The Gift Paradox: Complex Selves and

Symbolic Good

Elias L. Khalil

Abstract Symbolic utility involves appreciation and esteem and expressed bysymbolic products (gifts), while substantive utility entails ordinary welfare

satisfied by substantive products. For neoclassical theory, both utilities aresymmetrical or fungible and, hence, substitutable along the uni-dimensionalutility function. If they are substitutable, though, why would agents be

judged as ‘‘crass’’ if they intentionally remind the recipient of the cost of thesubstitution? For normative sociological theory, the judgment of ‘‘crassness’’would arise if the agent mixes moral norms with non-moral substantive

interests. The two are supposed to be non-fungible, stemming from multipleselves. If both utilities are non-fungible and stem from multiple selves,though, why do we call agents who spend on gifts beyond their means

‘‘fools,’’ while those who spend very little ‘‘cheapskates’’? It seems that theremust be a supervising, single self that makes decisions on the proper divisionof the budget between substantive products and gifts. But this invites thesingle-self idea from the back window, reverting back to the neoclassical

approach. We would be caught in a vicious cycle of anomalies. To get out ofthe cycle, this paper identifies the critical issues and suggests an alternative,complex-self view.

Keywords: unitary-self view, multiple-self view, complex-self view

INTRODUCTION

Symbolic products or gifts express outwardly the tastes for appreciation,

respect, esteem, and other symbolic utilities. Such symbolic utilities are

signaled by the way the gift is wrapped or is attached with kind words. Such

symbolic signaling is generally called ‘‘gift wrapping.’’ In contrast, substantive

products satisfy the tastes for warmth, food, aesthetics, conversations, and

other substantive utilities.

REVIEW OF SOCIAL ECONOMY, VOL. LXII, NO. 3, SEPTEMBER 2004

Review of Social Economy

ISSN 0034 6764 print/ISSN 1470–1162 online# 2004 The Association for Social Economics

http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals

DOI: 10.1080/0034676042000253972

I employ the term ‘‘gift’’ loosely to denote only the gift wrapping, as when

one sends a Christmas card, or to denote a ‘‘present,’’ i.e., the card as well as a

substantive product. Further, I use the term ‘‘gift’’ to refer to the expression of

appreciation towards others as well as towards one’s self. Self-awarding gifts

are abundant as in the examples of birthday parties, wedding celebrations,

and the purchase of status goods.

The gift poses a paradox for neoclassical economic theory. Another face of

the paradox also confronts normative sociological theory. For neoclassical

theory, symbolic utility and substantive utility are symmetrical. If so, the

agent substitutes smoothly between the two as they maximize the uni-

dimensional utility function. However, this view, called here the ‘‘unitary-

self’’ view, invites an anomaly: If the two utilities are fungible, why would

agents refrain themselves from revealing the cost of the smooth substitution

by, for example, hiding the price tag of a gift? Obviously, they do not want

their action to be called ‘‘crass.’’ Or in case it is a money gift, why would

agents commit ‘‘crass’’ acts if they intentionally remind the recipient of the

cost of the gift? And why would the recipients commit ‘‘prostituting’’ acts if

they accept ‘‘gifts’’ or payments for their labor services attached with insults,

unkind words, or improper respect?

For normative theory, agents do not reveal the price of the gift or remind

others of the trouble of getting the gift because they follow a moral norm that

is non-fungible with other norms. Some norms concern the pursuit of

substantive utility. Other norms concern the pursuit of symbolic utility such

as esteem, pride, appreciation, and so on. So, according to the normative

view, agents have multiple selves. However, this normative solution, called

here the ‘‘multiple-self’’ approach, invites the other face of the same paradox:

If the two utilities are non-fungible, why would we judge agents as

‘‘blunderers’’ and ‘‘fools’’ if they spend too many resources on gifts, whilst

judging agents as ‘‘cheapskates’’ if they spend too little resources on gifts? For

these judgments to work, there must be a supervising, single self that makes

decisions on the proper division of the budget between substantive products

and gifts.

