The Great Illusion: Chimeras of Isolationism and Realism in Post-Iraq U.S. Foreign Policy

The Great Illusion: Chimeras of Isolationism andRealism in Post-Iraq U.S. Foreign Policy1

Adam QuinnUniversity of Leicester

In light of the Bush Administration’s failures in Iraq, some have foreseena turn toward a new isolationism or realism in U.S. foreign policy. Thisarticle argues that such an ideological reorientation is unlikely.America’s level of economic entwinement with others, and its role inmaintaining strategic stability in certain regions, present formidablepractical barriers to isolationism. Though realism might be a moreplausible prospect, the nature of America’s historical and ideologicaljourney toward internationalism makes it difficult for a realist approachto gain lasting supremacy. Increased pragmatism, and reducedmilitarism and adventurism, are likely responses to harsh operationalrealities. Nevertheless, the core axiom of American strategic thought—the liberal universalist credo that all nations must eventually adopt abaseline of American values and practices for lasting international peaceto be achieved—is embedded too widely across the political spectrum tobe ousted without a major revolution in American political culture.

It appears to many observers (see e.g., Freedman 2005; Mueller2005; Schneider 2006) that America’s engagement in Iraq is slidingtoward a reprise of the “Vietnam Syndrome”: that it will prove notmerely a costly and ultimately fruitless military engagement, but onethat grievously undermines political support for any new effort atdemocracy promotion or state building for a generation or more. Asa result, the quest for a “new direction” in American foreign-policythinking is well under way. James Pinkerton (2007, 13) is far from alonein this debate in musing that “one can imagine that a new cycle ofAmerican realism, if not outright isolationism, is gaining momentum inreaction to Bushite neoconservatism.” Naim (2004) and Kaplan (2004)share similar views, although neither are as pleased as Pinkerton by theprospect.

This article queries the likelihood of a lasting shift toward either ofthese ideological perspectives. The argument is pursued in four stages.First, it clarifies the liberal universalist foundation on which the Bushera’s ideology has been based. Second, it defines how “isolationism”

Politics & Policy, Volume 35, No. 3 (2007): 522-547. Published by Blackwell Publishing Inc.© The Policy Studies Organization. All rights reserved.

and “realism” will be taken in this study, in the context of anyprospective shift in U.S. foreign policy. Third, it sets out reasons—someoperational, some ideological and cultural—why neither of theseapproaches is likely to succeed in becoming the primary ideologicaldriver of U.S. strategy. Finally, it argues that the likely future course isin fact only a less fundamentalist version of the same ideology of liberaluniversalism which has thus far predominated.

While isolationism and realism are explored in more detail insubsequent sections, it makes sense to provide a starting point for thediscussion early on. “Isolationism” is taken here to mean a strategicperspective that seeks to disavow the perceived American responsibilityto manage global stability through a quasi-imperial Pax Americana,and hopes to radically reduce U.S. strategic commitments abroadthough seeking to retain commercial ties. “Realism” is taken here tomean a perspective that accepts the need for continued, extensive U.S.commitments in multiple theatres, but which conceives of the nationalinterest in a considerably narrower sense than liberal universalism.Focusing directly on the maximization of American power and wealth,the realist approach regards the spread of liberal political values andpractices as being connected only contingently, and sometimes not atall, to furthering these interests. Such values are of relatively lowpriority.

Such differences in approach to U.S. foreign policy are in essenceideological, and hence in focusing on them, this article concerns itselfwith ideology as a driver of U.S. foreign policy. For this purpose itassumes the broad definition of ideologies offered by Martin Seliger,and adapted for the study of foreign policy by Macdonald (2000, 191).That is, ideologies are

sets of factual or moral propositions which serve to posit, explainand justify social ends and means of organised social action,especially political action, irrespective of whether such action aimsto preserve, amend, destroy or rebuild any given order. Accordingto this conception, ideology is as inseparable from politics aspolitics is from ideology.

Working in accordance with this view, it is this article’s contention thatthe dominant ideology of U.S. foreign policy at the present time is that

Quinn Illusions and Realism in U.S. Foreign Policy 523

of liberal universalism, as it has been for some decades. However, theauthor also accepts as crucial Seliger/Macdonald’s observation thatideology acts as a driver of real-world action only through interactionwith practical constraints. As such, it is (1) dynamic: it can changeand adapt in light of changed external circumstances; and (2) hastwo dimensions, “fundamental (normative, ends-oriented moralprescriptions),” and “operative (empirical, means-oriented technicalprescriptions)” (Macdonald 2000, 193), the balance between therespective weights of which depends on circumstances. From thisinteractive process between ideological principle and practicalcircumstance, an operational conception of the “national interest”emerges. In theoretical terms, therefore, the argument of this article isthat the effect of Iraq will be to turn U.S. policy toward a lessfundamental approach to liberal universalism, without that ideologyitself actually being displaced by an alternative perspective.

An argument of the sort made in this article must rest on theproposition that the rival causal claims of systemic, structural factorsand domestic ideological/cultural factors can somehow be synthesizedin accounting for America’s foreign policy choices. Major debates havebeen ongoing in the literature for many years between those whoprioritize power, security, and systemic pressures, (Mearsheimer 2001;Waltz 1979) and those who emphasize either the intersubjectiveconstruction of ideas on the international level (Wendt 1999), ordomestic cultural, political, or ideological forces (Hunt 1987; Lieven2004; Mead 2002).

