The International Politics of Climate Change (Paterson y Grubb)

8/10/2019 The International Politics of Climate Change (Paterson y Grubb)

1/19

The International Politics of Climate ChangeAuthor(s): Matthew Paterson and Michael GrubbSource: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 68, No. 2(Apr., 1992), pp. 293-310Published by: Blackwell Publishingon behalf of the Royal Institute of International AffairsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2623216.

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2/19


3/19

Matthew aterson

nd

Michael Grubb

importantwas the drought

n the

United States.

As

people began to

realize

that

the decade of

the I98os was the hotteston

record,

the

growing

scientific

consensus started

to

appear plausible to publics

and

policy-makers.

These

factorswere reinforced y the general surgeof concern over environmental

issues

n the ate

I98os

(particularly

n

the

North) generated y

acid

rain,

ozone

depletion,

ocal

pollution problems,

wildlife

oss,

and

other

phenomena.

In response to

these

concerns,

n late

I988

governments

stablishedthe

Intergovernmental anel

on

Climate Change (IPCC),

whose brief was to

consolidatethe

scientific

nowledge

on the

subject

and to

produce

outlines

of

possible responses.

As it became clear that the IPCC's science

working-group

would endorse he widercommunity's oncerns, ufficient omentumbuiltup

to lead to formalnegotiations.Following presentation f the IPCC report o

theSecond World Climate

Conference

nNovember I990, theUnited Nations

General

Assembly

established he

Intergovernmental egotiating Committee

for

a

Framework

Convention

on Climate

Change (INC).

These

negotiations egan

in

February 99I

and are

expected to lead to the

signing

of a 'framework onvention' at UNCED

in

June

992.

This will not

result

n a comprehensive ontrol regime,but rather

s

intendedto provide a

basis and

framework

or future

negotiations.Yet

the

road to Rio has already

revealed major divisions of interest nd attitudesbetween states,which are

likely to be exacerbatedrather han eased as negotiations roceed.

This

article ooks

at the

international oliticsof climatechange againstthis

background of UNCED.

Its

purpose

s

to outline

and

analyse

the

response o

climate

change

in

the international

rena,

and to examine the

prospectsfor

successful

ooperation

hereafter. e firstook at

why cooperation

ould

prove

so

difficult,

nd

what the main ines

of conflict re.

We

thenconcentrate n the

positions

of the

major

states nd

groups,

and

on

the coalitionsof like-minded

states

that

have

emerged

in

the

negotiations. Finally,

we consider

difficult

political

routes

by which

responses

o climate

change may

evolve as countries

tryto develop

a concerted

nternationalesponse.

Principal obstacles

and

divisions

Cooperation

on

the climate

change

ssue s

particularly

ifficult

ecause serious

responses

could

reach into the heart of

countries'

political

and

economic

structures. ince thereare no easy technicalfixes for climate change, and

measures

o

absorb

greenhouse ases such

as

reforestation)

re

relatively

imited

compared

with

the

projected

scale of emissions

the

only

effective

way

of

reducing

he

build-up

of

greenhousegas

concentrations

s to reduce

emissions.

Carbon

dioxide

(CO2),

the

main contributor o

projected

radiative

change,

comes

predominantly

rom he

use

of fossil uel

nergy

nd

from

deforestation.

Energy

use is

intimately

elated

to

economic

development,

nd

the fossil

fuel

industries

enerally

ccount for everal

per

cent

of

GNP and

comprise

ome

of

the largestand most powerful industries n the world. Deforestation has

294


4/19

Internationalolitics f climate hange

Western

Europe

EasternEurope

North

America Western EuLrop

North America

Eastern

Europe

,~

Latin America

USSR

Latin

Am-erica

JANZ

Afic

Middle East

planned

Asia \ fricaSot&EatAi

South

&

East Asia

Middle

East

Centrallyplanniled

sia

(a)

Total

GHG IO,564

MtC

(equivalent) (b) Fossil

fuel

emissions 5,426 MtC

IOO yr

GWP

Figure

I:

Distributionof greenhousegas emissions, 988

Notes:

a)

Total

greenhouse as

emissionsre

compared n

the

basisof ioo-Global

Warming

otentials

s

estimated

n

the

990

report fthe ntergovernmentalanelon

Climate hange, sing missionsatafrom tockholm nvironmentnstitute,ational

greenhouseas accounts: urrentnthropogenicources nd sinks Boston, MA: SEI,

I992).

(b) Fossil

CO2

emissions rom astern urope nd theformer SSR are believed o

have declined y 20 to

30%

during

990

and 99I.

complex causes, ncluding onsumption ressures

rom

ndustrialized ountries

and various

and-use

pressures

n

many developing countries.Thus statesface

tough political

and

economic decisions

n

order to respond.'

Figure emphasizes he global natureof the problem by illustratingurrent

emissions

f

(a)

overall

greenhouse ases

and

(b) the

fossil-fuel

O2 component

of this.

This

distribution

hanges substantially

f

presented

n

otherbases such

as

past emissions,per capita

emissions or

projected

future

missions;

it also

changes

with the

range

of

gases

considered and

with

differing tatistical

estimates

f the

contribution rom ourcesotherthan fossilCO2.

This in itself

is a source of

diverging

ttitudes n

the

division

of responsibilities.

In

addition to

differing ast, present nd future ontributions,tatesvary

n

the ease with which they can reduce emissions, ccording to their current

efficiency,

ealth and

technological apability

or

mproving fficiency,

s

well

as

their

ccess to

non-fossil esources.

he

causes of

deforestationnd

ease of

ts

control also

vary widely.

Countries

differ

reatly

n their conomic

strength

and

consequently

in their

capacity

to

pay

for

response policies.

Their

vulnerability

o

the

mpacts

of

climate

change

s

widely divergent: ome,

such

as

low-lying

sland

statesor states

n

semi-arid reas

where rainfall

may drop

even

further,

an

expect

to move even closerto the

margins

f

existence,

while

othersmay experience mallgainsfrom limate hange,dependingnpartupon

the rateof

change. Finally,

nd related o the ast

point,

tates

ary

as to

where

climate

change

fits nto their

political priorities.

Whereas

for some

countries

climate

change

s a vital

ssue

since t could affect heir

very

existence s

states,

forothers

he ssues

ssociated

with

poverty, udget

deficits

r other raditional

concerns

re far more

pressing.

Throughout

the

negotiations,

our

main fault-lines

f

political

conflict n

relation

o climate

change

have

emerged.