To insist that there is no such a supervising, single self means that one can

excessively demand appreciation, honor, and attention without being able to

judge such demand as excessive. Put differently, the theoretical machinery of

the multiple-self view cannot come to grip with distinguishing the gift proper

from excessive appreciation. Examples of such excessiveness include self-

adulation, narcissism, self-aggrandizement, and self-reverence. These tastes

might be externalized when the agent makes others into fetish or idols of

worship and veneration as epitomized in the Madonna phenomenon.

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However, to invoke the idea of a supervising, single self may amount to

inviting from the back window the neoclassical theoretical machinery and its

consequent anomaly. It seems that we are caught in a vicious cycle. To solve

the anomaly that faces the neoclassical approach, one needs to introduce a

normative multiple-self theory. But in order to solve the anomaly that faces

the normative approach, one needs to revert back to a neoclassical unitary-

self theory. This paper aims to break the cycle of anomalies by showing that

each anomaly that faces each theoretical machinery is one facet of the same

coin, viz., the gift paradox. The paper suggests a way that presents the self as

neither unitary nor multiple, but rather as complex.

1. THE UNITARY-SELF APPROACH

The neoclassical, unitary-self view comes in three flavors when it tries to

explain the gift: 1) gift-as-strategy; 2) gift-as-taste; and 3) gift-as-trait.

The third explanation, gift-as-trait, basically employs neo-Darwinian

selection arguments to justify why agents use gifts when interest dictates

otherwise. This explanation depends on the existence of the trait to give gifts

at a critical ratio in order to explain the profusion of the trait in the

population. Thus, the gift-as-trait hypothesis is basically tautological (Khalil

2003b).

This paper focuses on the second explanation, gift-as-taste. This

explanation is not the favorite explanation because it invokes new tastes,

which violates the assumption that tastes are stable (Stigler and Becker 1977).

The favorite explanation is instead, the first one, gift-as-strategy. According

to the gift-as-strategy model, the agent uses gifts to ensure cooperation in

future interaction. The gift is treated as a signal and, hence, part of the

constraint function in order to show that one can be trusted because

cooperative behavior is incentive-compatible. So, the gift acts as capital that

cements the stock of trust in the relationship. This explanation goes a long

way – as evident in the fact that firms provide gifts to employees, known as

‘‘efficiency wage,’’ in order to ensure cooperation and non-loafing behavior

(Akerlof 1996). It also explains why firms invest in expensive architecture,

name-brands, highly paid executives, and what Williamson (1983) generally

calls ‘‘hostages.’’

However, this explanation fails when one gives gifts where one does not

have to worry about reputation, as in single-shot games. This behavior would

be particularly anomalous for the gift-as-strategy approach if the cognition

cost is sufficiently low. This anomaly persists irrespective of whether one is

awarding the gift to others or to the self.

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381

Gift-as-Taste

To solve the anomaly, the unitary-self view advances, as a last resort, the

second explanation, viz., the gift-as-taste idea. The idea amounts to stating

that the agent gives gifts to others or the self because the agent enjoys the

associated sentiments of admiration and respect. In this manner, the unitary-

self approach appeals to the objective function, where these associated

sentiments are modeled as ordinary tastes. That is, the neoclassical gift-as-

taste explanation amounts to treating symbolic products as analytically not

different from substantive products. When the agent takes a rational decision,

he supposedly chooses between symbolic and substantive products according

to cost-effectiveness in order to maximize the single utility function.

In this manner, gift wrapping or greeting cards make these associated

sentiments available, which transform commodities into different ones. So,

gift wrapping or the greeting card transforms a box of chocolate into another

commodity in an identical matter to how almonds transform the same box

into a different commodity.

But is gift wrapping an ordinary trait, similar to the almonds in chocolate?

It is obvious that gift wrapping has no innate utility, while almonds have

nourishment value that stand on their own. In fact, one cannot consume gift

wrapping, unless it is anchored in some kind of relationship or meaning, while

almonds and other traits can be consumed independently.

However, this difference might be particular to the example of almonds. If

so, the example would lack any theoretical value. So, to examine critically the

neoclassical thesis that symbolic sentiments of appreciation and respect are

substantive tastes, it would be more appropriate to juxtapose gift wrapping

with other attributes that have ephemeral existence similar to gift wrapping.

Squeamishness and Other Ephemeral Tastes

Ephemeral, non-innate attributes of goods have recently received great

attention from behavioral economists. They have been regarded as the source

of a class of anomalies known as the ‘‘availability heuristic’’ (Posner 2002).

