The International Journal of Psychoanalysis Volume 83 Issue 4 2002 - The Need for True Controversies...

8/13/2019 The International Journal of Psychoanalysis Volume 83 Issue 4 2002 - The Need for True Controversies in Psychoan

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THE NEED FOR TRUE CONTROVERSIES INPSYCHOANALYSIS:

THE DEBATES ON MELANIE KLEIN AND JACQUES LACAN INTHE RIO DE LA PLATA

RICARDO BERNARDISantiago Vazquez 1142, Montevideo 11300, Uruguay

(Final version accepted9 Jan 2002)

Controversies are part of the process of scientic knowing. In psychoanalysis, thediversity of theoretical, technical and epistemological positions makes the debate

particularly necessary and by the same token difcult. In this paper, the author

examines the function of controversies and the obstacles to their development, taking as

examples the debates held in the Ro de la Plata (Buenos Aires and Montevideo) during

the nineteen seventies, when the dominant Kleinian ideas came into contact with

Lacanian thought. The author examines different examples of argumentative dis-

courses, using concepts taken from the theory of argumentation. The major difculties

encountered did not hinge on characteristics pertaining to psychoanalytic theories (i.e.

the lack of commensurability between them), but on the defensive strategies aimed at

keeping each theorys premises safe from the opposing partys arguments. A true debateimplies the construction of a shared argumentative eld that makes it possible to lay

out the different positions and see some interaction between them and is guided by the

search for the best argument. When this occurs, controversies promote the disciplines

development, even when they fail to reach any consensus.

Keywords: Controversies, argumentation, incommensurability, Klein, Lacan,

Baranger.

Introduction

Certain methodological and epistemological

problems of present-day psychoanalysis

emerge quite clearly when situations of theor-

etical or technical dissent among analysts are

studied. Confronted with discrepancies, each

of the positions is invitedat least in princi-

pleto substantiate its afrmations, elucidat-

ing the reasoning that supports them. The

study of this reasoning should make it possi-

ble to better understand the problems under

discussion, evaluate the different solutions

that were proposed and identify any consen-

sus or points where there is no agreement and

further research is needed. As analysts, too,

we know that it is necessary to remain aware

of the unconscious forces that can inect the

apparent rationality of a given discourse. Ex-

amining the substantiations used in situations

of dissent should open the way to greater un-

derstanding of how the problem of narcissism

and alteritywhich any discussion stirs up

is being managed at the unconscious level.

That would also lead every participant to

self-examination of his/her unconscious

Int. J. Psychoanal. (2002)83, 851

Copyright# Institute of Psychoanalysis, London, 2002


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relationship with analytic theories and with

whatever signicance particular authors or

ideas might have in each individuals personal

history. If events did happen in the way I have

just described, we would be looking at a

heartening panorama where successive gen-

erations of analysts would have ready accessto a clear vision of the previous generations

advances, of the different theoretical and

technical paths opening the way to possible

new steps and of the reasons proffered for

preferring certain paths over others. At the

same time, the experience of personal analy-

sis would make it possible to more efciently

manage the uncertainty and hostility debate

generates, and also the unconscious conictsand remnants of transference inecting the

choice of theory. I believe that at this point no

one doubts that I am describing a panorama

more ideal than real, which in this post era

sounds like a dream of the Enlightenment.1

The fact is that scientic debates or

controversies are possible, though difcult. If

we observe the debates that take place in

psychoanalysis, whether in written or oral

form, or internally (when a person examinesa topic in his/her own mind), we discover

that there are a series of factors tending to

restrict the scope of the exercise. The number

and heterogeneity of positions existing in our

discipline, and the indeterminate character of

the limits between them, make it quite

difcult if not impossible to consider all

positions when entering into a debate. Even

those controversies that have had the greatestinternational repercussions, like those of the

British Society in the nineteen forties, were

limited to the ideas dominant within the local

tradition. But even though it is necessary to

accept the restricted nature of debates, it

proves to be of the greatest importance, for

the integrity of the eld of psychoanalysis, to

examine those debates that break out between

psychoanalytic conceptions differing substan-

tively in their theoretical, technical and

epistemological suppositions. Such research

should centre on particular instances, thoughit should at the same time arrive at conclu-

sions that could be generally valid.

From a historical perspective, Freuds in-

uence did not make it easy to create a

culture of debate and free examination of

differences; instead, the use of authority-

based arguments and the exclusion of diver-

gent positions were favoured. Only recent

decades have witnessed slow but sure pro-gress in the recognition of the fact of, and

right to, theoretical and technical pluralism in

psychoanalysis. However, the existence of a

diversity of positions made it necessary to

clarify the points of agreement and disagree-

ment between them, to identify, not only

instances of real consensus, but also points

open to discussion. Scientic controversies

thus become unavoidable paths opening the

way for the discipline to advance through anarray of opinions.

For controversy to be possible there must

exist minimum prior agreement regarding the

methodological procedures and epistemologi-

cal bases that will govern the discussion, so

that the arguments offered by each party can

be evaluated by mutual consent. But arriving

at shared criteria is no easy matter. Studying

the editorial policies of psychoanalyticaljournals, Tuckett reached the following con-

clusion: For those who believe in psycho-

analysis, the disciplines frequent failure to

develop an ongoing methodology of rigorous

debate to sustain it should be a major

1We must, withal, be cautious in surrendering the dreams of the Enlightenment. The critique of a too narrow

conception of reason does not mean that all forms of rationality must be given up. Psychoanalysis itself wasborn of, and continues tied to, a certain form of rationality, as Steiner states: In fact, both the scientic and the

curative norms of psychoanalysis imply the acceptance and the use of logical presidia and moral values which

stem from a particular blending of the liberal radical tradition with the Enlightenment and Romantic traditions

of Western European culture without which psychoanalysiscould not have been born (1995, p. 442).

852 RICARDO BERNARDI


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concern (1998, p. 446). The rst require-

ment, then, is to have procedures that make it

possible to discuss procedures.

Freud had advised taking instances of

dissent to the court of clinical experience,

testing divergent positions on the basis of

particular cases and clinical problems. Hestated:

As a rule, however, theoretical controversy is unfruit-

ful. No sooner has one begun to depart from the

material on which one ought to be relying, than one

runs the risk of becoming intoxicated with ones own

assertions and, in the end, of supporting opinions that

any observation would have contradicted. For this

reason it seems to me to be incomparably more

useful to combat dissentientinterpretationsby testingthem upon particular cases and problems (1918

[1914], p. 48).

Facts and all, it is not easy for the clinical

court to reach unanimous and incontroverti-

ble decisions, and discrepancies regarding the

correct interpretation of a particular material

are frequent. The insufcient reliability of

clinical judgements constitutes a problem

when basing theoretical developments onthem. This problem becomes more manage-

able when one species the different contexts

to which clinical judgements may pertain and,

in light of those contexts, the different paths

forward that become available.

I will now discuss three types of contexts.

