talion, 4th Marines, facing a well-def ended ridge, a coconut grove, anda sinister clearing, was nearing thesentimental and tactically importantgoals of the old Marine barracks, itsrifle range, and the runways of Oroteairfield. With heavy tank support,the 22d Marines surged forward pastthe initial obstacles and by afternoonhad reached positions well beyondthe morning's battles. On the left ofthe 4th Marines, where resistancewas lighter, the assault was led bytanks that beat down the brush.While inspecting positions there,Lieutenant Colonel Samuel D. Puller,the 4th's executive officer and brotherof famed Lieutenant Colonel Lewis B."Chesty" Puller, was killed by asniper.

By mid-afternoon, the 4th Ma-rines' assault elements broke out ofthe grove just short of the rifle range,only to stall in a new complex at dug-

in defenses and minefields. Strangely,and yet not unusual in the climax ofa losing engagement, a Japaneseofficer emerged to brandish his swordat a tank. It was easier than ritualsuicide.

The horror of the American gunsagain must have been too much forthe Japanese defending the immedi-ate front. Surprisingly, they just cutand ran from their strong, well-defended positions. The elated Ma-rines, who did not care why theenemy ran — just that they ran — nowdug in only 300 yards from the prizedtargets. Their capture would wait fortomorrow, 28 July. The Japanesewere now squeezed into the lastquadrant of the peninsula. All oftheir strongly entrenched defenseshad failed to hold. The Orote air-field, the old Marine barracks, theold parade ground which had not feltan American boot since 10 December

29

1941, were all about to be retrieved.General Shepherd sounded a great

reveille on 28 July for what was leftof the Japanese naval defenders: a45-minute air strike and a 30-minutenaval gunfire bombardment, joinedby whatever guns the 77th Division,brigade, and antiaircraft battalionscould muster. At 0830 the brigadewould attack for Orote airfield.

Colonel Schneider's 22d Marineswould take the barracks and Sumayand Colonel Shapley's 4th Marineswould take the airfield and the riflerange. Japanese artillery and mortarfire had diminished, but small armsand machine guns still spoke intense-ly when the Marines attacked. Atthis bitter end, the Japanese wereevoking a last-ditch stubbornness.American tanks were called up butmost had problems with visibilityand control. Wherever the thickscrub brush concealed the enemy,

Major John S. Messers' 2d Battalion,4th Marines called for increased tanksupport when one of his companiesbegan taking heavy casualties. Inresponse to General Shepherd's re-quest, General Bruce sent forward aplatoon of Army tank destroyers anda platoon of light tanks to beef up theattack.

General Shepherd wanted the bat-tle over now. He ordered a massiveinfantry and tank attack whichkicked off at 1530 on the 28th. TheJapanese did not intend to oblige thistime by quitting; this was do or die.By nightfall all objectives were inplain sight, but there were still a fewhundred yards to be gained. The Ma-rines stood fast for the night, hopingthe Japanese would sacrifice them-selves in counterattack, but no suchluck occurred.

When the attack resumed on the29th, after the usual Army and Ma-rine artillery preparation and an awe-somely heavy air strike, Army andMarine tanks led the way onto theairfield. Resistance was meager. Byearly afternoon, the airfield was se-cured and the 22d Marines had oc-cupied what was left of the oldMarine barracks. A bronze plaque,which had long been mounted at theentrance to the barracks, was reco-vered and held for reinstallation ata future date.

The Japanese found this latest ad-vance difficult to accept. Suicideswere many and random. Soldiersjumped off cliffs, hugged explodinggrenades, even cut their own throats.

Private First Class George F.

Eftang, with the 4th Marines' sup-porting pack howitzer battalion, sawthe suicides: "1 could see the Japanesejumping to their deaths. I actuallyfelt sorry for them. I knew they hadfamilies and sweethearts like anyoneelse'

While the embattled peninsula stillswarmed with patrols, Admiral Spru-ance; Generals Smith, Geiger, Larsen(the future island commander), andShepherd; Colonels Shapley and

Schneider, and others who could bespared, arrived for a ceremonial flagraising and heartfelt tribute to an oldbarracks and those Marines who hadmade it home. General Shepherdcalled it hallowed ground and toldthe distinguished assemblage, whichincluded a hastily cleaned-up honorguard of brigade troops: "you haveavenged the loss of our comradeswho were overcome by a numericallysuperior force three days after PearlHarbor. Under our flag this islandagain stands ready to fulfill its des-tiny as an American fortress in thePacific'

Many of the Marines standing atattention, watching the historicceremony, could only thank God thatthey were still alive. At the end ofthis ceremony, engineers moved ontothe airfield to clear away debris andfill the many shell and bomb holes.

30

Only six hours after the first bulldoz-er clanked onto the runways, a Navytorpedo bomber made an emergencylanding. Soon the light artillery spot-ting planes were regularly flyingfrom them.

