The German Wehrmacht in the Last Days of the War Part 2 of 2

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The German Wehrmacht in the last Days of the War. Part 2

Transcript of The German Wehrmacht in the Last Days of the War Part 2 of 2

Page 1: The German Wehrmacht in the Last Days of the War Part 2 of 2

1n 2tz n th enemy sttion w rerovrtd as foliow:7 The

%ritiah 53$ Infantry iviothe Guards arow cdv fori, ndthre

armored dtvi-fons, were cn trated in the atack area Itlor, the % '.1

Ziver. Canadian forces are not rcp tor~ine in the attack. -ear .-:emo

the eraeo of two arncread divt.sio-'s, two .infanty divfis , anid severa

armored brinaes was assumed. fligh water rrcventd the tosibility of

attack d~ the front bold by Army Group E. Ffay tanks succeeded in

reaching Ginve and the road through the Retebawld. Thirteen ersy tank

were disabled. Corps Luettwits was to be assigned to this sector where

parme xwte troo sa w-re now prtly plcred.

Preparations for t aw enemy attack crntinued along the front held b

t-rmy Group T~. The Thar overflowed its bTan ad forced the enem positions

back as far as Jtalich. Again the 'aes main effort was directed against

Pruem, whc habd already bc--en ent ,,l The 9th Panner Tivision was cone*

zittad. lbthis area the enemy nemployed tour divisions.

to oed fighting continued in the Army Croup C area. The Tiaraonau

Forit ws blocked by the construction of. otstals, Ao crer wes issued.

for th rehabilitation of three divisio which bad forely been employed

inAlsace.

an e he iider in Cief of the Navy informed the C

snder in Chief West that twentw boats loaded with 9,00 tons of oal

adten empty boats andi tboats, eli belongig to th Ilv, were bafted

in the attok area at Cl*e. The A. w asked to help with their snow-

tion . it van stated by tel hone that the lol headquarters had already

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ma ruins for the reoxu3 at the boat s p~er th protecti on of art.ilowry

J~ r or of the Chief of the Webreaht Qrrtion Sta'he chief

of staff of the Condner b2Chief to tsutzitted a report Ly LVI Carp;

with rerird to the enemy's rerxets tion of the Wotwall northeast of

wuhet, where a C'roup of bunkers at .nndsheid bad boon captured on

4 January Tb. report called attention to the emhusted condition and

the lack of coo bt experience of the bunker garriso ns (the 326th Yolks

greneier Vi'ytion), the lack of re seres an the iraadeqizto antitank

defense. In sOdition, the Coarier in Chief west pointed out that the

average daily losses in thi area asounted to about 3,000 men, motly

infantry, ile the daily replacements including returning convalescents

nbened only 200) me.

On 12o ?orr the sw captured the north part of Clove. The

situation in the Neiohsw ld wan not clear. Some houses were lost at

Gennep. A counterattack waas launched by the XXXXII Panzer Corps eimploy-

iug two batteries of the 116th !flhw IDivision a.t, after 1200 hoar, the 15th

Paanerga ler Dhlalocn. The flooding caused the Ru flyer to widn by

three hundred atrs 9 anl created stamps In the Seeiel the 24 83

?Pamn fitsla recaptured '?rusm and sweeded in restoring the situation

along that etiro sector of the front. Te nay ho wvr, w"ale to

enlarge the brd ehed at Dllinja and chternach.

tootise fihting continued in the An Group 0 area. he the

front blge at the Pian, fighting took place aeaur ttenofn.

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a~n 12 F'ebruary the Cou~nder in Chief = ast subitted a report or the

situation of Firm~ :osips B and ii with regard to the nten~ sng ensm

offensive against the ihive - eitphalian industrial area. fIn part, this

offensi~ve was already In progress.

Of 29 divisions as~signed to ^r.y Group B, 7 were fully ready for.

co nto .t, including 2 motorise diviions, 17 were capable of limitsd

defensiv, action, and 5 were battle-weary and not fully able to fight.

?Total losses since 16 December amounted to 832, 234 men; replacements for

the same period numibered 29,7O$ men. Infantry strength amounted to 45

full battalions or 6b full divisions.

On the other hand, the enemy was so strong that-in the sector held

by the Fifteenth Prm one battalion faced oeenemy division, and in the

sectors held by the %ventb Army and the Fifth Panzer Army one battalion

face. two-thurd8 of an enem division. In the Fifteenth. Army sector,

115 tanks and assault guns facd 1, 000 enemy tanks. In the Fifth Panser

Army sector, 185 tanks and assault guns faced 400 enemy tanks. In the

Smieth Army sector, 114 tanks end assault guns :faced 800 enemy tanks.

Reere being shifted to relieve the particularly unfavorable situation

of the Fifteenth Army did not move as fast as enemy forces being concentrated.

in the general vicinity of Mshen.

The position of Bey Qroup H was slightlymr favorble. Nine 'divi..

alons were availabl t, of which only four parachute divisions and the 15th

Pansergrendier Division were not fully capablee of combat. IWith the exwep-.~

tior of the 7th ?'amohutte Division and some of the cadres, the parachute

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dtviiorzo ht' it9.: cot exPerinoM' The ezn aoroe oposn t

rzaicx~t dv~icn wroez~Q~eat 1C infantry r94arZ-rOd dVi, r"s

and prrobably an a tios Carmored Prig ls The oroprton ot forcs

on tho 7 tffteenth Anmy front wereA now to be two utnc a half times leiss

favorable than ~ryn tho nuoesaul doe no on the A rhe are. Moree

over, the strong artiliory- support wic h had in'de t hat suceeso possible

would novwb lackin due to the shortage of aunition. On 10 Yea ry

the Comwaner in. Chief at had drawn attention to thin fact after an

order was issued by the Chief Zpsly' on 7 ditnstratior Officer limiting

the allotment of lisght field howitzer ammunition on, the entire estrn

Front for Vebruary to 1.1 baste ,sues and for he-avy field howitzers to

045 basic iasses)

The ehsnnes for a sucessful defense of Aechen anid the area heldb

the paehtte. divisions ha therefore decreased. flooded sections of the

front would protect Army, Croup !~ only. until 16 Fer r. Periss ion had

been granted bythe F"4hner on 8 7ebruary to onen the iuw and rft " T e ey

dams, The time rapt int.o& before the start of the aenw offenive Vag to

butilized for tranferrtg further foge to the Fifteenth ?&rm area.

"ta not ao pesm , oocted the, C ridr in Chief 11at, 'blat in

viev of# the decisiv nsture of the coin Wtfle, I consider it- dt

to gives aclearr ot of the eituations I Zaeit. Both officers-am

meare fully aware of their respoeibltties.'#

Once aaib the Comander in Chief Vest repeated his request for the

rapid shipnnt of reerves arnd for an E ncreaseod amount, of . f"uel, swmantion,

and other supplies.

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A direettvD wanH issued in ose of an enemy brek- through from. the

fleve area. taiio Gran co r-mesres.

On jerm the Vu ehrer issue a pramorad : ir wtie to theO Coz

mender in 014a2 West dionatoed o the rwrtng of IC rbrw r7 to cover the

case of' an Allied broet-tbrowjh from the i~ichewal' or across the 1Roer

Rtver in the d rection of the Rhine. In s aa an event, the Co -rder in

Chief pasat was to defend th flhie beteo Atnem and Dorm, including the

prepare bridgeheads on the. western bak. A proposed defense plan wee t

be submtted in advance but no directive wore to be issued to the sub-

ordinate e smaniers or troops. Firm contact was to be ma Ltaine bt en

those forces detendins th~ c W- at l and thoe holding th~ Thtno, at least

between Nuee adthe ?srgheia. - Roer pocition near Olutran. To strengthe.

the !ttne defenses, the construction of a fortification system along the

eastern bank from ifmmerioh to Itarlaruhe was ordered. 'Unless the 3elgolau

tight were endangered at thm; sn time a~i an enemy treet-rouxgh occurred,

the Oc ° ander in Chief est was to be sent all ams:Lablo forces from the

ante at tim Oprtions Staff orth Eost.

On '2 eb rr the Luftwaffe Uigh :osmnd received directives for the

eoitaont of the air fore in the area 'Nijmegen - Venlo - Sehieldan, Where

defeus lye fightin had already begun on the enev'e loft wing. Th. weaken-*

la of the air force in the Wet in fayo of the Est, together with the

low sn ply offuel, ade necessary a clear Ulttion of the objectives.

The in effort was to be directed a~ eInst the section of the f ro between

rijmogen and Ichiciden. Plombing was to becarried out both during the day

and at night.

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Cm 3 'bsr r ships at Antwotn amiountd to 150,000 Irds TS4StA!

tons loss tA wetI last 1~ere. 111a zir rail3s waye no , ftopc bc!a s

of the lack of fuel. Zne.' atta cs in the Vlove ares, were rust bystrong

ar tilery ire, The Qerwm UTIrn3f&Lb ODG$'Om ThBC3Vn

a short :dtance into the ;;sichawald, but the oea ruhed, thead east of

Clove as fa as Eaaselt. Ground wan also lost on the left wing. Frther

to the south, high floo aters continued to effect the si tation. At

?rnthe en~had again :ented th tow n fighting contine, while

at X ronu feld the C era line bold.. ighttn also canined at Zohtcrraoh

but the eneWy made no gains. Enthe Aachen area the headqszatere o the

LVIII Panzer Coras was emloyd s an oners tiona staff.

In the Arm roup area it appeared 'that the %S lX Ccrps was t

be coatta against the lint 1fl7. 'rh location of the three armored

dit ion aruo to bo west of Colirr was not clear.

As priotwly anunced, the Gsawier in Chief West n'dbittr a

report on 13 ? ebrtwry concerning that shortage of rumnition and its vroatble

effect on the fighting along the entire Wstorn Wrot. The preet supply

of Ight and heavy field howitzer asunition wa carclted to last for

only on. week of heavy defonsiwe fightinj. While the clculation a only

theoretical, it could be applied to the most serious circmtaossw which

mgt occm=. The C sumde r in Chef W .tasked for a raptA deciio onth

asmat of additional eanitn that could be ezpected in Febrry.

At 2000 hours onflekM= a study was sutaitted bythe o r.

in Chief West regarding teproibibe intentions of the enemy. T he attack

N .

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tr u t> Yt'o; ' te h b th Virt phase ot f gnrddede

wau to be attackd tr~ tiwl rear. IT this Wire su aeatful, the #flew4

would thcm, ! .a froztal attack tetvei Wv3lo ar4O Re end.« t'1C eni

the ttac er 1 not fimuesst4 t * 4. l2th A $ roup vould attempt

a rtmhrouh inthe directio tW Cologn and fttr oo batg theER tn e e rrn in s , w ou ld se ad to tti not h a d so uth . . T n to th b b r a ~ h v a . 1 a a u # t e U .. e t

Anyq vued attnst a bmrathroues into th raatte .by wey of Eatser-w

u ia t n rm art tend va k order to ra ck theTe O s t r o v o .h ld i * t rieu tr p la in .

amn tdthdrsv volutamr in a ao malte 'dvun atit to tbea

Rhne Pwner, if onatact b.W..t th Tvertyttfth Ar n d the pasoae

at. divisin vere broken, t1e front was to be wlt r0n to the WSSER

Postin (I s~ Ztea a. tet of trna) Ths ot g4ving uptortveten

flP n aMd th 72 ba, as rai as the ab aninent or it nava

E'wtioa (the ampiqwzt of aze motor bits, midget n

sines) at the mouth o1 the bfo t Rieran the vrtlen ar rtatth

*mui. A is of sbc owisaq m id ab ae W' the ebre.

Anr wp P Ad so tar not be se otake nob a 4.velcmst uder

:h tu t plie ot possible en air lanins o4cmlr been

aseed. A nswsf lsrg..ai airborne operation on the coat ofitla

land Bieht, it was falt, weud brintg about the ooflp of the Wetr Front.

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A ±rthor e'itim&to of the sitestiara in th -_, nth Army sector pre .ad

th o a of Army (Orur a Subiit ted by t o ~o tdo it C pie

West pointed out the. possibility of an enimy thrust az int the Wstvll

Tortifioactiona at the Ours rc ur positomni. In oso sutficient resre

could not be sent (two to three diviionzs, roplsoee.nts for the troops on

teline, fuel, an a w tion ), it wa s uggstedl thait the front be with.

drawn stepa by step tothe shorter true ipioition. In addition, it ws pro-

posed to moveu oe VO hsstu division each; as reserves for the Eyll posi-

tion and for the fortifid town of Trier. This ruqs~t was refused by the

Co mnder in Chief Wst b enure it constituted a delaying action and, among

other. reasons, because of the vit hdrawl to the north of the U.S. 6th Armored

Ditvision, With regard to the eployment of two Volkestur d ivisions, the

toamaderof PArmy Group B was referred to 'a .eter Sint,, simn the Ca03w

mander in Chief West had no authority to m~ake assignments from the zone of

the pntrior.

On U b~rCanadian treop wee reportedly taking part in the attack

OnCleve. ~orinferemes we being receive by the on~, whose in

effort ws stil saoentra ted at Vano. The !. . 99th lnfattriiionnowe ito the Vrvlers area, while the whebuts of the fr1 infnr

an five armored divisions which in the eantime wre prsmdto have been

rehbiltaed)wenet flir.

Tb. Geram dfse. on bot si4es of lin vas still .s s"" am a.

eounts bthrxst Into the 1W*bsvald we begn tnn ~ssur at Gonep

contire. The level of the Rur ?fiver had risen and the Rr iake, as a

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result ot mlting snow, bid risen anothe two ters despite the onelig

at the d&:. -'trony nrssueonu at* rut ariC Z Thnrah, evdetl

a im!e at bring through the b'1izo in the. flank, Severl grPof i hos

were lost at ?ren, the enemy received rin oroatints. The in line of

resistance was no the Pnoum switch position. - At 77ohternoh the situation

had becm more acute.

In the Army, Grop B sector the flohcusollnr l Bridge near Cologne was

again abl, to support 25-tc vehicl loads and: the doable tnt* railroad

bridge wes argan ins.

Ithe AryGroup 0 sectr the whereabouts of the .S. 10th Armored.

Divis ion we not detent. .~ s artiller y wes re inforce in the r orbach

ad Igua arose. ?ightin contipue at 'ther bulge of the front ontin

Pide. Inthis area the en .reported theaptur of 150 sea which

corresu ponmds' to t he number of our teeing2 .i rtilery fire ch hn. Vletm ob rai botied omnw n

the ppe fline Th Vokasurswasto e oganuafy asor.'!into the

three Als.atia n division which were being norgaaised at the front along

the Bhin.,

on It Fe bnarr the Cousdri Chief Waet as orered to denine

Lhih f ea vel nfale. to reinforce tien southern flatk of Sevent

Army in the ma n area In ease it vas, nt posible to bring fown'd

the 1th S83 e d e Diviio. First consideration weto begige

to the 24 asn Division.

on15 'mc t was learn that on Arioan division 1.4 been

shifted fromColar tothe Mochen area. At %chtermcbh the enemy had

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comwmitted the 15th, 80th, and. eleen s of ths 76th !nt nr Pivisicns.

The 6th, 17th, aM +2A irtxrno ri inioL sere col zitt at- the front or

ware held inthe r.n' The 101st Airborne Uivis ion, which was last

repote near iguenau, nreanbly was badly wekene anid had been with-i

draw from the lin.

Nothing further- was reportaed about an apparently aiuior enemy landin

on houwt bland,

On the Western Front there were no hanges of any iportance. Attacks

near Cit were +ontinued, with the sin enemy effort inthe left sector.

Most of the attacks were relsed. rnemy attacks along the roaxd were,

considered likel to coantinue. 1een mil vMage were lost, The

fighting near rrs adin the ohterbaet area was contiued.

Ithe Any Group C area it appeared that vrnchb armored forces would

beccntte aginst the ist Army

An order of the fTebrer on 15 rebntary assigned the Uth snser Pin..

Ston to Army Grou E in the area northwest of Colon.

.1 i u"talk we ported concerning posible ladings on the.

North Sea coast and in the northern areae. ?iaoe diploatia mirlee played

a pert In dissecutiug tis intonmation, it ma7 have been only. deceptive

nae. Ro eccnrtion of shipping wsrepoted. ?wcftoa r divi-

sions wre said to bestill in Zaglaud, three of which were ksrlcn; all

ofthee were expece to beat to rnc. While, the Luft'affe did not

expet any eneWlanding, there was son possibility that as taetical land-.

ing might m sde. Peconniamrnewa ordered.

.. L 4h..

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The !Wsrse of' the rtibh 15th an 3to .nfnrry rvts ions arodun

love ts con firmead. :so rport& in tht area wwere four additionali

infantry divioions, one naoed division, and two armored brigde. The

4th Psnzer tvision was moved forward into the Rchternaoh area. At the

sons tis, the 4th Paach t ividion wis withdrawn under the momentary

proection of t wa wath'r and was transferred to the Clove area. The

division is replantd by fres of the p1amut 7froning Army. Follow-

ig a report in person by Cnl )odel, the ?ixehrer ordered tin transfer

of the flth 'Panser fivision into the Cologne area in oppositio to the

evr,-ressed opinion of the Cie nder in Chief Jest.

T)1 organization of Korpsoppen9 on the Western Front as considered.

The Fuebror was opposed to the plan, since the rtention of divisions would

tend to deceiv e the and , at the sear tin:, allow our o w = to

kvno exactly what strength was available.

The attack againat showon was repsned* rnmmy attase at Clove

were usccesfual and heavy losses were inflicted. There were 560 enemy

dead. The Coa trop fought well. here scented to be no dangr of a

reakathough between araie, sine, the Ri River formed a strong natwral

obstae agiont a thrust t the east.

ittle ativity we reported near Plue, whl at tornob the

eumy s reulsed. In th, opinion of Fi6 rhatl Mdel the high water

wald resin ntfl 20 lebwwy aoording to ether repors, the high water

would last for an additional ter to fourteen days. The Rhino 'River was

9. A e e sally oomm'ied two or three nderstrength divisions

assembled Ito a taotial unit under a corps onandor, with an inrOrisedcorPaps staff (Editor).

~ ~1 CU~b

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exracted to rea ci on oien for two weelw

tr the - rmy rotw G1 atre renewed V lht had Ir- nrt}en ouat P-t th

Oreholt switeb position. In. a surnrise attack, the en.eiy saceeded in

teretnrti ng the canter of' First rAny.On 17 _ ebunry the Lftnrte report? that air trvasort fCa c ilities

hdbeen inoroase inth greater 1ttrie area,. evidently only to augment

the supy serie. Vie heavy glider wore reportedly in use andn air-.

born umtts bad been brought for .r. In Thig~nd there were etil air

twmpotfacilities aind equtyamt but force were 1ackin,. Sine only

em'rittsh amd on. Maricani airborne division had been renorted in

Zngleand a najor airbore oprta on va not thought to b.likely.

Te amloynent of siget subsruno continued. One steamer of 6,000

gross register tons is sunk off the Degima cast *d a second stoer

of similar wise was lne.Inthe Ca".nel, 1,230 tone were suk and,

7,000 ton wrn daaged; this was considered an erordinary suces. A.

total of 24,00 tans wi suk or dew-e.

lb.octuent of the '7.S 11th Armored Division at Cloe ws not yet

sonfire. Tb 1 *h TT89h Dliviston istransferred from Colmar to the. are

vest of liege

At Cloy th en ontinud to attace with stron formes in the

direetion of Calar, supr b strong ertir tfre and 150 tanks. The

Germn psitions were pulle task a short distance but, on th. whol, th

day assed favoraly. ' orn attacks south of the tteioheld wore rewulse d.

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One battalion~ of Ofan thnr" tovns . was moved utto the I. use front and3 the

Paeier L &:r Division w es shifted to the ry Group Garea. Strong ernei

attacks forced a snort withdrawal of the re nn line at Thhternach.

n the Army (Group G area localized fightin~ occurred on the First

Army irnt. righting continued in the sector hold by the 17th 3 S .vyjsion,

The 2d 1ountain Di ris ion was moved out of the Alsace bridgehead and it

forward elements were commtted in an attack.

jo r Priedel of the yeracht Operations 4'taff submitted a report on

his visit to Army Groiap B (First P~arachute Army) and Army Group B (rife..

teenth Arm) from 10 to 16 February, the contents of which were as5 f olow s

"Second in importance onthe Westen~ Front," he said,, "was the holding of

the area west of C~olon.'" It seeod certaira, according to the report,

that the enemy, particularly the !1ritish, would hold to the same method-

io al combat methods that had been observed since the start of the invasion.

After the determination of an objective, usually strictly limited in

nature, the area to be attacked was sutbjected t o heavy,; artillery fire.

Dhrin the attack, tanks were employed lees for the break-through than

for destroy loal nests of resistance. The objecti.ve of the attack,

usually a single village, wes first screened, off by a cirty~ of artilley

fir, an then wes oepied by 8lW wrvig tankS and infantry, rc the

captured villa r, tanks weud then strike out to break up other setion

of the wdn ine of resis'tane.

it was the opinion of the units that in most ox the enem could

not beprevented from oeaptw'tng these limited daily objectives. Under

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favorable ctrowmatanoos, the fighting would remlt only in the loss of

Smor or 1es wide strin of ground, while at t'. me tIns t Streiigth

of the attack w ou l d gradly ucbside. Pased on the eny's method of

attak, a defense hd een zranised which provided for only forty bat-

talions (sic) of eah divion on the wdn defense line, one regi t

with etlve (sic) battalions in the artllery cover position,, and the

Tuesflir 1 0 battalion, the engineer battalion, and the field replacement

battalion in the second position. The artillery wns likewise echelons!

in depth, with only the foremost batteries in the artillery cover position.

Tb sae principle was applied to the antitank artiflery.

Generally, the era thought it possible to hold out during the

first three das of a lar- a le e n attack with nly the divisio

on lipne After that, the cgr t taet of large reserve formtions was con-

sideed necess .r

The C r or inChief West and Army Group B were for attempting to

defend every individual village and bunker in accordance with the exiting

orders of the tueer, and for attempting to nall dov" the min 4. i. of

rten e.dwo B s e ng every village t. be a base or strog point. At

the sam time, the tit M re rartiuarly th divisin cs t

urged the adoption of a more aasth defesa , allowing the ew enatia Of.

i vt sl vidlage before artillery bombardment bad betm sad letting be'.

hind on a weak rear guard. This rcdre would rresere the streth

10 Infantry or remoaisseance battalion,

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of' the inf'.nttry over a longer tine. llowever, this meth of combat

r'qui.re i well-trained infantry, kept: rfimly pner control. in the

case of' exhausted or poorly trained troops, there was great danger' that

the tactically correct e&lasticity of this method of' corbat would lead

only to a series of' delaying aotions, a nd that no. position would ever

be held.

With regard to the use of tanks in defense againzst a major attack,

the cow er proposed not to attempt counterattack s, vhich a~fter

initial successes .could- only come to a complete stop, but to employ.

parser unite only to intercept or force bak enemy penetrations.

Assault guns and tanm destroyers had proved to bethe only effective

defense against tanks.* Tb. heavy traotoudawrn antitank gun warn not

considered efficient.

Major $'rie del'st report also covered the ammunition and fuel situa-

tion. The o tinder in Chief West belie ved it would be possible to hold

out 4th existing-stocks of' ammunition only for seven days after the

beginning of a major enemy offensive. e leek of fuel would not only

hider the forwwrd movement of the Yolks artillery 4orps, Volk projector

brigades, and other large formations, but would also affect the ability

of the defense to shift tactically. Tanks and assault guns,, already

Insufi it its nusber, could not be empoyd to their full. advantage

because of th. lack of fuel.

The matter of replace~nt s was also considered. At that tie, the

7f'ifteenth ArmIy was receiving no replacements since those available were

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d'5{'d.