These debates are too voluminous and too intricate for this article toengage in depth without setting aside its own purpose. It may be helpfulto note, however, that some excellent recent work has been conductedby so-called “neoclassical realist” scholars (e.g., Dueck 2006, 9-43) toformulate in theoretical language the commonsense position that powerand culture, nation states, and the international system operate ininteraction with one another without any one possessing exclusively thecausal power to determine outcomes. It should also be noted that suchwork is essentially, and self-consciously, an attempt to recover theimplicit insights of less-recent scholarship (e.g., Osgood 1953). Prior tothe polarizing intradisciplinary battles of more recent decades ofinternational relations academia, this approach naturally assumed anappreciation of the interaction between levels and factors to be essential

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to attaining an understanding of the world with any depth. Whilemaking no claims to equivalent theoretical sophistication in what isattempted here, I am grateful to be able to rely upon this body of workfor conceptual buttressing.

Liberal Universalism, Iraq and the Bush Security Strategy

President Bush has self-consciously aspired to a “transformationalpresidency” (Gaddis 2002; Nye 2006). In the foreign policy context, thishas meant seeking to remake the international order in line withAmerican preferences, securing in the process long-term peace andstability.

The administration’s National Security Strategy (White House2002, 2006) stated as its goal “a balance of power that favoursfreedom.” On inspection, however, this proves to be an essentiallyliberal ideological proposition despite invoking the ostensibly realistterminology of power balancing. The document advocates benignAmerican hegemony in power terms, while anticipating the willingcooperation of other major powers with the U.S. agenda. Supportingspeeches and articles (Powell 2004; Rice 2002) emphasized the themesof common interest and common new threats, suggesting the existenceof unprecedented scope at the present moment for a cooperativeinternational order under U.S. “leadership.”

Also critical is the assertion of the universal validity of liberalpolitical norms, the spread of which is supported by an asserteddynamic of historical inevitability. This intertwines with thelongstanding liberal dogma that the international behavior of states isintimately connected with their domestic systems. Thus, pursuing theadoption of liberal-democratic values and practices—“freedom,” inadministration terminology—by other states falls within the legitimatescope of the pursuit of U.S. national interest (Rice 2005).2

Administration policy in Iraq was the product of a particularlymilitarized approach to democracy promotion developed within thecontext of this analysis of American interests. It was justified in the mostdirect sense by reference to weapons counterproliferation, but premisedon the desirability and feasibility of replacing Saddam Hussein’saggressive autocracy with a more pacific liberal regime, and initiatingthis process with a military decapitation of the Ba’athist state. With this


ideological underpinning, it has been extremely difficult, intellectually,politically and morally, for the administration to acknowledge openlyany disjunction between its declared goals and events on the ground, orto recraft U.S. goals in the face of setbacks in such a way as todowngrade the importance of building a liberal state.

The ideological approach taken by Bush during at least his first fiveyears in office veered notably toward the fundamental end of theliberal universalist spectrum.3 Despite widening gaps between U.S.aspirations and material reality in Iraq, the president persisted injustifying not only that conflict, but his entire foreign policy, byreferring to a visionary ideological liberalism that equated the defenseof U.S. interests with the successful spread of liberal domestic order toIraq and other nations. His second inaugural address set the “endingof tyranny in our world” (Bush 2005) as the ultimate goal necessaryto defend American security. Here he defended the administration’sproactive, militarized pursuit of that objective, displaying (if anything)an ideological hardening since the outset of the Iraq regime-changeproject.

This strategic posture on the part of the administration has causedgrave concern to many on both left and right, whether looking throughthe lens of American self-interest or ethics. From the perspective ofthe national interest, realists and conservatives can accuse theadministration of leading the country into a burdensome engagementwithout an exit strategy (other than American flight), its armed forcesand its credibility tied down in a theater where the objectives are eitherunclear or unattainable. From the moral perspective, the administrationis also highly vulnerable. Through its Iraq policy it is directly orindirectly responsible for enormous amounts of human suffering,justified chiefly by its own ideological assertions as to what is best forthe citizens of a foreign nation. Such a position can easily be portrayedby critics as a distasteful neo-imperialism. The United States has alsofound itself serving at times as referee in a low-level civil war, whichraises ethical and political questions as to whether one should askAmerican soldiers to risk their lives to play such a role.

With an assertive brand of liberal universalism in the driving seat,and offering such openings for criticism, therefore, it is unsurprisingthat some commentators (Rose 2005; Simes 2007) should call for a lessideal-driven (what they might term a “less ideological”) foreign policy,


and do so in a way which focuses on the desire to narrow America’sdefinition of its national interests.

Potential Responses: “Isolationism” and “Realism”

Isolationism“Isolationism” has been a controversial term throughout its

existence, often used as a tool to misrepresent those to whom it isapplied, in particular to imply that they want to “cut off” the UnitedStates from the world. History has fed this pejorative use of the term:the standard conception of isolationism is inextricably bound up withthe mainstream history of the 1930s as an era when isolationism peakedamid disillusion with the World War I settlement and the GreatDepression, leading the United States misguidedly to ignore thedegeneration of Europe into fascism. Since 1945, internationalistadministrations have periodically used the isolationist tag to attackcritics of their projects, warning of dire consequences should Americashrug off its “responsibilities” abroad.4 Today, the label provokesobjections from most of those to whom it is applied, a fact aggravatedby President Bush’s broad-brush use of the term against his opponents(Logan 2006; Preble 2006).5

This is understandable. On examination, those tarred as“isolationists” usually prove to be accepting of a variety of necessaryinteractions, especially economic ones, with the world rather than theeffort at severing all ties which the label seems to imply. CongressmanRon Paul of Texas is universally regarded as the member of theRepublican presidential field leaning farthest toward isolationism, andyet he nevertheless professes on his campaign website that he favors “astrong America, conducting open trade, travel, communication, anddiplomacy with other nations” (Paul 2007). Patrick Buchanan, still oneof the most strident voices on the right criticizing interventionism andglobalization, outlines in his writings an economic program which isdecidedly protectionist, but which nonetheless assumes commerce withother nations to be a major component in American prosperity(Buchanan 2002, 2005).

