The Intentionality of Plover Cognitive States

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The Intentionality of Plover Cognitive States

in Between the Species, v. 8 August 2008

Chuck Stieg

Departent of Philosophy

!niversity of "innesota, TC

stie00#$%un.e&u

Abstract

This paper attepts to clarify an& 'ustify the attri(ution of ental states to anials (y focusing

on t)o &ifferent conceptions of intentionality* instruentalist an& realist. I use each of these

general vie)s to interpret an& &iscuss the (ehavior an& cognitive states of piping plovers in or&er

to provi&e a su(stantive )ay to frae the +uestion of anial in&s. I argue that attri(uting

ental states to plovers is )arrante& for instruentalists insofar as it is )arrante& for siilar

huan (ehavior. or realists a(out intentionality, the cople-ity, a&apta(ility an& fle-i(ility of

the plovers (ehavior, along )ith its a(ility to utili/e the content of its representations an& to

satisfy the con&itions of concept attri(ution, 'ustifies attri(uting intentionality to plovers. etting

clearer on )hat is eant (y anial in&s, provi&es a (etter i&ea of )hat to look for in anial

(ehavior. In any respects, investigating such phenoena is siilar to investigations in other

sciences.

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The Intentionality of Plover Cognitive States

1. Introduction

Interpreting the causes of anial (ehavior presents &ifficult pro(les to the anial o(server.

ne of those pro(les is &eterining )hether the anials (ehavior is the result of

psychological states or nonpsychological states. In the 1#th century 3ene Descartes argue& that

anials are echaniss an& pro(a(ly &o not think in any sense, as evi&ence& (y the fact that

they &o not possess anything like huan language. "ore recently, Donal& Davi&son 415826 has

argue& that since having (eliefs &epen&s on having concepts an& speech, an& since anials are

not speakers or interpreters of a language, anials &o not have thoughts. Aongst soe anial

scientists such as coparative psychologists there is a reluctance to attri(ute ental states

generally to anials. Soe, such as 7ynne 420016, even argue that this shoul& (e avoi&e&. The

faous (iologist .C. 7illias 415526 suggests that the ental (e left out of (iology entirely.

The follo)ing +uote fro Patrick Colgans Animal Motivation 415856 puts for)ar& this very

i&ea.

The central &efect of entalis is the a&itte& nontranslata(ility of intentional ters

into (ehavioural ters. There can (e no historical &ou(t that (ehaviouris has a&vance&

ethology as a science, )hereas the etho&s a&vocate& (y cognitivists have yet to prove

their )orth. !ntil ental concepts are clarifie& an& their nee& 'ustifie& (y convincing

&ata, cognitive ethology is no a&vance over the anec&otalis an& anthropoorphis

)hich characteri/e& interest in anial (ehaviour a century ago, an& thus shoul& (e

esche)e&. 4Colgan 1585, $#6

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This puts ethologists, an& cognitive ethologists in particular, into an uncoforta(le

position since, at least for cognitive ethologists, it is their goal to provi&e accounts of anial

(ehavior in ters of (oth ultiate an& pro-iate echaniss )here any of the pro-iate

echaniss are assue& to (e cognitive ones. In this paper I take up the challenge to (etter

clarify an& 'ustify the attri(ution of ental ters to nonhuan anials.

In particular, I present Carolyn 3istaus e-perients on piping plovers 415516. I suggest

that there are &ifferent approaches to the pro(le of )hether plovers have in&s &epen&ing on

)hether one is a realist or an antirealist regar&ing intentional states. If one is an antirealist, one

can either refuse to use intentional ters altogether or one can eploy the in certain types of

&escriptions of (ehavior. If one refuses to use the, then the case is close& an& they )ill not use

the in regar&s to plovers. If one &oes use the, then every reason )e have for using the in

huan scenarios siilar to the plover scenarios carries over, an& plovers, in a sense, have in&s.

If one is a realist an& naturalistically in&e&, then one )ill likely a&opt a representational theory

of in&. n this vie), given the cople-ity, a&apta(ility an& fle-i(ility of the plovers

(ehavior, along )ith its a(ility to utili/e the content of its representations an& to satisfy the

con&itions of concept attri(ution, one is 'ustifie& in attri(uting intentionality to plovers. I (egin

)ith a (rief &escription of the concept of intentionality (efore oving on to 3istaus stu&ies. I

)ill have ore to say a(out the concept of intentionality in sections 9 an& :.

2. Intentionality

Intentionality is a key characteristic of ental states. enerally, it refers to the fact that ental

states are &irecte& at things or are a(out things. or e-aple, the hope that the party )ill turn out

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)ell, is a ental state 4hope6 a(out ho) the party )ill coe off. The hope is &irecte& at a future

state of affairs.

Intentional states are typically taken to have at least three iportant +ualities 4see, for

e-aple, Cling 15516. ne, they have an a(outness. As entione& a(ove, ental states are

&irecte& at or are a(out things<states of affairs. T)o, they are representational, i.e. they represent

soething to (e the case. The representational feature of intentional states inclu&es the notion of

content, )here the content of the representation is )hat the representation is a(out an& is taken to

refer to things in the )orl&. The content of a representation is typically hel& to (e a&e up of

concepts that the su('ect possesses, an& in its (eing &irecte& at the )orl&, can (e either true or

false a(out the )orl&. The hope a(out the party turning out )ell has the content =the party turns

out )ell.> This represents the )orl& as (eing such that the party turns out )ell. "ore

specifically, as a hope, it is the pro'ection of this state of affairs into the future, an& it ay turn

out to (e a false pro'ection of the future state of affairs since the party ay not turn out )ell. A

thir& crucial feature of intentional states is the particular specificity of the content of the state.

The specificity characteristic refers to the fact that not all su(stitutions of coreferential ters or

of logically e+uivalent stateents can (e a&e in the conte-t of an intentional state an& yet

aintain the truth value or specific content of the state. The (elief that there is too uch salt in

the argaritas at the party is not the sae as the (elief that there is an overa(un&ance of so&iu

chlori&e in the argaritas at the fiesta. or one thing, the (eliever ay not kno) that salt is

so&iu chlori&e, or that ?fiesta is the Spanish )or& for ?party. r even if they &o kno) this, it

ay not (e the case that they actually ha& the occurrent thought that tokene& ?so&iu chlori&e

an& ?fiesta, (ut instea& specifically tokene& ?salt an& ?party.

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It is )orth noting an iportant &ifference (et)een intentional states such as (eliefs an&

states that are solely (earers of inforation. @eliefs are uch ore specific in their content than

inforation states are. An&re) Cling 415516, for e-aple, ela(orates the specificity of (eliefs in

the follo)ing )ay. A state S is a (elief 4or )hat he calls a 2n& or&er intentional state6 only if the

follo)ing con&itions are et.

16 it is a natural la) that s are s

26 S has the content that soething, , is

;6 S &oes not have the content that is .

This arks an iportant &ifference (et)een siple inforation(earing states an& (eliefs. or

e-aple, I ight have the (elief that the (ottle of li+ui& in y han& is )ater )ithout having the

(elief that the (ottle of li+ui& in y han& is 2. r I ight have a (elief a(out the pressure of

a gas in a container )ithout there(y (elieving anything a(out further properties of the gas such as

its volue, even though @oyles Ba) &ocuents the relationship (et)een these t)o properties of

gas. n the other han&, the siple presentation of )ater carries inforation a(out 2 since

the t)o are the sae. Bike)ise, the easureent of a gas pressure carries inforation a(out

the gas volue since the t)o are in fact inversely proportional. The &ifference (et)een

inforational states an& intentional states suggests that siply pointing to the e-istence of

inforation(earing states, perhaps neural states in the (rain of soe anial, )ill not (e

sufficient to groun& the attri(ution of (eliefs or siilar intentional states to such an anial.