3oyr sztpo to th" >vnt kcay a r tthn >nr 3 Ariwro.nts

1,rin~ to th. 7'f:nhA5i er~ie r~i~~

e rrot Thatly dealt wIts the oonntr ci' ot nf 7jv, o fi i

by male civilia lare post ot thtn nurow £o frtifficttione rtie thte

front rznd the Fthtne "fiver waro cmeider& useless.

On 2Z &~ ir the CornLa~nde in Chief Wvest ws orderd to aseemble

the ran, antiaircraft briraee still a-signed tohim insuch a aixer as

to beable t o intervene quickl agait possible enry airborne opra tiom9

in the sectors oi' Army Gros a nd Hi.

On A I" rrn another freighter was rer ored ernt by a midge sub..

rinsue. Thbe mnth off the Emtor <ite wo me . In the Cleve &aa the

tttish 22d Pivtido and the "eanadian lt !rigde were reorted to have

taken part in the attack. Airborne units were sdthdnwn from the sector

of the rtea rrt rmy. Roenr, these units were only tmufled kc

a shots distnc from: the lie, aned since they were to be- abIlitated,

nconclusions could be C rwny conerning a tr jar enemy action. sea Clove

thsh t daarply twrds Qnch adapproached the norter win of

the Westwfl, which we badly oonetruoteed in that area. The enm addao

ws held iap but reservs were tobe available onthe foflowln Oay. The.

water. bad arte d to subsde in the sector of A rmy Group 3. An attack wes

totiued against the left wing of the Fifth Panzer Any At oetuah

furthe enm rgs was dciep a oomterttae was lamhl

It the sector of kryGopCfighting continued southeast of

Sa arbrueoken. The enemy a ttac eod with six to seven bttalion, probably

Page 17: The German Wehrmacht in the Last Days of the War Part 2 of 2

from two divisions, bu1-t in bster off aifter th arrival of resere e,

the chief of staff of iXr' Group P. i.sue) d~roctiws~s for the conduct of'

bttle between the M osefle and hine Rivers. The groeatest danrer wss

from t he iiagtena ares. 2y lvtng Uath rchl wtch peition, the

outpost area at the '=oDene gap as far a0 Trier :ad also be lost. Owving

to the situation in the tt it waveof great imnortane tot to lose th

industrial area aron Sarruetken. The strength of the wilts asigredto Any Group C was mc greater then these signed to Gn Grop 73.

ft 1 r~ebrZ Ioalise attaccs weecarried out againt the COrehols

switch poitio and the area south of Snisrtrueoken. Apj rently the W-ronch

let crored Pflivis ion was being transferred" to Oeveler, After noon

fight-ing became stronger inthe Cletean ob areas. While the line at

Gle+ was hold, the stuatio around Gech becats more serious. The DOnn

forces were regrouped. B~y the foll.owin night the bulk of the Panser Lehr

rivisio wasn eoted to arriv'. "he attack against 3eveth fAn continued

from the north aced south, but as no arc ored divtiin were emd, it

could not be aoed ae oobined-.rm dier attack .

?wvilages were lost in the northern sector. The ads lin, of

resiosnc wes moved buak two to three ki Los ters. Resrvfrcsor

left in pootio, except for the 2d Panzer _Divison vbic. as shifted to,

the soth. A number of fortifications were captured by the on. in the

ohtenzoh are.

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0-020 a152e

The Groolt witoh no attion in the f ry -run 0 ares had beer unider

attae z-n ne rlry iiorning and a nwm"rno no, ;eratttor were ,ade. ot h

of Saarbrueoken tt zituation bad beer ata dlizeti and! an u nterrtedi

main ine of reslst%nce was estabitshed.

The 708th 71olkagreadier Th'iv.i io, erpoye an t aper Rhino, was

bein reorganized into the 106th £nfnty --1virdon. From the 32d wavs

(age-+lass 19"), four divisions were being newly activated onthe w~er

Rhine. from the same agoeclss, one division eaoh was. being activated in

Wldfleoken, holln, Derrk, and Slovaki. One division in Holstein and

two di~vision in r"enmrk wore tobe rehab iltated. In holstein, one naval

division wnn to benewly activated, Two Paehrer briLa-a wore to be

p~lsreorganised

into divisios,

On fl ar f a sibarin reort the enm a ovessels over

3,0 rone register tons betwe the Scheldt and Tae .ive.

At Clove the radians played a larger rart in the fighting, nrobr~bl

due tothe haiy losses already sustained. It had not yet been d ee +

whether the enery woul stare an airborns attack.

E iehoww had reportedly transferred hid headquarters tothe iteia

fethel .area. This wes tken to mean that the otfoasivo would begin soon,

Heavy fighting cotinudna Cln along a line betsee C ear and

Cosh, The Ceman forces wee forced back to the road betwe thee two

towns btit the Panzer Loe' Diviion suceeed in retaking part ofthe. lost

gnuwi Hard fihtg o' both ade of Coch resuted in heavy loses btt

the overafl situntion wasoe onidordt be stabilized. Additional reserves

..152_

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-153-

were locat&d at ' bi14z. The tranz :3,or of t"tt :rt cha:ts : tvis ion

would ber ont th ' f~oflow .. iz day. Th 11th cp~sr MZ 'c wus 7phtft+ ed

to the A ri YGrow P area a s a r sorve;. The bulk ofl the 9th =an er 2 lvi-

atom had alra dy arrive '. Th.it or to the K oathp the %4th infantry 7%jyj

dion had n ed into petition. -'rmy Group also received the 104th

Panze ride

The water level was still high. Inthe ennth Army sector fighting

continued in the north an south and ainbl -.=nket continued to be lost

every day. These bunkers were mostly designed as urergun quarters a

were in the main unoccupied besa of the shortage of roersornol. sear

Igohterneth the eny- praased to the northeast.

At the probls switch position the enemy adancd through gape i the

lin, and captured four villages. Contact betwee Grm forces n the.

line was re .stablinhed by counterattack. A. new, thin main line of resist.

amos wac being rebuilt. The Orhoisi switch position was pierce between

?ettirrn and terleuten. A uerba o, Eouth of 5iarlautern, was lost and

te enq now approached the Spceren feights. The situation at still

not considernd tene.

The 11 tn Division bad now arrived in the rear of the First

Army. The 16th Infantry tivisio, whih was to be umited with the 905th

inntr Divisi on, was moved forwrm Bn aden .emn.

OnB92 ka the C ne r in Chie West and each of the three

arwz grup were inf'ored of the Vuehrer's i pression that Seventh' Army's

nlanned withdrawal to the ?rueut position (see 13 February),, which the

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A-' C-012 04

?ushrer had forbidden, d~ boed to hirvs n hautf'ul e ffect or. ths !moeth

A rm's conduct of b ttle . Lr~ee =re, thU : tit e ir the trcn; c

the Fuehror ordered the sevoth 'r- to hOld the 4 ostwaI boundtary. 'The

idea that defense wol eeasier from the so-cali, - ruOPi ntion," he,.

said, 'tnw t be effaBedeCoz themnso the uit c zeramtheir

sbtordts. 4

At 2130 hours on 20 rbruy the Oainder in (Chief V est trsnsAltte

to the Chi ef of the vtrnciet 0fltion Staft: his general istwsston of

the situation on t he Wet e rn ?tont. ti ilatedangeo a break-through

was seen in the sector of the Tirst Parachute Army. An unusaly la.rge

conentrtion of enem armoro units in the A'che area was reported. The

situation in that secto wa flawe with co'noera. A attetpt was mrtde to

shift -the 3d Pansr ergnaior tvision ito the area west of Cologes. The

enemy threatened to break through along the southern part of the Z itel

bend, which would react onthe situation at the 44oselle Cap. rightin in

the area west of' 3rrebourg, arid for the rr- fining sqcttors of the Crelicils

switch .position would avn to be co-ordinated with openations to the north.

lb onaybetwsn h First 4, reet M epi was to beprotected under

alcirctmstanoes. T':.his point inthe front was strengthened after theCW

bad, permitted. vith.nwal of the First Arm right wing. A farher cause

for eonos we the defense of th liaguenau Forest. te tipper Rhine atd

twent-fifth An (Bllet) fronts 414 not seem to be in date dner.'

Whr they were fresh ad strong, the troops continued to fight bard

and brvely, particularly in the sector of ArM roup B. flovover, the

Page 21: The German Wehrmacht in the Last Days of the War Part 2 of 2

efficIency of -i ny unit-i hrs2 be gretl rec cs by the ritr ain of th

eaerc £itlng * Th r ruon at pi*r oZ~ rcwp cx ~ r w~rl a

searious problea .

The Corra.ndr in Chief es t informed the 7aehrer that Cfoa the

beinring h had f ught again:t the danger of "s!now &alflrg t; y ret asitg

to arov reats towithdraw the front Itne. ~owuld make su.ch

requests to the Lhrer only if itt were cear ly a matter of saving a

valuable unit.

O21 1'eruarr the thef of the CW informd the Co or in Chief

Wlest that the TPuherr bad agreed as to the proms ale areas (Rtoora

Dweron) where the ain enemy effort would be concentrated. Aga-in the

Wiorer repeated the iirtanoo of clingng teenacusly to eah foot of

G"rman son, to each bunk-.r, etc., ina order to zzevent an ever fastor

retreat to the Phine. The $?uerer reserved the right to sanction the

evmoution af individual units in the Wetwlt, a move whic would b

made only when it wa necesar to bolster the infantry strength or a new

msin line of real tance. A directive for organizino the front line within

the Wtwfl ad already b assued on 10 Fbr:,ary.

In his rerzly it 1600 hours on 22 February-v the Widor in Chief j est

assure the flmhrer tint nobh of the a ny groups had been ordered in the

strmest terms to defend evr foot, of ground. The C er the x-

plflned 4wy metin snotions of the front, prticulrlyr those with strong

bunker lines, had been lost in en astonishingly short time. Chiefly, the

difficulties had been the slow arrival of replace fite, their lck of

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S~ f.02-0~l6

training an stamina, eamI the lack. of siufficient nirhers of troops to

hcpa all of the bk~rr. Ths., ile the bunker's w r ' ueul In poteotimn

end quartering reserves in the do-nth of the reair area, they were easily

damd by direct artillery an~' tank fire, et icularly whn aimed at the

frontal embroues. T~he lack of mutual flank protec ion in zany bnlkersws also pointed out, '+he decisi.ve factor, however, was the lack of

sufficient niumerical strength to occupy afl of the exdsting fortification

nd to control the in-between mrss. This bad mmritte d the enemy to by-m

pass the bunkers and to rnut them out of actio from the rear.

OnZ hanr twenty-.one motor torpedo boats were in action, part

of which succeeded in breaking tbroug'h.

S\rher enemy rifroeens were maoved into the Clern area, Th

lotion of the three major British uit was not clla. Fighting in this

area had now lasted two. wmks, during vhich tie the enemy had gained

twenty kloo ters. nemy tarks wore moved forward behind the TT.S. First

and finth ;ryfronts. They could bhv come only from the strategic

resevs,

Until this tUm the fighting near Car an Oceb had been the heatest.

(leurlly, the enemyv ws conta ined,. while the Pan s e hr Divisim t had ee

gaied omeground. Only at Caiar was thw line withdrawn. Despite the

defensive atu~re of this battle, 28 enemy tanswr disabled and 142

prisoners wer taken. TeI 'xaht Corps had be netdi re

to effect a unified, vell.a-ordihate defense* On the aeura front the

L!X'1 Corps ws in action, while to the south the 8th ;!arachue Division

was being withdrawn.

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9 42 slV

Zthe 3vnth Afrmys str enn attck cc tinu& aainnt the flanks.

?o the north the oma had reehe d th line -rou'eld -St .lhioh - &tnschoid ,-

Fie ebfeld. The %astmfl bad been pilerced fler. bat ua being diotendod

further to the west. To the south the enemy toaed oft' to the vest, cutting

off one negimnt. Ak s only haf were ocpied, a ta> of bunkers were

eapture. Gersm fores, including tank and. assut gm, were eingmoe

The situation at the Or ohls s awitch sition was crital. After the

bulge nnar Tottinrein had been reduce, the anew suoaedd in breaking

through to a new defense line vhtch bad not yet been ecne . The Caa "

oader in hio! West ordered replaceent training batalis to be moved

forv.rd inthis area. The loss of sarebour would seriously

secuity of the tswf. Ha fighting continnsd south of ssbruecka.

Althouh Snihern wes lost, the heights which permitte hostile obsrvnation

into $arbnueekan were still Win held.

the fuetbrer again s tresso the importance of holin

the Spiohen heghts, the lose of whicn was to be pevente tdew al circue.

stwnes. Any op Cwas to report in the eveiga to whtmesaea

mnteeein of 23. ?emy7 the Scd in Chief Wot ws instructed

that sic the fortiication. at the ?4on12 gap were among th. strongest in

fth entire Weeall, the shoud beoccpied by the etrongeet peuilble force,

if neesay by weakening the outpost ares.

147-

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1- I Bc.' -as4-

Cn ;2 ! *ri tr It van repnrte t't the w-oto r tiree t -ats a

so far r otl, neonntrrr~ ar ~rer rt. T rty Mdget iubsarines also

put to tea. There' wa inceraseed evdene that enes air orme foration

were beizy ha tllr readin sjn.

At -chit:cmah thae errt r ite the 6th Anware £tvisicn Mprobctb ly the 4th Arues 7 ti :m. cmenr, t strati attak was

being planned in that area, sines thore wera no North r lare units

r ete to be onentrating thn. The heavy pressure at the Orchals

switch position wes aprlahwlf by the eowmrdtmeft of an additioa

Arertnar& division.

thttn had died dw at Galar anid Goch. The avm resed &t

blc had ennicyad only tro orn, To the northeast owa foes

fofl.nin up the Osnen witbirava ware alse repulsed. The Psaser 1.1w

flivisi r was;v wtsMwa srin to fow a reve. The 238th lnfantr7 Djvje

alec and several prachute uits wemre ontheir way to the front. Further

to the south the seex artifllry bosa ajustzent fire. In the Seventh

A seetor eontinued pressure free the north and south resulted in ftmer

vithdrs-als. the Grms wer foned to isproin.

In the south contact with th '79th Isfntry i t ore tb

and then l.t again. Weak itt wer vithdnawn frt the trout to neuf

the netr wi tch positis. ?&gt iung at th (hos stb pstition *ootimned. The n5th Infantry Division and the right fitS of the 416th

Infantry livisiae were famed back behind the Suer River. After heady

figbtire Gs brdwore lot nd the *fevQ ov into

£a rrbourg. .er Snertg eneey f ris reabd the 'Star ivtr. Those *l-

zents of the 11th ?anstr Disn which bad not yet been vitraw were

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ms 9 r20O

thrown into a counterattack. Enem y forces entered Irora ch and occupied

the heights between hrbch cn cnd the zSieherr hoights, oar-turi several

bunkers To the east, the enemy was retsa e ack at ".r:choenbach, but at

two points his ac anoed ole ents were able to look over the valey at

.arbe oken ant Volkingen. The Co ner in Chief zest ordered the

o-nat tnnt of the 5C9th Infantry Ditsior together with the assault gnms

of the 17th 3 Panzer ivision.

On 22 ?ebiarr9' the Coinnder in Cief Wst rported that the forces

brought forward south of Trier for roinforenent of the Watwall (on,

Uight field howitzer battalion of the 212th Xolkgrenadter Divison, the

519th Antitank Battalion, the 47th Volks -Ing er Briade, one mxed anti-

aircraft artillery battalion, and other urits), the 212th 'olkredier

Division, and nints from the south trier sector, woul4 be tobined to form

Group Serfuss. O23 February Army tr B reported that the garrison

strength of the fortifiottions on both a idea of the 4ose11 'g ap uwabered

$79 men. These figures would increase after the oomttmnt of the 7*1ocm

engineer brigade.

on 22 V1ri c the Wi nder in Chief West tranemitted an order to

AryGrou B to establish a suffioiently large force (Csee ofa the

79th aM 276th fantry fvtsion) at the P asrm psition in vinew of en

suns at the of the south f lf front (see 13 an 20

Ves x ry). Oat the ase day, the Feb er rplod that it was permissible

to secure the I rues position, prvi ed that it would sue. no wenig

in the spirit of those troops stifl fighting in the forward area. ecurity

~555r-

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s C-O20

force for the ocow atone f the re nzition wnre rot. to- b tC'ke frr

the .1knks -. i'T Sevett h A± Qn 23 oruarr theCntre in Chief ~i

eorted that ranewa eney neetntions inL the flnsat, the io end

rad. forced .Pctto&! idth rrwnl1 to e. iri rt 3itsoi.: Neuorburg

o1liendor '.

on X1 Fo =anr' the rjor eneimy offensive weiz be p'xm. it iaevs reportod

that two days earlier twentyetwo m~otor torpado bots encontere an enm

convoy and e robably sank sein s tsnrs * li ;other stemr were damaged,

while the dnage on the Giern . rOde was light. All of thek e oomitte

in the Sohedt sliver haw returnet The nidget sub arines Th ite to retort

any success1, although in the Irish =e one loir er-rnge sumrineo sank two

s hins a daniged two others.

At och the enem's main point of effort was reinforced by the co it

mot of the British 15th Inftantry rLivision.

As wn ox octod, the xr Corps took over cor and .

Thepretene o th TV Z'h Ifanry rivision near .onsohauwa

confirmed. At Eagunau the 4,2d Infantry riviston was shifted to the west

where the 45th infantry t3ivinio had ben withdrwn to form a roesv. Th.

?rnoh 19th Infantry rivision arrived in Aleac. from E:rittany,, alt lug i it

was not Yet fully or aised.

Fighting at Cocl had abta te nmy pene dton were mt b~Gea

counterattacks.

At. X45 hours on 23 Vemegry the mruete enemy offensive was bog~un

in the eeotor of A r y Group f. 4 rtillery boi raot ha nreceded the

attnck.. T1e right wing ins.q less effeote4 becau's a' t~ :Ainundate g rodnd.

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-I461-C4220

Tn the beszfnr the mai eneny effort wran ocn. rentrnate near tinnich,

where water COnyhtics we're more favor t1q to ear avac, ThnkS apmr°ed

there. An enemy bridgehead measuring- 2 kiomtere wide by 2 kilomasters

deep was formed. Tridzeheitde of local_ importne were also establishe at

Jzalieh and- tltenbrg. In the 2ator bold by the xxav r'i anzer Corps

brI4,heads were estatlishd on both sidos of Dueron. A further attack

was direoted against the 353d Infantry Division which still occupied a

position on the lett bank. ecause of th. heavy smoke and the saatwaton

bombing, it was still not poss ible to 'determine the enot point of min

effort.

The tnser Lehr Division oner the a th ?araehut ivrision wore held in

restv bG the Comaner in Chief Wt. Those -units were both supplied

with trucks and fuel for rapid mvmt. The 9th Panzer Pivision was in

position in full strength, while the lO6th ?anser Brigade a! elements of

the dVclks A rtillery Corps had not yet arrived.

Heavy fighting ameewed on the northern and southern flanks of the

Seventh Army, resulting in the loss of ground. Th. infanty lost further

strength to several uaits were out off. floments of the 5th raraehute

tion vows appt'isching.

Southvest of Trier in the Army Ortp Csector, the enmy ma headway

at Okfen, At Srrieb and Ham the snow' joined several bridgeheds and

advamedto the Sear heights. One 'lebrkret battalion was bein socdvu

from the rear.

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) e# -02 uwlo

Nar Saarbrueeken ened forces apture several bunkers on te

Spichoren heitghts only the reconnaisuance battMalion of the 2d t Launtir

Division suoceeded in recapturing .the heights themselves. There was

s e hope that the situation could be stabilised at least until the

afterno. The 2d Aontein Division vas withran at Pirmasen and

moved around to the northwest.

On *AE)M ight ofthe fourte idget sbam rturned

ho without hamin encountered the enui, altog the sinking of cue

destrzyer and two or thre mechant ships or transports bad been obs erved

Asuccessful attack bythree flotillas totaling twentyon motor torpedo

boats asreported to have been carried cut despite poor visibility,

rovin the feasibility of such operttosi.

The British were regruin and attacked vdth only two divisins

lot all of tte Amria uis were identified. The U. S. Ninth A rq

widene! its eatr to the south in preartion for a driv, t owards

tha~seldort axd Cologne.. Mcooringly, the U.S. First Arvq' provided

flankU~x rc tiIt appared m ely that the three a irborne mits

At Gosh the British stueee ingin frthe gou:. to hek

this advance th Gten epplared the Pse labs flvise the 1t

Ins t Dis, ar two battalions of th :I rahe

)Is o olgthe enem was LaU~e the seco of thi U

8$ Corp. At the corps botindary, hover, enem forces advanced as tar

-462_

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10 C-0020 w163el

as Bal. Inthe sector held iqthe y L! orp, the Raer River was

crossed at uever places, iolitn at tihnich , Juelich, end Dtwr a,

ighg was growing Weker in the. -seor off the 353d Infartry Division,

although the s he ad gained a brtdehead at t rauthauso. The Poer

vual dam was blown up for a aseon tira, oaiwirg the release &oftour

zillio cubic satan a water within sit days.

'' o the flth Paer Division and the entire 9th

Pader Diwtsicc, at the corps boundax, w~r novel toward, while the

34 Pasergresadter Division wa wtnrwn. Other rainforc eots were

unable to ucrf torwad fros the rear because of daVto the railroads.

The opeo4fl of the offenive was aopanied by stron air attacks.

In ,th Seventh Army sectr heavy fighu bad again broke ot is

the Prs poition. New .n ain had led to the dedsioa to withdraw,

lad wile the nao was carre ncot uoeesfufly, two eairled

12ba had to be abwanoned !nUm attack sotipta against the

soutlwent corer tthe positic.

In the Arm Group 0 area the Amrens atu t tne and gained two

brldhas atthe Boer Rive. Snt alm be alrnlernd i

river WIt it wAM tl hoped that th gains c.ud be locald. After

the entwis t o the 24Muti iialce it was hoped tha i situto

woul lspnn.o

Ilk twls 3 si4DS tOn attar o* It of ini sta12 a1 remt esettum duagwntsea!ooueig aa

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X ; w 0-020

Pi. tip contine o the Spichern hight with alternating ouccess.

era Larces occupied the hegtwhile certain bunker weyre hel by

the *e7

2 a~ 3 anport the0C srmntom'Westvwasnrem.e

bthe Chief of the X aenet Optrationa Staff. N ti i eiate break-*

truhbetween the IHnae and Itineo Rivers was eiqmd *acording to the

report.I the Fifteenth Al ser hnver, the enha rse

the gMac finer and metseven k tens.. Th rain thrust towards

Cols and the north v mmnn.

The chief conert o the C er In Chief West was the devolr eat

of th situation an either aide of the Mo a River. Ifthe evWcouldnot bethrown back across th Prmec a vit Mvl to the £41U position

weud becoma eesar. This udght neeitate the abac aof prer.

The First w was not stronm nc. to fore the eateq back acros the

Sas River. n.ns brmak-hroub al.ng the Thsek highroad was

likely.

The repr of the Oair in CMie West poite a the upoua

ofaauinit contact betwee nW w rup 3 o an .It ws not posaib

to ttbnw aove frt either a , in the area soubh at the

Rsefl Itv . Mimnent attack agait the Wisenbcurg

relte &w abitq of toe ihnth sctor of rW Group 0. the

Cmmne in Chief ft" fe o aw d ireetivs

13 "prt the situation for 25 February is issingfo theLitratio o* (Auho).

ale

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-1,4 4i 0-20e15

On 1 :jkMat 1635 hours the Csomdr in Chief ieet received a

teletyp letter signed by the Fuebr.r The Anerican attacks onboth

aides of the )oelle gap were described a being only in the nature of

hdig attacks Accordin to the ferr, the U.S. Third Arq did not

bats sufficient forces to eXploit a beAlc~troug into the )4osel alley.

he enoq's main effort was concentrated onthe lRoer front in an at tcmpt

to break through to th fin. Thre was no doubt that a lsgoeo

m attack lwas in thear.