Yet there is good reason, intellectually, to want to group isolationistthinkers together, even if not necessarily under that label. This is


because when compared with the other two categories discussed here,realists and liberal universalists, isolationist thinkers do have a distinctcontribution to make in terms of policy advocacy. “Isolationism” callsfor a strategy that is simultaneously less interventionist, less costly, andless controlling of others than the approach which has predominatedover recent decades. Its central theme is that the United States shouldabandon the dogma that it has a duty of “world management,” andcease playing the role of hegemon, underwriting the security of troubledbut distant regions. Emphasis should instead be placed on domesticpriorities: a cry of “America First!” that can have great appeal in timesof domestic trial.6

Although they share reservations concerning liberal universalism,there is a qualitative difference between the minimalism concerningglobal affairs desired by isolationist thinkers and the activist globalrealpolitik of, for example, Henry Kissinger, one of the archetypalAmerican realists. Yet, in contrasting themselves with the “ideological”thinking of the Bush Administration, isolationists no doubt considerthemselves “realistic” in their approach to foreign policy (Buchanan2007). In seeking a new, less pejorative, label for “isolationists,”therefore, one could potentially subdivide the term “realist” between“minimalist realists” and “internationalist realists.” The precise label,however, is not the key issue. It is more important to acknowledge thata distinction exists between this tendency of thought and “realism” in itsmore standard sense.7

Isolationists historically have not always felt obliged in the sameway realists often do to explicitly disavow the assumptions of American“exceptionalism”: the belief that the United States is somehow special inits national characteristics, and often, by inference, in its capacity to riseto a high moral level in its politics (Lipset 1996).8 Indeed, for many ofthe archetypal historical isolationists, such as William Borah (Hunt1987, 136) and Robert Taft (Moser 1999, 179), it was the very need topreserve America’s special social qualities and moral integrity thatrequired its leaders to minimize embroilment in the ugly practice ofgreat power politics.9 For liberal universalists, who travel via theideological high road of Wilsonianism, this means a duty to useAmerican power to spread liberty. Isolationists, looking for inspirationinstead of a combination of John Winthrop’s (1630) “City Upon aHill” speech and the Washington-Jefferson principle of prudential


nonentanglement, take the view that America should seek to upliftothers only through the power of example.10

Today, an “isolationist” turn in U.S. foreign policy would meana restoration to prominence of the once-dominant norm ofnonintervention except in cases of critical emergency. From thisperspective, the United States should look to advance its commercialadvantage, and form agreements of convenience to secure desirableprinciples as freedom of the seas, and so on. It should not, however, asnow, maintain its substantial troop presence in each of the world’smajor theatres in an effort to enforce the quasi-imperial stability of PaxAmericana. Strategic alliances with other powers should be kept to abare minimum. Nor should the United States seek to interfere on ahumanitarian basis in the internal affairs of others, except in the mostegregious cases (e.g., genocide), and perhaps not even then.

An “isolationist” response to today’s circumstances would mean aspeedy, total withdrawal from Iraq, and probably from the Middle Eastmore broadly. It would rule out significant military involvement inresolving distant humanitarian catastrophes such as that in Darfur.And it would treat with extreme scepticism the suggestion that U.S.national interests require the use of American force to avert a nuclearIran, defend Israel, or to tackle the problem of North Korea (whichis arguably only a “problem” for America because of the undulycomprehensive scope of its imagined interests).

RealismThe realist perspective is a good deal more internationalist than

isolationism, but of a different character to the liberal universalismpropounded by Bush—in particular, by seeking to be much moreparsimonious in its definition of the national interest. Rather thanseeing the U.S. interest as encompassing the universal spread of liberalnorms, realism holds that it can be satisfied by more limitedachievements: retention of access to vital natural resources and foreignmarkets, preservation of global stability through the judiciousapplication of American pressure, and the neutralization of directthreats through the least costly means likely to be effective.11

Realists typically dismiss exceptionalism, concluding that anunjustified faith in America’s special status can lead to a dangerouslymorally charged approach to foreign policy, and a tendency to crusade


fruitlessly after grand visions of the global triumph of American values(Kissinger 1995, 372; Lieven 2006). In the realist account, it is better tosee the United States as merely a strong and successful state in a systemof others, each with their own interests to pursue. Realists accept it as agiven that states each have the capacity, and the right, to define theirown national interests as they see fit. Realism works on the assumptionthat competitive rivalry follows as those interests clash in a contest thatneeds to be managed to the United States’ advantage. The proper goalof a foreign policy, therefore, is to maximize the United State’s power tofurther its own interests, which must often, by the nature of things, be atthe expense of others. From the realist perspective, the domesticstructures of other states are of limited salience in foreign policy; theUnited States must try to deal productively, and rationally, with thegovernment de facto of a given territory.

