The Greek Referendum: The case of a non- Coopera6ve Referendum?
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1/16 The Greek Referendum: The case of a non- Coopera6ve Referendum? Elias Dinas (Oxford University) Stefanie Walter (University of Zurich) Ignacio Jurado (University of York) Nikitas KonstanFnidis (IE University) Stefanie Walter IPES 2016 Durham, 11-12 November 2016 How National Referendums Are Challenging the EU Robert Schuman Centre European University Institute, 26-27 January 2017
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Transcript of The Greek Referendum: The case of a non- Coopera6ve Referendum?
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TheGreekReferendum:Thecaseofanon-Coopera6veReferendum?
EliasDinas(OxfordUniversity)StefanieWalter(UniversityofZurich)IgnacioJurado(UniversityofYork)NikitasKonstanFnidis(IEUniversity)
StefanieWalterIPES2016Durham,11-12November2016
How National Referendums Are Challenging the EU Robert Schuman Centre
European University Institute, 26-27 January 2017
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MoFvaFon
• Recenttrend:– PopularreferendaonforeignpolicyissuesthatpotenFallyhavelargenegaFveconsequencesforothercountries.
• Examples– BriFsh2016„Brexit“referendum– Greek2015bailoutreferendum– Swiss2014„MassimmigraFon“referendum
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ResearchQuesFons
• HowcanweconceptualizethesereferendainacomparaFvemanner?
• WhatroledoexpectaFonsaboutthereacFonsabroadplayinindividualvoFngdecisions?
• Canforeignpolicymakersinfluencethereferendumvote?
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ForeigncampaignintervenFon• Anon-cooperaFvereferendumoutcomeina
high-stakesreferendumhaslargenegaFveconsequencesforinternaFonalpartners.
• StrongincenFveforforeignpartnerstoinfluencereferendumcampaigninfavororayes-vote.
• But:ForeignpolicymakersfaceprivateinformaFonproblems.– Costlysignalsneededtoconveywillingnessto
punish/notaccommodatenon-cooperaFonexpost.
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Hypotheses
1) Voters’expectaFonsabouthowforeignactorswillrespondtoanon-cooperaFvereferendumvotewillbeamaindriverofvoFngbehaviorinahigh-stakesforeignpolicyreferendum.
2) ThreatsandcostlysignalsfromforeignpolicymakersmakevotersmorepessimisFcintheirexpectaFonsabouttheconsequencesofanon-cooperaFvevote.
3) CostlysignalsincreasethelikelihoodthatvoterscastacooperaFvereferendumvote.
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The2015Greekbailoutreferendum
27June2015• NegoFaFonsbetweenGreeceandcreditorsaboutbailoutextensionandcrisisresoluFonfail.
• PMTsiprascallsforareferendumonlastcreditorproposalandrecommendsthatvotersvoteagainstit.
– YES-side:No=begerbargainingposiFon+lessausterity
– NO-side:No=GreecewillbekickedoutofeurozoneEscalaFonofevents
• MassiveintervenFonsbyEuropeanpolicymakers• Eurozonerejectsrequesttoextendbailout,ECBrejectsrequesttoraiseELA.
• Greececlosesbanks,imposescapitalcontrolsandmissesIMFpayment.
5July2015• LandslidevictoryfortheNo(OXI)-Camp.
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ResearchDesign
Keyvariables• VoteintenFon
– Dummy-Variable:No-vote• ExpectaFons
– “Whatdoyouthinkwillhappeniftheagreementisrejectedinthereferendum?”
• Countrywillexittheeurozone• ThegovernmentwillconFnuenegoFaFons• DK-NA
• ForeignIntervenFon:Bankholiday– “DidthebankholidaychangeyourvoteintenIon?”
• Yes• No• DK-NA
OriginalSurveyData– telephonesurvey– fieldedinGreeceonedaybeforethereferendum(4July2015)– 989respondents
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ExpectaFonsaboutconsequencesareaverystrongpredictorofthevote(H1)
• Matchinganalysis– Effectofholdinga„Grexit“-expectaFonontheprobabilityofano-voteamongotherwiseidenFcalrespondents.
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ForeignintervenFon:costlysignals(H3)–ECBdecisionnottoraiseELA–
Effectofbankholidayon2. ExpectaFonsaboutconsequencesofano-vote
– bankshutdownreducedthepredictedprobabilityofexpecFng
• NewnegoFaFonsbyalmost20%.• Grexitbyalmost10%.