With regard to th Me. - tor frot, the Fsr issued the

f ollwing direetiv to the Oower .in Cief West a A break-

through war to bprve te at al css. Ift ecsar, reserw were

to be taken ire the . ntet of the Fif t ase r e ven if grat risk

vone iuvlv A withdraa of, thesh t fna of nq Grop 3 wa

*unl out of the question, despite the eag penetration into the

rk.a are (toe below). The tes on the . ifteenth Aqfot

scold not be eqmatod for bythe tact that the Keuse Riv.r, on than

sq oter rear po atmn oaO be ocpie by tne forces. In ceeo

OS ISV tkchth cotS tit.a wire to be suemtte

in svscw iah a.e dire.tve of is Nt uary.

Vbhj it asstill too early to wthdraw the seeth AnyW fronta

both ses o th teefe g to the Ny oition, ti Puer would

alo ent s nte front Is with his direcie

of 10 Febru "y Banter, fis eattat with the tamer tot in the

Seifel lnteins, in the Pram area, aMd e th. Eaus ier wevve to

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.t CEO et~pe

be secured.

A further eztintet of the it atin on, 27 r'ebrusry ttdicated that

Trier, eve if encircled, could ause Sthe utmost difficulty for the

*sip d hould therefore. not be abadoned. In order to pren an

nulargement f e the en bridge-ead, the nta Division wuld have

to attack in the diffiult train south of the ton.f It was. essential

that this sncsO of the frost should keep close contact with the

fofifiawto south of Trier the one band, n with those at liersig

atd Milbh on t other bt. After the arrival of the reinfoCed

6th 8tai Division5 the eq bridgewhd was to be elI a ediati

Based on these oas ideratin s, a further directive was set to the

Co as er in Chief West othbe see ight. the Mias front was to be

hele it hdrawal would be ade yet to the 171 sueor In the

Sarrborg ara the euow was to be contained by forces .the M

Moutain Division, The 6th S.S Mountain Divsion was to be brought fore

ward. O the folleuig day, the hrmoaaht Operation Staff loand that

t last co bat elemt. of this divisio wold4 asable in the hilfdl4

7.Uwi~ a* tlx oocveiatt@4 with the DepaV Chief f the

W net Oprtic taff, the ohio f staff of the GUd S in Chi

Vestrepoted theewbeiehhA U&led tthelmss of alb

of bunkers uedia the Spi em . t jmitom (see 21 ?en ctw),

the details o which b.4 not so far be hwn to the (W4h

Us Webnacht 1ib Cnai,

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*0 # 0e020 467-

Also on27 Febrar, the C omnnder in Chief >est was it omd that

the 1Puenr agreed to the w tdrawi of thde 346th Infan try DIvision from

th arv tone, provided that the section ofthe front from which this

division wa taken woulsl stl be defended.

Cti2 the Febrer had declined a request bi the C or

is Cef West to wthdaw the riohtwing ofthe II S Cirs adthe left

win of~'rOrop to the Xiedr-Kues area. After a briefigr

the DevuV Chief of the Webm l pratis rStaff Lt. Colonel D

usthe critica sitmatio in the rrkelws area, the C ei he

est on 27 Februry reed his request to witdnvw the left wing of

AMw Grop H' to a lin running from Keseleonetb+e e to the, area

south of iadr~ek . At th.se tm, the C evdr in Chief' Ilst

would tvr to sh ift th 1'lth Divisio into the resultiug gap, thnt

lestablishing msat with the Poser Lebr isite in the Rheindablea

area. The neqnest was spo ted7 the Dpw Chief of the Weho ht

Operations Staff, and was subsequent2y osnctiaad bar the Fuebrear .1-o

thoq 'with a beary Virt* as rered by the D putr hief, Lt. Colo el

.r~ The chit of .tttf of th C eitaa La Chift w as iufom

aeeerdlagl Ir V bs a the w - SLIW

At =1 ban the Caster an Ch eet reported

btelr p let ter tthe Puobers that al diffiet t wed e

a n so tas itws in his powr to do e@. Anocrdlug to th

Ommar inChief West, the main task was to keep the entir Wester

Frost intact, in order to protect for as long as possible the imprtant

l67

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E # 0e020 -168-

indatrial. areas of the Rtuhr and ""er. In view of the vaiu mont-

bilities which might lead to a strategic en bra--thro, sis of

which were already a ri (ai pentrtion at J"irelea; and eneq

admones towards Colope, the yU pvtio, and th. area .. st of

Sanebourg ),# the r~r er in Cyief West asked for greater freedom of

action than that prmitte by the secret dfrective Cive to his peronaly

an 15 February. A decision would have to be tad as to whether the los

of taottcll isprtat tow9 suet as Trier, or theaVM s tvfforti

tioatios asjustified in order to save uite fighting ther e r more

imaportant later an eats. A new diretive on thi question was re«-

quested.

Again th opiio wa repet that it was moeimportant to maizeo

taes the c ontti'tyo the front then to elagr a unified lineof

reistane by clintg to cerain area.* The C o*Mr in Chief West

begged for permissio to order the necessary tacticalyea hImelf,

since valuabe time was oite lost mewating for decisions. ?tuf

rep ort ach measur taken wud begive to the 1W.

In e ittn his repor, the Cosaer in Chie Veit age's Wee

the Ntitt9 f "bytmu imq pbe il e dou top prv the withtraval@ the front Use t. the Rhb iver.'

1i te evenin of U8 Febraury, the Pser asrd the la C rniri

Ce Weto his efiesa aM, referin o h directiv of the

prMein dq, urged th. rapid withdrwal ofte left w of Arq

-.168m

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C.02 -69

(In the sane day, the Cimader in Chief Ves~t sent to the ?uehrer a

rew estiwate of the eituato with referreroe to the flehrer'e direetive

issued on the altenoon of 27 Febrary, It yas painted out that the

.ne bad broken through the front in the area of the lilt &4 Corps and

that two snmort divisions had slreadyr advanced as far as the W^aJdspiesB

are The Panser Lelir Divisin was egd nhenvy defensive fighting

at Rhidahln. Tere was imcrasig danger that the front held by the

Frst ?arstte 'w ould coapse" as a result of ane press r t

the south. Strong attacks against the Drft position had ade the loss

of vrowd there unavoidble. It vas no longer posible to transfe

gleenta of the Fifth PaserAr to the north because of stron

attack agast the a right ving. At the Koefle gap, the nwmy

pla n ived more tha aamer plin d of the Gene forces. Th

heavel bettered Sevent Ar~bdbe onrated on the left wing,

the retv ekelyepsn other sections of the front. That the

addition" al upr of the 246th Volkereair Division would be sufficient

to stabilee the sit"ti " apered doubtful. nEt o Ssr rou the

attac b the Ud homctal Piiic b not bessonstu. The 6th

OSKutaa Division uld ntarie from the teina od arabfore,

AolrLN ad =0 the Osa for Is ChefWet had bees ordered to osmne po-.sibIlitte

for imrvn the poition of Rineteauth Any b avcin the vai line

of resistance to the line Eehlettstatt - Narkireb a Col du Z na«

-269.0

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1$R C cm0047.

. Vltin aid by emp og'ing te 6th S$ ountain -Piion, than assigned

to the ?irst Ani f£ighting t2 the onort.

The report of the C sr inChief rest, submitted at 21.05 hours

@8 &M dscried as impossible the withdranwal at this division

from First Any in view of the i plg enetrey drive against the Moelle

gap and the Sars and booms, of the time whioh wold b needed to effect

the transfer. The possibility of an attack a inst the Wissabourg

dopren ion y also susidered. At the same ti , the adva the mai

line at resistance was not feasible: without the support of an additiona

division. Probably th. 2 t Untain Division vas no longer capable of

offensive antiso. It was Jtdged sore important to stabilzts the existing

front by stre~igtheng the bridgehead hold by Nineteenth A rq.

the C or in Chief West transmitted the fofliang

order to rnw Group 0t 'th. Aas. bridgehead mast bheld trier all

ci ramtns in order to tie up the a forces there and to prevent

their reach ig German soil. As support is not available fta other

eat o, the neessay fore.f atsut be taken fram the Mntain tract as

rapdly as pmusible.*

on t it 2330 hou"r the Costr in Chief Vest submitted a

reprt describing the tense situaio at the Atles. bridgehead. The

e5W VS reported ta b only eight 'ilnegdterit the site of the

Dreish bridge, hile the greatest idth of the bridgehead va '01 35

kflm ten. Under these conditios, the question asasked whether it

vawise. in the lon ras to contiu holding the bridgehead, and wther

the Nineteenth Ares was not still in danger of being cut off.

-1370

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fg 4 ClYl-

tf n~ n the trsner in Chif t e ast ponted out that on the

First Ar~ front thore were no orpe~ svailablc to eomperate fsr the

vtthdrvalof the 10% SF anser fivision. Contray to the piion of

the W4, the Corander in hief We.t mnentarly epected an attack

against the Vosoetle front 1P way of the oros switch position, against

which only a weak.r Oeran fore was available. An n tihrus towars

the indutrial area along the -Saar River wasnot considered i mnet.

No solution could be fond by attmapting to shift the sector boundaries

withn the First Army ara.* The forces necessary to stn.g the

First Arm front culd only be taken fr Alsare.* Thi aised the

question as to whether or not Alsace should beabandoned. Wile this

wol oertainly release enw forces at th ae tine, it was ot coca-

siderad that they would be available for i ate emitent.

Upon receiving the report from the Chief of the fl concerning the

situation ab the upper tine, the ubrer resed to allow the vacu-

atin of the Vosge. bridehead, and at the same time requested a d es

oriptim of the overall defense of the tne 1 5

b ~ lat 2310 hus, the Comner in Chit? Weist was in-

fored aooordizg]y that the upper Rie bridgehead ato be held.

Vthim the brdgehead the bulk of the de fendg forest were t beo

eamitted >ant attacks in the Cozar atSanheia fulose arems,

while the frost bordering the Vosges listass was to be secured oly

15 rn a note ade by the Chief of the tehraoht O tiperaton Saff.

-1711M

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)Z#C0O -1720

Ia thin defense Lime To obtain a more aoiwate picture of the situ-.

atton, the Yuerer- dmed a s tatemet off the actual ~tren off the

Nineteenth Arq ad a map sheto the disposition of secrity fos

alog the astern ban o the !hn south of IMsatt.

On Zg==at 1325 hours the C ar in Chief West anwer

that in the long run th defeat of the Zineteet Arny would be inevit~-

able, Without the Ncineteenth Axq teres wcudb no forces with which

tbuid upa stron an lasting 4sfeone othe upper Itmne. Aleady

the frot bordering on the Voegs KMowtais bad been weakened so tarda

to resemble oly a fBarni pition. ?2tbing ould now prevent the

.new trai crusting this line.

(ii 2 Tebrzqi th ie If of staff ofdAt Grop 0 submitted an satiate

of the situatio at Nwnteent A to the Cht.!ef the Webfct

Oeratio ataf (throg the Deputy ctiat). At th point of attae

near Coie rl, a thin .ermax line faced three enem inantz r divisions,

two French snored divisions, erA possibly eleents of the Algerian 3

Ztvnsion. Ano eqbrak.4rough at this point was ccasidered ikely.

A fauhr v"ekin o th aetai fratt ad the rigtbank o the

RhZOInei favor of the Coluare nt. no loner possible

bler the ObiW of the ehaeht Ortion Staff wped with tie

estimate ofthe a ituain hep 'te out that the cit" task of Nine0

tnth Aw was in w sa to istrengthen the probbl point of brett-'

At 1300 hr on2 etran' a telephone anuse vs received fm

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11-10 # e.02047.

(oener lsutnn~t W estphal (Chief of Staff to the Coma~er in Chief West)

stating that end. troops had entered Coi.uar, that the line of r'etirement

as189, and that the 16th frantry )iviaion was endangered. General

~etplal ashe that this further report be given to the ?tohrer.

In view of the report bythe. earin Chief. =est and the proposal

of the Chief of the liehrnacht Operations Staffa the uefirer decided that

the Motain fiot should be further veakened in favor of the Co~man

corner in ardor that n units would beout *ff. This involved a with-

drawal to a bridgeha at the rear of the Riuae44arns Canal from where

a line could be held until aUl of the re ng Germ forces had crossed

th Vine

A Cmlete evacuation of the bridgeh.~4 vas to be coningent on the.

state of the Rhine defenses at that tie.. Forces released as a relt

of evacuatin the bridgehead were in pert to be used for other missions.3 '

At 2250 hours an 2 February General WIestphal again telephoned to re-

quest an iunediate decision on the evacuation of the bridgehead. The

Chief of the V~hmoht Opratloas Staff pointed out that as all forces

includili the art llewy v r e already being itdam fro the mutai

frt, am isuav tion bad actual7 'bedu, axv that an i idiate decisio

was not n ees auv. Nwv e, he added that a definite decision wouldbybera hd a h ovn.d y

At 2105 hours n F Feb ruary Genea . estera repotedi on the general;

2 oe ud y the Chief of the V ebraht gyrations Staff. (Author).

-173-

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I 53 20 G+,42

outlxtsof tLe reduced brl4geh sad =4x on the intended enploament of

troop which would 'he re: med. F~our divisions (those with thc 1ower-t

cwnbt a trcDgth) would ae ssigned to the upper R~hine front anzd three

divisionu would be sent to First AruWy

Later on the sea dat the C er in Chief reeeived p riaion to

evacuate the Alsace bdehead.

Follow a onv ration with the Chief of the t .zacht OratioM

Staff1 General Westpha told~ the Depu~ty Chief that he udrstood the

moros, of fit1.r'a intention to pin dow as many of the en s' forces

as possible forvard of the VIia.. hexplainaed by the D~eputy Chief of

the Wehrmacht Operation Staff, the flanks should be reinforced at the

-zpee of the sal4ent. The outposts should be vithdravn cu2y in cae

of an attack that would mean their d~strucetio

At a mttution conference an 5 Fabr r, the ?ehrex' enphasised the

inpor'tsaef not losin ai artilleryT ian the " rid ebea4 was evacv ted.

The mrilles would first have to be w thdravn behind the fIinemfhone canal

and tbiea late across the IRhine Rivers. An order to this effect was to

bism eto the C dr in hit Wont. At the same tium, he should

bs vised atthe lpite seo l tb. t t lueir Klotz end the

Iaisrtu agains the possibility ofa surprise attek

dlaat Isish the0a erief Vst e td that

the bridges and fee at the Aime brdgehea were exposed to strog

artillery fre". Te inantry forces were no longr able to contain the

eaw Loig delays in the withdraval threatened to break up the infantry

-174-

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?;/ C-.020 e74

forams.* In riv of the apparent witfrlraval. of eelr £o~et fryt northern

Aliae, it as ±mpowtnnt to a'ivanos r es of thc Un.+defntL r~~ as

quickly ae possible into the Wist~bou depr asion. Theretore, tlit

Coweander in Chi e iit desired to evaeu te the fls'ee bridgehead by the

m orningU of 1/0 rew.ar unless a to wte rrer va aiven feitl.

The ?uebror granted the nqu ew t onthe rollcmin ds,p Tfoavin the.

proposa of the Chief of the rsrueht Cperatiems Stea if and inf2.uned

tr the feet that the bridgehead was no Icege large enosht tie up as

statable enetv fore. Arder to this offet was issued at 0 hblz

at 05 hor the Gwawerin Chief Wext reported a

Mis intention ith regrd to reorgsisig the chadn of ead, the

distriltto of ton cm a th. upper MIni frot nd on the l.ft tt teItnd oit t t +.Aa fr uwing of

PintAny aMtheintndrioomtset o foces.Apat fwz nit ofthn Ill S ofpf, the 159th, 189th, 198th, 70th, aw 716th Inantry

Division vould rmain assigned to flretmnth Army. The pers , of

the 189h, 708th , end 71 th Infatry Division were to bewre with

the 16th, 1 9h, ea 18h Thtntry Divisions. mhe atcuzttu Diviia

and ti 33t Infantry ierio wane to be tnfaed as soot as possible

to terear ofthe lof wing of Fi rat A in afle to replace the 559t

nantr D.tvii and the 905th lDvision is the Toge.

At 202 biurs tb C ow r is Mhef West mesed an oder to r.o

habl tm the 708 M. 76th Vo gr eD tutsiec n the 189thInfany Divsin near the front in Webulcret V 1le ist). '.

enemy opposite this ertr ofthe front shoyl be gins the Iaprssia

spy

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-476 4? £'. C020

that these thre divsions were being held Ir. retnev by netsenh Art.

The upper _ ie de3 egger wers e to be furer. stregthbedb the

comuitsaent of Volk stw battahon, for the quatericg and training of

which the eourltios onthe upper Rhino wor favoreble. Additional

Volkasturu battalions were to be activated in the Nineteenh Aw sector

in accordance with the request of the C ander in Chief West.

ZOn ho the or in Chef West was directed to instrat

the Nieeeth Arqr of the ?nhifrs opinion regarding the lkeihood

@f an ean7 attempt to cross the Rhine in the sector Bisohveiler

Stnsbourg The rehabilitated divisicms were to be eaployed agant ash

a possibility..

2n 28 Ferar an order ras gives to transfer the 190th Infar

Divisio fre the upr Itan fiot to the ieb area. The

division would breplaced bythe 553d Volkigeir Division, which

was bein rehabilitated in that area. tazpt in the case of an tasty

attack, the infantry adengineer elements were to be held in the nearj

the entire division vas to be onrd ly if the er attepe to

cssthupetie

The defenses of the uppe Rhite front vir to be tr

steghndby al available inn., Reisas. was to be eari

out arme the river.

. the,

Oesar in Chef West orderu Aw Group B to spoy its loca tOrces

to stop the enety drive west of Clove aM to retain this city47 as a

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F4it C"020 7'

pivot point. All aesu prepswmtlos vwe to be ade for a partial

withdrawa). Of the lef't wirng of ?wevtyfifth Ary. The mafr effort

should re*main oonentrate d onboth tides of V.nU lo &~r ad.

~th s ndy, thbC arin hiefX .st "fued arequestb

A~ Grioup H to -dtWrev the front to th Lim Bab* switoh position-

Clor. deprossiona Qannop. The pwsnt lin avs to be hel with the

aid of elemts of the 7th ?aaot Division (abmlt tvo-hizii of th

die sion). Vhile the ?ubwr bad alloved the vithdwtval of the salient

at 1i esr, hbad refusad l~~iion to plideo the left flank of

'n the maer in Chief a et asked fo w e uthoit to

shift 'n atta lion fr iBehren Iusad 4. the iula front of the

?fven - if"h Anw, whisk WA t een akened by th et *. atteoks I

the Clove area. This request was wetued in v of the ism eds imp4

sne. for the pr'teotiom o the D~utch naval base and for tb.- ei t et

of midget sh ie against ship trafi, n the Soh.3t River.

At 3230 hoom a 10 1'.bruzs* the eaadar LaChief Wet dispateod

a uss to Awi QOp " draving Ateatios t the Nerious eftuw~a

of an min bik-thr t to thes Pbnaw stressing t he ismrts~e

Mo34i" Clov at al a. Contest Witt tbho T weaytthAu e to h

ainte aer a13 eirsutanes.

ka WWeW!d 1a a with zWak mad the Vuthre darlt the situatiofn

'oserm Fn 0 V auwmwy the attuiioso the Com~ in Chie West

vas aai . drawn to te possibility of an enmy aiern landing in the

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Ki # Cw.020

Arbsm area in conjunction 'nth the attac against Cloe . The Cnander

in Chitf? West vas instructed to examine the defensive easures that had

so far bee ntskene the possibity of transferring additioal replacement

taining units and rehabilitated parachute units, and such other naures

which might b. still feasible. The transfer of the 245th Infantry

Division to Tioand was to proeed as rapidly as possible.

at 2045 bors the hief of staff of the Co ndr in

Chief W.t tranmitted an order assigng the 33ath Infanter Division to

Anya Group H in the Gden area.

U rabr an .nher was issued transferrin to Holismd the entire

replacement training orgnination the parachute a m t. the

Wst ia ordor to tae admatage of the favonble billeting ,oowiticss

ant beanie it was desired to aocup tefo n! in grater fom. This

order reslted trona ssion by the Chief of the Wemracht Operations

Staff dxin ue of the situation oaferenees. "Weak paracute units in

Italy (let and 4th Parchut t Divisons and the 9th Prachute Division

is Geawur wre not stnct to this ordr. In acordanoc ith a

requst the Counter in hef West, an order an3 February direoted

that th1 361t Volkegrenadter Divso wovo be roe tivated souh of

UtVeett ratt he r tha n northeastern tfln, . The diisionm to be

rtainm as pat of te r es an was to be ewltted onfl In

the eect of 'as neq airborne l ag,

As ore cc directed thit the division would be

reabilita"t near the frot but that infautzy ant engineer elements

-17- 1

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Z45# C00 02 -179

were to he used only for recocnaisanoe sad cmbat patrols.

t 25 Pebrunzy the resons for shifting th 361st Voflrsgresdier

Division nearer to the frnt, were explained to the Ctender of the

ltQ1AadI;I~flt Training A , who ad asked that the order be ohansed.

eserves would have to be shifted ftc. quiet sector in order to

provide anpwer for defensive. fihticg elsewhere onthe fronat; there-

tore it was necessary to emloay mashift measures of evr sot to

oac 1 sectors ot the fract.

O0 19 an order was Issued direting the 265th Infantry

Division to be rehabilitated east of the rhine in the Boolt area

rather than in northern Ballet as had bean previously ordered (sue

10 febuary). Utfl the arriv tnw replasaents, the Coaas

in Chit I st was permittd to agoy th division stfs, sigfa

battalions, artillery, ad aitank wit of this division for security

issions along the Rhine. A rus y the C or in Chif West to

use the infantry and engineer uits of the division was declined sie,

they llwou~d beee asa crr ad~e.

they w m M be nepp as 2 7e b the oa tb t sta re of the .5th Parachute Dfv tsi n

V'as reported to number W? a fle, th.e.abt strength of the 7h

Parachte Duieteion trS $67 a.

For details concerning the withdrawal of the left wing os ir

b"up K to the lb#ao XerIteh, sepeg. 167.0

For details osenrsimg the withdral oi the 346t Inantry D.vision,

see pape 167.

r57C79

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#C0a0

(b P the P'ushrr ismue a directive oonendn the

eploymet of deeeptive moasures to cove the ithrawa of .force fryn

the ?atytft A. Uit. frcm all branc. were to he constituted

into "deceptiv tviioute 6i3d, 21 , 249ths 34th en 7Q3d Thart

ivision s. T he n w u n it d e sig n tio n w ere to e d in a ll c am' P w : a n o a m p s i g t e a a or b Car c ef es,

takin into ashon the admiistrative difficulties that woed eour.

Two Nfrther directive fr the ierwre transmitted to the

o m er is Chief West an 28 Februry. Owing to the rutm iti in

launehing tado sfe, the area east ofThe Hage would gin in Is-m

portau to the emes. Therefore, the fones relieving the 346th

Ina ntry Division were instructed to increase their vigilance.

