The Global Financial Crisis: Implications for Debt...
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Transcript of The Global Financial Crisis: Implications for Debt...
The Global Financial Crisis:Implications for DebtImplications for Debt
Management
1
Leonardo HernándezPRMED
May 2009
Presentation Outline
• The ongoing crisis in a nutshell
• Debt Sustainability: a summary
• Debt sustainability &• Debt sustainability &management in the currentenvironment
• The crisis: a protracted one?
• Room for improving the DSF?
2
Presentation Outline
• The ongoing crisis in a nutshell
• Debt Sustainability: a summary
• Debt sustainability & management
3
• Debt sustainability & managementin the current environment
• The crisis: a protracted one?
• Room for improving the DSF?
The Crisis in a nutshell
• Antecedents of the crisis:– Boom-bust credit boom, fueled by lax
monetary policy in developed countries
– Financial innovations (securitization, assetstriping, etc.)
– Poor assessment of risks
– Poor corporate governance
– Macroeconomic imbalances (low savings insome developed countries,...)
• Led to an asset price bubble and excessinvestment in real estate
4
US Residential Mortgage Backed Securitiesversus Other Securitized Assets (% GDP)
Source: Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson (2008), Federal Reserve,Datasteam, OECD.
The Crisis in a nutshell
Three Main Contagion Channels
• Liquidity squeeze and lower riskappetite higher financial costs
• Lower commodity prices and tradevolumes lower export proceeds andgovernment revenues
• Reduction in capital flows andremittances tightened financial sources
6
Drastic fall in commodity prices andexport volumes
Selected Commodity Price Indices
300
350
400
450
500
Energy
Metals
January 2003=100
World Trade Volume
(Annual Percent Change)
0
5
10
7
Source: IMF staff. Latest projections correspond to April 2009.
50
100
150
200
250
Jan-03
Jan-04
Jan-05
Jan-06
Jan-07
Jan-08
Jan-09
Jan-10
Food
-15
-10
-5
2007 2008 2009 Projection
World trade volume (goods and services)
All Types of Private Capital Flows toEmerging Economies Plunging
U.S. dollars, billions, net 2006 2007 2008 2009
Private Flows 565 929 466 165
• Equity investment 222 296 174 195
• Direct 171 304 263 198
• Portfolio 52 -8 -89 -3• Portfolio 52 -8 -89 -3
• Private Creditors 343 632 292 -30
• Commercial Banks 212 410 167 -61
• Nonbanks 131 222 125 31
Official Flows, net -58 11 41 29
• IFIs -30 3 17 31
• Bilateral -27 9 24 -2
Capital Flows to Emerging Economies
Source: Institute for International Finance: “Capital Flows toEmerging Market Economies.” 01/27/09.
Potential Decline in Remittances
10
15
20
25
Baseline Low Case
(% change)
-10
-5
0
5
10
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Source: World Bank data and staff estimates.
Remittance Flows to Developing Countries
The Crisis in a nutshell
• Countries reactions to the crisis:– Loose monetary policy
– Recapitalization of financial systems
– Bail out of household and corporate– Bail out of household and corporatesectors
– Fiscal stimulus packages
– Financial systems regulatory overhaul
• And IFIs are stepping in byintermediating more funds
10
G20 Countries – Discretionary FiscalStimulus in 2009 (% of GDP)
Australia
CanadaFrance
Germany
Italy
JapanSpain
U.K.
U.S.A
Advanced Economies -
Simple average = 1.2%
of GDP
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
Argentina
Brazil
China
IndiaIndonesia
Korea
MexicoRussia
Saudi Arabia
South Africa
Turkey
Australia
Emerging Economies -
Simple average = 1.3%
of GDP
11
Source: IMF Staff Note to G20 Deputies Jan. 31, 2009
Bottom line: outlook for LICs in 2009has deteriorated sharply
GDP Growth
(In percent)
6
8
10
WEO Spring 2008
Latest projections
Current Account Deficit
(In percent of GDP)
12
14
16
18
20
WEO Spring 2008
Latest projections
12
Source: IMF Staff. Latest projections correspond to April 2009.
