The Klymene Principle Rainer Zimmermann

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The Klymene PrincipleA Unified Approach to Emergent Consciousness

by Rainer E. Zimmermann

Philosophy Preprints PP 981201

IAG Philosophische Grundlagenprobleme

FB 1 (Erziehungswissenschaft & Humanwissenschaften)

Universitt-Gesamthochschule Kassel

Nora-Platiel-Str.1, D - 34127 Kassel


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The Klymene Principle

A Unified Approach to Emergent Consciousness

by Rainer E. ZimmermannLehrgebiet Philosophie, Fachbereich Allgemeinwissenschaften, Fachhochschule,

Postfach 200113, D - 80001 Mnchen & Fachbereich Erziehungswissenschaftund Humanwissenschaften, Universitt-Gesamthochschule, Nora-Platiel-Str.1,

D - 34127 Kassel, e-mail: pd00108atmail.lrz-muenchen.de

... poetry and science alike

require for their healthy practice both precisionand an appreciation for subtlety and complexity.

Lee Smolin: The Life of the Cosmos1

Abstract

The recent development of philosophy is discussed in terms of its re-positioning withrespect to science. The basic ideas on the traditional line of thinking dealing with thisrelationship are briefly summarized, giving an overview on theories beginning withancient Stoa and reaching up to the philosophy of Ernst Bloch, including the Arabconception of matter as a modified Aristotelian approach, and the theories of Bruno,Spinoza, and Schelling, respectively. The relationship between the major results ofthis philosophical tradition and recent concepts of modern science is discussed then,displaying the heuristic power of philosophy in more detail. In particular, ideas putforward by Trifonov, Tegmark, and Smolin are reviewed with respect to a possiblefoundation of physics and mathematics in view of a consequent rephrasing of whatphilosophy can mean today in terms of a unified onto-epistemic conception. Hence,the problem of cosmological principles determining early evolutionary aspects of theuniverse is addressed, referring to what is called a theory of everything (TOE) and its

further consequences for the shaping of the world, in particular with respect to otherfields of science. Also, Smolins ansatz of cosmological natural selection is general-ized somewhat, and it is shown that in principle, the basic material for a truly unifiedapproach to the totality of the world is assembled already, provided that an appropri-ate type of generalized perspective is taken into account. It is shown that such aperspective is basically one which points to a theory of reflexion which in turn, in sofar as reflexion is visualized as nothing but as a product of this same process of evo-lution being discussed here, shows up as a theory of self-organizing nature, being aself-differentiation of its underlying foundation, at the same time. Hence, there-constructing of basic categories such as space, time, matter, and so forth, is basi-cally the same as the re-constructing of the underlying process which produces the

concrete correlates to these categories. And so, categories as being the result of the

1 L.Smolin: The Life of the Cosmos, Oxford University Press, 1997, 145.


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epistemic progression of (human) reflexion, are themselves the auto-epistemic cor-relate of the unfolding of the world. A short, programmatical systematic is given as anoutline then, of how to unify all these aspects in one conception, encompassing sci-ence as well as art, in order to eventually gain some more insight into the manner inwhich humans grasp their worldly environment for establishing a basic orientation

which may serve as a guideline for their actions according to what they call consciousunderstandingof the world. This is also important for gaining some more insight intothe role, philosophy on the one hand, and science and art on the other, play in theexplicit designing of everyday life, as it is defined in empirical terms. Ethical implica-tions of this discussion are given, with a view to the fact that - well in Spinozist tradi-tion - philosophy serves primarily the foundation of ethics, an objective which basi-cally depends on improving human reflexion.

Contents

(Outline)

I IntroductionII The General Line of Thought

A. The Stoic FoundationB. AverroesC. BrunoD. SpinozaE. SchellingF. Bloch

III Modern Implications of the General LineA. Metaphysics as Ultima PhilosophiaB. The Relationship to ScienceC. The Principle of Self-NarrationD. Topoi of Emergence

IV The Conception of TrifonovV The Conception of TegmarkVI Cosmological Natural Selection According to SmolinVII Systematic Aspects of Unified Onto-Epistemology

VIII New Organon of Philosophy (A Proto-Theoretic Matrixof Basic Concepts)

IX Intercultural Stability of ConceptsX Ethno-Poetical Ethics as Advanced Theory-Praxis: Walking

the Songlines of Nature


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I. Introduction

One should have two lifes: one for reading all the important books that comeacross, and the second for carefully re-reading them. During the last twenty-five

years a considerable amount of conceptual change has taken place in the physi-cal sciences. And it looks very much as if a kind of permanent revolution hasbeen underway all the time. As Paul Davies has formulated in the preface to hiscollected contributions to the New Physics, the beginning of this century saw

the dawning of this new physics rather than a Golden Age lying buried in thepast and giving rise to nostalgic moments. And he visualizes a third revolutionby now, taking place across a broad front, indeed.

2Consequently, in his col-lection, all the fields of actual development have been assembled, including,among others,space-timephysics(presented in contributions by Will, Guth andSteinhardt, Hawking, and Isham), thenew astrophysics(Longair), critical point

phenomena (Bruce and Wallace), far-from-equilibrium systems (Nicolis), andthe celebrated GUT(Georgi). The names quoted are well-known by today suchthat merely listing them indicates the change of physical viewpoints related tothe work of their holders. On the other hand, this was almost ten years ago.Hence, in the meantime, other topics have emerged which were hardly men-tioned before. But the point is that everything was there already, only that oursharpened perception and our heightened attention are used to realize this not

before the end of a second turn. Usually however, there is not enough time tostart a second turn in first place. (This would be the necessary re-reading phase.)

Indeed, if one would like to deal with the history of this change in more detail(what is not our objective here, in fact3), one would realize that the milestones ofthis development can be easily mapped to a particular reception of significant

books being published at the time. So, before we continue with the explicationof what this present paper is actually all about, we will shortly outline the basicaspects of this correspondence.4It was in the year of 1973, when the historic volume by Hawking and Ellis, on

2 P.Davies (ed.): The New Physics, Cambridge University Press, 1989.3 For an illustration of how an appropriate assessment of this historical development could look like refer to

M.Serres (ed.): Elements dhistoire des sciences, Bordas, Paris, 1989. The time table in this collection of essaysstops at about 1950 (while actually starting in ancient times). Probably, a similar volume should be necessary tocover the development of the following fifty years.4 A remark should be in order as to the subjectivity of the chosen criteria for selecting the works actually men-tioned: They start from the classical view of Einsteins relativity theory and its generalizations as having been

presented by what I like to call the English school (with Penrose, Hawking and others). This is mainly due to myown development in the field which began in the year 1973 as a DIC student at Imperial College London andincluded a regular participation in the relativity seminars at Kings College London. Unfortunately, at that time,my particular interest in Kaluza-Klein theory, let me fall between two stools, because as a student in the neigh-

borhood of Abdus Salam and Thomas Kibble this was not quite the appropriate subject to choose, while atKings (and on excursions to Oxford and Cambridge) cosmic censorship and the behaviour in the vicinity of

black holes were the central topics to be discussed. Before re-entering the subject in time in order to getaquainted to promising developments in superstrings (or later in loop theory), I had changed to philosophy, be-

cause after my return to Germany it appeared to be useful to look for an alternative way of satisfying the needsof the stomach as Einstein used to put it. This present paper is actually about this philosophical turn, in first

place. So if I speak of we at one or the other occasion, I mean those who have taken a similar development. In

fact, it can be shown that the set of all those is at least non-empty.


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the large-scale structure of space-time, had been published, collecting for thefirst time the insights gained by general relativity, after the introduction and es-tablishment of the co-ordinate-free notation in terms of differential geometryand topology. About the same time, the famous work of Misner, Thorne, and

Wheeler, and the concise book by Weinberg, represented the standard instru-ments of understanding the universe as a whole.5The innovative aspect of theEnglish work was the consequent exploitation of the methods developed. Thesetechniques were also discussed by the American texts, but they did not reallyestablish the methodological nucleus which consisted instead of an alternative(canonical) formalism developed first by Arnowitt, Deser, and Misner in allgenerality.6 (Of course, from the beginning on there was no doubt as to the

permanent interactions between the two conventions which can be seen mostclearly in terms of the Newman-Penrose spin coefficient formalism developedeven earlier.7) For someone who had acquired the basic knowledge of relativityin terms of classical books such as Adler, Bazin and Schiffers introduction8, thechange of viewpoint was an enlightenment: In particular, the new quality of aformal language extending towards physical problems which could be formu-lated exactly, but without necessarily relying on anything of a quantitative,computable or measurable kind in the traditional sense, was a centre of strongintellectual attraction. This was even felt in view of the very layout of the text inthese books such as that given by Hawking and Penrose: theorems being pre-sented not so much in terms of a long sequence of equations, but in a closed blocof colloquial text, similar to a piece of literary prose. Not that there had not

been elegant expositions of theoretical physics before, the generation of the stu-dents then being accumstomed to works on physics such as the equally canoni-cal books by Landau and Lifshitz, or the Bourbaki mathematics taught byDieudonn in volume 1 of his Elements of modern analysis, but their style

was the usual one known from school (not however from Dieudonns volume 2onward), - and although the new form of language was not really less inter-spersed with abstract symbols (in a way, all in all, the degree of abstraction hadactually been increased), the new texts breathed a kind of concrete atmospherewhich encouraged the student to tackle far more difficult problems in a wider

