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The Ideology of the Machine and the Spirit of the Factory: Remarx on Babbage and Ure

Author(s): Andrew ZimmermanSource: Cultural Critique, No. 37 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 5-29Published by: University of Minnesota PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1354539

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The Ideology of the Machine and the Spiritof theFactory:Remarx on Babbageand Ure

AndrewZimmerman

Tf, as historians have recently argued, the industrial revolutionhappened both later and more slowly than has previously beenassumed, then we cannot explain early political economic textscommenting on this industrial revolution merely as ideological dis-tortions of economic reality.' Indeed, our very understanding ofideology has largely been inspired by a tradition beginning withMarx's reading, especially in Capital,of classical political economyas an apologetic distortion of a historically real industrial revolu-tion. Thus, I see a need for a return to two of the texts Marx criti-cizes in Capital,Charles Babbage's On theEconomyof MachineryandManufactures(1832) and Andrew Ure's Philosophyof Manufactures(1835). By way of this return, I reopen their cases in light of whatwe now know to have been the case-that the all-encompassingsystem of industrial manufacture that Babbage and Ure allegedlyjustified and that Marx took to be real in fact probably did notexist at the time of their apologies. In this article, I want first todecouple Babbage's and Ure's texts from the section of reality theyclaim to represent (mechanized factories specifically and capitalist? 1997 by CulturalCritique.Fall 1997. 0882-4371/97/$5.00.

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production generally) and then to suggest ways in which one mightrecouple them with a historical reality to which they belong.2 Byrereading these texts, and by reopening the question of their rela-tion to the history of capitalism, I hope to shed light both on ourunderstanding of machinofacture and on the practice of dialecticalmaterialist ideology critique.I focus on Babbage and Ure because they, unlike other politi-cal economists in early-nineteenth-century Britain, center theirtheorizing of capitalism on an understanding of machinofacture.3Classical political economy generally did not focus on factories andindustrial production, but rather, as Keith Tribe has shown, on theproduction and distribution of grain. Babbage and Ure themselvesboth possessed wide expertise in industrial technology and manu-facture. Babbage (1791-1871), a professor of mathematics at Cam-bridge, was particularly interested in machines and is rememberedas the inventor of a calculating engine, a kind of proto-computer.Ure (1778-1857) was an industrial chemist and the author of awell-known dictionary of chemistry. Their insistence that mecha-nized industrial production, rather than the grain market, formedthe central phenomenon of the economy can thus be read as partof an attempt to make their expertise appear more essential toBritain's economic future than it might otherwise have seemed.However, my interest in Babbage and Ure is not biographical butrather ideological. Their texts seem to be the first, and certainlythe most widely received, political economic theories that repre-sent capitalist relations of production in the context of mechanizedindustrial factories. The biographical background for this shiftseems less interesting than its consequences for both capitalist ide-ology and the critique of ideology.To assert that Babbage and Ure were simply the first to noticethe results of the first industrial revolution would blind one to theconstructive work of these two writers. It is not clear precisely howindustrialized Britain was in the 1830s, or even exactly how onewould measure "industrialization." However, indicators such as thenumber of steam engines in various cities or estimations of the per-centage of capital bound up in machines support the view thatwhat we would today recognize as machinofacture played only asmall role in British capitalism at that time. This does not mean,however, that what we today might identify as factories did not


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exist in the early nineteenth century. As both Berg and Braudelhave shown, the concentration of parts of certain production pro-cesses under a single roof, and even the introduction of machinery,had already existed for several centuries. Indeed, the meaning ofthe word "factory"remained as heterogeneous as the factory's realrole in commodity production before Babbage's and Ure's system-atic theories of machinofacture. Before Babbage and Ure, the term"factory" more commonly referred to a warehouse or a tradingoutpost than to a building containing machines for the productionof commodities, although both meanings of the term can be tracedback to the seventeenth century (OED). It seems likely that the un-derstanding of the factory as a warehouse preceded the under-standing of the factory as a center of machinofacture, since theterm "factory"relates to the person of the "factor,"a merchant act-ing on behalf of another party. One originally referred to a centerof production as a "manufactory,"which perhaps facilitated thenineteenth-century slip to the word "factory."However, this trans-formation also parallels a discursive shift in political economy froma focus on circulation to a focus on machinofacture, and shouldnot be dismissed as a mere contraction. Babbage and Ure redefinethe term "factory" while preserving its position in the center ofpolitical economic discourse. They thus radically transform politi-cal economy by centering it on a factory understood not as a centerfor the circulation of grain but rather a center for the mechanizedproduction of commodities.

Babbage and Ure construct not merely a political economictheory of machines, but also an ontology,an understanding of real-ity prior to machines, humans, and the economy, and, indeed,prior to both history and nature. I understand "ontology" in themost literal sense of that term: speaking (logos,from legein) aboutBeing (ontos). To speak is to legislate (both from legein), and all-logies are, therefore, political arguments. I use the concept of on-tology because Babbage's and Ure's texts do far more than merelyjustify a cruel and exploitative system of production. They also,more importantly, reconceive the mechanical as a political-onto-logical category prior to historical and economic reality. My at-tempt to understand the mechanical ontologically will, I hope,more thoroughly carry out the kind of historicizing that led Hei-degger to the concept of "enframing" in his lecture "The Question


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Concerning Technology." While the approach I take to Babbage'sand Ure's texts is partly inspired by some of Heidegger's questions,especially his insight that "the essence of the technical is by nomeans itself technical" (287), I do not want to ask what the "es-sence" of technology is, but rather how it is that we have come tothink technology has an essence at all.It is particularly important to foreground the ontological as-pect of Babbage's and Ure's texts because it is here that their mostimportant ideological move is made. Conventionally, ideology criti-cism has focused on discovering concealed relations to the eco-nomic base in apparently apolitical texts. Political economic texts,by contrast, presuppose an explicit relation to the economic base:their ideological effectivity is predicated on an overt relation to thebase. The claims of political economic texts to refer to the worldare, thus, of special interest to the critic of political economy. Bab-bage's and Ure's texts reveal this ontological claim with particularclarity because they found a novel ontology, centered on the ma-chine. The inventiveness of Babbage's and Ure's arguments canonly be understood, however, when their ostensible referentialityto any external real condition is first bracketed out. To thematizethe ontological claims of these texts thus requires separating theeconomic base and the ideological superstructure. Though ulti-mately unknowable apart from its representations, historical real-ity must necessarily be regarded as separate from its representa-tions. Not to separate the two would be to reify, and indeed to blindoneself to, both the superstructural nature of ontology and the on-tological nature of the superstructure. Separating base and super-structure allows me to historicize the texts at a more fundamentallevel than that of the explicit claims they make about the world.This separation allows me to comprehend the historical specificityof the construal of the world in the texts and the texts own con-strual of their relation to that world. I will begin my account bypresenting the ontological projects of Babbage and Ure.

