The Kansei Refor

8/2/2019 The Kansei Refor

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The Kansei Reforms-Success or Failure?Author(s): Isao SoranakaSource: Monumenta Nipponica, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Summer, 1978), pp. 151-164Published by: Sophia UniversityStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2384123 .

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The lKanseiReformsSuccess or Failure?

by SAO SORANAKAI the past MatsudairaSadanobu' has failed o attracterious onsiderationfromWesternscholars.He has seemed less significant han his colorfulprede-cessorTanuma Okitsugu.2This general lack of nterestn Sadanobu resultedfrom a Western historical preoccupation with Japan's so-called 'miraculous'modernization.JohnW. Hall's treatment fTanuma as a 'forerunner fmodernJapan' represents hisdominanthistoriographicalnclination.3Recently, however, there has been increased interest n Sadanobu's career,and Herman Ooms's book, Charismaticureaucrat, resentsthe firstfull-lengthstudyofSadanobu to appear in English.4This biographical account reveals theman as a significanthistoricalfigure.The author characterizesSadanobu as apragmatic reformer nd rejects the traditionalview of him as a conservativefeudal figure-a view still currentamong some historianswho writetextbooks.5Ooms's workon Sadanobu deservespositive appraisal in thatit raisesthenewand stimulating ssue ofthe success or failureofthe Kansei Reforms 1787-93).But Ooms falls hortofproviding convincingexplanationin his book. He simplystates,withoutadequate substantiation,that Sadanobu 'enabled the Bakufu tosurvivea crisis,which,at somepoint,threatenedto destroy t . . . solvedfinancialdifficultiesnd laid solid foundationforan economic recovery hat continuedfordecades. He unambiguously reassertedBakufu authorityand, most important,reformulatednd gave new vigorto itspoliticalvalue system,whichwas in seriousjeopardy whenhe tookoffice.'6n partthisview follows romOoms's biographicalobjective to revise Sadanobu's portrait.My question is this: were the KanseiTHE AUTHOR is AssistantProfessor n theDepartmentof History,The UniversityofWesternOntario. He wishesto acknowledgehis gratitude o ProfessorsWilliamB. Hauserand Tetsuo Najita for theirkind help andadvice.

' **Zro,21, 758-1829.2 'RM, 1719-88.3 JohnW. Hall, TanumaOkitsugu,719-1788: Forerunnerf ModernJapan,HarvardU.P., 1955.

4 Herman Ooms, CharismaticBureaucrat:A Political Biographyof Matsudaira Sadanobu,Universityf Chicago Press,1975.Also to benoted is Robert L. Backus, MatsudairaSadanobuas a MoralistandLitterateur,npublished disser-tation,UniversityfCalifornia, erkeley, 963.5 For example, Mikiso Hane, Japan: AHistoricalurvey,larkScribners Sons, 1972,p. 219.6 Ooms, pp. 152-3.


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152 Monumentaipponica,XXIII, 2Reformstruly uccessful? f they were,why was the Bakufuforced to carryoutsimilarreformswithdisastrousresults n the 1840s and yet another n thefollow-ing decade?Furthermore,did not theserepeated attempts t reformllustrate heBakufu'sinabilityto regenerate tself t the crucial periods? The mostobvious weaknessinherentnOoms's work s that he moves from favorable mpression fSadanobuto a favorable mpressionof the Kansei Reforms. His accompanyingassumptionthattheBakuhan systemwas 'stillvitaland flexible'7n the ate eighteenth enturyalso needs to be critically xamined.The crux of this question about the success or failureof the Kansei Reformsconcerns the economy since Sadanobu recognized the vital importance of thissector.His commercial policieswereprimarily ntended tocontrolhighprices,yetin thisaim Sadanobu was frustrated.While he might have been able to improvetheBakufu'spoliticaland economicpowerto somedegree,hewas unable torestorethe system o anything ike a healthy condition.8The fundamentalcauses oftheBakufu'seconomic impotencelay below the perceivedsurface;onlythe outwardsymptoms of the disease were treated. Sadanobu's effortwas determined andintelligible,but it was not soon enough or deep enough torectifyn economicallyentrenched ocietyalong Bakufulines.During much of the 1780s the Bakufu was faced with serious socio-economicproblemswhich tended to undermine tspolitical authority.These crises came inmany forms, uch as the persistenceof the fiscalcrisesfor the Bakufu,the socio-economicalienationofthesamurai and, above all, thefrequent rbanand agrarianrevoltswhich characterized that decade ofthe eighteenth entury.Social and economic disorderpersistedbecause the existing agrarian economyproved vulnerable to the natural disasterswhich mercilesslyhit Japan duringthisperiod,especially n 1783, 1785and 1787. Cropfailures n theseyears destroyedany equilibriumbetweensupply and demand. This disruption n turn broughtabout acute shortages n urban centers nd a consequentspiralofprices nOsaka,Edo and other areas. For example, the price of rice at the wholesalemarket nOsaka reached a recordhigh inJune of 1787, rangingfrom181 to 187 monmefsilverperkoku,9oughly hree times theusual price.The pricesof othercommod-