For instance, one may refrain from eating a chicken after seeing someone

slaughter it, or from eating a lobster after watching it being steamed alive. The

same person would be ready to feast on chicken and lobster as long as no one

reminds him with what he has the misfortune of witnessing a week earlier. So,

the person refrains from the consumption not because of new knowledge, but

simply out of squeamishness, i.e., associated memory that turns his appetite

off. Likewise, if a person has fear of death, the person would decide not to buy

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a house that sits across from a funeral parlor. Similarly, if a person takes great

pleasure from being close to nature, the person would purchase a house in the

country.

Posner (2002) argues that associated memories, which can be positive or

negative, simply transforms the product from A to B. Such associated

memories are ephemeral, i.e., the non-innate character of the product as it

stands independently of the consumer. Nonetheless, such associated

memories, for Posner, are simply substantive traits and, hence, can be easily

handled by the unitary-self view.

Likewise, Becker (1974, 1976, 1996) maintains that one can model

associated memories as reference points, social influences, and social

interaction along the standard rationality approach. Concerning social

interaction, Becker (1996 Ch. 9) shows that the consumption of a meal from

a particular restaurant greatly depends on whether friends and colleagues eat

at that restaurant. Agents derive pleasure not only from consuming the

product but also from sharing the experience with friends and strangers. The

dependence of utility on social interaction may explain the ‘‘blockbuster’’ or

‘‘winner-take-all’’ phenomenon: agents are ready to pay more to see a recently

released film, about which relevant others are talking, than wait until it comes

out on video.

It is true that the neoclassical theory can, without over-stretching, explain

effects arising from squeamishness and social interaction as elements of the

substantive utility function. The pleasure of eating a chicken involves more

than simply the meat in the stomach. It also involves conversations over

dinner that do not evoke unpleasant memories, garnishes that turn the

appetite on, and dining in a popular restaurant about which everyone in one’s

social circle is talking. Such effects are ephemeral in the sense that the utility is

not derived from something material. While one can consume the almonds

independently of the chocolate piece, one cannot consume ‘‘talking about the

meal in a popular restaurant’’ with one’s circle of acquaintances without

dining at the said restaurant – or the experience would not be the same.

Despite the ephemeral character of squeamishness and social interaction, it

does not give rise to anomalies that the unitary-self model cannot explain

easily. Although ephemeral, these attributes involve cost and, hence, the agent

must apply the optimization calculus as he does with regard to decisions

regarding any economic good.

Given that these ephemeral products are substantive, does it mean that gift

wrapping is also a substantive and, hence, unitary-self theory can easily

model? Posner (2002) explicitly argues that gift wrapping is similar to

squeamishness or pleasantness that transforms the product from A to B. That

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is, despite that gift wrapping is ephemeral, it is an ordinary, substantive

product that can be handled easily by the unitary-self approach.

A Critique of the Gift-as-Taste Explanation

The main problem with the gift-as-taste view is the set of anomalies of

crassness, shame, and the wife/prostitute continuum. Simply put, the

neoclassical model cannot differentiate between the contract made between

a wife and a husband, and the contract made between a client and a long-term,

multifaceted prostitute. As mentioned earlier, if the agent is rational why does

he feels crass if he leaves the price tag on a birthday gift, or feels like

‘‘prostituting’’ when he sells his dignity?

It is the anomaly of crassness, or its counterpart prostituting, that troubles

the neoclassical account. Some authors have shown theoretically (Stewart

1992) and empirically (Titmuss 1970) that the supply of blood would decline if

donors are given monetary compensation probably because they negate

symbolic recognition of the donation. That is, the supply curve for blood is

downward sloping. Critics have used this finding to reach the conclusion that

the neoclassical, gift-as-taste must fail because people, when gifts as precious

as blood at stake, are motivated by causes other than pecuniary, substantive

incentives.

However, this judgment of neoclassical theory is premature. Sophisticated

neoclassical, gift-as-taste models do not deny the relevance of non-monetary,

symbolic incentives. Neoclassical theory offers one way to explain how

morality and morale influence behavior. What is at stake is how to model such

symbolic incentives. Should one model symbolic products, as Posner argues,

qua squeamishness and pleasantness – i.e. as features that transform the

product from one kind of substantive product to another kind of substantive

product? If one is to argue that Posner is wrong, it is definitely insufficient to

state that morality and ego-related goods matter. Rather, one needs to locate

the differentia specifica of gift wrapping.