First, psychoanalytical clinical judgements

can be used to support decisions in the eld

of health sciences. Medicine has met with asimilar problem of lack of consensus in the

clinical area. The evidence-based medicine

movement (Sackett et al., 1997) attempts to

confront the disparity in clinical judgements

bearing on the efcacy of treatments, deve-

loping methodological procedures that make

it possible to evaluate the degree of scientic

support accorded to different therapeutic ap-

proaches. The idea of empirically supported

treatments is a current subject of discussion

for the different psychotherapies, and psycho-

analysis is also involved.2 It is probable thatadvances in systematic research on the pro-

cess and the results of treatments will make it

possible to answer certain kinds of questions

with increasing precision, such as which

therapeutic approach benets, in what

evidence-based way, what types of patients

and by what means does it achieve this. It is

probable, too, that neighbouring elds (the

neurosciences, the study of child develop-ment, cognitive psychology, epidemiological

studies etc.) could contribute useful know-

ledge on a number of other issues that

psychoanalysis is questioning at present

(though certainly not on all of them). It is

worth noting that in all these cases, know-

ledge is supported by well-dened methodo-

logical procedures and, when discrepancies

arise, the procedures themselves become the

focus of the discussion, for they supply thecriteria that support the argumentation.3

Second, other issues pertaining to psycho-

analytical controversies, however, are not

amenable to this type of standardised proce-

dure. Some of these issues are irresolvable;

that is, with the present state of knowledge, it

is not possible to reach decisions regarding

their truth. While these questions may refer to

problems of undoubted ultimate or philoso-phical interest (i.e. many meta-psychological

topics such as the nature of the unconscious,

or of drives etc.), there are no procedures

within the discipline that make it possible

to answer these questions conclusively.

2For example, at the 42nd Congress of the International PsychoanalyticalAssociation (Nice, 2001) there was a

Panel devoted to Evidence-basedMedicine.3See, for example, the discussion on empirically based treatments in the Special Section devoted to the topic in

Psychotherapy Research(1998, vol. 8, No. 2: 115171). See also Fonagy et al., 1998: 5258, An open door

review on outcome studies in psychoanalysis. Electronic publication of the International Psychoanalytical

Association atwww.ipa.org.uk.

THE NEED FOR TRUE CONTROVERSIES IN PSYCHOANALYSIS 853
http://www.ipa.org.uk/


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Mentioning them in the course of the debate,

however, can prove useful in providing

information about each partys premises

or frame of reference, or for heuristic

purposesto encourage the emergence of

new ideas.

A third type of issue, located at the heart ofclinical research and psychoanalytical theory,

elicits another class of problem, giving rise to

questions referring to the unconscious mean-

ing of the subjective and inter-subjective

experiences that occur in analysis, and to the

best way of conceptualising these clinical

discoveries. In the disciplines present state,

discussion of these topics takes place mostly

on a hermeneutical plane, and arguments aresupported by clinical intuition enhanced by

the personal experience of analysis, and by

critical reection on the concepts used. When

divergent interpretations arise there are no

standardised procedures for resolving the

issue, nor is there agreement about whether

this would be possible or even desirable,

given the distortion these methods could

introduce in the consideration of certain

problems.Thus, we nd that different types of ques-

tions have a place in psychoanalysis and, in

each case, the pertinent answer is supported

by evidentiary criteria that are also different.

Frequently in psychoanalytic controversies

issues of different natures are discussed at the

same time, without having previously estab-

lished what procedure to consider valid when

approaching each class of problem. To under-stand this difculty we must remember that

historically psychoanalysis has drawn from

both the scientic and the humanistic tradi-

tions, and the literature of psychoanalysis is

sometimes closer to one or the other of these

traditions. Yet the criteria governing contro-

versies and also the procedures for achieving

consensus are different in each tradition. The

humanities do not aspire to the same type of

consensus that the sciences seek. The pro-

blem of what is decidable plays an important

role here. Discussing Rortys ideas about

problems of commensurability in the sciences

and humanities, Connolly & Keutner (1988,

pp. 578) noted that, although there are

decidable and non-decidable issues in both

the sciences and the humanities, there is a

difference between them on this point. While

decidability occupies a central position in the

matters with which science is concerned (atleast normal Kuhnian science), in the huma-

nities non-decidable issues predominate. The

fact that psychoanalysis should include both

types of issue prominently quite often leads

to discussions being conducted not in a

common language but in different ones with

different regimes for truth. This impels us to

examine the extent to which the participants

in a debate share the same premises.

The conditions necessary for a truedebate

To argue implies enunciating something in

a form that will be supported by or grounded

in other statements, which are taken as

premises. When arguments that are convin-

cing for one of the parties in a debate have novalue for the other, this frequently stems from

each of them having started from different

premises and suppositions, and may not have

been made explicit in the debate. When

speaking of premises I refer to the general

principles and categories that organise know-

ledge in a particular theory; by personal

suppositions I mean each authors own con-

text of ideas, reecting his/her vital experi-ences, including experience as analyst and as

patient.

It is not easy for the participants in a

controversy to accede to discussing their

premises and suppositions. The reasons for

this are of different natures: some are of a

logical and rational order, while others can

be best understood from a psychoanalytical

perspective.

From a logical point of view, for each

partys premises to enter in the discussion

there must at least be some shared criteria

providing a neutral arena, that is, a eld for



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discussion that does not favour one position

or the other. This makes it possible for the

participants to convert any of the discrepan-

cies arising in debate into a subject of debate

itself; thus in principle all the truths

accepted by the different psychoanalytical

schools can be questioned. At the beginningof the debate these minimum shared criteria

need not go beyond the processes governing

the secondary process. It is a function of the

controversy itself to esh out these premises,

establishing progressive agreements about

the nature of the issues discussed and the

criteria governing the validity of the reason-

ing. However, these minimum initial agree-

ments about premises can be difcult orimpossible to establish when the basic rules

governing the use of scientic language are

being discussed, as has occurred in a number

of recent controversies (Sokal & Bricmont,

1997; Bouveresse, 1999).

The difculty of including personal pre-

mises and assumptions in the discussion can

be better understood if we examine the

problem from a psychoanalytical perspective.

Controversies challenge a persons con-scious and unconscious relation with his/her

assumptions and theories. In the case of an

analyst, his/her theoretical and technical ideas

not only have an intellectual value but are

also linked to personal history and analytic

experience as patient and analyst. To call into

question these assumptions and premises gen-

erates strong feelings of uncertainty, reacti-

vates remnants of the transference datingback to analytical training and institutional

life, and mobilises narcissistic conicts. All

this tends to limit the analysts capacity to

operate with a reversible perspective, that is,

to adopt, if only as a methodological exercise,

the positions of the other parties. For to do so

is tantamount to accepting the possibility that

the solutions he/she has adopted in his/her

own lifeas analyst or patientcould be

incomplete or provisional.

Elsewhere (Bernardi, 1992; Bernardi &

Nieto, 1989; Bernardi & de Leon, 1992), I

have referred extensively to the analysts

unconscious relation with his/her theories,

and also to the need for examining this

relation in personal analysis or in a reection

open to self-analysis. It is worth adding that

such personal willingness is necessary if the

analyst wishes a scientic controversy to

enrich him/her. If there is no attitude open toexamining the unconscious signicance of

ones own certainties, these can give rise to

processes of identication that lead to narcis-

sistic withdrawal. In a controversy, a number

of personal issues are at stakeamong them

the hunger for power or prestige, loyalties

and enmities of different sorts etc. But

controversies also make it possible for some-

thing of the love for truth to come to light. Inthe eld of psychoanalysis, love for truth

starts with being willing to think about

oneself from the vantage point the other

offers us. Thus, we reach a point where the

epistemological perspective and the psycho-

analytical one proper converge: for any true

debate to exist, the existence of an inter-

subjective eld must be accepted where the

different parties can be governed by common

laws. Ultimately, to be guided by the logic ofthe best argument is to show interest for

something new that the other can tell us, and

be willing to change if necessary.

In this paper I propose to demonstrate the

usefulness of the ideas of the theory of

argumentation for examining some of the

problems elicited by controversies in psycho-

analysis and to identify possible paths

forward.