5 S.W.Hawking, G.F.R.Ellis: The Large-Scale Structure of Space-Time, Cambridge University Press, 1973.-C.W.Misner, K.S.Thorne, J.A.Wheeler: Gravitation, Freeman, San Francisco, 1973.- S.Weinberg: Gravitationand Cosmology: Principles and Applications of the General Theory of Relativity. Wiley, New York etc., 1972.6 In Weinbergs book there are two relevant chapters, one on the action principle (ch. 12) including the tetradformalism (12.5), and one on symmetric spaces (ch. 13), respectively, while in the book of Misner, Thorne, andWheeler, these aspects were treated in more detail, as global techniques (sect. 34), and spinors (sect. 41), beingaccompagnied then by other techniques such as Regge calculus, superspace, or pre-geometry (sect. 42sqq.).- Adirect (and fruitful) confrontation of the two could be observed during the 1974 visit of Wheeler to England,related to the historic Oxford symposion on quantum gravity in the spring of that year. Cf. C.J.Isham, R.Penrose,D.W.Sciama (eds): Quantum Gravity. An Oxford Symposium. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975. This volumeincludes a detailed exposition of twistor theory (Penrose, 268-407) and the famous article by G.M.Patton and

J.A.Wheeler: Is Physics Legislated by Cosmogony? (538-605).7 E.T.Newman, R.Penrose: An approach to gravitational radiation by a method of spin coefficients, J.Math.Phys.3, 1962, 566-578.8 R.Adler, M.Bazin, M.Schiffer: Introduction to General Relativity, McGraw-Hill, New York etc., 1965.


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range as had been expected before. And these problems became more and morerelated to a conception which viewed the universe as a unified totality governed

by laws which could be extended in a progressive differentiation into detailedregions of very specific processes, even extending beyond physics, at the same

time.

9

This became even more important when another branch of physics emerged allof a sudden, in a comparatively spontaneous onset of publication (in Englishlanguage). Curiously enough, it started in pure mathematics, and was general-ized in physical chemistry first, before being re-introduced within a wide rangeof possible applications into the field of physics proper: It was the advent of thetheories of self-organization and the formation of structure, introduced first byRen Thom, and by Ilya Prigogine, from two different perspectives. While theformer, in his creation of catastrophe theory, aimed to the modelling of arche-typal germs for some local dynamics, the latter concentrated on the thermody-namical aspect of the maintaining of stable structures far from equilibrium.10Later on, it was recognized that Thom described in fact a special case of modelscontained in the theory of Prigogine, referring to a dynamics of gradient-type,only.11 The important point however was (still a number of years before the im-

pact of chaos theorywas actually fully comprehended) that both of them did nothesitate to extend their basically mathematical and physical arguments to otherdomains of sciences, in particular to those which had not been the topic ofmathematical modelling before. To be more precise, there were two differentaspects of this kind: On the one hand, the range of possible applications was de-

cisively extended. On the other hand, first philosophical implications were beingdiscussed, including a closer look to the practical interactions between scienceand society. Hence, the work of Prigogine gave rise to activities not only in

physics, chemistry, and biology, but also in social science, and in philosophyitself. (In fact, it was Michel Serres who for the first time found a direct connec-tion between philosophy and modern science, which was introduced on-line(soto speak) into the theory of Prigogine in two subsequent works the latter pub-lished together with Isabelle Stengers, a former student of Serres.12) The samedid the work of Thom.13But contrary to the impression one could have won in

9 It was in fact, an intellectual adventure alone, to try the rephrasing of well-known outlines of classical theory interms of both new formalism and style, e.g. when applied to Einsteins theory of unified fields, to KK theory, or

the gauge theory of Weyl. Cf. M.A.Tonnelat: Les thories unitaires de llectromagnetisme et de la gravitation.Gauthiers-Villars, Paris, 1965. (See ch.IV on KK theory, and ch.IX on Weyl theory.) Also id.: Einsteins UnifiedField Theory, Gordon and Breach, New York, 1966. (French ed. at Gauthiers-Villars, Paris, 1955).10 R.Thom: Structural Stability and Morphogenesis, Benjamin, Reading (Mass.), 1975.- I.Prigogine: Vom Seinzum Werden (From Being to Becoming), Piper, Mnchen, 1979.- G.Nicolis, I.Priogine: Self-Organization in

Non-Equilibrium Systems. From Dissipative Structures to Order through Fluctuations. Wiley-Interscience, NewYork etc., 1977.11 R.E.Zimmermann: Ordnung und Unordnung. Zum neueren Determinismusstreit zwischen Thom und Prigo-gine. Lendemains 50, 1988, 60-74.12 I.Prigogine, I.Stengers: Dialog mit der Natur (La nouvelle alliance), Piper, Mnchen, Zrich, 1981.- Id., id.:Das Paradox der Zeit (Time, chaos, and the quantum), Piper, Mnchen, Zrich, 1993.13 Cf. R.Thom: Mathematical Models of Morphogenesis. Ellis-Horwood, Chichester (UK), 1983.- T.Poston,I.Stewart: Catastrophe Theory and its Applications, Pitman, London etc., 1978.


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the beginning, namely that the theory of the latter was nothing but a restrictedversion of Priogines theory of self-organization, in particular with a view to therather unfortunate debate on determinism taking place in France afterwards,there was another point of difference to it: Thom extended not only the domain

of processes to be dealt with by catastrophe theory, but he also extended therange of formal languages pointing to a kind of convergence with other,non-formal types of language. The idea was originally, to develop a kind of lin-guistic theory bound to a semiological approach to meaning in general, withfinding the language of qualitative mathematics at the root of this. 14 It is thisidea in fact, which has secured the value of Thoms theory for the future, and

which enables Thom to visualize his approach as a first approximation to a fu-ture philosophy of nature still to be developed.15 The key volume illustratingsimilar aspects of a possible interaction of philosophy and science, was the col-lection of essays edited by Jantsch and Waddington in 197616: Within the frameof a systematic network of topical references, the above mentioned problemswere combined to give a global panorama of human development. Or to be more

precise: The anthropological roots of science were in the focus of this interdisci-plinary discussion. We could learn about the analogy of self-organization in so-cial systems (Prigogine), or about the self-reproducing aspects of natural au-to-poiesis(Zeleny and Pierre). And of course, we learnt of the relevance of the

principle of resilience, as the correct interpretation of Darwins theory of evolu-tion in terms of natural selection (Holling).17 It was the latter concept in fact,that turned our attention to the classical work of Robert May on ecosystems. 18

(The full implications of this however remained hidden for quite a long while.)At the time of theEinstein centennialhowever, there was still only little contact

between the physics mainstream dealing with relativity and its implications onthe one hand, and non-equilibrium processes of self-organization on the other,although Hawking and Ellis in 1973, actually had referred to (the French versionof) Thoms book stating that (i)t may be that there is some connection between

the singularities studied in General Relativity and those studied in other branch-es of physics (...).

19Three monumental reviews of mainline relativity appearedin 1979, but there was no explicit reference to any change (or extension at least)

of the classical paradigms handed down to us from an epoch prior to the qualita-tive step taken in 1973. Instead, the approaches to quantum gravity had been di-

14 R.Thom: Langage et catastrophes: Elments pour une smantique topologique. In: M.M.Peixoto (ed.), Dy-namical Systems, Academic Press, New York, London, 1973, 619-654.15 R.Thom: Towards a Revival of Natural Philosophy. In: W.Gttinger, H.Eikemeier (eds.), Structural Stabilityin Physics, Springer, Berlin etc., 1979, 5-11. See more recently R.E.Zimmermann: Emergenz und exakte Narra-tion des Welthaften. Zur Naturdialektik aus heutiger Sicht. System & Struktur III/1, 1995, 139-169.16 E.Jantsch, C.H.Waddington (eds.): Evolution and Consciousness. Human Systems in Transition. Addi-son-Wesley, Reading (Mass.), 1976.17 C.S.Holling: Resilience and Stability of Ecosystems. (73-92) - I.Prigogine: Order through Fluctuation:Self-organization and Social System. (93-133) - M.Zeleny, N.A.Pierre: Simulation of Self-Renewing Systems.

(150-165)18 R.M.May: Stability and Complexity of Model Ecosystems. Princeton University Press, 1973.19 Hawking, Ellis, op.cit., 363.- For some of us this was a strong encouragement to actually start looking for thisconnection.