Gift wrapping signals the context of consumption, while other ephemeral

associative memories are not about context but rather about content. Gift

wrapping provides meaning to the content: why does X give Y a box of

chocolate? Is it to express appreciation of friendship? In contrast, the funeral

parlor that sits across from one’s house simply exerts a cost, a negative

externality, on the dwellers of the house. It is not given by someone in order to

express some sentiments about the relation. It just simply happened that the

house has blue aluminum panels, a small backyard, big kitchen, a funeral

parlor across the street, and so on. It is true that the parlor is totally

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subjective, but so is the color of the house. While the cost of the externality is

subjective, it does not signify a judgment of the self and its accomplishments.

But still, what is the analytical ground that differentiates between context

and content? While symbolic products are produced goods, they differ from

other substantive products with regard to two interrelated things. First, the

symbolic product does not generate or satisfy the symbolic effect as the case

with substantive products and substantive effects. One does not celebrate

because he buys a car with expensive label. Rather one buys a car with

expensive label because he’s already celebrated something. In contrast, one

satisfies hunger (substantive effect) because one ate dinner.

Second, and therefore, when one celebrates, the celebration is the

context of something else such as passing an important exam. The context

signified by the symbolic product is, after all, a context or meaning that is

not a commodity in any ordinary sense (Khalil 2000). The context is not a

scarce commodity. Context has no scarcity price or cost of production. Of

course, gift wrapping, such as greeting cards and wrapping paper, are costly

goods that may not have any substantive element. But the essential feature

of the gift wrapping is not that it is costly. The recipient, with sufficient

communication, does not ultimately need the gift wrapping or the card to

understand a particular context. If the giver does not wrap the gift, an

apology can normally substitute for the gift wrapping if the receiver is

convinced of the sincerity of giver. In fact, even if the gift is wrapped in

velvet covering, but delivered with unkind words, the receiver would not

enjoy the symbolic effect.

There are three possible objections to the thesis that words are costless

and, hence, the symbolic effect they convey is costless. First, we have the

case of non-scarce goods such as dirt and air, and they are not symbolic

products. In answer, the thesis proposed here is not that all non-scarce

goods are symbolic. The thesis is not that words per se express symbolic

products. The thesis is rather that, insofar as words are used to express

symbolic effects, the symbolic effects are costless because the signal

happened to be costless.

The second objection is that words are not costless but rather cheap – as

shown by the fact that recipients usually prefer more expensive signals, such

as gift wrapping and greeting cards, in order to be assured of the intent of the

giver. In answer, if there were sufficient trust, words would be as convincing

signals of the intent of the giver as expensive gift wrapping. So, the symbolic

effect is not contingent on the cost of the signal, and such cost is incurred to

take care of an orthogonal issue, viz., the amount of trust between the giver

and the recipient. To wit, the content of the gift stripped from the gift

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wrapping and the greeting card, such as the box of chocolate, is also non-

essential for the conveyance of the symbolic product. The substantive product

that usually accompanies the kind word or the gift wrapping can be seen also

as a further confirmation of the giver’s intent, which is concerned with the

orthogonal issue of trust.

The third objection is that words are not costless: it takes time and effort to

express and utter words. In answer, one can express nasty and unkind words

as easily as one can utter gentle and kind words. That is, the switching of an

unkind sentence with a kind one is free. This entails, as stated in summary

next, that the optimization of a uni-dimensional utility function is self-

contradictory:

Gift wrapping, insofar as it acts as the signal of symbolic products, and not simply to

affirm trust, is a costless commodity. If the signal has a cost, it arises from an ortho-

gonal issue, the issue of trust, which can be ignored if one wants to analyze its func-

tion as a signal of symbolic product. If this conclusion is granted, optimization

calculus must collapse if neoclassical theory insists upon including symbolic utility

at par with substantive utility. Such a uni-dimensional utility function cannot be op-

timized because symbolic products are free and, hence, are not included in the budget

constraint. The agent cannot substitute between symbolic products and substantive

products at the margin and optimize the choice if one element of the choice is free-of-

charge. The idea that there is a tradeoff between symbolic and substantive utilities is

self-contradictory. Symbolic products are non-scarce commodities to start with. That

is, the agent does not face an economic problem with regard to judgment of self-

worthiness because the judgment is involuntary, costless assessment of one’s action

or identity.

