THE GREAT CONVERGENCE - PIIERICHARD BALDWIN - THE GREAT CONVERGENCE Manufacturing & GDP shares...

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A NEW BOOK BY RICHARD BALDWIN PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS THE GRADUATE INSTITUTE I GENEVA THE GREAT CONVERGENCE Information technology and the New Globalization Peterson Institute of International Economics Washington DC 15 November 2016

Transcript of THE GREAT CONVERGENCE - PIIERICHARD BALDWIN - THE GREAT CONVERGENCE Manufacturing & GDP shares...

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A NEW BOOK BY R ICHARD BALDWIN

P R O F E S S O R O F I N T E R N AT I O N A L E C O N O M I C S

THE GRADUATE INSTITUTE I GENEVA

THE GREAT CONVERGENCEInformation technology and the New Globalization

Peterson Institute of International EconomicsWashington DC 15 November 2016

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Manufacturing & GDP shares shifted from G7 to a few developing countries

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G7’s share of world GDP

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• Globalisation disruptive in G7:– Labour’s GDP-shares fell, but the reward to

knowledge rose.– Frustration & economic disenfranchisement.

• Globalisation was cohesive in emerging markets: Middle class flourished.

• Trade agreements got ‘deep’.– Hyper-globalisation

Globalisation’s impact changedAsymmetries & “Hyper-globalisation”

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What if globalisation was about knowledgeinstead of trade?

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• Suppose everything is made from knowhow & labour.

• Suppose trade costs & trade barriers unchanged since 1990.

• Suppose in 1990 “pipelines” opened that allowed knowhow to flow across borders.

Be extreme to be extremely clear

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Assume this pipeline pattern

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• Headquarter Economies (G7)

High & High wages

• Factory Economies

Low & Low wages

Review 1990 situation for knowhowto predict direction of flows inside pipeline

Knowhow

Labour

Knowhow

Labour

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• Headquarter Economies (G7)

High & High wages

• Factory Economies

Low & Low wages

When pipelines openknowhow flows massively to Factory Economies

Knowhow

Labour

Knowhow

Labour

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• Factory Economies industrialise; HQ Economies deindustrialise.

• Factory-Economy growth takes off. → Great Convergence.

• Factory Economies embrace policies that fosterknowledge flows; HQ Economies embrace policies that protect knowledge flows.

→ Hyper-globalisation & Globalisation Paradox

What are the international impacts?

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• In HQ Economies:– Labour GDP share falls; – Knowledge-owners’ shares of GDP rise.

• Globalisation is disruptive.

• In Factory Economies:– Middle class rises, 100s of million rise out of

poverty.• Globalisation is cohesive.

What are the domestic impacts?

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Asymmetric anti-globalisationBranko’s Elephant Chart

• G7 knowhow moved to Factory Economy workers & thus undermined incomes of G7 workers.

• Rich knowledge owners prospered.

• Other developing-nations puzzled: – Why aren’t we growing like

China?

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Income rise from 1988 to 2008 (%)

1988 position in global income distribution (percentile)

Lower-middle class in G7

Rich in G7

Middle-class in China & other rapid

industrialisers

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How do we put knowledge flows back in the box?

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Broader perspective on globalisation3 costs that form 3 constraints on globalisation

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Around 1820, trade costs fall:Lower trade costs drive “unbundling” of production & consumption (i.e. Old Globalisation starts)

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Production clusters locally as markets expand globally This micro-clustering sparks innovation

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G7 innovations stay in G7 due to high communication costsResult is “Great Divergence” (1820-1990)

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Around 1990, communication costs fallICT Revolution + wage gap drive unbundling of G7 factories (i.e. New Globalisation starts)

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Offshoring of factories leads to ‘knowledge offshoring’i.e. Global Value Chains (GVCs) are the pipelines

To ensure offshored production meshes seamlessly, G7 firms offshore knowhow along with the jobs

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Knowledge offshoring → massive knowledge flowsResult: “Great Convergence” (1990 - today)

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Recap: What put the ‘new’ in the New Globalisation?

ICT enabled G7 firms to precisely control what

goes on inside developing-nation

factories

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How not to address anti-globalisation

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Premise #1) ICT broke the monopoly that G7 labour had on G7 knowhowThis can’t be undone with tariffs

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Premise #2) Globalisation operates with a finer resolutionThis can be partly undone with tariffs

Product

New Globalisation

Manufacturing stage

JobJob

Manufacturing stage

JobJob

Product

Old Globalisation

Manufacturing stage

JobJob

Manufacturing stage

JobJob

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• #1 + #2 ⇒ Globalisation’s impact is:– More sudden;– More individual;– More unpredictable;– More uncontrollable.

Premise #3) The rage is rationalAnxiety & anger generated by New Globalisation

No matter what job or skills you have, you can’t really be sure your job won’t be next.

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Consider: ICT Revolution + “Trump Tariff Act of 2017”20th century thinking meets a 21st century problem

?

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Two questions: - Will US manufacturing stages rebundle? - Will rebundling take place in US or abroad?

?

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Raising US trade barriers will not stop offshoring of US knowhowbut it will raise the cost of industrial inputs in US

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• US imported parts get dearer.– Mexico, Canada & China are major parts suppliers.

• US final goods stay competitive inside US due to tariffs on imported final goods.

• Economic logic → manufacturing shifts:– to US for US market sales; – to US foreign affiliates for non-US sales.

• Foreign retaliation exaggerates the trend.• (And Japanese & German competitors)

Trump tariffs would make US a high-cost island for manufacturing

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Jobs? US workers competing with robots at home & China abroad

• The offshored jobs were typically low-skill and routine, thus prone to automation.

• Economic logic → lots of jobs for robots, few jobs for US workers.

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1. Accept 21st century realities: • New Globalisation isn’t something that foreigners are

doing to us.– US competitiveness depends on “Factory North America”

since New Globalisation de-nationalised comparative advantage.

• You can’t vote against globalisation by voting against the agreements that shape & control it.– Old Globalisation tools that control trade flows don’t work on

New Globalisation knowledge flows.

What way forward?

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2. Rebuild the team:– Restore social cohesion with policies that protect

individual workers, not individual jobs.• Retraining, education, mobility support, income support,

maybe even active ‘clusters policy’.

3. Package it politically:– “Trade policy in the service of society.”

• When proposing more open trade & GVC policy, also propose policies that help economically disenfranchised.

What way forward (continued)

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Thanks for listening