In fact, the &ifficulty of (eing a(le to &eterine the specificity of an anials

psychological state is taken (y any philosophers as a strong reason to &eny the attri(ution of

ental states to anials altogether. 7hile )e ight, for e-aple, fin& it attractive to say that an

elephant (elieves the (ones it is caressing )ith its trunk are the (ones of a &ea& elephant, there

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ay (e pro(les lurking in such an attri(ution. Philosophers such as Donal& Davi&son 415826

argue that )e cannot kno) enough a(out the specificity of the elephants (elief 4if it has one6 in

or&er to say the elephant really &oes have such a (elief an& to )arrant such an ascription 4see

also Stich 15#56. Since )e &o not kno) )hat the precise content of the elephants (elief really

is, )e cannot say ho) the elephant conceives of things. no)ing this )oul& ena(le us to ake

sense of the actual con&itions that the (elief ascri(es to the )orl&, an& it )oul& &esignate the

truth con&itions for the (elief. If there are no such con&itions, then there is no eaningful

specificity of the content of the elephants e-perience, in )hich case, there is no (elief. As our

attri(ution stan&s, )e have siply assue& that the elephant (elief has the content that the (ones

it is caressing )ith its trunk are the (ones of a &ea& elephant. @ut for this to serve as specific,

intentional content, the elephant )oul& nee& to have concepts of ?(ones, ?&eath an& ?elephants,

an& perhaps even ?trunks an& ?caressing.

7hile I think that arguents regar&ing kno)ing the specific content of anial

psychological states an& a(out their possession of particular concepts are iportant rein&ers

a(out )hat any particular anial ental state ight (e like, I &o not think they are the en& of the

atter for those intereste& in anial in&s. or one thing, our ina(ility to kno) the precise

ental content of an anial is a &istinct issue fro )hether that anial &oes in fact have ental

states. ne ight pursue the latter issue even though they cannot fulfill the forer re+uireent.

To &o this, one nee&s to look for evi&ence in as any places as possi(le. no)le&ge fro fiel&

stu&ies an& controlle& la(oratory settings can provi&e iportant inforation a(out anials that

can (e use& to try an& gain a (etter un&erstan&ing of the appropriateness of ental attri(utions.

This evi&ence can suggest the sorts of things &ifferent anials are sensitive to, )hat their social

interactions are like, )hat they see to value, an& ho) they respon& to varying circustances

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an& challenges. no)ing these things can, in turn, help approach )hether the characteristics of

intentionality entione& a(ove see 'ustifie&. In the ne-t section, I look at a series of

e-perients focuse& on piping plovers, an& then in the follo)ing section apply the results of

these e-perients to the +uestion of plover intentionality.

3. The Plover Studies

Consi&er a nice san&y (each in the e) Eork<e) Fersey area. A strange an has (een )alking

(y you repeate&ly, once at 20 eters an& then again at : eters, the )hole tie staring at you

intently. Eou are also in possession of the only copy of the structural layout of the Bos Alaos

nuclear copoun&. As a )ellseasone& spy, you kno) that this character )oul& love to get his

han&s on those &ocuents, an& )oul& (e incline& to follo) you since that )oul& ake it ore

likely for hi to fin& the &ocuents. Eou see the an, an& you leave the &ocuents fairly )ell

hi&&en in the san& an& ove a)ay fro the. Eou ake sure that you have his attention an&

ove slo)ly so that he thinks he can catch up )ith you or follo) you easily enough. Eou look

(ack occasionally to ake sure that he is still follo)ing you. After you have taken hi far

enough fro the &ocuents, you slip a)ay an& &ou(le (ack. "ission accoplishe&* you )ante&

to lea& hi a)ay fro the &ocuents. Eou &i& not )ant to lea& 'ust anyone a)ay fro the

&ocuents, (ut you (elieve& that he, that particular person, )ante& the. Eou even (elieve&

that the (est )ay to lea& hi a)ay )as to ake sure that he )as follo)ing you, an& you (elieve&

that he thought he stoo& to gain soething (y follo)ing you.

o), :0 eters a)ay, on the sae (each, other people are illing a(out as )ell, (ut one

person in particular approaches the nest of a sall (ir&. This person has recently (een here

(efore, at )hich tie they scanne& the groun& visually, (ent over an& sifte& through the near(y

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grass, an& in all )ays, appeare& to (e searching for the nest. Sitting on a nest, incu(ating her

eggs, a feale piping plover su&&enly springs up an& (egins to )alk a)ay fro it. She stops an&

turns her hea&, (ut the person is not looking to)ar&s her, so she situates herself into a position

)here the person can see her. The plover (egins to act as though its )ing is (roken, &ragging it

on the groun& in an a)k)ar& anner. The person takes notice of the (ir&s con&ition an&

follo)s it a)ay fro the nest containing the eggs. After they have ove& a sufficient &istance

fro the nest an& the person has gaine& groun& on the (ir&, it flies a)ay. Is this (ir&s (ehavior

like the persons, i.e. is it siilarly (rought a(out (y psychological statesG

In =Aspects of the Cognitive Hthology of an In'uryeigning @ir&, the Piping Plover,>

Carolyn 3istau &escri(es a series of stu&ies of siilar circustances involving piping plovers

an& argues that a lo)level intentional stance to)ar&s the plovers sees like a proising

hypothesis regar&ing their (ehavior 43istau 15516. The hypothesis is that the plover wants to

lea& the intru&er a)ay fro its nest an& young 43istau 1551, p.586. The hypothesis is =lo)

level> (ecause she is only claiing that there is soething like firstor&er intentionality, i.e. that

the plover )ants<&esires<ais to lea& the intru&er a)ay. She &oes not clai, as the a(ove stories

ight suggest, that the plover has certain (eliefs a(out the intru&er, the intru&ers otives, or the

effects of the plovers &eceptive acts on the actions or (eliefs of the intru&er. f course, these

attitu&es ight see natural states or &escriptions to attri(ute to a huan, or even a nonhuan

priate in the plovers position, (ut they )oul& (e iensely &ifficult to test for a nonhuan

anial in an e-periental situation.

3istau 415516 presents three sets of e-perients con&ucte& )ith plovers* 16 plover

response to intru&ers 26 plover response to ga/e an& ;6 plover &iscriination (et)een safe an&

&angerous intru&ers. The first e-perient is &esigne& to a&&ress 3istaus hypothesis that the

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plover wants to lea& the intru&er a)ay fro its nest an& young. As allu&e& to a(ove, plovers

&isplay an interesting for of (ehavior )hen confronte& )ith intru&ers )ho coe into close

pro-iity )ith their nest<young. They are kno)n to e-hi(it a variety of &istraction (ehaviors

inclu&ing )alking in front of the intru&er an& eitting a peeping soun&, sho)ing off their

un&ersi&e an& (right )ings )hile flying overhea& of an intru&er, falsely appearing to sit upon a

nest, an& feigning in'ury 43istau 1551, p.596. 3istau focuses on the latter type of (ehavior

(ecause it is ore easily o(serve&. This is the (roken)ing &isplay 4@7D6 )hich, though there

are &egrees of severity, priarily involves the plover arching its )ing or )ings, &ragging the

an& )alking a)k)ar&ly 43istau 1551, p. 596.