To solve the gift paradox, we need to see symbolic and substantive utilities

as asymmetrical. To experience the symbolic effect, one does not need to

consume the signal. The signal is helpful only insofar as a reminder such as an

heirloom, as a reinforcement, or as a catalyst for social interaction as one

celebrates his success. The symbolic product cannot satiate the taste for

appreciation – unlike how the substantive product is designed to satiate the

taste for comfort, food, and so on.

In other words, the symbolic product (the signal) is incidental to the

symbolic effect – which is not the case with substantive effects. In substantive

effects, the signal is intimately connected to the effect – as food is connected to

hunger or clothing is related to warmth. In the case of symbolic effects, the

signal is not intimately connected to the symbolic effect. The signal is used as a

social or personal convention to solidify the symbolic effect. The symbolic

effect has already risen spontaneously. Ultimately, there is no need for a signal

to satisfy it as in the case with substantive products.

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How does one model gift wrapping, which reduces the budget, without

conflating symbolic utility with substantive utility? One does not demand

symbolic products (gift wrapping) in the same way one demands

substantive products. While symbolic products do not satisfy symbolic

effects, substantive products do satisfy substantive effects. Symbolic effects

would have risen and would have been satisfied prior to the purchase/

consumption of symbolic products. Symbolic products merely solidify and

accentuate the already satisfied sense of achievement. In contrast,

substantive effects are satisfied only after the purchase/consumption of

substantive products.

So, to model the symbolic effect, we should not start with gift wrapping or

other costly signals. The signals do not satisfy the sense of achievement. The

sense would have been already satisfied by the sheer fact of its spontaneous

appearance – the appearance simultaneously entails the satisfaction. Thus,

even if signals are costly, they can be, at first approximation, be ignored when

we want to model symbolic effects.

The attempt to optimize a function, which forcefully includes costless

symbolic effects, is at the origin of judgments of ‘‘crassness,’’ ‘‘vulgarity,’’ and

‘‘tastelessness’’ (Khalil 1997, Prendergast and Stole 2001). The failure of

neoclassical theory to attend to the non-ordinary status of symbolic utility

leads to its inability to explain judgments of ‘‘crassness,’’ ‘‘vulgarity,’’ and

‘‘tastelessness.’’ The act of agents to remove the price tag from a gift is

paradoxical in the neoclassical world of gift-as-taste: why should the extra

information (the price tag), which is costless to transmit, somewhat tarnish

the value of the gift and, hence, must be removed?

2. THE MULTIPLE-SELF APPROACH

The normative multiple-self approach, dominant in sociology, comes in

different varieties, some concerned with intertemporal choice and choice

under uncertainty (e.g. passim Elster 1986). What concerns us here are the

multiple-self theories related to the symbolic effects of integrity, pride, and

appreciation that arise from pursuing duty, ambition, and obligation. The

multiple-self approach can easily explain crassness, shame, the wife/prostitute

distinction, and other similar anomalies associated with the neoclassical gift-

as-taste theory. The advocates of the multiple-self view advance a theory of

the self where the agent is not only motivated by substantive utility but also by

a separate utility related to esteem, honor, respect, and so on. So, for the

multiple-self theorists, shame and crassness arise when the two separate

accounting books, the substantive and the symbolic, are conflated.

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Back to Kant

The core of the multiple-self views with regard to symbolic effects can be

traced back to Immanuel Kant’s (1969) notion of the ‘‘categorical

imperative.’’ For Kant, the moral self, whom he called the self that demands

and pursues symbolic products, stands independently from substantive utility.

For Kant, the categorical imperative amounts to acting according to duty as

dictated by the maxim that one acts according to rules that one would wish to

be universal laws. There are other formulations of the categorical imperatives

that need not concern us here.

