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Draftversion:pleasedonotciteorcirculatewithoutauthors’permission.Commentsarewelcome.Pleasereferto:Ilyas.saliba@wzb.eu

The influence of diffusing protest on perceptions amongst

authoritarian regime elites during critical junctures.

Investigating the conditions of transnational authoritarian learning in

Morocco and Egypt during the Arab Uprisings in 2011.

Keywords

Arabuprisings,diffusion,authoritarianlearning,resilience,contestation,political

elites

Author

Ilyas Saliba is a PhD candidate at the Berlin Graduate School of Social Science

(BGSS)atHumboldtUniversityBerlin.HeisaresearchfellowattheBerlinSocial

ScienceCenter(WZB)intheDemocracy&Democratizationresearchunit.

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Abstract

Authoritarianregimesunderpressurecandrawupondifferentstrategiestore-

spondtoachallenge.Naturally,themagnitudeofthethreattotheirauthority

andthetypeofthechallengerinfluencetheregime’sresponse(JosuaandEdel

2014,6–7;Franklin2009;Davenport2007).Furthermore,theregimetype,tradi-

tionalresponsepatternsandtheresourcesthedictatorcandeploytocontain

contestationinfluencetheresponsestrategy(Geddes,Wright,andFrantz2014;

Svolik2012;Barany2013).However,theactionsofauthoritarianregimesunder

pressurecannotbelookedatfromapurelydomesticperspectiveastheyarealso

embeddedinaregionalandinternationalcontextthatinfluencesregimedeci-

sion-makingaswellaswavesofcontestation(DellaPorta2014;Hale2013).

TheoreticallythepaperengageswiththeemergingliteratureonAuthoritarian

Learningandproposesananalyticalframeworkthattakesvaryingnaturesof

threatperceptionsanddifferingdomesticdecision-makingstructuresintoac-

count.

Buildingonsemi-structuredinterviewswithpoliticalelitesinEgyptandMoroc-

coIdevelopanactoraccountbasedapproachtoassesstheeffectsoftransna-

tionallearningonauthoritarianelitedecision-makingduringcriticaljunctures

(CapocciaandKelemen2007;Soifer2012).Basedonmorethan50eliteinter-

viewswithgovernmentofficials(formerandcurrent),partyleaders,political

consultants,journalistsandacademicsinMoroccoandEgyptthegathereddata

allowsaninsightintohowtheregimeelite’sperceptionsareinfluencedbywhat

theyobserveabroadandhowthisinfluencedthedomesticdecision-makingpro-

cessin2011.

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1. Introduction

Thispaperaimstocontributetotheevolvingdebateoninternationalinfluences

onauthoritarianpolitics(Weyland2010;2014;2016;Ambrosio2010;Levitsky

andWay2010;HeydemannandLeenders2011;Vanderhill2012;Erdmannetal.

2013;Brownlee2012;KoeselandBunce2013;Tansey2016b;2016a). It is ra-

theranendeavoroftheorydevelopmentthananexerciseintestingconcretehy-

pothesis.Howevertheat thisstagestill incompletecasestudieswill–ata later

stage–incorporateamoresophisticatedmethodologicalapproachtothestudyof

internationaldimensionofauthoritarianpoliticsbasedonoriginalaccountevi-

denceandaninterpretiveempiricalaccountofeliteperceptionsandtheimpact

ofdiffusingprotestsonregimedecisionmakingduringcriticaljunctures.

After introducing themain conceptual building blocs, I explore aim to identify

themost relevant conditions for transnational authoritarian learning tohavea

significanteffectondecision-makingprocesses inauthoritarianregimesduring

regional upheavals. Empirically, I illustrate the varying conditions and subse-

quenteffectsoftransnationallearningontheperceptionsofpoliticalelitesinthe

contextof theArabUprisings in2011 inMoroccoandEgypt.Methodologically,

thisanalysisrestsonaccountevidenceinformofeliteinterviews,conductedin

MoroccoandEgyptbetween2012-2016.Basedupontheseinterviews,theavail-

able literature and other primary sources (such as speeches and official docu-

ments)thepapergivesanaccountoftheperceptionsofregimeelitesandallows

aninsightintotheoftenopaquedecision-makingprocessesofregimeelitesdur-

ingthecriticaljuncturemarkedbydiffusingcontentionthroughouttheregionin

2011.Iconcludewithsomeimplicationsforfurtherresearcharguingforlessra-

tionalchoicebasedandstructuralexplanationsbutmoreactorbasedandmech-

anismbasedapproachestoovercometheshortcomingsofpreviousattemptsto

incorporate external influences into explanations of authoritarian politics and

strengthenthelinkbetweenexternalinfluencesanddomesticregimeelitedeci-

sion-makingunderpressure.

Authoritarianregimesunderpressurecanresorttodifferentstrategies.Presum-

ingrationalactors,theincumbents’goalisassumedtobeensuringtheirsurvival

atthetopofthefoodchain.Naturally,anyregimeresponsedependsonthemag-

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nitudeofthethreattoitsauthorityandthenatureofthechallenger(Josuaand

Edel2014,6–7;Franklin2009;Davenport2007).Furthermore,theregimetype

and theresources thedictatorcandeploy tocontaincontestation influence the

responsestrategy(Geddes,Wright,andFrantz2014;Svolik2012;Barany2013).

