The Group: Successes and Failures of the United States’ Special Operations Campaign in Vietnam

7/23/2019 The Group: Successes and Failures of the United States Special Operations Campaign in Vietnam

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TheGroup

SuccessesandFailuresoftheUnitedStates

SpecialOperationsCampaigninVietnam

AndrewMullikin

PreparedforDr.PhillipKarber

GOVT451GeorgetownUniversity

7December2012

Contact:[email protected]

Figure1:TheunofficialSOGinsignia,

designedbymenassignedtotheunit.


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Youveneverlivedtillyouvealmostdied

Forthosewhofightforit,

Lifehasaflavor

Theprotectedwillneverknow.

SOGmotto1

Introduction

Anofficial1988studybytheJointChiefsontheconductofthewarinVietnam

simplynotesthattheMilitaryAssistanceCommand-VietnamsStudiesand

ObservationsGroup2providedadviceandassistanceintheareasofresearchand

development,combatdevelopment,andclandestineactivitiesinadditiontoevaluatingSPARreports[SignificantProblemsAreaReport]andrecommending

coursesofactionand/ormethodswhile[coordinating]and[monitoring]

clandestineactivities,suchascross-borderreconnaissanceandoperations3

However,SOGwasafarmoredynamicandimportantunitthansuchabland

descriptionwouldseemtoindicate,conductingsomeofthemostdangerous

reconnaissancemissionsintheVietnamWar.Thefollowingpaperexaminesthe

Groupsantecedents,formation,structure,personnel,andtacticsindetail;the

GroupscontributionstothewarinVietnam,anditseffectivenessinachieving

operationalandstrategicgoals,areanalyzedthroughoutthepaper.

ThewarinVietnamwasacomplicatedaffair,andforthatreasontheSOG

operationsdiscussedherearepaintedinbroadstrokes.TheworkofProjectsDelta,

1

As written by Larry Trimble, Jim Lamotte, and Ricardo Davis. Quoted in John L. Plaster, SecretCommandos: Behind Enemy Lines with the Elite Warriors of SOG, Simon and Scheuster, NewYork, NY. 2004, p. xi.2

When SOG was founded, the acronym stood for Special Operations Group; it was changed tothe Studies and Observations Group for purposes of operational security in the summer of1964.3Records of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam: Part 1. The War in Vietnam, 1954-1973,

MACV Historical Office Documentary Collection, ed. Robert E. Lester, (Bethesda, MD: UniversityPublications of America, 1988).


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Sigma,andOmegapriortotheirmergerwithSOG,4forexample,isnotcoveredhere,

despitethesimilaritiesbetweentheirmissionsetandthatoftheSOGreconteams.

Itsalsoimportanttonotethatthescopeoftheactivitiesoftheseunitsremains

largelyclassifiedtothisdaythosegovernmentdocumentsthathavebeen

declassifiedare,ingeneral,redactedsoheavilythatprecisenumbersandother

concretedataforSOGsoperationsisvirtuallynonexistent.TheJointChiefsstudy

referencedabove,forexample,includesonlytwoadditionalreferencestoSOG,both

ofwhicharepubliclyunavailable.Forthatreason,muchofthefollowingtextrelies

heavilyonpersonalmemoirsofthosewhoservedwithSOG,andanalyticaltextson

theeffortsofAmericanunconventionalwarfarespecialistsinVietnamandother

partsofSoutheastAsia.

TheStudiesandObservationsGroupwasanimportantassetintheAmerican

prosecutionoftheVietnamWar,anditspersonnelclearlyrankamongthemost

valorousofalltheunitsthatservedduringthatwar.UnfortunatelytheGroupwas

misusedbothoperationallyandstrategically,anditscombatandcommand

experienceinVietnamofferimportantlessonstomodernspecialoperations

missions.AsMajorDannyKelleynotes,

Determiningamoreeffectiveuseofmilitaryresourcestomeetthestrategic

goalofdefeatinginternationalterroristsandthenationswhosponsorthemisa

difficultproblem.Inthepast,policymakersfacedsimilarproblemsintryingto

determinehowtodefeatagrowingcommunistinsurgencyinSouthVietnam.TheUSemployedamixtureofDODclandestineoperations,CIAcovertaction

forces,andconventionalmilitaryunitsintheprosecutionoftheconflict.5

RecognizingwhereSOGanditshighercommandwentwrongisakeytaskin

developingamorecomprehensiveunderstandingofmodernspecialoperations

missionsatthetactical,operational,andstrategiclevels.

4

Programs similar in design to SOG but operating under the authority of the 5th

Special ForcesGroup. For more information, see Kelly, Francis J. Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces1961-1971. Washington: Department of the Army, 1973. Print.5

MAJ Danny M. Kelley, The Misuse of the Studies and Observations Group as a National Assetin Vietnam, 2005, at , p. 4.


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Origins

SOGgrewfromrootsintheU.S.ArmySpecialForces,whichinturnowedits

earlyexistencetoveteransoftheWWIIOfficeofStrategicServices(OSS)andotherguerrillacampaignsinboththeEuropeanandPacificTheatersofthewar.Menlike

BrigadierGeneralDonaldBlackburn,Col.ArthurBullSimons,Col.AaronBank(an

OSSveteranwholaterbecamethefirstcommanderofthe10thSpecialForces

Group),andotherswhogainedhard-wonunconventionalwarfareexperience

fightingbehindenemylinesduringWWIIandtheKoreanWarwerethefoundersof

awholenewtypeofunconventionalwarfightingdoctrinewithintheUSmilitary.

RecognizingtheArmysneedforapermanentunconventionalwarfarecapability,

GeneralRobertMcClure(thentheheadoftheArmysOfficeoftheChiefof

PsychologicalWarfare)establishedaSpecialOperationsDivisionin1951.That

organizationwaseventuallyrenamedtheSpecialForcesDivisionandwas

dedicatedtosupportingpartisangroupsinoperationssimilartothoseoftheOSSin

WWII.Fiveyearslater,thegrouphadagainchangednames,becomingtheUSArmy

SpecialWarfareCenter,andwasdeployingunitsaroundtheworld.6

ThefirstArmySpecialForcesdeploymentstoSouthVietnamarrivedinJune

1956,whenadvisorsfromthe14thSpecialForcesGroupweresenttotrainSouth

Vietnamesetroops.WithAmericaninvolvementinVietnamescalatingin1961,

attentionturnedtoSpecialForcesPresidentKennedysfavoritemilitary

organizationasawaytoprovidemoretangiblesupporttoSouthVietnamslargely

ineffectivearmywithoutthepoliticalramificationsoflarge-scaleconventionaltroop

deployments.7WhiletheSpecialForcesteamstrainedSouthVietnamesetroops,

notablyincludingtheelite1stObservationGroup,theKennedyadministration

taskedtheCIAwithprovidingthemanpowerandresourcesforacovertwar

6Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of UnconventionalWarfare. London: Frank Cass, 1998. Print, pp. 54-57. Note: this brief history of the Army SpecialForces does not do justice to the innovative men who founded the organization. For moreinformation on the Green Berets, Adams text is an excellent place to start.7

Ibid, p. 78.