But basically the categorical imperative is about obligation that does not

hinge on one’s preferences, inclinations, feelings, or substantive tastes in

general. For Kant, the categorical imperative or maxim has the power of

‘‘moral law’’ in the sense of ‘‘duty,’’ i.e., doing something for its own sake.

This should not be interpreted that Kant was advocating strict particular

rules. Rather, whatever is determined to be the particular rule or duty, it acts

as a moral law.

If one’s duty is to fulfill a promise, it is a categorical imperative in the sense

that it is not, what he calls, a ‘‘hypothetical imperative.’’ A hypothetical

imperative includes all actions that are ‘‘permitted,’’ i.e., not prohibited by the

hypothetical imperative. So, such permitted actions can be subject to

optimization efficiency where the sole criterion is the assessment of options

in terms of their expected substantive consequences.

Modern Approaches

Similar to Kant, modern normative sociologists argue that moral principles

have the status of the categorical imperative. For instance, for Amitai Etzioni

(1986), one should distinguish substantive ends, which generate ‘‘pleasure

utility,’’ from ideal ends, which engender ‘‘moral ‘utility’.’’ Etzioni’s ‘‘pleasure

utility’’ corresponds to Kant’s permitted ends, while Etzioni’s ‘‘moral

‘utility’ ’’ corresponds to Kant’s obligatory ends. The two kinds of ends or

utilities are supposedly incommensurable (Harsanyi 1955, Sen 1977, 1995,

Hirschman 1985).

Sen (1977, 1995) regards duty, or what he calls commitment, to be ‘‘counter

preferential’’ in the sense that it has a higher moral source that is bound to

reduce welfare or what is called here substantive utility. Sen welcomes

Harsanyi’s (1955) distinction between ‘‘ethical’’ and ‘‘subjective’’ preferences.

While the former expresses what the person prefers ‘‘on the basis of

impersonal social considerations alone,’’ the latter denotes what the person

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actually prefers ‘‘on the basis of his personal interests or on any other basis’’

(Harsanyi 1955: 315). This Kantian dichotomy draws a wide and unbridge-

able distinction, as if the social ‘‘good’’ is metaphysically separate from

individual welfare. Sen (1977) enriches this dichotomy by proposing the

notion of meta-preferences (Frankfurt 1971). For Sen, the structure of the self

is hierarchial, where the social good can be stratified into multiple levels,

ranked by a higher principle of morality.

A Critique of the Multiple-Self Approach

The multiple-self explanation solves the prostituting or crassness judgment,

which is anomalous for the unitary-self approach. It solves it by positing

dignity as part of a utility function that is radically different, at least at first

approximation, from substantive utility. But once the theorist regards dignity

as radically different from substantive utility, another set of anomalies

emerges. If the two selves, the substantive and the symbolic, are radically

separate, how does one decide the extent to which to pursue symbolic goods?

Can the pursuit of dignity become foolish? Where should one draw the line

between the treatment of others with respect, and excessive respect that can

become a form of veneration?

Even when the symbolic dimension is costless, still one has to decide what

symbolic effects is worthwhile pursuing. In fact, the moral self can become

out-of-control, where the agent can become moralizing, inhumane, and angry

at the world. The categorical imperative (universality rule) may not help in

reigning-in the out-of-control symbolic self. In fact, the symbolic self can

become obsessed with self-glorification, ego-worship, and self-aggrandize-

ment. If the two selves are divorced, how can one judge that the demand for

gifts that celebrate the ego are excessive in one instance, but not excessive in

another instance? What criterion can one use to judge that the demand for

self-congratulation is unjustified?

3. THE SELF AS A COMPLEX ENTITY

The approach followed in this essay can be characterized as methodological

individualism in the sense that it starts with the individual decision maker to

account for social phenomena. However, this should not be misconstrued as a

reductionist approach. While the individual is the starting point of analysis,

the individual is already pregnant with judgements of approval or

disapproval, whether the act is ‘‘crass,’’ ‘‘tasteful,’’ or exhibit excessive

amount of self-esteem bordering on arrogance and ego-worship.

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The individualist methodology followed here aims at explaining action

without reference to social pressures or cultural norms. If one appeals to

society and culture, the explanation begs the question because one still has to

account for social norms and cultural institutions.