The

first,

he

North-South divide

is

1

For a

fuller

discussion

of the problems

of

negotiating

reductions n CO2 emissions, ee M. J. Grubb,

'The greenhouse effect:

negotiating targets',

tntertnational

ffairs 6:

i,

Jatn.

I990.

295


5/19

Matthew aterson

nd Michael Grubb

still,

at

least on

the surface, entral. n the (overemphasized)words of the

journal South,The

cold

war is

over,

the

green

war

has begun'.2 Major issues

include: how the burden of reducing emissions should be shared; the

importance f industrialized ountries cting first o show their ommitment;

the relative mportance f historical nd current missions;

whether missions

should be expected

to converge towards similarper capita levels in the long

term; technology ransfernd

additionalfinancial esources o help developing

countries espond;

and

the

extentto which climate change links n to wider

questions

bout

international

olitical economy

such as Third

World debt or

the world's financial nstitutions.

ll

of these testify o the

complexityof the

North-South divide, discussed

further elow.

A second importantarea of conflict s the split between major energy

producers nd

others

and

to a lesser xtentbetween major forestry ountries

and others).Those without ndigenousresources re ikely o

be more receptive

to schemesto

reduce

emissions,

ince t simultaneously nhances

theirbalance

of

payments

nd

reduces their

dependenceon foreignproducers, o making

them less

susceptible

o crisessuch as

those of

the

I970s.

But countries hat

depend heavily

on

energy

exports and sometimes

deforestation) or current

and projected development,

such as the

OPEC

countries nd the growing

number of coal exporters,fear the economic consequences of emissions

limitation, nd

are

likely to

oppose abatementmeasures trongly even those

taken

by

other

ountries. here are

also

important

ountries

such

as the

United

States and

China)

which do not

rely heavily

on

energy

exports

but which

nevertheless ave developed

on the basis of

large

and

cheap

domestic fossil

resources, esulting

n

strong

domestic

nterests

nd an

'energy

culture' that

similarly

makes

them

unreceptive

o plans

to

curtaildomesticfossilfuel use.

A third division

occurs

between

those that

are

relatively

resilient o the

projected mpacts

of climate

change

and those that

re

very

vulnerable o

such

impacts.Those

that

perceive

thatthe

mpacts

of climate

change

on them will

not

be

particularly armful,

r

may

even be

beneficial,

will

be

far

ess

receptive

to calls for

stringent

ontrols on emissions than

those that will

be

severely

affected

y

sea-level

rise or

changed

rainfall

atterns.

his fault-line nteracts

significantly

ith the North-South

one,

since

vulnerability

o the

impacts

depends

also

on

whether

country

has

the

economic

resources

o

cope:

thus

Bangladesh

is

more

susceptible

o

sea-level rise

than

the

equally low-lying

Netherlands.

This is

probably

the

east

mportant

ivide at

present except

for

thelow-lying slandstates),but could become more importantn the future.

A

final ource

of division s to

be

found

n

differing

ttitudes

o environmental

impacts

nd the

nherent cientific ncertainties. his

is not a fault-line ased on

interests,

ut on

an

important

spect

of

political

ulture.The

impacts

f climate

change

are

extremely

uncertain.

Policy-makers

n

many

countries ee

little

reason to take

difficult r

costly

actions to avert

an unknown and

perhaps

distant isk.

But scientists

and

the environmental

ommunity)

ncline

to

the

opposite

view:

they argue

that it

is

extremely dangerous

to continue

2

Sothtt,June

990-.

296


6/19

Internationalolitics fclimate hange

interferencewith the basic planetary system of heat balance, at

an ever-

increasingpace, when the consequences are unknown (as a result

of our

inadequate understandingf theclimate system)-especially since by

the time

impactsare clearly visible it will be far too late to avoid extensive further

changesover subsequentdecades.

In

many countrieswith a strong

radition f

scientificnd

environmental

onsciousness, r

in which

previous nvironmental

conflicts

have left such

perceptions ascendant, this view is now

politically

dominant: the

principle

hat

precautionary ction has to be taken

seems self-

evident.

In

others, uch counsel remains politically mpotent. These

widely

differingttitudes ave become

a

source of conflict ot only

domestically, ut

also internationally, ecause stateshave used scientific ncertainty o

justify

theirown positionand perceivedself-interest.

The

North-South

divide

For

many developing countries climate change is a Northern issue, both

because

it

is the North that s

primarily nterestedn

it

and because theNorth

created the

problem. Despite statements uch

as

'We are deeply concerned

about

the

accelerating degradation

of the

global environment,

basic

development nd thealleviationof povertyremain t the top of theirpolitical

agenda. Many developing

countries

remain

unconvinced that the North is

committed o

tackling

limate

change

and see no reason

why they should

act

until

they see

such

commitment.

Many

such countries re concerned that

the

D'

in

UNCED

is

being

lost

beneathNorthern nvironmental

reoccupations.

t

worst, hey

ee theNorth's

concern

to

put climate change

on the international

olitical agenda as

an

attempt o hold backdevelopingcountries' conomicgrowthby

limiting

heir

energy

use. Thus

many developing

countries

re interestedn climate

change

only

to the extent hat

they

ee the

North

as committed o substantial ransfers

of

finance

nd

technology

o

help

the

South

develop

without

ncreasing

heir

emissions.

They

are

likely

to

participate nly

if

they

feel that

any agreement

reached s fair

n

the context of the

inequitableglobal economy.

These concerns

are exacerbated

by

the

great inequalities

in

per capita

emissions

and

population,

as

illustrated n

Figure

2.

Average per

capita

emissions

f

fossil

CO2

from

developing

countries

re

barely

one-tenth f the

OECD

average;

and

per capita

emissions rom

regions

uch as the

ndian sub-

continent ndAfrica re around one-twentiethf thoseoftheUS. But because

of theirmuch

greater

nd still

growing population,

the

developing

countries

account for about

one-quarter

f

global CO2

emissions nd

have an

immense

potential

for future

rowth. Also, developing country

subsistence missions

associated with

agriculture

nd land-use

change

are

proportionately

much

higher.Developing

countries hus ee the

problem

as caused almost

entirely y

the

consumptionpatterns

f

the rich North. But

many

Northern countries

point

to the

futility

f theirown efforts

n the

absence

of

developing

country

3

'Beijitng

nzinisterial

eclarationini tnvironimenitnid evelopmetnt',

eijing, I9

June

I99I,

para.

I.

297


7/19

Matthew aterson nd Michael Grubb

tC/cap

7

3 .

..............

..............................................................

..................

2 .

..............

......... . .

.

.

. . . . . . . . . . .

..........

.........

.

. . .

.

. . . .

. .

. .

.