The stron points ofresistance in the area of tb. 64 earn ez

tratios east of Sarrebmr were to b hld at all cost saw with the

ss f aain obstinacy which the Ameans had displ ad .t taste

in order to create favorable onditions for th counterattack of the 6th

88 Matls Division.

4. i n

to sift certai antiaircraft witsro th West to the e Frot,

the Vhruaoht rO tntms Stafft, which eeet4 a enw attac k twtvesa

Vole and L. iQh atter P ea y c a sinew sen attack betws

a S-arantft ate ~wafter 10 February, requsted an 30 Jau

that the comimet of antiaircraft arftillry in the aboweumetieum

eras adat the Mane Arosinga emi unchale in order to reduce the

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)W# Qe0l

infleee of euesi tir supiPority on the pve of tattle. Thereupon,

the Chief of the 'Jizuaeht Opations Staff proposed on I TFerary to

re a 191 antiaircraft batteries from the ost Frot am! th. son

of intrioar for tranfer to the Fat. This proposal was agreed to by the

Febrr

31 "Ml= the Fuebrer further ordered that the 21st PuiAer

#tvlio. ve to be ove d to the Faste front. An order to that effect

as s at to the C or in Chref Wet. At the sane time the CaEnoder

inCef" t4 wo asked to eenine Sheher the 10th SS Punier Division

could 1 released for assig nent to the An Gnral Staff. Te division

was then casitted on the First Any front.

the Contender in Chief Ve p as Informed that the

evaonatin of the 21st Vrner Division made it uaeoessary to trans!fe

the Venter Letir Division to the fltst. The 10h 5 Peaser Division was

de tfiaitey to be shifted to the. Fast. Bath of those division, the 21st

Panser Division first, were to b given priority of movement, A further

rdeer direted the Cmnier in Cief West to .transfer the U WierPaer

Corps aong with the 2ftt aser Dion. The U!?!? lesser Corp. we

to be pld it th. dipoal of tt* Ay General Staff wr oaitwat in

the East.lr

ow104m a telephone oevesttos iht obietf stf. the

Cowaster i lC"! Wst, te Cef of te lhnht Operatio 3t t

r r on r Se Yebrr moonig the delay at Anrar mp B in e i

nis intended for transfer to the Fast. It was pointed out that snow at

Wlaaw

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#L C-O2O

ta, enemy fighterbomber activity, and intnrruptioms in the supply of

fuel (air attacks had oyrail zovenet to a bait in some instane)

bad contributed to the delay. Intrptions in telephon e serie had

made it diffioit to locate stalled trainf, pticular in the ease of

trin carrying 5$ uite, which were sattered over a wide area. The

sudden transfer of the Co or of the Sixth Eaaser Any, who should

have praly eup rflsed the loeisg operatisj also vas a factor in

the delay. In aelloctig fl to the isite designated for transfer, the

C er in Chief tad so depleted his on supply that defensiv

operations along the trout bad suffered. Th. late niela of antitank

units in the Ujpaenau ara was due to the shorage of fuel at that tine.

P the 404th VoUka t lery Cops, ate!d of the

rigtnally desigate d 401St Vlks rtillery Corp and the 6th battalion

of the 40th Vtgks Artillery Corps were laced at the asposal of the

Aray Geel S taff for ausigawt on the Ptasten Fot. The Ocanmder

is Chi!West was to receive the 6th batta lion of the 40tkhofls

Artleryo .aiw.

S acerase with asorder of 24 Februar, the Csaater ix Chief

West as to transfer the 24th Fortrss m Stff to the Chief

and Fortiftatos O fficer for neew e is the defese* sowe

between the Elba a e rv ive..

5. fn~ In 'itation a h Vecrs ernt, In vi of the

imp e euew ofemive in th West, teC or is Chief Jest a

30 Jamary reqnested imnediate atio to remedy the asteful distri

butten of petrsonttl between the three branches. the ame forces.

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IC s20 01830

Large numbeors of y soldier assigned to the Min ort th uft rfe

were being ploe4 in the rsar areas at a time bahu additional m~nower

wsneeded at the froet. The Graner in Chief vWest asked .the fnrer

to wae a deeeicon ts fundmzetal problem.

Cmanting on the condition of his forces, the Cranier in Chief

ass on I rebroary stated that certain nits engqe& in defnive

fighting wonI4 =euavoidably lost :mu the supply of Wenoren ti

vere mediatel increased. The orgaizton of cadre regiments for

newly activated waits bad proven vauable; herer, thesereint

aol4b retuied to their wi division. The traimngo reiforoaets

coflinued to be inanttiient. It was not posibl, for each division to

train itsow em toed oficrs. 'Recent figures indicated that

8$ percent of .1 lodes were ft's the tnfaatl.

the Comrin Chief"Wst reptd to the blefOtthe s that th. aveag strength ofthe irtfantzy battalion in fl

Group G nmb'ered 200 mon9 whbile in 4wM Group Bthe aerage inifanty

batlon nweaered osly 34 o. Based on thest statistis, the

Catder in Chef West sa that 'it isso diffitat to nszlu ta

the r ecabao t engtb of teinfantr will be dtrcqe4 it no

plasamats f a il to a rri . Th. C hifo th Welunokt igh

declare that the C or iChef" Wst aft r ene or t

bataion of repiseements ta eah diviuio orattl of mtV to.*ifl battalion of r Iplaeem ts, me Ss ing eomvats,

.b the Cauder in Chief West fckowledge receipt at a

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MS 4 COO4

t.etjp. e ege frw the Chief of the Ct sh declared that no

aditios repine Uwou24 be ailadle. The C iander In Cidef V est

pointed out that he hd rinot evn reetvod curreut rep.acoaints and aeked

urgenty for .the late aisnet of at least ten bttaltza of

replaowsnt tros

.On m the fayW Oenl Staff , and the Zys~ r ot the

ePsoem .Treit ing Mvw received word tbat the Fuerer had ordered the

a"ILSMa iothsC e Cif Whest of fifty bttalion of ifantry

rep ea#aand ten battalions of repleents for the armrd tr p.

Fifteen battalio of i.fantr and thre battalions of anczoed troop

wor, to be ade avaiable between 10 awd IS February an the halane a

to beaniltl by 23 February,

Ct5 February the Chief .t the ' normed the C ar in Chief

Vest that the nassar plaoeate woul be prc dby drail

heaviy ro personnel stil ast to the tiy as d :mtdte. Fo

tee battalion of rala t were to be ready by 0 teruary

As t e brerisw dem tow fift batlons of. rplsomts coul

sot be fulile W' the OsC er of the Reli eat Trinn v, an

order was lasht n ml Febrar for the $nadmate assWA toth

"et of fi thasemarine " wo wr te bing taine in Dtmat

th ae Tr ain fit Amadin. fin thouasa d main

ware tob tranfer Et to the Vest o 2 Febrar z

Inme with a order oftA Februry the following- units em

the Western Front were to bewithdrawn for rehabilitation at re-

organiat on The 24th laantry Division (Is two bttalions), the

4 84..

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CeZ l 5

edre of the 85th, 7th and to other divisions of' the ? nteenth

Araw (to be used in train newly. aetivatd- units), the dtvis ion staff

adsignal battaflon of the 4Mt Infantry Division, ad the reginter

ae of the 3dVlkagrenasdier Ulvision (for aneigieut to units

designte for rehabilitation).

Ct one full-strength battalion from the rhabilitation

reglst t the 36th Volageado Division was ade available for

ocebat epat by the di visio. The buk ofthe regiment was also

tbe avalable after the rehabilitation of pers ae a comlete.

Within the next ten dams, te btta lion of replcm ents for the 58th

ligda tattalion, about 450 =mn was to be assigned to the Co ear in

Chief West.

Aoorim to a rport of 3 Februar received on8 February lossesm

ofthe )atoeth AM .frog 20 January to 3 February were 527 dead,

1,769 vom4 a 2,310 missing.

On 'eb the faoleig GM units were designated for ansigawn

to the Cmenter in Chief West durig Februarys The 31334 Fortress

bglaat (61e)' the 115tb ll th, Y3lth, oa 3fl6th Fortress Batters

(ss* ), ala light antiaircrat artiller biae (505th *U, 17h

508t, Sflb, an 5lt) adfiv fortresis antitank "ompaias (for

feigaet as saorS troop). teset redueM4 productiom eawitr,1

bra of tho se wo.tits wee epeted t be delaed.

oil ther C omdr WMin Chieof Werst wa inorm ed flat only

1,250 officer an rose's offieer apnplits sould be assigned to the

-185-

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#CamO

;'eetr n P m t during Februay, inst ed of the 1,80 onrinally pr ad.

In aco dane wi th exoder of 10 Februiary the Co~andr in Chief

weswa to aseig to the .p e eent Train~~ Army the adrea of the

159th and 19dInfantry .i in n the 16th Voikogrenaier Di.sion

for use i aotivatin reabilitation re jixvent

Z*h 11 !Mbru diri~ttvy were sent to the Cosaedr in Chiaf West

ordering te fiset possible reorguaization o the 189th. anti 726th

Tfantrz' Diiios and the 70 th Voksereadir Divisionk. 1Rerpnusatiam

Was to b. arried out in an area zmr the frot. Two strong Coares

wer to be detadhed for this purpose.

The Co new in Chief east was asked to prohibit the drafting of

personnel bythe troe uits theilves, a tios vbih bad heen

earned out in* s ese, as it won3 disturb the established spsts

of jwiidig rplaoesets

C~ 1 ?bwurithe ea tier of the replaaeat traimn uits oththparaohute divisions was inforsed that 10, 750 men wouild be requmr

for the six di iios# in ordar, to avo1& a total doplstioa of t weir

the Geawander iAeL' WeJst was ordered to traiser.

the 27hAssault Gu ~gds,a a p e ln unt vithx trzucks, to

the flplao t ais ng for aperiod of wrgenisti.a

Ia. ?obruewy 3,m0 wep1.. us wer allocated to the Cmane JI'

Chief blast This ube diA not inelud 16,0 atm laborers n

RsiRan prinorfers of v'ar who were also asesped to the 4.ste ?nt.

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J.! # Ce2 4

The panohut. diviions hd askced for 12,750 rplacement troops. I

16 Yebruary thrynumbcr of replacesents fuonised durnj' theaL ht

O r in Chief beest totalet 55,250. This nw itr i i ,e a route

fpso but not foreig *uxlise# or cotwale oenta. ' -the total,

wh i ch was higher than t h at d by the ?uebre, 30,407 men had

alrea4 ben assigned orwere under orders. The CaGer in Mehit West

na solel resporiible for the distribution ofal replaceents, i-

eluini~g those designated tow the penehut dirisiozis.

Sine, the faces of the 7O0h M n1th Volka edier Division a

the 19t TfnyDivision, tihih the C e r in CiI* rest h ad

designated as ceadr for swl organised uits, were no4 sufficient for

the usber of nit. d 4e by th ?hrer, additional ces were

ordered to bewihdvn fra uits aong theo upqt ine frit. Th. los

ofthis additional strength was to be aspstad for bythe inease d

ositent of Volkaszturn uits in the sane area. Coa 21 F ebrur h

Camnde isChief Wort reporeo the str njtb of the a res vbdoh had

bee relesed.

0b 22 Tebrna the Gmaier is Chie 'est was t ai4- that

deniuet. s the Ep roae the assigm of further iaaut

diwisi o th Wester Trou.

CO.MMA"de in Chief West akite a rport a hisixe

distributios .t the Febrary rsp a at. Ieudo foreign auiires 5

31,34 se would be assige to Arq Grraup B.

In order t tak ful advantage of ever; defensive poscibility, te

-l8"7-

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MS #£ 0-020 - e

Cnsclr in Chiof West rerqueeted on23 !ebmery the tumedite asiignnont

of a11 forces of Wehrkretse ' VI, an! XII.* In justifyin this requst,

the C or ina Cief W.t pointed ott that tmaf lon range plan Of the

(SW withi regard tothe orgardzation of new units, traainhng, and re-

hbilitatio can only be carried out if an eney bre akhroug is pr"-

vented to,'"

The % -ehmsht Opention $taff pointwd ou so 24 2Febrtor that8

in addition to the repleoutints assigned cte17 month, the Cetno in

Chief Wnstb habe able to seenre replsoert personnel f'ro the

f'rontior Vehrk ib. Hoe ver, still3 eaiting or reactivated replacn t

training toruztion wotald be shifted tothe area of the Coffr i

Chef W..t. The requested asne t of personzael trm th. above-

maimd a~hrrin would Eager the entire replacement system ofthe

field onr . Who three Werkreiae fiarnisbe 27 percent of the replan-m

awent personnl or th. entire eich. The re fore the Cwmaler in Ckd$f

let was referred to the order already issuiedb theb accordin to

w hi ch b e we give b r oad authorit to us. personnel within bin a

area. This ardor bad boon issued on7 e ptember 1.944 to give the

Coauer is Chief We suthority to soplq -for de fensiv use f fre

of e doanht, Aslti s 8$ u i, and a3. organtatloa not Pert ofte Wbhrhaet with i is ka area. The rues asig en t the

toe from th three f'rontier Mebztrois. w as red. When the reques

was reeted cc26 Febrr, the Fbror ansered that no change itthe

deetatot 0414'bo mao.

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MS # C-020

To offer ied4.ate relief, the C ner in Chief fleet was assigned

fiveO infntry bat zi ion~ 'r c~ oikis~ e 17 d XII Zr em p1m nt as

r p~acients ~ the 1iea an additiona3. five thbuand somie= wit

fz'm four to eight ieeks of twain. hese try p er In addition to

repIC ont8 aLroady aeoigtId 'or ?ebruarZ7. .1-pa2t f the 12,.000

February repl1 eeens which ha already arrived, an edditionsl 28OOW

Rninoiw nz prachute troops were in transit. Special eazres vwr

to be t ken to expedite the departure of the rmining 16,800 men.

1+r the "?ebriiachiL c ration t off protested against o

ordr Issued bHiltler's =1ehrm acht cihief p rsonne of.icer for the rapid

activation of one division in eknkr, is X, to be osigne4 to Asr Qoi

Vistula. It argud that this would sever y strain the tailn api

of the Rewnnt Trining A~ and further weaken the position on the

sslgoland bitbt. 1oreo er, two d ivisio 'rs this aea had been

prom~ised to the Cizwaner in Chief 1pest.

on 27 Zec ru the~ Co zdez' it Chief Wet issu 4 en order releasing

spa tr ined in the use of specil weapons in pa zr aid, puisergrenadlordivisions for employment as ini'antry troops in their respecstive divisions

sine theme was no Icnger sufficient an~ition axe equipment to jute4their se. The divisions, Including thoe of the Waffn $ , ver. to bhereogvaud so as to coneentrate the greatest ocmbat strength in the

paunepeaiei divisions.

'B suse the smooth am~ply of reacement peraoan al,such as replac.

seat battalions, was eozetial to the def ense of the Western Front, the

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# 0-020P'-190..

foflovig directives were issued to the eannd hem& uartars in charge

of movig prsonel r erenttt:

1. The C ar in Chief West was iwediately to desitpate the

destintid and the receiving division of each imt of replceents.

2. R~lceme were to be tmaved out i ladtely even though the

intende route of transport was not open at the bqinning of the move-

sen t.

3. The onder of the Replaemet Training Ary was to take

Samdiate zeo for the reroutg or detrueking of repl~eaorxts is

the event of interruptions intransportation. i nece~essry, movemen

was to prod cco foot.

lOn Se tbe C er in Chief West reported that the @adrn

had been withdrawn from the re hilitation regisents of the #9t inantry

Division =a from th 9th, 3th, and 560h Volkgrenedi r ivision.

Remaining elsents of the Sixth Paner ArM now masered 149 ead

23 eiles.r

6. Th aeil$tto mteVtr twt 2 Febu the

lowtS Assault Nr Ii er Rattowas assigned to teC is

Chief' Wtf

A oe~iq to a repefl of SFebu ry, a total of 633 tasks, assut

gums, sat tn 4sstw o von avalale in th Wet (Awry Onup Ha

126, *1 OnaW 3s 281*J Am * GrupQ 397)o -Of flaeg~ 269 flQUIZ'5

amo repairs en 420 required n jar Veir". in aoor .eae with an

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t$ C C4J ll

order of 6 revbruay, thc 51 .. rr ,t!tdt" ' a14"dth 31 "Jnti; rw

tadcs a ct aointc Tr 'ymrst z r thrsI t 'rr .tront. The

1st Capa of the hattalton wes t Wb rest! for eor vtmcnt by

A repozt oa Lll. tW~a~ L.rr-m?I cn the 4We ttrn rot

was suittte to the m: e4 .1a, t&v 3Id vnc, (1pnrnttlnS "Staff on

7 F.eay. $in . no furthcr taus nrfld b~e aeetrtt to 'the C or

ins Chiaf West inth near t tno e va diretc to jne1n h

eighty t a nks iateAzyrp &rcvs thot vr'e r mmtly nat being

*sp~re beaur ofthe ka-k sr fuel

An oriAcr of 9 Fibrinry di re td the rtts.bilitetien of the let

Iattal iou, 13%th iner i~giuft (rafeweh) for ineorporatia into

the Panzer Lohr Di iion. The mnpotor Genral of Penser Forres th pWo rn t , ewa tf e

recqvstc or 10 Fcbrus ry to ucis snttte* eopeniea as sanis poseJ

to tree dvisions on the T4kter Front vhlch sr L'ar had no antitank

i st. Thre. of six obthe divisions whch h so antitet unit wer

assige the CdOcepanios of the 79th, 212th, er V63 Vokg ier

Division , The othero tw i c ati .otnes if tbne divisions worn

tnansferned to teTpaeosot fang Arsy for reo rgani tis.

Mooriq to a report of 10 Thbruar, the sssig nat of weapons

the Westons ant inette 3,000 pistl, 1,000 n pu, at

2,000 noins Sa.. Issiprenat wa based on prodwuc eapaity.

To sugant the projeetar amwzm tion in th Wet, additional suppis

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1~S # e020 192-

were to be assigned to the aa grops arid es.

Because of the low rate of produetion and the situation onth

!nter Wiot, only a smaell number of tanks were asp gne to the

CoGaeer I Chief West, whereas eight hunded tanks together with their

respeotive unit pononel had teen transferred from the West to the East.

The Cosande in Chief West had been promised the assigxet of 20 -tank

dest ry , type 38 the 512th Antitank ttalion, and the lot Battalion

ofthe 130t inter Regiet. The 653d Antitauk Battalion (41 'Jagtigt

tma o whimh 32 ere ready for cusitment) was alred avaiable. It

yas expected that the 1st Cowp of the 512th Antitas battdlion woud

be ready for oanituet at Dolersheiu ty 22 Feb rar.

t23 Teraythe Ccmsader in Chief '4est recivwrd that ha

woud heassesgned .*J Jgp tet tank (twa ne prodotican) for the

654th Atitan Dattalica (QM), twenty "agdpuise tanks, type 383,begining cc 15 February, anrd another twenty tanks toward teedo

the moth. Further ueesnza armoe reserves would have to be taken

ftw the large steak tf taks that 'were not yet ready foro cccii

iealgthe eigtystvo tank ai assut gusleft 'behind t~ th

S dt Pser wthe twae *Ja psnses' wrer readyr for ummat cci ebruaryp

an aditoal! twenty tanks were exetdto be naty b 3 March..

I O afr x toteD e Chm stinte ebruar that wo ore tank ft new produflias wodb

mde avalabl durin the r t~i of the month. hi attention we

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1Z G-re2O

agin drawn to the tanks left binfd tr the S ixth Paser Axwy. Rf emer

w as also made o n 25 Thbruery to the blockizg of aunitiz stoks wichb

* hd oouodon the Westn Front the days Erler.

n28 Nebrtiz it wa neporte4 that A' Group B * bals 100 .3 oktPo o i hedfniefgtn o e guns

and 5 rcke prjecors n te dfeniveftgbingup o. 6 Fbns.

7. "a+ naEM11laJa Cb 5 e ebrur p rido wa

puaitad Ll sjetw *sfolhmtUe f t4M giulfli4 RJ" a ine

04.4 to ftedriebshfef) since the fl,O0 laboers eepld there were

on th uerlin f'rot.

1 e thC .eriChif Westwvsord vr .dto ree e

mesures take so tar to crate aobtacle zone in the deptht of the

defense sstem. To the extent that it has acot yet beat dose, a bstacle

ae was to be eamtrueted a the Ta e14* of the Wa twall (so far a

was possible oiieriug th had aready reached the VJetwfl at

saq point) with the strongest section in thea W in.sw depressics.

Th. chief of staff to the CnaMer in Chief West rplia that ordere

based apeie gane the fi xtig trout haiaread

b eert Copie*o the openw vn submtted.

On JL4flWX the apW riat heaquatens sere ler tht the

NWi er bad urdewi the ostket ot a ep4n tine.' A deey

syse t fortiflat. wato bmstrmt. agm the

eSas ba t the tine from u oh to Karnh, with the river

surin as the ain line of resistace. Zehid this live va to bean

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?E5 P -00 9

obstacle so. up to thirty kflaeten i depth extoning as far as the

line w d awl etward fr the pro-

teotion ofthe industrial area. The strongeat part ofthe line was to

be Iithe sector btveen !norich and Koenigainter. All coastructiom

work was to becarried out by the Gauleiter, wit nilitary tontrol

exercised bythe Cander in Chief West. COcztrwction of fortifi.cations

eat ofthe Rhine vas to be stopped.

S. U mnslam~am~a. OQa 31 JanuazY an oder was

S v t at l l e d V2 o e a ith r W b s e of 83 Obern Rain er. The targets were still to be

deter ied by the CP i accordance with directive frm the Puebrer.

an order direce d that all nattens relating to the

V.I and VaR rocket projeciles in the Webnaoht Oprations Staff would

new be hadled byr the peratios Branch of the Army instead of the

Operations Branho the Lufwafe.

After 17 Februar the 317t Atiaircr ft Artillery $attalion, a

statie unit splqwl to proet 7. firin postion, ws no lnge

sbodisated to the Comner In CMef West.

9. M" ~ cl.m n Q 30 January at the request of blobs

)mster Speer tvo rea t of Org iatio Todt wre, "aged from the

aw .t the Commndr in Ce West to guard the Rhin bri de

Zview t th seios ee of ligh fil howitser ss th Wste

frost, the Orgaiaion Pbrac ot the Army Cement St.! Va rqete

031 31 Jenn to a saig thirt-six ligh fieldhwtzers to the new

4-19400

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W «0020

atiler remit of the 84th Infan Division.

on 31 Jte .the CGeaner in Chief 2e!st reiported onthe atrength

an! am.asxet of the 361st Volarnder Division,

the opetom staff of the Voia stur was infonmed

that the C or In Chief Wes ha requested tewithdrawal of all

Vo kstu wits on the Wston rotsi tWesiyumex battalons, nine of

whch hdfive independen compoa

. the artillery ngent of theL 8th Irfaty flhii

wlhhdn lest all of its hore, ws assigned to the e scortee

Brige, This latter Wilt was to be. roorgantud #tt the 1nhnr Escort

Division and transferred to the ' ast r r . To replace the artier

regient a the Westeon front the C teRa rm

Ar van to assig anether artfllez rgaat (honseadnvn) to th. area

of the flat_ 2"asat. Any'.

'e' ar the staff fthe C or E" ast Hvollwan was disso lved,nthereby restoring full resibiltyr for military interests in the

Jietherland to the Militay0 Qvno

Sithe supply of casvt would ot perit the destrastion at,

all gnot time frtiftle te thes CChe tt wa Wred

-o Zkunt d astr a); thee fertificatioaVU wh r et h±&*ly'

t.0ose iertat t th e'

Caiba an order Artille ery Rttalta

(ow) fu it s as ldpsat n*ter d orpaw i uorise

unt, rthe than as £ pert of the artillery reglent .f the10t

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1$ G .20 -9.

Infantry Diin, as had been previously cared

It was reported on 2fr. wa that the withdnwal of the 184th

Artillery egiet bythe C er in Chief vest va not postdble owirg

to the comt sitation but db carried out aftr the defensive

flghtim btween the Va and Pinc ivers had partialy subsided..

eb J& ''it was reported that addtion a ss on the Western

ront had been merised.