Realism thus assumes a less sweeping and less moralistic approachto foreign policy than liberal universalism, one less ready to claim thatthere is always a harmonious “common interest” toward which theUnited States should expect others to follow it. On this view, the UnitedStates should, in effect, treat international affairs as a kind of contest inwhich it ought to seek to maximize its own benefits. Any boost given touniversal ideals of liberality and democracy in the process is either aside-benefit or, for the hardcore, an irrelevance.12

In the present world context, implementation of a realist perspectivewould require downgrading U.S. aspirations in Iraq and Afghanistan tothe provision of basic stability and security, while recognizing the needfor a continued active presence within the region. American troopsmight be withdrawn to regional bases, ready to react to crises directlyaffecting U.S. interests, but would no longer be interested in pursuingmajor social engineering projects or using American force to directlyassist “good” sides in civil wars. Humanitarian intervention would beshunned except in cases where a clear and present danger to U.S.interests, conceived narrowly, could be identified. In dealing withthreats such as Iran and North Korea, regime change would beconsidered a recklessly extreme objective in view of the nature ofAmerica’s concerns in each case, and perhaps not even desirable intheory from the point of view of American interests (who knows whatelected replacement regimes might be like?) Instead the United Statesshould pursue sober carrot-and-stick negotiation, seeking to secure key


U.S. priorities while regarding the regimes themselves from a morallydetached perspective for the purposes of diplomacy.13

Prospects for a New Isolationism or New Realism in U.S. Policy

The Trouble with IsolationismIt is too simple to dismiss “isolationism” simply by asserting that it

amounts to a refusal to have a foreign policy at all. Even so-calledisolationists do acknowledge the need to interact with other nationseconomically and diplomatically, but aspire to do so in a way thatresonates with an idealized version of America’s pre-First World Wartradition of ideological detachment. Yet, while its reality does notresemble the worst caricatures, its credibility as a practicable approachto U.S. strategy is open to stern questioning for two chief reasons.

The first reason is the fiendish difficulty inherent in any attemptto disentangle economic relations from political and strategic ties. Thishas been a dilemma since the inception of U.S. foreign policy. ThomasJefferson’s desire for “peace, commerce and honest friendship with allnations, entangling alliances with none” (Jefferson 1984, 494) did notavert years of strife with European powers culminating in war withBritain in 1812. Indeed, it was America’s insistence on its simultaneousrights to neutrality and commerce in conflict zones which kept thenation on the precipice of conflict throughout its first two decades ofindependence. Similarly, America’s neutrality in the First World Warwas tortured throughout by the refusal of belligerents to accord respectto commercial neutralism. Much as war-averse politicians sought todevise strategies for keeping America out of war in such circumstances,it never seemed plausible that anything short of a voluntary cessationof U.S. commerce with war-afflicted territories—something akin toJefferson’s disastrous 1807 total embargo on U.S. trade—could sufficeto guarantee peace.

In 2007, of course, the growth of the United States’ power andstatus makes the precise replication of such scenarios impossible. Thereare, after all, no relative titans between whom a neutral UnitedStates might find itself trapped. Yet that important differencenotwithstanding, the central insight remains valid: the separation ofeconomic relations from political and military ones may—just—bepossible in the abstract, but it is fiercely difficult to sustain it in practice.


Worse, with the vast expansion in the reach of the U.S. economy andthe complexity of its connections with the international economy overthe past two centuries, the problem has multiplied many times in scalesince the days of Jefferson. There is scarcely a region of the world inwhich the United States does not have a vested interest in securing/preserving access to either resources or markets. Yet the very act ofpreserving such economic ties in good order requires political andstrategic engagement with the relevant states and their regions. Itdemands that America take an interest in geopolitical security andstability to ensure the safety of its direct and indirect commercialinterests: shipping lanes, oil wells, mines, and so on. In many cases italso requires concern for the internal political stability of nations.Could the United States regard with indifference the seizure of power inSaudi Arabia, to cite just one example, by a group intent on shuttingdown the oil trade for religious or ideological reasons? Then there is thematter of protecting U.S. assets from expropriation, or the threat ofit—something which proved a recurrent spark for U.S. interventionismin the twentieth century within the domain of the Monroe Doctrine.

The act of trading with a regime and its citizens is, of course,political in itself; the refusal to trade even more so. And the decision tomaintain a trade relationship with a nation encourages the growth of anetwork of ties and interests contingent upon sound management of thestatus quo. Thus, even if the United States should decide that apoliticalcommerce should be its goal (and only, one presumes, the mostoutlandish extremist beyond the pale even of mainstream isolationistdiscourse would call for American autarky), the extent and nature ofU.S. commercial interests would inevitably compel engagement onAmerica’s part with the strategic and political issues of all those parts ofthe globe in which it is involved. Explicitly attributing top priority toself-interested commercial motives might change the character of U.S.interventionism, and the rhetoric surrounding it, but history does notsuggest that it would obviate the necessity for strategic and politicalentanglement.

The second reason for skepticism regarding the feasibility of anisolationist policy program is the extent which America’s presentstrategic and political commitments may not be reversible withouttaking unbearable risks with national and international security. Inregions such as East Asia and the Middle East, the strategic


commitment of the United States has become integral to other states’calculations. Even taking into account extreme acts of destabilizationsuch as the occupation of Iraq, U.S. “presence” has in the maincontributed a stability that those regions would otherwise lack. Onemight soundly foresee that Europe, with its combination of developedeconomies and stabilizing regional institutions, would continue on apath of peace and stability should the U.S. disengage. It would beself-deceiving, however, to deny that other, less stable regions have thepotential to transform into tinderboxes as rival states—Japan, China,or South Korea in East Asia; Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, andSyria in the Middle East—vied for advantage in the unstable balance ofpower that would be left by the retraction of the weighty outsider’shand. Indeed, such would be the likely surge in dangerous instabilityin key regions that any U.S. administration—having made such aradical withdrawal from global commitments—would be compelledto contemplate a reversal of course on the grounds of preemptiveprudence: that is, to go back to providing stability through globalpresence before a regional crisis or conflict forced America’s hand.

For both these reasons, which flow essentially from pragmatism, itis difficult to see a sustainable isolationist strategy taking the reins ofU.S. policy.