The capture of Orote Peninsulahad cost the brigade 115 men killed,721 wounded, and 38 missing in ac-tion. The enemy toll of counted deadwas 1,633. It was obvious that onOrote as at Fonte, there were manyJapanese still unaccounted for andpresumably ready still to fight to pre-vent the island's capture.

With the breakthrough at Fonteand failure of Takashina's mass coun-terattack, the American positionscould be consolidated. The 3d and21st Marines squared away their

holds on heights and the 9th Marines(July 27-29) pushed its final way upto Mount Alutom and MountChachao.

The most serious resistance to oc-cupying the Mount Alutom-MountChachao massif and securing theForce Beachhead Line (FBHL) acrossthe hills was a surprisingly strongpoint at the base of Mount Chachao.Major Donald B. Hubbard, com-manding the 3d Battalion, 9th Ma-rines (replacing Lieutenant ColonelAsmuth, wounded on W-Day),called down artillery, and, after the

barrage, his Marines attacked withgrenades and bayonets. They des-troyed everything that stood in theirpath. When that fight was over,Major Hubbard's battalion counted135 Japanese dead. As the assaultforce pushed up these commandingslopes, the Marines could spot menof Company A of the 305th Infan-try atop Mount Tenjo to the west.Lieutenant Colonel Carey A. Ran-dall's 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, thenmoved up and made contact with theArmy troops. Originally, MountTenjo had been in the 3d Division

zone, but General Bruce had want-ed to get his men on the high groundso they could push ahead along theheights and not get trapped in the ra-vines. He also wanted to prevent thepiecemeal commitment of his divi-sion and to preserve its integrity.

Conservative estimates put theJapanese dead as a result of the coun-terattack at 3,200 men. The loss ofTakashina's infantry officers, includ-ing General Shigematsu, who hadcommanded the 48th IndependentMixed Brigade, was held to be as highas 96 percent. Takashina himself fellto the fire from a machine gun on anAmerican tank as he was urging sur-vivors out of the Fonte position andon to the north to fight again. WithTakashina's death, tactical commandof all Japanese forces remaining onGuam was assumed by General Oba-ta. He had only a few senior officersremaining to rally the survivingdefenders and organize cohesive unitsfrom the shattered remnants of thebattalions that had fought to hold theheights above the Asan-Adelupbeaches.

All through the night of 28 July,Japanese troops trudged along thepaths that led from Fonte to Ordot,finding their way at times by the light

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 88153

A Marine uses a flamethrower on a Japanese-occupied pilibox on what had beenthe Marine golf course on Guam, adjoining the Marine Barracks on 0 rote Peninsula.

This Japanese airstrip on 0 rote Peninsula was one of the primeobjectives of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade in its zone.

Pockmarks on the strip resulted from the aerial, ships'gunfire, and artillery bombardments directed at this target.

Department of Defense Photo (IJSMC)88134

31

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of American flares. At Ordot, twotraffic control points guided mentoward Barrigada, where three com-posite infantry companies were form-ing, or toward Finegayan, where aforce of five composite companieswas to man blocking positions. As hefully expected the Americans to con-duct an aggressive pursuit on the29th, General Obata ordered Lieu-tenant Colonel Takeda to organize adelaying force that would hold backthe Marines until the withdrawalcould be effected.

Contrary to the Japanese com-mander's expectations, GeneralGeiger had decided to rest his battle-weary troops before launching a full-scale attack to the north. The sub-stance of his orders to the 3d and.77th Divisions on 29 July was toeliminate the last vestiges of Japaneseresistance within the FBHL, organizea line of defense, and patrol instrength to the front. With capture ofthe beachhead line and its criticalhigh ground and the annihilation ofgreat numbers of Japanese, the turn-ing point of the Guam campaign hadbeen reached.

Yet, few Japanese had surrenderedand those captured were usuallydazed, wounded, or otherwise un-able to resist. Almost all of the ene-my died fighting, even when theirlives were lost without sense or pur-pose. Still, a substantial number of

troops from the 29th Division werestill not accounted for.

General Geiger's intelligence sec-tions could only list about one quart-er of the estimated soldier-sailorstrength that had been on the island,and he needed to make certain thathis rear was secure from attack be-fore heading north after the enemy.Captured Japanese documents andprisoners of war, and sightings fromaircraft, all indicated to Geiger thatthe Japanese had withdrawn to thenorth to better roads, denser andmore concealing jungle, and com-manding terrain for strongpoints.

To ensure that his rear area wasnot threatened, General Geiger hadthe 77th Division detail patrols toscour the southern half of Guam,repeating and intensifying thesearches the brigade had made.These soldiers, as the Marines before

them, found Guamanians every-where, some in camps established bythe Japanese, others on their farmsand ranches. The natives, some sur-prised to see Americans so soon af-ter the landings, reported thepresence of only small bands ofJapanese and often only single sold-iers. It became increasingly evidentthat the combat units that remainedwere in the north, not the south. Thebest estimates of their strengthranged around a figure of 6,000 men.