,, iar three (WQ light antiaircraft atillery briade wowse

comittd on the Westorn rot to pMoet supply routes against attak

1o o flying plaes . A flurthrote grate perninsiom to taporrily

e poy eight repaleesmnt training battalions from Webkris V to relieve

the Ml Pae hute Diviion. Those battalions had previously been

emidttedo the ?nt line.

ca *6eb~ an mor was given for the constrtrtio of fortit-

caatio. 1 7i

On 11 b the Contnder in Chief Jest var iulontd that

requests for meging diviin into'>n " a ena r

tv the enter of Arq Group S, naut be eomided ilkuafyV

the ?nebrr who desire that the divisoms -shouIt wet l... their in..

divwa oberacter in th.es t th

U Fe bra the %th 8 Pwse rpac Dttalic assigned to the

6th 88 Waat Division 'Nndo' was ordered tob wihrawst the

17flwther datia .a not .given. (wtor).

""196-

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.#C..320 9a

front for assigmt to the Rei bfnehrer M'$*

Th er in Chief West na it known an 1... that the

ensq press ara dio reported. that the Uern= eoldie braveby stood

his groiwd, esiona criticisum of th defense wee voad* o b'

f or the ustial p QP#aSda pbz;O58.

On 2 'bM the easrte baurada27 of the oo ares of the

C v ine Chief Wst vas ezed to iaoude that Ppt of W~heis

V in Get Eadn w d the distreti o Ca, ?fioen tat, Bab, t(stWii.

adTuttliugei In (2n Mettberg.

Reaing the di pera nd vaa tion of the civiliant poff:sti

in the Vst, the a pprra te ecasnd headqueaers were ±if#*md on

22. ?erMsr that a fiwtber qsbeatio evacutio of the population fro

the red and gree zone va not intendd, since thoe involved vould

onb be sujected to danerv and bardship and no oti.er ae vm

available for quatering evacees. lcl evacuation were p+essble

with the conment ofthe Gauleitor or the XNational 1)eee Constmoer

if fighting at the frn raeit n@sai. Wiens refsting to b

#woae vere not to We raded trit w. Al a 3*.bo&d and

kiled v~za .mode not albd bean drafte into the Vabrssh

-,th Vey1ist~ were to be aated is all oaen.

~ 23~.biuzthe Ins etr +eei of Tron~wope eore

that the Adolf Bitter Bridge at Colgn. bad bean 4.etw~ed "~ a drc

w hb it!

1g a reimes al ta of the 7Qt V ogrwdier

497-

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ikZ #c Q0O

Division (later the 106th I nflatn Division) vax orlered to bead

withi the feork ofthe 406th Tlnfantr7 Division.

Ct than divisio staf of the 716th Infa ntry Division was

to beassigned to the C~a or in Chief Vast for ooctit nt t'ithil

Pinetnth :Anq mtil 31 ahe.

On fl. am pnnision was given to merge the 62.d Vo3kas odir

Divisio n and the 09th 'nantry' Diviio into Zorpegrappe !ati. As

soo as sp aoaons vw. trained the two units wer asjain to be

28, r. a remr a g4ven on, o~ent in the cantwe and

neutral press coneerning the recent fighting.

Ut.1 fltCCWTX (V IN w1MCt the toner C namer in Chitf Sothwat, 11*34 Tbral

Kessering, tplae. 71e4 Mantel vo btstedt as C es i he

West. Genrl t iee tpba remuinsd as chief of staff.Goeraberst arpe eseste of thed First Paahte Any.

(b w9 Orcup teat 'vwearns of th. 71nt asa Siat

,Armaes The upper Rhino front vu aide imeiately subtwdiate to the

Ccmnster i t. Vat.If to the wihraa of mU peait mit fra the low Paso9

Sin, the t . s s of D mtaomtalab into nation athiprtal, the folloin ot i rtten nl f etIin th'Sitwaat ioa.'

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that sector of the frn was held bypoice, instrtor wits, etc.,

whch were orgad into "Eopp Ratern, un.mer the ccmuazv of

Wetherlard oic he tatr

For the puse of dcoeivinz the enew, "AnecabteflunZ !efL'el'

vas oranised ard acaignsd to the Twentynfit A ~A. 1 9

O eer alo' b ers t flaskwvi tsz wa tr eoarman of the tve nty.Citt Ar.

After 9 April the area via refrrd to as 'otrn n.

~b 1 ,.It was reorted that 25)#0O groes ?e fiste ton

bad besa stuk off the coast of !n lart.

Until R7~e Foarr a continuous defence line hssd been matntaim4

alngthe etire coure ofthe Vneten iot, althouah the euew had

attacked infaes at thre different poiatsl Wing to hea vy losses vai

p1 teal ezhssttcn# the fightin sbfltt of the troops ha! dininlehed.

The forces of the Omisder in Chief West co'41 not be fully nantained

ving to the lack of repisesent personne. The fact that the enq

hd boon force to employ ali of their Eat .zgio teo res, with the

rtcetio of hre airbon dithto a tvd tw !Yzsttlsh tormtioe,# whose

ReSDOe h otbe rent l erifiod yas to be regaia as a runes",

The cnsa ha cusedd in brntzg through at !flelen a Wi

pereads reache the Ahin Rier at eaus.i pntrated Iato friar

An- ' a is*ei.noMe aorps with a corps-type staffegad~l a corp. r Cmer

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J~#C-020 20

ne eeitatin a further wthdrawal ofthe parachute azv. It was hoped

tht the gap at Trier would not be inaesed1 to asinin stntegio

signiene. Until 28 Februr it was posibe to rpma of a "large

scale dsesive aoration.' Since then, the fighting had taken an

unnatisfactory torn, in spits of the prformaeo the troop and the

@-tope operations wrere eapcted along the Dutch coast. The

346th Infantr' Division was to beshifted to, the 0mb ares whre the

eaw contiued to attack against I~rib and ! !!e l.M The oer's

main effort vman contrated againat the left flank. In spite of heavy

nm q artillery fr., a coneted fromt was reestabished by do eotr-

attack FUocdg this# the Fuebrer pertitted the main line of

resistance t. be wthdr"awn,

The .sm'y via repote to breruing ra.pidlyr, end anthe British

Arq7 was appa nl being eapioyed in the arers, new surprives voe

empeted. Strong prlure vw exerted at the corp boundary where the

U.&, XI Corp prssed to the north and the U3.5. XflU Corps attacked

.saar. nFigtinm wt in th Vnlo are,2 feetsf the U3..

III orp"ealso atume to the west though Me hen~ah awl

Jqdt flepit .; efo .f th Pastie va Mviato seal off the

sdvvenes am ye s a I reaching th. railroad statinat

mess, th 1th Psier Ditiia wee able to edgaony to the. ra.

nwahiwg ..oni.o al.er t. tft lve, whon eneu brideheds wersealed oft. Th LVII Fiagr Corp a in a critica poitio. Weak

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VZ#Ci.02 w 23le

ene=' f os attaeked the right wing of the Tftb Per Arny. Strong

artilnyex fr continued. The left oin of the fifteenth Panzer Akw,

dssending pert of the Wtwli, suffered only loa l lses. The Seventh

Arq released forces for comm tn t in the Trier area, naldug possible

the estaabhRiset of a n ' line between Perosy ai ruhlbflrz. The nn

frcs were moved by trcak.

Che of the brlldgs at Cologee amapsed.

The British press hted th. brae defens of tbe rb area.

in the Ar Group 0 area two ene r arnored divisionS admeed

toward the norh, reashed the eastern outskirts of Trier an pexnetrated

into the southern part of the ton. Th. southern bridge had already

bee destroydS4. The enaW division leading the spearhead radioed that

heavy losses wore sataineadg the o triigf general

order the advazce to contine, sts ie a vibdrnaval vcld also insve

se * The Qenmn line wase no longer cotinuots . It was considered

doubtfrl that the 6th SS Mountain Division could rtore the sitiastica

an h fat a surit s coud be established in tim on the Ece River.

Nothing f imprtae occre on the southern setit of the ft.*

Ixthe Arr G roup C assume+ commend of the frtad a eventh

Aries, The pp Rhin e treat was ante me diate y subordint, to the.

Ca er Is Chief Vest.

The reort on the eneq atuations r sle& . that the

Srittsh 11th Anutad ivision bad bees l tfitelld t Vb ,8 wher it bed

wVdently made its apaerace for ther purpose o attackng southvard to

424073

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N4 C-320 apLw

destroy thos Gemn ioe t est of the Rhins. After this had

bee achieved, sAntac ars the Rh-ine at Woeel and Tierieb was

expece to follo. This uld e tinly take place after the snaw

bad o cpied the road betwee 'ee1 a elden, Aeordtng to reportS

from reliable atees, the emmiq then planne to uxlvanoa north of the

industrial area to the niort Gren p ,l, orossing the Rhine with the

sumf of the IBrittab 6th Airores Division, two Ca aian pacrachute

bttelion, slth. Nlish paracute bricade.

Eight ai~ tof the ES. tint Any were emitted north of the

Urf Vallq ar in the Colges ,. Don area. A decisiv attack W the

four dtvtsioas resetin south ot the dam va not eonuidared likel.

It was tgt tp be more probable that the ID 5. Eighth ArqW would

oouoentrate its sein effort oath right. Alog the Rhie, fen Trash

divisios" distributed ona widesfot.

~th iwer hine tb. ew attacked in the Gch area after the

nsilnt station at Lbbeck had bee subjected to stron artillery firej

oever, t)h advnc was htedb a (lenin cu ttaot South cot

USwr ms w tnks advanced to ithin three kil e. the area

southwest of 8on e where the psetration vw seaed .ff kr a

thrst. To the south the e~ a ocupies ia ~ ados Sa &tna

ati near Yale les vuto S ds but a Pot e established a

fthold at Irefeld

Ithe Anq' Group) se to te fightingo s tised ona lre meals

The an bad roportedly enter e KurhaGlad bh Couterattack t

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30 if C.O2 .2m

the mazr Lair Division uresed the nmq Wok at Soblieflefln. The

torward snuriV flue at Neon was :breen. fla farees wrre throa

batk agais at Qrenbrieh, il, at Weienfe ld the f ti tg ttontinued

without either side ainin g the advantage. ?ieedrath twas reisptutredbu

Qymerieh, t leob, !trp, am ixi refletn were lost.

In the sector of the ?t ?anzer Army, Zuelpleh uag lort and

ffihtotng took place fir the bunkers at Orsost, bear )ettsrnieh te

e advace b io Kyf. North of Trier e r ew res penetrated

thrUgh the Gema eiroleaut. The esg apture frkr nor

dueesfly a ttacin fro the east.

Tthe Anmy Growp 0 area the fighting vest of Pm wa of a

detain nature.

=b 2 * It was observed that th Brittsk employe their

tortes ofly for a few days at a tin., Whether they Veore aseblIng for

an assa lt In anither diretio na tot clear.

The paitio of the inst falcute Arm had deteriorated, The

point of mai effort vas is th Anrhern froet. Evm though attacks

eotU be o eok a withinvsl became ceessary after n fytoes a

brake throan the souhr sect of the trot. A transfer of

tor,. w he orternto te soAhern scion ot the fiot wan

losser possibl. The brtehe was Nill of Ga"troop.- h

bryge over th Ma e wunear artiflery fire sdhd beet oere

leted. flsttn cotai at Ema.0- TFifteent A'v vira v

to the tr River A brigehead had bu'n tone. at Cologne. The

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C~mO2O

positio of the Fifteenth Arm had4 sot deteri rt.4. At Yettemioh the

snw' advaed across the 1Xyf River. At Trer the stationx was tn-

oh ;ed the en ,y famees were not strong.

It was ?tport.d that onthe evening of thirythee forte

were rtiU. held along the ~twaI.

Ith iawj 4op G astor the 11th lanser Divis cm was csplcye4 at

the )Xyll River. Figting continued at ?ozrbah in the face of strong

pressre

_5 irehL4. An agent raporta that 3O0 land1ing crot '.e :cam

concntr~ated In the Grimsby area although a large4"ecale o fratic t; C d

not s to, be p1 ~.a. It was possible that th1.s was or4 for feeder

traffia. Submarinns repoteI beat' night trftio at the uut~ of th

S.i and at Chertarg. A steewer of 7#0OO eos register' t=n vas snk

off the coast of unglau4. Another ship of C#000, tor was sun b~y one of

the new suwrines. These new veaasels operated fro~ cave y, were very

facs, but carried onl~y two t r"*d oss.

General eta.e was torepsr to the )eair onthe ocosaton of

the Situation eonferee

Tbe 345th infatry Division vas to have been vlran fron a

isleatls t7 24 kB+ 'y7 tre$$'io was orossing the byld( at Ni a e..

It was to bedo rwmand whether the Wavy or the Lutaffe could take

actio amant the bz'idpo

The -Kaier ' i1heI a Bdge at Cologne vo. stt.ll intat andi capabl@of a ppo ig ;xeen~ vehicles. All of the hridge at Dese orf

2

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)45 CnM00 25

wer, destroed oc3c ib At Krefeld the foarln bidge vaz, blown up

first; the rain bridle was not destrye utl . tic two tridgee

at Pauci ctr the tv h r ovr edt of Exam Wrt J 0 Lztroyed.

cL1 artillery, fire ba do trad the atrcet-ca~ t:t at '

while the ,rahlrm brttze wts AS 411 utle Wk t p'o lI2

brille acin the' attc zce w'nrr ~ue-erthfy dsztr t

The First Ptaacute Ar still heol d a bridlohea vent of the fainc,

althouh the eney e ttaokod str ngly fro the 'dlit .d tie south.

Special ttn staf f of leare v ere sen~t out 4w 2&ti I b

corps were Interrtted. The German bridgheds further to tom so~uth

Vere still hodfrg out anA their yoeitio reaincd t-} w an e. T-he "'II 3S

Corgs was ptwbn~ toward the south. try'Group twas cadinheav

fighting. vest t Coon an endm penetnation was stalc4 off. At

Woarringen, hoever, aneny r petrhaeed tuioe cdI splitting up the

Viftotert; flm. Cot: rattseks w "r- irade fry:. the aorth., en tl etne0

terrain ws lost near (olhtt the enemy et-'ace : tQed.

Ithe sector held L7 the Fifth Pern Ary thcs enemy vas stopped,

although ?askirotan was lest. More bunkers mare amatnc4 I the

S+eventh Arw sec tor. It frost of Cton the dvnee was .Ae&iis: at aot

pints . A gabtf ad to be closed att the armry .g t bow ,n7.

The lh$. 1Oth imore Division advnei eastv-ark aaron the 411

lin to Trier, prbably cro"ssg over the souther bridge whileh could

not beblows pp,

I n te Ar GCroup G sectr the xacy at t!he Tkmwe flgvet atterte to

4 *2 C5..

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W#R 2 206eo

eonolidsto their astabl shd brd ehnads an to forei others. The

attack by the 6th &S ~uutai Division, sported ty a Voiks rtIll ery

corp, wa to begin in the evening _in the direction of Oberv *l two

bunkes wer lost in the Stating k+ernIl are while ea t outposts

tthe mast weve wit raan. At other points on the line the"e was only

localized fihtn.

11di." " NTo snr ifatxy divisions and n. acre diviic

Von reportsdt have arrived fi Eglan. ;Theewsstill no nSidene

o1 an .nae landing at the atern Ports. Odang to an increase in

sppli in the Canadian seoar during Jamaaq sad ?.bruazyl, the arrival

of an ad ditiona three infasntry divisions adtwo armored division ws

aemmed. This wade a total of sight British an Chamdn division..

)(onovw9 four British infautr .M three a cored division weerlad

tv narrowing the attack area. T or with the 7th AmedDivision,which liW not yet beena emloyed, this ae total of eight aidditional

diviio. Elements of the V S. Ninth Arq wone also released. The

Oceaderis Chief West expected a British attac ehelond in depth

ar fore at frier ha still ntbeen reisfmed.

After the tw tyithdyf figing the bridgehead poitica of

the First Aaaht Js bad Wa ertica, p aiwly to the. soit

when a Csse unt was st bulatet

It, h t. a r v s o * t e 1AVM h Div Uiio the O th and n% th Tf aa Divisi o, the 16th C a ea

igae 9 a! two assault gu battalio would beat least prtiall

destroyed The =mntion suppli was critical. The sev erit of the

-Q ob-

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-- 0Cs2 '27

fighting va i2 ieat&d by the fact that 302 tanks ver destroye within

four days * The eney 's fint attept to ero the Rhine was un usfnl..

All Germ brdgads on the western bank of the Whte had been destroy-

In the Arm Gru 13 sector -the corad staffso the fthM Pine

MnW and the Fifteenth Army wer a b~. The chief of etaf to the

C or in Chief Vest, Geneal Vetpu, was preset at the situatio

nflt@ held4 at the Thetaw's hndqwarbrt . A twnet to md~erteke

an air l abi operation Wastitted bythe cowier ofArm Oroti Bi.

A decision van to be mwde coceaig the milleatio of foni

Wehreis V.

The brdbMheld northwest of C was piemd togethe i

the spi into two pr. North at norh t ofCelagae enem tor

pieweed the Coan l nes. ai a th cate at the city where

there wee no ifteatr. &ithe anuthemn flak ndat the 'bouaro th

V Nrahute Corps the situation beeoritiesi. The tract now ra

ftw north of San to the southwest. ute p s a ot as tin

rgt wing of the Ffteent Arq. the a gainm c or -te kio

meesatth fighting owthe fllevin d. At a~there wats f for lsbakens. ~'vtroop pentate into 411,

This saunesea to catrtt4s a prviw tam t inwhiekthe athsu ie the 'bridgehea itil hel q the Pint

Mmy. kbcetrfres npetedl refer *4e s hweston bn of the tine. (1sttr).

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HS C..00eZa

while eat of th M v tor tanics pnsh;ng to the north werr sealed ofrfb

alert tmits. Thert< was s till hoe that the eap could te closet A

request by (lnera loberst Iausser to ithdrew to a chord position was

refused bythe C er An Chief Whest in order to s~itain a connection

with the Westwall.

The attack of the 6th S" Motan Division btgan according to plan

at 2300 hours e, advaning by way of Z sen, eontiw~ed to ak. good.

ar es spite stubomar iuatanoe.

Il the AnGroup 0area Porbaoh was lost and a emaiulineeo

resistanc, was established * The situation at Spiohoren was unchanged.

The Osnttion and fuel supply re even more serioes. To help

alleviate the situation, the r1*t of the MW released 500 cubic mters

oaf fuel, leaving a balance of only 500 cubic meter in the CAW rsese.

Z-bmU til now the reaining ,els of the First Para-.

chte Anmy had been stationed in northern Eolland. During t he nighta

order vets given to occupy. the area around the ljssel and to m forvam'

units Trm Web 'reies VI, slate a tactinil airborne leaing was eeted

as the easter sid of the tiner. It was expeco that airborne trop

wouU be drpped either in the rich _-- oel are or in the fbr

terrtori order to eable th seq to 'begin a strate attaok

bar ral traffic had iomsed durfag th last fear days.

P reparations t ar Si crossing were unerwqar and an attapt was

expeted at arqime. The U.S 101S Mt Mrborne Division was located at

Se, the 82d Airborne Division was at Stesoane, while the- wherebouts

oft Of;-of km

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W ( C0 020

et the 17th Airbornw D-ivisio was Ot!11 rvft knin.

Int t of hr 3rcsup F thA rjr br r .. ?tihc sA t <si WS

further relued, desrpit e aounttesra ttao. The front vaS now held only

by & series of idividual strng points. In the anten sector the e

was reportsd to be laying ati oke screens for an rn~1cown purpose. The

bridgehead was stifl connected with the eastern bank of the Rhine by the

main bridge and the railroad bridge, both of which bend beeS .repaired to

earW thirty toe vehicles. The 15th asergtna er Division was beMin

ooogetrated in t erioh area as a reserve. Instead of being

transferd to the Cologne area as or iialy intended, the aser r1r

Division was held in reserve further to the north. IBoth of these

division hed lost ,aost all of their taom. A largeasale tbattle

continued to be fouht in the area around Cologne. Th. anew bad

penetrated into the city frn the vest arid had reached the river. Ony

* fa' etrongpoiats still held out, The 9th taner Division had bees

crushed nra t of the city enl the e oer vas killed is action. The

MlobAsMole bridge was dsetro $ a nd the ini Ine of reitasoe sOth"

of Cole was piessed back to the highay, flare v fiht i mbi.

The Atones sbift.4 thir usia effrt and re w attackig tovaa

te uth and sotheast. Deep tsrust were M ae tvwarde, Prahr nda

areh"6t. Same of the German stry to, f&ic amprise the do s

V, balready bea surr ouded. At the yllin ver the aance vet

stepped by the lett wing of Fifteenth Arq.

In the Anqy Group 0 area the situation at the any group bouary was

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)H$ # C-020 10

dangerous. W eak but active eneg forces were stoppezI et uatterihach ,

Thirty tanks were -rerrtedfly, a vanelwrr trc )a torxa d the o utheaot.

Another penetration vas =mde at Pst'fors t. No reports were received from

the 3524 Infantry Division. The 179th Infantry Division at Lauterbach

Was attacking Ntoobn on the I osel iver, The attack of the 6th Z!S

M~ountain Division vas stopped in order to cosit it north ofthe teonl

South of the Mosal the enew counterattacked, Along the Rowe Rivet

th. 256th Tatantq Division was presed bak,' The 6th 28 Mloimtuiu

Division was fone to gtveuaphal"f- of thegon that bad boen gained.

Localized fighting continued at Forbach and between the Fuar and

Blie Rive.

According to enm press reprts, the nin enemy effort vat conoernat

with destroying the Fieenth Army and the First Parachute Army, while

the next objective was to reach the Rhne. The latter objective hd beat

ac hievd. Other press reports described the renealo V-1 ativity,

ofair action, tant of the scarcity of ocean shipping a ce. On 4

I M uie Mitert Churchill was isthe West, visitin Aachen ant

*T aftvt. rpted that it also easidaete

si rbo"e a ttack to fir ikely. oceetration ,of trasprt planes- for

that puroe had cot yet bees obsrd, althouh prp ti oss could be

m~co shot ntie.o

The Fuerer deanded that the, traaining units of all three branches

of :t Wehmcht, so far as teohnioally possible, be withdrawn wel

-2z

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)$ 4 e11.e

bahin the front, vith the exction or th taoary antiairoraf't

artillery. However, the reserve 'units wore to rtamain where they were.

A order to that effeot was to be issued. The parachute its yene

arriving.

The ?uebrer expected an enemy unetaking in ith Arben area. What

the British would do was not yet clear. 1Btween e ich and W.ese1

the uituation rmed quiet Perhips the .seq sk e screens in that

area wre meant to conca the arrival of supplies. Serit7 iitms of

500 seneach and seven Volkusturs nits were distributei , er a flstae

of twenty kiloleters. mnition continued to be in short s p2. The,

'fine Position' was still in the process of construction at was Rot yet

echelosed in depth. Barbul wire .ntanglaeuts were at yet strung.

The situation at the 'WesI bridgehead ba bess stailised -after

the a En withdrew part of their foresa, perhaps to the ersric h 4"el

sector. Heavy weaos had been sooessfully withdrawn across the linse.

It was necessary to eoonomise on uitton.

Th. herd fighting arund Cologne was is its thirteenth day., Boy

arti ery fire ooxti uu. thre* ware no enaions btweenc e

0lgne andDnka. North of *e the remaider of the 9th hae

Disof bad e uessfully vithtran. BflSistJflb is Cologne bat

oswedl a few r ai its still helrd at south of th our..

ha a had befawnd arun the outskirts of on* The 10th Assult

Qa Brigade was available for ctent. In the sector at the Fifteenth

Arq the snee bad reached the Rhine on both fanks salband errun the

I~ilJ1~

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fl? -02

LIII Corps hesdiquartrirs * There wa probably no longrr any unitfied

coifn. Lremy fores ret,,he re'° mzerg alt th2& bridge at i~azen, which

apparently was crowe with irefu ce. The bridge was crosser ad a

bridgehead onthe easter bank was secured. A counteattack was launche

in the mornig.. The n1th Panzer triae was move up ra ton but the

fuel aupp]7 wa not suffiolent. Onthe western section ofthe Fifteeth

-T front there wen nl llsee p trationo the line. Frtbar

pestration 5lit upthe Geran fones o n the lett win. The sea

ccuie Koal an advaned to within fie kilo eters west ofColns.

