The Israeli - Palestinian Violent Confrontation 2000-2004

8/7/2019 The Israeli - Palestinian Violent Confrontation 2000-2004

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T h e J e r u s a l e m I n s t i t u t eo r I s r a e l Stud ie sT h e T e d d y K o l l e k C e n t e ro r J e r u s a l e m S t u d i e s

T h e I s r a e l i - P a l e s t i n i a nV i o l e n t C o n f r o n t a t i o n2 0 0 0 - 2 0 0 4 :F r o m C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o nt o C o n f l i c t M a n a g e m e n t

Y a a c o v B a r - S i m a n - T o vE p h r a i m L a v i eK o b i M i c h a e lD a n i e l B a r - T a l


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The Jerusalem Institute for Israel StudiesThe Teddy Ko l l e k Center for Jerusalem Studies

T h e I s r a e l i - P a l e s t i n i a n V i o l e n t C o n f r o n t a t i o n2 0 0 0 - 2 0 0 4 :

F r o m C o n f l i c t R e s o l u t i o n to C o n f l i c t M a n a g e m e n tYaacov Bar-Siman-Tov

Ephraim LavieKobi MichaelDaniel B a r T a l

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The Teddy KoIIek Center for Jerusalem StudiesEstablished by:

T h e Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies & The Jerusalem Foundation

T h e J U S Research Series # 102

Th e Israe l i-P a le s t in ian Vio len t Con fron ta t ion 2000-200 4:F r o m Conf l i c t R e s o l u t i o n to C o n f l i c t M a n a g e m e n t

Yaacov Bar-Siman-TovEphraim LavieK o b i M i c h a e lDaniel B a r - T a l

Translation & Editing: Ralph Mandel

This publication was made possible by funds granted byThe Jacob and Hilda Blaustein Foundation

The Frankel FoundationThe Charles H . Revson Foundation

The statements made and the views expressed are solely the responsibilityof the authors.

2005, The Jerusalem Institute for Israel StudiesH ay Elyachar House

20 Radak St., 92186 JerusalemIsrael

http://www.jiis.org.il
http://www.jiis.org.il/http://www.jiis.org.il/


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A c k n o w l e d g m e n t s

This study is the product of a joint effort by a "think team" that convened at theJerusalem Institute for Israel Studies between September 2003 and December 2004.I want to take this opportunity to thank a l l the members o f the team, each separatelyand as a group, for the devotion, diligence, and insight they brought to the project,out of a belief i n its importance and in the hope that it w i l l contribute to the publicdiscourse. The members of the team are: Prof. Daniel B a r - T a l , D r . Y o s s i B e n - A r i ,Ephraim Halevy, Prof. TamarHerman, Prof. Ruth Lapidoth, Ephraim L a v i e , ReuvenMerhav, D r . K o b i M i c h a e l , D r . Yitzhak Reiter, Prof. E z r a Sadan, Prof. Dan Z a k a i ,and D r . Yiftah Zilberman.

Special thanks to the staff of the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies: to OraAchimeir, the Institute's director, and to Hamutal A p p e l and Ilanit Segen, withoutwhose dedicated support it would not have been possible to move the projectforward and bring it to fruition.

Prof. Yaacov Bar-Siman-TovHead, Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies


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T h e A u t h o r s

Prof. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov Professor of international relations, HebrewUniversity of Jerusalem, where he also holds the Giancarlo E l i a V a l o r i Chair forthe Study of Peace and Regional Cooperation; Director of the Swiss Center forConfl ict Research, Management and Resolution at the Hebrew University; andhead of the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies. He is the author or editor ofeight books and has published numerous articles on conflict management andresolution, mainly in reference to the Arab-Israeli conflict.Colonel (res.) Ephraim Lavie M i d d l e East expert, researcher at the MosheDayan Center, T e l A v i v University. Served in the Research D i v i s i o n of M i l i t a r yIntelligence as director of the Palestinian Arena and accompanied a ll the stages ofthe negotiations on the final-status settlement and the crisis that erupted in theirwake. During the first intifada and throughout the 1990s was adviser on Arabaffairs i n the C i v i l Administration in the territories. Has also specialized in subjectsrelating to Egypt and Jordan and radical Islam. He is a graduate of the Departmentsof M i d d l e East Studies and of A r a b i c Language and Literature at Tel A v i vUniversity, an honors graduate of the National Security College, M . A . in p o l i t i calscience from the University of H a if a, and currently a doctoral student at the Schoolo f History, T e l A v i v University.

D r. Kobi MichaelA research fel low at the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies.W as one of the founders and senior commanders o f the Israeli-Palestinian securitycoordination apparatus in the wake of the Oslo accords. Has written on aspects ofpolitical-military relations, security issues relating to Jerusalem, especially the"Jerusalem Envelope" security fence, characteristics of security cooperation inconditions of conflict, and the development of models for international involvementi n regions of conflict. A lecturer at the National Security College and in programsfo r conflict research at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and at Tel A v i vUniversity.

Prof. Daniel Bar-Tal Professor of social and pol i t ical psychology at the Schoolof Education and director of the Walter Lebach Research Institute for Jewish-


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Arab Coexistence through Education, T e l A v i v University. In 1999-2001 servedas president of the International Society of P o l i t i c a l Psychology. Areas of researchdeal with prevailing beliefs in societies, such as security-related beliefs aboutconflict ethos, delegitimization, siege mentality, and patriotism. A major area ofstudy is the psychological foundations of intractable conflicts. He has authoredand edited fifteen books and published more than one hundred articles and chaptersi n scholarly journals and books.


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P r e f a c e

The violent confrontation which erupted between Israel and the Palestinians inSeptember 2000 developed into a continuing low-intensity conflict which hasclaimed a steep price in blood on both sides, caused serious economic damage,and raised the level of mutual enmity and mistrust to heights that all but precludedialogue. The sense o f impasse and the failure of the efforts to end the confrontationor reduce its intensity led researchers of the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studiesto reexamine Israel's modes of conflict management over the past four years. Thegoal is to propose a conceptual framework which offers conflict-managementalternatives of a more controlled character, thus facilitating the transition frommanagement to resolution. The Palestinians' conflict management, which alsomerits an in-depth examination, is not addressed here even though it is a majorconsideration in Israel's management of the conflict.

The Institute's researchers felt that both the Israeli conception of managingthe conflict and the strategies that were adopted in the past four years wereinadequate. The high casualty rate and the economic and political price paid byIsrael constitute an enormous sacrifice, and in addition our moral principles areconstantly being tested as never before. Manifestly, a new and more creative wayo f thinking about this confrontation is urgently needed.

Four in i t ia l insights concerning the outcome of the conflict have emergedfrom statements made by the political and military levels and from the public andmedia discourse in Israel:1. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not conducive to a military solution.2. Management of the conflict has played itself out in the present format and

cannot end the confrontation or moderate it substantially.3. The sides are not yet ripe to resolve the conflict, only to manage it by means

o f limited or partial political arrangements aimed at reducing its intensity anddiminishing its damage. However, even here third-party assistance w i l l l i k e l ybe needed, owing to the residual hostility and mutual mistrust.

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4. As long as Israel believes that it has "no partner" on the Palestinian side for apolitical and security dialogue, it w i l l pursue (in coordination with the UnitedStates) a unilateral management strategy to enhance its security, by meanssuch as the separation fence and the disengagement plan.

In September 2003, as part of its effort to develop new conceptual modalities, theJerusalem Institute for Israel Studies initiated the creation of a "think group" toanalyze the situation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The group reexamined theunderlying assumptions and the strategies of managing the confrontation and setout to formulate principles for alternative conflict-management strategies,consistent with the evolving risks and opportunities.

The group, which held its first meeting on November 3, 2003, is multi-disciplinary in character and consists of experts from arange of fields: Prof. YaacovBar-Siman-Tov, Prof. Daniel B a r -T a l, Dr. Y o s s i B e n - A r i , Prof. Tamar Herman,M r . Ephraim L a v i e , Prof. Ruth Lapidoth, M r . Reuven Merhav, D r. K o b i M i c h a e l ,D r. Yitzhak Reiter, Prof. E z r a Sadan, Prof. Dan Z a k a i , and D r. Yiftah Zilberman.Meeting regularly once every few weeks, the group engaged in a dynamic processo f disseminating background and position papers, and of meetings of sub-teamswhich developed ideas and drew up documents.

The following subjects were examined and analyzed:1. Israel's conception and basic assumptions in the Oslo process (until the Taba

talks, January 2001).

2 . Israel's conception and basic assumptions during the period of theconfrontation, beginning in September 2000, and their implications andconsequences.

3. The process of Israel's management of the violent confrontation.

The conceptual underpinnings having been laid with regard to the characteristicsof the conflict's management from its beginning, the group w i l l examine in thenear future the following subjects:1. The implications of low-intensity conflict management, as in the Israeli-

Palestinian case, and the ability to bring it to a decisive conclusion or reduceit substantially in order to enable "bearable l i f e " for both sides.

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. The implications o f unilateral steps as a component in the strategy o f managingthe present confrontation, such as the separation fence and the disengagementplan (including the evacuation of settlements).

3. The possibilities o f joint management o f the conflict, involving limited Israeli-Palestinian cooperation, in order to reduce or terminate the confrontation,this to be done by means of i n i t i a l confidence-building measures, partialagreements, or interim agreements.

4. M i x e d initiatives and international intervention as a means of managing theconflict (a trusteeship regime in evacuated areas, the stationing of foreignforces for policing, and supervision and control over unilateral or bilateralmoves).