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againsttheNorth,formalizingtheseordersinNationalSecurityAction

Memorandum(NSAM)52,signedbyPresidentKennedyon11May1961. 8

OperationWhiteStar

ThemodelforSOGoperationsdevelopedoutofanotherSpecialForces

deploymenttoSoutheastAsia,inwhichtwelveeleven-mantrainingteamsweresent

toLaosunderthecommandoftheMilitaryAssistanceAdvisoryGroupLaos,

formallyestablishedon19April1961. 9WhiletheseSFoperatorshadbeenquietly

trainingthegenerallyineptLaotianmilitaryalongsideCIAoperativeforseveral

years,theprogramwassignificantlyexpandedandmadeofficialbythe

establishmentofMAAG-Laos.Initially,theSFsoldiersservedalmostexclusivelyinatrainingrolewhilealsogatheringintelligencefortheCIA.Eventually,teamsbegan

deployingintothefieldwiththeirunits,servingasfullcombatadvisorsand

executingthefirstAmericancombatassignmentinSoutheastAsia.Stantonnotes

thatthisdeploymentwasimportantbecauseoftheSpecialForcesnewroleasan

instrumentofAmericanstrategy:

ByvirtueofPresidentKennedysbeliefinitsindividualandcollectiveexcellence,

theSpecialForcesbecametheprinciplecounterinsurgencyforceoftheUnited

States.ThewartimeSpecialForceswasforgedinthejaggedLaotianmountainsandforestplateausindirectcontrasttoitsintendedwartimemissionasguerrillacadre.InLaos,asinVietnam,SpecialForcessoldiers

wereemployedaselitetroopstoexecutelong-rangespecialmissions,tolead

normalinfantry,andtotrainremote,indigenousminorities.Actualmissions

againsttrueenemyguerrillabandswererare,andtheSpecialForceswasnever

allowedtopenetratedeniedareastoestablishguerrillaunits.10

Interestingly,theWhiteStarteamsinLaosenjoyedexcellentrelationshipswith

theCIAoperativesworkinginthecountry,allowingthemtooperateeffectively

withoutworkingthroughthebureaucracyestablishedbytheMAAGcommand.

8

Robert M. Gillespie, Black Ops Vietnam: The Operational History of MACVSOG, (Annapolis,MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011), pp. 4-5.9

Shelby L Stanton. Green Berets at War: U.S. Army Special Forces in Southeast Asia, 19561975. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985. Print, p. 22.10

Ibid, pp. 30-21.


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UnfortunatelythisrelationshipwouldchangeinVietnam,probablyinpartdueto

thefailureofCIAcovertoperationstherepriortotheGroupsestablishment.

OperationLeapingLena

By1963,theCIAhadfailedtodeliverpositiveresultsfromitscovertwarfare

campaignagainstNorthVietnam.DespitePresidentKennedysinitialorders,the

CIAhadfocusedmostofitseffortsintheSouth,fearingthattheirintelligence

networkswouldbedegradedwithoutconstantsupervision.WhileCIAoperationsin

SouthVietnamincludedparamilitaryandcounterterrorismcampaigns,operations

inNorthVietnamwerelimitedtoagentteaminfiltrationforintelligencecollection

andpsychologicaloperationsincludingleafletdropsandradiobroadcasts.SuchoperationswereafarcryfromKennedysorderstobuildaninsurgentmovement

againsttheCommunists.GiventheshortcomingsoftheCIAprogram,

responsibilitiesforcovertandclandestineoperationswereslowlytransitioned

awayfromtheAgencyandassignedtothenewlyformedStudiesandObservations

Group.Thetransitionbetweentheseprogramstookroughlyayear,duringwhich

timetheCIAstilltooktheleadonallblackoperationsinSoutheastAsia.

Itwasduringthisperiodthatthefirstcross-borderreconnaissancemissionswereemployedintheVietnamWar.Recognizingthatwhateverwashappeningin

Laosaerialreconnaissancehadfailedtodeliverreliableintelligencerequiredthe

seriousattentionofAmericanstrategists,DefenseSecretaryRobertMcNamara

resolvedtosendteamsdrawnfromtheArmyoftheRepublicofVietnam(ARVN)

andtrainedbyUSSpecialForcestroopsonreconnaissancemissionsacrossthe

Laotianborder.Despitewarningsfromasenior-rankingSpecialForcesofficerthat

themissionswouldfailunlessGreenBeretswereassignedtoleadtheunits,

McNamaraorderedtheteamsformedandreadytodeploywithinthirtydays.

Thesereconnaissanceoperations,codenamedLeapingLena,wereadministered

bytheCIAandtrainedbySpecialForcessoldiersfromthe5thSFGroup.Theeight

teamswereeachmannedbyfiveVietnamesecommandos,andwereinsertedinto


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dropzonesalongHighway92inLaosbetween24Juneand1July1963. 11

Unfortunately,alleightteamswereinterceptedbyNVAtroopsoperatinginside

Laos,withthemajorityoftheirmemberseitherkilledorcaptured.Onlyfourofthe

originalfortymenescapedbacktoSouthVietnam.12IntheaftermathofLeaping

Lenasfailure,itwasclearthattheNVAhadasubstantialpresenceinLaos,butno

onecouldbesureexactlywhattheCommunistforcesweredoinginthearea.The

taskoffindingoutwouldbehandedtoSOGanditsnewcommander,WWII

unconventionalwarfarespecialistCol.DonaldBlackburn.

FormationandOrderofBattle

TheinitialdemandforanenhancedspecialoperationscapacityinVietnamstemmedfromhigh-rankinggeneralsdisapprovaloftheunconventionalwarfare

tacticsthenemployedbySpecialForcesunitsinVietnam.Ratherthantrainingthe

VietnamesetofightthehallmarkofunconventionalwarfareMajorGeneral

WilliamB.Rossoninparticulararguedforanexpansionoftheater-wideU.S.covert

operations.ThisresultedinOperationsPlan34A,whichcalledfor:

1. AnexpansionoftheVietnamese1stObservationUnit,whichtasked

indigenoustroopswithcovertandclandestineoperationsagainstNorth

VietnamwithsupportfromtheCIAandArmySpecialForces.

2. CIAandSpecialForcestrainingofreconnaissanceteamstobeinfiltrated

intosouthernLaos,wheretheyunitswouldlocateandattackNVAbases

andlinesofcommunication,allunderlightciviliancover.

3. Establishmentofcompany-sized(100-150man)Vietnameseassaultunits

fordeploymentagainsttargetstoolargeforthereconnaissanceteams.

11

The exact number of men assigned to these units is unclear in the literature. The numberspresented here are from Mike Guardia. Shadow Commander: The Epic Story of Donald D.Blackburn - Guerrilla Leader and Special Forces Hero. Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2011. Print, p.166. Unfortunately even Guardias text has some discrepancies regarding the Leaping Lenateams; I have reported his most consistent numbers.12

Ibid.


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4. ThedevelopmentoftheSouthVietnameseArmyscapabilitytolaunch

light-infantry(Ranger)raidsintoNorthVietnam.

5. RegularflightsoverCommunist-heldareasforthedisseminationof

propagandamaterialstobothharassNVAforcesandhelpmaintain

moraleofanti-CommunistresidentsofNorthVietnam.

PresidentJohnsonapprovedOpPlan34AinJanuary1964,andon24JanuarySOG

wasbornoutofGeneralOrder6fromtheMilitaryAssistanceCommand-Vietnam

Headquarters.AccordingtoAdams,MACV-SOGwastobeajointunconventional

warfaretaskforceresponsibleforspecialoperationsinBurma,Cambodia,Laos,

NorthandSouthVietnam,andborderareasofChinaitwastobethejointservice,

unconventional-wartaskforceforSoutheastAsia13GiventheCIAsfailureto

expanditsoperationalmandateunderNASM52beyondSouthVietnam,theSOG

operationswerethefirsttrulytheater-wideAmericancovertandclandestineduring

theVietnamWar.

UnfortunatelythenewcommandsrelationshipwithMACVheadquarterswas

rockyfromthestart.DespiteSOGsdirectsubordinationtoMACVheadquartersin

Saigon,thecommandsmissionsrequiredapprovalfromtheJointChiefsofStaff.In

practicethisapprovalwasdelegatedtotheSpecialAssistantforCounterinsurgency

andSpecialActivitiesatthePentagon,andresultedinasignificantlagbetweenthe

openingofawindowofopportunityforadecisivecovertoperationandtheactual

approvalandexecutionofthatoperation.Severalsourcesalsoindicatethatthe

MACVcommandstaffwashesitanttoplaceitsfullconfidenceinthepoorly

understoodspecialoperationsunitsassignedtoSOG.Asaresult,SOGwasnever

constitutedasaformal,independenttaskforce.14

Perhapsevenworsethanthiscommandrelationship,staffofficersassignedto

SOGdidnotenjoythesupportandcooperationoftheCIA,despitetheAgencys

13

Adams, p. 118.14

Ibid, p. 119.