Resistance to RealismRealism, accepting as it does the necessity for wide-ranging

American entanglement on the global military-political stage, seemsto be a more plausible alternative to isolationism. It seeks not so muchto reduce the degree to which the U.S. is internationally engaged, as tochange the intellectual character of that engagement.

The difficulty with realism is that its principles run counter to theembedded ideological culture of American politics, and thus generategreat resistance if explicitly formulated as the basis of policy. Realismcalls for certain commonsense changes to the process of strategicthinking, such as matching goals more closely to available resources,and prioritizing more clearly regarding ends. These changes surely carryweight in light of recent setbacks. Realists are less likely to succeed,however, in the more fundamental goal of dislodging the bedrockideological premise of liberal universalism: that the U.S. nationalinterest demands the spread of liberal political order to other states. The


firmness with which this axiom is fixed in the mainstream of U.S.foreign policy ideology is in large part the result of the history of theUnited States’ peculiar journey toward internationalism.

Throughout the first century of America’s independence, thedominant ideological framework around which consensus had beenbuilt among elites in devising and justifying foreign policy was one ofhemispheric separatism: in effect, American “detachment” from theEurope-dominated international system. The states were united underthe new constitution in order to prevent a European-style balance ofpower taking hold in America. That achieved, the chief goal was tomaintain an ideological “wall” between the Americas and the rest of theworld, first through the Washington-Jefferson consensus regardingthe avoidance of “entangling alliances,” then later expanded throughthe Monroe Doctrine. Europe and its colonies were assumed to operateon the basis of the degenerate balance-of-power system of order,wherein militarized states vied with one another for nationallyinterested advantage. Meanwhile, it was hoped the Americas couldoperate a cooperative system of order, under benign U.S. hegemony.Thus, in the formative decades of the republic, realist patterns ofthought concerning international order became tainted by associationwith the European system from which it was America’s chief object toremain separate (see Quinn 2008; Quinn and Cox 2007).

The ideological “emergence” of the United States into globalaffairs, which took its biggest single step forward with its entry intothe First World War, did not take the form of a renunciation ofpast principles. Rather, Woodrow Wilson reconciled America’s newinternational entanglement with the tradition of separateness byarguing that the United States was not entering the international systemas it had existed before, but rather arriving as the catalyst of a newworld order. This order, Wilsonianism posited, would be cooperative,not competitive, and based not on a balance of power, but on collectivesecurity under U.S. leadership: a “community of power” as Wilsontermed it (Ambrosius 2002, 27).

This new order, it was supposed, could be expected to functionbecause the forces of history were driving the obsolescence of themilitaristic, autocratic model of government, and its replacement withthe liberal self-government of peoples. Self-determination, one of theconcepts with which Wilson is most closely associated, concerned not


just the right of ethnic groups to claim statehood, but also the right ofpeoples to freely determine their own governments.

From this period of ideological transition, trying to reconcilethe need for global engagement with the entrenched principles ofseparation, the American commitment to driving liberal universalismwas born. Most important for the purpose this paper’s argument wasthe implicit conditionality which Wilsonian thinking placed on U.S.internationalism. In “agreeing” to move away from its isolationisttraditions, the United States was assuming the validity of a sort ofideological “deal,” whereby it was entitled to pursue its program ofglobal reform: the production of a cooperative international orderof liberal states. Thus founded on the pursuit of such reform, U.S.internationalism becomes unstable in its ideological and domesticpolitical foundations if it is not pursued. The Cold War, which operatedon an ideological level as a clash of rival universalisms—though ofcourse it was also driven partly by fears for more rudimentary nationalsecurity—derived its ideological legitimacy from the assertion that theWilsonian “deal” retained validity.

Despite the fact that this approach to foreign policy is anathema torealism, realists themselves have, perhaps ironically, been the mostvocal in noting the dominant influence of Wilsonian ideas. Realistthinkers and practitioners, such as Kennan (1984) and Kissinger (1995),both in office and in later writings, have periodically sought to bringtheir rival principles to the foreground of U.S. thought. Yet they haveconsistently failed to overcome the underlying tendency towarduniversalism in the American discourse. Even the apparent catastropheof Vietnam—caused, many suggested (Gaddis 2005, 235-71; Kissinger1995, 620-73; Morgenthau 1965), by egregiously “unrealistic” thinkingabout American interests and capabilities, and which in its aftermathallowed realists like Kissinger some opportunity to redefine U.S.strategy in their own image—failed to have a lasting effect. Only fiveyears after the fall of Saigon, Ronald Reagan was elected on what wasa confrontational platform of liberal universalism, (in its ideologicalpresentation if not always in its subsequent practice).

The barriers to a realist takeover of U.S. foreign policy strategy inthe long term, therefore, are not so much practical and geopolitical (asin the case of isolationism) as ideological and domestic. Americanleaders have been socialized to talk and think about international


affairs, and habitually obliged to justify their policies in search of publicsupport, in terms which militate against the realist agenda. Thelanguage of realism is that of narrow self-interest, power-balancing,and a morally dispassionate acceptance for the rights of others todefine their own national interest as well as the political order thatdomestically legitimizes it. This language has never succeeded inattaining anything more than short-term traction in U.S. politics, andthus the evidence of history demands skepticism regarding any claimthat it is likely to do so now.14

The Residual Strength of Liberal Universalism

So far I have detailed the liberal universalist ideology underpinningthe Bush Administration’s national security strategy, and set out somepractical and ideological/cultural reasons why isolationist and realistalternatives are unlikely to displace it. This final substantive section willexplain why, and in what manner, we should expect liberal universalismto retain its dominance.