Babbage and Ure center their representations of the factoryon representations of machinery; for both, the machine is a meansof disciplining labor, and the factory an assemblage of such ma-chines. They respectively advocated the mechanized factory as asite of production because machinery disciplines human labor.


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Babbage writes: "One great advantage which we may derive frommachinery is from the check which it affords against the inatten-tion, the idleness, or the dishonesty of human agents" (Economy54). Because machines work regularly and without human vicesand weaknesses, humans attached to machines in the labor processwill also have to work regularly and without their usual vices andweaknesses. Machinery, for Babbage, is a "check" on humans; itsets limits to the variety of human actions, which Babbage believesdisrupt production. For Ure, on the other hand, machines do notmerely limit the role of human labor in controlling the productionprocess, but actually reverse the relations of control betweenworker and the productive apparatus. Instead of skilled workersdirecting machines and thus controlling the processes of produc-tion, the mechanized factory directs workers. Ure characterizes in-dustrial production as follows: "every process peculiarly nice, andtherefore liable to injury from the ignorance and waywardness ofworkmen, is withdrawn from handicraft control, and placed underthe guidance of self-acting machinery" (Philosophyx). In this pas-sage, Ure does not so much imagine labor being displaced by ma-chines as he imagines labor integrated into a mechanized factoryand, thus, unable to disrupt factory production. The key terms ofthis argument are controland guidance. Certainly machines displacethe handicraftworker, but this person is then reconstituted as thefactoryworker, a subject differing from the former primarily in itsrelation to the controlof production, not in the extent of its partici-pation in production. For both Babbage and Ure, the factory limitsthe autonomy of workers-in Babbage's case as a "check,"in Ure'sas "guidance." Neither author imagines a factory that runs withoutlabor, but rather one in which human labor is placed under me-chanical control.A more familiar argument for the introduction of machineryinto the production process rests on the greater productivity ofmachinery. Adam Smith, for example, argued that machines "facil-itate and abridge labour" (Smith 7). Neither Babbage nor Urechose to ignore the labor-saving potential of machines, for this as-pect of machinofacture actually presents a problem for their visionof machines disciplining workers. If machines increase the produc-tivity of workers, then workers spend increasingly less time underthe disciplinary force of machinery. Mechanized factory labor


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tends to make itself obsolete, assuming a steady demand for, anda steady value of, goods. The problem of discipline becomes cen-tered on leisure rather than labor to the extent that labor can pro-duce enough leisure to make itself mostly obsolete. Both Babbageand Ure solve this problem of increasing leisure by following Ri-cardo in assuming that the value of a commodity does not inherein the good itself, but rather depends on the labor necessary toproduce it (Babbage, Economy147-48, 160-61, 163-68; Ure, Phi-losophy433ff). This theory of value means that laborers must alwayswork the same amount of time no matter how efficient productionbecomes, because the less they have to work to produce a good,the less that good is worth, and the less they are paid for it. Sinceboth Babbage and Ure assume an elastic demand for goods, aworker's tasks can never be completed. Machinery reduces theamount of work necessary to produce a given commodity, thus re-ducing the price of that commodity, which means that demand in-creases: instead of labor fulfilling a need and then being complete,need itself continually expands. Babbage writes that even if a ma-chine saved half-an-hour's work, the worker would not gain a halfhour of leisure, but instead would use the half hour to fulfill apreviously unfulfilled demand:

He who hashabituallyworked ten hoursa day,willemploythehalf hour savedby the new machinein gratifyingsome otherwant; and as each new machine adds to these gratifications,new luxurieswillopen to his view,which continuedenjoymentwillas surelyrendernecessaryto his happiness.(Economy35)

Even if demand for a commodity were somehow finally satisfied, anew demand would arise, so that labor still would gain no leisure.Because demand can never be satisfied, work can never end. BothBabbage's and Ure's political economies tend towards the total in-duction of the human into a mechanized labor process.Babbage imagines the factory as a way to organize skilledhu-man labor. Babbage's most famous contribution to economic the-ory is his addition of a concept of skill levels to Adam Smith's analy-sis of the division of labor. In The Wealthof Nations, Smith arguesthat the division of labor speeds up production because each stepof the process is carried out by a worker specializing in that partic-


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ular step, and because workers need not shift activities after com-pleting each step. Thus, for Smith, the division of labor actuallybrings about an intensificationof skill in the production process. ForBabbage, the division of labor also allows each task to be dividedup into subtasks that require different levels of skill, so that noone labors beneath his or her level of skill. When labor is dividedaccording to skill levels, a factory owner need not pay skilled labor-ers for tasks that less skilled laborers will complete for a lower wage(Economy169-210; Passages436-37). Babbage sees in the divisionof labor the possibility of an inclusive distributionof skill that incor-porates all varieties of workers into the factory, and by doing soreduces the costs of production. For Babbage, then, the factoryis primarily a way of organizing and disciplining variously skilledhuman laborers.Ure's notion of the role of skill in the factory represents amore radical break from previous political economy than Bab-bage's does. Ure applauds mechanical factories for excluding hu-man skill from manufacturing. He refers to the Babbage principleof the division of labor according to skill as "scholastic dogma"(Philosophy23). A "factory,"for Ure, consists of an assemblage ofself-acting machines, only tended by human workers:

The term Factory,n technology,designatesthe combinedop-eration of many orders of work-people,adult and young, intending with assiduousskill a systemof productivemachinescontinuously mpelledbya centralpower.... [T]histitle, in itsstrictestsense,involvesthe idea of a vastautomaton,composedof various mechanical and intellectualorgans ... all of thembeing subordinatedto a self-regulatedmovingforce. (Philoso-phy13-14)