Iarguethatincriticaljunctures(CapocciaandKelemen2007;Soifer2012)aris-

inginthecontextofregionallydiffusingpoliticalcontestation(McAdam,Tarrow,

andTilly2001;TillyandTarrow2006),authoritarianlearning(Heydemannand

Leenders2011;2014;Vanderhill2012;Diamond2005;Dobson2013)canhavea

crucialimpactonthecalculationsofauthoritarianregimesunderthreat.

2. Theinternationalcontext:Blindspotofauthoritarianismresearch

Worksonauthoritarianregimeshavebeenfirmlynestedbetweenthecompara-

tivetraditionofregime-relatedresearchandthestudyofdemocratizationwithin

politicalscience.Studiesonauthoritarianpolitics,mainlyinspiredbybehaviour-

alistandinstitutionalistapproaches,havedominatedthescholarlydiscourseon

the prevalence of authoritarian politics (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Gandhi

2008;LevitskyandWay2010;Cheibub,Gandhi,andVreeland2010;Svolik2012;

Geddes,Wright,andFrantz2013).1

From the literature on authoritarianism, onemay identify three larger dimen-

sions that are expected to have an impact on authoritarian regimes and their

stability (Gerschewski2013;Merkeletal.2013).Repression,whichmayeither

takethe formofviolationofphysical integrity(hardrepression)ormeansthat

restrictpoliticalrightsandliberties(softrepression)arebothpartofthestand-

ard repertoireof autocrats (Davenport2007;Davenport and Inman2012). Se-

cond,cooptationofrelevantelitesandpotentialchallengersthroughformalleg-

islativeinstitutionshasbeenproventohaveasignificantimpactonauthoritarian

regimeresilience(GandhiandPrzeworski2006;Magaloni2008;BoixandSvolik

2013; Svolik 2012; Geddes,Wright, and Frantz 2014). At the same time other

works have shownhow informal patronage networks and allegiances can also

contribute to foster regime resilience in authoritarian contexts (Arriola 2009;1TheyhavealsobeenappliedtoexplainingtherecentdevelopmentsintheArabWorld(Barany2011;Barany2013;Bormann,Cederman,andVogt2013;Volpi2013;YomandGause2012)

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Lindemann2011). Thirdly, legitimacy throughdiffused (input) or specific sup-

port (output) has an impact upon the foundations of authoritarian rule

(Gerschewski2013;Merkeletal.2013;Burnell2006;Gilley2008;Schlumberger

2010).Howevermostanalysisfocusingoneitheroftheabove-mentionedfactors

andtheireffectsonauthoritarianregimeresilience,solelyrelyonanassessment

ofthedomesticconditionsinauthoritarianregimes.

Iargueinthispaperthatinthecontextofthe2011ArabUprisingsapurelydo-

mestically-boundperspectiveisnotsufficientforexplainingthedecision-making

withintheeffectedauthoritarianregimes(Volpi2013;HeydemannandLeenders

2014;Ambrosio2010;Brownlee2012;Weyland2014;2016;Tansey2016b).A

purely domestic perspective cannot account for crucial changes in the percep-

tionsofregimeelitesthatalteredthebasisofhowincumbentregimesassessed

their options anddecidedwhen andhow to react to emerging protests (Bank,

Richter,Sunik2013;Erdmannetal.2013;Bellin2004,144).

Althoughthereseemstobeaconsensusontheimportanceofexternaleffectson

authoritarianregimesmostworksneglectinter-andtransnationalinfluenceson

domesticconditionsofregimestability(Bellin2012,144;Erdmannetal.2013;

Gleditsch2012).AsErdmannandcolleaguespointout“Theliteratureonthein-

ternationaldimensionofauthoritarianruleishighlyfragmentedandonlyloosely

connected topreviouslydeveloped conceptsof democratization anddiffusion.”

(Erdmannetal.2013,9).

Theinternationalenvironmentinfluencesandshapestheperceptionsofincum-

bentregimeelitesandthushaseffectsonhowtheyreactfacingprotestsintheir

ownbackyard(KurtWeyland2016,216).Thecalculationsandstrategicchoices

ofauthoritarianregimesunderpressureareembeddedinaregionalandinterna-

tionalcontextthatcanhavedecisiveimpactsonanincumbentregime’sresponse

togrowingcontestation(DellaPorta2014;Hale2013).