5. Implications of the transition from the conflict's management to its resolutionby means of existing or proposed initiatives the Geneva Initiative, theRoad M a p , or others.

The present paper analyzes two aspects:(1) The Israeli conception and basic assumptions in the Oslo process.(2) The Israeli conception and basic assumptions during the present Israeli-

Palestinian confrontation (from September 2000). The paper considers thesources and validity of these assumptions, describes the patterns of activitythat stemmed from the conception, and addresses the implications o f the actionstaken for both sides.

Prof. Yaacov Bar-Siman-TovHead, Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies

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C h a p t e r O n e : The I s r a e l i C o n c e p t i o na n d the B a s i c A s s u m p t i o n s o f I s r a e l i P o l i c y

i n R e l a t i o n s w i t h the P a l e s t i n ia n s , 1 9 9 3 - 2 0 0 0

After long years of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which in the terminology ofinternational conflict studies can be described as intractable1 and which was markedb y a multitude of violent acts peaking in the Lebanon War (1982) and theintifada during 1987-1993 Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization( P L O ) decided to launch a political process aimed at resolving the conflict. Thisprocess was a breakthrough which was made possible largely in the wake of theemergence of a new Israeli conception holding that it was possible, under certainconditions, to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The new conception, which was developed by the political echelon under theleadership of the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and of the Foreign Minister,Shimon Peres, was fundamentally revolutionary and at odds with the conventionalIsraeli conception, which maintained that the conflict was not ripe for resolutionbut only for management, and even then mainly by violence. The new conceptionevolved gradually and in the course of a lengthy learning process, against thebackground of the intifada, the G u l f War, the collapse of the Soviet U n i o n , theM a d r i d Conference, and the failure of the Washington talks (between Israel and ajoint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation representing the territories). The newconception was based on the following assumptions:2

1 Daniel Bar-Tal, "Societal Beliefs in Times of Intractable Conflict: The Israeli Case,"I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l of C o n f l i c t M a n a g e m e n t , 9 (1998), pp. 22-50. Also published in M e g a m o t ,39(4), (1999), pp. 443-491 (in Hebrew).2 The assumptions were defined and articulated on the basis of a large number of sourceswhich were available to us and which we drew on to write this chapter. They include interviewsfrom the research project of the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations of the HebrewUniversity of Jerusalem, which addressed the question, "What Went Wrong in the Israeli-PalestinianPeace Process?" See also: Gilad Sher, J u s t B e y o n d R e a c h : T h e I s r a e l i - P a l e s t i n i a n P e a c e N e g o t i a ti o n s1 9 9 9 - 2 0 0 1 (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth, 2001); Pursuing Peace: The Peace Speeches of Prime

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(1) The Israeli-Palestinian conflict cannot be decided by military means.(2) Israel does not want to continue ruling the Palestinians and wants to separate

from them.(3) A political process with the Palestinians i s a vital Israeli interest and i s possible

only with the P L O , headed by Yasser Arafat.(4) The P L O and Arafat are w i l l i n g to enter a political process and can be

negotiating partners for a political settlement in the light of the strategicchanges that have occurred in their positions, namely: abandonment of theprinciples of the "armed struggle" and the "phased doctrine"; readiness torecognize Israel and reach agreement on the establishment of a Palestinianstate within the 1967 borders based on United Nations Security C o u n c i lResolutions 242 and 3 3 8 ; and solution of the refugee problem on the basis o fU . N . General Assembly Resolution 194. Israel was aware of (and rejected)the Palestinians' conditions concerning the right of return and Jerusalem asthe capital o f Palestine, but hoped that these were maximal positions o n which

Minister Yitzhak Rabin (Tel Aviv: Zmora-Bitan, 1995); Danny Rubinstein, Robert Malley, HusseinAgha, Ehud Barak and Benny Morris, R a s h o m o n C a m p D a v i d (TelAviv: Yedioth Ahronoth,2003);Itamar Rabinovich, W a g i n g P e a c e : I s r a e l and the A r a b s , 1 9 4 8 - 2 0 0 3 (Tel Aviv: Kinneret, Zmora-Bitan, Dvir, 2004); Ron Pundak and Shaul Arieli, The T e r r i t o r i a l A s p e c t of t h e I s r a e l i - P a l e s t i n i a nF i n a l Status N e g o t i a t i o n , Peres Center for Peace, 2003; Uri S a w i r r T h e P r o c ess (Tel Aviv: YediothAhronoth, 1998); Yagil Levy, The O t h e r A r m y of I s r a e l : M a t e r i a l i s t M i l i t a r i s m i n I s r a e l , TapuahSeries ( T e l Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth, 2003); Moshe Ya'alon, "Force preparation for a limited conflict,"M a a r a k h o t , 380-381 (December 2001), pp. 24-29; Gershon Hacohen, '"Test of the outcome' as atestof tendencies,'' M a a r a k h o t , 383 (May 2002), pp. 12-15;Yair Hirschfeld, O s l o : A F o r m u l a forP e a c e - F r o m N e g o ti a ti o n s to I m p l e m e n t a t i o n (Tel Aviv: Rabin Center and Am Oved, 2000); GalHirsh, "From 'Molten Lead' to 'Another Way' Development of the campaign in the CentralCommand 2000-2003," M a a r a k h o t , 393 (Feb. 2004), pp. 26-31;Raviv Drucker, E h u d B a r a k : TheF a i l u r e (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth, 2002); Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov (ed.),As the G e n e r a l s See it:T h e C o l l a p s e o f t h e O s l o P r o c ess and t h e V i o le n t I s r a e l i - P a l e s t i n i a n C o n f l i c t (Jerusalem: The LeonardDavis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2003); Ronen Bergman,A u t h o r i t y G i v e n (Tel Aviv: Miskal Yedioth Ahronoth and Hemed Books, 2002); Shlomo Ben-A m i , A F r o n t W i t h o u t A R e a r g u a r d (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth, 2004);Yossi Beilin, M a n u a l f o r aW o u n d e d D o v e ( T e l Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth, 2001); Ran Edelist, E h u d B a r a k : F i g h t i n g t h e D e m o n s(Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth and Zmora-Bitan, 2003).

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the Palestinians would show f l e x i b i l i t y during the negotiating process,knowing Israel was unable to accept them.

(5) The P L O is ready to accept Israel's position that the political process must begradual and conducted in stages, with the problematic issues such as thestatus of Jerusalem, the refugee problem, the borders, the settlements, andthe security arrangements to be discussed at the stage of the final-statussettlement.

(6) An interim settlement can be achieved without third-party participation that is, without mechanisms of supervision, verification, oversight, andcontrol with the form of the permanent settlement left open.

(7) Israel's strength and the P L O ' s political weakness w i l l accord Israel enhancedbargaining positions in the negotiations.

(8) The P L O ' s commitment to abstain from and prevent terrorism w i l l make itpossible to transfer to its hands the burden of the war against Palestinianterrorism.

(9) Mutual trust can be created in a continuing peace process.(10) The establishment of a Palestinian Authority w i l l bring about responsible

behavior by the Palestinians, as a governing authority and formal institutionscreate a quasi-state which immediately "has something to lose" and thereforew i l l negotiate with Israel responsibly on a "fair compromise."

F o l l o w i n g the signing of the Oslo accord, Israel did not fundamentally change itsbasic conception vis-a-vis both the Oslo process, the P L O and its leader, Arafat,even though in the Israeli perception Arafat and the Palestinian Authority did notfully honor their commitment to abstain from violence and to thwart terrorism byPalestinian organizations.3 At the same time, Israel was generally satisfied with

3 In the Palestinians' perception, the Israeli side did not fulfill its commitments within theOslo process framework either, especially in regard to continued building in the settlements andthe ongoing increase in their population, and because the additional interim stages of the originalaccord went largely unimplemented.

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the security cooperation between the sides4 its evaluation was that Arafat wascommitted to the political process and to the solution of two states for the twonations.

This conception d i d not basically change, at least not outwardly and officially,during the premiership of Benjamin Netanyahu, despite the violent events thatfollowed the opening of the Western W a l l Tunnel, in September 1996, whenPalestinian policemen for the first time used weapons they had received fromIsrael against the I D F , and despite the slowdown in the negotiations. On the basiso f this basic approach and its underlying assumptions, Israeli governments signedinterim agreements entailing the transfer of powers and territory to the PalestinianAuthority. The negotiations with Arafat and his staff continued during the tenureo f Ehud Barak as Prime Minister, at the Camp D a v i d conference in July 2000hosted by US President B i l l C l i n t o n , and in the Taba talks the following January.