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previousexperiencerunningcovertoperationsinthetheater.ThefewCIAofficers

assignedtoSOGwererestrictedtothePsychologicalOperationssection,wherethey

hadlittleimpactonthemajorityofSOGmissions.Evenmoreproblematic,the

positionofSOGdeputy,or01,wasreservedforaCIAliaisonofficer,butLangley

neverassignedanofficertothepost.Somesourcesevengosofarastosuggestthat

theCIAwantedtokeepitsdistancefromSOG.15Thecombinationofthesetwo

factorsmeantthatthenewSOGcommandwasforcedtobeginitsoperationsin

SoutheastAsiawithoutsignificantsupportfromitspredecessororitshigher

headquarters.

Organization

TheSOGcommandwasinitiallyassignedsixofficersandtwoenlistedmen,led

byCol.ClydeR.Russell,whohadservedwiththe101stAirborneDivisionduring

WWII,butlackedrealexperiencefightingunconventionalwarfare.Drawingfrom

15

Adams, p. 119-120.

Figure2:SOGOrganizationalStructure.TheGroundStudiesGroup,SOG35,wasthebranchresponsible

forcross-borderreconnaissanceoperations.


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hisconventionalbackground,RussellorganizedSOGalongtraditionalmilitarylines,

withseparatedivisionsforvariousadministrativeactivities.

Asthecommanddeveloped,itsforcestructureeventuallyincludedan

assortmentofspecialoperationsunits,includingArmySpecialForces(Green

Berets),NavySEALs,ReconnaissanceMarines,andCIAagents,inadditiontoalarge

complementofindigenousmercenariesincludingVietnamese,ChineseNungs,

Montagnards,andCambodians.Giventheclandestinenatureoftheunititishardto

tellhowmanyoperationalpersonnelwereworkingforSOGatanyonetime,butin

1970thecommandhad383authorizedpersonnel(downfrom394attheendof

1969).However,totalcontributionsfromtheArmy,AirForce,MarineCorps,CIA,

andindigenousgroupsbroughtupthetotalto10,210personnelreportingtothe

SOGchiefinSaigon.16AccordingtoAdams,thevastmajorityofthesepersonnel

whichtheauthorreferstoas2,000Americansand8,000Vietnamesewerefrom

theUSArmyandVietnameseSpecialForcesunits.ThepersonnelassignedtoSOG

frombranchesotherthantheArmyasidefromsmallnumbersofUSNavySEALs

andtheirVietnamesecounterpartswereprimarilysupportstaff,includingtheair

andmaritimetransportationcomponentsofSOG.17,18

16

Gillespie, p. 197.17

Adams, p. 119.18

According to Col. Francis J. Kelly, the US Marine Corps contribution to special operationsmissions in Vietnam came largely before the creation of SOG, running from 1962-1964. (See,Kelly, Francis J. Vietnam Studies: U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971. Washington:Department of the Army, 1973. Print, p. 162.)


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SOGeventuallyestablishedthreeoperationalheadquarters:Commandand

ControlNorth(CCN)inDaNang,CommandandControlCentral(CCC)inKontum,

andCommandandControlSouth(CCS)inBanMeThuot(seemapabove).Theseheadquarterswereservicedbyforwardoperatingbases(FOBs)strategicallylocated

withinashorthelicopterrideofinsertionsitesclosetotheCambodianandLaotian

borders.19Allofthesesiteswerecloselycompartmentalized,withstrongcover

storiestokeeptheircovertoperationssecret.TheCCCinsertionsiteatDakTo,for

example,washometoanAmericanengineerbattalionandemergencymedical

bunker,providingplausibledeniabilitytoitssecondaryroleasabasetorefueland

rearmhelicoptersflyinginsupportofSOGscross-bordermissions,andasastaging

groundforthoseinsertions.TheinsertionsitesalsohousedBrightLightunits:

reconteamsstagedforemergencyextractionsandpersonnelrecoverymissions

19

By the end of the war SOG operated six FOBs throughout South Vietnam (Guardia, p. 170).

Figure3:MapofthreeoperationalSOGheadquarters.


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behindenemylines. 20ThusSOGteamsrotatedfrommajorSOGinstallationsdirectly

tothesecovertinsertionsites,executingmissionsandreturningbacktotheir

headquarters,sometimesafteronlyafewhoursontheground,butoccasionally

afterweeklongoperationsinenemyterritory.

Figure4:AerialviewofCommandandControlNorth,DaNang.

Combatforcesattheregionalcommandandcontrolhubswereorganizedinto

reconnaissanceteamswhenJohnPlasterarrivedatKontum,eighteenteamswere

fullymannedwithanadditionalsixauthorizedbutwithoutsufficientmanpowerto

gointothefield.EachteamwascomposedofthreeAmericanoperatorsin

Plasterscase,allGreenBeretsandnineindigenoussoldiers,andnamedforan

Americanstate,forexample,RTTexasorRTCalifornia.OtherSOGregional

commandcentersuseddifferentnamingsystems;reconteamsfromCCSatBanMe

Thuotwerenamedfortools,whilethosebasedatCCNwerenamedforpoisonous

snakes,likeRTCopperhead,ledbyRicardoDavisuntilhisdeathinCambodia.

20

Plaster, p. 46.


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RecruitmentandTraining

JohnPlastersmemoirofservicewithSOGprovidesareadyexampleofthe

dedicationshownbythemenwhovolunteeredforservicewiththeunit.After

enlistingintheArmyatage18,freshoutofhighschool,PlasterattendedAirborne

SchoolatFortBenning,GeorgiabeforebeingselectedtoattendSpecialForces

training,followingasimilarpipelinetomodern18Xenlistees.21Afterintensive

trainingwiththeSpecialForcesTrainingDetachmentatFortBragg,Plaster

deployedtoVietnamwiththe5thSpecialForcesGroup,initiallyassignedtoaSignals

Company.Atthebehestofanoldfriend,Plasterfakedhisordersandvolunteeredto

gotoCommandandControlNorth,hopingtofindhiswayintoSOG.Uponarrival,

PlasterandtheothernewmenwerebriefedbytheCCNcommander,Lt.Col.Jack

Warren,whomadetheimplicationsofrunningcovertoperationsinVietnamcrystal

clear:

Youwillnotkeepadiaryorjournal,[Warren]ordered.Yourlettersare

subjecttocensorship.Youareforbiddentotellanyoneoutsideherewhatyou

aredoing.WetrainVietnameseandMontagnards,thatsall.Onpaperwe

belongtothe5thSpecialForcesGroup.Inreality,weworkforSOG.22

Unfortunately,themenwhofinallymadetheirwayeitherbyselectionor

accident,asinPlasterscasetojointheranksofSOGwereingeneralill-prepared

forcovertwarfare.Pre-missiontraining,likealmosteveryotheraspectofservice

withSOG,wasinformalandlargelybasedonthewhimsandpastexperiencesofthe

teamsOne-Zero.23Reconteamsweregenerallyallowedoneortwoweeksto

21

The U.S. Army 18X programalso referred to as direct entry or Initial Accessionsprovidesyoung men the opportunity to enlist specifically to attend the Special Forces Assessment andSelection program.22 Plaster, 29-30.23

One-Zeros were recon team leaders, in charge of two other Americans (referred to as One-Ones and One-Twos, denoting their rank in the team hierarchy) and several indigenousmercenaries, usually Vietnamese, Montagnard, or Cambodians recruited and funded by SOGmoney. Plaster explains that rank was irrelevant in the choice of a One-Zero: Some One-Zeroswere not their teams highest-ranking man Here in SOG, rank did not determine leadership;experience and ability meant far more than the stripes or bars a man wore. (Plaster 37). Theauthor offers several examples of SOG officers, including a lieutenant colonel in charge of


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prepareformissions,butthetrainingtheyconductedatleastaccordingto

Plasterrarelyprogressedbeyondbasicimmediateactiondrills.Newly-

constitutedteams,orteamsreformedwithonlyoneortwoveteransremainingfrom

theirpreviousiterations,weregivenabriefthreeweekstobringtheirindigenous

soldiersuptospeed,formingamission-ready,greenteamdespitesignificant

languageandculturalbarriers.24

Equipment,Weapons,andLogistics

MuchlikemodernAmericanspecialoperationsforces,SOGunitssucceededin

partduetothetoolstheycarriedintocombat.Inadditiontobasicsmallarms

(whichsometimesperformedpoorlyinthefield)SOGcommandersleveragedsignificantexternalassetstomovetheirunitsaroundtheunitssecretbattlefieldsin

LaosandCambodia.