Thus, the attack wa directed ent1 aginst the cors boundary, which

bed bee shifted. Other attacks woe ma near Heerfrt spite the

be of Muit, the left wing still held aut at the Msel fiver.

In the Arqy Grouzp 0 secter thre was deyloaied fihing.

J, W,. Radio intelligence made it clear that the British

weeon oocentratin six to seven divisions,. They were faced br the t

Pader Corp (84th .M 245th Inantry Divisions) with the 15th Paze.

erDvisio held is .resetv. The Com er inChief West wes tSbe ukoed for.a stateimt of his intenss te Lutaff &M the Nv

'were to report whether such devicesupe aS tt u st ointin sine ea be emiq

nwq effort voulA he mue, al.thou stryge tores were being +mle

ainst toan, At Rmg the. 78 Mnt dui M elemens atthe

9t nfaty anl 9th Artored ° .visionsi wre* tnv into the bridgehead.

Oppola thene was &Pgrppe von. Kortsflelseh.

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Xi C4-2 -2C30

Tebreasa-throxtgh ifl the sector of the !ftfteenth ty was aocomplishei

byv the. U.s . 1th Artor&h.s tn; o .y .ftu nfllr throug:- a narrow grap.

Mdditionol enety re:inforcements were moved np to the corps boury.

The 45th fantry Division remained in the ose. Eountins. A concen-

tratio of foames in the W4iszembourg depression was considered a

possflhlitq', meaning that the ene~ would attapt a pincer attack to

annihilate .those Germe forces -still holing. out vest .of the Rhine. Tie

offensive would then be carried to the eastern ba of the river.

The n.th Infanty Division van being vithdnwn from the Dtch-

iesla *. Sat eemonts had already been moved. The W ea l bridgehead,

which was still held by the 3dParachute Division and the 116th Pmnser

Dili on~ ws further redced in area :by strog eary pressare. Afer

the ;etera heights had been reached, the ezwq coid look down ups the

Oens positios. Unit *onand staffs were being wthdrwn in order to

take over the defense enboth sides ofthe ie. Division Hbur? was

to 'be espled on the so ther via. South of Colorne tiof the

German tonces crosed to the easten .betk. Stron pressure was being

crted at Bones. It was still possble to blowupth bridge. C "-

atin ha been Isernpated sice 0200 'how., after tanks ha oe

over to the estr bank At R ae h attacking 11th ser Divisica.

was able to ew a vlas, bat the nza q .u a the bridgehedt

the artheastt REQ troops ,were brought fcwsal.

The Fifeent Anyr was in a serious situation, although. on the

heights south of the Abr river the enety was still contained. Cwung t

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IOZ C C-.020

deep enes penetrations, there was no longer a six le c ar. Enem

forces continued to advance in the ! osci acrd Coloeriz areas * The IX

Corps was m~oved up Prot Wiseernbonx'g. The 6th S~ 1-ontain Division was

being concentrated.

The northern front ofthe Sev .th Army was quiet but strong attacks

on the western section of the front had forced a withdrawal of the lain

lUse efresistance to the* Sal sector. At Lsmapa.en the Gernms forces

retreated to the southwest.

10 iakiib1945. The Scheldt River was mined again. During the night

of 8 March elevgy boats made a surprise attack from the chanel isla, .

against the port of randvif.e. ?ive ships totaling 4#80O gross register

ton were stik 9 ,one large steamer was captured and brought back, .fit t~y

five prisoners were taken and- sibt persons were killed. A lighthouse

was damaged.

Intercepted radio messages between London and 'France made it sewm

more likely that an airborne operation was imminent.

It appeared that the. 7h : ~v Division v as being moved foward

inU~ the tmgen brSfehead, here ntil now nl the 7$tli IsTri

34ioz sue eia s of. the 9t rfjt7 and 9th Wirared Diviuionsh4

bee plq ed.

Nothing bad -so ,far indiated what the eneq intended doing with fios

o i ar.. fldli the 1.S. V Corp) which were, tot then Tmoyed. ?h

=II Corps had now been c mitted opposite the Yirst Anw and the.. fritish

3d Infantry Division was assigned to the W issembourg sector.

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-22$-

No pentration were wade in the bridgeeis at U-ese tt thq er

both later contadnrA-. foswrse reported that 100 prisoner5 were malen

ad forty-two tanks wer disabled. I-urins the night the Cierp fos

were wituirawn, exp for rear guards whic were to folo by on7~.tThe rairoad andt toot bridg wore to hedeted; the other two

bridges had already bee bow up. The ferries wre ready to operate.

By abadonin the bidgeehead, the ensiy 6t srI 9th Infantry Divisions

were released. At the e tis hoverr, good troop were made avtaI

for aplopient as seoiit fores behind the Germ nes*.. there vam o

fighting along the !.in front. The fightng at Bia had stopped. The

o ant, Gene rvo Botimer, was a e oed bya cotrbaattal to

losse .r is rak &at five years imprisoe Wnt, whruo h. shot himse.

At Reme the en r tried to e"lrg the bria * oue

attacks were mde bythe U1th Pter Diison. Reseofte hatd.

Ith. sector heM by th. LXII Corp the ees pessed further

to then sot, fortin a bridgehead aiencircolig Aernch. h buk

of the Fiftent A bad now been eeie vest of ak. Leash.

attept vold bemd to break out to the sth.N detailed evdes

veto give,. The C orIIU, of the 131Co , Geeal Iaht wa rcr

to resAte )tel to the souh

There vant ese e the nor ther section of tefret. Ne

pntrtion of the western sectio of the front fore a withofwa

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2# C-20

the win line of resitzze. the left wih thoa tttic' wara r1 teod,

maki nrecesaary the ocunatlon ot a ohor3- pa~wt itr Th.cre tano .,i.hting

othe southern front.

, " 2* Apparently the enemy had forted a te rw, the

7±i4 )4nal von ftuna t was reo replace as C r i Chif

West Fiel 7±4Mral Xesfflrin, who had been C or in Chief £0tbs

west. Field Mrhu esselring now worked awan with his fogner cif

of Otaff3, Gene e estpbl.. Gene aoberot !1rpe wa appointed c

of the irst Parace Arq

E reinforcements were moved into the Clovea~aler area, ira-

dicatan intention to attack towards rich.* Mie a mget, te

engs was attnacting Elust th. eutire Aaeriean any. 'At the

tohel the drive was no d iced toward the south, rather then

eastward.

The bridgehea that had been held by the First Parachte An was

- omlet*C esatad ad bot btgee were destrye. Sines the

beginin .t the ar battle Ar ipBb4 destroyed 700ene take

sa ake %O prsan kilw flin was heat' aog the Rhia. bt

nto imporan atic ee takin plan. The Gern side wev lackn is

tafaratt fowns 4 tasowpntwg T natws =its sad eowlrW

bttai flm, t f±tr str h babe incrsed but *78* diuted.

the e st and t . M v d i t n i i e h ote s , Three m flitat bridges had alred be n thrw

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Cc.920 2le

across tiw rIver, ?or l4onner thc encry was forwd to wi t*.raw two

kt cc trrs. r* r .tnf terty twre Y .r mc 'I*" mrd * 7It~ 106th

&zsatlt (kn Drh d r rovtd agfrtonr while th' t and 11

?anwr iviies nd the troops r4 the orricer candidate setool wer

notsttd.

The G-ztan bridgehsa was caroe; its evacua.tiQE had already been

psntted by .the Piwhrr. Andormaeb was lost. "Thene vere noother

reports from thew Sevnt Any.

The Coblecz a vas rstvcly ea la. The brid~ vew Uwn up in

the nnnxmn alone wth all other bridges across the Iose1. EnAMY £orefl

advaned s1onq a wid fnt and .tanks had arvady mnvah4 Kookiei. The

front on the vest was moved beek to the Mloel Pdver, On the l0Ier

?4osol front the LIZX Corp hnquartorc avurmed cortaM

fl rsh 12l. The best of the p ahute divertons were to b

tepidly rehab litated dee~sion or, the enuitent of th 10th

ansr Dision hdnot yet been made..

(hs son airboree M iio was trasterrd Tro* Ewaee to Franc..

Th encetnttien w ap eda to beeamt. The let Airborne Brigad

ofte )ritish eairborne dvisies was in JilamI, There n wevidence

that the -Polish brigae aM two Cnia battalions two ~SlaMme wer.

*3. in Holla, =atn a totlo about sne and ace-half dtuC

The U.. 32 irae iii vs ia tbe Meehrrs are,; oebrigad

Olt te U65. 101st Arborn Dtflsion ws in the Ziseonampea the

location o f t he 1 7 th Airbornme ig tqe vas not known.

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&e ' as-

At Reiwsgn the enemq continual to move torwzH. It wat not yet

clear in which irectiorn the 1. . Thir! i Dtison4 :ouid tuim. The

point at =ain effort tight be directe either agant the Vioel River

or against Coblena z n enar coraeeatration .was reported north of Trier.

Apparontl the 65th Intatrr7 Divinion had arrived from the United States.,

It wv clar that the 'Britisb would lan their airborne divisions

inthe Perich ara bitt it wa not ceran whether the Amricans would

drop limediatol to the south or inthe area of the Twelfth Army.

e e of thq crowded baildigs the )eael of area wase not considered

a 4liel target for as airborne attack, although the area of Bon an

frakftirt mght beconsidered.

The- Patch islands were oaupie d by naval units jprouped together

uder the deceptive designtion o the "11th Naval Division.'

The Jtzeber had permitted -the Division Haburg to bebroken up ito

separate units ; the reorgnastion was elpeted to be completedb

15 Naeb.

South of Duseldorf the cae arried out an anssat ra arns

the Shine The situation at Magng+ zr eiu after the .n

gandfurthrgod to the. noth an eSat. ?iv, me taurlswethe Oly totm N

4stra en thuhth.-M Corne tmntz7 w wa, onl tote t

nC4 tb situaton be mpoved.

Claz4poitions wee mopid it. the Mosel -set,'or ao ttt oft the

riv'er. Ot ewse, there w Ulttl, activity. South of Voelkiimgean

~ Theauthor " mea 3dftom Division. The 3d Inf'antr Division,vas in the TVoges. (Edtor).

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CO -219

bunkrers ic could ?vt 1:e ocunial tyhe rear nr h xJs bo1a up.

1JrAj95.Th Tt;af re Iatni t xtor emteirper1iig

ened arberc attack. The ?ueh rr still exprtd the attacks to be nade-

in Roll nd. On the main points the 'J ehrmacht Qpsrations V taff and the

Cwaner in Zhiet West were in agreet.

A t t he ttengen bridgehead the ensueq hay: c ittd the 7th and 9h

Armored Division and the 9th, 1 th, ad99th Infantr Divisiozis. The

24tafantry Division was still etthe weste bfnk, while further to t he

rear the V Corps waie ed in mopping-up peretioza.

Tighting continued in the lake Leach area where the 5th Parachute

Division was still fighting. Regrouping continued in the )soul sector.

Aordig to the oning's reports the eneq had wa roscsed

te )4osol, although the ui ae of the fo was not yet clear. At ae

event, a rwi crisis appeare4 to be i. enst.. The entire 6th 8, Xoutaa

Division an the 559th Livision Were being move forward, vhfle the 198th

Inantry Diio as being traneferre from the upps Rhne to Singen

to bued man aw group reserv. Anotne asault gunbattalio as

to arriv. All of thea * however9 woe exet totkesn

ti ,

2Z00eptat a tbenverreeabat atorof au twe

Aodg t lat reporb, tks bad already reached the autobaba The

S61Q wie nos auteporss towards the no. T G rnn attak

Were nc~ effectin.

At tac, along the entir front between the )4oeel and the Sear ivns

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II c-o e22$m

serionaly threatene the Gerxtan poition., The s'ithcrn part of the

frt wa qiet. Thci 56'i 4Tn mhr -tr; Div1Stn; wac b:ing iutovr up to

Simnern.

1aA5Z1 2La2 A Router 'a report concerning a' chage In the ocrnsa

relationsd~p betwreen Bradi anl hontgomery V&E retracted. It wa con

sideso possible that the Ertish would bqbi a thnt towsxdc the nort

sdeast. The emsw pres stated that Rewagen was not veil located ad.

that difticultia ha arisen. The puwpose of the report nyhave opeethp rmb rie o uc drs no-Grybest

sinae the iesw strateuy seemed to aim at annihilating the German force

befor crossing the Rine. Eflita circles are wondering wheth.er then

re rq ami forces 3SZ in lfa. 1poaver, a te landing vcul

*tm. hars ben diffiotit for the enmo' since the flooded areas offered

protection and there were stfl German wits stationed ao the coast,

Ithe sector hld trAm Group Sactivity va limited to th

norsnt of troop. Two regents ofthe 346th Infantry Divisio were

no eaite. The Division Bmibirg had bena split up and divided .be-

tweet the 17' Vo~ksvntiar Diilon an the =1E'lm Infants7 .e~ss

The 9t Vclksgrfaaie Dvisio wa withdrawn. 'Attacks at !n~

o t u m d b e - e t o ws v4 t e no r sa d o r th a st, w th t e m on-ot m r t s s a d i g t e v * f l o

adac{ w cekatr as nh th e toni ofte teb

WE thea ,ut' also made acs progr s # bfe th ad z a n theo

lout was checked RPort on =nit strength arrived; three division

ismilIllEt

iu

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M5 9 C--O2O 21

wer to be dissolve and their o r staffs ewl.ayed as oponatioxs

staffs.

1the Anzy Group 0 sector there were attacks along the entire length

of the front. There was fighting around. toppard on the NoselS*2 An

enear bridge was thrown across the river at Waen. The 19th anI 559th

Divisions were etif en route to the front. EnaWq forces wee repulsed

again at Nnaste. lighting continued inthe soh. The eneq had

crossed the Sohwarawaeler Rochwald (souh o the oadl, nea Trier).

Near Srbrueoe the situation .nquiet. Cotainig attack were

bein nde on both sideo the '4estwafl. Z oast itt Sarbrue en the eneV'

penetrated to a dewt oftelve kfoete~ wh the line s taorarf47

weaened by the witdraal of defending uits that were schdue for

r4.ef. Hower the. eye' ha itill not reached the Wotafl.

16 n'oh The situation was nov ade clear with regard to the

British, The S$ccn Arq was ccsutted onthe right wing and the

Chnaian First Ja o the left wing. British air neoca~naae is

sat eole oncerned with th ftto i twin. if the Third Arqy

erb not extended t bsot but nrq pree together ino r

eeter9 it it t mhsis. their ittoa to attak

The U.8. Nith Arq (the 3d AxswrDii an the 9th Inftry

-by the U.S. Seventh Away onthe soern frot in Rine. and which 'ratnever thereafter stopped. (Eitor).

-221w

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15 # 0.00-2.

Division) van r eady to a t tok. The U.S. Tint Aflwy as maintainingS

nadte etlsee, which also insdented attak ncntions . ?repratioz

for a nwv effort againf the Pinpt Anr vast of 1~t he w a tns .e.o

At Hag'uenan the iits remn~ ha efon. tne no r ech dit io

vae ecmittted then it wa possIble that they ir ealed to push aroa

the Wiper ine. So far it vas sa o that the attark aia t~h

First krqV wore Wae only for the rstpo e ctaimsit and were not

itteed to be strateo

In order t. deeiv.e the enne , Me eabetnn fleffel vas foned i

Rolnd water th e a of the evn t .tb AW. The noeessa7y re-

rosptngo the Qoerso force on the Itiu wa no ocplota. flghtig

*otiso4 at basges where th bridgeba8 va vtdeon4 to the nortA c

ast. T he Dr els+ hadt beu apr d b fihtn continued at

Ko~nlgawister, where the e uq a only a towad raert fros the

autoa. To the eat the nlwer thrncd ee kiln:tern an! captured

Eiesoetdt. Vettelsohoe .vow held. In the south thene wa orly aime

activity. T Pwtsergnier Pivioac e a ovn p .

Ta he l'v rou 0antea sitmwtiec o t rigtwigM na

nnserious Rotils throe ba seaed the Macel ad had ma deep

tat ps ti . hsee fightig .t St. ear Man Snn' a ef

as sthas ofKoks All T rca to the vest of the thretesed arm

wo Mndr t. the flU i 125 Crps. rc to the nust Wvet b the IUhf Crs. The ect $.eaim t Uofh 6th. 0. $oati

T)YSO Vat wat knon., fr eq forces non faced the iSoonvwa ad tb.

ate..

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vs ~'

Btn erw aerA hd broken through to the vest wher there bros fightIng

In the Sehwarzwaelder Hehwld.

At itehe the we ti i ficant Chage tr the rdtuntior. A

char poition vas ocu;I Sin the I oer Vogs ;>rti~

T h C or in Cbier ~et rep-etcd th~ t 'h rtra er ofthe

I!plaeaent Training Army reinase forces trw V7ehrrwt TX 'a XII.

Saat the face of the TXCorps were srare4 units am! those ot the

XI Corps vows met2 stationed in the wrut tn,A

fli1arhL1241. Th. locatiot of the left botndry at the Prokttsh

Beoon Army was asertaimed. ' eb n th. area to the sout

were the tareao the attaek. It wae etili not devries hethr the

Canatan flnt Anr voit prtitnt the fltn of the tritish e4Aw

or would launh its oaattak tova the nort. The Fuobror tiwM

that the latter possib~lty wan the ,"st likely. At aq :vt, the

reaetton of the front betweean Wesel anid the point where the Rhine divlden

into three branebe was ecnsidcrd to b e tteed. The Tritieb were

eanduottu neonnaisssne in the Gera rear.

Is the r kNae assault vat neitars the smit. The

1.8, 4th Arme4 Ditetoa a tb. 15th aMd 90th tfat i)vi en

being em,10r1d en the soer wentter of the front. The otion at the

12hnut 14th Trfat? Diviios *abo knw

24 rwa sors t the sm mroideguto as its bnVebereie. (Mditr).

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C-2 .224

Actten in the Ariuy Group S. sector vat limt to patrol activity.

At £hictrg a rin shat 'ner the i Thire was tloted.

Further crazy retn ret s wtere mtoved intQ tha Rage bridjehead

'whe aditional ground vat lost tc the northeart. Xonigsinter was

lo~t bzt &on famces succeeded in recptuting QeGlberg. Fighting

continued at Aegidienburg where the enn7 proesed ahead to the autobahn,

A ocunerattak wa la nhed by th 3d Pnergrenadie gnaer Ditision.

The aituatiot n the southern setor of .thermt was not clea.

Ithe WBel sector the eneivy pshed across the hahe !tver west of

reanech. The town was ft iLl in Gern hands. (n th. extra right,.

the UnIX. Cor was bein wthdran across the Ihn. The bulk of the

&III UEV Corp was wi "r for an attack towards the ... t, whilea tbe

359th lntntry Division was ea rtt to the Soom"d. At all other pelts

alcmg the $os,1 f rout the ene forces h ad been repulsed. Fightig

cotinued in the Sechvrsvaldn Eaehwal er pnetrations wer made at

&ttong flet attacks were mae agatet the southern sector of the

trit, ree f ore were wt M Ct the bitch. are m the lester

Vugas jl atbs Tesw a r tat ann

arn The na reoiteden adjuttw their fit.

Intsatv tint *8*2* reported' in editem t. the artiflw7 fin0

isdicatin that the lne bad been strenth ned At Rmwfa -the 3

?a aerrnair Division advancd towards the southwesxt but was the

brought to a halt.. One village vas recapture.

.224_

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YS~ 002 -O5

Furtbsr ground aslost onthe southern sector of the front. The

blanc.s of the 1&th ad 16?t Volkcgrena&Ie Dilenso were being rncve

up from the south.

In the Mace. sector the righ wing of 1ru Group G stil held fast.

The craned the Wake River wih onl a weak forn. The l;flt1h

Infantqy Diviion wa sig moved upto the front.

7mw force* had entered Boppi. A Grma bridgehea s being

e stablshed arond Binges. The fit Ct~orp was now assigned to the,

'First Arq German attacks bad eco. to a staadtifl. The 559th That7

ivision was fightinrI the Soocal. Ther. was heavy fighting art the

most votor part of the fros. fliar forces advanced as far as BlI*Was

1.1. The eropin peltts were held, but since infnr strength was

Ilckng te line vas held es 2y a series of stroupoinb.

Sthe souther fecor of the front the hnq ad wade a gap of 700

latem in the mter Wntvaf.

9 ah %. In the Dueaelhcrt Cologn sector the tuericmfl

bad ecimtteed mlV three flvist+on a vide frot. At Reaga the E.S.

V Corps waited to tres te riv. In the s a vr sectr mUl ew

tone We n idntfi.

There was 11v2l tmeto s 0 th sct of Away 0ro: R.

44At a th ew gained AMditioni to te nort ad north-

Bot h Genes 4s.n lee oaidaable. Onl a few pemtnt

were ade wht, tho front bad been puse furhet to the .xt. Wak

"225-

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4C02 fn

attark w ere reprten the sother seotsr of the Wiot. Acoding

to a British report the bridges at Rrsgr bad collapsed as a rilt of

Gera Oir atta. . n Coblenss, vhic was being dended by2#OOO *w

al rsstance bad reportedly ca ed, The Pins bidgh* vasn being

evacuated. A ne lne va being established by the Il X Corps an!rt~ th1b k a s X * A G a b d e~ t f ~ u e

held fir two battaon, o .hh vat a wee a ac un it. The

b Pmsa tn " v e t e at V~ " l m uopt

at issebourg, w her * a section of 2 fo w rd are w still 1

held, the 1sVia,~l van being occupie at all points The 47h VTe

.c m dwRi v e r , . h r i g h t w o f t h ,i ' t h e e f o t e

to eater the Palatinte.

tamq activity inreasd the upper Via.

II Tar. s4ip wee o i ritih water. Anther

ti esl tet S A tag l7 U ton eat pmb.f atow4 f

ftin VA 8t fw (ae t ae h t TidE"

thshn Tt 9. tr ntifhu ws ttc h

IWnel seat thu a a srong takt, apoit h

Geran right *~n The Ynmh sue readto cre thes upper Zine.

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#1 c-W0 f e

The luf afe Oporation Staff reported as tefon on the lxper~ig

enues airborne 1ainsa The British It Airborne Corps was noted near

to the British I Airboye Cos ed.it. forer position was occupied by

th U.S . 9t Airborne Division (area of Nijitegen - Veno a Eindhovem).

reparationsove presumab2its copete m operations wer emoeted to

bgin at eqtts. Thes 17th, M. at 10st Aiborne Division were

tO w isted1MA,4 at Rhein. That the 1.01st rbre Division asreviwed

Vi enral Fisewr was regarded as evider: that that din ion wras

also ready for bacto. Air iea~m ta..te the presence o

transport pinsn trop carryig gldr .t Reins.

Itentio of th e w shown by et a satvt

tas Wstpbli, Erum huaire, at Euarg, attacks agans

brides ad viaduots, ni4ght Mail ome attek ocetral Germ,

end tbe sealing of .f the rea area. The Iaclones wer expnte to

attc in the Rhie - Kain ae.m etire picture of the euw"

intentio was clear.

Re o ts fo aget t aa that peve tions wer being made i s n-i o *1 M n t t e m ut o h

Ther wer no siiime.ttoseotdl the AM Grou I

Ithe nsto! Aw Grasp S thee attace northad frn th

.1 $t the a..m was bet by theUnser'.

greaisr Dvisio and little grow S as t.