T h e validity of this conception, which as noted was formulated during theperiod of the Rabin government, was largely undermined after the Camp D a v i dsummit, when Barak blamed Arafat for the failure to reach an agreement andasserted that the Palestinian leader was not a partner for peace negotiations.5 Atthe same time, Barak's policy reflected a duality in Israeli policy, as negotiationswith the Palestinians continued until January 2001 despite his complaint about the"absence of a partner." Barak cited a series of developments the failure to

4 This was the view of the Shin Bet security service, which was responsible for cooperation withthe intelligence bodies of the Palestinian Authority aimed at foiling terrorism. Shin Bet policy reliedlargely on conveying intelligence alerts and reports to the Palestinian intelligence organizations sothey would act to thwart attacks. The Shin Bet tended to show a certain understanding for thePalestinians' passivity. However, this policy was harshly criticized by senior officers in MilitaryIntelligence and in the I D F i n general, who insisted that Arafat and the Palestinian security apparatuseswere not doing all they could and should be doing: see Aluf Benn and Eitan Rabin, "MI director:'Lebanonization in Gaza. Arafat not likely to act against terrorism'," H a a r e t z (Dec. 5, 1994); AlufBenn, Eitan Rabin and Sammy Sokol, "Shahak: 'Doubts about security arrangements based oncoordination with Palestinian police'," H a a r e t z (Sept. 29, 1996).5 Nitzan Horowitz and Aluf Benn, "Barak sends letter to Clinton announcing that he is leavingCamp David," H a a r e t z (July 20, 2000); Nitzan Horowitz and Yossi Verter, "Camp David fails...Barak: Vision of peace not dead," H a a r e t z (July 26, 2000); Lally Weymouth, "Stream of Life,"interview with Ehud Barak, N e w s w e e k (May 6, 2002); Ehud Barak, "Israelneeds a true partner forpeace,"New Y o r k T i m e s (July 30, 2001); Ehud Barak, "More an actor than a leader," N e w s w e e k(May 12, 2003); A r i Shavit, interview with Ehud Barak, H a a r e t z M a g a z i n e (Sept. 6, 2002).16


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permanent settlement at Camp D a v i d , the eruption of the violenti n September 2000, and Arafat's refusal to accept Israel's far-reaching

C l i n t o n blueprint verbatim as proof o f Arafat's unwillingnesswhich was needed to reach a solution of two

for the two nations.Some of the Israelis who participated in the Camp D a v i d talks formed the

that the two basic tests for the Palestinians' true intentions in regard tothe conflict were the Temple Mount and the right of return. During the

subsequent negotiations they found that the Palestinians weret interested in resolving the conflict in accordance with Israeli expectations

ot only because they showed no readiness to compromise on Jerusalem, the Templeand the return of the refugees, but also because they declined to accept

el as a Jewish state with a legitimate right to exist i n the region, because Israel'sent had done them a grave and irreparable wrong.6

It i s noteworthy that members of the Israeli delegation later expressed differingpinions about the Camp D a v i d talks.7 Since then, a great deal has been published

about the conference, not least by several of the participants, showing largedisparities in the description of the events and the reasons for the outcome.8

6 AriShavit, interview with Shlomo Ben-Ami, H a a r e t z M a g a z i n e (Sept. 14, 2001); A r i Shavit,interview with Ehud Barak, H a a r e t z M a g a z i n e (Sept. 6, 2002).7 Jeremy Pressman, "Visions in Collision What Happened at Camp David and Taba?"I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u ri t y , vol. 28 (2003),pp. 5-43.8 Gilad Sher, J u s t B e y o n d R e a c h ; Shlomo Ben-Ami, A F r o n t W i t h o u t A R e a r g u a r d ; Ari Shavit,interview with Ehud Barak, H a a r e t z M a g a z i n e (Sept. 6, 2002); personal interviews within theframework of the DavisInstitute;A r i Shavit, interview with Dan Meridor, H a a r e t z M a g a z i n e (March2003); conference on "The Camp David summit 2000 What went wrong? Lessons for thefuture" (Tel Aviv University, June 16-18, 2003), lectures by Ehud Barak, Danny Yatom, AmnonLipkin-Shahak, Gilad Sher, Dan Meridor, Yisrael Hasson,Yossi Ginossar, Martin Indyk, and AaronMiller. See also Danny Rubinstein et al., R a s h o m o n C a m p D a v i d; Menahem Klein, S h a t t e r i n g aT a b o o : The C o n t a c t s T o w a r d a P e r m a n e n t Status A g r e em e n t i n J e r u s a le m 1 9 9 4 - 2 0 0 1 (Jerusalem:JerusalemInstitute for Israel Studies, 2001); Yoram Meital, P e a c e in T a t t e r s I s r a e l , P a l e s t in e andt h e M i d d l e E a st (Jerusalem: Carmel, 2004), pp. 33-45; Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, "CampDavid: The Tragedy of Errors,"New Y o r k R e v i e w of B o o k s (August 9, 2001); Arie Kacowicz,"Rashomon in Jerusalem: Mapping the Israeli Position in the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process 1993-2001," paper presented at the conference, "Assessing the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations 1993-2001" (Leonard DavisInstitute for International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem); Acram

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Nevertheless, a survey of the comments made by the majority of the participantsshows that even though certain agreements were in fact reached during thenegotiations, failure to reach a settlement was due largely to the dispute overJerusalem and the Temple Mount.9 Afterward, however, the political echelonintimated to the Israeli public that the major issue in dispute was the Palestiniansposition concerning the right o f return. Israeli officials construed this as reflectingthe Palestinians' unwillingness to arrive at a two-state political solution andexplained that the reason was Arafat's commitment to the phased doctrine. Itfollowed that the violent confrontation was planned and initiatedby the Palestiniansand constituted an existential general war. 10

Arafat and the Palestinian negotiating team argued, for their part, that Barak'sproposals at Camp Dav id were insufficient and unworthy and were part of anIsraeli-American conspiracy aimed at imposing an unjust and unfair settlement.11I n their perception, Israel, with the connivance of the United States, had tried todictate a solution tailored exclusively to the Israeli interest, and its proposals atCamp Dav id would not enable the creation of a durable state. From their point ofview, the fact that they rejected Barak's proposals does not mean that they areunwilling to resolve the conflict but that they are unable to accept an agreement

Hannieh, "The Camp David Papers/' J o u r n a l o f P a l e s t i n e Stud ies , vol. 30 (2001), pp. 75-97; DennisRoss, "Camp David: An Exchange," New Y o r k R e v i e w of Boo k s (September 20, 2001); CharlesEnderlin, The S h a t t e r e d D r e a m s : The F a i l u r e of t h e P e a c e Proce s s i n the M i d d l e E a s t 1 9 9 5 - 2 0 0 2(New York: Other Press, 2003).9 Menahem Klein, S h a t t e r i n g a T a b o o : The C o n t a c t s T o w a r d a P e r m a n e n t Sta tus A g r e e m e n t inJ e r u s a l e m 1 9 9 4 - 2 0 0 1 ; Sher, Ju s t B e y o n d R e a c h , pp. 228-235; Aluf Benn, "No change in Palestinians'positions," H a a r e t z (Sept. 1,2001); Danny Rubinstein, "Temple Mount top item," H a a r e t z (June 21,2004);Khalil Shikaki, "New Thinking aboutJerusalem," presentationat conference inWashingtonD . C . , www.centerpeace.org (Sept. 5, 2000);Pressman, "Visions in Collision."1 0 Amos Gilad, "Evaluation of developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict," in Bar-Siman-Tov, As the G e n e r a l s See It, pp. 39-48; Yosef Kuperwasser, "Identity of the other: Complexity of thestructure of the Palestiniansociety," ibid., pp. 27-37;interview with Ariel Sharon, M a a r i v M a g a z i n e(Sept. 5, 2002);Ari Shavit, interview with the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Moshe Ya'alon,H a a r e t z M a g a z i n e (Aug. 29, 2002); Ari Shavit, interview with Ariel Sharon, H a a r e t z M a g a z i n e(April 13, 2001).1 1 Acram Hannieh, "The Camp David Papers"; Abu Mazen, "We went to Camp David so no onewould say the Palestiniansrefuse to negotiate," H a a r e t z (Aug. 9, 2001); RobertMalley andHusseinAgha, "How Barak torpedoed the Camp David talks," Y e d i o t h A h r o n o t h (July 20, 2001); TracyWilkinson, "Blame for Camp David talks' failure takes atwist," Los Ange l e s T i m e s (July 29, 2001).18


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does not meet the following strategic goals: (1) establishment o f an independentstate within the 1967 borders which does not tolerate restrictions on its

apart from security arrangements; (2) Arab Jerusalem as the

of the refugee problem based on U . N . General Assembly Resolution 194.12I n retrospect, it appears that Israel's demand for the "termination o f the conflict"

terms was construed by the Palestinians as an attempt to subjugate thenarrative to the Israeli narrative. Any such "subjugation," from their

political option.13 This Israeli demand shifted theby the two sides from the outcome of the 1967 war to that of the 1948political crisis thus reflected, at a very high level of intensity, the clash

and the end of the Palestinians' claims, in return for far-reachingthat reflected the outcome of the 1967 War: establishment of a

state, ceding of the majority of Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Stripthe Jordan Rif t V a l l e y ) , uprooting of settlements, and the division of

D a v i d , as in the negotiations that followed, theside became acquainted with the Palestinians' determination not to resolvee conflict, as this entailed only a solution to the outcome of the 1967 war.

1 2 This policy position of the Palestinians is permanent and overt and has not changed since itsadoption by the 19th Palestinian National Council, in November 1988.1 3

Sher, J u s t B e y o n d R e a c h , p. 416. The Israeli argument is that the Palestinians' insistence onachieving justice ruled out the possibility of reaching a settlement, as they sought not a solution but(Ben-Ami, A F r o n t W i th o u t A R e a r g u a r d , pp. 475,497). Justice means setting right the "historic

wrong" that was inflicted on the Palestinians by Israel's very establishment. See also Gilad,Evaluation of developments," p. 40; and Yosef Kuperwasser, "The Palestinian vision A state inll of Palestine," H a a r e t z (June 23, 2004). The Palestinians maintain that they will never be able toccept that the eventsof the 1948-1949war were just. At the same time, the Palestinian mainstream

s apparently ready, for lack of any other choice, to accept the war's outcome and reach an agreementn asettlement, but as it will not be "just" it will also not be final and absolute. They draw a practicalistinction between a "just settlement," which includesasweeping and full realization of the right ofeturn but is not practicable, and apossible settlement which will address the outcome of the 1967

war and will at most recognize the historic wrong but will not realize the right of return in practice.However, the Israeli side, by insisting that the Palestinians declare the conflict terminated, implicitlyasked them to acknowledge that the 1948-1949 war and its outcome were just, which is a positionthe Palestinianswill never be able to accept.