The theory of argumentation

The theory of argumentation has grown

apace in recent times. This branch of philoso-

phy is part of the tradition of Greek dialectics

and rhetoric, and epistemological, linguis-

tic, psychological, sociological and other

approaches now converge there. It studies

how to proceed if one wants agreement in a

eld where it is impossible to obtain the

necessary demonstrations in the modes of



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logic or geometry (Toulmin, 1985). As Perel-

man states, The very nature of deliberation

and argumentation is opposed to need and

evidence, because there is no deliberating

when the solution is necessary and no arguing

against the evidence (1983 [1958], p. 1). In

his opinion, if we forget that the proofs usedin argumentation are not logically necessary

truths, we fall into the fanaticism that strains

to impose such proofs as universal truths or

into the scepticism that rejects the validity of

any adhesion or commitment in the absence

of this type of truth.

Toulmin points out that epistemology must

study the arguments as they appear really in

the different scientic elds. He states:

In the natural sciences, for instance, men such as

Kepler, Newton, Lavoiser, Darwin and Freud have

transformednot only our beliefs, but also our ways of

arguing and our standards of relevance and proof:

they have accordingly enriched the logic as well as

the contentof natural science (1958, p. 257).

In consequence, what Toulmin proposes is

to look at the history, the logic, the structureand the modus operandi of the sciences

through the eyes of a naturalist, without

prejudices imported from outside. In a word,

what is required, in his view, is not epistemo-

logical theorybut epistemologicalanalysis.

Toulmin uses the idea of argumentative

eld to designate the logical ambit where the

different arguments can interact. He notes

that depending on the logical nature of thearguments used, the argumentative elds can

become non-reducible (pp. 14 38). Sandler

took note of the same problem in other terms:

To the extent that different psychoanalysts share the

same meaning-space for a concept or theoretical

term, they can communicate relatively satisfactorily

in that particular area. However, it may happen that

their meaning-spaces for the concept are different,

and then problems of lack of communication or

pseudo-communication may arise (1983, p. 36).

The Dutch School, analysing argumenta-

tion, posits the convergence of a descriptive

dimension and a normative or ideal one,

which makes it possible to do a rational

reconstruction of the argumentative discourse

and also construct an ideal model of the

critical discussion. The critical discussion

model is a theory of how discourse would

be structured if it were purely resolutionoriented (van Eemeren et al., 1993, p. 26).

Argumentation is seen as a special kind of

regulation of disagreements: Our particular

choice has been to develop a model that

construes argumentation as a methodical

exchange of speech acts among cooperative

discussants (p. 22).

Returning to Toulmins idea about argu-

mentative elds, he denes them as institu-tional frameworks that give content to the

conduct of argument (p. 143). Argumenta-

tive elds: provide standards or authority,

legitimacy, objectivity, rationality, and ac-

ceptability. The eld notion, then, stresses

that all argumentative deliberation occurs

within some socio-historical context and

that all reasoning is reasoning-in-context

(p. 143).

This path for resolving discrepancies im-plies a number of steps: 1) identify the

disagreements between the two parties; 2)

establish agreements regarding the means by

which the disagreement can be settled; 3)

allow indenite exploration of the merits of

each position; which culminates in step 4)

reach agreement, or mutually recognise that it

is not possible to achieve one for the time

being.In my opinion, the agreement provided for

in point 2 (procedures for managing diver-

gences) is often lacking in psychoanalytical

discussions, with the problem never becom-

ing a topic for discussion. In consequence,

there is no way of proceeding with the

indenite exploration, as wide ranging as

necessary, of the different positions (as point

3 stipulates), because the prior issues to be

claried before the dialogue could continue

were not identied and accepted (p. 26).

Van Eemeren et al. consider that a dialec-

tical reconstruction of the argumentative



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discourse must include appropriate consider-

ation of the following aspects: a) the points to

be questioned in the debate; b) the positions

of the parties with regard to these points; c)

the explicit and implicit arguments the parties

bring to bear in support of their points of

view; d) the structure of the argumentation,that is, the relations between arguments

(1993, p. 60). The debate should then be

governed exclusively by the value of the

arguments.

It is well known that in reality controver-

sies involve not only ideas in conict but also

confrontations of human interests of different

orders, among which are issues of power. For

the controversy to be fruitful there must be awillingness to accept a series of prior condi-

tions of diverse psychological, social, episte-

mological and ethical natures, guaranteeing

that the value of the argumentation will be

recognised. This is hard, but not impossible.

The dimensions lying just beneath the

discussion itself (reason, truth, communica-

tion) are on the agenda of contemporary

philosophic thought. The possibility of a

search for truth through communicationbetween the speakers has been analysed both

in the Continental hermeneutic tradition

(Dilthey, Heidegger, Habermas, Gadamer),

and in the school inspired by Frege, Wittgen-

stein, Quine and Davidson. The very idea of

truth, for Habermas, must be enlarged in such

a way as to give a central place to the

communicative processes that, through dialo-

gue and confrontation, make it possible toreach uncompelled consensus where truth

follows the logic of the best argument.

Davidson has reviewed the philosophical

problems of the nature of the interpretation of

what goes on in other minds; from the

externalist position he assumes, interpersonal

understanding serves as a model for self-

knowledge. From a similar perspective,

Cavell (1993) notes that the idiolect of any

person can, in principle, be translated into

that of any other: the difference in points of

view would make no sense if there was notsomething common to both of them; some-

thing true for both of them even if they state

it in different ways (Davidson, 1984, in

Cavell, 1993), which reduces the pretensions

of scepticism and relativism.

I should like to return, from these different

contributions, to the topic of controversies in

psychoanalysis and especially to the difcul-

ties that exist when constituting a sharedargumentative eld.

Incommensurability as a defensivestrategy

In previous articles (Bernardi, 1989, 1992),

I have noted the difculty of determining

with any precision to what extent different

psychoanalytic theories are coincident,opposed (or even contradictory) or comple-

mentary. I also explored the possibility that

certain aspects of the theories could be in a

relation of incommensurability, in Kuhns

(1962) sense: that because they start from

different premises they will lack common

measure.4 It seemed to me then that incom-

mensurability depended on the nature of the

theories themselves, each of which constitu-tes a heterogeneous paradigm or disciplinary

matrix organised according to its internal

need for logical and semantic coherence.

Today I am willing to revise this opinion in

the case of psychoanalysis.

4

Kuhn (1962) noted that during periods of normal science there is a single dominant paradigm. Scienticrevolutionsare characterised by the appearance of a new paradigm, which may not be commensurate with the

previous one, in which case logical compatibility or semantic congruency between them is not assured.

Disciplines having multiple paradigms constitute a situation of another type (Masterman, 1972), which could

be that of psychoanalysis(Bernardi, 1989).



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Psychoanalytic theories become incom-

mensurable when it is accepted that their

hypotheses can only be discussed from the

premises on the basis of which they were

formulated. Instead of what should occur in a

hermeneutical circle, where theory and ex-

perience are each in turn enhanced by theother, in the above-mentioned case each

premise ends up providing the basis for its

own validity, limiting the possibility of being

questioned from outside, or from the dimen-

sion of observable facts. Britton and Steiner

(1994) noted the difference between selected

facts, which are patterns arising from experi-

ence and overvalued ideas, where the facts

are forced to t into an analysts priorhypothesis or theory. In this last case, each

theorys postulates and premises end up

determining what is and what is not to be

considered true psychoanalysis. In conse-

quence, circularity is engendered, whereby to

question certain ideas one must rst agree

with them. Here the premises of each position

elude any radical critique, for anyone starting

from different premises can nd no common

eld for discussion. Any psychoanalytic idea,no matter how valuable (i.e. the unconscious

conict, primary decits, early anxiety, the

role of language etc.) can become a barrier to

discussion if taken as an incontrovertible

premise instead of being recognised as a

hypothesis that must be submitted to scrutiny.