It is important to be clear about what I am not arguing here. I do notwish to suggest that the grave problems caused by the decision to invadeIraq will have no effect on future decisions. Nor do I wish to imply,simply because this article has prioritized an exploration of ideologicaldrivers, that U.S. foreign policy is made at the level of pure theory,without regard for practical considerations. Recalling the discussion of“ideology” in the introduction, it is my contention that there is aspectrum on which any ideology must operate. This spectrum rangesfrom the most purist and principled stance to positions along theline that are increasingly tempered by the demands of expediency(Macdonald 2000).15 The Bush Administration’s posture revealsapparent flaws in the assumption that significant progress towardliberal ideological objectives can be made through adventurous militaryaction. However, the most balanced prediction is that Iraq’s effect willbe to move policy-making ideology toward caution and pragmatism,while it nevertheless remains on the ideological spectrum of liberaluniversalism.

There is already evidence of a trend toward greater pragmatism inU.S. policy. The moment when the president took his stance furthesttoward ideological fundamentalism was his second inaugural address


(Bush 2005). Since that point, practical difficulties have accumulatedto the point where the administration has been forced to acknowledgethem openly. Most commentators have noted over the lasttwo years the trend toward backpedalling on hard-line demandsfor liberalization and democratization on the part of strategicallyimportant allies who lack liberal credentials (Broder 2007; Editorial2007; Rose 2005). A moderated approach to the pursuit of U.S.objectives, with less militarism and bluster, has been notable in a rangeof areas, from conscious efforts to soothe relations with Europe, toedging toward an agreement with North Korea over its nuclearweapons program.

This is not the same, however, as a change in the ultimate goal ofU.S. policy, which would require a much more substantial ideologicalshift than the moderation of the means used to pursue it. Prima facieevidence that U.S. leaders will stick with an underlying ideology ofliberal universalism is found in both history and the present, withmotives that originate in both principled philosophy and tacticalpolitical expediency.

The previous section’s explanation of the historical pressure tocleave to liberal universalism leads to the conclusion that compulsiontoward liberal universalism and aversion to realism are opposite sides ofthe same ideological coin. These themes are explored at more lengthelsewhere (Quinn 2008; Quinn and Cox 2007). The central point tobe made here is that U.S. internationalism is politically sustained bya commitment to the pursuit of world reform toward a liberal,cooperative order. No administration, from Wilson, through Truman,to the post-Cold War era, has ever succeeded in mobilizing andsustaining popular support for foreign policy without recourse to thisdiscourse. Only Kissinger and Nixon’s détente agenda came close, andthe ideological underpinnings of that policy proved short-lived.

This historical trend lies behind both the principled and the tacticalmotives for politicians to appeal to liberal universalism. They can do sowhile being principled because they themselves have been socialized inthe political culture in which it is the dominant discourse. As such, theycan invoke it with, in most cases, complete sincerity. Even if they shouldnot be true believers, the demonstrated reluctance of the Americanpeople to embrace a self-consciously realist language of powerbalancing and self-interest offers a strong incentive nonetheless. Should


any candidate or elected leader actually embrace the realist paradigm,they must do so knowing that they will be attacked by those who accusethem of amorality and a lack of belief in American values. AnyKissingerian effort at “educating” U.S. foreign policy into “maturity”knows it must contend with a Reaganite backlash. The evidence ofhistory is patent about which chimes most clearly with the populace.

Launching into a detailed analysis of prospects for the 2008presidential election is well beyond the narrow remit of this paper. Itmay still be usefully noted, however, that none of the presentlyprominent candidates of either party has been disposed to reject thepremises of liberal universalism; only the way in which it has beenoperationalized by the Bush Administration. The most prominentRepublican candidates—McCain, Giuliani, and Romney—havepresented themselves as hawkish defenders of the principle, if not themanagement, of the Iraq war, and defenders of the broad ‘War onTerror’ paradigm. Democrats, for party political reasons as much asanything else, have been harsher regarding Iraq. They also seem moreintuitively disposed to embrace arguments regarding the importance of“soft power” (Nye 2002; 2006). Yet on proper examination their leadingcandidates are careful not to repudiate the liberal universalist approach(Kagan 2007). While rejecting the Iraq model of militarized regimechange, both Clinton and Obama have retained the long-standingargument that American values and interests are inextricably entwined,painting the choice between idealism and realism as a false one (Clinton2006; Obama 2007).

There is some common sense to be found in this last position, butin practice it tends to become a charter for the pursuit of liberaluniversalism justified in part by reference to security: seeking to achieve“idealist ends by realist means” in the tired formulation of U.S. leadersover many decades. Lest we forget, the Bush Administration’s nationalsecurity team entered office with precisely the same argument regardingthe merging of idealism and realism (Rice 2000). From the Democraticestablishment (Albright 2006) to the neoconservative right(Krauthammer 2004), realism, in the sense of claiming to be cognisantof reality, has ever been combined with a declaration of higher ideals,professing a fruitful synthesis. In practice, this amounts to positiontaking somewhere on the liberal universalist spectrum which says thatthe end goal of U.S. policy must be a cooperative world order based on


the spread of democratic capitalism. The only difference lies in themeans chosen to attain the agreed end, which reduces the debate,in ideological terms, to one regarding operational matters, notfundamental ones.

If “realists” are prepared to embrace universal liberalism as theirend goal, and to declare that all they call for is a more measured,tactically astute pursuit of that goal, then perhaps one might accept thatsuch realism has an excellent chance to take hold in U.S. foreign policy.Indeed, defined thus, it has probably been the dominant ideology forsignificant periods of American history. All that such a philosophywould demand, after all, is that one be “realistic” (in the common-language sense of the term) in pursuing liberal goals. And few liberalthinkers would repudiate the idea that one should bear in mind theimportance of reality in this common-language sense.16 However, thismay well seem to be a redefinition of realism which guts it of itstheoretical core, in effect reducing it to a tactical faction within liberaluniversalism. “Purer” forms of realism require setting aside, in pursuitof the national interest, concern for the domestic systems of othernations, so long as they do the United States no harm. They requireaccepting that others states, liberal and democratic or otherwise, arefree to define their legitimate interests in conflict with the United States,and that foreign policy is a power-balancing game to maximize benefitto the interests of one’s own nation. Promoting liberty is a side issue, notthe ideological end goal (which in the American case should be makingthe United States as rich and powerful as possible).