0
2
4
All LICs Sub-
Saharan
Africa
Asia Middle East
and Europe
Latin
America
0
2
4
6
8
10
All LICs Sub-
Saharan
Africa
Asia Middle East
and Europe
Latin
America
Global growth: -1.3% in 2009
The Crisis in a nutshell
Impacts and responses
• Higher financial costs, although benchmark interest rates
will remain low for a while;
• New intermediation channels, although financing gaps
remain significant;remain significant;
• Renewed focus on fiscal stimulus: fiscal space
considerations.
Bottom line
• Full impact depends on countries’ initial conditions
(fundamentals) and exposure to shocks;
• Final outcome depends on the depth and length of the crisis.
13
Presentation Outline
• The ongoing crisis in a nutshell
• Debt Sustainability: a summary
• Debt sustainability & management
14
• Debt sustainability & managementin the current environment
• The crisis: a protracted one?
• Room for improving the DSF?
Debt sustainability: a summary
• Debt is sustainable as long as it can beserviced without resorting toexceptional financing and/or majorcorrections in the balance ofincome and expenditures.income and expenditures.
• Analyses focuses on indicators such as:
– PV of Debt in percent of: (i) Exports,(ii) GDP, and (iii) GovernmentRevenues;
– Debt Service in percent of (i)Exports, (ii) Government revenues.
15
Debt sustainability: a summary
• Debt sustainability indicators willdeteriorate due to the fall in exports andgovernment revenues, and the increase indebt service.
• For some countries rollover and acceleratedrepayment may be an issue.
• Debt sustainability indicators maydeteriorate even further as governmentsimplement fiscal stimulus packages.
16
Debt sustainability: a summary
• A critical issue is how long the crisiswill last.
• A short lived crisis will have a small effecton debt sustainability as relevanton debt sustainability as relevantindicators are of a long term nature(forward looking, 20 yrs).
• In contrast, a protracted crisis will have amore lasting effect on debt sustainability.
17
Presentation Outline
• The ongoing crisis in a nutshell
• Debt Sustainability: a summary
• Debt sustainability &
18
• Debt sustainability &management in the currentenvironment
• The crisis: a protracted one?
• Room for improving the DSF?
Financial crisis: issues to consider
• Initial conditions (resilience):• Domestic financial sector (including links to international
markets through private and sovereign borrowing)• Fiscal imbalances (taking account of official financing
commitments)• External imbalances (including reliance on portfolio flows)
• Crisis impact:• Crisis impact:• Growth prospects (dependence on commodities whose prices
are falling or sectors where external demand is falling)• Fiscal revenues (dependence on commodity exports)• External account (terms of trade shocks)• Remittances• Domestic financial sector (links to international markets)• Financing – official and private (new borrowing and rollover in
private markets, aid)• Volatility and uncertainty (interest rates; exchange rates)
19
Issues to consider … taxdependence on commodity exports
AngolaNigeria
ChadCongo, Republic of
Commodity Revenues to Total Revenue, 2008
(Ratio, in percent of total revenue)
20
0 20 40 60 80 100
VietnamGuinea
MongoliaMauritania
Papua New GuineaSudan
AzerbaijanYemen, Republic
Angola
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Implications for Debt Management
• Borrowing environment is increasingly complex - madeeven more challenging by the evolving financial crisis
• Potential for rollover risk // sudden reversal is high
• Need to avoid costly mistakes, accumulation of unsustainabledebts (due to new borrowing or arrears accumulation)
• Exchange and interest rate uncertainty is high
• Current situation underscores importance of having a• Current situation underscores importance of having astrong debt management capacity, institutions andpractices
• To address concerns about the growing risk of debt distress, and
• Contribute to improved public financial management in developing countries
• Scaling up in provision of technical assistance andcapacity building efforts if lacking the capacity
• Need for coordinated work programs to provide concerted capacitybuilding and TA
21
List of Heavily Indebted PoorCountries (as of end March 2009)
24 Post Completion Point Countries
Benin Ethiopia Honduras Mauritania Rwanda Tanzania
Bolivia Ghana Madagascar MozambiqueSão Tomé and
PríncipeUganda
Burkina Faso Guyana Malawi Nicaragua Senegal Zambia
Cameroon Gambia, The Mali Niger Sierra Leone BurundiCameroon Gambia, The Mali Niger Sierra Leone Burundi
11 Interim Countries
AfghanistanCentral African
RepublicCongo, Dem. Rep.
of theGuinea Haiti Togo
CôteCôte d’Ivoired’Ivoire Chad Congo, Rep. of Guinea-Bissau Liberia
7 Pre-Decision Point Countries
ComorosComorosEritreaEritrea SomaliaSomalia
SudanSudan KyrgyzKyrgyzRepublicRepublic
5
HIPC: Debt burdens have beenreduced markedly….