Howevermostof the recent literature trying to integrateexternal effectsupon

authoritarianregimesfocusesontheforeignpoliciesinChinaandPutin’sRussia

orotherregionalpowers(Erdmannetal.2013,5;KoeselandBunce2013;Ba-

bayan2015; Isaac 2014;Tansey2016a, 141–142). Suchworks often rooted in

the fieldof internationalrelations focussolelyon intentionallypursuedforeign

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policy by regional powers or strong authoritarian states vis–a–vis fellowauto-

cratsor transitionalregimes.Theseworksthusattesta lotofagencytotheso-

called“blackknights”(Chou2016;Tolstrup2015;Bader,Grävingholt,andKäst-

ner2010;BurnellandSchlumberger2010;Tansey2016a):Regionalpowersand

theirintentiontopreventtransformationstowardsdemocracyintheirsphereof

influenceinordertoavoidspillovereffectsandinternalpressures.Whileworks

touch upon important questions of interference and the diffusion and alleged

promotionofalternativestotheWesternliberaldemocraticmodeltheyremain

focussed on the intentional influence of outsiders. Investigating such external

interferenceprimarilygearedtowardseithersupportingproxyregimesortran-

sition countries in order to support their transformation to democracy have a

longtraditionininternationalrelationsandstudiesoftransition.

Muchlessattentionhasbeengiventoexternalinfluencesthatchangethecalcu-

lus of authoritarian regimeswithout targeted involvement of external powers.

Treatingdomesticregimeelitespassivelydoesnotaccountforthevariousways

inwhichexternal factorscaneffectregimecalculationsandpractices(Weyland

2016,217).Asexternaldevelopments inothercountriescanalso influence the

perceptions of regime elites and through that influence their own calculations

simplybasedonobservation.

3. Beyondthestability-breakdownparadigm:Theimportanceofactorsfor

decision-makinginauthoritarianregimesduringcriticaljunctures

ContrarytomanystudiesinthefieldofauthoritarianismIamnotpredominantly

interestedinregimestabilityorsurvival.Startingfromamoreexplorativedepar-

turepoint theprimarygoalof thisresearch is todetectconditions for transna-

tional learningprocesses inauthoritarian regimeelites. I aim toexploreunder

whatconditionseliteperceptionsandcalculationschangeduringepisodesofpo-

liticalcontestation.Criticaljunctures,suchastheArabUprisings,the1848revo-

lutionsinEuropeorthediffusionofproteststhatinstigatedthefalloftheBerlin

wallanddissolutionofthesovietbloc,providesituationsinwhichhighlevelsof

contentionmakeexternal influencesmorevisibleandthusbecometangible for

the actors aswell as for the observer. Political contestation of the incumbents

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authority thus constitutes a scope condition for the analysis developed in this

paper. In the following paragraphs I will briefly outline the main conceptual

buildingblocs relevant for thispaperandrelate themto the literatureand the

onjectofauthoritarianregimesunderverticalpressure.

CriticalJunctures

I turn to the concept of critical junctures (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007; Soifer

2012)inordertoadaptfortheextraordinarycircumstancesfordecision-making

inCairoandRabatduringspring2011thatweremarkedbyahighuncertainty

and accelerated decision-making practices based on incomplete information.

Such conditions naturally amplify the importance of actors in decisionmaking

processes and allow for tracing regime elite perceptions andhow they shaped

regimeresponsegeared topersevere thestatusquodue toa limitedanalytical

timeframe.2

Critical juncturesdescribethoseseldommomentsinpolitical lifethatmarkthe

endof stable periods andopenpossibilities for significant institutional change

reconfiguringthebalanceofpowerandtherebyreshapingthepatternsofpoliti-

calinteractionforthefollowingyears(CapocciaandKelemen2007,348;Hogan

2006; Soifer 2012, 1574–1576;Merkel and Gerschewski 2012). In contexts of

authoritarian regimes under pressure, critical junctures mark the crossroads

that decide the faith of an incumbent authoritarian regime (Merkel and

Gerschewski2012).

Inthispaper,whichfocusesonverticalregimechallenges,suchepisodesemerge

out of disruptive and exceptional political contestation from below (McAdam,

Tarrow, andTilly 2001;Tilly andTarrow2006) inwhich the existingpolitical

orderisfundamentallychallenged.Suchsituationsbearthepossibilityoferoding

existingstructuresofauthoritythroughoneormorechallengersandarecharac-

terizedbystruggleofvariousactorstoinfluencethereconfigurationofpowerin

theirfavor,thuscreatingasituationofincreasedpoliticaluncertainty(Tillyand

Tarrow2006;Tarrow2015).Theendpointofacritical juncture, irrespectiveof

2Ashaveotheranalysisofregimereactionstothepopularuprisingsin2011(Slater2010;Lynch2014;Heydemann2013)

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its outcome (revolution or mere adaptation and reconfiguration) is defined

through a new stable equilibrium of authority (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007,

358).Duringcritical junctureswethusassumethatactorsareempoweredand

structural or institutional constraints –thoughnot irrelevant– canbe reshaped

andarehencelesseffectiveinshapingthebehaviorandstrategicchoicesofrele-

vantactors.Thisbringsustotherelevantactorsforthisstudythatthenetpara-

graphswillbrieflyintroduce.

PoliticalElites

Turningawayfrompredominantlystructuralanalysisoftransitionprocessesof

the Arab Uprisings and beyond I follow Ahmed and Capoccia’s (2014, 9) ap-

proaches “focus[ing] on the strategic interaction of key actors in fighting over

institutionalinnovations”.Thisopensthepossibilitytoinvestigatethestrategies

andinteractionofcrucialactors–inthiscasetheregimeelites–inthecontextof

acriticaljuncture(AsseburgandWimmen2016,5).