......... . .

.

.

Global

1.ld

I -

r' '

=~ F

111''' laverage

0

0~~~~~~~~~~~~~

6

Population, billion

Figure 2: Fossil-fuel CO2 emissions per capita and population, 1989

The vertical xis shows per capita emissions f fossil-fuelarbon n I989; the horizontal

axis shows thecorresponding opulation. The product-the area of the blocks-is thus

proportional o total emissions.The figure llustrates he large disparity n per capita

emissionsboth between industralized nd developing countries, nd withineach; but

it

also shows how the greater populations

of

developing countries make their

contribution

o total

emissions

lready quite significant.

The

potential

forfuture missions

growth may

be

visualized

by considering

he

way

in

which the total area of the blocks will increase

if

per capita emissions from

developing countriesgrow

closer to the current evels of industrialized

ountries,

nd

as

global population doubles

as

envisagedby

most

projections

or he middle of the

next

century.

n

stark

contrast,

cut

of

more

than

6o%

from

current

evels would be

required to stabilize tmospheric oncentrations.

Sources:M. Grubb, Energy oliciesand thegreenhouse ffect,olume : policy appraisal

(Aldershot: RIIA/Dartmouth, I990); data

from

BP

statistical eviewof

world

nergy,

1990:

world opulation rospects988 (New York: UN, I989).

action,

and focus on

the

immense

potential

for

growth

in

the

South,

particularly regarding population something

which

many developing

countries ee

as a neo-colonial

attempt

o interfere ith their

development.

These

inherent ensions ound

expression

n a

heated debate over the

way

in

which the

independentWashington-based

World

Resources Institute

WRI)

presented ata on current nd projectedglobal emissions,4

hich was attacked

by

the ndian Centre for Science and Environment s

a

'politically-motivated

[attempt]

o blame

developing

countries

or

climate

change

and

perpetuate

he

current

global inequality

in

the use

of the earth's

environment

and its

resources

.

WRI's

analysts

were bewildered

to

find themselves he source

of

such

a

storm;

to

developing countries,

WRI's

tone and

presentation

eflected

4

World Resources

Institute,

Worldresources

ggo-91

(Washington: WRI, I99I).

5

A. Agarwal and S. Narain, Global

warmiitng

n ant nequal world-a case of envirotnmetntalolotnialismiNew

Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment,

990).

298


8/19

International

olitics f

climate

hange

the

essence of

the

equity divide.

The

fallout

has

exacerbated North-South

suspicions, nd has aroused considerable omesticpressure, articularly

n

India,

not

to

compromise

on

basic equity perceptions

r

'give

in'

to

any

Northern

demands.

Some

developing

countries

believe

that their

potential

for future

missions

growth s a source of potentialpower, which

can be

used

to 'blackmail'

the

North into

major

concessions

on resource and

technology transfer,

r even

broader nternational conomic restructuring.ut,

unlike forozone

depletion,

the

identifiable mpacts

of climate

change appear

worse

for

developing

countries,which

are

already

n hot

climates,

nd

whose societies re farmore

directlydependent upon

climate

and more

vulnerable

to

changes

in it

than

those of richer and more technologicallyadvanced countries. n fact,the

industrialized ountrieswhich

have

expressedgreatest nxiety re also the most

internationalist,nd are motivated

n

part by concern about

the

impacts on

developing

countries.

They may

feel

somewhat

guilty,

but not

frightened

enough

to

be

'blackmailed',

and

attempts

o

do so

may

even weaken the

internationalists'

and and

deepen

the

divide

rather han ead

to resolution.

or

such

threats' o exertany real everage,Northern ountrieswould have to be

more

directly

nd

urgently

oncerned bout their wn

vulnerability-and

the

'South' would have to be more united than t currentlys.

Groups

within the South

The

developing

countries

an

be

split

nto

at least threemain

groups

n

terms

of

their

negotiating ositions.

At

one

extreme

re

the

oil-producing

ountries.

Led

by

Saudi

Arabia

and

Kuwait,

these tates

ave been

opposed

to

all

controls

on

CO2

emissions.

They argue

that

mphasis

hould be

placed

on

sinks f

CO2

(primarily

orests

nd

oceans)

and on research

esigned

to increase

knowledge

of

climate

and

to narrow uncertainties efore

ny strongresponsepolicies

can

be

undertaken; hey

have

blatantly ought

o

slow

the

pace

of

negotiations,

nd

have

vigorously

ttackedthe unilateral

C

initiatives o limit

CO2

emissions.

The

major

deforestation

ountries,notably Brazil,

have likewise

opposed

referenceso effectiveontrolof deforestation

specially,

s an

interference

ith

sovereign

use of

naturalresources

though

as hosts o the

UNCED

conference,

Brazil has

shown more

flexibility

n

many issues

as

negotiations roceed).

At the

opposite

extreme are the countries

organized

into the

Alliance Of

Small Island States (AOSIS). These are states from the Pacific,Indian and

Atlantic

Oceans,

some of which are

only

two metres bove

sea-level

at their

highestpoint. They are thus extremelyvulnerableto the impacts of climate

change, particularly

ea-level

rise, some having their very existence s states

threatened. n the

negotiations hey

have

proved vocal

and well

organized,

pushing

or

arly

ction

to

reduce CO2 emissions nd haltdeforestation,nd for

resources

o

help

them

adaptto thechangesthat re now considered nevitable

whatever

action

is

taken.

These two groups, while vocal, are relatively small. The rest of the

299


9/19


developingcountries orm third,much ooser group. Their emphasis s on the

equity and development concerns, and on the belief that 'the developed

countries bear the main responsibility or the degradation of the global

environment.'6

Basic economic development is the primary need, and

developing countries' commitments should be purely dependent on the

provision of financial resources and technology transferby

the North.

Furthermore,he Convention should not include sophisticatedmonitoring nd

complianceprocedureswhich would infringe eveloping

countries'

overeignty

over theiruse of naturalresources. he group clearly mergedas an important

sub-group

of the

G77

at the December

I99I

session f the climate

negotiations,

when 44 developing countries ubmitted textas a basis for negotiationwith

the North.

But

this

group probably

has more

underlying lexibility

han ts

negotiating

position suggests.

There is some bluff n their

nsistence,

or

example,

that

Northern

ountries

hould contribute o a fundon

an

assessed

basis,

and some

willingness

to consider

differing nterpretations

f the

'adequate

in the

insistence n 'new, adequate and additional' resources.There are inevitably

differencesf degreewithin he group concerning cceptablecompromises,

ut

for all of

them, any

commitments n abatementremain

contractual,

hat

s

dependentupon meaningful ommitments romtheNorth includingresource

transfers.