3istau reasons that if the plover )ants to lea& the intru&er a)ay, then there are various

(ehaviors )hich shoul& (e o(serva(le an& )hich, if o(serve&, )oul& len& support to the

hypothesis that they )ant to lea& the intru&er a)ay fro their nest<young. These e-pecte&

(ehaviors inclu&e* 1. The &irection the plover oves in shoul& (e a&e+uate, if follo)e& (y the

intru&er, to lea& the a)ay fro the nest. 2. The plover shoul& onitor the intru&ers (ehavior.

;. The plover shoul& alter its (ehavior accor&ing to the intru&ers (ehavior that it is onitoring.

or e-aple, if the intru&er stops follo)ing the plover, the (ir& shoul& (e e-pecte& to try an&

regain the intru&ers attention or attept to reengage the intru&er into follo)ing the plover.

9. The plover shoul& sho) fle-i(ility of (ehavior, i.e. not e-hi(it (roken)ing &isplays in

conte-ts )hich &o not involve intru&ers or in )hich there are no young to protect 43istau 1551,

p.58556.

The e-perients involve huan intru&ers )ho approach an& stop at the plover nests. If

the (ir& engages in a @7D, then the intru&er either &oes or &oes not follo) the (ir&. 3istaus

e-perient sho)s that the plovers fulfill con&itions 19 a(ove. In 58J of the cases, the plover

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ove& to a location )hich took the intru&er a)ay fro the nest<young. The plovers also

perfore& @7Ds in the visual fiel& of the intru&ers in 99 out of 9: cases, an& the (ir&s al)ays

ove& (efore aking @7Ds. If @7Ds are nothing ore than refle-es, it sees likely that the

plovers )oul& (egin @7D )hen they first encounter an intru&er, instea& of first oving into the

visual fiel& of the intru&er. During @7Ds the plovers also appeare& to onitor the intru&er (y

turning their hea&s to position their eyes in a )ay that situate& the intru&er into their visual fiel&.

In the cases )here the intru&er continue& to follo) the (ir& as it engage& in its @7D, the (ir&

&i& not stop its @7D or reapproach the intru&er. In the cases )here the intru&er &i& not follo)

the (ir&, 1# of the ;1 situations involve& the plover reapproaching the intru&er 5 of the ;1 cases

involve& continue& or intensifie& @7D ; of the ;1 involve& the (ir& returning to its young 1 of

the ;1 involve& the (ir& flying a)ay an& in the final case, the (ir& &i& not reapproach or fly

a)ay 43istau 1551, p.1011026.

Though one ight initially e-pect a (etter perforance of attracting the intru&ers

attention in the cases )here they &i& not follo) the plover, it shoul& (e note& that 1. The clai is

not that plovers are perfectly rational creatures 4an& of course, neither are )e6 an& that 2. n

further reflection, the results &o not see so far a)ay fro )hat )oul& (e e-pecte& even of a

creature such as a huan. or e-aple, in the a'ority of the cases one )oul& e-pect a person

to try an& reapproach the intru&er to reesta(lish its attention. f course, it )oul& also (e a

reasona(le strategy to try an& intensify the &raatics of ones act since that ight (e fairly

effective in gaining the intru&ers attention as )ell. Eet, there )oul& likely (e soe people )ho

ight fear that this act is not )orking, an& so they return to the si&e of their chil&ren. r perhaps

they are scare& an& cannot figure out )hat to &o ne-t, so they instinctively return to their

chil&ren. "ay(e they panic an& run a)ay or free/e an& cannot ove. one of these

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possi(ilities )oul& (e very surprising, an& in fact, are not far off fro e-periences )e have or

learn a(out fro others every&ay.

The secon& set of e-perients, the a/e H-perients, attepts to &eterine if plovers

are responsive to the attention of an intru&er. This set of e-perients is &esigne& to o(serve the

plovers (ehavior )hen encountere& (y a person )ho )alks near the nest<young an& keeps the

&irection of their eyega/e a)ay fro the nest vs. a person )ho )alks near the nest an& keeps

their ga/e in the &irection of the nest<young. The stu&ies sho) that the (ir&s stay off their nest

longer )hen a passer(y ga/es to)ar&s the nest. Since a longer &uration of tie off of the nest is

an in&ication that the plover regar&s the passer(y as an intru&er<threat, or at the least, that the

plover is engaging in a &istraction (ehavior, it sees to in&icate that the (ir& is sensitive to

passers(y )ho &irect their ga/e to)ar&s the (ir&s nest. A&&itionally, the to)ar&nest ga/e of

an intru&er fro up to 2: eters a)ay causes the plovers to (ecoe ore arouse& than the ga/e

&irecte& a)ay fro the &irection of the nest 43istau 1551, p.10;6.

The thir& e-perient con&ucte& (y 3istau investigate& the a(ility of the plovers to

&iscriinate (et)een intru&ers )ho e-hi(it =&angerous> (ehavior 4i.e. a passer(y )ho

approaches the nest, keeping their ga/e &irecte& to)ar&s it an& appears to hunt<search for the

eggs6 an& intru&ers )ho e-hi(it =safe> (ehavior 4i.e. a passer(y )ho )alks )ithin 12;2 eters

of the nest an& keeps their ga/e a)ay fro the nest6. The &angerous an& safe intru&ers )ore

&istinctively &ifferent clothes to ai& the &iscriination task. After each perfore& an initial

&istance& )alk(y, a safe intru&er an& a &angerous intru&er )oul& perfor their respective

passes (y the nest. Then each )oul& again perfor a &istance& )alk(y. T)o (asic categories

of responses involve the (ir& getting off of the nest or reaining on the nest. 7ithin each

category there are gra&ations of responses inclu&ing, )ithin getting off of the nest* aking a

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@7D, spen&ing a varying aount of tie off of the nest, an& going a particular &istance fro

the nest. 7ithin the category of staying on the nest, the (ir& ay stan& up (ut reain on the

nest, crane its neck, change its orientation, or ake no oveent 43istau 1551, p. 1106.

It )as foun& that the (ir&s (ecae ore arouse& )hen the &angerous intru&ers a&e their

final &istance& )alk(y than )hen the safe intru&ers a&e their &istance& )alk(y in 81J of the

trials. A&&itionally, aong the plovers that )ere arouse& in those cases, :2J of the reacte& in

a ore &raatic fashion (y leaving the nest )hen the &angerous intru&er approache& (ut not

)hen the safe intru&er approache& 43istau 1551, p.1126.

Though one ight e-pect the nu(ers to (e higher if the plovers are really thought to

have learne& to &iscriinate (et)een &angerous an& safe intru&ers, 3istau suggests that there are

several possi(le e-planations for this. or e-aple, the (ehavior of the intru&ers )as not really

&angerous, an& perhaps that playe& a role in the plovers &iscriination. Also, the group of

plovers in the e-perient are, in 3istaus )or&s, =Kaong the ost ha(ituate& to huans> an&

=Kthe e-perients )ere perfore& un&er less than i&eal con&itions> 43istau 1551, p.11:11$6.

The less than i&eal con&itions involve a lack of participants, )hich results in intru&ers &ou(ling

as o(servers, an& the association of the participants )ith one another in the presence of the (ir&s

un&er stu&y. All of these factors ight play a role in keeping the plovers fro aking a higher

percentage of correct &iscriinations, ho)ever, it shoul& (e note& that they )ere correct in a

large nu(er of trials.