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C h a p t e T w o : A New I s r a e l i I n t e r i m C o n c e p t i o n :F r o m the S t a r t o f t h e I n t i f a d a u n t i l the E n d

o f t h e B a r a k G o v e r n m e n t

to achieve a permanent settlement, compounded by the eruption ofat the end of September 2000, gradually produced a change

the Israeli conception. In the first stage, until the Barak government was votedut of office (February 2001), a k i n d of interim conception was articulated inaddress both the failure of Camp D a v i d and the continuing negotiations

w e l l as the Palestinian violence. The task of Israel's policymakers wasup with a new political-strategic conception which would allow the

tiations to continue but deny the Palestinians political gains through violence,t also allow for restrained military activity to ensure that the confrontation was

within boundaries offering reasonable security for the country's citizensd not harm the chances of the political process.

It was made clear to the army that the policy of containment was not intendedthe Palestinians or bring about their collapse, developments whichto end the political process and lead to the conflict's inter-

14 O n e of the reasons for the decision to pursue the political processs the security establishment's assessment that Arafat wanted an agreement ifterms were fulf i lled within the Palestinians' narrow parameters of f l e x i b i l i t y .

the political and security echelons also believed that the most effectiveto stop or reduce the violence was through the political process. This

was backed by the premise that the violent confrontation with themeans and that even i f they endured a

mauling the resulting calm would be short-lived and their "minimumpeace would remain unchanged.15

4 Major General Moshe Ya'alon, deputy Chief of Staff, "Victory and decision in a limited conflict,"u n i m b e b it a h o n l e u m i (July 2001), p. 80.

5 Shlomo Ben-Ami, A F r o n t W i t h o u t A R e a r g u a r d , pp. 329-330, 360,426. Anunderlying reasonrecommendation of both the Israeli intelligencecommunityand the National Security Council

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Formulating this conception coherently was rendered highly problematic byits many internal contradictions. The policymakers, headed by Barak, felt utterlyfrustrated by the failure o f the Camp D a v i d summit and placed the blame o n Arafat.Nevertheless, the political process continued, now "under fire.'' It is noteworthythat Barak later admitted that the post-Camp D a v i d negotiations were conductedprimarily for domestic political needs, even though he himself had lost a l l faith inArafat's intention to reach an agreement.16 In addition, the multiplying acts ofterrorism made it difficult both to continue the negotiations and keep the militaryresponse moderate under the containment policy, i n accordance with the directiveso f the political l e v e l . 1 7

T h e success of the new conception, which integrated a political process witha controlled response to the Palestinian violence, depended largely on the process'sprospects of success and on the ability to contain the military confrontation.However, the lack of rapid progress toward a settlement despite intensifiednegotiating efforts, combined with heightened violence, rendered this conceptionunviable.

Israel's willingness to proceed with the negotiations even after the eruptiono f the intifada derived in part from the i n i t i a l evaluation of most elements of theIsraeli intelligence community that this was a popular uprising which Arafat hadnot planned in advance.18 The Israeli intelligence assessment of possible violence

that the political process be continued was the assumption that the negotiations themselves wouldhelp abate the violence.

1 6 Ehud Barak, lecture at Tel Aviv University at the conference on "The Camp David Summit(2000) What went wrong? Lessons for the future" (June 16-18, 2003).1 7 Ben-Ami, A F r o n t W i t h o u t A R e a r g u a r d , pp. 318-319; Ben Caspit, "The intifada two yearson Part 1," M a a r i v (Sept. 6, 2002); Ben Caspit, "The intifada two years on Part 2," M a a r i v(Sept. 13, 2002); Sher, Ju s t B e y o n d R e a c h , p. 349; Beilin, M a n u a l f o r a W o u n d e d D o v e , pp. 256-257; personal interviewsby Kobi Michael with Yossi Sarid, Amnon-Lipkin-Shahak, and Gilad Sher.

1 8 However, there is a contradiction here, which should be emphasized, between the assessmentwhich foresaw given abreakdown in the political process and failure to achieve a settlement the outbreak of a violent but limited uprising which would be controlled fromabove, and the eruptionof the intifada from below. The research bodies of the Shin Bet, Military Intelligence (MI) and theForeign Ministry agreed that the confrontation was a popular eruption from below, which Arafatexploited for his own purposesbut which then lurched out of his control. However, senior levels in

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antedated the Camp D a v i d summit and was based on the apprehension that thedisparities between the sides about the final-status agreement might lead thePalestinians to declare an independent state unilaterally, sparking a limited conflict.This assessment was one of the factors that prompted Barak, according to his ownaccount, to try and reach a settlement with the Palestinians in order to avertviolence.19

However, according to assessment sources within the intelligence community,the background to the violence that erupted in September 2000 was the ripeningo f conditions for the outbreak of a popular uprising against both the PalestinianAuthority a n d Israel. Their appraisal was that the Palestinian public was increasinglyrestive in the face of the centralism and corruption of the Palestinians' self-rulegovernment, along with accumulated bitterness at the Oslo process, which hadfailed to ameliorate the economic situation or alleviate the sense of occupation i n the form o f restrictions on movement and a constant Israeli military presence while enabling continued building in the settlements, land expropriations,a n d the building of bypass roads. In July 2000, when it became clear to thePalestinian public that no agreement that would remove the occupation hadbeen reached, a process began to gel akin to that of 1987, accompanied by afeeling of the need to help the leadership breach the political deadlock. In largemeasure, then, the events of September 2000 were an expression of distress and

M I were disinclined to accept this conclusion and held instead that Arafat initiated, guided, andcontrolled the violence: Yossi Melman, "Dispute between Shin Bet and MI on Arafat's part in thedisturbances," H a a r e t z (Nov. 16, 2000). The director of M I , Major General Amos Malka, told theKnesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on November 21, 2000, that the events in theterritories were shifting from a popular uprising (stone throwing, demonstrations) to popularresistance, characterized by a lower level of civilian involvement and increased terrorist activity.See: Gideon Alon, " M I chief: Arafat will continue with terrorism," H a a r e t z (Nov. 22, 2000); MajorMichael, "Has Arafat returned to the armed struggle strategy?" M a a r a k h o t , 381 (December 2001),p. 6; Akiva Eldar, H a a r e t z (June 10, 11, 2004);Alex Fishman, Y e d i o t h A h r o n o t h (June 11, 2004);Yoav Stern, interview with Ephraim Lavie, H a a r e t z (June 13, 2004); Yoav Stern, interview withAmos Gilad, H a a r e t z (June 15,2004); Danny Rubinstein, "Mistaken evaluationproves self-fulfilling,"interview with Matti Steinberg, H a a r e t z (June 16, 2004); Yoel Esteron, H a a r e t z (June 23, 2004);Amos Malka, "Retroactiverewriting," Y e d i o t h A h r o n o t h (June 30, 2004).

1 9 A r i Shavit, interview with Ehud Barak, H a a r e t z M a g a z i n e (Sept. 6, 2002).23


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frustration on the part of the majority of the Palestinian public toward both the P Aan d Israel.20

September 28, 2000, the date on which A r i e l Sharon, the chairman of theL i k u d party, paid a controversial visit to the Temple Mount, is usually consideredthe start of the violent confrontation known as " A l - A q s a Intifada." Agitated bythe event, the Palestinians initiated disturbances which required the interventiono f the Israeli security forces. The next day, in the course of the riots, sevenPalestinians were k i l l e d and about 300 wounded; a few dozen policemen wereinjured on the Israeli side. In the days that followed, the disturbances spread tovarious places in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and even into Israel. Thesecurity forces, who were prepared for a violent confrontation initiated by thePalestinian Authority's security organizations, responded with great force to quellthe unrest. T h e Palestinians sustained heavy losses:21141 Palestinians were k i l l e d

2 0 D r. Matti Steinberg, an adviser to the head of the Shin Bet at the time, told Danny Rubinsteinin an interview, "The intifada did not result from a decision reached up above; it stemmed from amood that swept through the Palestinian public. The Palestinians felt as though they had reached adead end due to the failure of the Camp David summit. Their economic and personal circumstancesworsened. The PA frameworks collapsed. Corruption was rampant. These structural circumstancestook hold; they awaited a pretext to erupt," "Mistaken evaluation proves self-fulfilling," H a a r e t z(June 16, 2004); A m i Ayalon, a former head of the Shin Bet, said in a lecture entitled, "The dreamshattered: A n analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process," "Al-Aqsa Intifada was initially anunplanned popular phenomenon which did not operate according to a defined political goal. Theuprising was aimed against Israel, against the entire political process, and even against the PalestinianAuthority," in Bar-Siman-Tov (ed.), A s t h e G e n e r a l s S e e I t , p. 11; Amos Malka, the director of M I atthe time, noted in his article, "Retroactive rewriting," Y ed i o t h A h r o n o t h (June 30, 2004), "There isno unequivocal evidence that Arafat ignited the conflagration in September 2000" and that "it ismore likely that it erupted from below." In an interview to H a a r e t z , Malka said, "... When theconfrontation erupted, Arafat thought he was going towards something far more limited, whichwould have a shock effect... Within two or three days, Arafat was unable to go against the street,"Akiva Eldar, "His true face," interview with Amos Malka, H a a r e t z (June 11, 2004); and see alsotalks given by EphraimLavie, who at the time was chief of Central Arena in MilitaryIntelligence'sResearch Division, on "The Palestinian society in the wake of the intifada"; at the Peres Center forPeace (May 18,2003); at the Dayan Center (Jan. 29,2004);at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies,Te l Aviv University; and at the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies (June 21, 2004).2 1 Ben-Ami, in his book A F r o n t W i t h o u t A R e a r g u a r d , notes (p. 319): "The IDF High Commandhad a different agenda; the spirit of its commanders projected exploding rage which ultimately led tothe expansion of the vicious cycle of violence, instead of reducing it."24