Obata had expected a hasty pur-suit, and set up strong rear guards togive time for his retreating forces toorganize. Victory was no longer evena hope, but the Japanese could stillextract a painful cost. General Geiger,who had a little time now, could givehis troops a rest and move into at-tack positions across the width of theisland. Strong and frequent patrolswere sent out to find routes cross

A tank-infantry team from the 4th Marines advances slowlythrough the dense scrub growth that characterized the ter-

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 88152rain in the regiment's zone on Orote Peninsula. The attackmoved forward yard by yard until the objective was secured.

Marines of the 1st Provisional Brigade hurl hand grenades at enemy positions onthe other side of one of the rice paddies that slowed their advance toward 0 rote.

32

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• trenches, anything, by the Navy Ma-rines, and Army spotter planes whichwere constantly overhead.

country and glimpse clues of enemystrength and dispositions.

Obata organized delaying defensesto include the southwest slopes ofMount Barrigada, midway across theisland from Tumon Bay, and the lit-tle town of Barrigada itself, barely 20houses. On all approaches to his fi-nal defensive positions near MountSanta Rosa, in the northwest cornerof the island, he organized road-blocks at trail and road junctions,principally at Finegayan and Yigo,

and concealed troops in the jungle tointerdict the roads which were theonly practical approach routes to thenorthern end of the island. TheJapanese commander felt sorely be-sieged, and as his notes later revealed:"the enemy air force seeking our unitsduring daylight hours in the forest,bombed and strafed even a singlesoldier:' Perhaps even more damag-ing than the air attacks were artilleryand naval gunfire bombardmentsbrought down on men, guns,

III Corps's Geiger knew Obata'sprobable route of retreat and drew upa succession of objectives across theisland which would incrementallyseize all potential enemy strong-points. Jump-off for the drive northwas 0630 31 July with the 3d MarineDivision on the left and the 77th In-fantry Division on the right, dividingthe island down the middle. The Ma-rine zone would include the islandcapital of Agana, the Japanese air-field at Tiyan, Finegayan, and theshores of Tumon Bay. The 77thwould have Mount Barrigada, Yigo,and Mount Santa Rosa in its zone.The 1st Marine Brigade relieved the77th Division of the defense of thesouthern portion of the FBHL andwould continue to patrol thesouthern half of Guam. As the Corpsattack moved northward and the is-land widened, the brigade wouldeventually take part in the drive tothe extreme north coast of the island.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 93468

Marines bypass two smoldering Japanese light tanks, knocked out of action byMarine Sherman medium tanks on the road to Sumay on Orote Peninsula.

Marine artillerymen, members of Battery C, 7th 155mm (LongToms) Gun Battalion, III Amphibious Corps Artillery, take

advantage of a lull in fire missions to swab the bore of theirgun. Soon after, the gun was back in battery firing missions.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 91347

33

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midriff of the island, the Agana-PagoRoad would prove critical in winningthe battle of Guam.

The 3d Division reached Ordot inthe center of its zone where Obatahad directed some of his survivors.The 3d Battalion, 21st Marines, raninto them and one of their pillboxes,which the Marines thoroughly gut-ted. The Americans also accountedfor 15 infantrymen and two lighttanks which were the targets of M-lsand bazookas.

The honor of liberating Agana fellto the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines. Theriflemen entered the town's ruinstreading carefully, sizing up the stark,dusty building walls for snipers. Afew enemy riflemen emerged frombehind concrete outcroppings thendropped back into eternity. TheJapanese guards were stragglers, thewounded, or a few foolish enough tostay. In one house, a Marine openeda closet to reveal a Japanese officer,sword in hand. The Marine slammedthe door, riddled it with an automat-ic rifle, and didn't bother to lookagain. The once-beautiful old Plazade Espana was in American hands 15minutes after the town was entered.By noon it was secured.

The 1st and 2d Battalions, 3d Ma-rines,moved along to the criticalAgana-Pago Road. At 1350 the 21st

Marines was right up there withthem after the few engagements withpillboxes, snipers, and tanks. By1510, Colonel Craig's 9th Marines onthe division's right was partiallyacross the road and seized the re-maining portion of that highway inits sector on the next day. Hard-surfaced, with two lanes across the

Leaving Agana and its historic res-cue of the capital, the 3d Battalion,3d Marines, under Major Royal R.Bastian, Jr., who had taken com-mand when Lieutenant ColonelHouser was wounded on 22 July,moved on with relative ease. Beforedusk the battalion had seized 1,400yards of other critical roads and trailswhich led to strategic and defendedstrongpoints of Finegayan and Bar-rigada.

General Turnage got well withinstriking distance of the Tiyan airfieldand the little town of San Antonio,on the 31st, but the next day, 1 Au-gust, his advance was seriouslyslowed by mines. It took the cool skilland slow and steady hands of thebomb disposal specialists of the 25thNaval Construction Battalion and the19th Marines' engineers to reducethose obstacles.