PlasterencounterstheSOGtransportationnetworkearlyuponhisarrivalin

SouthVietnam,whenheisorderedtoboardaplanetoKontum,thenaforward

operatingbaseunderthecommandofCommandandControl-North,butlaterhome

toCommandandControl-Central.HedescribestheC-130,normallyastandard

transportcraft,butspeciallymodifiedinthiscaseforSOGoperations:

NicknamedaBlackbirdbecauseofitsdistinctblackandforestgreenpaintscheme,theplanesnoseboreafoldedyoke,partofaspecialapparatusfor

extractingsecretagentsfromtheground.ItsU.S.insigniawerepaintedon

removablemetalplates,sotheyeasilycouldbetakenoff.InsidetheC-130,the

cargocompartmentsforwardthirdwascurtainedoffwithawarning:TOP

SECRET.Squeezedintotheremainingseatswasasmorgasbordofpassengers

reconnaissance units at Kontum, going into the field under the command of young StaffSergeants serving as One-Zeros.24

While almost all indigenous recruits to SOG had previously served with and been extensivelytrained by other U.S. forcesgenerally Special Forces teams operating throughout SouthVietnamtheir ability to serve effectively with SOG recon teams left much to be desired. Plasterrecounts using toy soldiers to teach basic infantry tactics to Montagnard mercenaries who weregenerally illiterate, learning tasks by rote, and lacking basic mathematic skills, which theyovercame by counting one, two, three, many (Plaster, 162).


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Chinese,Vietnamese,Americansincivilianclothes,armedandunarmedGreen

Berets,andnondescriptAsianswhosenationalityIcouldnotevenguess.25

Withconcernsoverdeniabilityrelaxedbyaround1970,SOGalsohadahandin

developingcloseairsupporttactics,specificallyfortheAC-130gunship,aheavily

armedgroundattackaircraftthathasbeendeployedbyUSSOCOMforcloseair

supportmissionsinAfghanistanandIraq,andaspartoftheNATOinterventionin

LibyainMarch2011.

Intermsofpersonalfieldkit,SOGunitswereinitiallyhighlyrestrictedinterms

oftheweaponsandgeartheycouldcarryintothefield.Inordertomaintainthe

UnitedStatesplausibledeniabilityofsendingtroopsintotechnicallyneutralLaos

andCambodia,reconteamsdeployingacrosstheborderweresterilethey

carrieduntraceablegear,woreAsian-madeuniformswithoutnametapesorrank

insignia,andcarriedno

identificationcardsor

dogtags.SOGteams

oftendeployedwith

foreignweapons,

includingAK-47sandBritishandSwedish

silencedsubmachine

guns.Iftheunitscame

intoheavycontactonthe

ground,theywere

essentiallyontheirown;

earlySOGmissionswere

notallowedaccesstotacticalairsupport,acriticalfeatureofmodernsmall-unit,

especiallyspecialoperations,tactics.Theserestrictionswerelaterrelaxed,allowing

moreandmoreSOGoperatorstocarryAmerican-madeweaponstheCAR-15,a

25

Plaster, 28.

Figure5:RTMaine,1970.DressedinNVAfatiguesandcarryingmostlyforeign

weapons,thisreconteamisreadytodepartfromCCC.


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forerunnertothemodernM4carbine,wasareconfavoriteandtorelyon

helicoptergunshipandfightersupportinextremeemergencies,providedthe

limitedassetsdedicatedtocross-bordersupportwereavailable,andnotoccupied

withotherteamsemergencies.

Tactics

Between1967andApril1972,OPS-35[thereconnaissancegroupresponsible

forcross-bordermissions]conducted1,398reconnaissancemissions,38platoon-

sizedpatrols,and12multi-platoonoperationsinCambodia.Duringthesame

period,itcaptured24prisonersofwar.26Giventhesizeoftheunit,andthecombat

attritionthatconstantlykeptmanpoweratsub-optimallevels,thesheernumberofmissionsrunbySOGisextremelyimpressive.SOGteamsinthefieldalsodisplayed

uncommonvalor;JerryMadDogShriver,forexample,oncefamouslyrepliedtoan

officerconcernedthathewasabouttobeoverrunbycalmlystating,Nosweat.Ive

gotemrightwhereIwantemsurroundedfromtheinside.27

Despitetheseextremecasesofbravado,SOGoperationswereamongthe

deadliestinthewaraccordingtoMeyer,Theunitexperiencedanincredible

casualtyrateofexceeding100percent-meaningthatatonetimeoranother,every

manservinginthatunitwaswoundedatleastonce28Thedangerassociatedwith

serviceinSOGcamelargelyfromtheunitshighoperationaltempoandwidespread

areaofoperations,whichwas,forthemostpart,restrictedtoaustere,deniedaccess

areasbehindenemylines.SOGteamsconductedland,sea,andairoperationsin

NorthVietnam,Laos,andCambodiaareasforbiddentomostotherAmericanunits.

Furthermore,SOGteamshadaroleineverymajoreventoftheconflict,including

26

Capturing an NVA soldier was the ultimate coup for a SOG recon team, providing highercommand with a rare opportunity to interrogate a prisoner, and earning the returning team aweeklong R&R in Taiwan. Unfortunately the act of securing a prisoner was incredibly difficult;prisoners were often killed in the inevitable run and gun firefight that erupted after a recon teamsecured its prize.27

Plaster, p. 21.28

John Stryker Meyer,Across the Fence [Kindle Edition], SOG Publishing, 2011.


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theGulfofTonkinairoperationsoverNorthVietnamtheTetOffensivethe

secretbombingandgroundincursionintoCambodia,thePhoenixProgram,andthe

SonTayRaid.29Whileindividualunitsweregivenaweekofstanddowntime30

afteramission,thelimitednumberofteamsavailabletoSOGcommandersmeant

that,atanyonetime,multipleteamsfromeachregionalheadquarterswere

deployedbehindenemylines.Atanoperationallevel,sheerweightofnumbers

madeSOGoperationsextremelydangerous.

Thesituationwasmorecomplexatthetacticallevel.Duetodemandsfrom

higherheadquartersinSaigon,officiallymission-readyteamsteamsthatwere

sometimespoorlypreparedandlackinginsufficientunitcohesionwereoftensent

intothefieldwithdireconsequences.AccordingtoPlaster,Youcouldsaytheydied

frombadluckorbadfieldcraft,butIthoughttheydiedfromtoolittletime,not

enoughchancetolearnfrommistakesinSOG,justonemistakeandyoucouldbe

dead.31Whilethisstatementislikelytrueforanycombatoperationinanywar,the

isolationofSOGteamsoperatingoutsideSouthVietnamraisedthestakesofthe

game.ForSOGoperators,especiallyreconmen,deathwasnotadistant

afterthought,butastatisticalinevitability.Onaverage,areconteamleaderaOne-

Zerohadbeenonroughlyeightmissionspriortotakingcommandofateam.

GiventhehighcasualtyrateofSOGreconnaissanceunits,fivemoremissionsandthe

youngsergeantwasaseniorteamleaderandalmostastatisticalanomaly.