-'-

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C ..CS2O

Cn the sowhen sector of the front trog attackr uable enem

tan to rea.ch the area hrwdatel north ofAndern ach.

The Karl gn 5 fired !on.e~ rounds.Army Grp C) as enaged in heavy defensive fighting, with the

cneq attacking towa'ds the southeast against the right wing. A nil

fore in Coblens ws still holdin out. ftiye was attacke and the

" mo dat tins vas Nurther roued. Enw fores appeared at

ais. The L=X Cop ocuie a swith poitio th the right flat

pe. The Semeth Aw held a line ramming vest fuWorn and t

beaingbak. On the right wing of the fleventb Army the situation was

net clear. The XII and LXXI Corps were withdawin. z ' elmets

advaned towards ZasIAb1 ,

Cthe sothern part of the front the Vntwafl wa no etirey

0-ed,

b~bj* According to an agets rer, the peone of

enem airburn units bad been under restriction since, 9 arh. tight

tat bad areef be loade. Th. repm ad ofe roano to six

diviioae hihfuradith t*ooiiis

aied know^ to be is Frae Mbgaz., it wS stil ot kns

whether al ftee u=its il be q togete Insate

ttc rhehthee Morto' vaRl "attc nsat int[rn

fatarea.Te.41eq t.atatcaaitbls.A

renege ntrepted 1v n ?vnt lt AsW indiated that %t*y

intended to launc a attac.

A5 6l3evs heavy howiter, also known as WThorI (?dtor).

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C~ -020 29

There vat no imorat attion in the metor of Aty Group B.

In the Py Group n3 sctor attaeks continued. all alone the ine

from Dinsen to the north and northeat and enem Corees succeeded ±nI

reaching the moutain olts. There was fighting at Bee and 4lon

the rotul to Slegburg. To the norhest the c tutios waus stabillze

afteron h been gained byr iits of the 364Infant r iiionad

the 34 ogr Diviaio..( that sectio of the front furthst

to the east there vas Only lcisdfitting. To the soth th

situation at Az4eruaeh took einfavrafle.a tint At Thmerstein a ocimterew

attack led b the LI Corps s r, Gsenrl lit sed, vas brough to a

stanstill, fl ghting va reporte a d.latolsdorf,

Ith Ar Group G s er the situii had doveloped noily

threatening the position of tFit Aq sistmaa at Coblnsha

stopped. E troopi entered Binge ant wore approsoig Pains. The

1U43, 4th Arord Division turne off towards the soh, approaching

Worm. and the area to the south. A bridgehead whih ha o b at -

visaged i n adma.., was ste azboit Worms sndr t he a M r of

th 47th Inantr Dhli. flhta ga rpoted inthe area.

re U bad arrivdfo thEC or flU 1885 Corm . th rimt vt

ofTnt *r tenq .dntasa ther" aruadXtwe~tftf

th butt, .th headquarters ofthe LEII Corpwa onsidered last.

The =XI Corp at tie itls4tbir estwa rdas Kaiser-

slater. teir ntwn btbe lnk of fuel.

Attark o the southerna section of. the fron were rimuled.

-zz"3-

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IC 9 0.020 ai2jOsw

22 ~arh ~)I5STbe Consis 5th flivi4in Rw move up Trm Stily.

It t os~d lc;y tbnt other Cnm3ia divi.sionns there u also.

be sent tothe e atton front sine ol . thee units ha so far baei

employe togeher.

Ithe Axn' Group 0 seotmr the enw 247 , end I9G t Diiions

wone eup.oyeA along the ZAdn frot. The 4th Arod Division t the

Sth Zaatry iion wee splayed aant Won, The U,, . flth and

12th Dtviians sdthe 89t Infantry Diiio vo fihing in tin

Pfaeserwsld. The 10th Armo re Division was oomdttad as t Artw$.ler,

while in the rear the 46th and 'nth Infatry Divisions wen bald in

Lth A Group B ma a o sheq thrus agfaist, Daldr

van repDusd. At R"mfight eostinud a th. north aM north-

a.stern edgesro the bigea, taeq tone" pshe ahead to U Steg

River but bir uh to a hat in front of Sisr. In the ee200A omtswih t eea h ztt *w

1u$hel4 te 36X I3a1r Divisionft, hi eb thw C is Cbie Wes

41 ao cnider eaai. of ofei.ntion bon. the division

ifantrya we omot lmost etinry t strained stOiM or mademb

at the Volhsstums.

Petatosrt a t. khseter it doph were ad a th Atbensectio of th fro ba the eqa stepped beo recingthe

autoza To the south further attacks were not otizuwd. Kta guppe

.0230M

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)CS0 C3 zlv

teayerlein wee dissolved; Generl fhrlei asvn couwr of the LIII

Cors, the former c der of whih had been taken priaornr.

In the Amy7 Group G sector the ennry was active at Worts where all

of the Gertan bridgeheads bad now been fimlete'' withdrawn.

Fighting was reported at ?eutadt. The situation in the wooded

area was not cle ar. Th. flU, LXIII aid LIMX S$ Corps had to be

oonsded ovar. The LXXX Carp was attempting toforme its

through to the et. The 17 th S3 Pser Division wsalso fightin its

wy bakto th Germn lines. Nde was to be supped.

flier force. breached the We twal near Anelr a a coxrtenttae k

was de fro the softh. An e sn ored re sere probabl the 24th

Armored D ivison was being held in reediuiess.

*The T4S Firs"t Ar had arie d in the Pa are.

At the bend in the Rhin enw tonesft Wer ed to the south, The 1t

Wimred Dvision arn two infeatry regiments were pushing .crthwsrd in two

searate sperheds. It could not be determined how the.e planned

to dispose of those troops that bad bee eleacad fwa oouitsaf sot

ofth eetal

Then VMs 40 ispotan action i h secter of 42w Grup N.

les Imge the aw turned eastward south ofthe Slog Ryve.

Fighing as rpor e wM teet The sitation there scold be.

irrei. Ch& the rigt vwin of t Un.S. -tvsyit L.azw (tie) the

eaw avanedthree kilseter. the 15th lamaer Divison a other

forces were being ovdforward, Advueos wer made aross the Wid Rive.

or-

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Cumt2O 022

Gexran forces on the to er 'lec were Dressd hac and the oney entered

Tellie.

The AMix Group G sector was qidiet. Resistance had ceased between

Coblens and t4aint, A critical situation was created then two hundred

men with tank sueeedd in crossing the river at Opemibeim,. vhere they

advanced .as far as COroaa.Ooraii uder the protection of smoke and r'tillery

fire. The attaek force was then reinforced by other units, proba3y

frog the 4th Awi, red Division* Renaisano a was umade possible b

permanent fighter protection. A Eoton bridge was already half coampleted.

German fores were being moved forward. .These Inc~luded a partly motorised

regiment from the idneteentb Army and local antiaircraft forces from

Fvankftrt.

The situation bad fuwther deteriorated in the sector of the First

Army, although the switch psition to the northeast was still holding

out. The 17th IS Nnsr Division vas firghing south of landau. Attacks

from the south were wisucessfu.. The fate of Boreen division, of

which at least elements presuably still eisted, was otclear.

Th C er in Chief West eas suficiest .qui et. for fire

divisions.

Tnom inte lies learmed tOat 71.3 Marshal lesseiriug 4tke

oveommea Of the Gum a29,00uin the Vest,

24, rob , The V .3. Pit Lmy was ready to attam. The 1IJA.2d Infantry Division vat also moved u ~te the Reage bridgehead. (

the wester side of the river the V Corp with three divisions was still

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VSCaO2O42

waiting. Opotf:ttc Aram Srouzp GI, ertem ing as far as LsAin;, there was,

li ttle a &at ac t ivity. The 5th Infantry Division en2 the 4th anI 5th

Armored, Divisions were still waitin to cross the river, indicating that

General Pattontis next tactical rovemeati had to be taken into account.

The 12th a rd 94th tntantry Divisions were near Ludwipehaf en and the

11th Armored Division was to th north. What other forc e tre available

to the enory could not .be learued.

The larpecale enwd attempt to cross the Rhine was begun at Weel,:

as expected, in conjunction with amt arborn attack. Sa f toereac hed

the eastern bank of the River at flees and the area to the .vest at 2200

hour. German counterattacks were not snoeesetul. At 001 hour ensaq'

tornes attacked south of' W...i, eaptur.n several villaes ant entering

the town from the norhest. At 1.90 bot trop-crrig gides 'tore

reported flying over Thaktk. A landin was affected .t 1020 hours

south of' ooholt. At 1125 hours word was received that thirty tryo-

carryig gliders had been shot down arid that Regiment Kanst, in ifoxe.

territory the landing wasiad, had ulrnflag* thse in pcombat.

Apa 7nl the attackin force was th British lit Afror Diviuica

Thre were no prtant etints reported alg this Rhin fl'on tbm-

+e bndgeheat the *nasw psh$W forwm south ofthi Stey itav u

Wade little prges against the Gearya ounterattacks. . Theose Leh

DivisIon san! the 11th Panze Diiuion wer tti held in-a'rsse .Th

enem made noattem$ to* take Siebur but advanced fro euied to

Katenwengere. Fa Tr elements crone the lower_ e1. River and advanced

-23

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wor? boirn rovd £oiorsad.

In Lic IArT &roup C secotor ~Vxth thitc e btec;Cur n

azA Vtnz. The arm~ ba rity he.d at Zpnhc it 'ens en] arged.. A counter-

attitet laurched at 230 houns was sutcesful 'but Trehur va aln4orf

were l~oot again.

The X1lI SS Corps (fire divioa*) rnppeand, so that the wene

about of only nice diisim wa u n nan

Vnew forces entered Lwigahfea where I ttomue fI bti a

repoted. fltre were iltl 70,0O0 civilians isth tn.

The bridge at Gt.nrrshek was rtfll in rm QWsihns. The ef

reported the opntio of er

I 1 Inth ntw (C the Csxia firstAyth

Patish it Arzorod Dvisiton erA the BritIeh 49U DisioTvere idaaifiad.

(nw Cae eTsn dtlio aw the rttiah 7th Arzos 12visio vanr identia

flid et toes* S mt4h f tooholt trny the Trit.ich 6th Aitrborn. Dliiica

had definitely beer identifie. The :Il30th Infantry ivislon an

t C Caada 8h Amed Divisti wont idautflt4 an the lef n ic at

th# U.S. Nitnth kw.y The US. 9h Aral Division Was u1fowa to be

a ft ns. north of kwiod. hi the Oppenbla b t Vctwe the

U. . 4th an d*d bh Infantry Difltns wxto th XMt It atry

ivo tW (rpasd South of Mias te 26th Inantr Division) end

probably the 6th Amenrd Diia and tone3s lad fr+ the Sat

Palatinate. The bo edry' bttwn the UJ.S. Thrd axt Seventh Artes

weeso at Worse. Th. latter *.ry inwltiue the ,6th and 42d Infantry

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is # C-~o -3

T~711~$arithe 10th s414th irterod Di.vis iore.3

fry~rog ! rrtc £Itror artillery fire on, t if wiry.,

uto te Ylrt ?aaehuts Air cane ord that about 1,.20O nn had

landsd at rdrra-dn - z lirrrtnlt.. A >rm cornt'rattack presaczd the

e z7 tackr south of t n rb rg. The JA ftwatfe reported that 59 out of

11troc arztz zi &rs we're shot down. A second Arerican l.auftog

was wade in the rear ofthe S4th Thtantry Pirisiom. Part *fth

attaek n airtonte troop were arrtih t"4

Tmhnrz the ntzht atta ck wr re nde tron the Rec., area towards north

anid xortl)East. ri~rsr d r ere; aptured by the ew'wy, whbile

Speldrop was belrhidefendred arid Rees tws at~f in On.eran hands * South

ofthe Ltst'o Canal the eneea dvenee touar kilomten to the east b'

fway of 7'riorchsfsl&.,

Tr fore', pushed rm tbrcagh ftins1~ItYn to lea el. South of

UHlmsa ,en fort 4Trplane loads f fratr rs joie the erey pen..

ttrtxg £'roi the y 1e t.

On 24 ?4Aroh sixty troop-carying gitlers end thi.rty'-eight plane

wnr* shiot dow . ?*enty-thres enem trang ere destrced.

In the La Group P area thn rmow attacked stronly tters t.

northeast east of Traef. A naber of vfllas were lost in the

Fifteenth Arty sector.

In the Lny Group 0 ares the Rhine van croned betwen Braaseh

tt. Goirohu rn. The Djpcnheis b ridgehead was widere to the nrtb h

and southest. Themyu forces captured Ateiez, Cret-r, end GrosQerau and

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C -. 20

entered Mederanstacit and Rehnlein. nThe, bridgehead at tdwgehafen was evacuiated. The1D wan. lost.Th

Zarisruhe bridgehead was attacked vtrconlly fran the north and south.

ineq forcs ba reached the outskirts atWoerth.

There was no ignlfioant activity £n the sector of the Nineteenth

*rq.

Z6 .srsL941. Two enem sttaen totaling 10000 tote were sunk.

tar mines at the mouth of the Soeldt River. fThippig aacity sufficient

to transport one to two diioas. being assaxbld at the with of

the El bcr River. The U1S. 17th a nd the British 6th Airborne Div iio

were reported in the tievel-e:ee ares. The 79t Arored Division was also

.rupred in the c area. The U# S. , 9h Inantry Dhvisica, which had

rettly arrived fro the Unite States,wa reported south of Coblens.

Uder flat protection of the 5th and 9t iAmre iviesios, the U.S .

4th Aitored Divisio wa lead ing the thrust to the Vai River. A .'rench

divisio was ove from ainet the Western Alp ax4 van repiacad b

n4w2r' arrived units.

?h ire attacked ftmRses t. the north, f' al -to the noteat

aMwt h .. ~pf eh atte p. aa to the east. Tht*

nn almeho o cbat woes a esibl onl W the 'a is ts.. 1.

ta capture.- CQean farce edterpsto nte(1 ie

rjjjrm

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The bulk oC the 4th rfantry .lv iot t o mm t northeas t of' teoe behaddc ?t

Inmthe Arxz Group r area the C.v, ?irst Arny begat to atta.ck on a

wid, front. In thet center of the ttack area, the German forces Were

pressed bak kour to six ki.lometers. A new a line of' resitnee was

being built upwith its stronest point in the sector of the anzer teh

Division aMd the hnrl r combat units. The situation was especIally

critical northeast of Coblenz where the advrnce had reached Grenshausen.

To the souzth of this point the enesV had been able to establish bridge-*

heads. A switch position war occupied youth of the Labn River, Units

fn Webtrei VII ware reporte to be approaching.

Ithe AylGroup 0 sector the .aews ashaut area had been

ooueidenably widened, Ger forces were pressed back to the forest andDamzstadt, whIch was being held by only 2CC) men, was captured. A bridge

at ianau was only partialt destiwed. eavy righting var' reported at

Achafenbure'where the railroad bridge (over the Vain) had. not yet been

blov up7 Th 3 t il elkgr dier Division was organising a switchposition ruing southest fr , Asbaffeabar. Tmforces attackedan a v14 fmt betwee Tdwidghf b Spey.r. Dridgeheeds weae tobe

eon2s two maa S s eq forces gained te road along the river beak.

27 the Gon4i not suectedi destrqyin this brld.y. The U.17 orp ltr plaed -it over, andused it for motor vehicles. (aitor).

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VSz WtaC2

At Speyer, however, etnen attaeks were repulsed. The R~hine arnt had

now been plecroed alonz a ditance Off f ro thirty to forty k11omter.

There vas no isi nfia nt actionm on 'the southern ection of the

front.

The enemy can entratedi front of the ZEouth Oironle fortress.

According to ne pross reorte, fi ttn vas still goinj on

within the, Wettal.

Churohill witnessed the ifigbting at ~et

The eomrar4 area of the Conune In Chief W}est wras aain extned.

Two hundred tanks were shifted to the est from the Vistula Itver. Five

thousad i'e of the ~$ Rlaplacezent raisdn~ Erigade assigned to the

Filnt Parachute A rwv wore transf erred to te is7 Z Diviaifm. Two

other re.placetent training brigao were rovd iforward brtrunk at

0530. hamr.

All f orcs rtitnng in the zone of interior, according to n order

tthe Fuewer, were now thrown into the front (movces rTTZ1 a

The Reioheb rer 3$, after having: rdiquishd aofM

Ontp Vistial, aw eonondhiul again iu.ith civil atain.

Aorder was given toftae strong steps against pens ahowin

fit, flag or re Mantiank otta .

A 34 NamIl Divisio was beir au.t 6nted$ eossaqat the 2d huti

Division was expected to remain in the luecksdt area.

Propgna wa tak-1. advatage of the fact that the Mciriea

shot down Ttsian fighter planes ovr aocian twirt.z .

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PS -23as9-

_____________ A ' '4

n- p #^ +" ro.Ao= ,.teb adr

btwecn the 1 sttk an1 triewl canr. At th .s? nint the zltrrienS

erpleyed tht ih am 79th T .ra nt'y7-- .i n .s hlo proably

bclona cd to the 31± Artored fition, The U.t. 3d nord Divisio 175

now i~Aer tti in the lezy t:dshed It xtstot yeksnow, wher

the three Wtvigonh of the US. V %rps were empoyed. Ithe ?renkuf

area thre. eneq divisions attacked rk 'tbLr-s . "he 1 th Armord t.visio

tuheo towards the east with the 26th ivicsion toflowtng in the rar

The location of four diiiers in the sotthen reeotor was not yet knowriS

Three ?rnh 4!1viions wer kowt to t it the S$trasboarg area.

Ink the JAi Group I!sector the enery only witr local gains at WoEsel.

Pr=m Bohlt, near here enem foren ha jugp4 hostile elaent*

penetrated to the north, opposed iycounterattacks launhd by a t

Kast. The enemy was Etopped at the iippe branch canal.

The 3±tuation war cadet at the 9 3 roup tura. The 'P arachufte

Divisio and the 1920th Volkeeir Division vwere still avaflable as

reseres.

smrcan force sesedl in 1wnij out of the. Rmsgenbigeha.

The JZI Corps was overua adn~ sares reached the Ltxhurg a

Countenattacks ver hnched t r the Piner Lehr tviaio an the 2

Vo s d erD vs o . T e . e i i i ns t e6hDivision were brought forwa d from the s outh. ts istan was sttett

28 These comprised the_ U. S. Seventh Arey which Va them preparing tocross the Rhie. (Editor).

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C -02

a .+c th li Uf1l1 - .loht =.

Thre vi littler eriay activilty in the wrthcrrs cart of the ArVty

Group 3area. A r staf Yw~~t ere thrownt ccT> t c i ai r 'er

To the east the ent.w pe roe an far ai, :schaifenburg ar!at %605

hour a Toroo spe-arh eced hy th rty to fifty tarW. rra h&4 Loh in the

itiz. fnu, wltob was defeivled by a arrion ot 2,700 irs, still

remian quiet.

The on+ wais attempting to alarm the population by broadcsting

false stateaents on the tactio.

T' r cmnWr the ery, srncedi easttrd to the P c's traws,, tie road

eonnectin Darmstadt an Eeiddlberg, arr! pushe bai the Gecnan detenden

at Xanaeis. The bridges at Eeiddlberg vere blown up. The 36th Volkee

gr ow dcier Division was being uiovod up from the south but it w doubtfrl t-ud a r v nt

20. 1arch 1LThe GYI=wvtent iaz ndrter. Task ?orce

TU5hfl dakr "us.11 ' eparted! for they t est, ?aner Task Three flAK ase heduled

tleave Ztittgart withi two days an P'anzer Task ?ore UFTFIMAfl was

reufl for movemet Col oe ?rier of the Arj Otneral Staff ari htA.

Ca4 7fe of t lspcoet Training Antdeparted for the hed'

quarersof the Caoer in Chie West .t contrl the movement..

Three ivisions were beiha activate froui th cadre of the. Eie

labor seie -ant thn further duvsos were to b* toned out of

Pere a ttahe to the service schools Tortyethre tryin wer

dispatched, twelve of which had already arrived at the Wester Front. 1*

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additiou, 72,30 trainees (without tanks) were moving by foot to the

est and 94000 trainees were being rove to the Eat. T of tber with

the othr forces, this made a total of 20, 00 won. No particulars

were available yet on the activation of the Rfobert 14y Volunteer Corps.

General ?isenhowor announced that norther llollod would not be

attacked sine it was not conside-red a strategi# objctive. The lerm an

Vel operations would imediat y stop if the lines of ecmmnaication were

ut.

Itore ground was gaine in the Wjesel area where en=q attacks to the

north and northwet wore oontinued* Diktea was lost. Eneiq troops

advacd to the wooded area to the east and reached the western edge

of Oadeok. The autobaba was crossed and, no reserve toes were agail

able to stop the ,dvance. With the withdrawal of the 12th Voltke.rendier

Division, the 95th Infantry ,livision, arid other units, the 5th aser

Division could now do nothing more tha serve as a security tfone.

HEvy attacks omntied in the t ator of the riftecath Ary,

spittigthe German forces into two parts with the lager force to the

nomt,. An attempt was made t. hold a ne line Siege - hrtur OigGi.ss

rakfonb. Tj sets betwe the lab andt, the Mim Riven was assiged

So Aaq Gmap 0.

The sw t of the 12th Puesr Ztvisioa was hapered tV lak of

fuel Vetsar wa beig held but Ltinburg was already asptured. tn

units a dvanced along the autob as far as Aseb where alert units were

stationed. In the P. area the flUXT Corps was attacked f'rm the roar.

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9 mt242

Ithe anmy Oroup Garea heavy uttckz Cutnrxd In tbt Vtanktu rt

Aschi.f a~acna:r , .ae tr- rt' t -n t g r c'F.rsd. tc:D .rd4d9c; lri, -%:rt ur1 ,e-onttrsf t asfar as We ~rn z 9 T Hi na t Lil t ' eot iitd but the eneVa

ge7a2ycz0Mnd Zwetz o tb ThZlY r GeC'rry :n*c~eed! in forcingthae on to wlthIraw trra JAtc ttrvr;. th tank colta which had

broken ti nuo to the east twaz nx cut oft . flsnolburg vnt- uder attuok.

it was posible toevamate nost of the 6,000 prisoners ot var 2.eae

te. Thin ota :oro 9 fitty ene~ tar r oe destroye, the

raaanior beix forced "bc to the et. For the preeent, the nev2ye

ostabl~if z wito ,oettoni wa holdin g out.

Srt t Dnrtadt th G ierman iutoh post ion vs. peerated. A

ew front Vuse b in bit uap alo;r the 1trnk Miltenberg Ebrbh -

Ktekar - ?mnheisw.

flJ rot 1',. This eta wth regtard to the British was no

cha r. The .U.. t int Army pushed twards the north and norstht with

the 3dand 7th DUitnstrnn zirh ad ad the 99th Oirtuton fofloves

tag to the rear. 4parexl two other flvit vern bcng tnugt up.

The U.?& hird AnyT1 uder Qenenl Pattn, likwie Gisoottnud its

drive townl the east en turned nrth. The atens sattyko

the Germ deteio at the tn be. flwubl the southern eorfl

boetr vaU snt ot Asehatfezburg.

*eport teate d that th ta ir in lviuten was -beighodI

Thtl1axA for am airborne lauig at ?des. A shmultaeu attf waso

came by sea.

-uIIIEmEhIIII

r° r

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I~5 A' 0-020 n243e

Another beaka through was made ithe .eco the flrc t Thraohute

A rmy. i oeoltY was lost and, enray Ccfrcew now t eei. d ott' towaras Twax riohA.