Although Ure does use the word "skill"in this passage, he uses itto refer not to a particular productive skill, but rather to a compe-tence at machine-tending. The factory, for Ure, is not an organiza-tion of productive humans disciplined by machines, as it is for Bab-bage, but rather a "self-regulating automaton" merely tended byhumans. For Ure, the factory does not involve the division of laborso much as the coupling of labor with "a peculiar mechanism, soself-regulating, that a child may superintend it" (19). Ure does notadvocate this system on the basis of its greater productivity, but

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rather because it deskills workers, and, in what is perhaps Ure'smost famous phrase, "the more skillful the workman, the moreself-willed and intractable he is apt to become" (20).Ure makes this connection between automation and the disci-pline of humans most explicitly in his description of the effect ofthe introduction of the self-acting mule on striking textile workers.Ure describes this "spinning automaton" as

a machine apparently nstinct with the thought, feeling, andtact of the experienced workman-which even in its infancydisplayeda new principle of regulation, ready in its maturestate to fulfill the functions of a finished spinner.Thus, theIronMan,as the operativesfitlycall it, sprungout of the handsof our modern Prometheus[Ure is referringhere to an engi-neer who improvedthe spinningmule] at the biddingof Min-erva-a creation destined to restore orderamongthe industri-ous classes,and to confirm to GreatBritainthe empire of art.The news of this Herculean prodigy spread dismay throughthe Union, and even long before it left its cradle, so to speak,it strangledthe Hydraof misrule.(Philosophy67)

That the self-acting mule can actually spin seems secondary to itsability to "restore order among the industrious classes." Ure notesonly that the machine can "fulfill the functions of a finished spin-ner," rather than that, as one might expect, it can produce moreor better goods. He attributes human qualities to the machine-"thought," "feeling,""tact,""infancy,"and maturity-and its virtuelies partially in the accuracy of its simulation of the human. Urerefers specifically to Mary Shelley's Frankenstein,using the subtitleof that work, the "modern Prometheus," to describe the inventorof the self-acting mule. Apparently Ure did not read Frankensteinas a warning against natural philosophical or political hubris.Rather, in the mechanical construction of a human body, he sees ameans of subjugating real humans.

Ure may have read Shelley's novel with particular interest,for he himself had conducted experiments similar to those of Dr.Frankenstein. In November 1818, the year Frankensteinwas pub-lished, Ure tested the effects of electricity on the corpse of a manexecuted for murder. While the effects of electricity on various or-ganisms had been tested long before these experiments, Ure's own


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electrical studies shed light on his views of the human and the ma-chine. Ure conducted four experiments in which he exposed vari-ous nerves of a cadaver to electricity from a "voltaic pile" or "gal-vanic experiment," which today we would identify as a battery. Inone of these experiments, a facial nerve of the cadaver was exposedto electricity, at which point "every muscle in his countenance wassimultaneously thrown into fearful action; rage, horror, despair,anguish, and ghastly smiles, united their hideous expression in themurderer's face" ("AnAccount" 290). Ure describes this electricalmanipulation of facial muscles as if it were the mechanical opera-tion of human emotions, perhaps the most direct expressions ofthe human will. Ure's experiments seem to demonstrate that emo-tional and even physical life operate according to natural philo-sophical and mechanical principles. During another experiment,Ure used electricity to induce "full, nay, laborious breathing" inthe cadaver and, he speculates, had the cadaver not been so dam-aged in the course of the experiments, "there is a probability thatlife might have been restored" (292). Ure concludes his descriptionof these experiments by suggesting that "a udiciously directed gal-vanic experiment" might be able to restore those suffering from"cases of death-like lethargy, or suspended animation, from diseaseand accidents" (292-93). Humans, like other machines, can be op-erated and repaired, and perhaps even built, by engineers.Ure describes industrial machinery not as arising from theimprovement of tools or from the division of labor, but rather asthe application of the principles of automata to the production ofcommodities (Philosophy9-12). The mechanical human, the au-tomaton, provides a model that allows Ure to speak of humans,machines, and factories as ontologically similar, as uniformly me-chanical. In the first pages of ThePhilosophyof Manufactures,Ureadmiringly describes various automatons, concentrating especiallyon a mechanical duck built by Jacques de Vaucanson, the famouseighteenth-century French automaton maker. According to Ure,the duck "not only imitated the different movements of this ani-mal . . . but also represented faithfully the structure of the internalviscera for the digestion of food." Apparently the duck could eatand digest grain, which was "finally subjected to excrementiousactions" (10-11).4 The defecating duck is as important to Ure'saccount as the self-acting mule. Ure represents "excrementious


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actions" as mechanically reproducible, so that, like all labor, thelabor of the bowels can be subjected to "the system of decomposinga process into its constituents, and embodying each part in an au-tomatic machine" (22). This mechanist vision of the body extendsthe seventeenth- and eighteenth-century mechanistic visions of,for example, Descartes, Hobbes, and La Mettrie by grasping thebody not merely theoretically as a machine but also practically, asa mechanically manipulatable machine. Ure secularizes "l'Hommemachine" to a greater extent than even La Mettrie: humans, forUre, do not merely resemblemachines; they can be constructed andoperated like machines. Ure's is a mechanical universe, but oneconstructed by humans, not by God.For Ure, not only does the machine serve as a model for themechanized human body, but the human body also serves as amodel for the machine. In several places in ThePhilosophy fManu-factures, Ure develops detailed anatomical images to describe theworkings of a machine:

the main-shafting,and wheel-gearing[of a mechanized mill]... are, in fact, the grand nerves and arteries which transmitvitalityand volition,so to speak,with due steadiness,delicacy,and speed, to the automaticorgans.Hence, if theybe ill-madeor ill-distributed,nothing can go well, as happens to a manlabouringunder aneurismaland nervous affections.(32)For Ure, both the human body and the mechanized factory can becomprehended as a great automaton. Elsewhere in the book, Uredescribes the entire manufacturing economy as a biological body,complete with "the muscular, the nervous, and the sanguiferoussystems" (55). In this automatic body, there appears a unity of hu-mans and machines that was not, in fact, at all apparent in thecontemporary economy, even by Ure's own account. By reconsti-tuting both the human body and productive machines as a singleautomaton, Ure imagines a monologically organized society, freefrom class and other social conflicts.

