistGarethPorter's"Timeto Talk With North Korea" (FOREIGNPOLICY,Spring 1979).

On the historyof nuclearand missileproliferationon the Koreanpeninsula,seeJamesClayMoltzandAlexandreMansourov's,eds., The NorthKoreanNuclearProgram(New York:Routledge,1999),PeterHayes'sPacificPowderkeg(Lexington:LexingtonBooks, 1991), and DavidAlbrightand KevinO'Neill's,eds.,Solvingthe NorthKoreanNuclearPuzzle (Washington:Institutefor Scienceand Inter-nationalSecurity,2000). DavidShambaugharguesthat Chinadoes not ultimatelywant to end NorthKorea'snuclearprogramin "Chinaand the KoreanPeninsula:PlayingfortheLongTerm"(TheWash-ingtonQuarterly,Spring2003).

On North Korea'seconomy,see MarcusNoland'sAvoiding theApocalypse:The Futureof theTwoKoreas(Washington:InstituteforInternationalEconomics,2000), NicholasEberstadt'sThe Endof North Korea(Washington:AmericanEnterpriseInstitutePress,1999), and Hy-SangLee'sNorthKorea:A StrangeSocialist Fortress(Westport:Praeger,2001).>>Forlinksto relevantWebsites,accessto the FPArchive,anda comprehensiveindexof relatedFOREIGN POLICY articles, go to www.foreignpolicy.com.

28 FOREIGN POLICY