The actual gift is a complex entity. It combines the gift wrapping to signal

symbolic utility, on one hand, and substantive product to satisfy substantive

product. For example, a greeting card (symbolic product) attached to a

chocolate box (substantive product) is a complex entity. It consists of the gift

proper, i.e. the greeting card, that delivers the symbolic effect and the welfare-

conferring product, the chocolate, that delivers the substantive effect. The gift

proper, in this case the card, is gift wrapping broadly understood and, hence,

does not differ from the label Lexus which costs $10,000 beyond what an

equivalentcar,withoutalabel,costs.Thewelfare-conferringproductis thecar in

terms of all its mechanical and comfort features. The proposed solution to the

gift paradoxoutlinedabove is that giftwrapping, evenwhen it ismore expensive

that the substantive product, is not simply another feature of the product.

Let us take for example a chocolate box. The gift proper aspect, i.e., the gift

wrapping insofar as it expresses the symbolic element, does not relate to the

box in the same way that almonds relate to the box. Gift wrapping expresses

the context of the chocolate box as a whole, while the almonds are part of

substantive utility and, hence, expresses the content of the chocolate box.

To note, though, we can imagine that in some cultures where almonds are

rare and, hence, may act in place of the wrapping paper to deliver the

symbolic effect. So, the gift wrapping would have two functions: the gift

proper as in the case of wrapping paper, and the substantive dimension as in

the case of aesthetically pleasing wrapping paper. To make the discussion

simple, we should abstract from the possibility that some gift wrapping, such

as aesthetic wrapping paper, may have substantive elements. In this fashion,

the term ‘‘gift wrapping’’ is used to denote items used to signal the context of

the gift which, although they might be costly, confer no substantive effects.

The context of the exchange is nothing other than the meaning of the

substantive product. The symbolic product connects with the substantive

product in the same manner that a set connects with its own members. Let us

take a team of men who are professional basketball players in Paris. The

common character that defines the set cannot be a member of the set. That is,

the category ‘‘Parisian males who are professional basketball players’’ is not

an individual such as Francis and Michael who make up the set.

As such, the neoclassical treatment of the symbolic product as another

substantive trait amounts to making the set a member of itself. On the other

hand, the symbolic effect should not be radically separated from substantive

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390

taste – as the multiple-self model does (Khalil 2003a). This would amount to

severing the set totally from the members of the set.

The unitary-self treatment of the set (symbolic utility) as a member of itself

(substantive utility) makes it difficult to account for ‘‘tactless’’ behavior and,

its counterpart, the sense of ‘‘prostituting.’’ Neoclassical theory fails to

provide a differentia specifica that sets the marriage contract apart from the

sale of sexual services, when the former is supposed to be characterized by

appreciation while the latter is judged as indignifying and demeaning.

On the other hand, the multiple-self treatment of the set as radically

separate from the members of itself makes it difficult to account for excessive

demand for appreciation and attention. There is no criterion to rely on that

tells us when the demand for the symbolic effect is excessive because the model

presents the symbolic effect as unrelated to the substantive effect and, hence,

deny the theorist from any traction that allows us to judge the demand for

symbolic effects (Khalil 1999). If the symbolic self is unrelated to the

substantive self, the agent should have no bounds or qualifications in the

quest after symbolic effects, which could become foolish, narcissistic, zealous,

and self-aggrandizing.

For instance, if a seasoned attorney wins a minor settlement of $5,000 for

his client, and the attorney celebrates the victory with a huge party, the

multiple-self approach cannot make a judgement about the celebration. The

spectator could not judge whether the celebration is excessive if, to start with,

the spectator assumes that there is no relation between the party and the

settlement of $5,000. If the multiple-self hypothesis is granted, the agent

would have no analytical tool to judge whether admiration has become

ostentation. Likewise, the agent could not judge whether respect has

transformed into pomposity. Similarly, the agent has no basis upon which

to delineate dignity from reverence (Khalil 2000).

If we see the symbolic utility as a hallo or as a by-product of substantive

utility, it would be possible to see the self as a complex entity. It is not a uni-

dimensional plane where all tastes lie symmetrical vis-a-vis others. It is also

not a community of selves where one cannot judge if one self is being satisfied

excessively. To see the self as a complex entity, where the pursuit of symbolic

effects are never direct, promises to solve the gift paradox.

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