7 Ibid., p. 83.8 One might argue that Sadanobu wasable to improve the Bakufu'sfiscal solvencythrough he uccessfulnforcementfprogramswhich resulted n an increaseof gold reservesin the Bakufu's coffers. ut thisargument sless convincing ince the recovery f financialsolvency rovedonly temporary.For example, available statistics how thattheBakufuhad 2,147,200 yo ofgold on handin 1785. But its total reservesdecreased toonly 817,200 ryo over the next two years;

they increased slightlyto 1,079,700 ryo n1798,butagain shrank o 723,800ryiby 1816.For furthernformation,ee TakeuchiMakotoMMpki, 'Bakufu Keizai no Henbi to Kin'yuSeisakuno Tenkai' 4V#QAi*)ODEV:- RfDf, in Furushima Toshio , ed., NihonKeizaishiTaikei J3 T6ky6DaigakuShuppankai, 1965,vol. 4.9 NakazawaBenjiro M4 ]3, Nihon eikaHendishi i ; KashiwaShob6, 1965,p. 238.


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SORANAKA: The Kansei Reforms 153ities such as rapeseed oil," salt,bean paste, bean cake, paper, cotton,and driedfoodsalso roseproportionally."Matsudaira Sadanobu came to prominence n the Bakufu's administration ur-ing thisperiodofsocio-economiccrisis nd carriedouthisfamousKansei Reformsdirectedat their olution.Judgingfromhis writings,we can discernthathe under-stoodsomeof thecauses oftheeconomicproblems.His understanding f theprob-lem of inflation s reflectedn his commentaryon prices, 2 probably written n1789. In this essay Sadanobu revealed his concernabout therecentrise n pricesand expresseddefinitedeas about thesourceof nflation.He maintainedthattherewere threeprimaryfactors.First,he realized that therewas an acute shortageofgoods and services n Edo. Second, price increasesseemed to be aggravatedby adecline in the relative value of metals (gold, silver and copper) and regionaldisparitiesn the value ofcertainmetals gold and silver), speciallybetweenOsakaand Edo. Lastly,Sadanobu with hisaustereNeo-Confucianconceptsbelievedthatthe populace was consuming too much.'3 This so-called 'extravagance of thepeople' he singled out as the most important cause of inflation,yet fromourperspectivethis reason seemsthe least correct aspect of his diagnosis.Sadanobu's commercial (price) policyfollowedfrom heseviews. Soon afterheassumedhis office s roYjiuhuza'4 inJune 1787,he introducedand enforced strictpolicy of thrift nd frugality o discourage excessiveconsumption,especially ofluxurygoods. Thus he imposed a severe reductionof the Bakufu adminstrativeexpendituresby placing a tight control on spending,while he also ordered adrastic cut in the expendituresat the Shogunal Palace.'5 His own austere life,patternedafterhisgrandfather, oshimune, setan example forBakufuofficialsand retainers n Edo.Sadanobu also attempted to extend his own personal frugality o societyingeneralthrough seriesofsumptuary aws designedto discouragecertain nclina-tionsof ociety.Between1787and 1793ordinanceswerecontinuouslyssuedagainststreetprostitution although some authorized brothels ike Yoshiwara survived),against gambling, against mixed bathing, against gaudy hairstyles, nd againstthepublicationof obscene books.'7 While seekingto correctpublic morals,whichseemedtoBakufuofficialsohave declined,Sadanobu also attempted odiscourageexcessive consumption. His Neo-Confucian moralism thus complementedhis

10 natane buraXA11 KitajimaMasamoto 4LWE:IE,Bakuhanseino Kumonugfiij1 1:r (NihonnoRekishi, 8),Chuo K6ronsha,1965,p. 26.12 Bukka-ronO'RI13 Nihon eizaishi osho-NKS] H*,UA

gF,NihonKeizaishi S6sho Kank6kai, 1914-7,v, p. 30.14 7-Wrpj15 Nihon aiseiKeizai Sosho -NZKS] 2fgffi:R;, Zaisei Keizai Gakkai, 1933, iII,

p. 928.16 @7w 1684-1 75 1.17 ZokuTokugawa ikki ShinteiohoKokushiTaikei)4RJII5f,id KokushiTaikei Kankokai, 1933,XXXVIII, pp. 57, 90-1,103 & 146. For a more detailed account ofcensorship nder Sadanobu's administration,see Peter F. Kornicki, Nishikino Ura: AnInstanceofCensorshipnd theStructure f aSharebon',n MN, xxxii: 2 (1977), pp. 153-62.