To reiterate an earlier qualification, there are multiple factors whichwill influence the degree to which the United States commits itself tomajor foreign interventions in coming years. Divided government couldplay a part: a Democratic Congress, remembering Iraq, would likely actas a check on a Republican president’s ambitions for bold moves unlessan unarguable emergency were at hand. A president who seeks to get hisway in dealings with Congress by reference to secret intelligence in thehands of the executive will inherit a poisonous legacy of distrust fromthe Bush Administration, which has tainted both the intelligenceservices and the political context in which they operate (Phythian 2006).The extent to which the U.S. government recovers its fiscal health mayplay a part in such decisions, as will the speed at which the U.S. militarymanages to rebuild its morale and the quality of its manpower, which


has been sorely tested by the strain of an unexpectedly lengthy andsizeable deployment in Iraq. Internationally, U.S. confidence inundertaking any major new interventions will be affected by whether itfeels it can carry the support of allies in what it proposes to do: Europe,and Russia in the case of Iran; China, Japan, and South Korea in theAsian theater. Finally, of course, some power must lie in the hands ofAmerica’s enemies, in how provocative they choose to be in managingtheir relations with the United States.

With all that was mentioned taken into consideration, it isnevertheless still the case that once one looks beyond the short term,ideology has a significant part to play in influencing the nation’s foreignpolicy. In dealing with the issues that presently trouble the UnitedStates—weapons proliferation in Iran and Korea, the rise of a powerfulChina, Russia’s behavior in its “near abroad,” the peace and stability ofthe greater Middle East—the events of the last few years have set thescene for a new circumspection in the formulation of U.S. policy, withan emphasis on diplomacy and tactical compromise over absolutismand militarism. Under the leadership of either party, however, liberaluniversalism will still provide the guiding ideological paradigm. Thismeans that the United States will lobby for a cooperative, harmoniousworld order justified by reference to what it argues are interests commonto all the international community. It will reject the idea of building aninternational order explicitly based on a rivalrous balance of power,and repudiate the idea that U.S. policy is or should be directed atmaximizing U.S. power and wealth in a zero-sum game with rival states.Perhaps most importantly, to the extent that states refuse to cooperatewith this liberal agenda, and insist on defining their interests asantithetical to it, American leaders will trace the fault to illiberaldomestic political structures in the states in question. The end pointtoward which U.S. ideology is directed will remain the resolution ofinternational conflict through the universal spread of liberty, a processwhich is viewed as supported by the dynamic of history.

Conclusion

The perceived shortcomings of the aggressive and militarizedapproach to liberal universalism pursued by the Bush Administrationmake it understandable that “isolationism” and “realism” can and


should be viewed as potential alternative ideological paradigms.However, this article has argued that visions of a long-term shift intoeither paradigm are likely to prove chimerical. While it is entirelylegitimate to argue normatively that one or other such shift shouldoccur, predictions that they in fact will are likely to be frustrated byevents.

The possibilities for a new isolationism are severely constrained bypracticality: the preservation of economic ties without military andpolitical entanglement is far easier said than done, and U.S. strategiccommitment to some regions may not be retractable withoutunbearable cost in terms of stability. Realist calls for being clear aboutthe national interest, thinking through the hierarchy of America’spriorities, and matching ends carefully to means all seem like sensibleresponses to present difficulties. Yet pure realism also demands shiftingto a balance-of-power-oriented approach to foreign policy, shorn offaith that the long-term end of world peace lies in a new world orderbased on the harmonious interests of universally liberal states. Thehistory of U.S. internationalism, and the ideological culture it has leftfor present policy makers to work within, make this an extremelydifficult task which is no more likely to succeed now than when suchcalls have been made in the past.

Instead, it seems most probable that the United States will continueto pursue a strategy of liberal universalism, but adopting a moremoderate approach than that of recent years to the operational pursuitof the same long-term ends: universal liberty, democracy, andcapitalism. In effect, this amounts only to a shift from a morefundamentalist to a more pragmatic approach to essentially the sameideology. This may be seen as a turn toward a new “realism,” but toaccept this usage is to accept that realism has diminished considerably inthe breadth of its ambition to reorient U.S. strategy.

Notes

1 This article originated as a paper delivered at the International Studies Association conference atChicago in March 2007. My thanks to the chair, Jeffrey Legro, discussant David Skidmore, and myfellow panelists and audience participants for their valuable comments on that occasion. Thanksalso to the anonymous reviewers, and to John E. Owens, who commented helpfully on earlierdrafts of this article. The shortcomings, naturally, remain my own.


2 I use “liberal” in its general sense, often employed in political theory. It is here used to encompassthe majority of political thinking in the United States, rather than in the sense used in the dialectof American domestic politics, where it identifies a much narrower set of beliefs and is now mostlyused pejoratively.

3 The liberal universalist quality of the “Bush Doctrine,” as well as its origins in the long-termevolution of U.S. thinking, has been noted by a great many scholars. For one example with depthsee Monten (2005). This approach to analyzing Bush in turn has its antecedents in the study of thesecular trend in U.S. foreign-policy thought toward “messianic” thinking and away from afounding tradition of detached “exemplar” status. For example, see McDougall (1997).