4. Plovers and Intentionality

o) that )e have a rough un&erstan&ing of 3istaus e-perients, )e are face& )ith a &ifficult

+uestion* shoul& one cre&it the plovers )ith intentionalityG At first glance it certainly sees that

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their (ehavior is about soething. ne ight suggest that aking a @7D is an action about

&eception or about lea&ing an intru&er a)ay fro the nest an& young. @ut one coul& 'ust as

easily say the sae thing a(out the activities of an aoe(a, an o&oeter, or an ant. Their

(ehaviors, or activities, are surely a(out soething. @ut this is not )hat is generally eant (y

asking if a syste is an intentional syste. 7e &o not see to &ou(t that their (ehavior is a(out

soe state of affairs, (ut )e see to )ant to kno) soething a(out the nature of that (ehavior

an& )hat is (ehin& it .

Though intentionality ay have to &o )ith aboutness, in+uiring as to )hether a plover

shoul& (e cre&ite& )ith intentionality ay invoke any &ifferent )ays of un&erstan&ing the

+uestion. 7hile the piping plover @7D (ehavior has (een &iscusse& in ters of eotion 4Stieg

200#6, I inten& the notion of intentionality here to (e ore general. ne possi(le un&erstan&ing

is )hether one ought to treat the plover as an intentional syste 4i.e. as having (eliefs, &esires,

hopes, etc. )hich play soe role in its cognitive an& (ehavioral activities6 regar&less of )hether

it really has these intentional states or not. n this vie), =treating> the plover in this anner

involves, aong other things, pre&icting its (ehavior (y consi&ering the (ir& to (e a creature that

acts as if it )ere rational an& acting on the (asis of its (eliefs, &esires, etc. Another )ay of

approaching this +uestion ight (e to treat the plover as an intentional syste, though it is not

clear )hether they are or not, in an effort to &esign an& create e-perients that ight she& light

on )hether the (ir&s actually have (eliefs an& &esires. This sees to (e the sort of approach that

3istau takes in her &iscussion of plovers.

Eet another variant of this vie) is to treat the creature as an intentional syste in

e-planation an& pre&iction of its (ehavior, (ut to hol& that any further +uestion as to )hether the

creature actually has ental states is istaken. n this vie), ental states are not =things> to

1;



(e &iscovere&, (ut are ore like heuristic a(stractions )hich are use& to &escri(e<interpret

(ehavior fro a certain perspective. This sees to (e the sort of vie) that Dennett takes

4Dennett 15596 4Dennett 15586. In a siilar vein, Fohn Dupre 4155$6 argues that there is no

eaning to the +uestion of )hether there really are ental states like (eliefs an& &esires

in&epen&ent of a creatures (ehavior. The eaning of particular ental states is crucially tie& to

particular sorts of (ehavior, an& to insist that there are separate ental states, )hich are

in&epen&ent of an& prece&e certain acts, is to fall into the pro(leatic vie) of a Cartesian theater

)here the ental states e-ist an& play theselves out on soe inner stage. This vie) shoul& (e

&istinguishe& fro (ehavioris. Dupre &oes not insist that certain ental states are certain

(ehaviors (ut that the (ehaviors are criteria for the ental states. Talk of the (eyon& the

criteria for the is eaningless, i.e. sense of the cannot (e a&e.

The a(ove vie)s all take )hat ight (e calle& the intentional stance, i.e. they all use the

structure of folk psychology, incorporating e-planations of (ehavior (y referring to coon

ental ters or states, in e-plaining an&<or pre&icting various anials, an& in Dennetts case,

even therostats activities. Does a&opting the intentional stance to &escri(e the plovers

(ehavior )orkG 3istau argues that it &oes. The four con&itions that she sets out as (eing

in&icative of )hat an intentional plover )oul& &o in regar&s to intru&ers an& aking @7Ds

see to (e o(servationally confire& in her stu&ies. They also see like intuitively plausi(le

(ehaviors to e-pect fro an intentional syste.

@ut are there other possi(le e-planations of the &istraction (ehavior in general, an& the

@7D in particularG 3istau, herself, &oes a nice 'o( of listing possi(le alternatives* 3efle- an&

i-e& Action Pattern 4AP6 e-planations, Preprograe& se+uence of (ehavior e-planations,

Conflict (ehavior e-planations, etc. 43istau 1551, p. 5:5#6. She also gives goo& reasons for

19



)hy these e-planations are ina&e+uate, ostly relying on their siplifying assuptions a(out

the plovers (ehavior. or instance, it is &ifficult for the AP e-planation to e-plain )hy the

plover )ill alost al)ays ove in a &irection a)ay fro the intru&er an& the nest, )hich

re+uires cople- perceptual an& otor anipulation, as oppose& to a variety of other possi(le

&irections the plover ight take 43istau 1551, p.5$6.

The failure of other hypotheses an& e-planations of the plovers (ehavior, couple& )ith

the apparent success of the intentional hypothesis that the plover wants to lea& the intru&er a)ay,

sees to leave the intentional hypothesis as the ost favora(le hypothesis. urtherore,

conceiving of plovers as intentional creatures even helps to e-plain apparent pro(les in the &ata

results such as the varying (ehaviors o(serve& un&er siilar con&itions. It sees that there are a

lot of goo& reasons for treating plovers as creatures )ith in&s.

@ut taking the intentional stance to)ar&s a particular entity &oes not coit one to (eing

a realist a(out intentional states. So there ay (e a further +uestion )hich soe ight (e

intereste& in posing* Do anials 4really6 have (eliefsG Dennett a&&resses this very +uestion in

his article (y the sae nae 415586. In Dennetts vie), it is a istake to keep asking =but &o

they really have (eliefs>G As entione& a(ove, for Dennett there is not anything (eyon& our

a(ility to use intentional ters to &escri(e a creatures (ehavior that having intentional states is

like. In his usual style, he provi&es stories an& analogies for his rea&ers to glean iportant points

fro, an& though they are soeties o(scure, his story a(out a race of alien creatures )ho talk

of ?having fatigues instea& of ?(eing tire& helps eluci&ate the sort of vie) that I think provi&es

any iportant points to consi&er 4Dennett 15#86. The aliens, upon eeting earthlings, )ant us

to tell the )hat fatigues are, )here they are, )hat physical states they are i&entical )ith, etc.

@ut of course, this )oul& see copletely istaken to us. 7e &o not consi&er fatigues to (e

1:



?things that )e have, that )e can point to, etc. 7e ay talk a(out (eing fatigue&, sho)ing

fatigue, an& so on, (ut )e &o not suppose that fatigues are the sorts of things one looks into the

(o&y an& fin&s. 3ather, it is a ter that plays a certain role in &escri(ing (ehavior.

The sae sort of confusion ight (e involve& in asking a(out the reality of intentional

states. 7hat sort of ans)er coul& one give )hen aske& )hat they are, )here they are, etc.G o)

&o you point to a (elief ai&st a (un&le of cellular processesG Larious fors of ans)ers ay (e

given 4e.g. i&entity theory, supervenience, eergence, etc6, (ut they &o ore etaphysical

postulating than real ans)ering. An& this is pro(a(ly (ecause (eliefs, &esires an& the like, are

not the sorts of ?things one siply points to, or sees, or touches. f course, no(o&y really

e-pects these sorts of ental states to (e visi(le if one )ere to open up a craniu an& peer into a

(rain, (ut )hat &oes that tell usG It tells us that these psychological ters )e use, such as (elief

an& &esire, are really theoretical ters that )e use to &escri(e (ehavior. As theoretical ters,

they ay or ay not correspon& to an e-ternal reality, (ut the point is that )e have learne& to

use these ters, an& they have gaine& the sort of eaning that they have, (y (eing use& to

&escri(e (ehavior. In Dupres )ay of putting it, the sense, or eaning, of these ters is

confuse&, or eaningless, )hen )e start talking a(out the e-istence of ental states in&epen&ent

of (ehavior.