Students of the battle and thosewho were there consider the takingof the cross-island Agana-Pago Roadas a major factor in guaranteeing thesuccess of the drive northward. Itscapture solved a host of logistic

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 93543Fleet Marine Force, Pacific commander LtGen Holland M. Smith, right, stands withthe leaders of the successful retaking of Orote Peninsula. From left to right, LtColAlan Shapley; BGen Lernuel C. Shepherd, Jr.; and Col Merlin F Schneider.

As the regimental field music sounds "To the Colors," Col Schneider and his 22dMarines staff and command salute as the American flag is raised over Guam forthe first time since it was taken down by the Japanese invaders in December 1941.

34

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posed, the 77th by noon of 1 Augustwas across the Pago River. Residentsof the area said the Japanese had leftin a hurry for Barrigada, a destina-tion where III Corps intelligence al-ready anticipated the enemy wouldhold up. The jungle-covered moun-tain there, 674 feet high, dominatedthe area.

General Bruce assigned the captureof Barrigada to the 307th. It was tomaintain contact with the 3d MarineDivision on the left and pushthrough the town, then continueabout a mile to seize Mount Barriga-da. The 305th to the right of the307th would attack in the same direc-tion east of the town and Barrigadamountain and protect to the coast.The town was in a clearing fullyswept with defensive machine gunfire. In the same clearing was amuch-desired well. Its capture meantthe world to the parched troops.

At 0630, 2 August General BruceDepartment of Defense Photo (USMC) 93571

Troops of the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, enter the wreckage of Agana in the tracedispatched a dozen tanks of the 706th

of retreating Japanese forces, who had planted land mines before they left. Tank Battalion on a reconnaissance.As the "recon" armor turned into Bar-

problems, for the 77th particularly.The Army division, for example, had

Soldiers of the 77th Division reach the end of the road bulldozed by the 302d En-

no roads heading north initially in itsgineer Combat Battalion, and strike out cross country in the 31 July advance.

zone of advance and needed such aroad over which it could supply itstroops as they came down out of thehills and cut their way through thejungle. Frontline troops in the Armyzone were soon running low on sup-plies, especially water. General Brucepromised his people a hot breakfastas soon as they and the Marinescould give him the road. Trucks weresoon thick on the road even whileSeaBees and engineers were enlarg-ing and repairing it.

The 77th had moved out on sched-ule just after daylight on 31 July, withthe 307th Infantry in the advance,followed by the 305th. As was the sit-uation facing the 3d Division, enemyresistance to the Army advance wasnegligible. Within two hours, bothArmy regiments had secured thecross-island road in their zones. The307th rescued 2,000 Guamanians inthe detention camp at Asinan. Unop-

35

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tasked the 1st Battalion, 22d Ma-rines; the 7th Antiaircraft ArtilleryBattalion; and the 9th Defense Bat-talion, all under Lieutenant ColonelArchie E. O'Neil, who commandedthe 9th.

rigada town, the enemy opened upwith a torrent of fire. The determinedJapanese fiercely resisted the 307thwhen it reached the town and wereequally determined to stop the 305thon the right as that regiment's assaultcompanies tried to outflank the town.Repeated tank attacks and heavy ar-tillery support netted only a fewyards at a time, but the soldiers keptadvancing and by 4 August, the 77thDivision held the town, or what wasleft of it, its precious well, and thecrest of the mountain.

Captured documents and inter-views with prisoners again left littledoubt that the 77th Division's majorobstacle would be rugged, heavily

crevassed, and jungled Mount SantaRosa. It is six and a half miles north-east of Barrigada and a short distancefrom the ocean on the east coast.

First to be addressed on the waywere well-armed outposts likeFinegayan and Yigo. Each promisedcasualties, blood, and delay. GeneralGeiger employed the 77th to reduceYigo and take Santa Rosa, and leftthe capture of Finegayan and the restof northern Guam principally to the3d Marine Division. He brought upGeneral Shepherd's brigade to assistin the final drive. To protect the ForceBeachhead Line, care for the Guama-nians, and hunt down enemy strag-glers in the south, General Geiger

36

Before moving on, the brigade hadaggressively sought out Japaneseholdouts, brought the fearfulGuamanians into friendly com-pounds, and provided security forthose who chose to remain in theirown homes and again work theirown ranches. As late as 2 August, 4thMarines' patrols approaching Talof o-fo Bay on the southeast coast, cameacross some 2,000 natives, still appre-hensive of the Japanese, who weredirected to a compound whichpromised safety and at least mini-mum comforts. The Guamanian peo-ple in their own residential and farmareas could, however, still readily callupon the civil affairs sections forfood, protection, medicine, andshelter. Such civil care was integral tothe American occupation and wascontrolled by Marine General Larsen,who would head the garrison forceas soon as the island was again un-der the American flag.