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154 Monumentaipponica,XXIII, 2economicpragmatism.Sadanobu realizedthat the residents fEdo sufferedreatlyfromnflation.His so-called'reactionary'moral attitude houldbe temperedby anunderstandingofhiswider economic objective.But Sadanobu's campaign against 'moral degeneration'metwithseveresocialopposition,and people resistedhis negativemoral ordinances. Streetprostitutionthrived nd gamblingwentunderground,onlyto surface gain when theenforce-mentofthe laws was relaxed. It is well knownthatthe Bakufuauthority entoutto the streetsmany enforcement gents18to stiflegambling and other activitiessuch as prostitution.But this proved ineffectiven eradicating illicit activitiesbecause theseagentswere easily bribed by the operatorsofgambling and prosti-tutionestablishments.t is ironicthatthepolice authorityn Edo evenhad tohireseveral spies to watch its own spies.19 Sadanobu's moral pretensionsannoyedsociety, nd he eventually earned thatmoralreformwas a difficult ay toremedyeconomic hardship.As a resulthe was forcedto seek more effectivemeasurestostabilize prices.As a means to strengthen is overall price programagainst inflation adanobuturned against the kabunakama20or merchant associations). The origin of thekabunakamaoes back to the late seventeenthcenturywhen the Bakufu allowedcertainmerchant groups in urban centersto establishexclusiveassociations,en-dowed with monopoly rightsover distributionof specialized products such asjinseng, ron, brass, oil products,charcoal, lime, and many other items.They inturn paid a businesstax21 to thegovernment.The rationale behind theBakufu'searly policy was that it feltthat thesegroups could serveto facilitatethe flowofcommodities nd servicesfromOsaka, the chief upplierofgoods, to the shogunalcapital. But duringthe administration fSadanobu's predecessorthe Bakufual-lowedmorekabunakamao be formed imply n return or hebusinesstaxesand itsdesireto increase the revenuepromptedit to issue increasingnumbersof icensesfortheformation f theseassociations.But thisproliferation fkabunakamaesulted n a rise in prices. For one thing,the merchants automatically shiftedtheir tax burden onto the consumersbyincreasingprices. Second, these privilegedmerchants took advantage of theirexclusiverights,wheneverpossible,tomanipulatepricesfor reatergain. Sadanobuand his close advisors suspectedsuch abuses by thekabunakamand acted againstthemby dissolvingtheir monopolyrightsbetween 1787 and 1790.22 Sadanobu'smotive s reflectedn the thoughtof Nakai Chikuzan, authorof theSoboKigen nda close advisorof Sadanobu:

Since the Meiwa era [1764-72] it has been the Bakufu's policy to allowmerchantsto organize themselves n returnfor the payment of unjo.The18 onmitsu2319 Kitajima, pp. 85-6.2021 unjo i ?: ormyjgakinXtJk

22 NZKS, iii, p. 30; Harold Bolitho,TreasuresamongMen: TheFudaiDaimyo nTokugawaJapan,Yale U.P., 1974,pp. 201-2.


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SORANAKA: The Kansei Reforms 155imposition of these business taxes is definitely factorcontributing o therise in prices.However, I am convincedthat thehigh pricesofrecent yearshave mainlycome about because the merchantshave conspired togetherto manipulateprices and extract exorbitantprofits.For example, the price of paper dras-tically rose as the result of a crop failure, but since then harvestshave re-covered and yettheprice ofpaper still remains too high.Why? Because thekabunakamare makingtoo great a profit.23It shouldbe noted,however,thatSadanobu did not abolish all the kabunakama,or the system f grantingmonopoliesitself.He simply electeda number of them

fordissolutionbecause he stillbelieved that theyhad a distributive alue underthe strict upervisionof the government.His action against certain kabunakamawas part ofhis effort o 'restore'theBakufu'sauthority ver mattersofgold andrice' 24Sadanobu further ttemptedto stabilize prices throughcurrencyreform, orhe also suspectedthat theunrestrained urrencypolicies of theTanuma admini-strationhad caused inflatedprices.Again Nakai Chikuzan spoke on thematter:Since the issuance ofthe nishu25gold' pieces in the Meiwa era the relativevalue of gold has declined considerablywhile the value of copper coins hasalso declinedsharplybecause of excessive ssuance. It is thegeneraldecline inthe value of thesemetals that has contributedto the rise ofprices in recentyearsin Edo.26

Sadanobu approved ofthisview about the closerelationship fpricesand currencylevels,27and he thus enacted countermeasures o correctthe situation. First, nApril 1788,he stoppedanyfurtherssuance of the nishugold' pieces as a necessaryfirstteptowardshaltingtheirdecline in value. He did not,however,abolish thiscurrencyentirely. Second, he moved to raise its value by mintingmore silverpieces28 fromthe silver gained out of meltingdown quantities of nishu gold'pieces.29 This conversionwas possible because the intrinsicvalue of the nishu'gold' pieces was silver. Finally, he promoted an outflow of nishugold' piecesfromEdo. For example, the Bakufuduringthe early 1790s provided a numberofloans to various rural areas for the reconstruction ftheircommunities nd used

23 NKS, XVI, p. 403.24 This is one ofthe mostfrequentlyuotedphrasesfound n Sadanobu's autobiography,UgenoHitokoto c7)OA-.25 Although henishuginZOURwas a silvercoin, theBakufu irculatedt as a 'gold' pieceand treated t at paritywith the actual goldpiece, nishukin bearingthe same de-nomination. he nishuginasoriginallymintedto alleviatetheshortage fgold coins n Edo

in the second quarterof the 18th entury. utthe governmentater issued it in excessivequantity, nd thishelped to bringabout thedecline n relativevalue ofgold vis-'a-visilverin Edo.26 NKS, XVI, pp. 402-3.27 NKS, V, pp. 23-4.28 chlzginM29 Kitajima, pp. 69-71.