I &o not ean to iply that o(serva(ility &eterines e-istence, or realness, (ut that the

sorts of e-istence, or realness, )e often in+uire a(out regar&ing intentional states, is istakenly

the sort of e-istence that is closely relate& to o(serva(ility. or instance, )e ight think a(out

(oth ta(les an& centers of gravity 4or nu(ers or scores6 as e-isting, (ut )e ight also )ant to

say the )ay in )hich they e-ist is very &ifferent. Ta(les are o(serva(le, you can touch the, etc.

Centers of gravity play a role in &escriptions of phenoena, (ut you )oul&nt e-pect to

1$



=&iscover>, see or spray the. Intentional states ay e-ist, or (e real, (ut since )e &ont really

e-pect to see the, touch the, etc., )e shoul& e(race other )ays in )hich they ight e-ist

4e.g. as &escriptions6 an& let the chips fall )here they ay. Allo)ing this sort of e-istence, an&

not e-pecting the other sort, ay ake it ore apparent )hy it is istaken to ask ?but &o

anials really have (eliefs.

n this vie), if an anial &isplays the sort of (ehavior that coonly is &escri(e& using

intentional ters, then there is no further +uestion a(out the atter the anial has intentionality.

In the scenario at the (eginning of this paper regar&ing the spy at the (each, it is only natural to

&escri(e the spy an& the spys opposition in intentional ters. They (oth wanted certain things

4or states of affairs to o(tain6, (elieve& certain things a(out one another an& their otives, an&

(elieve& that perforing certain actions )oul& ost likely (ring a(out certain &esire& states of

affairs. The spy case is analogous to the plover scenario, an& every reason that )e have for

attri(uting intentionality to the spy an& the spys opposition, applies utatis utan&is to the

plover.

ne ight o('ect that )e have ore reason, in the sae case, to attri(ute intentionality to

a fello) huan than )e &o to the plover for a variety of reasons. irst, as huans, )e can safely

infer the e-istence of in&s in other huans 4the inference<analogy arguent to the other in&s

pro(le6. Secon&ly, huans share language an& this is necessary for thought. It is )i&ely

agree&, ho)ever, that the inference o('ection is pro(leatic. If recogni/ing that soe of our

ental states are correlate& )ith soe of our (ehaviors, an& upon seeing siilar (ehaviors in

others, )e conclu&e that they have the sae ental states, )e appear to (e reaching a uch

larger conclusion than our preises )arrant. All )e have to go on, accor&ing to this arguent,

is a single instance or e-perience of the con'unction of (ehaviors an& ental states. ro this

1#



)e conclu&e that every, or at least (illions 4population of huans6 of instances of the (ehaviors

are con'oine& )ith the ental states. If this is the sort of 'ustification )e give for (elieving in

other huan in&s, then it is not very strong. The secon& o('ection is ore coplicate&, (ut I

)ill attept to a&&ress it (elo).

5. The Representational Alternative

The a(ove ay see too li(eral, or even copletely unsatisfactory, in its +uickness to attri(ute

ental states to plovers. It ight also (e unattractive (ecause of its treatent of the ontological

status of intentional states generally. @ut )hat )oul& it ean for one to (e a realist a(out

intentional statesG 7oul& )e (e coitte& to an ontology of intentional states in the plovers

(rains, in huansG That is pro(a(ly too naMve an& a generally istaken )ay to vie) the status of

intentional states, (ut )e ight try to ake sense of )hat it eans to (e a realist a(out

intentional states (y a&opting a naturalistic approach an& in+uiring into conteporary scientific

theories regar&ing psychological states an& functions.

If, as o&or 415#:6 argues, it is correct that the general structure of current psychological

theories of cognition treat cognitive processes as coputational, then, since coputation ust (e

carrie& out on soething 4representations6, it appears that taking a naturalistic approach coits

one to a&opting a representational theory of in&. If one &oes a&opt a representational theory of

in&, then giving a little ore su(stance to the +uestion regar&ing anial in&s ight not (e as

&ifficult to get a han&le on.

n a representational vie) ental states are relations (et)een ental representations,

an& the ental representations are the (asic coponents of cognitive processes. So, for

e-aple, having a (elief ight (e (eing in a certain relation to a ental representation. o&ors

18



representational theory vie)s ental representations as the (asis of intentionality fro )hich the

propositional attitu&es, (eliefs an& so on, an& language &erive their content an& eaning 4o&or

15586. urtherore, thought is coputation on ental representations )here coputation is

un&erstoo& as a contentresponsi(le, causal relation (et)een sy(ols 4ental representations6

4o&or 1558, pp.5116.

It is iportant to note that this vie) allo)s for (oth thought )ithout language, since

thought is necessary an& prior to language, an& ental representation )ithout thought, since

there coul& (e ental representations )hich &o not have coputations perfore& on the. To

&eterine that an anial has intentional states, one )oul& have to have suggestive evi&ence that

the anial has ental representations an& that they are in a certain sort of relationship to that

representation. Presua(ly, the sort of relationship )oul& (e one in )hich the content of the

representation &eterines the content of the anials intentional state, an& this ight (e lent

support (y evi&ence<o(servations )hich suggest that the content of an anials representations

contri(utes to its (ehavior in certain )ays. Though it ight not (e possi(le to specify the e-act

content of an anials intentional state 4Stich 15#56, it ight (e possi(le to &eterine it to

)ithin a reasona(le &egree. f course, if an anial has language, then it necessarily follo)s that

they have propositional attitu&es an& intentionality since language, on this vie), &erives its

eaning fro the (ottoup as it )ere.

To &eterine that an anial has thought, it )oul& nee& to (e sho)n that there is soe

sort of coputation on the anials representations in light of the content of those

representations. Sho)ing that content plays soe causal role in the creatures cognitive an&<or

(ehavioral repertoire of activities is then necessary, an& so in fulfilling the a(ove criterion that

the content of an anials representations contri(utes to its (ehavior, it shoul& (e sufficient to

15



sho) that an anial has thought. ne )ay of getting at the causal role of a states content is to

e-aine the variation of the creatures (ehavior in light of varying circustances. iven

assue& goals, or otivations, a creatures perceptual representations shoul& elicit particular

types of (ehaviors. In the case of the plovers, this can (e a&&resse& (y paying attention to the

variation of their @7Ds an& attepts to garner the intru&ers attention in the situations )here

intru&ers vary their response to the initial @7D. The sae (ehavioral sensitivity is seen in the

other t)o e-periental setups as )ell. These provi&e reasons for thinking the plovers

representational content causes its (ehavior in soe )ay. An a&&itional, proising feature of

using this (ehavioral &ata to assess plover in&s is that it provi&es soe reason for supposing

that the content they are utili/ing has a certain aount of specificity to it. This is seen in the

sensitivity of the (ir&s to the particular ga/e an& intru&erlike (ehaviors of the huan

participants. The specificity con&ition arises in another for (elo) in )hat I refer to as the

con&itions in&icative of concepte&iate& (ehavior.