In a related way, it is interesting to note that

frequently those who do not agree with

certain premises tend to both reject them andignore themen bloc, without treating them as

alternates to be tested against the hypotheses

of those standing in disagreement. As a result

of this reduction of the eld of discussion,

discourses become incommensurable.

What looks like incommensurability can

thus be explained as a strategy to defend ones

own position. This strategy makes it possible

to limit the argumentative eld to the circle

of certain ideas and exclude rival hypotheses.

The controversy is interrupted when it

reaches the points of greatest intellectualand emotional tension, that is, when each

partys premises and hypotheses should be

questioned. 5

The situation of incommensurability can

be masked by an apparent integration or

pseudo-integration of theories. This is the

case when highly different psychoanalytic

theories are used with no comparison of any

sort and no attention paid to the reasoningsinternal coherence. True integration among

theories, on the other hand, implies the

existence of a debate, at least in ones mind,

ensuring the interaction of different ideas and

the possibility of mutual transformation.

Why do psychoanalytic ideas change?

Controversy supposes a willingness tosearch for the truth, and thus to receive new

ideas and modify the previous ones. In fact,

psychoanalytic ideas change through time.

This change elicits a number of questions:

Which ideas change? When and why? With

what effects or consequences? The problem

of change is not exclusive to psychoanalysis

but is a concern in science, leading both to

normative discussions (When should an oldtheory be abandoned? When should a new

one be accepted?) and also descriptive ones

(How does the change in ideas really happen?

What does history teach about this?).

In a quite simplied way, we can look to

5From the perspective of the theory of argumentation, this closing of the eld of debate shows up a aw in the

debates pragmatic preconditions,that is, in both parties willingness to continue to examine the foundations of

the positions and be guided by the logic of the best argument. Analysing fundamentalistdiscourse from theviewpoint of the theory of argumentation, van Eemeren at al. stated: Incommensurability and the apparent

closure of each eld to the objections and challenges of the other are aspects of the way that representativesof

those elds manage their encounters with one another (1993, p. 164). Regarding this point, where purely

logical analysis is insufcient, psychoanalysis,as we have seen, has much to contribute.



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three models to explain the mechanisms that

lead to the substitution of certain ideas by

others:

A) The classical scientic model, whereby

new hypotheses are accepted when they

are able to resist attempts at contrasting(Popperian falsication), or adduce more

compelling evidence than rival hypo-

theses (eliminative inductivism).

B) The Kuhnian model, whereby a domi-

nant paradigm persists despite the

anomalies it does not explain until enter-

ing a phase of exhaustion in its capacity

to explain new evidence, which leads to

the emergence of a new generation of

scientists with other paradigms.C) Hermeneutical models, where different

ideas coexist without either coming into

conict or totally replacing one another,

though they can lose their dominance.

There are no decisive proofs, or refuta-

tion, neither does a previous theory be-

come exhausted, but there is competition

among diverse interpretations of reality,

where those demonstrating a heuristicpower more in accordance with the

demands of the moment triumph. Meta-

phors and analogies play an important

role in the processes of understanding.

These models, markedly metaphorical

and analogical in nature, can be seen in

all sciences in the context of discovery,

but are especially important in the arts,

the humanities and in elds with incipi-

ent status as disciplines.

Each of these models guides the argumen-

tation through different courses. I will exam-

ine the debates in the Ro de la Plata at a time

(the nineteen seventies) when changes in

dominant ideas occurred. I will attempt to

identify the reasons advanced for preferring

some ideas to others, with the support of a

dialectical reconstruction of the argumenta-

tive process. Studying the context in which

the debates took place also makes it possible

to understand the potential value of debate in

the process of receiving new ideas.

The historical context of the Ro delaPlata debates

Two moments in the history of psycho-

analysis in the Ro de la Plata are especially

apt for studying the processes through which

ideas change. The rst of them was charac-terised by the reception and development of

the Kleinian ideas, which happened for the

most part in the nineteen fties. These ideas

made it possible to develop a local psycho-

analysis, with noteworthy original contribu-

tions. The second moment was when those

dominant, locally inected Kleinian ideas

gave way to a diversity of inuences, includ-

ing a number of authors (Winnicott, Bion,Kohut etc.) and especially French psycho-

analysis, accompanied by the higher valua-

tion of the Freudian canon. I will refer

particularly to the debate between Kleinian

and Lacanian ideas that continued throughout

the nineteen seventies, a decade characterised

by crisis and change in psychoanalytical

institutions and society at large.

The rst ascertainable fact that results from

revising the Revista de Psicoanalisis (APA)

and the Revista Uruguaya de Psicoanalisis

(APU), as well as other publications of the

period, is that while the above-mentioned

changes are noticeable, there were few arti-

cles where the author discussed the new

ideas, examined how they related to previous

ones, described changes in his/her own ideas

and made explicit the reasons for changing.

Etchegoyens (1986) volume on technique isamong those that most clearly present a

systematic comparison of different positions,

but it belongs to a later decade than the one

we are considering.

The reception of new ideas can be followed

through a number of indicators: changes in

journal indexes, in the frequency of descrip-

tive terms or in authors mentioned in biblio-

graphies etc. In general, references to

Melanie Klein or local authors decreased

while quotations from Freud and the other

authors mentioned increased. While there

was no systematic quantitative research into



10/23

how much quotation there was, a study of this

for the term countertransference (de Leon et

al., 1998) makes it possible to conrm the

impression.

The changes were not only theoretical but

also affected analytic practice. Research con-

ducted in Uruguay (Bernardi et al., 1997) onthe types of interpretation mentioned in the

articles of associate members shows appreci-

able changes in several aspects. Between the

nineteen sixties and the nineteen nineties

transference interpretations and those refer-

ring to aggression decreased in a statistically

signicant manner. Interpretations referring

to sexuality or narcissism or those occupied

with the patients infantile experience alsodecreased, though not by a statistically sig-

nicant amount. From the qualitative stand-

point the change of style was marked, and

this is quite apparent in interpretations that

the researchers evaluated as badly adjusted to

the patients material. Interpretations having

little clinical precision in the nineteen sixties

sought to impose the Kleinian theory on the

patient: the language was direct, assertive and

favoured a ping-pong style of dialogue.Inadequate interpretations in the nineteen

nineties were open, shaky and diluted, giving

the impression that the analyst expected the

patient to reach some conclusion on his/her

own; defences were excessively considered

and the negative transference was more

tranquillised than worked through. Questions,

virtually non-existent in the nineteen sixties,

constituted nearly one-third of all analystinterventions in the nineteen nineties.

It is possible that not only the new currents

or authors inuenced these changes, but also

the circumstance of theoretical and technical

pluralism itself. The existence of diverse

frameworks probably induced a more cau-

tious attitude and perhaps introduced some

discomture at having to choose among

them. It is probable that the controversies that

occurred at the time between old and new

ideas proved insufcient for the purpose of

clarifying the differences between the various

theoretical and technical options, and propos-

ing paths conducive to obtaining evidence for

or against particular ideas.

It is a fairly general truth that new currents

emerging in psychoanalysis are not for the

most part submitted to systematic comparison

with other existing currents; in general, only

the most salient points of discrepancy orcoincidence with some of the others receive

any notice. In the case of Lacanian ideas it

was not even easy to establish their relation to

Freudian ideas or to the rest of French

thought. Even today in France, for those who

are not followers it is not easy to delimit the

inuence of these ideas, as Wildlocher (2000)

noted.