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156 Monumentaipponica,XXIII, 2the nishugold' pieces for such purposes.30He encouraged their use outside thischief urban centerso that in Edo the relativevalue of thiscurrencywould rise.The Kansei reformeraw that an excesssupply of thenishugold' pieces in Edoalso disruptedthe balance of exchange between gold and silver, thus causingincreased prices in Edo. Edo primarilyused gold as its exchange medium forbusinesstransactions.As it was undercutby excessivegold currency he relativevalue ofgold (vis-a-vissilver) in Edo fell below the establishedofficial xchangerate of 1 ryo fgold to 60 monme fsilver. n contastthe exchange rate in Osaka,the chiefsupply centerforgoods going to Edo, remained fairlyconstant. Thischronicregionaldisparity n the exchange rates of silver and gold broughtabouta grave situation forEdo residents, nd it had the immediateeffect f preventingthesmoothflow ofgoods to Edo. For instance,a rice merchantoften hose to sellhisrice nOsaka for ilverbecause in Edo the same amountof rice could be boughtfor ess.3' Thus the regional disparityof exchange ratesdiscouragedmeaningfulinter-regional rade and encouraged speculation in the monies themselves.Theeffect n Edo was a shortageofgoods which effectivelyorcedpricesup.To complicate the situationstillfurther, do was floodedwith copper coins ofan inferior uality, especiallythe 4-monme enomination.An excessive supplyofcopper coins there tended to reduce theirvalue in termsof othercommodities,thus causing inflatedprices. Sadanobu realized that this situation directlydis-rupted the ivelihoodand security f arge numbersofpeople whoweredependenton copper coins. He thereforetopped themintingof these coins and at the sametime arrangedforthe Bakufuto purchase large quantitiesof themin the hope ofraising theirrelative value. In addition he also took the precaution of issuingordinances prohibitingthe transportof coins fromotherdistricts o Edo.32 Butthismeasure backfiredwhen speculators,keen on turning quick profit, roughtcopper coins to Edo, where the Bakufu had made them more valuable.33 Afrustrated adanobu could do nothing but rely on the forces of supply anddemand forthe restoration fthe currencyvalue in Edo.34The effectf Sadanobu's monetaryprogramon thestate ofpriceswas negligible.This is shownby the factthat the commodityprices in the years of 1788, 1789and 1790 either did not decline or did not recover the level as desired by theBakufuauthority,whichhad set thepricelevel of 1783 as thestandardpriceindexfor ts current nti-inflation olicy.35As shownin the diagram, theprice ofrape-

30 Takeuchi Makoto, 'Bakuhan Taisei toKahei RyatsiP' N${IJ3 WIT , in RekishiKyoikuTZW, xi: 11 (1962), pp. 30-1.31 Tsuda Hideo Mffl*)A, KanseiKaikaku'Ak:c, inIwanami iza Nihon ekishiKinsei3) ;j49-XrmA*M-Q (Bec 3), IwanamiShoten,1963, p. 269.32 Kitajima,pp. 71-2.33 Tsuda, pp. 269-70.34 The relativevalue of copper coins (in

terms frice) did not significantlyncrease nthe late 18thcentury, nd it would seemthatSadanobu's attempt o raise the relativevalueof coppercoins did not succeed n Edo either.See Fujikawa Kaname NJ)I, 'Edo JidaiShomin in'yuko' PW Al;, , in MeijoShogakuMf%, Iv: 3 (1955), pp. 93-116.35 Price data forthe early yearsof Sada-nobu's administration re scanty and lessreliable.But an examination f these cattered


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SORANAKA: The Kansei Reforms 157Silver n monme110 _1009080 _70 -RCE (perkoku)60-50-40 -RAPESEED OIL30 - 0.020-COTNIE10 _

t 1 1 l I ! I 1 I I l t I l I178 '82 '83 '84 '85 '86 '87 88 89 90 91 '92 '93 '94 95PriceTrendsorSelectedoods n Osaka,1781-95