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and about 500 wounded by the end of October, and another 186 were k i l l e d andabout 540 wounded in November-December; 82 Palestinians were k i l l e d and 700wounded in the first three months of 2001.22

I n the first months of the confrontation the violence was manifested largelyas mass disturbances in which Israeli security forces clashed with Palestinians.Terrorism i n this period mainly took the form o f Palestinians opening fire on Israelivehicles in the West Bank, the murder of Israelis in the areas of the PalestinianAuthority, and ambushes of I D F soldiers. Acts of terrorism in public places wererare. The first suicide bombing attack in which three people were murdered inNetanya was perpetrated on March 4, 2001. By the end of October 2000, 11Israelis (civilians and soldiers) had been k i l l e d and one wounded; in November-December 2000, 31 Israelis were k i l l e d and 84 wounded; and in the first threemonths of 2001, 28 Israelis were k i l l e d and 98 wounded.23

The shift i n the Israeli attitude toward the intifada occurred i n December 2000,i n the light of the escalating violence. The military dynamics which developedtransformed the popular uprising into a full-fledged armed conflict. The armedelements in Fatah-Tanzim, and afterward in Hamas and the other organizations,seized the initiative in the violent confrontation, which expanded to encompassattacks on civilians and security forces on the roads, shooting at settlements andI D F bases, and terrorist attacks in Israeli population centers. One view in both theIsraeli political and security establishments was that the IDF ,s excessive reactionmight have contributed to the escalation. The army, which as noted had preparedf o r the possibility of a violent eruption in which the Palestinian security forceswould take part, conducted the war on the basis of purely military considerations,without paying sufficient attention to the political side. The army abandoned itsstrict adherence to the policy of containment, in the spirit of the political echelon'sguidelines, and thereby contributed to the escalation of the conflict. The IDF's

2 2 Data from the Internet site of the Palestine RedCrescent Society:www.palestinercs.org.According to IDFdata, 129 Palestinians were killed by the end of October, another170 in November-December, and 67 in the first three months of 2001. See Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, TheS e v e n t h War: H o w We Won and Why We L o s t the War w i t h the P a l e s t i n i a n s (Tel Aviv: YediothAhronoth, 2004), p. 401.2 3 Data from the Internet site of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs:www.mfa.gov.il.

25
http://www.palestinercs.org/http://www.mfa.gov.il/http://www.mfa.gov.il/http://www.palestinercs.org/


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excessive reaction was intended not only to contain the confrontation but to forcethe Palestinians to surrender. The goal was to punish them for engendering theviolence and to teach them a lesson they would never forget that violencewould not advance their political goals and bring them to the negotiating tableweak and debilitated.24 The major result was the failure of the containment policy.This is reflected most tellingly in the large number of Palestinians k i l l e d , and this,i n turn, contributed to an undesirable escalation of the violence because thePalestinian organizations were intent on equalizing the "balance of blood." Thesedevelopments were compounded by the weakening of the Palestinian Authority,the prelude to its disintegration.25

I n its first stage, during the period of the Barak government (until February2001), the two sides treated the violent confrontation as a "bargaining conflict" that is, not necessarily as a zero-sum conflict but as a struggle by the Palestiniansto improve their bargaining position in negotiations.

A t the same time, the Palestinian leadership set no specific goals for theintifada, which indeed sprang from below. Initially, Arafat utilized it to try topressure Israel into showing greater f l e x i b i l i t y in negotiations "under fire" and in

2 4 Sher, Ju s t B e y o n d R e a c h , p. 368; Ben-Ami, A F r o n t W i t h o u t A R e a r gu a rd , pp. 319-321. Ben-A m i maintains that the army's reaction was in some cases ten times greater than what had beenauthorized, or than the spirit of the authorization, which was usually reductive in character (p. 321).A t the beginning of October the balance stood at 75 Palestinians who had been killed and fourIsraelis. Initially, the ratio of fatalities stood at 20:1. See: Caspit, "The intifada two years on Part1," M a a r i v (Sept. 6, 2002); and "The intifada two years on Part 2," M a a r i v (Sept, 13, 2002);Reuven Pedatzur, "The IDF's contributionto the escalation," H a a r e t z (June 30, 2004). Shaul Mofazdenies these allegations. The IDF, he says, did not cause the escalation, and the feeling that it didstems from the fact that it had prepared for a confrontation and that this took the Palestinians bysurprise: Alex Fishman, interview with Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, Y e d i o t h A h r o n o t h (January30, 2004).2 5 Caspit, "The intifada two years on Part 1," M a a r i v (Sept. 6, 2002); and, "The intifada twoyears on Part 2," M a a r i v (Sept, 13, 2002); Ben-Ami, A F r o n t W i t h o u t A R e a r g u a r d , pp. 319-322;G a l Hirsh, "From 'Molten Lead' to 'Another Way'," p. 28. The Palestinian armed groups grewstronger and became the dominant elements in setting the agenda and conducting the affairs in theirsociety, while the PA's ministries and security organizations, the symbols of the Oslo process, weremarginalized and gradually lost their ability to function: Alex Fishman, interview with BrigadierGeneral Gadi Eizenkot, Y e d i o t h A h r o n o t h (April 11, 2004).


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an effort to extract concessions beyond what Israel offered at Camp D a v i d . Thegoal was to force Israel to recognize the Palestinians' rights in accordance withU . N . Resolutions (194, 242, 338), such that any agreement would be based on arecognized international source of authority and not be dependent on theasymmetrical situation between the two sides. Subsequently, when the negotiationswere stopped after the Israeli proposals and the C l i n t o n document were retracted,creating a political vacuum, the confrontation snowballed until neither side couldcontrol it any longer. W i t h no prospect of returning to the negotiating table in thisstate of affairs, the Palestinian leadership sought to exploit the confrontation tointernationalize the conflict along the lines of Kosovo international intervention,including multinational peacekeeping forces thus also depriving the UnitedStates of exclusivity and increasing European involvement.26 The Islamists, though,uninterested i n these goals o f the official leadership, set out to yoke the confrontationto its ideological agenda of armed struggle and no settlement with Israel.27

A t the outset of the confrontation Israel's declared goal was to proceed withthe negotiations despite the violence, with the aim of achieving a final-statussettlement, while trying to restore calm as quickly as possible. Israel, that i s , soughtto contain the violence and avert an escalation that was liable to spark a regionalconflagration and/or internationalize the conflict. Accordingly, Israel respectedPalestinian sovereignty i n Area A and the I D F d i d not operate there systematically

2 6 Shai Feldman, "The October violence: An interimassessment," S t r a t e g i c A s s e s s m e n t (Tel AvivUniversity, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies,Tel Aviv University, vol. 3, no. 3, November 2000).2 7 See Yael Yehoshua, " O n the conflict betweenHamas and the Palestinian Authority/' M E M R IInquiry and Analysis Series No. 143, July 18, 2003, at www.memri.org/bin/articales.cgi?Page=archive&Area=ia&ID=IA14303. The article discusses the differences between Hamas andthe P L O / P A in regard to the struggle against Israel: Hamas advocates the liberation of a ll of Palestine,which according to the organization's charter is Waqf Islamic land meaning that none of it can beceded whereas the P L O seeks to establish a Palestinian state alongside Israel; as for the means toachieve the goal, Hamas believes jihad is the only solution to the Palestine question. See also: ArnonRegular, "Hamas decries Arafat remarks to H a a r e t z : Validates refugees' expulsion," H a a r e t z (June22,2004). According to the report, senior figures in Hamas sharply criticized Arafat after he told thepaper that he recognizes the fact that Israel is aJewish state and that the Jewshave an attachment tothe Western Wall, supports a settlement based on the transfer of 98 percent of the West Bank to thePalestinians, and acknowledges the unfeasibility of returning all the Palestinian refugees to theirhomes and land.

27
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(until Operation Defensive Shield, in the spring of 2002). The security forceswere directed to act in a manner that would accord the political level maximumf l e x i b i l i t y in conducting negotiations with the Palestinians.

This stage can be summed up as the failure of the Israeli attempt to crystallizea two-pronged conception continuation of the political process combined witha policy of containment to cope effectively with the violence which led to achange of government. Barak's policy was characterized by duality as regards therationale for conducting negotiations under fire and the possibility of achieving asettlement with the Palestinians. It may be this duality that accounts for the politicalechelon's inability to compel the military to carry out an effective containmentpolicy.28 The biting criticism, from both the political opposition and the public atlarge, also undercut the legitimacy of conducting negotiations under fire. Thecriticism was especially seething during the Taba talks, which were held in theshadow of the election campaign in Israel. Significant progress was reportedlymade in the talks, but they were broken off amid a mutual promise to completethem in the future.29

The public criticism and the need to assuage public opinion (on the eve of theelections) after the failure to obtain a political agreement induced the politicalechelon to pin sole blame for the collapse of the peace process and for initiatingthe violence on the Palestinians. The political leaders reiterated more forcefullythe complaints they had voiced against the Palestinian leadership after the failureo f Camp D a v i d . 3 0 M u c h of the public accepted these arguments as the unvarnished,

2 8 Ben-Ami, A F r o n t W i t h o u t A R e a r g u a r d , reports that he spoke to Barak about the need for himto flex his muscles with the army, "which is behaving like a state within a state,1' p. 397. Accordingto Ben-Ami, Barak sent a double message: "Both to continue with the talks... and to deepen andextend the military response to Palestinian violence," p. 402. Ultimately, Barak failed to get themilitary level to internalize the political message: "This was especially pronounced in his inabilityto make the High Command part of his peace policy," p. 468.2 9 David Matz, "Why did Taba end?" P a le s t i n e -I sr a e l J o u r n a l , vol. 10 (2003), issue 3, pp. 96-105, and issue 4, pp. 92-104;Pressman, "Visions in collision."