AccordingtoPlaster,bythetimehehadtwentymissionsbehindhim,itwasa

wonderthathewasstillalive.32ThebestavailablestatisticsforSOGcasualtiesnote

29

Gillespie, 258.30

Post-mission stand down times were good for both informal discussions of effective recontactics and blowing off steam from the stress of recon missions. SOG operators had access toseemingly endless beer and hard liquor at their base NCO clubs, which were funded by sellingalcohol illegally to underage American troops. While these rowdy weeks off perpetuated thestereotype of SOG men, and Special Forces soldiers as a whole, as undisciplined and unreliable,the process of hot washing missions immediately after their conclusion has been formalizedamong modern American special operations units, especially Delta Force and the Naval SpecialWarfare Development Group (SEAL Team Six).31

Plaster, p. 48.32

Plaster, p. 51.


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Mullikin17

thatoverthecourseofnineyearsofcovertoperations,163menwerekilledin

actionwithanadditional80listedasmissing.33,34

ThedangerofSOGmissionslaynotonlyinthejobstheywereexpectedtodo,

butalsointhelogisticsofinsertingandextractingmenbyhelicopterdeepbehind

enemylines.Teamswerefrequentlyinsertedonlytoimmediatelycomeunder

heavyfire,aswasthecasewithJerryMadDogShriversfinalmission,inwhichhis

reconteamwasinsertedtoalandingzoneonlytomeetimmediateoverwhelming

fire,leadingtothedeathsofthreeAmericansoldiers.35

HopingtominimizethecasualtiesincurredwhenreconteamswereinPrairie

FireemergencysituationsindangerofbeingoverrunbyNVAforcesSergeantMajorCharlesT.McGuire,aninstructorattheMACVRecondoSchool,developedthe

McGuireHarnesstorapidlyextractmenfromlandingzoneswithoutneedingto

actuallypullthemupinto

ahoveringextraction

helicopter.Essentially

Swiss-stylerappelling

seats,McGuireHarnesses

wereusedeffectivelyin

thefieldinemergency

scenarios.Unfortunately,

thetimespentdangling

beneathhelicopterswhile

stillsubjecttoNVA

groundfireexacteditstoll

33


If these statistics seem grim, consider them from the NVA perspectiveby 1969 SOG hadachieved a kill to loss ratio of 150:1 (Guardia, p. 177).35

Plaster, p. 127; Jack Murphy, The Legend and Truth of Jerry Mad Dog Shriver, SOFREP (1October 2012) [Accessed 2012.11.20].

Figure6:SOGsoldierspracticeanotherextractionmethod-climbingouton

ropeladders.


19/33

Mullikin18

onSOGreconmen;PlastertellsthestoryofRTVermontsattemptedrescueofa

missingSOGoperatoronthegroundinLaos,whenFirstLieutenantJimBirchimwas

lostafterflyinginaMcGuirerigforanhourandahalf.36

TheextremevalorshownbySOGoperatorsinthefieldensuredthatPurple

Heartswerenottheonlymedalswonbymenassignedtothereconteams.Sergeant

(laterColonel)BobHowardaccordingtoPlasterthemostdecoratedU.S.soldier

sinceWWIIwasnominatedfortheMedalofHonortwicebeforefinallywinning

theawardonhisthirdnomination;healsowontwoDistinguishedServiceCrosses,a

SilverStar,fourLegionofMeritawards,fourBronzeStars,andeightPurpleHearts.

Operations

SOGoperationsunderthefirstChief,Col.Russell,werelimitedinscopeand

failedtogenerateanynewintelligenceonNVAoperationsoutsideSouthVietnam.

Col.DonaldBlackburnimmediatelyexpandedRussellsoperationsupontaking

commandofSOGinMay1965,twomonthsafterthefirstAmericancombattroops

36

Plaster, p. 57.

Figure7:BobHowardcarriesanNVAprisonerofwarcapturedbyRT

Texasawayfromthehelicopterlandingpad.


20/33

Mullikin19

weresenttoSouthVietnam,andalmostayearafterthefailureofthefirstUS-

sponsoredreconnaissancemissionsintoLaos.

OperationShiningBrass37

Blackburnimmediatelyorderedastudyforcross-borderoperationsdesigned

tofocusonamoreimmediateproblemtheinfiltrationcomingdownfromthe

North.38Blackburnsplancalledforsmalltrainingteamstobeinsertedacrossthe

LaotianbordertoreconnoitertheHoChiMinhtrailatthetimeunderstoodtobe

littlemorethanamountainpath.EventuallyBlackburnsplanbecameknownas

OperationShiningBrass,anditwastobeexecutedinthreephases:first,

reconnaissanceteamswouldlocateNVAlogisticalcorridorsinLaosandreportbackwiththatintelligence;acompany-sizedexploitationforcewouldthenbedeployed

intotheareatoeliminatethecriticaltargetsidentifiedinPhase1;inthethirdphase,

AmericanandindigenouspersonnelassignedtoSOGwouldinfiltrateLaosand

organizeunitsofLaotiannativestofightagainsttheNVA.39WhiletheJointChiefs

werehesitanttoapproveoftheplan,ShiningBrasswaseventuallygivenagreen

lighton21September1965.Afterestablishingtheparametersoftheoperation,

BlackburnsfirstreconnaissanceteaminsertedintoLaoson18October1965.40By

theendoftheyear,eightmissionshadbeenlaunchedintoLaos,sixofwhichhad

returnedwithsignificantintelligenceonNVAmovementsinthearea.

WhileBlackburnwasforcedtorelinquishcommandofSOGon1July1966SOG

commanderswereonlyallowedtoserveone-yeartourshelaterstatedIdont

thinktheresanyquestionastotheeffectivenessoftheShiningBrassOperationIt

37

Later renamed Operation Prairie Fire.38

Col. Donald Blackburn, quoted in Guardia, p. 167.39 Guardia, pp. 168-169.40

The US Ambassador to Laos, William Sullivan, was wary of the political ramifications ofAmerican soldiers operating inside Laos. Sullivan initially restricted the movements of SOGteams to boxes of roughly ten to fifteen square kilometers, and tried to prevent SOG teams fromutilizing round-trip helicopter insertions. By sheer force of personality, Blackburn convincedSullivan of the necessity of helicopters, but it wasnt until the intelligence value of the reconmissions had been substantiated that Sullivan allowed an expansion of their area of operationsinside Laos. Guardia, pp. 169-170.


21/33

Mullikin20

identifiedandlocatedtheso-calledHoChiMinhtrailnetworkalongwhich,in

October1965,theNVAhaddeployedroughly30,000logisticalandsupporttroops,

notincludingtheroughly4,500NVAcombattroopsinfiltratingSouthVietnamalong

thetraileachmonth.41Gen.Westmoreland,theMACVcommander,wasequally

impressed,andSOGoperationsweresignificantlyexpandedin1966andafterward.

OperationDanielBoone42

By1967theGroupssuccessesinShiningBrasshadbeensowellreceivedthat

theprogramwasexpandedtoincludeCambodiainmissionsinitiallyknownas

OperationDanielBoone.Forroughlyayear,ProjectsSigmaandOmegahadbeen

runningmissionsintoCambodia,resultinginsignificantdisputesbetweenthe5th

SpecialForcesGroupandSOG.InpitchestotheOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,

theJointChiefs,andtheStateDepartment,bothorganizationsclaimedtheyshould

taketheleadinrunningreconnaissancemissionsinCambodia.SOGwonout,

claimingthatthe5thGroup,operatingundertheauthorityoftheMilitaryAssistance

Command-Vietnam,lackedauthorizationforoperationsoutsideSouthVietnam.

SOGtookoverSigmaandOmegaon3September1967. 43

SeveralnewSOGbaseswereestablishedtomanagethemissionsinCambodia,includingCommandandControlSouthatBanMeThuot.AccordingtoTurkoly-

Joczik,From1967throughApril1972,OPS-35conducted1,398reconnaissance

missions,38platoon-sizedpatrols,and12multi-platoonoperationsinCambodia.