(Adaptedfrom itajima,BakuhanseioKumonsee n. 11], p. 84.)seed oil remainedextremelyhigh duringtheseyears,while that ofcottonfiber36remainedunreasonablyunstable.The pricesofthese commodities hencontinuedto fluctuateand, moreover,remained comparativelyhigh (vis-'a-vis ice) in thefollowing ewyears,although pricesappear to have dropped temporarily n 1791.The forcibleendorsement fSadanobu's bukka-hikisage37rdinance in some areassuch as Edo may explain such a temporarydecline ofpricesand I shall commentmore on thisordinance later in thisarticle.The spate ofdifficulties roughton by the persistence f highprices was furtheraggravated by a reversal n price,whichbegan to drop in late 1788 and declinedfurther uring the following two years. The average wholesale price of rice atOsaka for the monthofJune 1790, forexample, dropped to mere 38.7 monmefsilverforone koku frice,whereas it had maintained the 60/70monmeevel in thepreceding two years.38This decline in the price of rice amidst the inflationarypricedata on a few ommodities,ogether ithotherrelated evidence, showsthat prices inEdo, Osaka and elsewhereremained highduring adanobu's earlyyears s theBakufu's

chief eformer.36 kuriwata037 Ntaglkazawa,p'. 238 Nakazawa, p. 239-


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158 Monumentaipponica,XXIII, 2atmospherereated n even more erious iscal roblem orboththe Bakufu ndthe amurai esidentsfEdo. It had the direct ffectfreducing hereal ncomeofthat egmentf ociety hich eceivedts alaryntheformf rice.KuseTangono Kami (Hirouji),39head ofthekanj5sho40nderSadanobu,acknowledgedheseriousnessfthisdecline nricepricesduring n inflationaryeriod:

Manysamurai refacingevere inancial ifficultieshesedays.Thisfacthasmainly esulted rom change n thepeople'swayof ifewhichpromotesextravagance.hus expenses or ll samuraihouseholds avedrasticallyn-creasedwhile heirncomes averemainedonstant. herefore,t hasbecomemoredifficultor hem o maintain heirbudgets.The worst ituation hatconfrontshem oday,however,s thatprices f all goodsremain xtremelyhighdespitewidefluctuationn theprice frice.This s extremelyrave incethe priceofrice s still n its downward rend.4'Our general bservationftheprice rends or arious ommoditiesuring hefirstewyears fSadanobu'sruleraises nebasic question:whatcausedthe teadydecline n prices frice tthe imewhen heprices f ther ommodities,ncludingthoserice-relatedtems uchas sake, inegar, tc.,remainedhigh?The answertothis uestion annot e obtainedwithoutullyssessingarious actorsf upplyanddemand. t seems hatbasically hedeclinenthepriceofrice ntheseyears

was caused bysupply actors.42For onething,hepriceofricedeclined teadily ecauseof a general ecoveryinagriculturalrice)production, hichhadpreviouslyeen depressedyfrequentnaturaldisastersuch as drought,loods, arthquakend volcanic ruptions.hereturn fnormal griculturalroductionncreased he evelofricesupply t therice marketsn Osaka, Edo and elsewhere,nd hence owered heprice evelofrice. Secondand perhapsmore mportant,he continuous low friceshipmentsto thewholesalemarkets,speciallynOsaka, in the atterhalfof theeighteenthcenturylso tended odepress hepriceofrice. n thisregard, he availablesta-tistics nrice hipmentsoOsaka,bothbythehan overnmentsndprivateradersin various egionsntheeighteenthentury,eveal hat hewholesale icemarketsin Osaka received ncreasingmounts f rice whichoften xceededtheannual1.2/1.5millionkokuevel.43This constant upply f rice n greatbulknaturallytended odepress iceprices.44Whatcausedsuch a concentrationfricesupplyinOsaka?The tendencyowards he accumulation fa surplus ice tockn Osaka came39 te@? (0L)40 MTl,theBakufu reasury.41 Quoted in Kitahara Susumu ;1L1E,'Kansei noKien Rei ni tsuile' Thi QV'C, nRekishiHyoron Tr, 162 1964),p. 68.42 The populationdecreasein Osaka andthe decline in the volume of rice shippeddirectly romOsaka to Edo in the late 18th

centurymayhave also caused thedropin theprice of rice.43 Yamazaki Ryuzo ILAUYR-E,Kinsei Kokini okeruNosanbutsu akakunoDoko' XLMMLt38;6A9ff DA, in Keizaigaku Nenpj