Asthispaperinvestigatesifandhowtransnationallearningwithinregimeelites

manifests and influences the strategic responseof incumbent authoritarian re-

gimesduringacritical juncturethatarisesinthecontextofregionallydiffusing

protests,themostrelevantgroupofactorsareindividualsfromthepoliticalelite

thatcanbeconsideredclosetotherespectiveincumbentregimes.

Formal positions in certain organizations or institutions are themost obvious

indicatorof belonging to this group.However there are also individualsnot in

formal positions that wield important influence on decisionmaking processes

andpreferenceformationwithinauthoritarianregimes,e.g.membersofthefam-

ilyor tribeof ahigh rankingofficial,businesselites,mediamogulsoropinion-

makers, thatareoftentimes leftoutofstudies investigatingregimebehavioror

perceptions(AsseburgandWimmen2016,5–6).

Startingfromthisbroadermulti-layeredandmulti-sectoralunderstandingofpo-

liticalelitesIidentifiedrelevantactorsandorganizationsbasedonthecaseliter-

aturesandexchangewithexpertsaswellasmembersofthepoliticalelitethem-

selvesaimedat talking toelites fromrelevantsectorsas illustrated in thecase

studies.

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Boundedrationalityanduncertainty

ReflectingontheroleofdiffusionduringtheArabUprisingsDellaPortaandTar-

rowaswellasHeydemannandLeendersarriveat theconclusionthat learning

mechanismsconstitutethemostimportanttypeofdiffusionamongauthoritarian

regimes (Heydemann and Leenders 2011, 649; Della Porta and Tarrow 2011,

140). Assuming that regime elites rely their strategic calculations facingmass

mobilizationonanassessmentbasedontheirownperceptions,eventsinneigh-

boringcountriesmayhavean impactupontheseand thusalter thechoices in-

cumbentregimesfacingprotestmake.However,duringcriticaljuncturesregime

eliteshavetotakedecisionsquicklyandunderincompleteinformationasevents

oftenunfoldwithinhours or days.Rational decisionmaking resting on awell-

informedassessments,assometimesexplicitlybutoftentimesalsoimplicitlyas-

sumed by recent approaches to the study of so-called authoritarian learning

(HeydemannandLeenders2011;2014;Vanderhill2012;BankandEdel2015)

mightthusoverrationalizechoicesbyregimeelitesunderpressure.

AsKurtWeylandhas shown inhis encompassingandcompellinghistorical ac-

counts of various phases of political contention for self-rule (Weyland 2007;

2005; 2010; 2014) the rationality of actors in critical junctures not excluding

elitesisbounded.Thecalculationsandthusthestrategicchoicesactorsmakeare

bounded by (1) their individual assessment of any given situation and (2) the

proceduresandinstitutionsthatstructurethepoliticaldecisionmakingprocess-

es(Weyland2014,48–49).Therapidspeedwithwhichtheprotestsacrossthe

MiddleEastandNorthAfricaspreadduring2011havemadewell-informeddeci-

sionmakingbyallactorsinvolvedevenmoreunlikely.Hastychoiceswithinthe

authoritarian elites, facing increasing pressure frommassmobilization can be

assumed tohavebeenespecially commonamongst the regimes firsthitby the

protests.

Takingthemicrolevelfoundationsofpoliticaldecisionmakingseriously,Iseek

outtograsptherationalofdecisionmakersinEgyptandMoroccoandtheimpact

oftheeventsintheneighborhoodontheirassessmentofthesituationduringthe

respective critical junctures in both countries during 2011. Through talking to

partsoftherelevantpoliticalelites inbothcountriesabouttheirassessmentof

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theunfolding events in theneighboring countries at the time allows a first in-

sightintohowtheseelitesmadesenseoftheeventsunfoldingaroundthem.This

enablesustoextractinhowfartheeventsinothercountriesinfluenceddomes-

ticdecisionmakingthroughchangingtheirperceptionsthroughdrawinganalo-

gies.

4. Linking the external to the domestic: Elite perceptions, transnational

authoritarianlearningandregimedecision-making

Inordertodevelopaframeworkthatmakesitpossibletolinkeliteperceptions

ofdevelopmentsinneighboringcountriestotheirpreferenceswhenitcomesto

takingmeasuresagainstdissentathomeIwillrelyoneliteperceptionsandtheir

understandingofeventsaroundthem.Eliteperceptionscruciallyinfluencedeci-

sion-makingprocessesinauthoritarianregimes,wereclosedcirclesoffewinflu-

entialindividualsandgroupscaninfluencepolicydecisionsintimesofcrisisor

emergingchallenges(KurtWeyland2014,13).Howauthoritarianelitesclassify

theeventsunfolding inothercountriesaround them impacts theirperceptions

andthusthemeasurestheyundertakedomestically.