Duringthesameperiod,itcaptured24prisonersofwar.44

Stand-DownandOperationCommandoHunt

The1968TetOffensiveleftNVAandVietCongforcesoperatinginSouth

Vietnamdecimated,andtheoperationwasanundeniablemilitaryvictoryfortheUS

41

Guardia, pp. 171-177.42

Later renamed Operation Salem House.43

Gillespie, pp. 122-123.44

LTC Robert L. Turkoly-Joczik, "SOG: An Overview." Special Operations.Com. N.p., n.d. Web.2012.11.20. .


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Mullikin21

andSouthVietnam.UnfortunatelythepoliticalfalloutintheUnitedStateswas

considerable,leadingtoamajorturningpointinthewar.Whileofficersassignedto

MACVuniversallyagreedthatthecommunistsshouldbepushedtothewallby

intensifiedbombingcampaigns,assaultsintoNVAsanctuariesinCambodiaand

Laos,andpossiblyeventhreateningtheNorthwithagroundinvasion,theJoint

ChiefsandPresidentJohnsondisagreed.InreturnforanagreementfromHanoito

seriouslynegotiateWashingtonterminatedthebombingcampaign;allofSOGs

northernoperationswereterminatedaswell.45

Withthebombingcampaignsuspended,NVAforcesweresendingmoretroops

andmaterieldowntheHoChiMinhtrailthaneverbefore.Withanincreasing

numberofaircraftavailableforbombingmissions,AirForceunitsweregiven

permissiontolaunchmoresortiesagainsttheNVAtargetstravelingalongthetrail

aspartofOperationCommandoHunt.SOGunitsweretaskedwithassessingthe

resultsofthesemissions,resultinginasignificantincreaseintheunitsoperational

tempo.Themenassignedtothesebombdamageassessment(BDA)missions

eventuallycametodespiseandevenfearthem;often,theaerialviewoftheeffects

ofthismassivebombingwasdeceiving,andreconteamswerefrequentlygreeted

withwell-organized,functionalfightingunitsupontheirinsertion.Theresultsof

thesecontactsoftenresultedinheavycasualties,aswasthecasewitha24April

1969raidontheheadquartersoftheCentralOfficeforSouthVietnam(COSVN),

whichAmericanstrategistsunderstoodtobethemaincommandofcommunist

forcesoperatingintheSouth.Inthisraid,SOGlostatleastthreemenandsuffered

dozensofwounded.46

OperationLamSon719

TheintelligencegatheredbySOGreconnaissancemissionsconclusivelyproved

thatthelogisticalsupportofNVAunitsoperatinginLaosandCambodiawasakey

45

Gillespie, pp. 132-133.46

Those killed on this raid included SOG legend Jerry Mad Dog Shriver. Gillespie, pp. 181-182.


23/33

Mullikin22

reasonbehindthecommunistssuccessinSouthVietnam.BothAmericanandSouth

VietnamesestrategistsagreedthatanattempttointerdicttheNVAsupplylines

acrosstheborderhadtobemade.Theinitialplansforanattackacrosstheborder

todisruptthecommunistsafehavensweredevelopedatMACVheadquartersin

SaigoninearlyDecember1970.

SOGteamswerebarredfromparticipatingintheattack,however,fortwo

reasons:theUSSenatesCooper-ChurchAmendmenttothe1970ForeignMilitary

SalesAct,47whichprohibitedUSgroundforcesfromparticipatinginthemissionat

all;andthefactthatallavailablehelicopterassetsinthetheaterweretiedupin

supportoftheconventionalSouthVietnameseattack.

Unfortunately,LamSon719wastoolittle,toolate.Withoutthesupportof

Americangroundtroops,theSouthVietnameseoffensive(launchedon8February

1971)stalledandwaseventuallyrepelled,forcedtowithdrawon25March.Despite

SOGsexhaustiveeffortstoreconnoitertheTrail,andCol.Blackburnsinitialplanto

sendSOGtroopsintotheareatocuttheTrailwiththehelpofindigenousguerrillas,

theGroupnevergotthechancetoexecutethatmission.48

TransitiontoStrategicTechnicalDirectorateandWithdrawal

InanticipationoftheUSdisengagementfromthewar,boththeMACVstaffand

seniorSouthVietnamesemilitaryleadersbegantransitioningtheburdenofcombat

operationstoSouthVietnameseforces.SOGoperationsinparticularwereslowly

drawndownin1970-1971,withoperatorscontinuingtoperformBDAs,gather

intelligence,anddirectairstrikesuntilthefinalSOGreconmissionwaslaunched

intotheAshauValley(oneoftheHoChiMinhTrailskeyentrypointsintoSouth

Vietnam,andtheprimarytargetoftheOperationLamSon719)inDecember1971.

47

The original amendment passed in the Senate, but was defeated in the House. A revisedversion was passed by both houses and enacted on 5 January 1971. 48

Gillespie, pp. 227-228.


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Mullikin23

Inanattempttokeepupintelligence-gatheringoperationsbasedontheSOG

model,theGroupwasreplacedbytheVietnameseStrategicTechnicalDirectorate

(STD),aunitmannedbyVietnameseSpecialForcessoldiersandsupportedbya

groupof155SpecialForcessoldiers.Unfortunatelyseveralmembersofthe

minorityethnicgroupsthatservedalongsidetheAmericansinSOGrefusedtowork

withtheVietnamese,resultinginasignificantlossofinstitutionalknowledgeof

runningcross-borderreconnaissancemissions.WhilemanyformerSOGoperators

remainedinVietnamworkingwiththeSTD,themajorityofthosewhohadrun

reconnaissancemissionswiththeGrouptransitionedelsewhere.Unfortunatelythe

STDgenerallystruggledtoexecuteoperationsontheSOGmodel,andcollapsed

whenthelastSFsoldierswithdrewinMarch1973.49

PresidentialUnitCitation

TheStudiesandObservationsGroupwasawardedthePresidentialUnitCitation

(Army)on4April2001.TheceremonyhostedalltheformercommandersofSOG

stillalive,andallformermembersofSOGremainingonactiveduty.Portionsofthe

citationarereproducedbelow:

TheStudiesandObservationsGroupiscitedforextraordinaryheroism,greatcombatachievementandunwaveringfidelitywhileexecutingunheraldedtop

secretmissionsdeepbehindenemylinesacrossSoutheastAsia.Incorporating

volunteersfromallbranchesoftheArmedForces,andespecially,USArmy

SpecialForces,SOGsground,air,andseaunitsfoughtofficiallydeniedactions,

whichcontributedimmeasurablytotheAmericanwareffortinVietnam.[]

Despitecasualtiesthatsometimesbecameuniversal,SOGsoperatorsneverwavered,butfoughtthroughoutthewarwiththesameflair,fidelity,and

intrepiditythatdistinguishedSOGfromitsbeginning.TheStudiesandObservationsGroupscombatprowess,martialskillsandunacknowledged

sacrificessavedmanyAmericanlives,andprovidedaparagonforAmericas

futurespecialoperationsforces.50

49

Adams, p. 127.50

Qtd. in Gillespie, p. 264.


25/33

Mullikin24

Strategy:theGroupsOverallImpactontheWar

SOGreconnaissancemissionswereessentiallytaskedwithdeveloping

intelligenceanddisruptingtheNVAsafehavensinLaosandCambodia,wherecommunistforceshadevictedlocalinhabitantsandsetupmassiverear-area

logisticalsystems,whichwereusedtoresupplyandreinforceNVAcombatunits

fightinginSouthVietnam.AccordingtoaretiredU.S.ArmyLieutenantColonel,

DepartmentofDefenseanalysisclaimsthat:

SOGoperationsprovidedaconsiderableamountofintelligencedatato

WashingtonandSaigononNorthVietnamesetroopmovementsalongthose

portionsoftheHoChiMinhTrailthatwerepatrolledbytheOPS-35forces.