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versified. Hence, in the Cambridge volume20, Brandon Carter e.g., summarizedthe thermodynamical aspects of black holes treating the horizon as a material(which later on led to the membrane paradigm of Kip Thorne), while Chandra-sekhar reviewed the results on the celebrated Kerr metric. But Roger Penrose,

Stephen Hawking, and Steven Weinberg, dealt explicitly with new aspects ofquantum theory within this framework.21While the first two mentioned aboveand most of the other contributions were real reviews in the sense that they weresummarizing recent results, leading not very much beyond what was known in1973 in fact, Penrose and Hawking opened up new perspectives: It was espe-cially Penrose, who with his Weyl curvature hypothesis, began a completely newdiscussion binding together thermodynamics, quantum theory, and the nature ofspace-time singularities. Insofar the theories of self-organization had led to theunderstanding of the difference among various types of singularities, the work ofPenrose made it possible to find reasons for looking for an explicit relationship

between the initial singularity of the universe (as its origin and the onset ofworldly evolution) and the local singularities encountered within the universedue to astrophysical processes, on the one hand, and between these singularitiesand the theory of evolution in thermodynamical terms including the formation ofstructure, on the other. The condition for understanding this was to re-formulatecurves on space-time including their boundary points in terms of a phase spaceassociated in a natural way to space-time itself. Also, a first step was done to-wards the foundation of the universe, in the sense of studying the conditionsnecessary for some primordial structure which eventually could produce the

universe in letting it emerge (such that worldly structures in the empiricalsense would show up as formal derivations of this abstract pre-geometrical enti-ty).22In the Berlin volume23, the philosophical perspective had been extended some-what, and apart from a number of papers dedicated to standard problems or togauge theory24, the philosophical relevance of cosmology was being discussed indetail for the first time.25 Very similar, but without a philosophical reference,

20 S.W.Hawking, W.Israel (eds.): General Relativity. An Einstein Centenary Survey. Cambridge UniversityPress, 1979.21 B.Carter: The general theory of the mechanical, electromagnetic, and thermodynamic properties of blackholes, 294-369.- S.Chandrasekhar: An introduction to the theory of the Kerr metric and its perturbations,370-453.- R.Penrose: Singularities and time-asymmetry, 581-638.- B.S.DeWitt: Quantum gravity: the new syn-thesis, 680-745.- S.W.Hawking: The path-integral approach to quantum gravity, 746-789.- S.Weinberg: Ultravi-olet divergences in quantum theories of gravitation, 790-831.22 I have summarized some of these aspects myself in: The Anthropic Cosmological Principle. PhilosophicalImplications of Self-Reference. In: J.L.Casti, A.Karlquist (eds.), Beyond Belief, Randomness, Prediction, andExplanation in Science, CRC Press, Boca Raton etc., 1991, 14-54. See also my: Self-Reference. On the Generic

Non-linearity of Nature. Phil. Nat. 27 (2), 1990, 272-297.23 H.Nelkowski et al. (eds.): Einstein Symposion Berlin, Springer (Lecture Notes in Physics 100), Berlin etc.,1979.24 Cf.e.g. B.Zumino: Supersymmetry. A Way to the Unitary Field Theory. (114-127)(Including a reference toKK theory, in fact.)- J.Wess: Methods of Differential Geometry in Gauge Theories and Gravitational Theories.(233-244)25 B.Kanitscheider: Die philosophische Relevanz der Kosmologie, 336-357.


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was the situation within the two Princeton volumes. 26 Hence, for quite sometime, there were two more or less isolated strings of development running paral-lel to each other with a certain amount of convergence, but without really com-ing into contact. Some of the outstanding books, collecting a large number of

important results in their own right, did not change this situation at all.

27

Butinstead, the time of twistorswas dawning.The twistor concept of Penrose was in fact the natural generalization of whathad been learned before, on the relationships between space-time structure andevolution in the thermodynamical sense, and with a view to the possible founda-tion of the universe on a pre-geometric structure existing in a sense (logically)

prior to the universe. The basic idea of twistors, as introduced end of the sixties,and particularly in a volume of collected essays on combinatorial methods edit-ed by Ted Bastin28, rooted in the concept of spin networks. Penrose tried tore-construct space-time from combinatorial elements of structure, basically con-sisting of a network of abstract particles interacting only by exchanging theirrespective spin numbers, without referring to any background metric. Geometricconcepts such as angles among principle directions of space could be approxi-mated then by simply condensing the underlying network. Twistors werenothing but a generalization of this approach in order to actually include morecomplicated (and thus more real) particles having also momentum and total

angular momentum under relativistic conditions.It was not before 1986 however, that the master piece on twistors had been fin-ished by Penrose and Rindler.29(I am not sure whether Penrose would himself

judge it as a master piece today, but it was one indeed, and the subsequent workhas confirmed this beyond any doubt.30) Of course, Wheeler and others had dis-cussed the possibility of pre-geometrybefore, thinking of a straightforward re-alization of Einsteins vision. And the idea of superspace had been born. But, in

a sense, the American approach appeared to be too qualitative (if not intuitive),and it did not couple immediately to the problem of unifying general relativityand quantum theory, if not in the interior of the world, then exterior to it. Andthe spinor picture of space-time was well established about that time. Insofar astwistor space showed up as a product of spin space and its dual, it was a kind of

systematic revelation of how to interpret the condensation of spin networks inorder to define something like a formal foundation of space-time-matter (be-cause for the self-dual case, pieces of space and time as well as elementary par-26 A.Held (ed.): General Relativity and Gravitation. 2 vols., Plenum, New York, London, 1980.- Cf.e.g. StanleyDeser (I 357-392) and Ferrara and van Nieuwenhuizen (I 557-585) on supergravity, Tipler et al. on singularitiesand horizons (II 97-206), and Penrose and Ward on twistors (II 283-328).27 Cf.e.g. F.P.Esposito, L.Witten (eds.): Asymptotic Structure of Space-Time, Plenum, New York, London,1977, with important contributions by Geroch on asymptotic structure (1-105), Parker on particle production bystrong gravitational fields (107-226), and Ko, Newman, and Tod on H-space theory (227-271).- AlsoP.G.Bergmann, V. DeSabbata (eds.): Cosmology and Gravitation, Plenum, New York, London, 1980, with con-tributions by E.T.Newman on complex manifolds (275-285) and R.Penrose on twistors (287-316). Probably, the

latter paper is the most concise and clear contribution to the understanding of twistor theory.28 T.Bastin (ed.): Quantum theory and beyond, Cambridge University Press, 1971.29 R.Penrose, W.Rindler: Spinors and Space-Time, 2 vols., Cambridge University Press, 1984, 1986.30 See e.g. R.S.Ward, R.O.Wells jr.: Twistor Geometry and Field Theory, Cambridge University Press, 1990.


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ticles could be produced without referring to a classical background space). In-dependent of the further development (in particular, of the fact that loops andknots appear by now as a generic generalization of spin networks, but (perhaps)not twistors), the twistor concept, including Newmans heaven theory as a spe-

cial case, was a first clear step towards telling the history of the origin of theuniverse as its foundation, and as an explication of the emergence of the relativ-ity view, and of the quantum view, respectively, at the same time.

*

So what is the intention of this present paper now, with a view to what we havesaid so far? In fact, other topics have emerged by now that govern the main-stream discussions today, in particular strings(including M-theory), loops, andknots ( there are about 400 papers in the hep-th and gr-qc sections of the LosAlamos preprint archives per month, about a quarter of them referring to quan-tum gravity, of which roughly 90% deal with either string theory or loop theory(in a division of about 3:1) such that most of the string papers appear in thehep-thsection, most of the other papers in thegr-qcsection31). But it is still thetwistor concept which has the privilege of having founded the first contact to aclassical line of philosophy.During all the progress made in the understanding of the physical foundations ofthe universe, mainstream philosophy has stood aside all the time. While beingengaged in either historical problems of its own field, or in the re-phrasing of

everyday language in logical terms in order to eventually extract a meaning fromwhere no meaning was actually being expected, philosophy missed the connec-tion to innovations in science. Ironically, those who worked in the field whichwas traditionally associated to questions of speculative physics in the sense ofSchelling, and to the materialistic turn of this approach, looking forward to a

possible foundation of the world in scientific terms, were at the same time thosewho (due to reasons related to their social and political theory) not only criti-cized (or censured rather) the progress made by science, but even neglected theactual development deliberately (so that very soon their arguments missed the

mark in first place). Hence, nowadays, very near to the millennium, a philoso-phy of nature in the traditional sense has almost disappeared, exactly at a timewhen it is most needed.