3 0 Ari Shavit, interview with Ehud Barak, H a a r e t z M a g a z i n e (September 6, 2002); Sher, Ju s tB e y o n d R e a c h , p. 416; Ben-Ami,A F r o n t W i t h o u t A R e a r g u a r d , pp. 377,445,447,455-456,463-476.


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unchallengeable truth, though others viewed them as an excuse by the politicallevel to shake off its responsibility and make Arafat the v i l l a i n . 3 1

B e that as it m a y , the underlying rationale of the new Israeli policy that thePalestinians must not be allowed to make political gains by means of violence also failed. The fact is that in the negotiating process, which narrowed the gapsbetween the two sides' positions, the Palestinians obtained additional significantIsraeli concessions between the Camp D a v i d conference and the Taba talks.Concurrently, as noted, because of the Palestinian Authority's noncooperation incontaining the violence, and the Israeli political echelon's limited control over themilitary in managing the confrontation with the Palestinians, the level of violencerose and the Israeli public's feeling of security deteriorated. The public lost itsconfidence in the Barak government, in both its ability to achieve a politicalsettlement with the Palestinian Authority and to provide security.

3 1 Daniel Bar-Tal and Keren Sharvit, "Psychological foundations of the Israeli Jews' reactions toA l Aqsa Intifada: The role of the threatening transitional context," in V . M . Esses and R. Vernon(eds.), W h y N e i g h b o r s K i l l : E x p l a i n i n g t h e B r e a k d o w n o f E t h n i c R e l a t i o n s (Montreal: McGill-Queen'sUniversity Press, inpress).

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C h a p t e r T h r e e : The New C o n c e p t i o n i n the P e r i o d oft h e S h a r o n G o v e r n m e n t and I t s A s s u m p t io n s

T h e p o l i t i c a l c o n c e p t i o nF o l l o w i n g the change of government in Israel, in February 2001, and moreespecially after the elections o f February 2003 (after the dissolution o f the nationalunity government), a new policy conception gradually evolved concerning thepolitical process and on dealing with the violent confrontation. Effectively, ascompared with the Barak period, there was greater accord between the evolvingpolitical conception and the military-strategic conception and the operationalconception on the ground. The changes in the political conception had a directimpact on the other two conceptions. A series of developments despair at thepolitical process, the cessation of the process, the surging terrorism and its risinghuman cost, the limited effectiveness of the military in dealing with the terrorism,and the events of September 11, 2001 in the US were deeply influential in thearticulation of the three conceptions: p o l i t i cal , military-strategic, and operational.32

The leading advocates of a new political conception were Prime MinisterA r i e l Sharon and Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer (Labor) in the nationalunity government and his successor, Shaul M o f a z , after the dissolution of theunity government. They inherited Barak's assessments that the Palestinians werenot yet ripe to resolve the conflict and were responsible for the failure of thepolitical process, because there was no partner on their side for Israel to talk to.Y e t throughout 2001, the official intelligence appraisals maintained that Arafatand the Palestinian leadership were st i ll interested i n achieving their goals throughnegotiations.33 However, Barak's explanations, although inconsistent with theofficial intelligence assessments, perfectly matched Sharon's outlook. Sharon hadopposed the Oslo process all along, viewing it as a threat to Israel's security and

3 2 Hirsh, "From 'Molten Lead' to 'Another Way'," p. 28.3 3 Ben-Ami, A F r o n t W i th o u t A R e a r g u a r d , pp. 387-389, 459.

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very existence, a n d h a d supported the settlement enterprise unreservedly.34 Sharona n d M o f a z objected to the concessions Barak h a d offered t h e Palestinians at CampD a v i d , i n the C l i n t o n plan, a n d at Taba. M o f a z , during h i s tenure as C h i e f o f Staff,n o t only expressed explicit opposition to those concessions, but also sharplydisputed t h e political echelon's containment policy a n d i n effect d i d n o t implementi t i n letter or spirit.35

T h e basic assumptions of the new policy reflect mainly the policymakers'belief system and their attitude toward the political process and the character o fthe Palestinian violence, a set of beliefs which was reinforced by the militaryechelon.36 T h e new political approach was grounded i n basic assumptions whichwere very different from those of the Oslo process:37

3 4 Ariel Sharon, "Oslo accord is seed for war/' Y e d i o t h A h r o n o t h M a g a z i n e (Feb. 4, 1994).3 5 Ben-Ami, A F r o n t W i t h o u t A R e a r g u a r d , p p . 387-389;Levy, T h e O t h e r A r m y o f I s r a e l , p . 398;Sher, Ju s t B e y o n d R e a c h , p. 367; Caspit, "The intifada two years on Part 1," M a a r i v (Sept. 6,2002); and "The intifada two years on Part 2," M a a r i v (Sept, 13, 2002). For Mofaz's publiccriticism o f the government, see Ze'ev Schiff, "Mofaz-Ya'alon dispute le d to Mofaz-Sharon dispute,"H a a r e t z (Oct. 15, 2001).3 6 The disagreement between former senior officers in Military Intelligence Amos Malka,Amos Gilad, a n d EphraimLavie as manifested in H a a r e t z in June 2004, indicates that the changein the basic assumptions was not the product of a change in M i 's official assessments concerning thePalestinians. Its importance lies more in the realm of M i 's professional ethics, as well as in therelations between the political level and the intelligence community. The point is that M i 's seniorofficers apparently spoke in two voices " o n the record" a n d " o f f the record."T h e "off th e record,"oral assessments more closely matched the positions of the political level and ostensibly accordedthem the intelligence imprimatur. In fact, both Barak a n d Sharon formed their approach toward thePalestinians on the basisof their own set of beliefs a n d assessments, a n d not according to the writteno r oral appraisals of M I . Defense Minister Mofaz even noted that Amos Gilad's assessments werecorrect and accurate: A r m y R a d i o (June 13, 2004).3 7 T h e premises cited here derive from a number of sources, including: Ben-Ami, A F r o n t W i th o u tA R e a r g u a r d ; press interviews with Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz a n d his deputy, Moshe Ya'alon, andlater interviews with Ya'alon in his capacity as Chief of Staff; interviews with Ehud Barak andShlomo Ben-Ami; the talks delivered by I D F major generals which appear in A s t h e G e n e r a l s S e e I t ,edited by Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov; and the addresses delivered by Prime Minister Sharon at theHerzliya Conferences of 2002 a n d 2003.

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Even though Israel did not official ly withdraw from the Oslo process, inpractice the political process ceased to exist because of the militaryconfrontation, and hence also because of the absence of a negotiating partner.

Even though Israel effectively adheres to the principle of two states for thetwo nations, such an arrangement i n the short or intermediate term i s o f dubiousfeasibility, as the Palestinians have in effect rejected it.

The Israeli proposals to the Palestinians at Camp D a v i d and Taba and inagreeing to the C l i n t o n blueprint are no longer binding on Israel after thePalestinians spurned them and launched a violent struggle.

The Palestinian violence was defined as a clear violation of the Oslo processand the renewal of the political process was made conditional on the completecessation of the violent struggle.

Not only d i d Arafat cease to be a legitimate and worthy partner for a politicalprocess, he also became an obstacle to peace: his removal i s now a preconditionf o r renewing the political process.

Israel is ready to negotiate with a different Palestinian leadership, one whichdissociates itself from terrorism and fights it, while implementing democraticreforms in accordance with President George W . Bush's speech in June 2002.

In the absence of any prospect to resolve the conflict, Israel w i l l focus onmanaging it, with the goal of terminating it or reducing it significantly, whiledenying the Palestinians any military or political achievement in theconfrontation.38

3 8 According to Brigadier General Gadi Eizenkot, the commander of the Judea-Samaria Divisionand formerly the military aide to Barak and Sharon and as such involved in the political directivesissued by the two Prime Ministers for managing the conflict, neither Barak nor Sharon talked aboutachieving a military decision of the conflict. At the same time,whereas Barak talked about reducingthe violence, Sharon ordered its stoppage: Alex Fishman, interview with Brigadier General GadiEizenkot, Y ed i o t h A h r o n o t h (April 11, 2004).

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These basic premises drew on the political viewpoints of at least some of theleaders of the political l e v e l , as expounded for years, 39 and were based on the newinterpretation given by senior assessment officials of the intelligence communityto the Palestinian positions in the Oslo process and more especially to thePalestinians' goals in the violent confrontation. The Palestinians were nowperceived as an adversary and an enemy with malicious intentions, and little faithwas said to have been placed in their talk of peace from the beginning: Arafat does not accept Israel's existence as a Jewish state and therefore w i l l

never sign off on the termination of the conflict, not even if all his conditionsare met. Arafat never explicitly mentioned an independent Jewish state existingalongside the Palestinian state but spoke about Israel in vague terms.40 N oteven the achievement of h is four strategic goals an independent state, the1967 borders, East Jerusalem as the capital, and realization of the right ofreturn w i l l induce h im to declare the end of the conflict and the finality ofthe Palestinians' claims.41

Arafat continues to adhere to the "phased theory" and his goal is "GreaterPalestine," to be achieved through the Palestinians' demographic advantage.