WithregardstotheArabUprisings,HeydemannandLeenders(2014)observean

equivalenceof the learningprocessesbetweenprotesters and their incumbent

regimecounterparts:

“Justasthespreadofprotestswasitselftheproductofsociallearn-ingbyArabcitizens—awaveeffectfacilitatedbytherapiddiffusionofideas,discourses,andpracticesfromonecountrytoanotherandtheiradaptationtolocalcontexts—sotoowerethecounterrevolu-tionary strategies of regimes shaped by processes of learning anddiffusion among regime elites, especially among those where pro-testsbeganlaterinthesequenceofeventsthatconstitutetheArabawakening”(HeydemannandLeenders2014,2)

Authoritarian learning can thus be conceptualized as learning mechanisms,

whichtakeplacewithinauthoritarianregimesandtranslateintotheadaptation

ofideas,practices,framesorpoliciesbydecisionmakerswithintheregime.Fur-

thermorethesemechanismshavetobebasedonexperiencesinothercontextsor

the direct exchange of knowledge (Heydemann and Leenders 2011, 649–652;

2014). Turning to the dynamics of the Arab Uprisings in 2011, they conclude

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that, “[…]processesof authoritarian learningandadaptationamongremaining

authoritarianelitesintheArabWorld[…]hadpowerfuleffectsontheircalculus

oftheprobabilitiesofregimesurvival”(HeydemannandLeenders2011,652).

Howeverknowinglearninghappensdoesnotmeanweknowwhatdecisionswill

be taken.Whichmakes itmerely impossible to pin down certain policies as a

consequenceoflearningprocesseswithinauthoritarianelites.

If regimeelitesbecomemorealertduetounfoldingmobilizationandthediffu-

sionofprotestsacrosstheirregiontheymighthoweverjudgetheirownsituation

andtheriskposedbyanarisingdomesticchallengetotheirgriponpowerina

differentlight.Itishoweverdifficulttoapriorideterminetheconsequencesfor

regime actions. One would expect authoritarian ruling elites to engage in

preemptive regime-proofing activities and the coordinated preparation of re-

sponsestoescalatingcontestation.

Such learning canbe expected to bemost visible during critical junctures as a

consequence of regional upheavals and diffusing political contestation. It is in

suchepisodesthatregimesevenpubliclyrefertotheeventsintheirneighbour-

ingcountries.Authoritarian learningcabbeexpectedtobemore likely ifcoun-

tries are culturally similar,have comparableauthoritarian regime types, are in

the same region and traditionally display strong economic, social and political

ties (Levitsky and Way 2010, 43–45). Especially in regions such as the Arab

Worldthathaveacommonlanguageandmediaandareeconomicallyaswellas

politically interwoven the perception of what happens in the region is much

moreprominentthaninothers.

Yet direct forms of communication social interaction are no prerogative for

learningprocesses.Decisionmakersmayalsolearnfromsimpleobservation(e.g.

through media or reports) of political dynamics in other countries. Although

venues,suchasregionalinstitutions,summits,statevisitsandministerialmeet-

ingscanplayafacilitatingrole.Howeveritremainsdifficulttoproveacausallink

betweencertainmeetingsorgeographicproximityandregimeresponsestopro-

testsoneithersideoftheboarder.

Thus investigating learning processes through assessing the perceptions of

members of authoritarian elites is a possibility to move beyond speculation

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aboutcongruenceandcorrelation.Itassumesthattheirperceptionsandtheim-

pressionsofeventsinneighbouringcountrieschangetheelitecalculationsabout

howtodealwithprotestswhentheyposeachallengetothemselves.

Focussing on perceptions furthermore allows disentangling the oftentimes ho-

mogeneouslytreatedrulingelite.Throughinterviewswithvaryingpoliticalfrac-

tionsandgroupsinEgyptandMoroccovaryingassessmentsofdifferentrelevant

actorscometotheforeandallowusnotonlyanunderstandingofhowlearning

processes fed into the estimation of their domestic situation but also into the

crucialdomesticdecisionmakingprocesses.

TherecenteventsoftheArabUprisingsandthefollowingautocraticrestoration

provides a template for further investigating external effects on authoritarian

politics in timesofcontestation. In the followingpartof thispaper Iwill intro-

duce my methodological approach and present some preliminary illustrative

casestudiesofMoroccoandEgyptduring2011.

5. FieldworkandInterviews

ToinvestigatetheroleoftransnationallearningprocesseswithinregimeelitesI

relyonsemi-structuredeliteinterviews,conductedinMoroccoandEgyptduring

2015and2016.Theperceptionsofeventsanddevelopmentsinothercountries

conveystheresearcher ifandinhowfarsuchobservationsactuallyaltereddo-

mesticdecision-makingprocess.

TheconditionsforeliteinterviewsinEgyptandMoroccodiffergreatly.InEgypt

thepoliticalsituationafterthe2013coupagainstMohammedMursiischaracter-

izedbyanunprecedentedextendofstaterepressionagainstanyonewhomight

beperceivedathreattothecurrentregime.Thiscreatesfearamongstlargeparts

ofsocietytotalkaboutpolitics.Thisfearisnotonlyrelevantwhenspeakingto

formerorcurrentactivistsandoppositionfiguresbutalsoamongstformerand

currentelites.During the first fieldworkphase inEgyptmanypeoplewereun-

willingtotalkaboutpoliticsingeneral.Itriedtoapproachpotentialinterviewees

throughreferringtotheeventsof2011inordertosignalthatIwasnotprimarily

interested inthecurrentdynamicsandentitledmyrequests for theirexpertise

13

insteadoftheiraccount.