It is probably an illustrating example to look at volume 31/2 of the journal Philosophia

naturalis which is one of the leading journals of its kind in Germany (though it is understoodas being an international journal, in fact, publishing both in German and English). This second

part of the volume appeared in 1994 and was dedicated to problems of space and time in gen-eral, and especially to cosmology. There are eight papers in the collection of this volume: Lu-ciano Boi discusses the relationship between Riemanns conceptions of a dynamical geometry

and his ideas about the philosophy of nature, William Craig and Adolf Grnbaum continue31 These dates have been collected meritoriously, by Carlo Rovelli, cf. his GR 15 lecture in Poona, gr-qc9803024.


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their debate about the question whether the universe has necessarily been created or not ac-cording to indications given by cosmology, Thomas Arzt discusses the interests of Pauli, es-

pecially with a view to his contact with C.G.Jung, Axel Ziemke deals with aspects of theneuro-biology of perception, Andreas Bartels refers to Earmans concept of absolute space,and Claus Kiefer finally, discusses quantum gravity. Except Ziemkes contribution, which

falls into biology rather than into the field of the main topic discussed here, all the other con-tributions are of a decidedly unsatisfactory type:Boi talks about basically old points which arewell-known for quite a while (except perhaps that the philology applied to extract these re-sults is comparatively new). As the most important insight into Riemannhe visualizes that themetric structure of a space is represented as a given state (or as he says equivalently: as atype of being) of matter, i.e. the metric structure is in a causality relation with the state of

matter.32Neither is this a very new insight in fact, nor is the terminology used very clearly.

It is actually the fact of knowing what might be meant by the author what makes a conceptualcritique of this formulation possible at all, because otherwise one could not extract a propermeaning from this relationship between states of matter on the one hand, and causality, on theother. There are several of similarly unclear passages, and we would not like to comment on

them any further. But it is interesting to note that a discussion which primarily refers to as-pects of substance metaphysics, mentions Herbart, but not Schelling. Instead of pointing tothe fact that Riemann might have anticipated Husserl and Cassirer, it would be more straight-forward to reflect about the influence of Schelling onto Riemann. It is in fact the philosophyof Schelling which anticipates numerous (philosophical) problems modern physics encoun-tered not only during the 19th century, but also during our own century. (Note that it is actu-ally Ziemke who explicitly refers to Schelling! And he even knows of the important work ofCamilla Warnke of the late seventies.33) Craig and Grnbaumengage on a debate about thetheological implications of the Big Bang.34This may be interesting in its own right, but thequestion is what the philosophy of nature has actually to do with it. An error of category is

probably the least one could state in order to object to this debate in such a journal. And in-deed, even in philosophical terms, the arguments presented are obviously rather off-shore:Craig insists that the origin of the universe is actually prior to the Big Bang (which iswell-known). Unfortunately, with respect to a cause of the universe, he continues: From thenature of the cause involved, that cause must have transcended space and time (...) and there-fore be uncaused, changeless, eternal, immaterial, and enormously powerful (himself). He

clearly describes the properties of substance (which in modern terminology can be defined asnon-being in the sense of a field of possibilities, or of a potentiality, out of which actualityeventually may emerge. But he does not use this standard concept, but postulates instead thatsuch a cause be (most plausibly, he says) a personal agent.35 And he concludes, like it ornot (!), cosmological theory ... does lend tangible support to the theistic doctrine of creatio ex

nihilo. This is in fact inconsistent, but, apart from that, do we have to read that in such ajournal?36 As Craig states on Grnbaum discussing Craig: If God exists, why could He not

32 L.Boi: Die Beziehungen zwischen Raum, Kontinuum und Materie im Denken Riemanns; die thervorstellungund die Einheit der Physik. Das Entstehen einer neuen Naturphilosophie. Phil. Nat. 31 (2), 1994, 171-216. Here:188.33 C.Warnke: Systemdenken und Dialektik in Schellings Naturphilosophie. In: H.Bergmann et al. (eds.),Dialektik und Systemdenken, Historische Aspekte, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin (Ost = DDR), 1977, 99-146.34 W.L.Craig: Creation and Big Bang Cosmology, 217-224, A.Grnbaum: Some Comments on William CraigsCreation and Big Bang Cosmology, 225-236, W.L.Craig: A Response to Grnbaum, On Creation and BigBang Cosmology, 237-249.35Ibid. 219.- In note 4 (p. 222) he adds: I mean that it is false that something existed prior to the singularity. Is

non-being nothing(ness)?36 It is interesting to learn that Grnbaum also discusses god and the world in a seemingly respectable volume ofcollected essays edited by B.Falkenburg and L.Krger (eds.): Physik, Philosophie und die Einheit derWissenschaft, BI Mannheim, 1995.


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cause momentary effects which are not events in the GTR sense of the word?37 Yes, whycouldnt he?

38 - Arztgives a historical account of the contact between Pauli and Jung, dis-cussing especially the unity of one world.39 This account is consistent and mentions the inter-esting semiological aspect of the role of symbolics for the unity of the world. (It is only un-fortunate that the author cannot abstain from reproducing the very questionable quotation of

Whitheads that occidental philosophy would be nothing than a series of footnotes to Plato.This quotation had a very negative impact on the ideas British (and American) scientists oftenhave about the uniqueness of Platonic philosophy. In fact, we will come back to this pointlater.)Bartelshas the word substance metaphysics in his title even. 40But he does not actu-ally deal with this topic. What he does instead is to discuss Earmans concept of absolute

space based on a modified Leibniz argument (as Bartels calls it) designed in order to refutethe position of Leibniz in his debate with Lockes follower Clarke. Although it may be inte r-esting in its own right to continue this discussion in one way or the other, it is not very usefulfrom the outset (I think), to deal with this debate in such a journal. Also, the author confoundsvarious forms of substance and their meaning, going back to Aristotle e.g., in order to discusshis topic. But he does not get the concept of substance quite right altogether, which is mainly

due to the fact that he leaves out Spinoza. (This is actually also true for the other authorsdealing with a philosophical context.)41 Finally, Kiefer discusses quantum gravity.42This isin fact, the only contribution of this volume which is eactly to the point. Kiefer is an out-standing, young scientist, well-known in his field. Unfortunately, he diminishes the quality ofhis works by being very ideological as far as the relevance of quantum theory is concerned.So he begins by stating that it is actually quantum theory which governs the picture of theworld we have today. Only gravitation would stand aside (or stand back?). And for him, theuniverse as a whole can only be understood within the frame of a theory of quantum cosmol-ogy. But he mentions string theory (without any doubt on thehep-th sideof science, but withgeneralizing aspects in fact) only in passing. And when discussing loop theory and knots, heforgets to mention that this approach is actually completely on the gr-qc side(which meansthat it is working completely without any background space in being based on generalizedspin networks). He also quotes Penrose as a witness for the breakdown of classical theory, butnot as a witness for twistor theory which is actually also based on the same concept of spinnetworks as loops are. Indeed, his example for the regulation of divergences can exactly beinterpreted as a case which demonstrates that gravity is more fundamental than anything else.But it does not follow necessarily that this fundamental gravity must be a quantumgravity.Hence: Only one paper (15 pages out of roughly 150 = 10%) is to the point (though we canargue about it). Most of the text (Boi, the Craig/Grnbaum debate, Bartels = 90 pages = 60%)is not to the point (and also very unclear, to say the least). One paper does not belong to thissection (Ziemke = 20%), and one is acceptable if viewed in historical terms (Arzt 10%). So

far the characterization of the philosophy of nature in Germany and in some other places.

The result is that physicists more and more often tend to create their own philo-sophical approach. On the one hand, this is basically a good idea, but on theother hand, it carries its intrinsic dangers: The problem is that for most of the

37 Phil. Nat., op.cit., 238.38 In ending, Craig threatens the following: I plan to develop all these points in a forthcoming book entitledGod, Time, and Eternity. (Ibid. 243)39 T.Arzt: Unus Mundus: DieEine Welt. Ibid., 250- 262.40 A.Bartels: Von Einstein zu Aristoteles. Raumzeit-Philosophie und Substanz-Metaphysik. Ibid., 293-308.41 Finally, the author ends with the statement: Modern philosophy of nature is not popularized science, but

philosophical reflexion under conditions of modern science. (Ibid. 306) This is not very mysterious, but actual-ly, as a result, it appears rather trivial instead.42 C.Kiefer: Probleme der Quantengravitation. Ibid., 309-327.