Becauseofthesereconnaissanceefforts,U.S.plannershadafairlyclearpictureofenemyforcesinthesanctuariesandalongthetrailbyearly1969.51

Unfortunatelyhighercommandoftenmisinterpretedtheintelligencesupplied

bySOGreconteams,usingtheinformationtojustifytheexpansionofoperations

thathadlittlepositiveeffectontheground.Aperfectexampleofthisphenomenon

weretheinitialbombdamageassessment(BDA)missionsfollowingtheNixon

Administrationscommencementofstrategicbombingmissionsalongsegmentsof

theHoChiMinhTrailinCambodia.AfterinsertingwithRTIllinoistoperformaBDA

ofthethirdsitetargetedbyOperationMenu,Plastertellsofbeingoverwhelmedby

enemyfiredespitetheobvioussignsofamassiveaerialbombardment.Inthe

teamsdebrief:

Allwecouldsaywasthatthesehard-coreNVAwererighttherewherethe

bombshadhit,whichapparentlypleasedtheAirForceandtheNixon

administration.Asaresult,thesecretbombingwouldbeexpanded,sothatby

yearsendnearly1,000B-52sortieswouldhavedroppedalmost27,000tonsof

bombsinnortheastCambodiaalone.52

InsteadofquestioningtheeffectivenessofthebombinggiventhefactthatNVA

troopsmanagedtonotonlysurvive,butalsoretaintheirfightingcapabilitiesdespite

heavyaerialbombardment,thePentagonandmembersoftheNixonAdministration

51

Turkoly-Joczik.52

Plaster, p. 130.


26/33

Mullikin25

chosetouseRTIllinoisassessmentasproofthattheirtargetingwascorrect,and

thusthebombingwasachievingitsgoalofdestroyingNVAlogisticalinfrastructure.

Furthermore,SOGcommandershandsweretiedwhenitcametousingtheir

unittoitsfullpotential.BeginningwithCol.Blackburnin1965,SOGcommanders

petitionedthePentagontogiveSOGpermissiontocreateandsponsorafront

organizationwithinSouthVietnamthatwouldmirrorthatofthecommunist-

dominatedNationalLiberationFrontsuchanorganizationcouldbeusedasa

springboardforarealresistance[guerrilla]movementintheNorth.53Despitethe

incrediblepotentialsuchamovementmighthaveofferedAmericanstrategists,

Washingtonrepeatedlyrefusedtherequests.Apparently,seniorAmericandefense

officialscouldneverseemtocomprehendthat[they]couldcarryoutcovert

operationsononehandwhiledenyingthemontheother.54Thisisjustone

exampleofthewayconventionalmilitarystrategistsandciviliannationalsecurity

officialsfailedtorecognizethefullpotentialofSOGasanassetforunconventional

warfare.

Theepisodesrecountedabovearecasestudiesinthestrategiceffectivenessof

theStudiesandObservationsGroup;whentheirmissionswereeffectivein

gatheringintelligence,thatinformationwassubjecttomisuseand

misinterpretation.Despitethestrengthsofthemenassignedtotheunit,especially

intermsofforeigninternaldefense,conventionalcommanderswereunwillingto

considerthepotentialbenefitsofunconventionalwarfare.Thisblatantmisuseof

themenandtheresultstheyproducedspeakstoasignificantproblemwiththe

Vietnam-eraU.S.militaryatthestafflevel.Thus,despitetheextremebraveryshown

bythemenassignedtoSOG,theunitsoverallimpactonU.S.behaviorduringthe

warwasnegligible.AccordingtoGillespie:

MACSOGanditsoperationsfailedtoachievethegoalsthatitsmasterssetforit.

Thisoccurrednotbecauseofalackofeffortorinitiativeonthepartoftheunit

53

Gillespie, p. 42.54

Ibid.


27/33

Mullikin26

oritspersonnel,butbecauseoftheinherentflawsinU.S.political/military

strategyduringtheconflict.OtherproblemswereexemplifiedbyMACVsand

SACSAsinabilitytoadaptMACSOGtofittheirstrategy.SOGcouldhave

servedasbothpathfinderandspearheadforanattackontheTrailsystemby

largerconventionalforces.Thankstounchangingpoliticalrestrictions,however,thatwasnevergoingtohappen.

Intheend,despitethesignificantintelligenceSOGdeliveredtostrategicplannersin

SaigonandWashington,andtheeffectivenesscommandoraidshadininstilling

fearinNVArear-echelontroops,SOGfailedtofullyexploititssuccessesinthefield.

ThereisnoevidencethatanydecisiveactionsweretakenbySOGitself,orby

conventionalforcesbasedonintelligencegatheredbySOGreconnaissancemissions,

todestroytheNVAsupplyroutesalongtheHoChiMinhTrail.Giventhatdisrupting

anddismantlingthatlogisticalinfrastructurewasakeyobjectivefortheGroup,we

mustchalkupSOGseffortsasadmirable,butultimatelyafailure.

TheGroupsImpactonModernSpecialOperationsUnits

SOGwasthefirstAmericanjointcommandwithaspecialoperationsmissionset,

makingitinsomewaysatheater-specificforerunnertotheU.S.SpecialOperations

Command(SOCOM)established16April1987afterthefailureofOperationEagle

Claw.TheStudiesandObservationsGrouppursuedtheater-wideoperationsby

deployingvariousspecialoperationsunits,inadditiontocoordinatingthe

cooperationofthoseunitssuchasSpecialForcesreconteamsandthespecialAir

Forcetaskunitsthat

insertedthembehind

enemylinesinthe

executionofthousandsof

small-unitmissions.Atthe

commandlevel,then,SOG

beganwritingtheblueprint

forthekindofoperations

Figure8:BillyWaugh(left)andanunnamedpilotpriortoaHALO

jumpintoenemyterritory.


28/33

Mullikin27

runwithsuchhighsuccessratesbySOCOMandtheJointSpecialOperations

Command(JSOC)inAfghanistanandIraq.Fortunately,manystalwartSOGveterans

werestillservingwhenAmericanspecialoperationswereformalizedunderSOCOM

andJSOC,helpingtoguidethoseorganizationsintheireffortstoformalizeAmerican

specialoperations.Attheunitlevel,theestablishmentofDeltaForcein1977and

SEALTeam6in1980reliedontheadviceofmanymenwhomadetheirbonesin

SOG,especiallythefamousAmericancovertwarriorBillyWaugh.55,56Others,

includingCol.CharlieBeckwith(thefounderofDelta),Col.JerryKing(founderofthe

IntelligenceSupportActivity),57andCommanderRichardMarcinko(founderof

SEALTeam6)alsocuttheirteethonspecialoperationsworkinSoutheastAsia,

makingthewarriorsservingwithmodernSOFunitssomethinglikethemilitary

grandchildrenofthosethatfoughtwithSOG.

SOGalsobegantheinitialdevelopmentoftactics,techniques,andprocedures

thathavecometodominateAmericanspecialoperationsdeployments.Inhis

conclusion,Gillespienotes,Themethodsandtechniquesdevelopedandutilizedby

SOGinSoutheastAsiawereadoptedbyDelta[Force]andhavebecomestandard

operationalpractices.Forexample,SOGcommanderinchiefCol.JohnSadler

authorizedthefirstcombatHALOjumpon28November1970,orderingSpike

Team58Virginia,composedofthreeAmericannon-commissionedofficersandthree

Montagnardfighters,toinsertbehindenemylinesbyjumpingfrom14,000feet.

Whiletheteammemberswerescatteredsixmilesfromtheirplanneddropzone,

55


Billy Waugh retired from the U.S. Army as a Special Forces Sergeant Major in 1972, and laterwent on to serve in the CIAs Special Activities Division. He served in the wars in Korea,Vietnam, Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom), and Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom). WithSOG, Waugh had a role in the first and last combat HALO insertions in Vietnam. Waugh was oneof the first CIA paramilitary officers to deploy to Afghanistan where, at age 71, he worked withNorthern Alliance leaders to topple the Taliban and appeared at the Battle of Tora Bora. Betweenhis Special Forces and CIA careers, he has spent more than 50 years running covert operationson behalf of the United States. He is the recipient of a Silver Star, the Legion of Merit, fourBronze Stars, eight Purple Hearts, and four Army Commendation Medals.57

For more information on this important human intelligence-gathering special mission unit, seeMichael Smith. Killer Elite. New York, NY: St. Martin's, 2007. Print.58

Another term for a recon team.