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SORANAKA: The Kansei Reforms 159about because hangovernments ttemptedto dispose oftheir surplusrice in themarket whereit commanded the highestprice; Osaka being the centerfor com-mercialand industrial ctivitieswith ts argepopulationusuallyoffered hehighestprices forcommodities, ncluding rice. In addition to the price advantage thatOsaka usuallyoffered ordistant uppliers, hetendency owardtheaccumulationofrice stock n that citywas also caused by the annual shipmentof rice bymanyhan governments or the paymentof debts and interests ue to theircreditors nOsaka.4" The han governmentsoftenrelied upon creditorsfor fiscal continuitybefore cropwas harvested.Thus bythe mid-eighteenthenturyhangovernmentswere already less than efficientn disposingof theirsurplus rice, and theywerelocked into an economic systemresistant o centralgovernmental ntrusion.Sadanobu realized that declining rice prices undercut the Bakufu's financesand lost no time n responding o thethreat. n late 1788he issuedan ordinance nwhichhe orderedthehangovernments o retain muchof theirrice surplus n theirdomains46 so thattheirrice would not flood the Osaka market. He also restrictedthehanwarehousesin Osaka fromssuingrice certificates47or hestockon hand.This was a precautionarymeasure against the tendencyof the han governmentsto issue these certificates eyond theirabilityto fulfill hem.The proliferation fartificialrice certificates48n Osaka helped to depress rice prices by making itappear that there was more rice in that city than there actually was. But thehangovernments eemto have simplydefied Sadanobu's ordinances.49 They con-tinued to ship rice to Osaka and continued to issue rice certificates eyondtheiractual stocks.The primacyof han nterestsn rice dealingsundercutthe interestsofthe Bakufu.In the meantime,Sadanobu carried out several other measures to restoretheprice level of rice. He ordered somewealthymerchantsto purchase quantities ofrice,thushoping to stimulatedemand.50 He also initiateda policyofpurchasingthe gluttedrice,but the amount the Bakufubought up did littleto influencetheprice at thewholesale market n Osaka. Finally theBakufurelaxeditsregulationson theproductionof ake nd otherrice-related roducts. Such measures toboostthe price ofrice throughmassivepurchasingprograms,however,did not bringabout satisfactory esults forthe Bakufu since the financialcapacity ofboth theBakufu and the merchants,who were not always cooperative,was limited.While battling against the rice price Sadanobu also continuedhisfight gainstinflationn thepost-1 87 period. Thus, in 1790,he reduced the volume ofannualtrade withthe Dutch at Nagasaki byone third.52 ome historiansn thepasthaveregardedthis imitationof foreign rade as a reactionarymeasure since it allegedlystifled ommercialactivities.However, Sadanobu's real intentionwas moreprag-

45 Ibid., p. 89.46 NKS, XXXIV, pp. 77-8.47 kome-kittekfJJ48 Furushima, p. 92-6.49 karamai-kittek J

50 Honj6Eijir6*lEXi#MP,Tokugawaakufuno Beika Chosetsu )IIW Ii, KashiwaShob6, 1966,p. 172.51 Ibid., p. 222.52 NZKS, III, p. 30.


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160 Monumentaipponica,XXIII, 2matic n nature.A passage, in theKasshiYawa, 3 which s attributed o Sadanobu,partlysubstantiates his:We knowthatJapan's tradingactivitieswithforeign ountrieshave broughtherenormousbenefitsn thepast. They have broughthernumerousvaluableitems,especiallyfromChina, whichhave enrichedher tremendously.Yet inrecentyearstradingactivitieshave dwindled because economicdifficultiesthome have reducedthe consumption fforeign oods. This fact n turnhasputundue hardship on merchants engaged in the trade of foreigngoods. Thisis a grave situationforthecountry s a whole.54He then expanded his opinion about the desirabilityofmaintainingtrade rela-tionswithforeign ountries n thefollowingpassage:

I hear that manysamurai hoard theirmoneyexcessively oremergencypur-poses. This habit ofsaving should be halted, because theuse ofsuch wealthstimulates he flow fcurrencyn the market nd hencestimulates henation'seconomy. n this ense,theuse of mportedgoods, 5 fconsumed nmeaningfulways, is not only beneficial to the individual, but also to the countryas awhole.56It is clear that n each case he saw foreign radeimplications n a purelypragmaticlightas regardstheireffect n theJapanese and theirdomesticmarket,and inthis way he was able to weighboth benefits nd liabilities.Sadanobu's anti-inflationaryrograms, ncludinghis programsto restrict or-eign trade and the reorganization of the distributionmechanism throughthedissolutionofthekabunakama, erestill nsufficiento bring pricesdown, and thisfailurefrustrated adanobu. Moreover, it left him with few alternativesbut totake more coercive action in dealing with the problem of prices. His frustrationthus resultedin the issuance of the bukka-hikisagerdinance in July of 1790.57This ordinance,directedat both thewholesale and retail merchants n theBakufuand otherhandomains,orderedreductions n thepriceofcommodities. he Bakufualso issued a series ofdetailed instructions o be followed by its administratorsnEdo, Osaka, and other areas. It also expected that the hangovernmentswouldenforcethe ordinance in their respectivedomains. These instructions rderedadministratorso obtain frommerchantsthe price lists of their commoditiesandriceoverthepastseveralyears.58 In otherwords,the Bakufuwantedthemerchantsto ustify heirpricepolicy n relationto theexisting iceprice.Judgingfrom his,one can discernthat the Bakufu designated rice as the standard commodityforthe ultimatedeterminationofprices. But the troublewith this was that ricewasno longerthedominant commodity n determining heprice level in theeconomy,