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British and Anglo-American authors, philosophy is more or less the same as thetheory of Plato (which they usually do not know very well though). It is veryrare indeed that physicists deal with other philosophers such as Leibniz e.g. indetail (and in a sufficiently consistent way). Probably, Lee Smolin, Louis

Kauffman, Julian Barbour, and some others are honourable exceptions here.And of course, the reference to Whitehead is very popular in English-speakingcountries. But it is less popular to discuss the consistency of the foundationsleading to Whiteheads theory. In fact, the necessity to deal with philosophical

problems of physics has been recognized for quite a while, but the approach tosuch problems is not well founded, especially because of the literaryone-sidedness just mentioned. The main point is that it is decidedly inappropri-ate to deal with philosophical problems of modern physics in terms of ancienttheories who could not be properly adapted to a modern environment. Either onerefers to modern philosophy then, or one refers (even better) to modern philos-ophy in view of the developmentwhich has actually produced it. Hence, the the-ory of Leibniz is not actually anticipating developments in science, being inter-esting therefore to be dealt with today, but it is its structural viewpoint and itsfurther development during the last two centuries as well as the more recentdiscussions (including Mach, Einstein, Reichenbach and others) that make it in-teresting for a philosophy which deals with modern physics. (The theories ofAugustinus and Thomas of Aquinas e.g., though full of brilliant ideas in theirown right, cannot offer anything comparable.43)It is nevertheless more appropriate, as we shall see later, to substitute the line

Leibniz-Hegelby the alternative line of Spinoza-Schelling: This is not simply avariation of the perspective taken, but this line is also part of a longer traditionthat actually dealt with the foundation of the totality of the world, and with itsrelationship to the latters evolution, in first place, originating in fact, as early as

in the time of the Greek Stoa, and extending into the year 1975, when the Ger-man philosopher Ernst Bloch published his final main work on the experiment

of the world (Experimentum Mundi). This is actually one thing we will do inthis present paper: to re-trace the structural development of this traditional lineof thought in the philosophy of nature, and to re-connect it with the recent de-

velopments in modern science. This will be the topic of the chapters II and III,the former giving a brief outline of approaches by stoic philosophers, by Aver-roes, Bruno, and Spinoza, up to the theories of Schelling and Bloch, the lattersummarizing the relationship between philosophy and science, as we see it to-day, discussing then the modern implications of this with a view to recent de-velopments in physics. What we will find is that the general idea underlying allthe conceptions on the line to be discussed is mainly based on fundamental as-

pects of what is called substance metaphysics. And this is the reason for theaforementioned privilege of twistor theory: that it provides a first, formal anal-

43 Hence, although the pledge for metaphysics staged by B.M.McCoy recently, is to be welcomed in principle, itdoes not really help to imply that these comparatively ancient philosophers had a direct influence on the devel-opment of modern science. (hep-th 9609160)


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ogy for what substance in this sense could actually mean for us today.But we will also deal with the following: In the meantime, a new, third string ofdevelopment has come into contact with the two other lines (of space-time

physics and chaos theory, respectively) mentioned here: This is the theory of the

physical foundations of consciousness, which points to a unified theory of phys-ics and logic, at the same time. The point is that when visualized itself as aproduct of nature, consciousness must not only have physics at its root, but thekind of thinking which it produces itself must be bound in one way or another tothat of what it is product. This is nothing but a consequence of the philosophicalline discussed here, which actually leads to what we call a transcendental mate-rialism, in the sense that thinking itself is just one (though very complex) formof that matter which is there from the beginning on. Seen this way, physicalmatter evolves to a high degree of complexity actually producing matter systemswhose characteristic activity (as their mode of being) is nothing but to think.Hence, this thinking has to be adapted from the outset to about what is beingthought, in fact. This is one important point to be discussed in further detailhere. The other point is that necessarily, because this is a primarily evolutionaryview, the sort of thinking as we know it (that is, as humans actually do apply it)cannot be the final stage of development: The universe being still comparativelyyoung, there is still time for many things to come. This introduces a kind of ra-tional modesty into the discussion, because it will probably not be humans afterall who participate in the shaping of the final stages of this universe.Consequently, some of the chief protagonists of the seventies and eighties have

left their old fields, at least to a certain extent, in order to work on more promis-ing topics. Penrose in particular, has concentrated on an explicit relationship

between fundamental physics and the theory of consciousness.44Unfortunately,contrary to his earlier works, his two recent books on consciousness suffer a lit-tle from the fact that he belongs apparently to the Platonic adherents. But thestrong resonance to his books and to the debate following the Tucson II discus-sion of the Penrose-Hameroff model of consciousness demonstrate the wide-spread interest in this topic. We will deal with this aspect within the discussionof a number of approaches which do not only change the relationship between

physics and logic, and physics and the science of consciousness (or cognitivescience as it is usually referred to), respectively, but which shed also a new lighton the relationship between physics and mathematics (being perhaps of evenmore importance). In this sense, we will briefly outline the conceptions present-ed more recently by Trifonov and by Tegmark, respectively. This will be topicof the chapters IV and V. We discuss then aspects of a true evolutionary the o-ry of the universe, based on philosophical motivations of Darwinian type (as-sociated with the mentioned Leibniz-Hegel line), presented by Smolin, referredto as cosmological natural selection. This will be the topic of chapter VI. We

will also refer to other recent developments within these chapters so as to secure44 R.Penrose: The Emperors New Mind, 1989, and: Shadows of the Mind, 1994, both at Oxford UniversityPress.


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the connection to what we discussed above and left in the mid-eighties with thewindingup of twistor theory.Finally, as a preliminary entry into the future development of a self-consistent

philosophy of nature under conditions of modern science, we will list systematic

aspects of a theory which will take into account that both physics and cognitivescience can only be sufficiently consistent in their own right, if their mutual re-lationship is founded on a unified (and in fact, historically unfolding) basis, in-cluding both ontological as well as epistemological concepts. This is the placewhere theKlymene principlewill be introduced, as a methodological conventionwhich facilitates the handling of intertwined historical processes of the men-tioned kind. A first list of onto-epistemicaspects is given in chapter VII, and asecond list is given of what may serve as a new organonof philosophy resultingfrom the discussion here, in chapter VIII. - But two additional remarks are inorder: The ansatz displayed does not solve all problems in the sense of giving akind of generalized TOE. Instead, it serves only as a rough draft to be filled out

by forthcoming work. And in this sense, it can be understood as exerting a criti-cal amount of heuristic pressure acting on the future development of scientific

models. On the other hand, having eventually achieved a systematic outline of aclosed model of the world, this does not keep us from having to work out all ofthe details: The point is simply that understanding the physical foundations ofneuro-physiology will not help in understanding what thinking actually means inone case or the other, in the same way as understanding the physical foundationsof oscillations does not help in understanding what music actually means in one

or the other composition.But finally, it is still far from clear whether the models displayed here do actu-ally have that universal relevance which is usually granted without mentioning.Hence, it is the problem of intercultural stability in fact, that is discussed inchapter IX, in order to look for explicit criteria that might define anthropic in-variants underlying systems of concepts similar to those which are known in

cosmology. Not unlike the latter, far from what an anthropic principle in thestrong sense would suggest, they could at best be expected to give a consistencyframework for thinking itself, connected to the very definition of what human

life actually means rather than providing a mechanistic sort of scheme accordingto which thinking could be classified as a static property. The basic idea is thatonce philosophy is interpreted as following up the results of science, then whatis actually being thought about in philosophy should have a unified root in whatis a structurally stable result in science, because all humans inhabit the sameworld. Hence, up to local variations, there should be a class of isomorphic pic-tures of the world of universal type. And also, one would expect a respectiveclass of languages which are compatible in the sense of being able to map these

pictures up to isomorphy. In terms of the perspective chosen here, it may be

possible to save the concept ofAchsenzeit (axial time = axial epoch) introducedby Jaspers, and to rescue it from racist connotations which were not being in-tended at the time, but which nowadays can be interpreted as a residue of the


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colonial age when one used to divide humans into hierarchically ordered classesof more or less developed cultural sections. Instead, the meaning of Achsenzeitcan be vindicated now in terms of a generalized concept which serves as aguideline for language criteria within a unified hermeneutic of communication.

In this sense, such a hermeneutic is not much different from a hermeneutic ofnature which is the object of modern materialistic theory. Hence, such a hu-manization of nature and naturalization of the humans (Marx) may be taken

as a starting point for improving the interaction between humans and nature onthe one hand, and among humans on the other. And this is explored briefly inchapter X which also provides an outlook of how to actually proceed.

II. The General Line of Thought

A. The Stoic Foundation

I follow here the systematic structure of Forschners book which can be thought

of as a standard text on the structure of stoic ethics. 45Note oncemore that (forreasons of conciseness) in this section as well as in the following sections Bthrough F, we concentrate on basic, structural aspects of the respective theoriesonly.