During the night of 2-3 August,the 12th Marines delivered 777rounds of harassing and interdictoryfire on the roads and trails the divi-sion would encounter aroundFinegayan. At 0700 on 3 August, the3d and 9th Marines moved in assaultwell past the Tinyan airfield. Then,about 0910 the 9th encountered ablock at the cross roads approachingFinegayan village. The situation andterrain favored the Japanese with ex-cellent fields of fire. After theJapanese position was finally over-run with tanks, Lieutenant ColonelCarey Randall, commanding 1st Bat-talion, 9th Marines, said that thesedefenses were the toughest he hadfaced on Guam.

That contest for Finegayan was thelast major battle for the 3d Divisionon Guam. The Japanese made itsomething to remember. A 3d Divi-

ii

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of a mortar barrage and it looked likethe beginning of a counterattack. Ar-tillery stilled that Japanese effort.The enemy tanks were driven off butsurvived to reappear again anotherday.

It was in one of those typical sud-den enemy attacks around Finegayanthat Private First Class Frank P. Wi-tek, with automatic rifle andgrenades, raced ahead of his owntanks to destroy an eight-manJapanese position which was holdingback elements of his 1st Battalion,9th Marines. He succeeded, but waskilled. He was posthumously award-ed the Medal of Honor.

sion armored reconnaissance patrolheaded for Ritidian Point on thenorthernmost point of the island raninto Japanese defenses located on theFinegayan trails bristling with anti-tank weapons and artillery pointedin the direction of the patrol. TheAmericans were surprised and

The Japanese were plenty feisty atFinegayan, and in a telling thrust dis-patched two medium tanks whichskirted the crossroads of the 9th Ma-rines at Junction 177 and went up theFinegayan-Mount Santa Rosa Road.Impervious to Marine fire, the tanksshot up the area and got away.

On 4 August, the new frontlinesand scheme of maneuver were beingset up to keep pressure on GeneralObata and his holdouts, and makea place for General Shepherd and hisbrigade. During the afternoon, thebrigade reached its northern assem-bly area and General Shepherd set uphis CP near San Antonio. In the fi-nal advance north, the brigade wouldbe on the left with its inland flankwithin a mile of the western beaches.The 3d Division would be in thecenter deploying its units on a three-regiment front which would swerveto the east to take in the whole north-ern end of the island and as well sup-

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 92327

The Catholic cemetery of Anigua became the home of approximately 7,000 Guama-nians liberated from Japanese rule. Here a family lives in a temporary shelter.

bruised, did the Japanese some harm, Another tank force of undeterminedbut sensibly cancelled the mission. size then rumbled down under cover

37

port the 77th Division.The Japanese now faced an over-

whelming number of attack forces.And there would be plenty of helpfrom the sea and from the air. Gener-al Bruce's soldiers made the principalcorps drive to destroy the remainingJapanese and attacked Mount SantaRosa. Priority of fires of corps ar-

tillery, air support, and ships gunfirewas now given to the Army. Thesenew arrangements were to take effecton 7 August.

Making new strides to end thecampaign, the 3d and 21st Marinesprogressed handily but the 9th Ma-rines kept running into dense junglethat was such a tangled mess that

tanks passed each other 15 feet apartwithout knowing the other wasthere. The division accelerated its ad-vance in battalion columns. On 6 Au-gust, it had progressed 5,000 yardsalong the road to Ritidian Point, theend of the island and the end of thebattle for Guam. As that evening fell,the 3d Division was in visual contact

north of Guam. Here, a blinding flash from a Long Tom lightsup the dark Guam night as it joins other guns in the shelling.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 93340

During the night of 2-3 August, U.S. artillery delivered manyrounds of harassing and interdiction fire on the enemy in the

38

itS

Captured by 1st Brigade Marines, rebuilt by Marine engineers, Squadrons 217, 225, and 321, and Marine Night Fighter Squa-and in full-scale operation, the Orote Peninsula airstrip is dron 534. Taxiing down the strip are Vought F4U Corsair fight-home to Marine Aircraft Group 21 and its Marine Fighter ers, while parked off the runway are Grumann F6F Heilcats.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 92396

39

PFC Witek's Medal of Honor Hailed 'Inspiring Acts'rivate First Class Frank Peterd' Witek's Medal of Honor cita-tion reads as follows: "For con-

spicuous gallantry and intrepidity atthe risk of his life above and beyondthe call of duty while serving with the1st Battalion, 9th Marines, 3d MarineDivision, during the Battle ofFinegayen at Guam, Marianas Islands,on 3 August 1944. When his rifle pla-toon was halted by heavy surprise firefrom well camouflaged enemy posi-tions, Private First Class Witek daring-ly remained standing to fire a fullmagazine from his [Browning] auto-matic [rifle] at point-blank range intoa depression housing Japanese troops,killing eight of the enemy and enablingthe greater part of his platoon to takecover. During his platoons withdraw-al for consolidation of lines, he re-

mained to safeguard a severelywounded comrade, courageouslyreturning the enemy's fire until the ar-rival of stretcher bearers, and thencovering the evacuation by sustainedfire as he moved backward toward hisown lines. With his platoon againpinned down by a hostile machinegun, Private First Class Witek, on hisinitiative, moved forward boldly to thereinforcing tanks, and infantry, alter-nately throwing hand grenades and fir-ing as he advanced to within 5 to 10yards of the enemy position, and des-troying the hostile machine-gun em-placement and an additional eightJapanese before he himself was struckdown by an enemy rifleman. His vali-ant and inspiring action effectivelyreduced the enemy's firepower, there-by enabling his platoon to attain its ob-

jective, and reflects the highest creditupon Private First Class Witek and theUnited States naval service. He gallant-ly gave his life for his country:'