53 *54 NKS, XXXIV, p. 59.55 tnmntUf4t1/i7

56 NKS, XXXIV, p. 59.57 NZKS, III, pp. 480-2.58 Ibid., pp. 482-3.


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SORANAKA: The Kansei Reforms 161but rather one of many commodities whose price was subjected to changes ofsupply and demand.An examination of the available evidence seems to indicate that the Bakufuwas largelyunable to enforcethe ordinance effectively espiteits determinationto control nflation.The following xample reveals the problemofenforcement.The Edo machi-bugyon September 1790 ordered the two main kabunakamanEdo, which represented heproducersand distributors f cottonfabrics, o reducetheir wholesale prices voluntarily. But the members of these two associationsrefused o obey the order,offering arious reasonswhich, they claimed, made itdifficult or them to comply. In responseto thisthe Bakufuofficials ointed outthat there had been a steadydecline in theprice of cottonfiber, nd therefore heprice of the finishedproducts (cotton fabrics) should be reduced by the sameproportion.Faced with this,the kabunakama esponded that they would imme-diatelyreduce the wholesale price by 5%oand declared thattheywould make anadditional efforto reduce the price by 3000 in February 1791 in orderto meetthe Bakufu'srequest.This offerwas rejectedby theBakufu,which insisteduponan immediate reductionof the price by 30%. Aftera deadlock lasting severalmonths, hekabunakaman December 1790made a compromiseoffernwhichtheyproposed to reduce theprice by 7% startingnJanuary 1791 and thenreduce itfurther o a level thatwould correspondto the Bakufu's order by the followingmonth ofFebruary (179l).5The Bakufugrudgingly ccepted theproposal and expected thepricewould godown as scheduled. But thekabunakama efaulted on theirpromiseand failed toreduce thepriceoftheircommodities. t is not entirely learwhy theybroke theirpledge, but one reason could have been the sudden increase in the price ofkuriwata, material over which theyhad no control, thus showing that the kabu-nakama acked any absolute power over the determinationofpricesand that theBakufu's restrictivemeasures (bukka-hikisagerdinance) lacked effectiveness.60Anotherexample of the ineffectivenessfthegovernment's rice-cutordinanceinvolved the dispute between theBakufu and the sake brewers n Nadame district(in Settsu province), which was under Bakufu urisdiction. In 1790, theBakufuinformed brewer,Nadaya Kiyobei,61 'While it s understandable that the priceofsake houldgo up when the thepriceofricerises, t s definitely otacceptable thatthe price of sake should remain higher when the price of its major component[rice] stays unreasonably low.' Like the Edo machi-bugyJn Edo, the Bakufudemanded a full explanation and satisfaction romthe brewer.To this Nadayaresponded, 'It is our policyto set theprice ofour product on the basis of thecostincurred n itsproduction,and thepricewe are askingforoursakeclosely reflectsthecost incurred n itsproduction thisyear.62 He too refused o comply withthe

59Kitajima, pp. 81-2.60 Ibid., p. 82.61 M A62 Quoted in Komatsu Kazuo IJ1ThI,

'Kinsei oshi hluzgy3oDotai' Fdj$$filA V)%X, inMiyamotoMataji ; ed., ShohinRyatsano ShitekiKenkya fMinerubaShobo, 1967,p. 105.


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162 Monumentaipponica,XXIII, 2Bakufu'sorder.Moreover,Nadaya had offeredn explanationforhis pricepolicy.He maintainedthat the price of rice at the timeofproduction n October, whenthe preparationfor heproductionof ake lways begins,was higherthan the priceofrice when the sake arrivedon the market. The Bakufu officials ould findnofurther retextfor nsisting n the reductionof thepriceof sake. What theBakufuofficialsand Sadanobu did not fully realize was that prices of commoditiesfluctuatedwidely, and often ndependently fothers, s they were being affectedby differentets of supply and demand factors, nd so theirattemptsto simplyenforce price reduction were frustrated.The prevailing price of rice was aninsufficientauge of proper price levels, and provedunenforceable n thecomplexeconomic contextof the Kansei period.In the meantime,Sadanobu's continuedsearch for means to curb inflationnEdo also convincedhimof the need toreshapetheexistingmarketmechanism.Asiswellknown,the Bakufu up to thisperiodheavilyrelied on Osaka tosupplyEdo,perhapswiththeexceptionofrice.63 It thereforelways attempted o improvethedistributionmechanismthat inkedthetwo citiesso thatthesmooth flowofgoodsbetweenOsaka and Edo could be assured.One might lso add that this establishedmarketmechanismfunctioned airlywell as it served thebasic needs ofthepopu-lace in Edo duringthe earlyphase ofTokugawa rule.The excessiverelianceofEdo on Osaka for upplies,however,proveddisastrousfor the Bakufu (and the residents fEdo) in the long run. The main reasonwasthat Osaka's dominantposition as the nation's centralmarketbegan to crumblein the courseof theeighteenth entury.The city'sgrowingweaknessresultedfromthe economic growth n provincial areas and subsequent changes in the patternof the flow ofgoods that now tended to bypass Osaka (vis-'a-vis mergingruralmarkets).64 Being dependenton Osaka for tssupplies,Edo naturally ufferedromthisatrophy n the volume oftrade between Osaka and theprovinces.Sadanobu seems tohave recognizedthis ubtlechange in thepatternof theflowofgoods in the national economy in the course of the eighteenthcentury,andthus took concretemeasures to reshape the supplymechanismforthe benefitofEdo, his main objective being to diminish the degree of Edo's dependence onOsaka. First,he encouraged the directshipmentofcertain vital goods from therareas toEdo. The mostnotable example of thiswas thepermission ivento Nadamedistrict n Settsuprovinceto ship oil productsto Edo in 1791.65 This encourage-ment of directshipmentclearlyreflected reversaloftheBakufu policy,becauseuntil thistime the oil producers (as well as distributors) n thisregionhad beenforced to operate under rigid regulation which restricted ny free trade. Forexample, theywere allowed to selltheirproductsonlyto the Bakufu's authorizedmerchants n Osaka and often t the pricesquoted by the privilegedmerchants.