1. The Main Problem

Given a world which can be perceived as a multitude of diverse objects, the firstquestion for the perceiving subject must necessarily be the question for its own

position within this multitude. This means to look for the structures constitutingthis multitude and to ask for the becoming of these structures, and for the be-coming of the subject itself within a worldly environment as it is defined interms of these structures. In other words: The basic problem is to explain whatthe concept of unity can actually mean, given the fact that the perceived multi-

tude can be observed within one and the same world. A related problem then, isto decide whether actual reality as it can be observed by a subject (including itsown, personal reality) is objective in the sense that one such subject is able toeventually establish a consentient discourse with other subjects about observa-tions made. If so, the question remains whether what is topic of a consensus is

practically nothing but what there actually is, or whether there are deep, under-lying structures of an elementary type which cannot, in principle, be observed atall. Hence, the question is that for the relationship between being and non-being,or, alternatively, between (modal) world and (real) substance. And it is the basic

definition and systematic foundation of such elementary concepts that actually45 M.Forschner: Die stoische Ethik, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft Darmstadt, 2nd ed. 1995 (originallyKlett-Cotta, Stuttgart, 1981 = Habilitation thesis 1979/80).


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triggers the onset of philosophizing.

2. The Principle of Logos

Basically, stoic theory visualizes substance as a dynamical entity such that it isitself in motion and develops in a fashion comparable to an organism, whichimplies that it is governed by an autonomous organizational principle of produc-tion inducing a specific organic structure and a characteristic processuality ofthe worldly constitution including a mapping of this very processuality to amodel of understanding. Hence, substance itself is onto-epistemically constitut-ed, and processes actually taking place in the world have a structure which con-tains explicit traces of this constitution. There are two worldly principles whichexpress the action of substance as being mediated within the network of local

processes actually taking place. One is the principle of passive suffering, thehyle, the other is the principle of active production, the logos. The latter can bedefined in the gestalt of a creative fire (pyr technikn) which penetrates all whatthere is. In that case it is referred to as pneumathen, and this is what stabilizesthe organic unity of the material universe in binding its parts together by an el-ementary sympathy (or affinity) on which communication and interdependenceof the parts within the whole are actually founded. At the same time, it is thedifferentiated intensity and quality of thepneumaacting on the different parts ofthe hylewhat is responsible for the fact that there is a definite hierarchical or-dering of what exists. The highest level of this hierarchy is achieved when

pneumais condensed to become pure logos.46So obviously,pneumais a kind ofdegradedlogossuch that the hierarchy implies an evaluation which assigns ex-

plicit values (in moral terms) to given positions in this hierarchy. An intensity ofthe aforementioned kind can be expressed in terms of a specific pneumatic ten-sion (tnos aerdes) which is nothing but a quantitative measure for balancedmixtures of the four elements of the material world (air, fire, water, earth) whichat the same time characterizes a given form qualitatively. Hence, there is alreadythe idea of a direct correspondence between quantity and quality. A concrete

body or object therefore, constitutes itself by a concentration, unification, and

circumscription of a selected number of pneumatic forces producing a field ofinteractions which penetrates in terms of a spatial as well as temporal continuum

parts of matter and contracts it to a relatively stable and homogeneous object. Ina way, we can state that stoic theory has actually invented the concept of forcefields.47

3. The Onto-Epistemic System: Physics & Logic46Ibid., 56.47Ibid., 58.


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Typically, the logos represents the actual law according to which all what hap-pens is constituted, and in this sense it combines the concept of a natural lawwith a normative meaning. In particular, the order exhibited by social systems is

interpreted as a direct consequence of a cosmic, fundamental law. Viceversa, thelaws of nature are interpreted according to the model of legal order. Hence, theepistemological problem is one of founding this unity and totality on anall-encompassing ground such that it is possible to derive (so to speak) the mul-titude of varying objects in the world as the explicit unfolding of some potentialwhich is inherent in this foundation. It is thus necessary to systematically deter-mine the unity of the world within a framework of manifold appearances andmotions, and also to ask for the source of this dialectically mediated process. Ina way, the difference of hyle and logos is expressed therefore in terms of theconceptual differentiation between the ontological entity and its semantic repre-sentation. It is interesting to note that the desire for giving a consistent founda-tion for both the legally ordered structure of the world, and also for its adequatedescription and comprehension due to immanent criteria which are themselves

products of this very process, coincides with the retreating of mythology in an-cient Greece. This leads to the emergence of a completely new perspective withrespect to the legitimation of knowledge about the world, because its relevancefor social praxis is not trivially secured anymore. (This is probably at least onesource of the permanent ressentiment since then, as far as philosophical concep-tions are concerned when being offered to the general public, because the so-

berness of rational philosophy generally lacks that kind of self-securingre-insurance which mythology could originally provide with emotional ease.)The actual constitution of the pneumatic structures is called hxiswhich charac-terizes the quality and quantity of a field of force for some object. Within thestate of perfection, the set of given hexeisrepresents the actual virtues associatedwith such a material state. The objective is thus to achieve blissful happiness(eudaimona) by stabilizing virtues and bringing the own actions in line withthem.48Note hence, that no a prioridifferentiation between physical objects andacting (human) beings is made as far as the classification of virtues is con-

cerned! Another important aspect is the close relationship between the ontologi-cal state and its epistemological representing by means of a direct mapping ofepistemic elements into a differentiated theory of language. (Remember thatZenon, the founder of the stoic school, is also the inventor of the first standardgrammar which we still use today in a modified form handed down to us by theRomans.) This approach to language approximates modern semiology in refer-ring basic definitions such as those for specific types of propositions,

predicational strategies, and logical rules, to the explicit sign-structure of sym-bolic communication. Note that according to stoic theory, a correlation between

language and reality is possible, because language is itself a part of reality.

48Ibid., 64sq.


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Hence, there is an actual isomorphism between linguistic and non-linguistic en-tities. In this sense, it is ptsiswhich is the meaning of the grammatical subjectwhile kategremais the meaning of the grammatical predicate which bound to-gether by the copula constitute the practical meaning of a proposition (axoma).

The latter is the intension of a sentence, the idea which is actually being ex-pressed, or the contents of the expression (prgma). Based on modern encoun-ters with language, developed in the philosophy of the 19th century, but refer-ring themselves to this original stoic systematic, we still use this conventionalsetting in phrasing propositions of the form A = B, even when applying it toformal languages such as mathematics. Basically, a theory in this sense is noth-ing but a set of propositions of this form obeying a certain number of rules.49Hence, what we actually have here is a close connection between the three basiccomponents of stoic theory: physics, logic, and ethics, such that the problem isto comprehend the world (as given by physics) so correct and consistent as pos-sible by means of a straightforward application of logic which is nothing but an-other product of the same underlying physics. The capability of gainingknowledge about the world at all is obviously secured by this fact such that re-sults of any (correct and consistent) reflexion are isomorphic to the constitution-al aspects of the world. Once, an appropriate picture of the world is achieved interms of the logic provided, adequate actions to be undertaken are well-defined,

provided the criterion is this very constitution of nature. In this sense, all threemain components of the theory, physics, logic, and ethics, are operating on thesame (ontological) level of the world, and their character is thus of an intrinsi-

cally objective, say, scientific, type.

4.Ethics

Now, if there is a cosmic sympathy which shows up as the fundamental bindingforce in the world, and if ethics works on the same level as ontology (mapped to

physics) and epistemology (mapped to logic) do, then it is straightforward toexpect that this global sympathy can be differentiated down into the smallestregions of daily praxis. If moreover, hyle and logos represent two types of

worldly activities, the former referring to a principle of passivity, the latter toone of activity, then this implies that there can be a choice of alternative types of

being for any member of the worldly community, e.g. for a member of the socialsystem. Hence, there is afreedomof choicefor humans. And there is an intrinsicexistential problem humans have to solve: namely to base their explicit choiceon principles they have derived from their knowledge about the world achievedso far. And still more: If the principle of activity is preferred (as the principle oflogos), then living according to nature (kat physein) refers to a nature whichis primarily producing (active) nature, permanently creating new forms within

the world. Consequently, an appropriate life (according to nature) should be one

49Ibid., 73sq.


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of permanent innovation. But, obviously, there is a contradiction between (hu-man-made) legal normativity and the laws of nature. And also, due to the dif-ferent states of knowledge achieved by one or the other, it is not quite clear howthe relation between the two should be valued. So, the main problem is to actu-

ally overcome this contradiction. And this can only be achieved in terms ofstudying the properties of nature in their totality, of studying ones own relationsto nature and to the social system, and of communicating the results to others inorder to establish a consentient discourse.The important point is that one has to start from oneself: It is only the correct

utilization of my imaginations which is within my discretion, nothing else.50

This is the basic rule to begin with. On the other hand, it is secured that I havethe possibility at all to do so, because there is already, from the beginning on, acharacteristic relationship of the human being to itself (due to the concept ofoikeisis). 51 The logos is actually providing a freedom of consent(synkatthesis), which shows up as a special case of the general freedom ofchoice: It depends on what has been recognized as virtue according to a perma-nent reflexion of our perceptions and cognitions, in particular, of ourself-perceptions and self-cognitions. Hence, reality is the continuous motion ofmatter(which leads by the way to the fact that the extension of cosmic motion istime - such that it is the temporality of the worldly what gives the processualframe for human reflexion and action, respectively). And in terms of physics,objects cannot be separated from their determinations. But in terms of language,this is possible.52So, ethics can be actually developed within a physical frame-

work which defines the space of free play for practical actions, itsrecognizability being guaranteed by a balanced interplay of physics and logic onthe one hand, and logic and ethics, on the other. Situative synkatthesis is thegoal for a consistent succession of single actions, pointing forward to an existen-tial conception developed in more detail by Sartre and others within a modern

perspective of French philosophy. The spontaneous shining forth of a possiblefuture within products of nature still to come is not excluded when listing the

possibilities for actually gaining consistent information about the world, thuspointing forward to an ontology of the not-yet-being in the sense of Bloch.