The initial controversies betweenKleinian and Lacanian thought

One of the rst confrontations between

Kleinian thought (as known in the Ro de la

Plata) and Lacanian thought occurred in the

conversations held on the occasion of the visit

of Leclaire (a disciple of Lacan) to Buenos

Aires and Montevideo. The discussions at

the Asociacion Psicoanaltica Uruguaya in

August 1972 were compiled in two volumes

that include Leclaires conferences and the

dialogues with the members of the Associa-

tion (Leclaire, 1972). There was already a

measure of knowledge of Lacans thought,

which several analysts had been studying for

some time. And that same year, O. and M.

Mannoni had visited the region.The activity consisted of seven theoretical

seminars and ve meetings to discuss clinical

material, which was supplied by the partici-

pants. As to the seminars, they did include

dialogue, though, except for Leclaires, the

names of speakers were not recorded.

A remark of Leclaires from the second of

these seminars shows how the focus of

interest was established:

Somebody (at the rst meeting) wanted me to speak

about our theoretical conception of fantasy. The other

question. . .was about the possible relation between



11/23

language and the force of the drive. . .In any case, I

thought the conferences I was to give would be

devoted to the problem of drives, of the object of the

drive, the force of the drive and its relation with . . .

words.

The third of the seven seminars introducedthe topic of how to conceive the body and the

mechanisms of introjection. Leclaire, who

had just discussed similar topics at the

Argentine Psychoanalytical Association, di-

rectly interrogated the audience in the follow-

ing terms, inviting controversy:

Serge Leclaire: Do you represent the body to

yourselves in any other way than as a recipient

equipped with some openings. . .

? If I ask you thisquestion it is because I believe that this representa-

tion is too ingenuous by far and, above all, does not

correspond to the psychoanalytic data of our experi-

ence (p. 29).

Intervention: The problem, it seems to me, is that

when you use the term Korper-ich [as synonym of]

vessel-body you murder the metaphor, you objectify

it, because a closed vessel, a closed body, is not

presupposed. . .So I do not believe that there is an

outside and an inside, though I do know that I

incorporate something. It is the way the ego-body

expressed this act, but not in a vessel that closes

(p. 33).

SL: I am glad to hear you say [that], but I cannot help

having the impression that the digestive reference of

the fantasy of happiness continues to mark your way

of using, at least, the term introjection. For my part, I

believe that it is far more important to consider what

is being played out in the process called introjection,as an attempt or a modality of integration in the

structure, of introducing an element that could

modify its structure . . .(p. 33).

I: . . . When you speak of the introduction of an

element in the structure, are you thinking of an intra-

psychic system or structure?

SL: Here again we nd that intra that always annoys

me (p. 34).

At this juncture, Leclaire explained his

conception of the body with the support of

the Moebius strip as a model. Lacan used this

gure from topology to demonstrate his

conception of certain relations that at rst

seem to constitute binary oppositions. The

Moebius strip is a three-dimensional gure or

ring that is made by joining the points of a

rectangle or a strip of paper after twisting one

of them 1808. In the case of the body, thisgure shows that it is not possible to oppose

outside and inside because in the Moebius

strip both faces appear in a continuum.

Phenomena related to the body are thus seen

as if they were elements in a structure. This

structure is of a particular nature, that is, it is

a system determined fundamentally as an

attempt to organise its own decit (manque)

(1972, p. 28). By using this model, Lacan wasalso distancing himself from the way in which

the Kleinians were using unconscious fantasy

to support their theoretical constructs:

In the Moebius strip model there is only one face. I

prefer this as a model and image of the body. It is at

any rate the only model that permits us to not enter

into the fantasy-laden contradictions of the patient

we have to analyse. And as I have said, it is always

preferable to not enter into fantasy if we are to be

able to analyse it (pp. 35 6).

The discussion subsequently centred on the

importance of unconscious fantasy, or struc-

tural models, for conceptualising the body:

I: The phrase element in a structure. . . is not the

language of the ego-body, ego-patient. My heart is

aching, that is quite clear, but I do not know how or

why, because neither do I know what an element is.

Yet I do know that it devours me, here, inside. This isthe language of the ego-body, this is how I speak and

make myself intelligible. On this level, that is the

advantage of such language (pp. 367).

SL: But I would put it another way. You were evoking

the problem of elements. I just spoke to you about the

representation of a surface, which seemed preferable

to me for speaking of the body, to delineate, to

represent the function of the body (p. 37).

[There was then an explanation of Lacans

conception of the body.]

I: When you proposed this role of the surface, I



12/23

thought that you would continue speaking of the

surface, but as a membrane, as a place of exchange.

And that perhaps here lies the source of the

differences between the thinking you explained and

what we are closest to admitting. This situation of

exchange, I think it is the origin of the pre-eminence

of the oral model (p. 43).

SL: Im going to tell you why I dont do this [speak

of the body in the manner suggested to him]. Because

I believe that there is no other substance in the body

. . . I believe that the substance itself is made with

these coincident and antinomian elements. It is this

that constitutes the very texture of the surface, that is,

of the body . . .(p. 43).

I would now like to comment on thesedialogues, emphasising not so much the

content of the discussion but the way of

arguing and especially those aspects that

facilitated or made it difcult for the two

hypotheses to be examined in depth and on

equal footing. I will limit myself to the initial

exchanges.

Leclaires initial question had a particular

rhetorical form: Do you represent the body

to yourselves in any other way than. . .

? Thisquestion encloses two aspects: the way he

understands the other partys position, and an

argumentation against this position, under-

stood in that way. This argumentation centred

on two criticisms: ingenuity and distance

from the clinical.

Among several answers, the one I tran-

scribed is the one that answered Leclaires

question most directly: Whoever was speak-ing rejected the attributed position and the

way of describing it (You murder the

metaphor. . .),6 and reformulated the ques-

tion in terms of unconscious fantasy, ex-

pressed in experiential language. Leclaire

reiterated his opinion about the digestive

aspect of the metaphor of incorporation, and

proposed as an alternative the metaphor of

introducing an element into a structure (else-

where in the text he noted the need to distance

oneself from biology to differentiate the

object of necessity from the object of desire).But before continuing along this path, which

is the one the discussion took, we might well

examine the arguments that were used at

greater length.

Leclaires rst argument was about the

ingenuity of the other position. In this context

the word can have several meanings. At one

extreme, ingenuous implies a disparage-

ment, connoting a lack of sophistication orworldliness (as when one says that someone

from the provinces is ingenuous compared to

an inhabitant of the metropolis). Nothing

explicit alludes to this meaning, yet it cannot

be totally disregarded, for it is present in

many controversies that crop up between the

metropolis and the periphery. Explicitly, the

word ingenuous seems rather to refer to

philosophic ingenuousness, in the sense of

insufcient critical reection about problems.The listeners appear to have taken it in this

sense, for at another moment one of the

participants said:

I: I believe we must completely separate the meaning

of splitting in the Lacanian school and the Kleinian

school. Klein imagines an ingenuous level, one might

say from a philosophical viewpoint, while Lacan is

much closer to what Heidegger called the ontological

difference. . .

(p. 111).

This attribution of philosophical ingenu-

ousness, to all appearances, was accepted

tacitly since it elicited no further discussion.

6Regarding the treatment of the metaphor, it is possible to state, in the terms of Lakoff and Johnson, that

Leclaire was considering as a simple physical metaphor what was originally a structural metaphor expressingan experiential gestalt (1980, p. 101). This argumentative procedure converts the adversary into a straw man.

In consequence, examination and discussion of the differences at the level of the premises was interrupted, that

is, in respect of the role the experiences of projection and introjectionplay in psychoanalyticaltheorising about

the body.