Babbage is not as concerned as Ure to reconstitute humansas machines, since for Babbage, humans, and indeed the entireuniverse, are already machine-like, in that they are calculable andsubject to rules. In his unofficial NinthBridgewaterTreatise,Babbage


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proposesa naturaltheology particularlysuited to his understand-ing of humans and machines. In that work, he argues that abso-lutely regular laws govern the world, although humans have notyet comprehended these highest laws. In addition, Babbagecon-tends that apparent discontinuitiesin the world are in fact "thenecessaryonsequencesof somefarhigherlaw" hanthe known nat-ural laws (43). Babbagesuggests that even supposed miraclesarenot "deviations romthe lawsassignedby theAlmightyfor the gov-ernment of matter and of mind"but rather are "the exact fulfill-ment of much more extensive lawsthan those we suppose to exist"(92). ForBabbage,the calculabilityand the mechanicalqualityofboth humans and machines are merely instances of the calculabil-ity and the mechanical quality of the universe itself.5Babbage'smost famousproject,his attemptto build a "calcu-lating engine,"relied on such a conception of the calculableandrule-governednature of reality.Babbagehoped this engine wouldmechanicallyproduceand printlogarithmicand other mathemati-cal tables(used at the time, for example, in navigation,astronomy,and surveying).Mechanizingthis production processwould, Bab-bage hoped, prevent the large number of errorsusuallyfound insuch mathematicaltables.Although Babbagenever succeeded inimplementing his scheme, he did seem to gain much inspirationfrom his attempts. He held that his calculatingengine would beable to play "games of skill" such as chess or tic-tac-toe, which tohim implied that it would meet common standards of human rea-son (Passages465-71). Babbage's high estimation of the potentialintelligence of machines rested on his view that both humanthought and the universe that it thought about were rule-governedphenomena. Like Ure, Babbage transformed a conventional viewof a mechanistic universe by presenting the universe as a machinethat humans can construct and control.

Babbage, then, held a more developed metaphysical theorythan did Ure and thus represented more explicitly the ontologicala priori on which his understanding of humans and machinesrested. The absence of such metaphysical musings from Ure's writ-ings should not, however, be taken to mean that his work is lessontological: ontology need not be explicitly theorized in order tohappen. Any identification of humans and machines, a move com-mon to both Babbage's and Ure's texts, rests on a specific ontologi-


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cal a priori, regardless of whether a metaphysical apparatus issubsequently invented to support this identity. The belief that amachine can represent a human presupposes that humans aresomehow already machinelike, or at least that there is a commondenominator between humans and machines, a means of circula-tion, so that they can be exchanged. Any assertion of resemblance,any comparison, presupposes a common ground between bothterms, so that a possibility of comparison exists. In much capitalisteconomic theory, to use an example close to the subject of this ar-ticle, money constitutes such a common ground between commod-ities, labor, capital, and the possession of land (in the form of rent).Money, Keith Tribe suggests, allows these widely disparate termsboth to be grasped by a common theoretical apparatus and to op-erate in a common system. A mechanical, technical, or automatonontology similarly allows Babbage and Ure to grasp humans andmachines in a single theoretical and, they seem to hope, produc-tive system.

The machine, then, constitutes not just a productive appara-tus, but also an ontological category that provides the key to under-standing the very world of which it is a part. Beyond studying pro-duction in the world, the political economies of Babbage and Urereproduce the world as a production, as produced. They thus un-derstand the world itself as an automaton, as a mechanical repro-duction of an apparently nonmechanical being. Neither Babbagenor Ure confine their accounts to descriptions of actually existingcommodity-producing machines. They both understand automataand productive machinery as existing on a single continuum (Ure,Philosophy9-13; Babbage, Passages 364-66). The modern readermay also be tempted to identify automata with productive machin-ery, for indeed, Babbage's and Ure's understanding of machineryas simulation seems to have exercised a wide and considerable in-fluence. An automaton, however, cannot be classified as equipmentin the same way as a machine for commodity production can, forit does not possess the structure of"in-order-to" (Heidegger, Beingand Time97ff). The automaton is not a means of production (or ofanything else for that matter), but rather an aesthetic object, whosedecidedly un-Benjaminian aura derives from its inauthenticity. Foran automaton to be appreciated as an automaton, it must revealitself as an automaton: Vaucanson's duck, which Ure so admires, is


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good preciselybecause it is not a duck. The aura of the automaton,thus, depends on its inauthenticity: f one were completelytakenby Vaucanson's uck and mistook it for a real duck, it would be nomore impressive than any ordinary water fowl.6 The automaton isthe inverseof Heidegger'sconcept of equipmentin BeingandTime,whichfunctions as an invisible means until it breaks down:the au-tomaton must be completelyvisibleif it is to function at all. Indeed,in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, exhibiting an autom-aton often included demonstrating its mechanical operation, atleast to establish that it was not a hoax, operated, for example, bya human concealed inside it, as turned out to be the case with afamouschess-playingautomaton.The automatonpresentsitselfasa machine with agency and, thus, is a reified representationof areifiedworldin whichrelationsof production appearto exist inde-pendently of sociallyrelatedproducers.Baudrillard'saccount of automation can perhaps point us to-ward a more satisfactoryaccount of the relation between the au-tomaton and the industrial machine. According to Baudrillard,when a skill or function is automated, that function is "arrested"in the automaticmachine;it is taken out of its social context andtrapped, prevented from developing further. Baudrillard, thus,refers to the machine as a "poly-para-hyper-andmeta-functionalzone" (159). The automaton, for Baudrillard,is the limit of themachine, it is the pure machine, for it has no direct function, butis merely surroundedby an appearanceof functionality.The ma-chine becomes less and less explicablein termsof "in-order-to" sit approachesthe automaton, as it becomes a simulacrumof hu-man functions.Baudrillard,however,wronglyessentializesthe re-lationshipbetween automatons and productive machinery.Theirrelation is rather an artifactof a tradition of mechanistviewsof thecapitalistmode of production, a tradition that finds an origin inthe texts of Babbage and Ure. Babbage and Ure do not merelypush the machinebeyond its functionality owarda limit as autom-aton: they render the machine itself such that it exists on a contin-uum with automata.The factory,then, representsfor Babbageand Ure both theproduct and the producer of a world that is neither natural norpolitical,but rather technical.The technicalworldappearsto reston natural laws but at the same time is produced by humans. In