Generallymyinterviewscanbesubsumedaseliteandactorinterviews.Thedata

and collected thus canbe classified as account evidence. The interviewees can

roughly be divided into three groups. The first group comprises experts from

thinktanks,universitiesorfoundationswithaprofoundknowledgeofthepoliti-

calsituationanddevelopment inthegivencountry.These interviewsprimarily

served threepurposes.Firstly,a fruitfulacademicexchangeaboutmyresearch

projects. Secondly, gaining important insights into the practices and norms of

elite interviews and contacting decision-makers. Thirdly, thesemeetings were

used to ask forprimary interviewee contacts thatwouldbe relevant tomy re-

searchandotherscholarsthatworkonsimilarissues.

Thesecondgroup is themain target formy interviewsandconsistsofgovern-

mentandpartyofficials(currentaswellasformer)andbureaucratswithanin-

sight intopoliticaldecisionmakingprocesses.These interviewsarethecorner-

stoneofmydissertationsempiricalsectionastheyprovidethefirstcollectionof

primaryinterviewswithdecisionmakersinthetwocountriesabouttheepisode

ofpopularcontestationin2011.

Relevantparliamentariansor functionariesof regime-affiliatedparties (suchas

theNDPinEgyptorthePAM,IstiqlalorRNIinMorocco)areamongstinterview-

eesaswellasofficialsinrelevantministries,membersofthesecurityapparatus

orpoliticalconsultantsandexperts.However–asstatedabove–crucialdecision

makersandpolicymakersinEgyptandMoroccoarenoteasilyidentified.Ihad

to relyona combinationofexpertknowledge, fewcasestudiesandreferences

within the elite network gathered in the context of the interviews in order to

identifyrelevantinterviewees.

Thethirdgroupof intervieweesIhavelabeledasNGOsandactivists.Interview

partnersinthiscategoryformakindofcontrolgrouptothepreviousone.Iam

particularly interested if they experienced any chances in the incumbent gov-

ernments approach todealingwith theprotestsduring2011 inpolitical terms

butalsothroughtheirexecutivessuchasthepolice. If thedescriptionsofwhat

happenedandhowdifferentstrategiesofofficialswereemployedandthechang-

14

es detected by the opposition activists and NGOs aiding them add up this in-

creasesconfidenceinthefindings.

Overall I conducted 64 interviews in both countries.Due to the described dis-

crepancyofaccesstointervieweesadifferenceinquantityofinterviewsislikely

inevitable. The interviews were conducted in English (primarily in Egypt), in

French(inMorocco)andfewinArabicwithatranslator(inbothcountries).

Table1interviewssummary

Category Egypt Morocco TotalExperts&academics 4 8 12

Governmentofficials,Partyleaders&bureaucrats

18 20 38

Activists,Media&NGOs 6 8 14

Total 28 36 64

Mostrecentstudiesof thecritical juncturesacross theArabWorld in2011ex-

plained the stability of authoritarian regimes with reference to differences in

domestic conditions such as political or socio-economic structures or different

actorconstellations(JosuaandEdel2014;Tétreault2011;YomandGause2012;

Volpi2013;Barany2011;2013;Lust2011).

To the best of my knowledge – besides the mentioned contributions by Hey-

demann and Leenders (2011, 2014) – no empirical studies on learningwithin

authoritarianregimeshavebeenconducted.Investigatingtherecentprotestsin

MoroccoandEgyptduring thecritical junctures inearly2011,allowsus toap-

proximatehowtransnational learningaltered the incumbentregimeelitesper-

ceptionsandinformedtheirrespectivepolicyresponsetotheprotests.

The centralproblemof in-depthelite interviews in the contextof critical junc-

turesliesinex-postrationalizationandbiasesbytheinterviewees.Theytendto

overplay(andat times justifyorevenglorify) theirownroleanddownplay in-

ternational influences and the role of other (especially disliked) domestic ac-

tors.3

3seealso:Weyland2014,23

15

6. Moroccoduring2011

--Missing:introductiontotheMoroccanelitecompositionpriorto2011--

Thissectionisafirstaccountoftheinterviewsconductedduringthefieldworkin

Moroccoduringtheperiodof2013-2016.4Tracingtheeffectsoflearningonpol-

icyresponsetotheproteststhatappearedin2011throughassessingthepercep-

tions of authoritarian elites should give us a hunch on what assessments of

events abroad actually fed into the decision-making processes in Morocco re-

sponsetotheprotests.