.4

fresh regiment, the 306th, which hadcome up from the south where it hadpatrolled with the brigade. It was incontact with the 9th Marines on thedivision boundary. Colonel DouglasC. McNair, 77th Division chief ofstaff, was there, too, seeking a site fora division CF and was killed by asniper. Colonel McNair's father,Lieutenant General Leslie J. McNair,was killed in France 12 days earlierduring an American bombing raid.

The attack on Mount Santa Rosabegan at noon, 7 August. Behind therumble of artillery and rattle oftanks, answered in kind by the ene-my, the 77th took Yigo, the door toSanta Rosa, and continued GeneralBruce's wheeling maneuver. Bulldoz-ers blazed trails, and tanks and in-fantry overran machine gunpositions. The 77th was dug into po-sitions on the night of 7-8 Augustready for the final attack on themountain. The expected big Japanesecounterattack still did not come. Therapid advance of the Americans ac-companied by heavy artillery sup-port likely forestalled that forelornhope.

Two regiments, the 305th and307th, proceeded rapidly on 8 Au-gust. By 1240, the northern half of

with the 77th Infantry Division, Sherman tanks of the Army 706th Tank Battalion pass through Agcina before tak-wherever the all-encompassing jun- ing the cross-island road to join the 77th Division prior to the Barrigada action.gle allowed.

Meanwhile, heavy Seventh AirForce bombing as well as artilleryand naval shelling of enemy areashad been going on for days. Nightfighters were now assigned to sup-port the advance, so even darknessafforded the Japanese no protection.By that same 6 August, the defenseline that General Obata had setacross Guam had been shattered andoverrun. Only isolated pockets nowexisted before Santa Rosa.

No American commander couldsay on 7 August when the fight forGuam would be over. General Brucein his attack first to Yigo and thenSanta Rosa would have a relatively

40

Mount Santa Rosa was in Americanhands, and the troops moved to se-cure the rest of the mountain. By1440 the Army had reached the cliffsby the sea and could look right downto the ocean. The 306th infantry hadalso completed an enveloping moveto take the northern slopes of MountSanta Rosa.

Only 600 enemy bodies werefound after the two-day fight forYigo and Santa Rosa. Yet, estimatesof the enemy personnel at Santa Rosahad been as high as 5,000. So thismeant that enemy troops in signifi-cant number now infested the jungledterrain everywhere on Guam. Worse,some enemy tanks were also unac-counted for. Enemy survivors of theMount Santa Rosa battle kept drift-ing into the 9th Marines lines on theArmy flank, slowing the regiment'sadvance. Sharp-eyed Marines notedmore than a smattering of enemymovement near a particular hill inthe Army zone. This was believed tobe the command post area of GeneralObata.

The 3d Marines on the left of thedivision's zone had progressed withthe same occasional enemy opposi-tion. A 19-man roadblock held upthe Marines, but was taken outquickly. Searching a corridor be-tween the 3d and the 9th Marines,the 21st Marines came upon the bod-ies of 30 Guamanians near Chagui-an. They had been beheaded.

The brigade had it a little easier onthe far west, for it found negligibleresistance as it advanced along fair-ly good trails. On 8 August, a patrolof the 22d Marines reached RitidianPoint, the northernmost point of theisland. Moving along a twisting clifftrail to the beach, the Marines en-countered less-than-aggressiveJapanese defenses which they quicklyovercame. General Shepherd's 1stProvisional Marine Brigade had thedistinction of being first to reach boththe southernmost point of the islandin the early days of the campaign and

the northernmost section of Guam atRitidian Point at this time.

General Shepherd's Marines beganvigorously patrolling the area it theyoccupied, but found few Japanese.As a result, General Geiger reducedthe amount of naval gunfire placedon the area, while Saipan-basedSeventh Air Force P-47's made theirlast bombing and strafing runs onRitidian Point. The 22d Marines wasdown below the cliffs at Ritidian,scouring along the beaches wherethere are many caves. The 4th Ma-rines was on the north coast at Men-gagan Point and tied by patrols to the22d Marines. At 1800, 9 August,

41

General Shepherd declared organizedresistance had ceased in his zone.

It was not so easy for the 3d Ma-rines. On the night of 8-9 Augustnear Tarague, the regiment was hitby a last-resort Japanese mortar andtank attack. Marine antitankgrenades and bazooka rockets werewet and ineffective and the Japaneseblazed away with impunity and thenducked back into the woods. Amaz-ingly, when Major William A. Cu!-pepper, commanding the 2dBattalion (Lieutenant Colonel deZayas had been killed on 26 July),counted heads, he found that he hadsuffered not a single casualty.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 94395

MajGen Henry L. Larsen, left, designated island commander, meets with BGenLemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., commanding general of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade,and Col Robert Blake, Gen Larsen's chief of staff. With them are three Guamani-ans who enlisted in the Navy before the war and are now visiting their homes.