Hence, the morally good is provided by nature itself which according to the te-los-formula of Chrysippos gives the final standard for human action. This is thereason why only the morally good is actually good (mnon t kaln agathn)

as the stoic guiding principle states.

Note finally that there is always the difficulty of consistently dealing with the problem of de-termination which lurks in the background of global systematics of the kind presented here inthe case of the Stoa: Forschner himself formulates that a theory which makes the process of

the world globally as well as in all local details to a lawful process of explicating a unique anddivine substance, can hardly associate a consistent meaning to the concept of moral freedom

50Ibid., 112.51Ibid., 146.52Ibid., 79, 81.


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and responsibility.53But this is not necessarily true, because the system is not a static one,

even substance itself is not visualized in terms of an absolute and intrinsically non-dynamicalstructure. It is however acting from beyond space and time, because otherwise it could not

possibly be a substance, but nevertheless it is generating a space of free play for futureworldly processes including human actions. In so far, it is not determining the single events to

be taking place, but it defines a worldly dynamic instead which exhibits the empirical tracesof what cannot be comprehended in empirical terms otherwise. Hence, the responsibility of asingle human is to consistently operate within the boundaries provided for by this space offree play. Freedom of choice means freedom according to given necessities and given possi-

bilities which are left open for further innovative development. This is not a theory of deter-minism in the strict, mechanical sense. It is rather a very modern dialogue between rando m-ness and necessity, very much in the sense of our chaos theory today, or in terms of social

philosophy, very much in the sense of Sartrean existentialism: Become what you are!

B. Averroes

In contrary to the stoic movement in ancient Greece and Rome, the Arab re-ception of European philosophy is mainly based on Aristotelian theory (includ-ing a number of neo-platonic and other ideas flowing in from falsely attributedclassical texts).54The beginning of this reception is usually attributed to a phi-losopher of the 9th century, Al-Kindi, who lived in Bagdad. He mainly dealtwith the problem of the relationship between body and soul, but also discussedthe category of infinity. In contrary to Aristotle himself, he postulates a dualism

between the finite region of the wordly and the infinite region of God. For him,the world is a true creatio ex nihilo corresponding to the thesis derived fromthe Koran. Matter so created is something passive (in the Aristotelian sense)which needs some external influence to gain distinct qualities. But for Al-Kindi,different from Aristotelian conception, substrate and form as well as potentialityand actuality, cannot be separated from each other. It is some time later thatAl-Farabi continues this discussion trying to adapt the Aristotelian system to theIslam in re-interpreting a crucial passage on creation (Koran, s.30, v.26) suchthat not nothingness is the foundation of the world, but some entity acting as a

potential for the world to be created. But it is not before Avicenna (Ibn Sina), a

student of Al-Farabi, begins his work that the relationship between possibilityand actuality is clarified in more detail. First of all, Avicenna differs between the

53Ibid., 113.54Note that the history of the reception of Aristotles texts is very complex indeed: Originally stored in ancientSyria, in order to save them in times of war and unrest, they were eventually sold to the Roman Lukullus whoforgot about them. Their contents was taught in an ancient Syrian language badly known to the Arabs of six,seven centuries later, emerging from the Arab peninsula. Nevertheless, the nucleus of Aristotles theory servedas a modern epistemological instrument in the development of a philosophy based on the principles of the Islamwhich provided the basis for what is generally referred to as the Golden Age of Arab Thinking, encompassingmainly the original Arab countries, including Mesopotamia, as well as Spain, where a very fruitful, interdisci-

plinary and intercultural science and philosophy emerged. It is not before the advent of scholastic theory in Eu-

rope, especially developed by Thomas of Aquinas, that this Arab version of Aristotelian theory comes to light incentral Europe. At last, the original texts of Aristotle are recovered again. But while greeting this theoreticalinflow as a progress, Thomas is later obliged to modify and to actually re-transform Arab theory in order to beable to secure compatibility with Christian dogmatism.


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necessary existence which is origin of itself (causa sui), and possible existencewhich needs a cause external to itself. Hence, the former is the immanent causein God himself, the latter the worldly entity which is determined by other enti-ties.The actual dator formarum giving essence to worldly objects (and thus to

worldly existence) is the intellectus agens, the highest form of intelligence al-ready introduced in a hierarchy of activities invented by Al-Farabi earlier. It is infact this intellectus which, once it is achieved by humans, opens up the way backto their divine origin, because through it they can learn to participate in theknowledge of God. Hence, the process of becoming has a basically cyclic struc-ture, and it is indeed matterwhich is the underlying, dynamical principle of this

process. In this sense, matter appears as a creative principle of multitude. Andalthough both matter and form are universalia for human knowledge, they can-not be properly separated, hence the close interaction between ontological beingand epistemological reflecting this being (reflexion being appropriatelyexpressend in terms of language). Matter is thus eternal entity (as principle ac-cording to original (primordial) being), but in worldly terms it gains temporality,and worldly objects are being constituted in terms of this temporal matter. Infact, Avicenna opens the discussion here, for differing between the (God-like)substantial perspective of eternal things and the worldly perspective of temporalthings. (In many discussions today, this difference is still a problem, namely indifferentiating between internal and external observers, which corresponds totwo different perspectives chosen in modern physics.) Avicenna formulates:The eternal can be understood either in terms of being or in terms of time. The

eternal with respect to being means that its existence is unconditioned. Theeternal with respect to time means that it has no beginning in time.55This doesnot necessarily mean that matter, form, time (and motion) are eternal andnon-created, as is often indicated in various interpretations. It simply means notmore that, if visualized in terms of a substantial perspective, the fundamentalcategories of the world have an eternal significance, but that locally, in terms ofa worldly perspective, they can be visualized as finite projections of these eter-nal entities which develop as anything else does. (This means in particular, thatalso time itself, as we see it, is subjected to a process of being actually pro-

duced!) It is interesting to note that nothingness therefore, for Avicenna, isnon-being rather than nothing at all: It is a moment of transition between twostates, so it gains the connotation of an active, dynamical potential.But the main protagonist of this creative period of philosophy is without anydoubt Averroes (Ibn Rushd) living in the 12th century in Cordoba, Spain. Hismain work consists of commentaries of Aristotle, and it will serve as stimulationfor Thomas of Aquinas to eventually begin his own work on Aristotle (from1260 on). In contrary to his predecessors, for Averroes, the manifold of worldlyobjects is not created by means of a mediation with intelligent entities. The pri-

mary cause for all what there is, is God himself who creates this manifold com-55 T.Tisini: Die Materieauffassung in der islamisch-arabischen Philosophie des Mittelalters, Akademie-Verlag,Berlin (Ost = DDR), 1972, 72.


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pletely from the beginning on. But this creation is actually a permanent processrather than a single moment at the beginning of the world. In a way, creation isconservation rather than permanent innovation. And creation in this sense is nota creation out of nothingness: The idea is simply to apply the implications of a

shifting perspective rather consequently. Unique creation at a beginning of theworld and the subsequent evolution of objects having been so created, are onlyconcepts which are due to the fact that humans interpret their world in temporalterms. But for God himself who is himself eternal, there is no time. He is theuniversal mover who is not moved himself, because he is, according to his es-sence, eternal. And there is no motion, if there is no time. But the world is actu-ally caused and moved, and as humans are part of the world, their perspective isone of causality and thus temporality. At best, humans can speculate about theeternal perspective of God, because they are led to concepts of potentiality andactuality, once they have gained some more insight into the historical structureof their world. Consequently, matter is also given immediately, as a universal

potential, and its form is founded on its substratum. Hence, form becomes im-manent property of the material, and there is a reciprocal interaction between thetwo. Note that this implies that matter itself gains the quality of being causa sui,

because it is a necessary entity now (which means that it could exist withoutGod as well). If there are two entities of substantial character one can basicallydecide in one of the following two ways: either matter is the basic foundation ofthe world itself (and the concept of God is superflous), or both matter and Godare synonymous and fall into one. Averroes decides in favour of the second ver-

sion and visualizes nature in pantheistic terms. Consequently, for him, motion isself-motion (and evolution, as the permanent unfolding of forms which are in-herent to the potentiality of matter, becomes self-organization).56

C. Bruno

This aspect ofproductivityis also one which is of considerable interest for Bru-no, who a number of centuries later sets out to re-formulate the structure of the

universe in terms of a relational infinity of uniform worlds which are subjectedto a permanent actualization of divine creativity. Productivity is visualized then,as the immanent activity of the world which is not a consequence but an equiv-alent of that divine creativity. In this sense, mathematics is not only naturesscripture in which the book of nature is written down, but it is a concrete rep-resentation of nature as alternative aspect to what is being manifested in the very

process of creation. God himself is being naturalized, and the theological per-

56 It is obvious that such an autonomous kind of matter is in serious conflict with Christian dogmatism which

postulates the dominating role of the spirit in contrary to the complete unimportance of matter. Hence, the pro-

gressive re-interpretation of Aristotle as offered by Arab philosophy, had to be modified again, and the resultwas even more: a modified Aristotle reduced to his conservative rather than progressive aspects. Remember that

professors at the first universities of Europe, founded in the Middle Ages not much later, were obliged to swearby the name of (that modified) Aristotle to promote and advance his theory in doing their work.