3 9 Nehama Douek, "Netanyahu: If the Likud wants to commit suicide, let them keep up theinternal strife," Y e d i o t h A h r o n o t h (Sept. 29, 1993); Benjamin Netanyahu, statement in the Knesset,Y ed i o t h A h r o n o t h (Sept. 22,1993); "Liar and inciter," editorial, H a a r e t z (Dec. 29,1998); Bina Barzilai,"There will be no vote there," Y ed i o t h A h r o n o t h (Oct. 19, 1993); Ariel Sharon, "Oslo accord is seedfor war," Y e d i o t h A h r o n o t h M a g a z i n e (Feb. 4,1994); Nahum Barnea, "Real time," Y ed i o t h A h r o n o t h ,Sabbath Supplement (Dec. 29, 2000); Michael Karpin and Ina Friedman, M u r d e r in the N a m e ofG o d : T h e P l o t to K i l l Y it z h a k R a b i n (Tel Aviv: Zmora-Bitan, 1999); Benjamin Netanyahu, A P l a c ei n the Sun (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth, 1995); James Bennet, "Sharon's wars," New Y o r k T i m e s(Aug. 15, 2000).4 0 Gilad, "Evaluation of developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" (according to AmosGilad, there was no reason from the outset to treat Arafat's peace intentions seriously when Israelsigned the Oslo accord with him, as he never concealed his strategic policy vision to establish aPalestinian power from the Mediterranean to the desert, encompassing also Jordan); and see also:Akiva Eldar, H a a r e t z (June 10, 11, 2004); Alex Fishman, Y ed i o t h A h r o n o t h (June 11, 2004); YoavStern, interview with Amos Gilad, H a a r e t z (June 15, 2004); Dan Shilon interview with Chief ofStaff Shaul Mofaz, M a a r i v M a g a z i n e (Jan. 4,2002); A r i Shavit, interviewwith Chief of Staff MosheYa'alon, H a a r e t z M a g a z i n e (Aug. 29, 2002).4 1 Kuperwasser, "Identity of the other: Complexity of the structure of the Palestinian society,"pp. 33-34.34


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Arafat,s positions in the negotiations and his statements challenging Israel'smoral right of existence and the Jewish national attachment to the Land ofIsrael, in contrast to the Palestinian people's historic right to the land, reflectnot only a religious-historical approach but a plan of action.42 Indeed, hisapproach is realistic and he is acting on the basis of political-diplomaticunderstanding, but his strategic vision is to establish a Palestinian power fromthe Mediterranean to the Iraqi desert, thanks to demographic superiority whichw i l l give the Palestinians control of the area.43

Arafat views the violent struggle as a cardinal means to promote his nationalgoals. H e made a strategic decision to launch a campaign o f terrorism alongsidea political-diplomatic route.44 However, that route has exhausted itself andhas even become dangerous from the standpoint of the Palestinian interest.Accordingly, the idea of the "armed struggle" has not been abandoned and isagain becoming a paramount tool to achieve political goals,45 as part of astrategic move to implement the "phased doctrine."

Arafat is a terrorist and the Palestinian Authority is an entity that supportsterrorism. The Palestinian security establishment is an organization of stateterror. Arafat is activating the terrorism directly, through his securityorganizations, which receive their salary from the PAthe Tanzim, PreventiveSecurity, General Intelligence, M i l i t a r y Intelligence, and Force 17 andindirectly by insinuated authorization to Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and othergroups to execute terrorist attacks.46

4 2 Jonathan Halevi, "The Palestinian point of view vis-a-vis the resolution of the conflict,"M a a r a k h o t , no. 383 (May 2002), pp. 16-25; A r i Shavit, interview withChief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon,H a a r e t z M a g a z i n e (Aug. 29, 2002); Yoav Stern, interview with Amos Gilad, H a a r e t z (June 15,2004).4 3 Stern, ibid., p. 45.4 4 Ibid., p. 43.4 5 Kuperwasser, "Identity of the other: Complexity of the structure of the Palestinian society,"p. 32; Yaakov Amidror, "The components of Israelistrategy in the war against Palestinian terrorism,"N a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y , no. 2-3 (Sept. 2003), pp. 13-23.4 6 Dan Shilon, interview with Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz, M a a r i v M a g a z i n e (Jan. 4, 2002);Amos Malka, "The regional system facing the test of stability," in Bar-Siman-Tov (ed.), As theG e n e r a l s See It, pp. 20-21;Yoav Stern, interview withAmos Gilad, H a a r e t z (June 15, 2004).

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The violent confrontation with the Palestinians is no longer the result of apopular uprising but a genuine war in which the Palestinians are trying toachieve their political goals by means of violence. This is a war of n o choicethat w a s forced o n Israel a n existential w a r which c a n brook n o compromises("a war for our home"), the continuation of the War of Independence andIsrael's most important war since then.47

Summing up this section, it can be noted that the conception holding that Arafatwas not interested in an agreement and therefore turned to violence and was not apartner for a political process a conception first voiced by the political level inIsrael after the Camp D a v i d summit w a s adopted b y the new government withouta renewed examination a n d became part o f the basic assumptions o f the new policyapproach. In the events related to the cessation of the political process and theescalation of the conflict senior intelligence officials found justification for thereasons cited by the political level for the non-attainment of a n agreement and theoutbreak o f violence. A s such, they gave backing to the conception that w a s adoptedb y the political echelon.48

W i t h the new basic assumptions as the foundation, an updated conceptionwas fashioned holding that there was deep doubt about the feasibility of achievinga permanent settlement entailing t w o states for the t w o nations. W i t h i n a f e w monthsthis conception was adopted by a l l the political and military decision makers andb y public opinion. Senior personnel in the intelligence assessment agenciesmaintained that even though Arafat's malicious intentions had only been exposedi n the later stages of the Oslo process, at Camp D a v i d , and in the Arafat-initiated

4 7 A r i Shavit, interview with Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon, H a a r e t z M a g a z i n e (Aug. 29, 2002).4 8 Gilad, "Evaluation of developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict";on the phenomenon ofthe shifts in intelligence assessments as backing for the political level, see: Gabi Sheffer, "Breakdownof strategic thought," H a a r e t z (June 5,2001);Aluf Benn, " M I as government propagandist,"H a a r e t(Feb. 6, 2003); Doron Rosenblum, "Who needs conceptions," H a a r e t z (June 25, 2004); ReuvenPedatzur, "Caution determined intelligence services," H a a r e t z (Feb. 2, 2004); Uri Bar-Yosef,"Internal check in M I ," H a a r e t z (June 14, 2004); Matan Vilnai, "The failure belongs to the politicallevel," H a a r e t z (March 31, 2004); Uzi Benziman, "When the army takes off its uniform," H a a r e t z(Dec. 7,2004); R a n Edelist, " M I at your request," w w w . y n e t . c o . i l / a r t i c l e s / 1 , 7 3 4 0 L - 1 5 7 9 2 4 9 f i 0 . h t m l(Jan. 24, 2002).
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confrontation afterward, from an intelligence standpoint his conspiratorialintentions h a d been discernible from the very start o f t h e process, but the politicalechelon's moves were n o t made known t o the intelligence community.49 S i m i l a r l y ,Israeli intelligence also predicted accurately Arafat's intention t o torpedo the CampD a v i d summit a n d launch a violent confrontation, but t h e political echelon ignoredthe warnings, unlike the I D F , which heeded the warnings and deployed for theviolent events i n time.50

However, the enshrinement of this conception that the Palestiniansrejected the Israeli offers because they do not recognize Israel's existence iscountered b y contradictory testimonies. F o r example, senior intelligence personnela r e skeptical and incredulous about the character of the assessments that wereproduced f o r the political level a n d constituted a form o f professional backing forgovernment policy on the Palestinian issue.51 F o r example, according to former

4 9 Amos Gilad says Israel paid a steep price because of the political echelon's disregard of theintelligence assessments. H e maintains that fo r years the political leadership refused to acknowledgeArafat's declaredpolitical vision fo r the establishment o f "GreaterPalestine," which would encompassJordan, a n d by its attitude brought about the present situation:Gilad, "Evaluation of developmentsin the Israeli-Palestinian conflict," p p . 39-40, 44.5 0 Ibid., pp. 39, 41, 44; Amos Gilad, address at the international conference of the AcademicCollege of Netanya(June 23, 2003). In this talk Gilad said: "Arafat'snegative influence stems fromtwo connected factors: his belief that every peace [agreement] must include the right of return suchthat, combined with the demographic trends, every peace process will bring about Israel'sdisappearance within decades. This assessment was presented to the government as an intelligenceappraisal before the Camp David conference... I have to note with satisfaction, on the onehand, thatthe army accepted this, but I am not sure that the government or the Prime Minister accepted it.What the Prime Minister at the time [Barak] said today [at the conference] comes in the wake ofwhat actually transpired, which could have been foreseen then with great accuracy. Excuse me forspeaking honestly here."5 1 In his article "Retroactive rewriting,"Y e d i o t h A h r o n o t h (June 30, 2004),Amos Malka notedin this connection: "It was here that the 'conspiracy' fashion developed... Gilad and other seniorofficers began to argue that 'even if Arafat were to get everything he is asking for he would notsign...' a very popular sentence at the time, but without foundation. I d id not articulate this line,because it was not supported by intelligence, but this fashion gained a foothold among leaders"; seealso Uzi Benziman's article concerning biased intelligence: "Good tidings for year 57," H a a r e t z(April 30, 2004); and Ofer Shelah, "The sad tale of Amos and Amos," w w w . y n e t . c o . i l (June 11,2004); D a n Rabinowitz, " O n e thing remains o n the national screen," H a a r e t z (June 30,2004); ShlomoGazit, "Return of the conception,"M a a r i v (June 14, 2004).