63 Yasuoka Shigeaki %R1)j, 'Osaka noHattenoKinsei angyo'kiDM& a idUiM , inChihashiKenkyuKyagiKai ;ed., Nihon SangyoshiTaikei ElFaky6Daigaku Shuppankai,1960, pp. 112-3.64 Ibid., pp. 112-4.65 Kitajima, p. 82; Tsuda, p. 258.


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SORANAKA: The Kansei Reforms 163Moreover, the oil processors n this regionwere also forbiddento purchase rawmaterial, e.g., rapeseed, from anyone except authorized dealers.66 Sadanobuhad an interestn increasingthe supply ofoil products n Edo, for this might nturnhave a favorable effect n prices.Second, the Bakufu under Sadanobu also began to develop Edo's outlyingareas. In the past the area adjacent to Edo providedvery ittle n the way of dailynecessitiesforthe residentsof the city. The economyof the Kanto area, whichconstituted he principal part of theBakufuterritory,67 as relativelybackwardin thesense that the degreeof agricultural ommercializationwas minimal,exceptin thosevillages mmediately djacent tothecityofEdo; thesevillagestraditionallyprovided perishable products,e.g., vegetables, forthe city. In the wake of thedecliningrole ofOsaka as Edo's supplycenter he Bakufu realized thatthe develop-ment of this backward area was essentialto securing supplies forEdo. Thus itbegan to promote the development of agriculture in this area, especially thecultivationofcash cropssuch as cotton,rapeseed, tobacco and some other tems.It also encouraged the development of certain processingindustries nvolvingcotton, rice,rapeseed, and grainssuch as barley,wheat and millet.68However, itseemsthatthe Bakufu'sdesireto stabilize prices n Edo throughthereshapingofthe existingmarket mechanismand the developmentof Edo's hinterlandareasended in completefailure n thelong run. This is evidencedby thefact that aterTokugawa officials uch as Mizuno Tadakuni were still preoccupied with theproblem of economic integration fthe area surroundingEdo (and Osaka) and,above all, feltpowerless n carryingout theBakufu'smeasure, i.e., agechiei69 of1843,whichwould have promotedeconomic (politicaland military) ntegration.70In generaltermswe need to knowwhythe Kansei Reformsfailed.Our analysisofthe Kansei programs n the precedingpages seems to suggestthat the Bakufuwas unable to resolveconflicts f interestswithinthe Tokugawa system.For ex-ample, thegovernment ailedto convince thepeople of theneed to obey its regu-latoryordinances against social activitiesbecause its own moral pretensionsdidnotcorrespondto the times.The populace in generalpreferred morepermissivesocial atmosphereand therefore esisted ny governmental ntrusion.Sadanobu'splea forthe cooperation of the hangovernmentsn the restoration f rice priceslikewisefailed because his demand challenged the self-interestf thehan govern-ments. By the late eighteenthcenturythesegovernmentshad littleaffection orthe Bakufu.Sadanobu's monetarymeasures as well as hisbukka-hikisagerdinancelikewisemet witha similarfatewhen themerchantsflatly efused o complywiththe orderin defenseoftheir own interests. inally, his programsto improvethe

66 Yagi Akira k1ct, Kinsei oShohinyiitsiio9finiS Hanawa Shobo, 1962,pp. 179-92.67 Tsuda, pp. 272-4.68 tenryjX69 -

70 Kobayashi Shigeru Jit8, 'Tenpo noAgechiRei ni tsuite' kg -cV'Z7, inNihonshienkyui*PT , 30 (1956), p. 57;Tsuda Hideo, Tenpo aikaku oKeizaishitekigi'Hit$0,W 9in Nihon KeizaishiTaikei Kinsei ), pp. 347-51.


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164 Monumentaipponica,XXIII, 2flowofgoods to Edo through hereorganizationoftheexistingmarketmechanismalso proved a failure n the long run, simplybecause the Bakufucould not effec-tively nforce uchprogramswithoutthecooperationof thedaimyo and hatamoto.It is possible to conclude, then,that the ultimatefailure of the Kansei Reformsstemmedfrom he Bakufu's nabilityas a centralauthority o redirectestablishedeconomic interests nto a Bakufu-orientedconomy.

The Kansei Refor

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