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Babbage's and Ure's technical understanding of the universe, na-ture is un-natural, for nature construed as an automaton allows forno nature prior to technology. Just as the factory ontology meansthe end of nature in artifice, so too does it mean the end of history,as change itself is technically mastered. For Babbage, the technicalrepresents the end of historical change, the end of historical time.What had, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, been theregularity of natural principles, of the clockwork universe, be-comes, with Babbage, the regularity of the products of mechani-cal industry. Babbage devotes a lengthy chapter to describing thevarious ways that machinery makes identical products. "Nothing ismore remarkable, yet less unexpected," writes Babbage, "than theperfect identity of things manufactured by the same tool" (Bab-bage, Economy66). Within machinofacture, production does notchange over time. The laws of the manufacturing economy are his-torically immanent and efface the possibility of laws valid outsidea given historical immediacy. However, by effacing the possibilityof historical change, immanent laws become simultaneously tran-scendent, as the world becomes technical. Historical change be-comes nothing more than a change of stationary technical statesby the masters of the technical, who for Babbage and Ure are capi-talists and engineers, and emphatically not workers. If the world islike a calculating engine, then historical change occurs only whenthe master of the machine changes the series it calculates.Ure also imagines the replacement of history with a technicalsystem. He does not regard the end of history as an ontologicalcharacteristic of machinery, as Babbage does, but rather as an inev-itable outcome of technical progress: "the progression of improve-ment designed by Providence to emancipate his animal functionsfrom brute toil, and to leave his intelligent principle leisure tothink of its immortal interests! . . . this consummation is within theworkman's reach" (Ure, Philosophy370). Ure claims that if workerscooperate with factory owners, they will soon be in the position tolet their "intelligent principle" contemplate their "immortal"-their transcendent, not their historical-interests, although thisspiritual freedom, Ure indicates immediately after this passage,would occur while physically tending a machine. In both Babbage'sand Ure's discourses, workers are pushed out of history as activesubjects. Historical time becomes cyclical in the realm of the tech-


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nical, and the possibilityfor historicalaction lies only outside thistechnicalworld. However,becauseboth writers raise the technicalto an ontological principle, they leave no historical outside. Thisontological conception of a priori technological world-governinglaws depends on the absolute effacement of nature as a giver oflaws, and the effacement of history as the field in which humanscollectively give themselves laws.The human, however,is the recalcitrantelement in this sys-tem, the element which can resistthe technologists.The human istherefore the element that must be most carefully disciplined iftechnological knowledge is to function (which,in a purely techni-cal ontology,is the equivalentof being true). The human as self-interested calculating agent disappears from political economyand reappearsas the more or less recalcitrantaborer who must bedisciplined and integrated into an assemblageof machines. Bab-bage and Ure themselvesrealized that their visions of systemsofmachinofacturecould become true only to the extent that workerswere trained to accept these systems. Hence, they both devotedmuch effort to educating workers,taking part in a general discus-sion in nineteenth-century Britain about the education of theworking population. Programs for worker education were in-formed, on all sides, by the assumption that rulers and ruledshould be educated differently. Educators believed society de-pended, in the words of Steven Shapin and Barry Barnes, on a"triple hierarchy-of authority,of mentality and of knowledge"("Headand Hand"235). Debates on education had to reckon withthe possibility hat a changein mentalityor knowledge might upsetthe statusquo of authority, hat too much education for the ruledmight threaten their separationfrom the rulers. However,educa-tors also hoped that education would make the working classesmore docile as well as more resistantto anti-establishmentpropa-ganda. Educationalprogramsproposed at this time aimed towardkeeping or making the knowledge of the ruled "passive"and theknowledgeof the rulers"active."Whilepositionson the ideal qual-ityand quantityof the educationof the ruled varied,everypositionwas informed by this relation between education, knowledge,andauthority.Both Babbageand Ure hoped to contributeto the educationof the working population (Babbage,Economy30; Ure, Philosophy


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426-28). Ure spent years lecturing for the Andersonian Institutein Glasgow, an institution founded to teach technical knowledge,especially political economy and mechanics, to workers. He lec-tured several times a week to around three hundred workers onchemistry and mechanics and viewed these lectures as a means toimprove the morals of the laboring population (Farrar). AlthoughBabbage did not teach at any of the institutions for the educationof the working population, he did donate the third edition of theEconomyof Machineryand Manufactures o the Mechanics Institutes,the most famous of these institutions for worker education (Berg,Machinery145-78; Shapin and Barnes, "Science"). The knowledgethat Babbage and Ure hoped to impart to workers constituted aradical ontological reorientation in which the political subordina-tion of labor at the point of production appeared as given by theorder of Being itself. This is the point at which Foucault mightenter this analysis, for one could surely view this type of technicalpedagogy as a mode of power-knowledge that transforms theworker's body into "both a productive body and a subjugatedbody" (Foucault 26). Certainly this was one of the more or lessunspoken intentions of the movements to educate workers, as wellas of Babbage's and Ure's texts.7It is tempting to stop here, to say that we have finally caughtthe apologists for capitalism spelling out in horrific terms the na-ture of their own mechanized dystopia. Thus, Marx used the textof Ure, whom he dubbed "the Pindar of the automatic factory"(Marx, Capital 394), as a description of the use of machinery incapitalist production. Although Marx criticized Ure's tendency toview conditions specific to capitalist machinofacture as generalconditions of machinofacture, he nonetheless accepted Ure's de-scription as an accurate, though partial, account. Ure's influenceon Marx is evident, for example, in the following passage in whichMarx describes the relation between industrial machinery and hu-man labor:

The implementsof labour,in the form of machinery,necessi-tate the substitutionof naturalforces for humanforce,and theconsciousapplicationof science, insteadof rule of thumb....[I]n its machinerysystem,Modern Industryhas a productiveorganismthat is purely objective, in which the labourer be-


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TheIdeology f theMachinend theSpiritof theFactory 21comes a mere appendage to an alreadyexisting materialcon-dition of production.(Marx,Capital 64)