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spective is nothing but a metaphor, setting the ontological structure of the worldand its philosophical reflexion into one (onto-epistemic) unity. To be more pre-cise: The mathematical explication of a process is therefore the sameas the un-folding dynamics of this process. Nevertheless, there is no explicit connection

between the logic and the physics of a phenomenon. Hence, Brunos critiqueconcerning Galileian physics: For Bruno, the tendency of modern mathematics,long before the works of Galilei (which Bruno could not know), to representconcrete processes in terms of formal structures, appeared as a translation fromone language into another, without really understanding the meaning of both.Hence, for him, mathematical knowledge fell under the criterion of what histeacher Nicholas de Cusa called docta ignorantia, unless it would beaccompagnied by philosophy understood as a hermeneutic of nature leading to

a true understanding of the structure of the world (being cooperatrice di naturain this sense). One basic aspect to this desired understanding would be thegrasping of the intrinsically productive character of nature as it is expressed inBrunos concept of matter, referring to stoic ideas as well as the conception ofAverroes.57 The important passage in his matter text58is the following:

...: therefore, the always persisting fruitful (and productive) matter must have the privilege tobe recognized as the only substantial principle and as that which is and always remains; andall forms together are nothing but different determinations of matter which go and come,while others cease and renew themselves, which is the reason why they all do not have thereputation of a principle. Hence, among those who have contemplated the logic of naturalforms in approriate detail, so far as one could recover it from Aristotle and others of the sameline of thinking, one has found only those who have deduced at last, that these forms arenothing but accidents and random circumstances of matter; and that therefore the privilege of

being action and perfection refers to matter itself and not to objects of which we can say nomore in fact, than that they are neither substance nor nature, but objects of substance and ofnature, of which they say that it be matter, which according to them is a necessary, eternal anddivine principle, as says this moor Avicebron who calls it God who is in all things.

Hence, for Bruno, matter is (very much in the Arab tradition) substratum andpotential, at the same time. But referring to this concept of productivity meansalso transgressing not only the limit given by de Cusa, but also the formal con-

ception of the Copernican system: First of all, the heliocentric interpretation ofworldly organization produces an obvious conflict with the order of being as ithad been handed down to Bruno in terms of scholastic theory. 59But even moreradical is the consequence for the hierarchical structure of this classical order,

57 Usually, Brunos conception is attributed to what is called neo-platonism. But this label is owed somehowto the tradition of mixing the ancient lines of argument leading up to the Renaissance due to the fact that veryoften sources had been falsely ascribed to one or the other school. Contrary to this, we refer Brunos conception

to the stoic tradition, basing this on the structural similarities of his ansatz with that of the Stoa as explained insection A. Hence, we give a primarily systematic argument for this, not a historical one.58 De la causa, principio ed uno, Venezia (= London), 1584, in: Dialoghi Italiani, p.1 (dialoghi metafisici),Sansoni, Firenze, 1985 (1958), 273sq.59 There is a short, enlightening review of this aspect in the book of A.Eusterschulte: Giordano Bruno zurEinfhrung, Junius, Hamburg, 1997.


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because for Bruno, the Copernican approach is only the starting point for expli-cating his principal thesis of self-motion, in terms of an intrinsic motion towhich all moving objects in space are subjected, due to the fact that no place inthe universe is distinguished in one way or another. In a sense, Bruno visualizes

an infinite universe which is completely isotropic and homogeneous. Hence,there is no location anymore into which a first mover who is not moved himself(in the Aristotelian sense) could be eventually placed. There is at most an intrin-sic mover who is permanently acting upon objects such that he is immanentcause of these objects. The universe becomes a uniform organism whose organ-izational principle determines a living process of metabolism within infinitespace. The idea is then, that an infinite universe be the consequence of an infi-nite cause and an infinite principle. It is inhabited by an infinity of living worldswhich are themselves organisms, and of which Earth is only one. And the struc-ture of these organisms can be grasped only in terms of an all-encompassingreason which is one aspect of the immanent creative power underlying this in-finity. The dynamical principle which actually governs the self-motion of thisorganism of organisms, is matter itself.Hence, as Blumenberg has shown in more detail60, the post-Copernican uni-verse, in having no distinguished location anymore, does not have any place fordivine salvation also: God himself has spent himself completely to the act ofcreation. This is one of the most important contradictions, Bruno produces withhis ansatz. (So it is Bonaventura e.g. who categorically formulates: Multa desuis thesauris profert, non omnia. And William of Okhamstates that a complete

spending of God when creating would be a degradation in the sense that heshows up as a mere cause of nature then.) The idea of de Cusa was that infinitycould be grasped only in terms of finite understanding such that all that existswould constitute a kind of finite infinity or created god (quasi infinitas finita

aut deus creatus). During creation then, something would have emerged at all,having the ability to become similar to God, because it could not be a God him-self that was being produced (quia deus fieri non potuit). This indicates an actuallimit of attainment in the sense that there is a difference between generatioandcreatiosuch that God creates the world, but generates his son, both of them be-

ing different aspects of the same action which is itself nothing but an expressionof his essence. The time between creation and generation however, is only ahuman impression subjected to the human mode of perception. From Gods

perspective, there is no time, and the act of self-integration into the world creat-ed by himself (once, the word has become flesh) is one and the sameself-motion as the original creation actually is. The absolute power being ex-

pressed in these two aspects of the same underlying action actualizes itself com-pletely (quiescit potentia in seipsa).Unfortunately, there is no logical way of giving a sound foundation for the un-

derlying postulate (that the above mentioned limit exists). And this is the scan-60 H.Blumenberg: Die Legitimitt der Neuzeit. (Erneuerte Ausgabe 1996) Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M.,1983-1985, 639-700.


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dal Bruno excites when introducing his conception. For him, a God who mustrealize what he can, reproduces himself necessarily. That is, generatio = creatio.And there is no personalization as absolute self-realization. That there is a worldat all, is not founded in the volition of God, but in his essence. The world is the

correlation of Gods impersonality, hence it is a manifestation, not a revelation.The latter would assume that there is a possibility for hiding and holding backthe world. But this is not the case. In particular, the world is not a message ofGod, not a book of nature therefore, because it does not express a specific o r-der at all. It is indifferent instead, it is due to plurality, in the sense that if there isanything at all, then all what is possible actually exists. Hence, with a view toexistence, all what is possible is also equal. It is probably this explicit (and ac-cording to the state of then progressive scholastic theory unsolvable) scandal

which renders any attempt of mediation unsuccessful and makes Bruno the lastphilosopher who is burnt at stake. (In a sense, one can say that he indeed forcesthe inquisition to choose the maximum of punishment.)

*

What we realize so far is the following: As a result of ancient theories beingprovided by the schools of Plato and Aristotle, it is the stoic approach whichaccording to the systematic needs of its epoch can provide an intrinsically dy-namical and open system encompassing the totality of nature including the epis-temic structures designed in terms of human thinking itself. The advent of chris-

tian religion (referring itself to various aspects of stoic theory) causes the neces-sity to adapt the innovative potential intrinsic to the stoic system to the dogmaticframe which is defined in terms of traditional concepts of God which in turncannot be based in one way or another on stoic logic. The same is true more orless for the later development of the Islam. Hence, the philosophical foundationof the world gains a purely negative quality, because it is necessary in first

place, to re-interpret concepts which are not compatible with a given basicstructure of irrefutible elements instead of developing them further. Obviously,this permanent construction of apologies cannot be suitable for continuing an

innovative line of thought. Hence, the consequent resumption and continuationof the stoic line is obstructed in a well-aimed manner, in particular with a viewto the dynamical aspects of a nature which is primarily based on an active sort ofcreative matter, so that one would be able to exploit the early concept of a fi

The Klymene Principle Rainer Zimmermann

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