I take it, ho)ever, that the notion of concepte&iate& cognition an& (ehavior is actually

a ore stringent re+uireent than the con&ition that the content of an anials representation

play a causal role in its (ehavior, an& it is this re+uireent that I )ill eploy for plovers. irst,

the notion of concepts is ore closely aligne& )ith =higherlevel> cognition an& a(straction in a

variety of )ays. or e-aple, at least part of the use of concepts involves a(straction fro

purely perceptual stiuli. Secon&, there see a plethora of e-aples in the anial king&o,

an& in a variety of inaniate aterials, )here it appears that there are representations (eing

eploye& )hose particular content sees very relevant an& responsi(le for the o('ects

(ehavior, (ut to )hich )e )oul& not (e incline& to attri(ute the sort of cognitive po)ers )e are

here intereste& in. or e-aple, os+uitoes ost likely utili/e soe representational syste in

20



coor&inating flight patterns, an& therostats represent the teperature of a roo. urtherore,

the content of that representation is responsi(le for future actions the therostat engages in 4e.g.

turning up the heat or keeping the teperature )here it is6. o)ever, &iscussion regar&ing the

cognitive po)ers of therostats sees very o&& an& pro(a(ly istaken. At the very least,

though )e ight attri(ute representations to these entities, )e )oul& alost certainly not

attri(ute concepts to the. ne a'or reason is &ue to the &ifference in contentspecificity

(et)een intentional states an& inforational states entione& in section 2. or the a(ove

reasons, I take it that evi&ence suggestive that the anial is eploying concepte&iate&

representations<(ehavior is sufficient to esta(lish thought an& that it is a stronger criterion than

the aforeentione& one.

7ith this criterion in in&, )e ight ask our +uestion regar&ing plovers an&

intentionality again, ho)ever, there are a fe) iportant points that nee& to (e spelle& out

regar&ing concepts. Allen an& auser 4155$6, in their &iscussion of concepte&iate& (ehavior

regar&ing the concept of &eath reark that the notion of concept

Kfits )ell into functional e-planations of fle-i(ility in anial (ehavior. Concepts are

capa(le of e-plaining cople- a(ilities to generali/e over varia(le stiuli, to rapi&ly

pro&uce appropriate responses to the coon features un&erlying those stiuli, an& to

o&ify (ehavior )hen it is &iscovere& that perceptual stiuli are unrelia(le gui&es to

un&erlying features. urtherore, this notion of a concept can (e teste& (y suita(ly

ingenious e-periental &esign 4Allen an& auser 155$, p.:56.

Accor&ing to Allen an& auser, a concept involves representation of soe aspect, property or

feature in&epen&ently of its perceptual coponents 4Allen an& auser 155$, p.::6. Attri(ution

of a nonperceptual 4a(stract6 concept, in this sense, to an anial at tie t , relies on evi&ence that

21



the anial is utili/ing a ental representation that is in&epen&ent of inforation )hich ight (e

provi&e& perceptually at t . Allen an& auser set out t)o con&itions )hich they think are

in&icative of an anial )ith concepte&iate& (ehavior an& )hich are testa(le an& o(serva(le*

16 the a(ility to generali/e inforation fro perceptual inputs an& to use it in various (ehavioral

situations 26 the a(ility to alter )hat is taken as evi&ence for an instance of that concept 4Allen

an& auser 155$, p.::6.

The secon& set of e-perients 4the ga/e tests6 offers a fe) possi(le insights into the first

con&ition. In the ga/e e-perient, the plovers &eonstrate& the a(ility to recogni/e or

&iscriinate (et)een t)o classes of passers(y* those )ho &irecte& their ga/e to)ar&s the nest

an& those )ho &irecte& their ga/e a)ay fro the nest. Since the (ir&s prove& to (e consistently

sensitive to the forer (ut not to the latter, it sho)s that they have the a(ility to respon& to

perceptual stiuli in a )ay )hich suggests that the stiuli, or the o('ects of the stiuli, have

(een classifie& into &ifferent categories (y the plover. This &oes not sho) that the plover has a

concept of intru&er or &angerous<safe, erely that its categori/ation of the classes is likely the

sae as that )hich )oul& (e e-pecte& if one )ere acting )ith one of those concepts. o)ever,

the e-perient &oes &etail the e-tree sensitivity to perceptual stiuli (y the plover, an& give

one reason to )on&er )hy it is that the (ir& reacts to the one stiulus an& not the other. That the

plover &istinguishes (et)een the t)o in&icates that the (ir& has a representation a(out<of the

o('ects in its fiel& of vision an& that the representations &iffer, an& apparently, the )ay in )hich

they &iffer is &ue to their content. Since the &ifferent contents are highly correlate& )ith the

&ifferent (ehaviors, it looks like there is soe for of coputation occurring )hich =takes

notice> of content. This )oul& likely satisfy the con&ition that o&ors vie) re+uires, (ut it &oes

22



not see to ove us closer to a(stract generali/ation a)ay fro ere perceptual stiuli. Still, it

&oes provi&e us )ith a sense of the &iscriinatory po)ers of the plover.

The thir& set of e-perients 4intru&er vs. nonintru&er &iscriination6 sees to (e a

(etter set to consi&er in regar&s to Allen an& ausers first con&ition. Accor&ing to that

con&ition, the plover shoul& (e a(le to take inforation it has receive& at soe point in the past

an& use it in soe )ay later in tie to affect its (ehavior. This is precisely )hat the plovers &o

in the thir& e-perient. The plover, upon receiving various fors of perceptual stiuli, coes

to &iscriinate intru&ers fro nonintru&ers. Since its (ehavior<response to these intru&ers is the

type of response given in the face of threats, or as an attept to alleviate a threat, )e ight say

that the plover recogni/es certain participants in the stu&y as intru&ers. So suppose that plover P

recogni/es person N as an intru&er. o), later in tie, the plover is presente& )ith a situation

that )oul& norally elicit a certain type of response to)ar&s N if N )ere a nonintru&er. or

e-aple, N )alks (y P at a very reove& &istance. 7henever a nonintru&er )alks (y at that

&istance, P sho)s no signs of arousal, (ut )hen N )alks (y at that sae &istance, P sho)s signs

of arousal )hich are &raatic the a'ority of the tie. The plover is taking perceptual

inforation fro one tie an& using it at a later tie to alter the (ehavior<response )hich it

)oul& ost likely have perfore& given the later perceptual state of affairs. This is precisely the

sort of (ehavior one )oul& e-pect fro a creature )hose (ehavior is concepte&iate&.

@efore consi&ering the secon& con&ition of concept attri(ution, I shoul& consi&er a

possi(le o('ection to the a(ove treatent of the plovers fulfillent of the first con&ition. It

ight (e replie& that this a(ility to use or generali/e past inforation is really nothing ore than

)hat is calle& learning an& that there is nothing special a(out learning such that it re+uires the

postulation of concepts. Surely there are instances of learning, such as iprinting, ha(ituation

2;



an& perhaps fors of con&itioning, )hich &o not re+uire concept possession an& )hich occur in

any lo)er organiss. So )hy shoul& )e take the plover achieveent to (e specialG

I &o not &ou(t that the plover has learne& to &istinguish intru&ers fro nonintru&ers an&

learne& that particular passer(ys are intru&ers. It is also true that there are a variety of types of

learning, (ut the types of learning )hich presua(ly &o not eploy the use of concepts, such as

iprinting an& ha(ituation, are not the sort at play in the case of the plover e-perients. It is also

unlikely that classical con&itioning can (e use& to e-plain the plovers &iscriinative a(ilities

since the (ir&s have not (een e-pose& to as any trials in these e-perients as )oul& see

nee&e& to for the relevant associations. "oreover, it is not even clear ho) an e-planation using

classical con&itioning )oul& negate the hypothesis of concepte&iation. or the intru&ers

presence 4at a &istance6 to (ecoe a con&itione& stiulus for the plovers arousal, the participant

)oul& alrea&y have to (e associate&, or in a relationship )ith the plover such that it cause& the

arousal of the (ir&. nly after there is such a causal relationship, coul& the su(se+uent stiulus

4the intru&er at a &istance6 (ecoe associate& )ith the sae (ehavior of arousal. @ut then )e

are left to )on&er ho) it is that the original relationship arose. Is it a purely har&)ire&

response, a refle- pattern, etc.G The cople-ities of the plovers (ehavioral repertoire an&

3istaus e-perients 4especially the first set6 see to in&icate that there is uch ore involve&

in the plovers &istraction &isplays than that. If this is correct, then ore attention shoul& (e pai&

to the plovers intelligence, a&apta(ility, an& fle-i(ility.