Morocco is widely acknowledged as an authoritarian regime (Willis 2012;

Benchemsi 2012; Barwig 2012; Hoffmann and König 2013). Despite itsmulti-

partyparliamentthekingreinsoverallcrucialpolicyfieldsthroughappointing

thekeyministersashepleases.Furthermoreheisthechiefofallsecurityforces

andcandissolveparliamentatanytime(Benchemsi2012).Theregime,whichis

oftentimesrefereedtoastheMakhzen5,encompassesthekingandhisadvisors

4MostinterviewswereheldinthecitiesofRabat,MarrakechandCasablanca5InDerija(Moroccandialect),Makhzenmeansstoragehouse.Historicallyitwasusedtodescribethepalacequarterswheregoodsofferedtoorexpropriatedbythesultan’srepresentativewerestored.NowadaystheMakhzenisusedtodescribetherulingeliteoftheMorocco,apatronagenetworkofandallegiance-basedrelationshipsbuiltaroundthepalace.Itincludestheofficialgovernmentinstitutionsanditspersonnel,suchastheroyalcourt,theroyalsecurityforcesandtheministryforreligiousaffairs,butalsoinformalstructuressuchastheking’sadvisors,thepal-ace’sshadowcabinetandmultiplebusinessesthatareownedbythepalaceanditsassociates.

Figure1:PreliminaryActorMappingMoroccoin2011

16

oftenreferredtoastheshadowcabinet,theheadsofthesecurityforces,political

partyleadersandbusinesselitecircles.

OnFebruary20th2011thefirstprotestersinMoroccotooktothestreetstoex-

presstheirgrievancesanddemands.Despiteconflictovertheroleofthepalace

the oppositionmovement also challenged the role of the king through putting

forwardaproposaltolimitthecompetenciesofthemonarchandtransitiontoa

Europeanmodelofparliamentarymonarchy.Theso-called20thFebruarymove-

mentmobilized up to 600,000 people across 40 cities and towns all over the

countryinthefollowingweeks.

ThemajorityoftheinterviewpartnersinMoroccohavestatedthatthereaction

bytheKingwasstronglyinfluencedbytheeventsintheregionalneighborhood

andthatthepalace’spre-emptivecountermanoeuvringwascrucialtoregaining

controlofthesituation(HoffmannandKönig2013;Benchemsi2012,56).

“He[theKing]sawwhathappenedinTunisia.HesawwhathappenedinLibyaandEgypt.Hefeltthatitwasnottheveryidealthingtobeviolentwithmassdemonstrations.Iwillofferthemareform.”6

“The King and his commission reacted so fast, because they wereafraidaftertheysawwhathappenedinTunisiaandinEgypt.”7

--Missing:Morecitationsbygovernmentofficials,partiesandsecurityapparatus--

ThetimingoftheprotestsinMorocco–aftertheevictionsofBen-AliandMubar-

ak–gavetheregimeaheadstartcomparedtoother incumbentregimes inthe

region thatwerehit firstby theprotests. Itgave thepalaceandother relevant

partsoftheMoroccanelitethetimetoadjusttheirassessmentandthustakethe

protestsmoreserious.Basedontheobservationofunfoldingproteststhrough-

out theregionand thewarningsignals through theexperiencesof fellowauto-

cratsinCairoandTunistheregimerecognizedthattheyhadtoactquicklyinor-

dertomaintaintheirgriponpower.

In contrast toother regimes thatwere also struck laterby theprotest suchas

Syria,YemenorBahrain,MohammedVIdecidedtonotfallbackonacoercivere-

6Journalistand20thFebruarymovementinterview0037HumanrightsactivistInterview005

17

pression strategy. Instead the regime fell back to the established repertoire of

response to contestationand initiatedamixof cooptation, targeted repression

and initiated a constitutional reform from above (Bank 2012; Joffé 2009). The

reformprocessinitiatedbytheKing’sspeechonthe9thofMarchwasseemingly

openanddemocraticalthoughthepalacekeptatightgripontheconstitutional

reformprocess andensured the resultwouldnot threaten itshegemonicposi-

tioninMoroccanpoliticsandeconomy(Saliba2016;Benchemsi2012).

Themonarchymanagedtoregaincontroloverthepathwaysofpoliticalcontes-

tationbychannellingthedemandsintoformalnon-revolutionarypoliticalchan-

nels (Volpi 2013, 1).Activists, analysts and regime-affiliated actors alike,men-

tionedduringtheinterviewsthattheresponsetotheprotestswasfasterandin

many respects more compelling than expected (Perthes 2011, 118). Most im-

portantly the Makhzen reacted very swiftly to the growing protests, with the

seminal speechby thekingbroadcasted just17daysafter the firstprotestson

the8thofMarch. Inanumberof interviews,oppositionactivistsaswellasana-

lystsremarkedontheimportanceofthequickrhetoricalresponse,pronouncing

reformsandresponsivenesstotheprotestersdemands.