Especially reminiscent of Ure here is Marx's emphasis on the ma-chine simultaneously replacing and controlling human labor.Marx, of course, did not applaud these conditions of productionand observed that Ure's was a vision of industrial production spe-cific to capitalism, that only within capitalist relations of produc-tion need a worker relate to machinery as "a mere appendage."Marx read Ure as he read other political economists: as theoristswho understood capitalism only immediately, rather than as a spe-cific stage in a larger historical process.However, for Marx, Ure differed from most bourgeois politi-cal economists because he expressed more than a merely ideologi-cal account of industrial production. Marx writes that Ure antici-pated "the spirit of the factory,"even though he could not havedirectly observed fully developed machinofacture:Although Ure'sworkappeared ... at a time when the factorysystemwascomparativelybut littledeveloped, it stillperfectlyexpressesthe spiritof the factory [Fabrikgeist],ot only by itsundisguised cynicism, but also because of the naivete withwhich it blurts out the stupid contradictionsof the capitalistbrain.(Marx,Capital 11)

Marx does not assert here, as he often did when considering otherbourgeois economists, that Ure observed a real situation and mys-tified it. Marx rightly asserts that Ure could not have based hiswork on observations of a fully developed system of industrial capi-talism. This passage on the one hand claims that Ure's work is un-true, the product of "stupid contradictions," yet on the other handthat it expresses a truth, the truth of a "spirit."What is this ghostlytruth that Ure's and Babbage's accounts of machinofacture ex-press?Marx was perhaps the greatest theorist of ghosts-from hiscritique of the idealist conception of spirits (Geister)(at its best inThe GermanIdeologyand his "Theses on Feuerbach") to his expli-cation of the specter haunting Europe in his "Communist Mani-festo." Marx's theory of ghosts, perhaps more than his critique ofpolitical economy, provides a key to understanding the truth of


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Babbage's and Ure's imaginary factories. These factories are not somuch mere ideologies, whose rational kernel can be extracted andused as a witness to historical reality, as they are specters hauntingEurope. They are ghosts who are also amenable to dialectical ma-terialist understanding, though not necessarily ideology criticismof the type Marx brings to bear on political economic texts in Capi-tal. In his earlier work, Marx does not present spirits as distortedreflections of society, which need merely to be unmasked to revealtheir truth, but rather as integral aspects of a historical totality,which can only be understood as they relate to, and form a partof, this totality. In his fourth thesis on Feuerbach, Marx writes thatit is not enough to discover the origins of the "holy family" in the"earthly family": the earthly family "must then itself be criticisedin theory and revolutionised in practice" ("Theses" 144). That is,it is not enough to unmask an ideology (in this case, religion) asan apologetic reflection of reality. Rather, ideology and social re-ality must be interpreted simultaneously, contextualized, so thatthey mutually illuminate each other. While ideology and the socialreality in which it finds its origin are radically bound together in asingle historical totality, these two aspects are also distinct ele-ments, whose difference should not be ignored.Althusser's understanding of ideology, especially in the essayscollected in ForMarx, develops the ghostly strand of Marx's under-standing of ideology. Althusser suggests that the truth of ideologyexists not because of any relation an ideology has to a truth or tofacts external to it, but rather because of its relation to the societythat "sustains" it (62-71). Ideology is not merely a representationof a real historical base, sending the historian distorted transmis-sions about the structural reality down there, but rather a part ofsociety itself. This may seem rather obvious, but it is enormouslyconsequential for my own critique of political economy and for thecritique of ideology generally. Like Marx's more famous specter,the "spirit of the factory" cannot be understood merely by readingbetween the lines: "The social revolution of the nineteenth centurycannot draw its poetry from the past, but only from the future"(Marx, TheEighteenthBrumaire18). If we try to clear away the fogin Babbage's and Ure's texts to get to the real machines behind theghostly ones, we shall miss the truth of these texts, which is not


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secreted somewhere within them, like a rational kernel in the coreof a dialectic.The truth of Babbage's and Ure's texts does not lie in anyhypothetical future system of machinofacture that they dreamedup, or, more charitably put, that they anticipated. Although Bab-bage and Ure could not have empirically known the highly devel-oped automatic machinofacture that their texts seem to describe,they did know capitalist relations of production immediately. It isprecisely, I argue, these real relations of production which sustainthe instrumentsof production they imagine. Both authors were ofcourse quite familiar with existing instruments of industrial pro-duction. However, their political economic texts not only repre-sent, for example, steam-powered spinning machines, but alsopresent a mechanical ontology illustrated by fantastic images ofmechanized humans and anthropomorphized machines. Thetruth of this mechanical ontology lies less in the "spinning jenny"or the "self-acting mule"-although these names themselves indi-cate a kind of acknowledgment of the mechanical ontology I seekto describe-than in a capitalist system whose essence and "hiero-glyphic" (Marx, Capital79) is not the machine, but the commodity.Babbage and Ure render the alienation inherent in capitalistsubjectivity as images of automatic machinery. As Marx explains inhis Economicand PhilosophicManuscripts,because workers produceobjects which they do not own, their own work appears to them asan alien objective force. The worker comes not only "to face theproduct of his activity as a stranger" but to face his activity itself asa stranger (274). The worker's very activity appears as an objectivesystem standing over and against him. The products of labor arealienated as commodities in the process of production (ratherthan, as in previous modes of production, only in the process ofexchange), so that alienation becomes a characteristic not merelyof the marketplace, but of all productive activity. The owners ofthe means of production are similarly alienated, for, as workersproduce what they do not own, owners own what they do not pro-duce. The alienation of workers is practical, it is a process; thealienation of owners is a "theoretical ttitude" (Economicand Philo-sophic 282). While Marx does not specifically relate alienation tomachinery, the ambiguities of his understanding of machinery


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present a suggestive opening: "It [labour] replaces labour by ma-chines-but some of the workers it throws back to a barbarous typeof labour, and the other workers it turns into machines" (Economicand Philosophic273). Marx here, like Babbage and Ure, demon-strates the very theoretical alienation he ascribes to the conscious-ness of the owners of the means of production, the "theoretical tti-tude" that work is separate from workers. Marx, like Babbage andUre, imagines alienated labor as mechanized labor. The machineis a reified theoretical understanding of alienation, and images ofmachines are projections of the "stupid contradictions of the capi-talist brain,"beliefs that alienation itself, apart from alienated hu-mans, must exist out there somewhere in factories. The machineis alienation alienated, reification reified.Although such generalizations about the actual consciousnessof broad sectors of society based on deductions from economic the-ory have been rightly regarded with suspicion at least since E. P.Thompson's TheMaking of theEnglish WorkingClass, this account ofalienation does indeed apply to Babbage and Ure. Babbage, forexample, ontologically grounds both his understanding of theeconomy and his calculating engines by representing historicalconditions of production as transcendent laws of the universe. Forboth Babbage and Ure, the machine itself appears as a nonhumancause of the reification of relations of production, so that condi-tions particular to capitalism can be rendered not just as necessaryconditions of all production, but also as the fundamental orderof Being, prior to both nature and history. Far from representingmachines as instruments of production, Babbage and Ure repre-sent machinery as production itself. Reification, which originatesin a historical system of social relations among producers, comesto appear as the result of instruments of production. The historicalcause of reification is, thus, itself reified. Machinelike workers andthe machines which control them by simulating (automating)them-the two great specters that haunt much capitalist mythol-ogy, apologetic and otherwise-are the product of no machine, butare rather an ideological mystification of a system of social rela-tions.