Groups

within

the North

The North

can be

usefully

ivided nto at leastfour

operativegroups.

The

first

group consists

f those

committed

o

stabilizing

missions.

Canada

was

initially

active,but

the

group now revolves round

the

European Community EC)

and

the Scandinavians, nd also includes Australiaand New Zealand. There are,

however,

variations within the

group.7

Members have

adopted

unilateral

targets

o

stabilize,

and

in

some cases

reduce,

their own

CO2 emissions,

s

summarized

in

Table

i.

The

status and seriousness

of

these

targets

varies

substantially,

ut

many

of these ountries re now

developing policies

to

meet

their

argets,

nd

all have called for an international

greement ncorporating

targets

o stabilize

and

reduce

CO2 emissions,

nd commitments

o

transfer

resources

to

developing

countries to

facilitate their participation. Thus,

Skolnikoff's ssertion

n

the

summerof

I990 that no

major

action

s

likely

to

be taken until .. uncertainties re substantially educed, and probably not

before vidence of

warming

and

its effects

re

actuallyvisible,

8

already seems

misplaced.

This

group

reflects

range

of

interacting

nterestsnd attitudes.Most of the

countries

oncerned-but

especially

he Scandinaviancountries nd Canada-

6

Beijitng

eclarationt,ara. 6.

7

For a study

which disaggregatesfurther, ee William

A. Nitze, The greenhouse

ffect:ormulating

conventionLondon: Royal Institute f International

Affairs,

990), pp.

5 -

8

Eugene B.

Skolnikoff, The policy gridlock on global

warming',

Foreigtn

olicy

79,

Summer

iggo,

p.

78.

300


10/19

Internationalolitics f

climate

hange

Table

I: Declared

targets

or commitments undertaken

by

OECD

countries

Energy elated

CO2

emissions

%

of

energy-

(tons

f

carbon

related

World

Country

per

capita) CO2

emissions

Undertaking

Australia

4.42

I.26

Stabilizationf totalghg

emissions t

I988

levels

by 2000;

20% reductionby

2005

Austria

2.

I9 0.28 20%

reduction f

CO2

at

I988

levelsby

2005

Canada

4.95

2.2

I

Stabilization

f

CO2

at

I990

levelsby 000

EC 2.28

I2.83

Stabilization

f

CO2

at

I990

levels

by

2000

Finland

3.57 0.30

Stabilizationof

CO2

at

I990

levels

by

2000

Iceland

2.33

O.OI

Will

meet

EC

target

s

agreed

with

other FTA members

Japan

2.24 4.69

Stabilizationf

CO2

at

I990

levelsby 2000 on a per

capita

basis

New

Zealand 2.08 O.I2 20% reduction

f

CO2

at

I990

levels

by

2000

Norway 2.35

0.

I7

Stabilization

of

CO2

at

I990

levelsby 2000

Sweden

2.38

0.34

Will

meetEC

target

s

agreed

with

other

FTA

members

Switzerland I 80

0.2I

Stabilizationt least f

CO2

at

I990

levels

by

2000

Turkey

0.77

0.72

None

US

5.76 24.37

Commitment to set of

policies

projected o stabilize otal

ghg

emissions t

I990 levels

by

2000

(including

FC

phaseout)

Souirce: International

Energy Agency,

Climate

change olicy

tnitiatives:

pdate Paris: IEA,

20

Nov.

I99I).

have

a

relatively strong perception

of

international

and

environmental

responsibility,

nd

sympathy

with

developing

countries.All

except

Australia

(and

more

recently

nd

temporarily

he United

Kingdom

and

Norway)

are

energy mporters.

n

many,

nvironmental

ssues

gained prominence

uring

he

I980s,

notably

acid rain

n

Europe

and

Canada,

and

ozone

depletion

n

New

Zealand and

Australia-both issues which were dismissed s

scare-mongering

at

the

beginning

of the

decade,

and

which, by

the end of the

decade,

were

recognizedas major threatsustifying elatedand expensiveaction.Many of

30I


11/19

Matthew aterson nd

Michael Grubb

thesecountries

lso senseeconomic

reasons

for ction,

n

terms

not

only of

the

benefits

f

improved

energy efficiency, ut of technological eadership-as

evidencedby the benefits

ermanyreaped frombeing the firstmajor European

country o act on acid rain: If a reinforced olicy ofenvironmental rotection

leads European companies

to an

adaptation

f theirmarketing nd R&D efforts

ahead of

others,

hese companies

will in the

future

e

better

placed

on world

markets.

9

The formal conomic

rationales

or hese

policies

of

setting O2

targets ow

are examined elsewhere.'0

As summarized

there,

the

US position differs

radically

fromthison

almost all

counts.

t has maintained steadfast efusal

o

set

quantitive argets

o stabilize ts

CO2 emissions,

nd has

beenmarkedly

more

hostile than most (though not necessarily ll) other OECD countriesto

proposals

for

ignificant

orth-South

transfers. t hasfurthermore,xpressed

grave fears

bout the economic

consequences

of

CO2 abatement,

nd doubts

about

the

precautionary

rinciple.'12

Andresen

highlights

wo reasons

for the

US position. One

is the extreme

personal hostility

f

leading

administration

ersonnel

notably

former

White

House Chief

of

Staff

John Sununu,

whose

'impatience

with the environ-

mentalists tops ust

shortof contempt13). The

other s a

'gas guzzler' culture

thathas long been accustomed to low-price energy. t is the world's largest

singleCO2 emitter,

ccounting

for

24 per

cent of

fossil

CO2

emissions. t is the

second

largest

oil

producer,

the second

largest

natural gas producer and

the

largest oal producer.

tseconomy

has

evolved

on the

back

of

cheap energy,

and the

history

f

US

energydemand and the existing esources,nfrastructure

and institutions ake

the

US

economy

as

dependent

ponfossil uels s a heroin

addict s

on

the needle.

4

This feeds nto the perception,

widespread n the US

administrationnd

corporate

ector,

hat the

costs

of

reducingCO2

emissions

would

be

very high.'5

Also,

the relative solationism f

the

United

States, specially

n

relation o

the

developing world,

has

enabled

it

to divert

attentionfrom its domestic

energy consumption by pointing

to

the role

of other sources (such as

deforestation

nd rice

cultivation)

and of

developing

country growth,with

little

omprehension

f the forces nd perceptionsnvolved. Finally, s a very

large

and

technologically

dvanced country, he US has increasingly rgued

that t can adapt to climate change with relatively

ittle ost.