4 Use of the isolationist bogeyman to drum up support for various administrations’ projects has ledmany to question its usefulness as anything but a straw man. For a discussion see Dunn (2005).Such critics are in turn sometimes accused of erecting straw men by denying the sophistication ofthe academic debate on isolationism (see Dumbrell 2005).

5 For an example of use of the concept to attack opponents of presidential policies, see Sanger(2006).

6 In discussing isolationism in these terms, I am thinking of the traditional right—which includesthe likes of Patrick Buchanan and many of his contributors at The American Conservative—libertarians such as Congressman Ron Paul or the Cato Institute, and also of a segment of theprogressive left, which in today’s climate can be found at the vocal core of the antiwar movement.“Isolationism” as defined in this study is by no means the exclusive preserve of the conservativepessimists, right-wing jingoes, and/or fascist sympathizers who have at various times rushed to the“America First” standard. Some of the more notable figures to be classed as isolationistshistorically have been located at the heart of American Progressivism. I am thinking here of thelikes of Senators William Borah, George Norris, and Robert La Follette, icons of the Progressivemovement who nevertheless staunchly opposed Woodrow Wilson’s decision to enter the FirstWorld War and then played their part in bringing down his internationally entangling peacesettlement.

7 For one example of what I would think of as an isolationist argument, see Simons and others(2007). Like most “isolationists,” these authors accept the need for occasional military action anda variety of interactions with foreign nations, but with its call to abolish all foreign aid, shun limitedinterventionism (and seemingly all use of ground troops), and abandon liberal universalism, theargument is clearly distinct from either liberalism or mainstream realism. The one area in whichthis piece differs from much mainstream isolationism is that it does not appear to favor significantdemilitarization.

8 In academic terms the theme of exceptionalism goes back as far as Frederick Jackson Turner’s“Frontier Thesis” in the late nineteenth century (Turner 1920). As a social and journalistic idea,the notion of America being somehow special and/or exemplary goes back far further in history,at least as far as John Winthrop’s “City on a Hill” sermon, and was first given the label“exceptionalism” in Alexis de Tocqueville’s (2004) celebrated Democracy in America. It occursfrequently in discussion of foreign policy. See for example, Pfaff (2007), McDougall (1997), andMonten (2005).

9 Borah was a progressive Republican senator from Idaho (1907-40), among the most prominentobstructers of Wilson’s League of Nations treaty. Taft was the influential Republican senator fromOhio (1939-53) who criticized both Franklin Delano Roosevelf and Truman from an isolationist“Old Right” standpoint.


10 For a theorized version of this division of approach, see H.W. Brands’s (1998) well-knowncontrasting of “exemplarism” and “vindicationism” in U.S. foreign policy thought.

11 In discussing “realism” it is not my intention to focus on those theories by that name seekingsolely to provide a descriptive or explanatory account of how nations actually do behave. I use theterm here to mean providing a prescriptive agenda for foreign policy and grand strategy. Writerswho consider themselves realists are too numerous to name here, but among the best knownexamples are Morgenthau (1982), Kennan (1984), and Kissinger (1995).

12 It would be wrong to describe all, or even most, realism as “amoral” as a result of this set ofconvictions, although of course some of the policies pursued or advocated by realists over the yearshave fed this impression. Several classical realist writers have been deeply concerned with the moraldimension of foreign policy, and indeed recent efforts have been made to reconnect realism with itsmoral roots (Lieven and Hulsman 2006). But realists have tended to see morality as demandingchiefly humility and self-restraint rather than “crusades.”

13 An example of a realist critique of the Bush Administration strategy that calls for a change ofapproach is Simes (2007). A realist agenda for the U.S. world role is set out in Saunders (2007). TheNational Interest, in which these two articles appear, serves as the chief discussion forum forpolicy-oriented realists; its editions contain a bountiful selection of antiregime change pro-realistic-diplomacy analyses of U.S. relations with troublesome states. Layne (2006) talks more as a criticof the U.S. pursuit of hegemony than liberal universalism per se, but nevertheless his call forretrenchment to provide favorable balances of power at less cost makes this an example of a realistproposal for grand strategy. His classification may be a matter of debate, however: Snyder (2006,par. 4) describes Layne’s position as “a strategy of engagement so limited that it borders onisolationism.”

14 I am, of course, not alone in noting the problems realism experiences in gaining purchase inAmerican politics. Apart from most of the great classical realists of the twentieth century, whomention the point repeatedly, more recent scholars have made similar observations. Focusing oncertain critical moments of choice, Dueck (2006) emphasizes the conflicting imperatives in U.S.political culture which tend to bring about a foreign policy combining grand liberal schemes forinternational order with unwillingness to allocate the sizeable resources that would be necessary toactually live up to them.

15 As Macdonald (2000, 188) cites, even Lenin, surely the archetype of an “ideological actor” inpolitics, regarded it as “childish” to suggest that those who pursue an ideology must therefore payno heed to short- and medium-term concerns of expediency. Attacking an argument that ideologyis a driver of policy on the grounds that it equates with the argument that ideology alone influencespolicy choices serves only to set up a straw man.

16 One of the best-known and most sympathetic biographers of Woodrow Wilson, after all, invokeshis “higher realism” in the title of a collection of his essays (Link 1971).

About the Author

Adam Quinn is a lecturer in International Relations at the Departmentof Politics and International Relations, University of Leicester,England. He will shortly undergo examination for the award of his PhDfrom the Department of International Relations at the London School


of Economics. His research interests focus on the ideology of Americaninternationalism, and the role of history in shaping U.S. foreignpolicy.

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The Great Illusion: Chimeras of Isolationism and Realism in Post-Iraq U.S. Foreign Policy

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