Patrols of the 9th Marines ad-vanced to Pati Point, the northeastprojection of the island. Intelligencesources then reported to ColonelCraig that a mass of Japanese (maybe2,000) troops were holed up atSavana Grand, a wild tract of jun-gle, coconut trees, and high grassesnear the coast. Colonel Craig did notwant to risk casualties so close to theend of the campaign, so the artillerysupporting the 9th Marines fired a to-tal of 2,280 rounds. The few Japanesesurvivors were either killed or be-came prisoners. The final Americanpositions formed along the coast. Bynightfall of 8 August, Colonel Craig'sMarines could wave to the soldiers ofthe 306th patrolling to their south.

General Geiger was not ready to

declare Guam secure until a pocketof tanks still existing in the 3d Divi-sion zone was wiped out. That hadto be done by the 10th, for that wasthe day Admiral Nimitz was sched-uled to arrive on a visit. There weretanks indeed and the task of findingand eliminating them was given toMajor Culpepper's 2d Battalion, 3dMarines. Advancing at 0730, the bat-talion and a platoon of AmericanSherman tanks soon found two ene-my mediums firing, only 400 yardsup the trail the Marines were follow-ing. The Shermans left their counter-parts black and burning. Seven moreenemy mediums were abandoned. AJapanese infantry platoon withdrewto the coastal cliffs and was killedthere.

On that day, 10 August, at 1131as he learned that the last Japanesetanks still in action had been des-troyed, General Geiger declared allorganized resistance on Guam hadended. It was a great day for theGuamanians. The island was theirsagain.

It was also the next to the last dayfor General Obata. His MountMataguac position was stronglydefended, so much so that when the306th had tried to force it earlier itfailed. On the morning of 11 August1944, when the general knew hisheadquarters had been discoveredand that his enemy was coming forhim, Obata signalled to his emperor:

We are continuing a

42

THE FINAL DRIVE- 7-JO AUGUST

SHOWING NIGHT DEFENSIVE POSITIONS OF &SSAIJLT BATTALIONS

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I''1 p

I.

•7'U

rk

;-.- ..eJ\ .rtPrisoners of war in the Guam stockade stand with bowed heads as they are read the August 1945 surrender announcement.

desperate battle. We have onlyour bare hands to fight with.The holding of Guam has be-come hopeless. Our souls willdefend the island to the veryend. I am overwhelmed withsorrow for the families of themany officers and men. I prayfor the prosperity of theEmpire.

The 306th made the last assaultsupported by tanks and demolitionsquads. The enemy defenders killedseven Americans and wounded 17before they went down to defeat, bu-ried in the rubble of blown caves andemplacements. General Obata tookhis own life or was killed sometimeduring those last hours of the battleof Guam.

Major General Henry L. Larsen as-• sumed command of the Guam IslandCommand at 1200, 15 August. Un-

der him, and largely with the forcesof the 3d Marine Division, the mop-ping up continued.

Part of Japan's terrible cost onGuam was the 10,971 bodies alreadycounted. Yet there were some 10,000

Enemy holdouts accompanied by theirmascot are brought in to surrender afterintensive preparations by the IslandCommand Psychological Warfare Unit.

43

Japanese still on the island. At firstsome of these men fought and stagedambushes, and a few sniped at theAmericans, but soon the remainingJapanese sought only one thing—food! Most of the others fled whenencountered. The Japanese now hadno central command. They starved,died of dysentery, became too weakto flee, and then blew themselves upwith the one precious grenade whichthey saved to take their own lives.Aggressive American patrols weresoon killing or capturing 80 Japanesesoldiers and sailors a day. A daringfew stole into Marine food storageareas at night. One soldier scribbled:"All around me are enemy only. Ittakes a brave man indeed to go insearch of food:'

In addition to the battlefieldcasualties, more than 8,500 Japanesewere killed or captured on Guam be-tween August 1944 and the end of

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the war in August 1945.In the 21 days of the Guam cam-

paign ending 10 August, Marineunits of the III Amphibious Corpsreported 1,190 men killed in action,377 dead of wounds, and 5,308wounded. The 77th Division's casual-ties were 177 soldiers killed and 662wounded. The Army and the Ma-rines were a closely knit team in therecapture of Guam. It is reputed thatGeneral Holland Smith was the firstto refer to General Bruce's troops asthe "77th Marines." Major Aplington,a battalion commander in the 3d Ma-rines, commented on the soldiers:

In their fatigues so differentfrom our herringbone utilitiesand their olive drab ponchos(ours were camouflaged) sodifferent from us . . . there wasno doubt in our minds that the77th were good people to havealongside in a fight and as aresult we referred to them as"The 77th Marine Division:'On the same busy day, 10 August,

only hours after Major Culpepper'sbattalion had knocked out the last ofthe Japanese tanks, the Indianapolis(CA 35) steamed into Apra Harborwith Marine Corps Commandant

Lieutenant General Alexander A.Vandegrift on board, accompanyingAdmiral Nimitz. On 15 August, Ad-miral Nimitz directed that his for-ward CinCPac-CinCPOA headquar-ters be established on Guam, andfrom here, he directed the rest of thePacific War. Soon after, from air-fields on Guam, as well as those onTinian, B-29s were blasting theJapanese home islands. Hard fight-ing was yet to be experienced by Ma-rine divisions on Peleliu, Iwo Jima,and Okinawa. But whether theyknew it or not, the end of the warwas less than a year away.

Spruance to the island. From left are MajGen Roy S. Geiger,Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps; Adm Spruance;LtGen Holland M. Smith, Commanding General, Fleet Ma-rine Force, Pacific; Adrn Nimitz; and Gen Vandegrift. Whiletogether they discussed the future course of the Pacific War.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 92087

The architects of victory in the Pacific met together on Guamon 10 August 1944, when Indianapolis (CA 35) brought Com-mandant of the Marine Corps LtGen Alexander A. Vandegrifttogether with Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Adm ChesterW Nimitz and Fifth Fleet Commander Adm Raymond L.

44

In addition to the official MarineCorps histories of the Guam cam-paign, Major 0. Robert Lodge's TheRecapture of Guam (Washington,1954), and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Ber-nard C. Nalty, and Edwin H. Turn-bladh's Central Pacific Drive, volIII, History of U.S. Marine CorpsOperations in World War II(Washington 1966), the author con-sulted the Army's official history,Philip A. Crowl's Campaign in theMarianas (Washington, 1960). Ofvalue also were the 3d Division'shistory by Robert A. Aurthur andKenneth Cohimia, The Third Ma-rine Division (Washington, 1948),the classic U.S. Marines and Am-phibious War by Jeter A. Iseley andPhilip A. Crowl (Princeton, 1951),RAdm Samuel Eliot Morison's TheTwo Ocean War (Boston, 1976),The Fall of Japan by William A.Craig (New York, 1967), and LtGenVictor H. Krulak's First to Fight(Annapolis, 1984).

Historians at all the Services'Washington historical offices wereuniversally helpful, but I wouldparticularly like to thank Dr. Ter-rence J. Gough of the Army'sCenter of Military History and Dr.Robert Browning, the Coast Guardhistorian for their assistance. Con-versations and correspondence, andoral history interviews, with thefollowing were helpful: Jack Ker-rins; MajGen Charles L. Davis,AUS (Ret); BGen Vincente (Ben)Blaz, USMC (Ret); Col Martin I."Stormy" Sexton, USMC (Ret); ColFraser E. West, USMC (Ret); LtColWilcie A. O'Bannon, USMC (Ret);Col Henry Aplington II, USMC(Ret); Dr. William H. Putney; DaleM. Quillan; William L. Dunlap;Paul Ulrich; and Alfred G. Don.Even if their words were not used,their thoughts and observationswere carefully considered. Theauthor's own experiences on Guamas a Marine combat correspondentpervaded his whole account.

C yril J. O'Brien served in a line company withthe 3d Marines, 3d Marine Division,

on Bougainville, and then as a Combat Cor-respondent in the battles for Guam and Iwo Jima.Following World War II, he covered Capitol Hillas a Washington correspondent, then joined thestaff of the John Hopkins University AppliedPhysics Laboratory where he was a science writerand supervisor of media relations. He attendedSt. Joseph's University, Philadelphia, and theAmerican University, Washington, D.C. He livesin Silver Spring, Maryland.

An editing error appears in the 1994 History and Museums Division pamphlet,A Different War: Marines in Europe and North Africa, by Lieutenant Colonel HarryW. Edwards, USMC (Ret), from the "World War II Commemorative Series." Onpage 8, the photo caption which begins "Then-Col Julian C. Smith, left , shouldread "Then-Col Julian C. Smith, below

94 i9WORLD WAR II

THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in theWorld War II era, is published for the education and training of Marines bythe History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,Washington, D.C., as a part of the U.S. Department of Defense observanceof the 50th anniversary of victory in that war.

Editorial costs of preparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part bya bequest from the estate of Emilie H. Watts, in memory of her late husband,Thomas M. Watts, who served as a Marine and was the recipient of a PurpleHeart.

WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMSBrigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)

GENERAL EDITOR,WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

Benis M. Frank

CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANTGeorge C. MacGillivray

EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISIONRobert E. Struder, Senior Editor; W. Stephen Hill, Visual Information

Specialist; Catherine A. Kerns, Composition Services Technician

Marine Corps Historical CenterBuilding 58, Washington Navy Yard

Washington, D.C. 20374-5040

1994

PCN 190 003126 00