9 InternationalEnergy Agency, Clitmiatehlatigeolicy nitiatives: ipdateParis: IEA, I5 July

1991).

10

M. J. Grubb, 'Climate change policies: the CO2 heresies', submnittedo Eniergy outrtial,

992.

Anne Kristin Sydnes, Developitig

otiuitries

ni

lobal

climiate iegotiationis

Oslo: Fridtjof Nansen- nistitute,

I99I),

pp.

9-Io;

Steinar Andresen,

US

greenhouse policy: reactionaryor realistic?',

Ititertnatiotal

Chlalleniges

I:

I, I99I,

pp.

17-24.

12

For

a detailed

presentation

f the

administration's

iew,

see

C. Boyden Gray

and David

B. Rivkin

Jr.,

'A no regrets environmentalpolicy', ForeignPolicy 83, Summer

1991,

pp. 47-65.

13

Andresen, US greenhouse policy', p. 20.

14

S.

Rayner, The greenhouse effect n the

US:

the legacy of enlergy bundance', in

M.

J. GruLbb t al.,

Etnergyolicies tid

the

greenliotuseffect, olumne

I:

couitry ttudiesnid

echlnical

ptiotis Aldershot:

RIIA/Dartmouth,

IggI),

p.

277.

15 The I990 economic

report

of the

presidentput

the

costs of reducing US CO2

emissions

by

20 0) at

between $8oobn and $3.6tn, based on the modelling work of A. S. Manne and R. G. Richels, CO2

emission limits: an economic cost analysisfor the USA', Energy ournal,April

I990.

302


12/19

Internationalolitics f climate hanige

The US position

has evolved.

Initially,there

was an

emphasis on the

uncertaintiesnvolved

in

the science, and on the

use of

those scientistswho

remained sceptical. When negotiations pened, there

was a

shift owards an

emphasis on the policies to be implemented,notably the phasing out of

chlorofluorocarbons

CFCs),

the

I990

Clean Air

Act

amendments o

reduce

various pollutants,

and elements of

a

'national energy strategy.

6

The

administration eport

'Climate

change:

an action agenda' projected that

governmentpolicies

would stabilizeoverall

greenhousegas

emissions

by the

year 000,

with the CFC

phase-out

being the main

factor

ffsettingrojected

CO2

increases.

n the MinisterialDeclaration

of

the

Second

World

Climate

Conference

n

November

1990,

the

United States accepted

a

proposal

for

'additional resources'fordeveloping countries7_although t interpreted his

as

meaning

resources edirected rom ther nternationalssistance. hus, while

some movementhas

occurred,

he

US position

remains ntransigentelative o

those

of the

Europeans

and

others.

The

position

of

Japan

is more ambiguous. During I990, Japan parted

company

with the US

position

nd adopteda delicatelyworded two-tierCO2

emission arget.

But while the

EC

favours conventionwhich clearly ommits

industrialized

ountries o stabilizing missions,

Japan argues

for one which

commitsthemonlyto 'make bestefforts' o stabilize.'8

Unusually

for

Japan,

ts

position

reflects

carcely

oncealed intense

nternal

debates.

Japan

is

already probably

the most

energy-efficientountry

n

the

world, especially

n its industrial

ector,

and so

may

have

greaterdifficulty

than others n meeting

equivalent

emission

targets.Also,

it shows little

direct

concernabout

possible

climate

changeimpacts,

nd

has not

traditionally

een

one

of

the

more internationalist' ountries.

ut

there

re also

strong ontrary

factors.With

an

economy wholly dependent

upon imported

fossil

uels, CO2

constraints re

perceived

as an

opportunity

for

Japan

to revitalize

energy

conservation nd

other

policies

which are

desirable

n

and

of

themselves.'19

Japan

exudes

technological onfidence,

nd is

seeking

n international

olitical

profile

o match ts

economic

might;

some

Japanese rgue

that the

UNCED

conference

rovides

the

platform

romwhich

Japan

could establish ts role as

the

country

o lead

the world into a

sustainable

wenty-firstentury. apan

has

sought

to

export

efficient

echnology

nd

productionprocesses

o

developing

countries

particularly

o the East Asian

newly industrializing

ountries or

NICs),

not

only

as

a

commercial

exercise,

but

also to

be able

to claim

a

commitmentto the global abatementeffort.20ike Germany,Japan senses

commercial

dvantages

n a

C02-constrained

world

advantages

nhanced

by

getting

n

first.

But

Japanesediplomats

till

ppear

uncomfortable

traying

oo farfrom he

American

fold, and,

as

illustrated

y

the

Gulf

War, Japan

resents

eing

treated

16

IEA, Climate chanlge olicy

tnitiatives.

17

Sydnes, Developingcountries, .

io.

18

ECO, IO

Dec.

I99I.

19

Akira Tanabe and Michael Grubb,

'The

greenhouse

effect

n

Japan:

burden

or

opportunity?',

in

Grubb et al., Energy olicies

nd the

greetlisouseffect,

0ol.

I,

p.

28I.

20

Tanabe and

Grubb,

'The

greenhouse

effect n

Japan'.

303


13/19

Matthew

aterson nd

Michael Grubb

as a source of global

finance

or nternational auses: in formal

negotiations

t

has, along with the

United

States

nd

Canada,

shown

distinct

nwillingness

o

discuss

new and additional

funding

o

developing

countries.

21

Thus, despite

a hesitantmovementtowards theEuropean perspective, heJapaneseposition

remainsopaque.

A final group,

which has

played relatively

ittle

part

n the

negotiations

o

date,

are the states

f Eastern

Europe

and

the

Commonwealth of

Independent

States

CIS)

that

once made

up

the Soviet Union. The

USSR tended to

align

itself

with

the US

position,

nd not

surprisingly

he

CIS

and theEast

Europeans

have

generally

had

more

pressing

oncerns.

As

the

situation tabilizes nd these

countries

esume

participation,

he

political

breakdown s

likely

o

be paralleled

by similarfracturesn attitudes o climate change. The whole region was

dependent pon cheap energy upplies

from he

massiveRussianresources.Not

onlyEasternEurope,but

also most of the

non-RussianCIS will now be faced

with

heavy mport

bills s border

prices

reflect

roduction

ostsor

international

market

prices. Replacing

old inefficientnfrastructure ill

give both oppor-

tunities nd incentives

or ow emission

development.

Combined with

the deep

environmental onsciousness aised

during

the

I98os, thesecountries re likely

to

adopt

a

European

attitude o

climate

change.

But the shocks

will

be far

ess

inRussia tself,whichmay become heavilydependent pon energy xportsfor

its future

ecovery.