Interpreting the works of Babbage and Ure becomes morehistorically fruitful when the economic base is understood not asthe machinofacture the texts themselves posit, but rather as the


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capitalist relations of production as they in fact developed in En-gland in the first half of the nineteenth century. The attempt ofthe bourgeoisie to rule the production process appears in Bab-bage's and Ure's texts as the theoretical primacy of the meansof production over production itself. The political victory of thebourgeoisie in Britain after the parliamentary reforms of 1832 mayhave provided the social basis sustaining this second-order reifica-tion. The conceptof the machine is no instrument of production. Itis rather one of the many ways that the bourgeoisie transformedits own culture from an attack on precapitalist modes of produc-tion and power into a defense of existing capitalist modes of pro-duction and power (Corrigen and Sayer 114-65; Richards). Thefate of Chartism in the following decade illustrates the Britishbourgeoisie's tendency to conceive of its interests more against theworking classes than against the remnants of the feudal politicalorder. One of the forms the British bourgeoisie's defense of its classinterests took was the attempt to train and discipline workers in theMechanics Institutes and in the Andersonian Institute, in whichBabbage and Ure each actively participated. What we today taketo be a machine stems from a mechanist ontology sustained by thecontradictions of a capitalism whose victories against earlier modesof production necessitated an immediate struggle against possiblefuture modes of production. The sociohistorical contradictionswhich sustained Babbage's and Ure's texts have continued to sus-tain a series of technological fantasies, from Taylorism to cybernet-ics to, most recently, dreams of a computerized postindustrial soci-ety. Such understandings of mechanized production are sustainednot so much by anticipated future instruments f production (in anycase a bizarre reversal of the temporal relation of cause and effect)as by contradictions in contemporary relationsof production.Ideology is not like a fun-house mirror that reproduces a dis-torted version of social reality: its connection to history happens ina much more fundamental and obscure way than merely by repre-senting (or misrepresenting) the things in the world to which itclaims to refer. More deceptive than any of its specific deceptions,ideology's greatest ruse is its connection to historical reality as rep-resentation. Like Babbage's and Ure's claim that the machine rep-resents human workers, the understanding of ideology as a repre-sentation of social reality obscures more than it reveals. The first


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step in the present analysis involved bracketing out this relation,separating economic reality from economic ideology, base from su-perstructure, so that I might ultimately connect the two in a moreproductive way than as villain and disguise. Immediately, this dis-association helped me show what I take to be the real philosophicalinterest of the political economic texts of Charles Babbage and An-drew Ure: they are not merely cunning descriptions of machinesbut rather metaphysical artifices, which raise drawing-room novel-ties such as Vaucanson's mechanical duck to economic and onto-logical principles. This separation of economic reality and eco-nomic ideology has also, I hope, helped to foreground both thelimitations and the specific truth of an image of the machine andof industrial production that still haunts us today. However, whileI began by calling for an analytic separation of economic base fromideological superstructure, I have concluded by suggesting howthe two might be reconnected, so that they illuminate rather thaneclipse each other.

NotesI am grateful to Johanna K. Bockman, Andrew Feenberg, and Simon Schafferfor their detailed comments and helpful suggestions on earlier versions of thisarticle. I am of course responsible for this final version and all of its shortcomings.1. For this revised role of machinery in capitalism in late-eighteenth- andearly-nineteenth-century Britain, see Berg, TheAge of Manufactures.As early as

1944, Polanyi argued that the first industrial revolution (of the late eighteenthand early nineteenth centuries) was primarily a revolution in the social relationsof production, and that only during the second industrial revolution (of the latenineteenth and early twentieth centuries) did a revolution in the instruments ofproduction take place. Braudel suggests that the importance of commercial capi-talism far outweighed the importance of capitalism in productive sectors eveninto the nineteenth century. Braudel, Gutmann, and Kriedte, Medick, andSchlumbohm argue that industrial development before the early nineteenth cen-tury took place only gradually, in the form of rural household production orga-nized in the putting out system rather than as wage labor within factories. Landesgives an opposing view of early industry and generally gives a good account ofthe industrial production that did exist in the period under consideration, al-though he underemphasizes the role of other sectors of the economy.2. Although I would not want to argue for the complete separation of eco-nomic discourse and the economy, as Tribe does in his structuralist account, I dowant to foreground the gap between the two entities, and their mutual irreduc-ibility.Also, unlike Tribe, I ultimately want to reground the connection betweeneconomic discourse and economic reality.