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Mullikin28

theysurvivedfivedaysonthegroundwithoutalertingNVAunitstotheirpresence,

andweresuccessfullyextractedfromfourlocationson2December.59Additionally,

SOGteamsvirtuallywrotethebookonsmall-unitsearchandrescueoperationsand

strategicreconnaissance.Withthesehistoricdevelopmentsinmind,wecanclearly

saythatdespitetheGroupsfailuretostrategicallyimpactthewarinVietnam,its

roleintheformationofmodernspecialoperationsunitsisunparalleledand

criticallyimportantfortodaysunconventionalwarfighters.

Conclusion

ThemenassignedtotheStudiesandObservationsGroupinVietnamfought

courageously,buttheirhandsweretied,tacticallyandoperationally.Inthefield,thestringentrequirementssetoutbyWashingtontokeepSOGmissionsdeniable

andcovertlefttheoperatorsthemselvesalone,withlittleoutsideaid.Operatingin

smallunits,SOGreconteamswereconsistentlyoutnumberedandoutgunnedfor

themenontheground,simplysurvivingthemissionunscathedcountedasavictory.

Unfortunately,statisticallyspeakingeverySOGoperatorsufferedseriousinjuries,

callingintoquestionthestrategicnecessityofsuchcostlymissions.

Attheoperationallevel,MACVstrategistsfailedtotakeadvantageofthe

potentialforcemultiplierofferedbySOG.Byrelyingonindigenousforcesto

conductthemorediplomaticallyuntenableoperationsofthewar,SOGtroopswere

neverallowedtodeliveradecisiveblowtotheNVAlogisticsinfrastructuretheyd

surveyedoverhundredsofreconnaissancemissionsessentiallytheexactmission

theywereinitiallymeanttoexecuteunderCol.Blackburnsvisionforthethird

phaseofOperationShiningBrass.Furthermore,MACVofficersfailedtorecognize

thepotentialbenefitsofunconventionalwarfare,remainingdistrustfulofimportant

tacticsthatcouldhavedrasticallychangedtheoutcomeofthewar.

59

Gillespie, p. 210.


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Mullikin29

Instrategicterms,theGroupsfailurelaymorewiththoseoutsideitscommand

thanwiththoseservingasseniorleadersofSOG.Theorganizationwasan

unconventionalforceoperatingwithinahighlybureaucratized,conventional

militarythatwasdistrustfulofspecialoperationsunitsingeneral.Despitethe

effortsoftheGroupsadmirableenlistedmenandofficers,itfailedtohaveamajor

impactontheoutcomeofthewar.AsKelleynotesinhisconclusion,

TheabilitytomaneuverandconductbattlesbytheNorthVietnamesewasnot

impactedtoanygreatdegreebySOGsactivitiesTheunconventionalwar

effortwasmoreorlessanuisancetotheNorthVietnamese.Historyshowsthat

theycontinuedtomaintaincontroloftheirrearareaandmovesuppliesand

personneltofightthewarinSouthVietnam.Theywerestillstrongenoughto

mountamajoroffensivein1972andagainsuccessfullyin1975.HadSOGoperationsbeenlinkedtotheconventionalfightandrestrictionslessenedor

dropped,theunconventionalwareffortmighthavebeenmoreeffective.60

UnfortunatelytheGroupnevergotthechancetoproveitsfullcapabilities.

Itisimportanttonotethatthescopeofthisstudydoesnotallowforafull

investigationofallaspectsoftheStudiesandObservationsGroup.Primarilydueto

alackofinformationontheotherunitsmannedbySOGincluding,forexample,the

largerHatchetandMikeForces61thispaperhasfocusedonthecontributions

madebySOGreconnaissanceteamsintheircross-bordermissionsintoLaosand

Cambodia.Moreresearchmustbedonetopaintacompletepictureoftheimpact

SOGhadontheAmericanwarinSoutheastAsia.Withthatsaidtheinformation

presentedhereissufficienttounequivocallysaythatSOGfailedtohaveadecisive

impactonthewar.However,asanySOGmemoirwillindicate,thatwasnotinany

waythefaultoftheoperatorsthemselves.

60

Kelley, p. 66.61

Company-sized units deployed on relatively infrequent cross-border missions, often to striketargets identified by small-unit reconnaissance missions. These units also sometimes served asquick-reaction forces, similar to modern Ranger units support of other SOF missions. Forexample, in the five years that SOG units operated in Cambodia, full Mike/Hatchet Forcecompanies deployed across the border only twelve times, compared to 1,398 recon teamdeployments in the same period.


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Mullikin30

Finally,giventhesimilaritiesbetweenmodernAmericanspecialoperations

forcesandtheirgrandfathersinSOG,itisimportantthatmodernstrategicplanners

takecareintheirrelianceonspecialoperationstroopsandthecapabilitiesthey

offer.WhilethemenwhofilltheranksofmodernSOCOMunitsarejustas

remarkableasthosewhofoughtwithSOGintheSixtiesandSeventies,theexample

ofMACVsmisuseofSOGprovesthatthetacticalexpertiseofSOFunitsisno

substituteforsoundstrategy,operationalplanning,andawell-grounded

understandingoftheenemyonehopestodefeat.


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Mullikin31

Bibilography

Adams,ThomasK.USSpecialOperationsForcesinAction:TheChallengeof

UnconventionalWarfare.London:FrankCass,1998.Print.

Delf,BrianandGordonRottman,USMACV-SOGReconnaisanceTeaminVietnam,(Oxford,UK:Osprey,2011).

Gillespie,RobertM.,BlackOpsVietnam:TheOperationalHistoryofMACVSOG,(Annapolis,MD:NavalInstitutePress,2011).

Guardia,Mike.ShadowCommander:TheEpicStoryofDonaldD.Blackburn-Guerrilla

LeaderandSpecialForcesHero.Havertown,PA:Casemate,2011.Print.

Kelley,MAJDannyM.,TheMisuseoftheStudiesandObservationsGroupasa

NationalAssetinVietnam,2005,at.

Kelly,FrancisJ.VietnamStudies:U.S.ArmySpecialForces1961-1971.Washington:DepartmentoftheArmy,1973.Print.

MACVCommandHistory(ReportfromtheDODandJointChiefsofStaff),

[FormerlyTOPSECRET].

Meyer,JohnStryker,AcrosstheFence[KindleEdition],SOGPublishing,2011.

Moyar,Mark,PhoenixandtheBirdsofPrey:TheCIAsSecretCampaigntoDestroythe

VietCong,(Annapolis,MD:NavalInstitutePress,1997).

Murphy,Jack,MACV-SOG:RTMarylandsFinalMission,SOFREP(29August2012)[Accessed2

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.Accessed2012.11.20.

Figure2:FromGillespie,BlackOpsVietnam,2011.

Figure3:Greene,Larry.CCNCompound2.Digitalimage.MACVSOG.N.p.,n.d.Web.2012.11.20..

Figure4:Newton,John.RTMaine,70@CCC,takenatFOB,NVADressed.Digitalimage.MACVSOG.N.p.,1970.Web.2012.11.20.

.

Figure5:Carrell,Tom.RopeLadder,FOB2.Digitalimage.MACVSOG.N.p.,1967-1968.Web.2012.11.20.

.

Figure6:Nowak,Richard.PrisonerCaughtbyRTTexas.Note:Howardcametothe

helicopterpadwhenthereconteamretuned,hepickedupandcarriedtheprisonerfromtheHuey.Howardwasnotonthemissionthatcapturedthis

prisoner.Digitalimage.MACVSOG.N.p.,1969.Web.2012.11.20.

.

Figure7:Waugh,Billy.Pre-CombatHALOInsert.Digitalimage.MACVSOG.N.p.,

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The Group: Successes and Failures of the United States’ Special Operations Campaign in Vietnam

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