Thus it

is

likely

that

Russia-which accounted for nearly

half the

CO2

emissionsof the former

Comecon will side with the

United

States,

while most otherswill incline to the

green

alliance'.

Conditions

for an

agreement

At

present,

he

gulf

between

the

positions

f

various states

ppears

too

great

to

allow

meaningful ooperation.

The contrast

etween,

for

example,

the United

States and the Indian positionstestifies o the huge divisions which exist. It

seems

unlikely

hat

nough

will occur

prior

to

UNCED for convention o be

signed

therewhich will do much

to

deal

with

climate

change. But,

whether

y

or

beyond UNCED,

the basic task

for those

wishing

to reach a

successful

agreement

is 'to craft and sustain

a

meaningful winning

coalition of

'22

countries around core

principles

and commitmentswhich can form an

effective ontrol

regime.

This would be

a

group

which formsa

sufficiently

influentialnd

credible

lliance to

put pressure

n

other

countries and which

ifnecessary ould proceedwithoutthem,for a time at least.

A

viable

coalition on

climate

change, panning

he North-South

divide

and

gaining

accession

from wide range of

countries,

would

have

to

meet several

political

criteria.

t

would have to include

explicit

commitments

rom the

industrialized ountries

to

stabilize,

and

probably

to

begin

to

reduce,

their

greenhousegas

emissions ver and

above

existing

ommitments o

phase

out

21

ECO,

i6

Sept.

I99I;

Sydnes,

Developinig

otutitries,

p. 9-I2.

22

James K.

Sebenius,

Crafting

a

winning

coalition:

negotiating

a

regime

to control

global warming',

iln

Richard E. Benedick et

al., Greenlhotise

varmitig.:

egotiatitig global regimte

Washington

DC:

WRI,

1991), p.

70.

304


14/19


CFCs-including

the

core issue of fossil

CO2. This would be necessary oth

as

a

basic logical

requirement n an abatementregime (given the current

arge

disparities) nd

as a means of convincing

developing countries f the sincerity

of the ndustrialized ountries nvolved. twould need substantialommitments

from the

industrialized countries to aid the developing countries

with

technology nd

finance. t would also require eciprocal ommitments rom

he

developingcountries o improve energy

fficiencynd/or slow

deforestation,

including t

absolute minimumreform f

perverse conomic incentives such

as large-scale

nergy ubsidies) nd therudiments f a crediblereporting

nd

monitoring ystem-even

the most generousof

the ndustrialized ountries re

unlikely o commit themselves o large-scale

ransfers ithout any

guarantees

that he moneywill not be wasted,or spent n wholly unrelated urposes.And

a

viable coalition will require enough

industrialized ountries to generate

sufficientncome for

the regime.

Northern

compromise and the

US position

Outside the

AOSIS,

concern about climate

change

is

most

widespread

n the

OECD

countries,

nd it

s

within he

OECD

that he

debate

s

most

ively.This,

combinedwith theprominence fOECD

CG2

emissions nd thefact hat hese

countrieshave the

wealth

and

technology o embark

upon reductions,

makes

the

North the natural focus of

expectations. As

noted above, all OECD

countries

therthan the

United States

nd

Turkeyhave alreadydeclared their

intention o stabilize

r reduce

CO2

or

greenhouse as emissions, r are partof

a

regional tabilizationarget.These countries ave

sought

s their

irst olitical

priority

to

bring the United States

into

the OECD 'green alliance'. In

particular,

ubstantial

fforts

ave

been

made to

persuade

the

US

to stabilize

CO2

emissions,

nd

to

agree

to

the

principle

f

new and additionalresources'

for

developing

countries.

As of

February 992

there s no

sign

that the

United States

will

readily

change

ts

position

on

either ssue. The US has

defended

ts stancenot

only

by

emphasizing

he

continuing

cientific

ncertainties

nd

perceivedhigh

cost

of

action: it

has

argued

that the Rio

conventionwas

never ntended

to

be more

than

a framework

without

significant ommitments; uestioned

the

sincerity

of

some

of

the

OECD 'green

alliance'

targets

and

positions

on

resource

transfers

in

some

cases

with

good reason);

and stressed he

futility

f

OECD

action setagainstpotential ong-term rowth n developing country missions

and

population. By underminingOECD

efforts

nd

highlighting otential

developing

country ontributions,

he United

States'

position

has also

left

many

developing

countries ncertain s

to

whether

he

Northern

ountries

eally

re

concerned about the issue at

all, and

has fuelled accusations

that

climate

concerns re a Northern

conspiracy

o

hamper

Southern

development.

While the US

position currently ppears immutable,

it

could

change

significantly,

epending

upon

changingperceptions

f the

stakes

nd

pressures

brought obear. As notedabove, theuncompromising oneof theUS position

305


15/19

Matthew aterson nd MicVael Grubb

has in part reflected he personalities nvolved, notably the formerChief of

Staff,John Sununu. Although

his

departure

has not

yet changed

the

US

position, t could stilldo so.

In

terms f perception, here s alreadymore open

recognition fthe need to act despite he uncertaintiesnd indications hatthe

other

main plank

of

US

reluctance

the perceivedhigh

cost of

abatement

is

being modified as economic studies advance.

The

likelihood

of

substantive

change by UNCED is difficulto predict, ince

t

could depend

on

theprofile

of climate

nd other

UNCED issues nthe US election ampaign and President

Bush

would

seek to use

any change

to maximum

political

effect

erhaps by

preserving

t for

announcement

t the

Rio

conference.

Rayner suggests hatthe dominantposition

within

he administrations not

as monolithic s it seems, rguingthat nfluential roups favour ctionso long

as it is demonstrated o be

economically fficient.hus,

the

challengeto

those

seeking rapid progress n international egotiations s to detach those who

would act

on

the

assurance

f

economic

efficiency

romthose who

prefer

ot

to act

at

all.

23

It

should also be possible if deemed necessary)

o

persuade

or

pressure ussia to oin a Northern ramework. hus it may be possible o forge

a

'Northerncompromise' as a basis fornegotiatingwith the developingworld.

There

are, however, serious drawbacks to the process

of

Northern

compromiseas a precursor o any attempts o grapple with the global and

North-South issues.

One

is

simply

the

pace.

To

date,

the

US

has remained

impervious

o

the pleas of its OECD partners, nd

if

thispersists hrough

he

final

negotiating ession

t could do

much

to make the framework

onvention

an

impoverisheddocument. But there are long-termcosts

as

well.