There are various characteri/ations of general o&es of learning. ne such

characteri/ation is that of learning )hich involves representations an& that )hich &oes not. This

&istinction is suppose& to e-press the sort of &ifference portraye& (et)een that of eories vs.

ha(its kno)ing that vs. kno)ing ho) etc. The a(ility to recogni/e, or &iscriinate o('ects as

29



soething or to use past perceptual inforation at a future tie is ost likely learning of the

representational sort, i.e. using eory, or kno)ing that, etc. aving sai& all of this, it is

apparently a atter of &ispute )hether classical con&itioning involves representational types of

learning, ha(it, or i-es of the t)o 43osen/)eig an& Beian 1585, p.$;;6. So it is not

ie&iately &aaging to a concepte&iate& hypothesis that the plover is learning to

&iscriinate via classical con&itioning. So even if con&itioning )ere responsi(le for the plovers

(ehavior, )hich sees unlikely, concepts ight (e an iportant factor in classical con&itioning.

The secon& con&ition of concept attri(ution re+uires that the anial (e a(le to alter )hat

it takes as evi&ence for an instance of a concept. This is a tricky con&ition an& sees &ifficult to

&eonstrate. In the case of the plover, an e-aple of this ight involve a plover recogni/ing a

participant as an intru&er, or (eing presente& )ith perceptual evi&ence that the participant is an

intru&er, (ut then (eing su('ecte& to evi&ence )hich is suggestive that the participant is not an

intru&er. Accor&ing to the con&ition, the plover shoul& (e a(le to o&ify its responses to the

forer types of evi&ence. A&itte&ly, 3istaus e-perients &o not provi&e as convincing results

for this con&ition as they &o for the first. The e-perients, especially the thir& set, ight have

(een a(le to a&&ress this con&ition if they ha& (een e-ten&e& for longer perio&s of tie. or

e-aple, the thir& set of e-perients ight have (een telling if, after the (ir&s ha& coe to

&iscriinate (et)een intru&ers an& nonintru&ers, the intru&ers (ecae passive an& &eli(erately

e-hi(ite& nonthreatening (ehavior. Then, if the plovers cae to recogni/e the once again as

nonintru&ers, it coul& (e teste& to see if the (ir&s evaluate& the sae sort of (ehavior, earlier

regar&e& as &angerous, in the sae anner, i.e. as evi&ence of a participant (eing an intru&er. If

they &i& not, then it )oul& (e evi&ence in favor of the plovers a(ility to fulfill con&ition t)o.

2:



In soe other respects, though not i&eally, the e-perients ay contri(ute soething to

the +uestion of the plovers a(ility to satisfy the secon& con&ition. In the thir& e-perient, )hen

the plover learns to &iscriinate (et)een intru&ers an& nonintru&ers, the (ir& sees to (e not

only applying ol& perceptual inforation to a ne) situation, (ut it also ight (e sai& to (e

altering )hat it takes as evi&ence for (eing a non-intruder . In previous trials, the plover &oes not

respon& to passer(ys at the reove& &istance. Passing (y at that &istance is evi&ence for (eing a

nonintru&er. o)ever, after (eing presente& )ith evi&ence that intru&ers also pass (y at that

&istance, passing (y at that &istance no longer suffices for keeping one fro (eing recogni/e& as

a nonintru&er. This ight len& soe support to the notion that plovers can satisfy con&ition

t)o. o)ever, it shoul& (e note& that the plovers ight not (e altering )hat they take as

evi&ence for (eing a nonintru&er, (ut rather, to (ecoe an intru&er, one ust perfor a ore

threatening activity than siply passing (y at a reove& &istance.

Though e-perient one &oes not sho) that the plovers alter )hat they take as evi&ence

of a concept, it &oes sho) that the plovers have the a(ility to onitor the (ehavior of intru&ers

an& to alter their o)n (ehavior in cople- )ays in light of ne) &evelopents. This involves

constant perceptual up&ating 4checking to see if the intru&er is follo)ing the6, co(ine& )ith

integrating this inforation in iportant )ays )ith past inforation, e.g. that the other organis

is an intru&er to (egin )ith. This a(ility )arrants fulfillent of con&ition one an& suggests that

the plover has the a(ility to alter its (ehavior in iportant )ays in light of ne) evi&ence it is

presente& )ith.

There is further, in&irect support for fulfillent of the secon& criterion (y a relative of the

piping plover. Though 3istau &oes not &etail any stu&ies of the kill&eer or southern lap)ing

(ir&s, she &oes (riefly note soe of their &ocuente& (ehavior 43istau 1551, p.5:6. The

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kill&eer, )hich is relate& to the piping plover, &oes not ake @7Ds )hen the intru&ing anial is

a nonpre&ator 4i.e. &oes not eat the (ir&s eggs6. Instea&, the kill&eer ignores the anials until

they coe close enough to the nest to (e threats to traple it. Then the (ir& lunges at the anial

in an attept to startle it a)ay fro its present course. The southern lap)ings perfor a siilar

(ehavior )hen the intru&ing anial is a nonpre&ator 43istau 1551, p.5:6. It sees that these

(ir&s are a(le to recogni/e, not only intru&ers fro nonintru&ers, (ut also nonpre&ator intru&ers

fro pre&ator intru&ers. If they &i& not ake this &istinction, then it )oul& (e e-pecte& that the

(ir&s )oul& perfor the sae sort of &istraction (ehaviors, for e-aple @7Ds, that they &o

)hen confronte& )ith pre&ator intru&ers. Since they &o not, it sees likely that they are a(le to

&istinguish (et)een the t)o. If they &o &istinguish (et)een the nonpre&ator an& pre&ator

intru&ers, then it )oul& ost likely (e a secon&ary &iscriination to the prior one of

intru&er<nonintru&er. If this is right, then at soe point, the (ir&s )ere a(le to alter )hat they

took as evi&ence for &ifferent types of intru&ers, an& this )oul& go a long )ay to)ar&s satisfying

the secon& concept attri(ution con&ition.

Though these secon&ary &iscriinations are seen in kill&eers an& lap)ings, it is not clear

that plovers also ake these sorts of &iscriinations. urther e-perients &esigne& to try an&

ake these &eterinations are necessary to get at these +uestions, (ut there are reasons to think

that the plovers ight also possess this capa(ility. irst, the kill&eer are relatives of the plover,

an& (asic cognitive skills foun& in the kill&eer shoul& likely (e foun& in the plover. Secon&, the

gra&ations in the response (ehavior of the plovers 4fro full @7D, to leaving the nest, to

ruffling the feathers, to no response6 to)ar&s &ifferent intru&ers suggests that the plovers ight

perceive the various intru&ers as threatening in varying &egrees. If this is so, then they have the

a(ility to &istinguish (et)een, an& likely alter evi&ence for, instances of a concept.