In billions of U.S. dollars, in end-2008 NPV terms
50.6
100
120
140
160
87.373.6
35.6 30.3
6.8
40.7
21.421.4
17.1
0
20
40
60
80
100
Before traditional
debt relief
After traditional debt
relief
After HIPC Initiative
debt relief
After additional
bilateral debt relief
After MDRI
24 Completion-Point Countries 11 Interim Countries
Debt sustainability and management
YEAR
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(1) Exports: % deviation with30 25 20 15 10 5 --
Two scenarios under different financing conditions
24
(1) Exports: % deviation withrespect to baseline
20 10 -- -- -- -- --
(2) Conditions of additionalfinancing incurred to maintainlevels of consumption andexpenditures constant
(a) IDA terms: 50% grant; 50% at 40yrs; 10 yrs grace period; 0.75% interest
(b) IDA terms: 40 yrs; 10 yrs graceperiod; 0.75% interest
(c) Commercial: 5 yrs.; no graceperiod; 8% interest
Presentation Outline
• The ongoing crisis in a nutshell
• Debt Sustainability: a summary
• Debt sustainability &
31
• Debt sustainability &management in the currentenvironment
• The crisis: a protracted one?
• Room for improving the DSF?
A protracted crisis?
• Short-term responses/effects
– Fiscal stimulus packages substitute for thefall in aggregate demand
– Government’s and IFI’s lending replace– Government’s and IFI’s lending replacebanks and other financial intermediaries
– Recapitalization/lending to banks allowthem to stay in business
32
A protracted crisis?
• Long-term issues:
– Global imbalance: large deficits andaccumulation of debt in some countries(and reserve accumulation in others) needsto be reversed, a costly and difficultto be reversed, a costly and difficultadjustment.
– Further balance sheet effects may resultfrom this adjustment as some currenciesappreciate/depreciate.
– Allocation of losses among stake holders: acomplex economic and political process.
33
What will provide the next locomotivefor global growth?
8.0
12.0
United States: Personal Savings Rate and Current
Account Balance 1950 - 2008
34
-8.0
-4.0
0.0
4.0
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Current Account Balance - % of GDP
Personal Saving Rate
Presentation Outline
• The ongoing crisis in a nutshell
• Debt Sustainability: a summary
• Debt sustainability &
35
• Debt sustainability &management in the currentenvironment
• The crisis: a protracted one?
• Room for improving the DSF?
Room for improving DSF?
• Bottom line:– DCs need growth and trade to resume
quickly (the sooner the better)
– Need cheap financing to muddle through(the more and cheaper the better)(the more and cheaper the better)
• What relaxing the DSF and relatedpolicies would accomplish?– It would allow countries greater access to
borrowing (with implications for non-concessional), but that is not necessarilythe remedy under the current conditions.
36
Room for improving DSF?
• Broadly speaking, the term “DSF” isused to address two distinct issues:
– Measurement of debt sustainability usingCPIA, DSA (“medical check up”)
– IDA/IMF policies on borrowing, including– IDA/IMF policies on borrowing, includingnon concessional (“treatment”)
– Currently the treatment allows forflexibility (the IMF is revising its ownpolicy to make it more flexible and theBank does a case by case analysis)
37
Room for improving DSF?• Is there room for improving the tests run
on the patient (“change the thermometer”)to ensure accurate prognosis? YES, work ison the pipeline for Annual Meetings,including the investment-growth nexus;
• Is there room for more flexible treatments?YES, carefully administered (family doctoris still the best suited to do this);
• Bottom line: let’s not mix up the medicaltests with the treatments (now, more thanever, LICs don’t need expensive loans).
38