The

US

position

s no accident f

time

and

personality, ut,

as

alreadynoted,

reflectshe

far

deeper pressures rising

rom

century's evelopment

based

on a vast

and

area and

unlimited heap energyresources.US development

has

known

few

limits, and popular culture tends

to

assume that every

constraint

an be

overcome witha

technical

ix

without

ffecting

esource-intensive

S

lifestyles.

Combined with its

highlyenergy-intensivenfrastructure,

mmense

ndustrial

interests

nd

open political ystem which gives

concerned obbies

greatpower

to

impede policy development),substantive olicy changes

are bound

to

be

slow and hard

fought. triving

or Northern

ompromise

s the

first

riority

would tie

the

nternational

rocess

o

the

painstaking ace

of US

energypolicy

development;

reinforce the

complacent presumption

of the

US

that it

ultimately

determines

what can

be done in

major

international

ffairs; nd,

furthermore,layto one of theunderlying bjections raisednot only byUS

diplomats

but also

in

many

domesticdebates thatOECD

action

alone is both

economically

inefficientnd

ultimatelypointless,

because of future

growth

from

developing

countries.

It is

also hard to see where such an

approach

can lead

in terms of a

North-South

compromise.

The

US position, reflecting

n

part

its historical

isolationism, specially

n

relation

o

thedevelopingworld, s

far

rom

what

any

developing

countries

consider

acceptable.

It

is

hard

to see what could

23

Rayner, The greenhouse effect n the

US',

p.

271.

306


16/19


realistically e expected

other than

a rerun of the

20-year-long

nd

largely

fruitless ebates of the Law

of

the Sea provisions

n

deep

seabed

mining,

nd

the

New International conomic Order. Domestic US

politics,

ombinedwith

its ideology and budgetary pressures,make it unlikelythat the US would

readilyoffer

much domestic ction or financial ssistance s

long

as

developing

countries were

not committed

to serious

abatement;

and

the

developing

countrieswould not

consider uch constraints

s

long

as

the

biggest

nd richest

polluter

in

the postulated agreement offered o little. If the firstpoint of

references what the US is happy to accept, t is hard to see a serious global

regime for tackling limate change getting ff he ground.

The alternative track: across the North-South divide

The alternative pproach to building coalitionof sufficient eightto form he

basis of a long-term ontrol regime might be for the nascent green alliance'

first o seek non-traditional llies across the North-South divide. Northern

countries hatdo wish to

find

ommon

ground with Southern quity concerns

would thereforeeekto coalesce around

the philosophythat the first riority

is not

necessarily o accommodate all the US concerns,but is rather o find

groundsfora compromisewhich can involve a substantial ody of developing

countries.This would

probably

also

involve detaching the more pragmatic

Southern

countries

rom

the more hardline tates.The aim

would be

to

build

a

central

ucleusfor

long-term egime

which

others

ventually

ave to

accept

as

the

only

effective

nd

legitimate

nternational nitiative towards

global

control of the

problem.

This would

be a

farfrom

impleprocess.

n

the first

lace,

the current

green

alliance'

is

tself oo fragmented o have

a

unitedview of how to proceed-how

hardto pushand what shouldbe offered. tarting o forgea meaningful eal

with a

significant

raction

f

the

developing

world would

require

both

strong

leadership on

both

sides)

and

significant

ew

resources.

he former ould not

be

achieved without the Nordic

countries nd

the

EC (and

would

be

greatly

strengthened y the activeparticipation

f

Canada and Australasia);

the

latter

is

implausiblewithoutJapan,whichcurrentlyemains mbivalenton

the

ssue

of

financial ssistance. hen there

s the

question

of

which

developing

countries

might

be attracted

beyond

the

AOSIS membership,

nd how

readily they

might part company

with the hardliners.

Currently,

n rhetoric

t

least,

it

appears that some developing countries still hope to 'blackmail' the

industrialized

world into

capitulation

on the climate

issue

by

the threat

of

uncontrolled

ncreases

n their

emissions,

nd are themselves

nder domestic

politicalpressure

ot to

compromise

n

their

iew

of fundamental

quity

ssues.

But

privatelymany accept,

to

varyingdegrees, he

need for

nd likely

form

of

compromise.

Such an

approach

would at least meet one

of

the essential criteria

for

developing country participation,namely

that

of

dealing

with

Northern

countries hataccepttheprimary esponsibilityorpastemissions nd current

307


17/19

Matthew aterson

nd Michael

Grubb

abatement fforts.

here

could stillbe

a

major developing country loc outside

the central oalition, n additionto

the energy xporters. ut direct vidence of

thepotentialbenefits f being

involved

in

an agreementwould then start o

exert a powerful nfluence n otherdevelopingcountries o compromise and

participate.

Perhaps the biggest potentialobjectionis that building a coalition without

the

US would

be

both

ineffective,ecause

of

its major contributions o global

emissions, nd politically

mpracticable. n fact he former s largely subset f

the

atter, ince

the

aim would

ultimately e, not

to

have an agreementwithout

the

US, but

to

create a 'winning

coalition'

that the

US ultimately felt

compelled

to

oin-a tactic hatwould

probably

have a

greater mpact

on

US

emissions han a processdrivenentirely y theneed to compromisefirstwith

US

recalcitrance.

ut

is

this

politically

feasible?

It is

too earlyto tell. Ten years go,

the

dea of an international rocesswith

potentiallymajor economic

mplications roceedingwithout he active consent

of

theUS would have

been

unthinkable. ut the

relative conomic decline of

the

US during

the

'feel-good vacuum'

of the I98os

has

already severely

weakened

the US's

economic and

international

osition.

The

financial nd

politicalweight

of

a clear

EC-Japanesealliance,

with

participation rom t least

some other OECD countries,would itselfput great pressureon the US

position. The EC has already

explicitly and deliberately tarted

to fill the

current

eadership

vacuum

on

global

environmental

ffairs; nd,

as discussed

above, Japan

too

believes the issue

presents

both

political

and trade

opportunities,

nd has moved

steadily way

from the US

position.

Furthermore,

f

a potentialcoalition formedwhich included arrangements

for

technology

ssistance o

many countries f Eastern

Europe

and

developing

countries,

with an

implicit or

explicit) preference

or more

energy-efficient

technologiesfromparticipating ECD countries, heUS would riskfinding

itself

xcluded

from

some of

themajor emerging

markets.The

presumption

that

non-participants

ould

gain

a

competitive dvantage

would not

necessarily

hold.