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M i l i t a r y Intelligence (MI) director Amos M a l k a , there was a substantive disparitybetween M i ' s official , written assessments and the oral assessments given to thepolitical l e v e l . The official assessments spoke of the intention of Arafat and thepolitical level to arrive, by negotiations, at a settlemenfcof two states for the twonations, and viewed the intifada as a popular uprising from below, whereas thespoken assessments reflected a completely different conclusion.

These viewpoints became part of a l i v e l y public discourse, which was criticalo f the research work of M I 5 2 and challenged the validity of the new conception.Academics, security experts, and senior figures who had participated in thenegotiations termed it simplistic and superficial, and adduced more complexexplanations for the failure o f the political process and the eruption o f the violence.53They maintain, among other points, that the leaders of the two sides deviated fromthe central channel of the negotiations to resolve the problems of 1967concretely and moved instead to the impossible task o f coping with the problemso f 1948-1949, which involve the national narratives of the two peoples. They alsopoint out that the negotiations themselves did not fail but were stopped (becauseo f the elections in Israel) before the attempts to examine the f inal latitudes ofmutual f l e x i b i l i t y within a comprehensive package deal could be completed. Theyare sharply critical of the political vacuum created by Israel and the United States

5 2 See Aluf Benn, "MI as government propagandist," H a a r e t z (Feb. 6, 2003); and Ran Edelist," M I at your request," www.ynet.co.il/articles/l,7340,L-1579249,00.html(Jan. 24, 2002).5 3 A number of symposia have been held on the subject in the past year, such as: "The CampDavid summit (2000): What went wrong? Lessons for the future"(June 16-18, 2003); and "Fromconflict resolution to conflict management: The Israeli-Palestinian violent conflict" (JerusalemInstitute for Israel Studies, June 21, 2004). In addition, academics, publicists, and negotiationparticipantshave published books and articleson the subject. See: Meital, P e a c e in T a t t e rs I s r a e l ,P a l e s t i n e and t h e M i d d l e E a s t ; Daniel Dor, N e w s p a p e r s U n d e r t h e In f l u e n c e (Tel Aviv: Babel, 2001);Daniel Dor, B e h i n d D e f e n si v e S h ie ld (TelAviv: Babel, 2003); Klein, S h a t t e r i n g a T a b o o : T h e C o n t a c t sT o w a r d a P e r m a n e n t Sta tus A g r e e m e n t in J e r u sa le m 1 9 9 4 - 2 0 0 1 ; Dan Rabinowitz, " E n d of the conflictor on and on repeatedly?", in Adi Ophir (ed.), R e a l T im e : A l A q s a I n t i f a d a and the I s r a e l i L e f t (TelAviv: Keter, 2001), pp. 33-45; Yoav Peled, "Don't be right, be smart," in Ophir (ed.), R e a l T im e , pp.46-56;Tanya Reinhart, "The peace that kills," in Ophir (ed.), R e a l T im e , pp. 57-68;Uzi Benziman,"Good tidings for year 57," H a a r e t z (April 30, 2004); Ben Caspit, "The army will decide andauthorize," M a a r i v (Sept. 13, 2002); Yossi Beilin, M a n u a l f o r a W o u n d e d D o v e ; Danny Rubinstein,"The way down to Camp David," in Yehuda Meltzer (ed.), C a m p D a v i d 2 0 0 0 W h a t r e a l l y h a p p e n e dt h e r e ? (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth, 2003), pp. 16-63.
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(February 2001). They reject the conspiracy theory attributed to Arafat and wonderhow it sits with his unwillingness to accept the bulk of the 1967 territories andawait another round from the status of a state, or with his rejection of Israeliproposals for a partial solution, which could have advanced the "phased doctrine."These experts are also skeptical about the notion that Arafat triggered the intifadaas a planned move which was aimed at imposing the "right of return" on Israel inorder to implement the "phased doctrine," noting instead its roots as a popularuprising. They do not consider Arafat solely responsible for the prolongation andescalation of the intifada; rather, various elements played a part in the situationthat was created, including Israel's military reaction.54

T h e m i l i t a r y - s t r a t e g i c c o n c e p t i o nThe basic premises o f the new political conception naturally nourished the strategic-military conception as w e l l . N o w , with the negotiations moribund and the militaryconfrontation defined as a genuine war,55 Israel's military-strategic approach wasaimed directly at the Palestinian Authority as a responsible governmental bodywhich was associated with the terrorist organizations. The military-strategic goalwas to bring about the rapid end of the Palestinian violence or reduce it to a levelthat would deny the Palestinians any military and political achievement and wouldburn into their consciousness the lesson that they could never make military orpolitical gains by means of terrorism. The goal was thus defined as changing themindset of the Palestinians (and in effect of all the Arabs) and getting them to

5 4 Akiva Eldar, "His true face," interview with Amos Malka, H a a r e t z (June 11, 2004). In theinterview Malka described how the senior security level inIsrael helped fan the flames. He notedthat in the first month of the intifada the IDF fired 1.3 million rounds, terming this a strategicstatistic showing that Israeli soldiers fired incessantly, meaning that the IDF shaped the "height ofthe flames." See also: Reuven Pedatzur, "The IDF's contribution to the escalation," H a a r e t z (June30, 2004); Doron Rosenblum, "Apocalypse again,1' H a a r e t z (May 20, 2004).5 5 Nahum Barnea, "Real time," Y e d i o t h A h r o n o t h , Sabbath Supplement (Dec. 29, 2000);AriShavit, interview with Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon, H a a r e t z M a g a z i n e (Aug. 29,2002); Dan Shilon,interview with Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz, M a a r i v M a g a z i n e (Jan. 4, 2002);AriShavit, interviewwith Ariel Sharon, H a a r e t z M a g a z i n e (April 13,2001); Yaron London, interview withChief of StaffMoshe Ya'alon, Y e d i o t h A h r o n o t h (Aug. 13, 2004).

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internalize deeply that "terrorism and violence cannot defeat us, w i l l not make usf o l d . If this deep internalization is not achieved at the end of the confrontation, wew i l l have a strategic problem and an existential threat to Israel. If that [lesson] isnot burned into the Palestinian and Arab consciousness, there w i l l be no end totheir demands of us."56

According to this conception, it was crucial for Israel to restore its deterrentcredibility, which had suffered in a series of events going back to the beginning ofthe last decade: the non-response in the G u l f War, Israel's participation in theM a d r i d Conference against its w i l l , concessions in the Oslo accord in the wake ofthe first intifada, handing over Hebron to the Palestinians in the wake of the violencetriggered by the opening of the Western W a l l Tunnel, and the withdrawal fromLebanon.57 It was therefore essential to overcome the terrorist threat as quickly aspossible.58 Arafat's malicious intention to liquidate Israel, exposed at the momentof truth, attested to the concrete threat Israel faced. That threat had to be eliminatedat any cost, by means of Israel's military superiority and the society's endurance.This was the only effective option, a policy that was essential in order to preventany future Palestinian threat to Israel's existence. The strength of the I D F must berelied on to prevent the Palestinians from implementing their vicious plans.

Henceforth, the mission of thwarting the malicious intentions of Arafat andthe Palestinian Authority would be perceived, by both the political and the securitylevels, as synonymous with "burning into the Palestinians' consciousness" Israel'smilitary superiority and the lesson that political goals could be achieved not byforce, only through a political process. Implanting this lesson would reduce theterrorism threat in the present and prevent a Palestinian threat to Israel for manyyears to come. In addition, when negotiations resumed on the final-status agreement,the Palestinians would have to pay a political price and emerge with fewerachievements than they could have extracted from Israel in the previous round of

5 6 AriShavit, interview with Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon, H a a r e t z M a g a z i n e (Aug. 29, 2002);and see also: Dan Shilon, interview with Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz, M a a r i v M a g a z i n e (Jan. 4,2002); Ya'alon, "Victory and decision in a limited conflict,"pp. 75-81.5 7 AriShavit, interview with Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon, H a a r e t z M a g a z i n e (Aug. 29, 2002);Amidror, "The components of Israeli strategy in the war against Palestinian terrorism," p. 3.5 8 Gilad, "Evaluation of developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,"p. 48.


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t a l k s . For the first time the political and security echelons defined Palestinianterrorism itself as an existential strategic threat to Israel. The security establishmentwas directed to eradicate the terrorist organizations, including the Palestiniansecurity units that were engaged in terrorism.59

Already in the first stages of the interim agreement, following the suicidebombing attacks in early 1995, and more especially in the wake of the violenceinitiated by the Palestinian Authority after the opening of the Western W a l l Tunnelin September 1996, the IDF was required to adapt itself to a new form of combatagainst the Palestinians, known as "low-intensity conflict." G i v e n the existence ofa self-governing Palestinian political authority with armed security units, this boresome resemblance to inter-state conflicts. Drawing on operational lessons fromthe Western W a l l Tunnel events and other violent clashes (including the events on"Naqba D a y , " M a y 15,2000, when the Palestinians mark the "calamity" of Israel'sestablishment), the I D F prepared for a possible confrontation with the PalestinianAuthority's security forces, trigge

The Israeli - Palestinian Violent Confrontation 2000-2004

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Transcript of The Israeli - Palestinian Violent Confrontation 2000-2004