13/23


14/23

summed up the differences in outlook as

follows:

SL: On the whole, to give you an idea of how we

work, we intervene in a much less systematic way,

and there are sessions where we do not intervene at

all. [We intervene] when something has begun to bedominantsomething of the order of repetition, or a

certain insistence, in words, gures, formulas, evoca-

tions of situations. My impression here is that a series

of interventions [by the analyst] do not allow the

patients discourse to develop. That would end up

adding something to the patients own personal

imbroglio (p. 181).

. . . We do not believe that the transference is the

presence of real feelings. We consider as transference

what is displayed in the eld of our non-response to

the patients desire. . .We do not respond as a human

person (p. 182).

. . . If we ourselves reintroduce representations of

inter-personal relations, we attenuate and in certain

cases annul the specicity of the analytic relation. . .

He (the patient) speaks, that is what we ask of him

and it is sufcient to know that the words really are

carriers of the drive-based tensions, to not have to

appeal to that kind of sentimental ambiance. Feeling,by denition, is confusion (p. 183).

In fact, Leclaires comments about the

previously presented clinical cases had been

limited to general aspects of the patient and

his psychopathology, or to theoretical issues,

even though the audiences questions were

aimed at very concrete matters related to the

moment-by-moment of the session. But these

differences in the way of considering clinical

material were not included in the discussion

points.

The subsequent discussion

The comparison of Kleinian and Lacanian

ideas reappeared sporadically in certain pub-

lications of the decade. The instances I have

found are not of a true debate between two

contestants but of accounts from within one

of the perspectives. Despite this unilateral

character, they make it possible to study the

type of argumentation used.

One of the rst topics discussed was the

relation between the early Oedipus de-

scribed by Melanie Klein and the late

Oedipus as it emerged from Lacans re-

reading of Freud.One of these papers considers the Kleinian

contribution valuable, but holds that it must

be reformulated from Lacanian premises:

It is important to note that these considerations do

not imply devaluing or ignoring the profound and

important Kleinian contributions, but only point to

the need to place them in the context of images to

which they belong and so be able to connect them

more adequately with the pertinent symbolic struc-ture (Szpilka, 1976, p. 295).

The author noted what in his opinion

constituted the weakness of the Kleinian

position:

The concept of early Oedipus or late Oedipus

dissolves the Oedipus itself. . .The Oedipus is or it is

not. We are, then, [in the case of the Kleinian early

Oedipus] at the centre of a theoretical and methodo-logical error that we could call inverting and making

empirical the times of determination(p. 294).

We see that in this case the point of

departure is the superiority of certain pre-

mises (which make empirical or chronologi-

cal descriptions look insufcient and uphold

the need for a structural perspective) and

from these the bankruptcy of the other posi-tion is inferredthe result of not taking these

premises into account in the same way.

A somewhat different position of the same

period held that while in Klein the concept of

the fathers symbolic function remained ab-

sent, this did not make her way of working

with the problem at the clinical level any less

valid. For Faimberg, the treatment of Richard

demonstrated that Klein was able to accord

symbolic signicance to her patients war

experience despite not having the concept of

the fathers symbolic function. Thus, Klein

was able to provide a response from the



15/23

clinical angle to the question she did not ask

at the theoretical level (1976, p. 161). I

believe that the concept which is lacking in

Kleinian theory is the one that dynamically

connects the idea of absent penis with that

of phallus (p. 157).

In this article, though the author explicitlydisregarded the problems of compatibility

between the different referential schemes (p.

149), she proposed a solution implying a

measure of complementation, where Lacan

offered the general theoretical framework

inside which certain aspects of Kleinian

clinical practice could once again be given

value, and formulated in another way.

Baranger was the author who compared theideas of Klein and Lacan in the deepest and

most systematic way in that period. I will

mention only some fragments of his publica-

tions, especially those where he returned to

the polemic with the ideas of Leclaire.7

Baranger (1976, 1980a, 1980b) tried to

delimit the zones of validity of the Kleinian

and Lacanian theories. He began by noting

the zones of divergence between Klein and

Lacan: the Oedipus complex, the oralisationof instinctual life, the total object as synthesis

of partial objects, the process of symbol-

formation, the role of introjection and projec-

tion in the modication of the object, locating

the breast as the prototype object, the concept

of partial object as the sole primitive type of

object relation. He also noted coincidences,

for example the description of the fantasy of

the fragmented body (1980a, p. 133). Hebelieved to be Lacan right in his criticism of

the notion of passage from the partial object

to the total object, or in marking the differ-

ence between demand and desire, or showing

the fetishs character of being a decoy. Yet he

did not believe that this made it possible to

consider resolved the problem of the diversity

of the possible categories of object, or even

less, abandon all the concepts of one author

for the others. He resumed the dialogue with

Leclaire, comparing the clinical scope of

ideas like internal object, signicant or repre-

sentation:

To speak of representation, as Freud did, or of

signicant, as Lacan does, or Letter, as Leclaire does,

stops short of what Freud meant in Mourning and

Melancholiaregarding the existence of objects. Do

not say that these phantoms are metaphorical, that it

is a matter of imaginary objects. Freud sometimes

uses the term imaginary object (or imagined, or

fantasised object), but he leaves us in no doubt that

he is then referring to something quite different from

what he describes in the process of mourning, orsomething that does belong to the order of the

representation (1980b, pp. 316 17).

For Baranger different types of objects

exist, and none can be reduced to any other:

One cannot treat a fetish like a living-dead8,

or like an omnipotent self-image. This is a

clear example of cases where prematurely

unied theory can engender simplistic tech-nique (1980b, p. 319).

Baranger tried to nd support in arguments

taken from clinical experience, resuming the

discussion with Leclaire on that basis:

If we were to give up working on the object, give up

reducing splitting, give up the movement that is the

inverse of projective identication, we would at the

same time be giving up not only the Kleinian concept

of internalised object but also the Kleinian andFreudian concept of internal world. Why, Leclaire

asked us, the phenomena always in terms of outside

and inside, introjection and projection, when there

are other possible categories . . .? Because, we

might answer, an entire aspect of our work, a very

important one, consists of managing this type of

ambiguous existence, endowed with a certain sub-

stantiality that is different from representation and

7An analysis of the way in which Baranger compared the ideas of Klein and Lacan in the case of the

countertransference can be found in de Leon (2000) and in de Leon & Bernardi (2000).8Baranger uses this term to describe a particular kind of object characteristic of mourning processes, which

transforms this kind of object in a group of memories similar to the other representations(1980b, p. 316).



16/23

closer to the type of existence of the subject. . .that

we call internalisedobject (p. 320).

Both the quoted texts and later ones leave

the impression of a controversy that was not

at all argued out, or that only managed to

develop by ts and starts, or even in a circularway.

During a recent debate in Buenos Aires

(2000) between Lacanian analysts (Miller,

Laurent and others) and Kleinians (Etche-

goyen, Zysman and others), some of the

topics mentioned above reappeared with little

change. Miller, for example, stated:

. . .

the idea of introjection and projection presup-poses the differentiation of the external and the

internal, and I know that for many people present [at

the debate] thinking about these terms implies a

particular mental framework. They must know that

Lacan does not think in those terms, and his use of

topology is used precisely to express another cong-

uration, not suited to the difference between the

internal and the external (Stagnaro & Wintrebert,

2001, p. 122).

Despite the efforts of different participants,and especially Etchegoyen (ibid., pp. 83, 84),

to focus the debate on the points where there

existed a clear discrepancy (the role of the

patients resistances, of envy and voracity, of

the relation with the body and biology etc.),

the confrontation of ideas did not manage to

advance compared to similar exercises of the

nineteen seventies. Though the meeting as

announced was to include shared clinicalresearch, references to patients material

were virtually non-existent and it is possible

to infer that it would have been quite difcult

to nd common criteria for clinical evidence.