“Thereactionbytheregimewasveryquick.”8

“ThereactionbytheKingwasveryfastjustafewdaysafterthefirstprotests.”9

“Theprocessofgenerallargedemonstrationswasstoppedthroughthatreaction.”10

“Ithinkthattheregimereactedquicklywiththerevisionoftheconstitutiontore-calibratethepowerandIthinkthatthisprocessofrevisioncontributedtoatransi-tionthatcalmeddownthespiritsinMoroccothatwedidnothaveproblems.”11

--Missing:Morecitationsbygovernmentofficials,partiesandsecurityapparatus--

Thequickresponsebythepalace,promisingapathtoreformthatwouldensure

thegrievancesandthedemandsoftheprotesterswereconsidered,hadimmense

signallingpower.Byputtingthepalaceintheroleofthemediator,thekingwas

8Activist20thFebruarymovementInterview0099Activist20thFebruarymovementInterview00810MinistryofWorkandSocialAffairsInterview00711ProfofLawatAgdalUniversityInterview006

18

abletocircumventfurthermobilizationagainstthepalaceandatthesametime

includeseveralcrucialactorsintothecalculatedreformefforts.

Aftertheinitialregimereactionthemonarchykeptatightcontrolofthereform

process through appointing themembers of the committee and decreeing the

rulesfortheconstitutionalprocess.Notonlywasthespeedoftheresponsecru-

cial,thestrategictwistofdelegitimizingtheoppositionbyestablishingareform

process,whichwasanimportantsignaltowardsMoroccansthatthepalacehad

understoodtheirlegitimatedemands.

The20thFebruarymovement,whichdecidedtoboycottthereformprocessearly

on, faceddecreasing support from thepopulationdue to the lackof a credible

alternative to the reformplanof the regime.Byputting thepalace at the fore-

frontofthereformeffortstheregimenotonlyrelegitimizeditselfasaresponsive

initiatorofareformprocess,butbythesametoken,itneutralizedtheopposition

movementasanactorforchange:“ThemovesbyMorocco’sKingMohammedVI,

for instance, to offer limited but significant constitutional reforms seemed de-

signedtopre-emptmassprotests,whichmightotherwisehavebuiltupmomen-

tumastheydidinEgyptandTunisia”(HeydemannandLeenders2014,9).

Theseminalspeechfromthe9thofMarch2011andestablishmentofthecommit-

tee on the revision of the constitution brought the king back into the driver’s

seat.Oneof the interviewedactivists called this somewhatboldmove “[…] the

reoccupation of the opposition movement.”12Ultimately, the kings’ response,

tookthewindoutofthesailsoftheoppositionmovement.Anotheractivistputit

morebluntly:

“Ithinkthattheregimereactedquicklywiththerevisionofthecon-stitutiontorecalibratethepowerandIthinkthatthisprocessofrevi-sioncontributedtoatransitionthatcalmeddownthespiritsandthetrajectoriesinMoroccothatwedidnothaveproblems.Butitwasnottheconstitutionthatallowedthat[…]”13

--Missing:Morecitationsbygovernmentofficials,partiesandsecurityapparatus--

12ATTACactivistInterview00213LawProfessorInterview006

19

MaincrossgroupreferencesfrominterviewsconductedinMorocco:

• Eventsunfoldedrapidly in2011.Protests inwereunprecedented in the

eraofKingMohammedVI.

• Inthebeginningtheprotestswereseenasisolatedeventsthatwouldnot

affectMoroccobutovertimewithmorecountriesbeingaffectedthrough-

out theregion thisperceptionchanged(especiallyafterprotests swiped

awayMubarakanddiffusedintoBahrain).

• KingMohammedVI.camebackearlyfromsummerholidaysinFranceas

protests started in Morocco and an informal emergency council at the

palacewasformed(consistingofadvisorsandtrusteesoftheking).

• Protestsinothercountriesservedasapre-warningforMoroccothatwas

laterhitbymassmobilization.

• Plantoactswiftly,offeringpoliticalreformsasasignaltothesubjectsin

ordertoneutralizethecapacityothechallengerstomobilize.

• Spreading violence and instability across the region also contributed to

lesspeopleparticipatinginprotestsfromMarchonwards(Libyainterven-

tion,violenceincreasinginEgypt,SyriaandBahrainandYemen).

7. Egyptduring2011

--Missing:introductiontotheEgyptianelitecompositionpriorto2011--

--Missing:Egyptcasestudywillbeinsertedhere—

--Missing:QuotesbyregimeeliteandoppositionactorsfromEgypt--

20

8. Conclusion

This paper set out to explore howelite perceptionsduring theArabUprisings

mighthaveledtoanadaptationofstrategiccalculationsthatcouldbesubsumed

astransnationallearningwithinauthoritarianregimes.

--Missing:SummaryofMoroccoandEgyptcasestudies--

Inordertoincreasethevarietyandscopeoftheempiricalmaterialsupplemen-

tary methods and data sources will be turned to. In addition to more semi-

structured interviews with relevant actors, I will also include press releases,

speechesandstatementsintotheanalysisinfurtherversionsofthispaper.

Generally, thispaperpleasfor furtherresearchtospecifythemechanisms,are-

nas and actors throughwhich external processes influence authoritarian deci-

sion-making.Connectingthedotsfromtheexternalenvironmentofauthoritari-

an regimes’ to the much too often autarkical conceptualized authoritarian re-

gimesthroughlookingintomechanismsofauthoritarianlearning.

21

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