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6. Plover oncepts

If plovers have concepts, )hat sorts of concepts &o they haveG Davi&son argues that having

(eliefs an& thought re+uires having concepts an& that having concepts re+uires having language

4Davi&son 15826. @ut if there coul& (e )ays in )hich a creature coul& possess concepts )ithout

language, then it ight (e possi(le to go soe )ay to)ar&s e-plaining ho) languageless

anials have thought. I &o not inten& here to try an& refute, or to take hea&on, Davi&sons

arguents. 3ather, in this liite& space, I )ant to si&estep it an& erely suggest a possi(ility

for concept possession in languageless anials. "y suggestion &oes not &irectly ans)er

pro(les that Davi&son raises relate& to a su('ectiveo('ective contrast an& notions of

o('ective truth, (ut I a not convince& 16 that these con&itions are not et in an anials life

through its &ealings )ith the e-ternal )orl& an& 26 that these con&itions are even as crucial to

thought as Davi&son akes the out to (e.

An anials representational syste ight (e attentive to, or constructe& (y, &ifferent

features of the )orl& &ue to an anials priary sensory o&ality an& its evolutionary history.

or e-aple, a (at an& a huan )ill likely represent the )orl& in very &ifferent )ays given their

priary o&es of perceiving their surroun&ings, e.g. echolocation vs. priarily visual

perception. o), if concepts are either instantiate& in &ifferent representations, or they are use&

in classifying an& thus interacting )ith representations, then it is likely that one creatures o&e

of representing concepts )ill (e &ifferent fro that of other anials. If this is so, then it shoul&

not (e e-pecte& that all conceptual representations (e linguistic.

Larious hypotheses regar&ing concepts e-ist )hich &o not rely on linguistic

representation. The e-eplar vie) of concepts an& the prototype vie) of concepts (oth allo)

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for the possession of concepts )ithout the possession of language. The e-eplar vie) hol&s that

concepts are represente& (y their e-eplars, i.e. the representation of a concept consists of

separate &escriptions of soe of its e-eplars 4Sith an& "e&in 15556. The e-eplars can

either (e specific instances of the concept or a su(set of the concept. or e-aple, the concept

=(ir&> is represente& (y the &is'unction of e-eplars like =ro(in>, =eagle>, =(lue'ay>, =T)eetie

(ir&>, an& =3oa&runner>. The e-eplars )hich are su(sets 4=ro(in>, =eagle>, etc.6 can (e

theselves represente& (y other e-eplars such as particular ro(ins or eagles, an&<or they can (e

represente& (y a &escription of the relevant properties of ro(ins or eagles. If the e-eplar is a

specific instance, then its representation consists of a property &escription. So, for T)eetie(ir&

)e )oul& have soething like aniate, feathere&, yello), )histles, cage&, etc. Though the

e-eplar vie) has various =su(vie)s>, none of the re+uire that instances of the representation

of a concept (e linguistic. The property &escriptions, tune& to)ar&s various perceptual

characteristics, coul& very )ell (e instantiate& in a variety of )ays, none of )hich nee& (e

linguistic.

The concepts an anial ay have, if one )ere to a&opt the e-eplar vie) or a siilarly

nonlinguistic &epen&ent vie), ay (e represente& &ifferently than a huan ight represent

the. The concepts ight then also (e &ifferent concepts altogether. This ight ake the e-act

specification of the content of an anials representations an& intentional states ipossi(le, (ut it

)oul& not altogether preclu&e appro-iations, )hich ight (e a&e )ith varying &egrees of

success &epen&ing on the e-tent of kno)le&ge regar&ing a particular anial, its evolutionary

history, (ehavior, environent, etc. urtherore, the +uestions<pro(les raise& (y Davi&son

a(out anials not having (eliefs &ue to their not having language, or a )e( of (eliefs siilar to

ours, ay (e seen to (e insufficient, or lacking, in (eing a &ecisive arguent against anials

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having (eliefs an& intentionality in general. If one )ants to (e a realist regar&ing intentional

states an& to utili/e a representational theory of in&, then it )oul& (e very natural to attri(ute,

as the evi&ence )arrants, intentional states to plovers or to other anials.

There is still a +uestion as to ho) )e )ill kno) )hen the evi&ence )arrants intentional

attri(ution. It sees to e that the (est approach is an epirical one* think up an& &esign

e-perients. f course, the results that are o(taine& (y these e-perients ay only (e

o(servations, (ut that is the iportance of higherlevel representations, or cognitive processes,

i.e. that they &o soething, affect (ehavior. So looking at (ehavior is not a istaken place to

look.

ne ight forulate o(servationinfore& hypotheses regar&ing anial representations

an& cognition, )hich ight evolve an& change over tie, an& &erive o(servations or e-perients

fro the. "uch like the hypothetico&e&uctive o&el of science, if the e-pecte& o(servation

o(tains, then, though it &oes not provi&e a(solute verification of the hypothesis, it ay len&

support to it. There ay (e pro(les )hich arise, siilar to DuheOuine type pro(les, (ut

that ight also (e a pro(le in other sciences such as physics. An& yet, these pro(les &o not

free/e physicists fro coing up )ith practical solutions an& )ays aroun& these pro(les.

Siilar pro(les regar&ing realis to)ar&s uno(serva(les ight arise as )ell. Confiring the

postulate& e-istence of intentional states in a plover ight see like going out on a li(, or even

ipossi(le, (ut these sae sorts of &ifficulties &o not keep scientists, an& people generally, fro

thinking of (lackholes an& &arkatter in realist ters an& fro continuing to )ork on )ays to

&erive o(servations an& to use the in e-planatory roles.

!. onclusion

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In this paper, I have (een intereste& in the cognitive status of the piping plover. 3istaus

e-perients provi&e an aple aount of &ata in a&&ressing this issue. I have suggeste& that

there are &ifferent approaches to the pro(le of )hether plovers have in&s &epen&ing on

)hether one is a realist or an antirealist regar&ing intentional states. If one is an antirealist, one

can either refuse to use intentional ters altogether or one can eploy the in certain types of

&escriptions of (ehavior. If one refuses to use the, then the case is close& an& they )ill not use

the in regar&s to plovers. If one &oes use the, then every reason )e have for using the in

huan scenarios siilar to the plover scenarios carries over, an& plovers, in a sense, have in&s.

If one is a realist an& naturalistically in&e&, then one )ill a&opt a representational theory of

in&. n this vie), given the cople-ity, a&apta(ility an& fle-i(ility of the plovers (ehavior,

along )ith its a(ility to utili/e the content of its representations an& to satisfy the con&itions of

concept attri(ution, one is 'ustifie& in attri(uting intentionality to plovers.

A possi(le reason for refusing to allo) that plovers have ental states pro(a(ly arises

fro a isun&erstan&ing of )hat sorts of things ental states are, or )hat sorts of things ental

ters refer to. Another reason ight have to &o )ith assuptions regar&ing )hat intentional

creatures ust (e a(le to &o or accoplish, e.g. possess language. If theories of concepts, )hich

&o not re+uire linguistic a(ility, are plausi(le, then it is plausi(le to attri(ute thought an& (eliefs

to languageless creatures.

inally, epirical research is nee&e& to investigate these issues. There ay (e

&ifficulties in these types of stu&ies, (ut these &ifficulties are not insurounta(le.

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Re"erences

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Cling, A. 1551, ? The epirical virtues of (eliefs, Philosophical Psychology, vol. 9, no. ;, pp.

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Davi&son, D. 1582, ?3ational anials, Dialectica vol. ;$, no. 9, pp. ;1#;2#.

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3osen/)eig, ". an& Beian, A. 1585, Physiological Psychology, 3an&o ouse, e) Eork.

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