Certainly, these difculties are not only

features of debate in the Ro de la Plata. If

one reviews the literature from anywhere else

in the world, it becomes apparent that the

absence of systematic confrontation between

different psychoanalytic approaches has been

the general case. It is therefore convenient to

examine more closely the processes obstruct-

ing progress in argumentation.

Characteristics of theargumentation

Are there any reasons, based on what has

been described, explaining when and why the

development of the argumentation halted? Is

it possible to offer hypotheses about the pathsthat might have made the debate advance? I

believe that these questions are fundamental,

for they speak to the practical usefulness of

this kind of analysis.

Let us return to the discussion with

Leclaire. A signicant advance was had there

in identifying and stating certain important

points of discrepancy. As we saw, the explora-

tion of both parties arguments made itpossible to confront concepts like intention-

ality and unconscious fantasy, on the one

hand, and structure and divided self, on the

other. But from that point advance was halted:

the question remained formulated in terms of

the intrinsic superiority of certain concepts

over others, and that, in the abstract, turns out

not to be a decidable question for psycho-

analysis. And what happened when the con-

frontation was stated at the level of thepremises? The attempt to generate conviction

no longer rested on the dialectical argumenta-

tive process but on the persuasive power of

enunciates, as occurs in the epidictic style

used in preaching or proclamations (Perel-

man, 1958, p. 62). Afrmations became self-

evident and, to produce adhesion to them,

reliance was placed on their expressive power

alone, which leads to reason in a circle(petitio principii).

What paths might have permitted an ad-

vance? There were two possible paths, but

both of them led nowhere, for reasons I will

explain. If it was a matter of discussing the

concepts (intentionality, structure etc.) in

their philosophic dimension, then it was

necessary to situate the controversy in the

eld of philosophy and avail oneself of its

methods. But this placed the discussion out-

side the purview of psychoanalysis, formu-

lating questions that could not be resolved

from its method. This does not mean that



17/23

psychoanalysis cannot include a philosophi-

cal dimension; but for psychoanalysis to be

able to express well-founded judgements

there, problems must be formulated in a

language that makes it possible to refer to the

empirical sources of evidence that are part of

the psychoanalytic method. Now this shiftedthe debate towards the second alternative:

discussion of the clinical usefulness of the

concepts under discussion.

However, this clinical dimension could not

be developed either, because there was no

shared language making it possible to discuss

at that level. The sorts of observations about

patients Leclaire proffered during the discus-

sion of the clinical material required prioracceptance of Leclaires technical-level pre-

mises, which were different from theirs. In

turn, Leclaire experienced the same con-

straint when requested to conduct a moment-

by-moment analysis of the session, something

he considered irrelevant and inappropriate.

This left out of the discussion an entire series

of concepts and approaches to understanding

that had had essential signicance in Ro de

la Plata psychoanalysis, like the concepts ofeld, link, analytic situation, countertransfer-

ence, communicative interaction etc.

Would it have been feasible to constitute a

eld for debate with room for manoeuvre for

both perspectives? Yes, but this would have

required both parties to accept discussing

their way of considering clinical material and

weigh the advantages and disadvantages of

both approaches. Judgement of the appropri-ateness or relevance of moment-by-moment

analysis of movements of the transference, or

of having a longer time-frame for listening to

the patients discourse, should not proceed

from any previously formed judgement but

from examining the effects of these technical

positions on the analytic process and the

analytic results. For this, there had to be

discussion of the advantages and disadvan-

tages of one or another way of considering

the material, or of considering important

affects or signicants, or of the analysts

intervening in one way or another etc.,

allowing both positions to be displayed on an

equal footing throughout the debate. We have

seen that this kind of openness held true only

at certain moments, but was quickly lost.

Thus, because it was incapable of generating

any further exploration of each positions

suppositions, the controversy foundered on apoint that could have relaunched it.

In later confrontations, a signicant change

did occur. In the discussion with Leclaire,

differences had been stated in terms of

counterpoised positions, leading to arguments

favouring one position exclusively at the

expense of the other. But in later published

material, though certain areas of opposition

or contradiction between the two approacheswere noted, there was also an attempt to nd

some complementary or coincidental points

in them.

Taking these debates as a whole, we see

that the successive steps prescribed by van

Eemeren et al., that is, agreement about how

to proceed regarding disagreements, and as

broad an exploration as necessary of the

positions, met with difculties of different

sorts.Regarding the rst point, we found no clear

statement of the procedures or criteria mak-

ing it possible to demonstrate the superiority

of certain ideas or technical approaches over

others. The different lines of argument

except for Barangersrested on the evident

character that each party attributed to their

premises.

Closer examination of the type of argumentused shows that it cannot be afrmed that any

explicit or implicit appeal was made to the

Popperian criteria of refutation or to those of

eliminative inductivism. Possibly some clin-

ical references used by Baranger in his

argument could at a pinch be further devel-

oped in this direction (1980c, p. 55), though

the author did not take that route. Nor did we

nd that the Kuhnian model of scientic

revolutions could be applied here. Observing

the subsequent evolution of Kleinian and

Lacanian ideas, both in the Ro de la Plata

and other regions, it would not be true to say



18/23

that a new paradigm substituted a preceding

one, because the new ideas coexistedand,

to a great extent, coexistwith the previous

ones. Returning to analysis of the argumenta-

tion, we see that no effort was made to

demonstrate the lack of coherence of one or

another of the positions. At most, the weak-ness or inconsistency of certain approaches

(i.e. the Kleinian) to theoretically explain

particular phenomena (i.e. the fathers sym-

bolic role) was noted; or the limitation of the

Lacanian approach for registering the emo-

tional qualities of the analytical experience

was noted. But it was not, properly speaking,

a question of internal criticism, being pre-

dicated on the postulates of the other theoryand not on the basis of common premises.

Arguments based on external consistency

that is, on concordance with the present state

of knowledge in other areasmight be im-

plicit in Leclaires afrmation of the super-

iority of the structuralist position. As in

previous cases, this superiority depends on

the point of view adopted at the outset, and

the argumentative strategy then consists in

placing the burden of proof on the other party(Gaskins, 1992). But if both parties employ

this strategy, communication is necessarily

severed.

To a great extent, the debates examined

above can be described as a competition

between analogical metaphors and models

(the body as recipient or as Moebius strip, the

Oedipus complex as structure etc.). Meta-

phors and analogies can play a double role inthe discussion. On the one hand they serve to

express clinical intuitions that could not be

communicated by other means.9 But those

same metaphors can become cliches or

stereotypes that promote the isolation of

theories, or empty them of their concepts

(Bouveresse, 1999), if their use is not accom-

panied by an examination of what in clinical

experience they allow us to apprehend, and

how they facilitate translating this into theor-

etical terms.

For psychoanalytic controversies to ad-

vance, they must be able to examine simulta-neously what each position allows us to gain

in terms of theoretical intelligibility and

clinical understanding. Exclusively theor-

etical discussions tend to veer off into philo-

sophical speculation, and for its part the

search for purely empirical evidence can

ignore the way theoretical concepts inuence

the observation of the facts. Critical reection

on theoretical concepts must then be coupledwith empirical research, whether clinical or

extra-clinical.