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3. This article owes much to Berg's TheMachineryQuestion.Berg argues thatalthough machinofacture represented only a small portion of actual economicactivity in early-nineteenth-century Britain, "[t]he machinery question became infact the hinge which connected the new economic relations of production withthe wider culture and consciousness of the new bourgeoisie and working classes"(2). Unlike Berg, I view Babbage and Ure not within the context of the machineryquestion in nineteenth-century political economy (see especially Berg 179-202)but rather as a radical break from prior political economy, and as the origin ofa mechanical, factory-centered tradition in understandings of capitalism. Moreimportantly, in this article I want to explore what this reconceptualization of thesetwo figures means for our understanding of capitalist ideology. Borkenau makesthe related argument that the mechanistic philosophies of the seventeenth cen-tury were ideological justifications for capitalist relations of production ratherthan merely reflections of mechanical instruments of production. And Noble pro-vides a useful analysis of what he refers to as "the technological mystification ofpower in our society" in "Present Tense Technology." See also Feenberg's discus-sion of "technical codes" (CriticalTheory,"From Information," and "SubversiveRationalization"), as well as Marglin; Reddy; and Noble, "Social Choice"; for read-ings of particular, actually existing productive machines as political arguments.4. Whether Ure actually saw the duck or only read Vaucanson's description ofit, which had been translated into English in the eighteenth century, is unknown.Jacques de Vaucanson's description of the duck, given in an appendix to hisLe Mecanisme du Fluteur Automate,corresponds to Ure's description. However,whether such a mechanical duck ever existed cannot be determined.5. For an excellent discussion of Babbage's attribution of mechanical qualitiesto God and his corresponding natural theological understanding of the world asmachinelike, as well as the relation of this natural theology to Babbage'sjustifica-tion of, and involvement in, the industrial revolution, see Schaffer 224-27.6. Hugh Kenner presents a fascinating account of the relation between hu-mans, automata, and artificiality, and discusses both Babbage and Vaucanson'sautomata (17-42, 100-142). On automata and political argument, see Mayr;Price; Sutter. On automata and the culture of automata, see Bedini; Strauss.7. Schaffer persuasively argues that "systematic vision in the Industrial Revo-lution," exemplified especially by Babbage's understanding of his calculating en-gines, his natural theology, and his account of the factory system, "was designedto produce the rational order it purported to discover" (226). As Schaffer demon-strates, London exhibitions of portions of Babbage's calculating engines, as wellas of other machines and automata, were part of a campaign to implement thedisciplinary industrial factory system. My project differs from Schaffer's in that Iseek to present the foundation on which the mechanized factory could be under-stood as a disciplinary apparatus in the first place.

WorksCitedAlthusser, Louis. ForMarx. Trans. Ben Brewster. New York: Verso, 1990.Babbage, Charles. The Ninth BridgewaterTreatise:A Fragment. 1837. Ed. MartinCampbell-Kelly. London: William Pickering, 1989.. On the Economyof Machineryand Manufactures. 1832. New York: Kelley,1963.


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. Passagesrom theLife of a Philosopher.1864. New York: Kelley, 1969.Baudrillard, Jean. Le Systeme esObjets.Paris: Gallimard, 1968.Bedini, Silvio A. "The Role of Automata in the History of Technology." Technologyand Culture5 (1964): 24-41.Benjamin, Walter. "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction."Illuminations.Trans. Harry Zohn. Ed. Hannah Arendt. New York: Schocken,1969. 217-51.Berg, Maxine. TheAge of Manufactures: ndustry,Innovation, and Work n Britain,1700-1820. New York: Oxford UP, 1986.. TheMachineryQuestionand theMaking of PoliticalEconomy1815-1848. Lon-don: Cambridge UP, 1980.Borkenau, Franz. "The Sociology of the Mechanistic World-Picture." 1932. Sciencein Context1 (1987): 109-27.Braudel, Fernand. Civilizationand Capitalism,Fifteenth o EighteenthCentury.3 vols.Trans. Sian Reynolds. London: Collins, 1981-84.Corrigen, Philip, and Derek Sayer. TheGreatArch:English State Formationas Cul-tural Revolution.Oxford: Blackwell, 1985.Farrar, W. V. 'Andrew Ure, ER.S., and the Philosophy of Manufactures." Notesand Recordsof theRoyal Societyof London 27 (1973): 299-324.Feenberg, Andrew. CriticalTheoryof Technology.New York: Oxford UP, 1991.. "From Information to Communication: The French Experience with Vid-eotext." Contextsof Computer-MediatedCommunication.Ed. Martin Lea. NewYork: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1992.

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. "Theses on Feuerbach." 1888. The Marx-EngelsReader. Ed. Robert C.Tucker. New York: Norton, 1978. 143-45.Mayr,Otto. Authority,Liberty ndAutomaticMachinery n EarlyModernEurope.Balti-more: Johns Hopkins UP, 1986.Noble, David F "Present Tense Technology." democracy3.2 (1983): 8-24; 3.3(1983): 70-82; 3.4 (1983): 71-93.. "Social Choice in Machine Design: The Case of Automatically ControlledMachine Tools, and a Challenge for Labor." Politics and Society 8 (1978):313-47.Polanyi, Karl. The GreatTransformation. oston: Beacon, 1944.Price, Derek J. de Solla. "Automataand the Origins of Mechanism and Mechanis-tic Culture." Technologynd Culture5 (1964): 9-23.Reddy, William M. The Rise of Market Culture:The TextileTradeand FrenchSociety,1750-1900. London: Cambridge UP, 1984.Richards, Paul. "State Formation and Class Struggle, 1832-48." Capitalism,StateFormation, nd MarxistTheory:HistoricalInvestigations.Ed. Philip Corrigan. Lon-don: Quartet, 1980. 49-78.Schaffer, Simon. "Babbage's Intelligence: Calculating Engines and the FactorySystem."CriticalInquiry21 (1994): 203-27.Shapin, Steven, and Barry Barnes. "Head and Hand: Rhetorical Resources inBritish Pedagogical Writings, 1770-1850." Oxford Review of Education 2(1976): 231-54.

. "Science, Nature and Control: Interpreting Mechanics' Institutes." SocialStudiesof Science7 (1977): 31-74.Shelley, Mary. Frankensteinor The Modern Prometheus. 1818. New York: OxfordUP, 1969.Smith, Adam. An Inquiry nto the Nature and Causesof the Wealthof Nations. 1776.New York: Modern Library, 1937.Strauss, Linda M. '"Automata:A Study in the Interface of Science, Technology,and Popular Culture, 1730-1885." Diss. UC, San Diego, 1987.Sutter, Alex. GdttlicheMachinen:DieAutomataur LebendigesbeiDescartes,Leibniz,LaMettrieund Kant. Frankfurt am Main: Athenaum, 1988.Thompson, E. P. TheMakingof theEnglish WorkingClass. New York:Vintage, 1963.Tribe, Keith. Land, Labourand EconomicDiscourse.London: Routledge, 1978.Ure, Andrew. "AnAccount of Some Experiments made on the Body of a Criminalimmediately after Execution, with Physiological and Practical Observations."Journal of Scienceand the Arts 6 (1819): 283-94.. The Philosophyof Manufactures:or,an Expositionof the Scientific,Moral, andCommercialEconomyof theFactorySystemof GreatBritain. 1835. New York: Kel-ley, 1967.Vaucanson, Jacques de. LeMicanismedu FluteurAutomate. 1738. Buren, The Neth-erlands: Knuf, 1979.

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