For a coalition

beyond

a certain

ize,

the

danger

of

being

excluded

from

major markets

ould

be more mportant.And

paradoxically depending

n

part

upon

the trade model

used),

the

mpact of

being

outside

an abatement

regime

on

US terms

f trade could

itself esult

n

net

transfersfrom

he

US,

as

it

pays

part

of ts

competitor's nergy/carbon

axes

through

n

expanded

tradedeficit

reflecting igher mportcostsand reducedcoal exports.Obviously,this nters

the difficultnd potentially olatile terrain f GATT and other trade ssues,

which are

beyond

the

scope

of

this rticle.But

it

may

be that

f

there s to be

a

substantive

agreement

on

limiting

CO2

emissions,

the

countries most

concerned to find a solution will

have

to

start

exploring

such

approaches,

whether

or not

they

ever

come into

being

in

an

eventual

partial greement.

308


18/19

Internationalolitics fclimate hange

The role of Rio

What

is

the role of

UNCED

and the framework

convention in all this?

Although heframework onvention tselfwill be far emovedfrom ny global

strategy

or

tackling

limate

change,

the convention

nd debates surrounding

it will do much to set the tone and terms f subsequent fforts,nd as such will

be a vastly mportant tep. t may do much to determine he natureof feasible

coalitionsthereafternd the pace at which they can develop.

It is important hat the framework onvention should establish he basic

preconditions ormeaningful ooperation crosstheNorth-South divide. This

means demonstrating

hat he

bulk

of

industrial ountries

re

serious bout the

problem and understand hat heybear initialresponsibilityor ddressing t. If

feasible, n umbrella

commitment

ollectively o stabilize ossilCO2 emissions

from OECD

or all

industrialized ountries the lattergiving extra headroom

fromthecollapse ofEast European and CIS emissions) t the standard'

I990

level an extended version of the

EC

undertaking-would yield several

benefits.

Notwithstanding the legal complexities, t

would convince

the

developing

countries

f

the

sincerity

f

Northern

oncerns;

reduce fears bout

competitivedisadvantages mong

the industrialized

ountries;

convince the

fossilfuel companies of thereality nd natureof initialconstraints; nd set n

train searching rocess

of

policy assessments,

uch

as thatcurrently ccurring

within

the EC. But even if such collective commitment urnsout not to be

feasible forpolitical

or

legal reasons,

n our view a

framework

onvention

should still contain the

strongest ossible language

on

industrialized

ountry

commitments-if

necessary, nvolving special exemption

clauses

rather han

reneging

on

the

basic

principles

of

CO2

emission stabilization

nd

resource

transfers

o

supportdeveloping country

fforts.

Many

of

the broader

UNCED

discussions re

similarly rappling

with the

potential

tensions between environmental

protection, development

and

sovereignty,

he

principles

nd

meaning

of

differentialesponsibility,

nd the

obstaclesposed by specialnational nterests.

io

will

not

be a make-or-break

meeting

hat

decides

whether r not

the

global community

an

cope

with the

challenges

f

global

environmental

roblems.

But

it

will establish he

basis on

which

the world starts

o

grapple

with all issues

raised,

nd

which

aunches

he

process

of

building

more effective

nternational oalitions

which

may

become

dominant

over

time. n

all

the

ssues,

s in

climate,

t

is

still

unclear

how

well

the chancewill be seized.

Prospects

and conclusions

Climate

change

is

in its

earliest

phase

as a serious

issue of

international

diplomacy.

t is not

possible

to

predict ither he pace

or the structure

f

future

developments

with confidence.

The

negotiations

have

only recently gone

beyond proceduralformalities,

nd

many

countrieshave

only

ust

begun

the

process of assessingthe full implications, larifying ositionsand exploring

309


19/19


coalitions.The foregoing iscussion s thereforeomewhat speculative, hough

grounded n some clear features f national nterests nd characteristics.

At present t s doubtfulwhether majority f states ven want a substantive

agreement,being either unconcerned about planetaryproblems of the next

century,

r unaware

of

or unconvinced

by the

rationalefor

starting esponses

now. A series of freak weather events could raise the political impetus for

action, and perhaps alter the distribution f national concerns. Growing

scientific onsensus n

the

severity

f

the problem,

or

economic consensus

n

the costs and suitable

degree

of

abatement,

ould

similarly

move the

process

forward. But however

it

occurs,

it

is

barely

credible

that continued

and

accelerating uman

ntervention ith the

atmospheric

eat

balance can long be

tolerated; o effectivebatement ction will ultimately ave to be undertaken.

The

negotiations

towards

a

framework convention have

already

revealed

seriousdivisions f

interest,

nd as the

process

moves into the

phase

of

seeking

serioussignificant

batement ommitments

hese

are

likely

to

intensify.

At least fourmajor divisions f interest re visible.The North-South divide

reflects undamental ifferences

n

priorities, esponsibilities

nd

perceptions.

The divide between major energyproducers and sometimes orestrynterests)

and others s almost

as

deep

and

perhaps

even

more

intractable.

xceptional

vulnerability o climate change is the critical ssue foryetother states.And,

finally, iffering

ultural ttitudes

nd

experiences oncerning

nvironmental

impacts

nd the nherent cientific ncertaintiesnvolved lead

to

contradictory

conclusions

s to how

to

respond

o the

arge-scale

ut

very

uncertain hreat

f

climate

change.

There

are thus

deep differences,

ot

only

between the ndustrialized nd

the

developing worlds,

but

within

each,

and

many

differentoalitions re

already

emerging.

Within

the

North the

biggest

conflict

s

between the US and most

other

ndustrialized

ountries.Whilst the

US position

has evolved and

may

change further,

e conclude that

the division

s

not

a

temporary henomena

but reflects

deeper divergence

of attitude

nd

interests.

Most

diplomatic

efforts o date have focused

on

trying

o

forge

first

n

alliance

of all

the

developed

countries.We

argue

n

contrast hat he best route

to

establishing

n effective

ong-term

ontrol

regime may be

for those states

that

are currently ommitted,

or

sympathetic,o

action

notably European

countries

led

by

the

EC, Japan

and a

significantgroup

of

developing

countries

to

pursue

a

coalition

among

themselveswhich commits them to

controllingemissionsand provides resource and technical assistance o the

participatingdeveloping

countries. Such

a

'green

alliance'

could form a

legitimate

asis

for a

broader

regime

and

would

put

considerable

pressure

n

the

US

and

Russia, as

well as on those

developing

countries

hat

are

seeking

idealistic but

politically

unachievable

goals,

to

compromise

and

join. The

framework

convention

should

lay

the foundations on which

subsequent

diplomatic

effortso build

a

'winning

coalition'

can

be based.

3IO

The International Politics of Climate Change (Paterson y Grubb)

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