Incommensurability between theories was

not an argument used in the discussion but

one that arose as an effect of the collapses in

communication. When Leclaire noted that

the patients emotions were not relevant in his

clinical listening (which was attuned to

another type of signier) he was saying that

he took into account aspects of the clinicalfacts that were different from those Klein

placed rst; for her, any anxiety surfacing

during the analytic session played the essen-

tial role. In consequence, the rened fact (that

is, the one taken into account in formulating

the theory) is not the same one in the two

cases; this could lead to thinking of a

situation of empirical incommensurability in

Stegmullers (1979) denition, because thetwo theories are not, strictly speaking, refer-

ring to the same facts (Bernardi, 1989).

However, it is evident that in principle

nothing hindered Leclaire and his inter-

locutors from overcoming this situation of

mutual isolationby examining the clinical

9From a perspective inspired by Davidson, it is possible to state that the creation of metaphors expresses

passing theories that the interpreter must develop to understand unusual verbal behaviour. While in general

there is insistence on the role metaphors play in transmitting meaning, for Davidson metaphors full a function

of conceptualcreation and are instances of radical interpretation(Quintanilla, 1999, p. 81).



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consequences of both positions, that is, the

pros and cons of paying attention to the

affects arising in the moment-to-moment

evolution of the session, or else abstaining

from interfering to favour the patients free

association. The barriers are not of a logical

nature, but psychologicalthat is, the reluc-tance to place oneself, even experimentally,

at a vantage point that one does not consider

truly psychoanalytical.

Thus, the controversy oscillated between

two poles. At certain moments it was possible

to explore the ideas and clinical foundations

of both parties, but for the most part each

position remained barricaded inside its own

premises, and the opportunity of examiningthem all from a shared argumentative eld

was lost.

Signicant, too, as a phenomenon, were

those arguments that were not used. Absent,

for example, was the question about the

possible effects on the outcome results of the

analysis of the analysts adopting one or

another position. Leclaire noted that each

position would create differences in the

analytic process, yet no mention was made ofhow these differences in the process could

lead to differences in achieving the objectives

of the analysis. Yet the issue of evaluating the

results of analysis was being discussed just

then in the Ro de la Plata, as publications

from the period show.

Finally, it is striking that the original

contributions from the Ro de la Plata did not

become part of the discussion of the newideas. With the exception of Baranger, the

discussants appealed to Kleins original ideas

without the benet of the additions and

modications introduced in the Ro de la

Plata by authors like Pichon Riviere, Racker,

Liberman, Bleger, Baranger, etc. Not to put

too ne a point on it, psychoanalysis from the

Ro de la Plata did not play any role in that

dialogue, and never spoke its true mind about

certain issues. Yet to include those concepts

in the controversies would have helped to

impart greater historical continuity to psycho-

analytic thought in the region.

Conclusions

A review of the case presented here elicits

some thoughts of a more general character.

Scientic controversies are necessary, despite

their difculties. Some of the difculties

mentioned above probably crop up in allelds of knowledge. Other problems, which I

will concentrate on here, are typical of

debates between theories that, though they

belong to a single discipline, diverge in their

way of comprehending the particular discipli-

nes methodological and epistemological cri-

teria. This is frequently the case with

psychoanalysis and with the social sciences.

The possibility of true debates betweenmembers of different psychoanalytical cul-

tures challenges psychoanalysis on two

fronts. From the epistemological side, it tests

the disciplines capacity to create a unitary

eld for argumentation when there are differ-

ences in premises. But, at the same time, this

invites us to work on the psychoanalytic

understanding of whatever unconscious fac-

tors encumber the dialogue.

When controversies erupt between psycho-analytic approaches differing in their pre-

mises, it becomes so difcult to circumscribe

the discussion to particular theoretical or

technical problems. Though not always ex-

plicitly, examining argumentative discourses

reveals that what is being discussed, too, is

each partys way of conceiving the rationality

and scientic nature of psychoanalysis, that

is, the type of scientic reasoning each partyuses to substantiate its theoretical and techni-

cal postulates. For their part, the points where

the discussion founders indicate problems the

discipline cannot resolve because it has not

been able to establish pertinent procedures

acceptable to all parties.

Two situations of this kind deserve

special notice. First, there is the difculty

of discerning the particular nature of each

issue that could be included in the debate.

Absent this, there is no way of identifying

the most appropriate methodology for ap-

proaching each issue. For example, in the



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above-mentioned discussion on structuralism

and Brentanos philosophy, for the debate to

advance it would have been necessary rst to

specify the different levels of the problem,

and then separate the purely philosophical

debate from the consequences for psycho-

analytical practice of particular philosophicalideas. This distinction would have also made

it possible to take the discussion on to a

terrain accessible to analytical experience.

Let us mention a second example: if the

discussion had considered the consequences

of the two ways of conducting an analysis, it

would then have been pertinent to debate the

different methodologies that could be used to

ascertain the results of analysis, thus broad-ening the scope of the discussion. Emphasis-

ing methodological problems imparts a

particular direction to the debate, for it

implies debating not so much what is known

as how we get to know (Tuckett, 1998, p.

445).

A second obstacle jeopardising progress in

the controversies was how difcult it was for

each party to include their premises and

suppositions in the discussion. When eachposition locks itself into its suppositions, the

situations of seeming incommensurability

that I have analysed here are created. In this

case, divergences at the epistemological level

made it difcult to nd common criteria for

evaluating the quality of the argumentation.

Even soas we have seenit is possible to

create a shared argumentative eld if people

accept comparing the different positions onthe basis of what each of them contributes in

terms of theoretical intelligibility or clinical

efcacy. More than a comparative confronta-

tion of theoretical or clinical arguments

piecemeal, what proves useful in these cases

is a comparison of the advantages and

disadvantages of the way each position in-

terweaves theoretical ideas with clinical

practice.

At this juncture, we can see that reaching

consensus is not the sole aim of controversies.

Rather, we must manage them so that the

different hypotheses interact and in so doing

acquire better foundations. This is the way to

further the development of the discipline. We

might also expect that the effort of looking at

the problem from different perspectives

should lead to personal development. Debate

can materialise only if there is the willingness

to engage in it, that is, if desire and hopepredominate, so that in the course of the

discussion we nd something we had not

thought about previously, or at least not

thought about in that way. If as analysts we

lose the desire and hope of nding something

new, perhapsto avoid the consequences of

professional burnout (Cooper, 1986)the

time for reanalysis has arrived.

Controversies demand a particular intellec-tual and emotional effort, connected to the

acceptance of the other as different. The

reward we can expect from such effort does

not reside exclusively in a reduction of

disagreements; indeed, controversies are also

good for developing better substantiated the-

ories, encouraging more careful examination

of our clinical evidence and reminding us that

there always are alternate hypotheses, whose

careful consideration can both lead us tostrengthen our previous convictions or see the

need to revise and modify them, in both cases

carrying us forward in the search for new

ideas.

Translations of summary

Kontroversen sind Teil des Prozesses wissenschaf-tlichen Wissens. In der Psychoanalyse macht dieMannigfaltigkeit der theoretischen, technischen undepistemologischen Positionen die Debatte besondersnotwendig und gleichzeitig entsprechend schwierig.Es werden die Funktion von Kontroversen und auchdie Widerstande gegen ihre Entwicklung erortert undals Beispiele werden die Debatten genommen, die inRio de la Plata (Buenos Aires und Montevideo)wahrend der 70-er Jahre gehalten wurden, als diedominierenden Kleinianischen Ideen mit Lacania-nischen Gedanken in Kontakt kamen. Die verschie-

denen argumentativen Diskurse werden uberpruftund dafur werden Konzepte der Argumentationsthe-orie benutzt. Die dabei auftretenden Hauptschwier-igkeiten drehten sich nicht um Besonderheiten, diepsychoanalytischen Theorien zu eigen sind der



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