3. VoteintenFon– bankshutdownchangedvoteintenFonof21%ofvoters.Ofthese,
• 12%switchedtocooperaFon.• 4%switchedtonon-cooperaFon• 5%switchedtoundecided.
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ForeignintervenFon:Foreignthreats(H2)
SurveyExperiment:“Varoufakis(T1)/Draghi(T2)/Schäuble(T3)/recentlyconfirmedthatthesitua6oncouldgetworseifGreecestopspayingtheircreditors.Thinkingofallthis,wouldyousaythatthecountryshouldconFnuetorepaytheirlendersorstopdoing?Pleaseanswerusingascalewhere"1"meansthatweshouldstoppayingthecreditorsand"5"meanswemustconFnuetopaythecreditors.”
Threatbysome,butnotallforeignpoliFciansincreaseswillingnesstocooperate(here:repaydebt).
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ForeignintervenFon:costlysignals(H3)–ECBdecisionnottoraiseELA–
1. Pollofpolls:Bankshutdownandpredictedyes-voteinGreekbailoutreferendum.
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Bank shutdown
20
40
60
27−Jun 28−Jun 29−Jun 30−Jun 1−Jul 2−Jul 3−Jul 4−Jul 5−JulDate of poll fieldwork
% Y
es v
ote
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ForeignintervenFon:costlysignals(H3)–ECBdecisionnottoraiseELA–
Effectofbankholidayon2. ExpectaFonsaboutconsequencesofano-vote
– bankshutdownreducedthepredictedprobabilityofexpecFng
• NewnegoFaFonsbyalmost20%.• Grexitbyalmost10%.
3. VoteintenFon– bankshutdownchangedvoteintenFonof21%ofvoters.Ofthese,
• 12%switchedtocooperaFon.• 4%switchedtonon-cooperaFon• 5%switchedtoundecided.
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ASurveyExperiment
• SurveyconductedbytheUniversityofMacedonia’sSurveyUnitonSeptember7and8,2015,lessthantwoweeksbeforetheSeptember20elecFon,withastraFfiedsampleof1,018respondents.
• Wedividedoursampleinto4groups:– Controlgroup– NegaFveoutcometreatment– Incumbentefforttreatment– Incumbenteffort+negaFveoutcometreatment
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PrompFngCues
(i)NegaFveoutcome:– “Aversevenmonthsingovernment,outgoingPrimeMinisterAlexisTsiprasdidnotimprovetheposiFonofGreecetowardsitslenders.”
(ii)Effort:– “Aversevenmonthsingovernment,outgoingPrimeMinisterAlexisTsiprasseemslikehedideverythingpossibletoimprovetheposiFonofGreecetowardsitscreditors.”
(iii)Effort+negaFveoutcome:– “Aversevenmonthsingovernment,outgoingPrimeMinisterAlexisTsiprasseemslikehedideverythingpossibletoimprovetheposiFonofGreecetowardsitscreditors,butwithoutsuccess.”
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Results
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−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
Prob. Syriza
Gov. Approval
Gov. Responsible
Better for Debt Relief
Syriza Austerity
Syriza Nat. Pride
Syriza Better Deal
Syriza Fought Hard
With Syriza Worse
Syriza Resp. for Bank
Trea
tmen
t Effe
ct Treatments●
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Neg. Outcome
EffortNeg. Outcome & Effort
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TheroleofvicFmhood
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−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
Prob. Syriza
Gov. Approval
Gov. Responsible
Better for Debt Relief
Syriza Austerity
Syriza Nat. Pride
Syriza Better Deal
Syriza Fought Hard
With Syriza Worse
Syriza Resp. for Bank
Trea
tmen
t Effe
ct
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No Victimhood
Victimhood
Neg. Outcome & Effort Vs Control
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Conclusion• HowcanweconceptualizethesereferendainacomparaFve
manner?– RoleofnegaFveexternaliFesandthestrategicchallengesforforeign
countries.
• WhatroledoexpectaFonsaboutthereacFonsabroadplayinvoFngdecisions?– TheseexpectaFonsarestronglyassociatedwithvoFngdecisions
• OpFmistsvotenon-cooperaFvely,pessimistsvotecooperaFvely
• Canforeignpolicymakersinfluencethereferendumvote?– Yes,usingthreatsand–moreeffecFvely–costlysignals.– Butthismaynotbeenoughtoswayreferendumoutcome.
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Canwegeneralizethesefindings?