Conetn between our units wase iterrupted. Lk rater was tor~t in a

push to the east. Tho troops crossed the railroad and pi shed towards

Oesfe o. Sout h of the tippe branoh canal the enemy took Gladbeok and

fathorn. It as not clear where th. 2d Pnrachut Division ouldbe

employed. There was little aetivt on the left wing of the P tt

asser Arm. A switch position was established onthe lieg titer. The

3d Puergremndisr Division and thbe Panzer Lebr Division were shifte4

to close the gap at Sieges. Hostile forces. pushed north fran Marbesg,

reaching Eattanb~rg at 1025 hours. The r ocupatioc of rkenberg was

Rot yet *~md T''he artere of the UXVI Corps was transferred

to tt34ko. There was n report onthe lction of teLllOw

headquarters.

In the Ay rop0area (six days after the eneq crossing at

ppenein) the i.S. 4th AWired Div is dvanced northwards as far as

Rtdda-44aesenbrg. its of th tint and Third dnes had alreay

like up4 in this aes- after advancing by wa o 'fitlr. Sownd of

fl~tin cold .be head sear Laitnbaeho

At hasa the Gerom deftees were forced to withrw from the

altier bu cotc w t heold brigehead a retained, hr.a

no furter entic at Asehuffenbrzg., At:I l r eromantroops

destroyed three eWtanks, the crew of whih were drunk. In the

Odetald the euae pushed on to the southwest, penetrating -a obstacle

-243-W

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tt$ 0 -020 s24

line that had been established there.

~%~aIU'.Two mldget sub rin',s Feznetrate3 the Mrbor defene

at Dunkizk. A third one was f ollhwit .

It was now known where the British employed the bulk of their

infantry strength but the disposition of their armored divisions Was still

not clear. The Amricas concentrated three iniantry divisions in the

Qladbeok.'Duisburg - abrn area. 1'robubW two of these were the 5th an

8t Armored Divisions. Leadine the advancing forces were the 3d and 7th

Armored Divisions under the ca nd of, III Corps.

Wile the bulk of the .enem forces was advancing efatward, the

75th nt antry Division pashe towards the north. From varicas rerorts

it was learned that strong enem forces wore stifl. pinne down in the

rear areas to opup continuing German resistance.

The U. S. 3d Infantry Division turned agoa to the east towards Pulda

and XEasel.

Ithe Wel area the enemy advanced towards the north and northeast.

Cesfeld ad IUb wrn lot en hostyl elem ts reacted the Jaerich

witc position. Four bttalvza s were being assembled to arry out a

flmldng attack towards te southwst. Zaew avanced elmets rache4-

th are northeast oW aster. A switch position wa occio "south

otasel

Th eb of Arq- Group t Goaloberst Slaskeits ordered

that the First Parachute Arm and the Twntyefifth Army should attempt

to make contact farthor to the north instead of onthe Ithine. It was

.240

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#P CsC2O 25

AXSdecided to defend western old as an indetr~enet fortre ss. The

49t Infantry D~ivision an the entiairart t sore :rom Whe tuhr ara

were to take uppositions alIon the oetud &t 4 canal. At the

:boundary betwee the ?ifth P aer Lxw. and the rifteenth ttrm the latter

was forced. to with:raw to the north. The. Any headquartens was tempore

wrily out of but yato attempt to push its way thre h. The Lil! Corps

van being assembled. Auorder was given to nfl off the Edr den.

The eneqfs path of a dvac1. through Srillo to the ar ea south

east of Paderbon~, turned offC towards the northeast to Hobur and

then proceeded eastward again, Germn tans and antiaircraft artillery.

fome oouterattaokd. inthe Any. Group 0area fighting was reported

othe Yoelsberg vest of ida. Germ resistc in Frankfut had.

stope. Ji was also reported to b. lost. From Rban the en

advanced towards the northeast but could becontained. Southeast of

Marte only a minor withdrawal was neessary. At Asohffenbug the 30th

Volksgruadier Division advanced eastward against the eneq Widrhead

bt van lreujt to a staudstfll. oca fighting wats reported at l .ltan-

berg. Th new main Itn of resistanos. was partially pnlled bk. Con"a

forrns no cling to the line on 't Necar .River. Sot of )as~

thei enoW ves held bask by th 17h ivis. Th .nq the+re we

prais Iridg equpmet. T orsd aotivi4r we obsre and it

apeae that ensqw forcs were to be moved ut'wd to thenrhat

Movements were also observed around Strasbourg.

fl Yarh 1945. The situation in thelritisb ports remained unchanged.

-2/4540

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S4 ' 0-020 '4

Only fifty-four lending arct wnre assembleci. Two ships were reported

sunk off the outhern coset,

It. was confirued thst forees on the rigbt ving of the Canadian

Second Army were aged in the fighting. It was to ae assumed that the

gards Division and the 11th Armored Division were ccwzitted. The

British 7th Armored Division was identified. The 8th and probably the

5th Armored Divisions were on the left wing of the UIt. th R±Mbr'. One

division each was being brought p behind the :3d and 7th Armored

Divisions', which pushed on to the east.

On the sector of Arq Group H the ensq left vial had advanced to

the western outskirteof hF eioh. The 6th Parachute Diisal was now

separated from the First Parachute Arw. Sinc, the easy advabce into

the area nrhwet of ftenter and southwest of Rheie, # theran

front was now too far extended. Arty Oroup H could b. reached either

with difficulty or not at ali. Little ground was gained by the

Aerians south of the ippe. branch canal. According to the srvq' group's

satiate ot the situation, the fritis had. nearly comleted their

strategic brea-tdhr h afloin force whic b ae advanced from wsel

to the east ant from m* t the northeast to join hands and encircle

Arq rou B.& One, poit at ains efor was at Sedge~r vhere tfhe aeq

bad aready apturgd several villag s east of the. town. It une not yet

known tethr the hequarters of the Fif tth Ar# hd attemted t

cut their way through to the Geman lines, The 176th lfantry Division

was being moved forward bqy tuk. south of Paderborn the $5 Brigade

2bE-

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t talen disabled eightnen tanks. The. bri ade a d been placoed at the

d1ianom. flc the arm group. A new lirve Wlt bei .: bilt ur feer :(arael.

Ituem fol'ces. advanoed along the corps boundary' to Ursteld , while a

smler force adv ad southward to Kar hein. A gap had been created

south of tessel. Only local fighting was reported at linau. Little

round had ben lost &t Asohaftenbtsr g, although to the Snuth the eneqa

had advanced as tar as Wrtheis.

East of the Olenwald the eneW -advace tough Nohen towards the

nothast and to the southeast. The 17Ith S5 Phuser Divisiona which had

been concentrated since 28 Earorh, was not yet engaged. After the in-

coHoratio of 4,000 sn from Amb rg, the divisio had a, strength of

1200to 3,00 non. South of Hleidelberg th enemy gained further

ground.

if. U ThC ORSS 0? EVh DIfl# Th .10h 1-18 ARI

.:mi tw9L. o ships totalin 14,00 gos register tons were

ask went of Englad

U~t tn*loeds of tr*4s, six tral ad of i tta, Sad tw

tran lofs with fue two disptce to)lsdb test trnsor.

Teofa letrs blS nqdn 40 toH of fuel sad 60

to erne eastwar, eaIrlnesting Lotus fihtgwa

retd in, tnste from whe An Group .hd, withdaw. Enar r?

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M4$ t c-ozo . .2 4-

acdvanoed towards ltzstr A brakthonh wa&s ntaze in tUe southent

Clank ot army Orouxp H. !a~ericsn an$ rttiahi Careen advanced zas ar as

the Bi teld area.. The enemy advateed along the tutobahn from Soent to

Ltppstadt, thereby completing the encirclement of Army Group B. From

Hian an artored column of about 150 tn nk turned towards the south. Gum

pivo :at- Htern still held out.

Fightin in the south cotinud with gret losses. The 'LXXIT Corpis

wast assigned to the FIft Penner Army. Ct teleft wing of the LbS.

'First Anuy the th Armred Division advanced northzwards wy Wyof

lirilon. After having reconnoitered to the east on the previous day,

the 3d rore Division advaced through Warbug to the area southeast

of ? aderboru (Thu, the enemy haA taken the rouedbot way.) kdditionfl

enw tanks arrived in Knel. The 6th Wrmred Division vas reported.

heading for ?ifhr-oh, maing it necessary to withdraw German fons from

the ohne.

Tanks from the boundary of ArM Group D ad0 advanced to the area

i sdiates~ went of iisenaeh a6. s tdll inmen hande. A

mdteh position was being organsb on the fla wiug# although Seblits

and GelnhaauesI were alread lent The situaition on. the left wing wa a-I

chtned. tmyTons crse d the Rhi at. Fnunbur. rtheitwans

lost4 but this adjacet a siU held out. Petatiods wre' ier. bee.

twe the nfata e Weckar* River. pr" ty th neu' ai& efft

badl been shited to the north. The Wiench were moving their forces

northwards and had torw two bridgeheads, althoueh neither one had been

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XIS ~ C420 e2t9As

eanded, The 17th C Pan ergrencir Division wa now cn.r.rtted but

ta contained by enemy armor. :n ele :tnts wtre: rssmorted heyAing

from Scahwetzingen to ?rtuchsai. The !?Iaok Yorest was being, hold b7

alert wilts. It was reported that the population was taking anincreased

part in the detaense. W4oinn bad joined in the C±.htiug at Schweinhiin.

Ten heavy batteries wn being snt to tkieraburg.

If eessnz7 orders wer, to be sent direetly to the C ri

Chief Waest and to the ay grois.

2SariLI945. The lot Atirborne Division t n Tgland was ready for

cormttment as of I pril. The let, 24, And 3d Inantry Divisions and

the 4th and. 5th Armored Divisions wer, assumed to belong to the Canadian

Ut Corp. It appeared that the British 7th Armored Division was at

the e, the British Armored Qua rd Division and the 14. 7th Airborne

Division were north of iwnter, cad the British 6th A ra rd Brigade,

the 11th Armored Division and the 6th Airbore Division were west of

)uenster. TMe buary between the British and the Americans run from

Don tem to a point six kflnmsters south of fluonster. Strong uit of'

the. US. Ninath A~ vere being sent uap behind te rigt wig ofth

fItJS sed Ay apparently for an attnokt southeast otf Thwute.*

the S. It A i I U1 m * y f Lp e tt'a ato~bh o t of 3 ie.t.1d, while te 3d ArumS Division vS. m m-"

ieta in ti tiotn ofe a wbon tippstdt. Th 10t In tq

Division was brought up to Rrilon. Southwest of 7 Kassel the 9th Armored

nd the 9th and EOt IX 'nantry Divisions were probably heading towrds

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VS rt X0On2c

ettinren. At $iegen reports identif ied the let an th In tryt

Yivisions, the latter oC whic wstrviousl nt orn.

Cn-t the left vine of the ~S. Third /ry reint'oreements hind rrive

for anassault towards the northwest aantMlug

Iaddition to the 1Oth Arooreod Division, which had advanoed to

Ifruobeal, the 24 oroca Inantry Division and the 3d Algerian Infantry

Division were reported betwee truehnil and Gormershis. There nos

strong ertiflery fine .t IFalderon. The bridehnd at Locen was unse.

Ithe sector of the 11 Parachute Corps the enemy captured mae d

Gronav. During the night the florund - Vt canal ws crossed at Grow.

Attacks sothwest of Dielef eld vere repulsed. essu e was exerted

a t Iii. Law troops passed though itokl~ngbausen.

Tthe 'Ar mrup Rarea the situation long the luine was unchanged.

Figtig we reported wet of Siogen and within the town .itself. H

and Knseel were attacked.

Ithe area of AM Group C the encey pushed further to the e ast9

with fighting at OGeser. dThe dfdesheld out at !shluechtern btt

Nd Orb. wa lest. besy forces *o Ochenfrt. Oroffi va lost

north of bo be. The *nemy headed dRhekarisehfhes while

fgting w report noth of

I AP~d The bundary bewe the Srt tand thes t

Ws nWot of mter. 4'o t. south vone the U.. 2dand, 5th Arond.

Divisiue, while the 6th Armored %ivsion was now rportedly north of

-ad M elsagen. Te 11th Armed Division *nd the 6th and 71st Inant

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eZ25l0245 # 0-020

Divisions were at the Werrs di'yr. The:1.. 1st, 24, and 3d nart

Divisions were n Tpoyed to the n rheAt l sr a dirivc i nto centrai

Oeney 1 so that0 for the ttimc bing 5cnthorn Uenx.any was less

threatened. Thq French were brigig up the 9th Colonial Division to

Join their other three divisions.

Futer ese ttacks were mats towars the 'vest nnd north at the

Dutch - Gee°a- bonder. Nod ar appers tobe been entered,. th.ereby

Opniu the way to Uinen and mren. Other 'eneq fores reached the

Teutobur r Forest and approached O nreck. After a break-throg

at Blielefeld the ene ' read ferford.

Ithe Arq Oroup B sector the northern sector of the waled ot

tightbv no"e was assigne to rq Group Hf for reasos of supply. This

led toan error in whmnd4en Asi Group B ordered the 116 tanner

ttain 'to dvaet the east. After four kfloters the division

was forced to a standtill.

The Ryie front nequiet ic!the rdtustim on the 2±.;s front re-

mied the. es as Ifon ta tones entered Kasel an d attacked th

s"itch position running to thbe southeast. !isennh was only two kilo

eters away. Two k'dgahnds weave thg'cwa annme. the upper Thd n.-

Shal .was sttf in Genes Wais. Gene fitte von U Gaine Wa Uk0

wlig. the - ties of ar ets 4Pse tW'm fernes bed

enter Fald. Tie sitta in he Suart )oatai was stA n3 oM

ehanged. Frm Bed Or the anow pushed on ttor, where swipme wone

to blow upthe bridge. env forces avenoed on Waersbrg. Southes

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n2 524.# 0-020

of. Ashatfenburg, whih had already been captured, one battalion was

conl.tte mgttnt a nning forceo at' itty Vttke.

l ernthein vas still being held. The Xl 3$I corps was in ct~rgo

of the area. 'Southwest of the Odenwald a' mney thrust to the south,

split upthe Grmrin forces. ?ighteg was reported near Nek rulm anid

Itoter's. re otd that roads ini the rear vw attacked by Prtis s.

Only in one instance, at Limburg on tb. taba, ' was there talk -of the

oneq being vold b the populetion. Qetn. reports or such aes

indicated that foreigpens, who felt liberated, wore apt to welome the

advancing enem.

The encirle 6th 3 Mountai Divie we ordered to reain in

the enemy rear, rather then to attempt to ant th rcig the limes had

been originflly ordred.

The ane now threatened the area of' S&felt -tuolstadt,

wbiqh was the ehief center for mszutacttzrta torpedoes for the Navy.

The Comando in Chief West don his headquarters frot Obrdruf to

A44 4.kcordih ,.. aptured -n s themi objecat ve

ofthe Srttis va * 6 Thw 11th Snore Division noted in ta

.4irctiam. fli thA wet a dea sprtmbewn itshat

Axericas Tores~ easel t ht. tieby th assignment of the U.S%. 'nth

Airbore Division to the Nfinth An~y. The armored division were being,

followed br The :infantry divisions.

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1$ 2

In thc4 Yi~pjenaeh re !the~hifir tivcnwsTlw h

the flctthoflt. The Prench nWante4r tensnrd : n{en i ' ZhrnhetS.

fltere wa no 'inication of vhae te other released 'forces voutd be

Th Gitnation in tho sector of 417 group 11 hqd not 'chunged. hemyq

forcess advanoe I1 beyo n e~nn. fhmabrseek vas lost.. Qnervtohbet

Student wn ordered not to attack. Three battalions that he %m to

receive were thvw -into the jgp. There was figtn for the ?uobte

7orest. A new line was bon built at rfeynasn on the 'ever.

In the AM~ Croup sector the !' in front woe ts .tfl quiet. The

southern (steg) front vet stllben hold slthcuit the enemy had mjae

two minor p nertir an t U egn. 7o the east there were deeper

eUtfltionS bat e brnk-trogh wes prevented by Task Thre esyerlein.

The tXVI and L VII Cop stablished a neline byemployig kmprovike

unite,1 but heavy weapons wore looking. Y!ighting took lse at Ressiaeha

Uohtenau.

the Tnerine ?Ft th boundar of Arq rotp 0 vwased

Cotha haad been lost after. te: ant Ou along the atehn. Thrn

ea ~twed, Yah M Sohuakl were let mdMlW

eurwt.. Ftbtgv eorted at Sl.AtQhrthtt the sta tek

through the Thneringen ForestAd avnce tmrd s the eouthws. fTh

6t tt oti iviaton failed to receive the order to rain fighting

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?4S 7C-020 e~5/e

ina the enee rear and wan now returning to the Srer li1nes.t

T here w s~rgting in the Werzhurg and Ochsaen flxrh areaps. itwa

inr tant 'to retain the laset lecylt vhieh trtctnra ball boar-ins.

F'itting continued at ReckMsih end Heflbronn.

The tineeteenth Arq was assign ed directly to the Ortender in ChieI'

West after having until now been aigned to An Grop G. The front

now ntesde generally along the Wase 8* h uoahtef a Karletadt a.

uesbug v est of Maktrit X osigshfen -. lleilbrn - Karleruhe.

Activatio of new units -we being h eredt.

5 Arl 14. The ene. c nned to attack towards the northeas t

in the dieto d of Ijsul. It would soon be n csry to bod back

the front ln to the uierZe and to begin the defense of 'fortress

HlisM.. The British were organice o a narrow front Lfa peparatio

for anattack towards the northeast. It wsnot yet known which uits

were available t the sney Unth Aty4 Onate effort was being

exeroieod aganst ?ask Force Dayerlein on the Ax Group B front. The

4h6tand fib - btt t ane. , folloCtel

Wthe 25th, 26 sM 90t Inan r iit w advrncig agant

rJnep. Te12th and. U t Anwe + visions spesrese the Seve

Arq's atttaeis thbe l~rlr eeta ea 'oto the sth th

Ynre nre taking an oeof t setors from thir avaLing alles.,

Itoe teetr of Ar rn fighting ooaiae in Holland. no.ncr advanced Irwyof ineto te nteast. At Rhein an airfield

was already being laid out. The, Weormaal 'had beau crossed at

several point. Furth edwy ws wade btino: Osnseeaandfite.

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g C-20

The Weser "ront still heldi ^ut. Th9 enety probed thodt lc.~sh

Th" th-n °Y Ar %ctp Ptotor } tit-,o,-. wre, nfi tEtt2 Z'u t he

auto bahn. 1$ ep ~0etrat nni r e ra e northes 2t :0rt- and.

rnomy forer o the Rhino front wre crmin.:ed.

Two Nrhor airfields 'were -lard o t ini the k ri Group ? sector. The

rlwenth A afssumed commnd of th nevlyaeostublihed front south of

th, Wser River. Theihusn wee captured. there was no activity to

the south. tDgnalza wa stifl In Gorman hn . flseaeh vaB vter

fire. ?i htin continued outh ot oths vTe enemy asdv ned c wsw

of Crruf to Arn :at. (frman fore still held the oeeart Mounta.

At Versbr the enem suceeded Sn crossing the M1tin River. 7It~tixtg

at Ohnnturt contifned with o.teting swon.

A totel of fortyeeit tans vas dines.l.. Ti hting ectatie at

Heflbron. TerarUrte ia lest but there was stil ftghtim arou d the

city. Freneb forces advaedt the east.

The Corgrnder in rhef 'iest sent In 'oter esat ato the situat4.o

in wih in phaslsed the ar of holding Sebfrt an th

bordh..im a re. Th. t. ar ilin df emd by Oruppmfentuh

$isd . The * R ite Aq ws pied wider the co dotth #.

twelft Aw Orup tere gvn the Drit isa

ind "edently. Aerican foces were aea with the eelaent o

wGroup a with thrusts twards the eust. The 9t Agrned Diis

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)W.l t~ G-i J2O -25*- S

amd tx r v to fror -Urtc t dIvioun the 3x~h r 1t i oh w ouM soor.b

bing sent to the 77. S.* enth :-. ='.

it the Army Gro'p F eotor Matak against t Mortrees *Iclleazr bed not,

icreased In intV nntty. The eney aned norrthwards at then bot4ar

betw t he LXtVIUI Corps Dnd the ..T ?aratrts Cors but tngen was

retakes. flps in the Win at tMim en and !4enbur. placed th prirachate

anzy in a critical posttion. Yoar bridgeheads had been thrown across

the e r titor ant hoati s Torooe had push past inden in the

diction of Brueckeburg.

The nrttern sector was eananded by Task foree Lwtt ts; the

soxtthoro sector vut oosnded by the 5th ?asr tlivinion; and that pert

of the front further to the east was wide the ocire.d offfenth

Arom. ae of these sector; hard been ansinecl one mbfle nit. Tb.

Panzer Lehr Ziiato was held as a centnal 'reserve.

Tere va no signifiat ain -in the flevntb , sector.

t ppa nty the ennr had mad to muthr proess at Mue~hausen aMd

Lagenalza . ?br were futer a tts b in the 'Trtae Fent,

*ee ieflr against ias a. The inea speatead was batd fe

pss*in soirth of Cotta .1am the .'autobsh i the directioofrrt-

ZDn7 tns aedvace by of. Vi*. twt ware not able tol os p with

the rou headint towards fut. Arnrtdt was stfl in German hands.

Thwere was little activity reported en the southern 'segto of the front.

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MAS oa a'57

Amky Grouip C suggenited that the everth Arr p, prating around Jena,

shoud move the First MrW o-it of the ~rb-rg area,$ and that trhe tetr

sot or Sohwabieh Hail should b. ritn over bythe !aneteent tray.e

It vas pointed .out that cinect consind over the southern sector tr the

a a',;in Chief E#t was net feasible. The forwr part of' the

salient held bySeneth s~u inte Snart tftmtaias vas cut off b

tesnq

The situation had wore itt the ?4aanhlm and lra a.

*urktbneit ws lWst, although the enmy had not been able to for a

pockt as was prtnbl intended. French forces were moving south !of

Karluto. Ettlingo and ettn were lout andti th 16th Volkegrnadir

Division wes onerrw.

9 a were being taken t* improe the suppl of

saauition en fuel.

-2 xnr . On Total Isla measues were taken against rebelling

Itus1s0ians who wer .being supporeted by the civilian poultion. The nwq

weo at Noth

t lint .Paraibt Arq now toke the sector pnvausl held

Yr a Stdet (withuat thZVUCro while the atr

ni.4rt h nte of VhteisIand U b awop i the

orea of AqbwpIadne t 2. Na In try Division. Attacks

fr. Lingo and Sies voe repul. ?4htlgtk ple at Smacs

29 l ea iwroised am under an Any Cm adr wth nlarviSn ta f .

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KS K X-20 28

and in the bridgehead atc tlsenn on the eoor.

A.rsteerrurpe Ctudent atacked Bueokotmg~ and the aren 0outhz of

No reports had arrived from arv Group tB.

Attacka wre mae agakagt the Weser -W erra bridgehead In the

flenenth Azw mector. Imen was lost ad ond fores .reaed

Ithe flyGroup s scor the enem captured Zisenach. Attark

nin fnthedinectio of Iagpslalsa. nmy forces pushed ahead

towards frt . There was fighting for V riedriolaros with alternating

aeoen. taincen, Gerafeld, and Wildtfeoken were lost and issinpa

was threatened.

-to thePit ~warea itsia was lot and fighting was reported

at leilbrona and south of Ir ttem.

LJ2AI#...,. Three tacic divisions wore blievd to besouth

of $Icmove, r, GroupD wes reinforced, probably y the 20th Armored

flivisn wich bad Just rd fr t Unte States sad by a divtsin

wich atlnor hdaparntly been at Qrleans.

T eusqyge Swtvat"a bflted, .fldnt4 r o

th iatry to cat upwth th nired divi c. The 67t lanty

fivlio.ne *pn then.

woting fther bed eelopd th 5weth .r seater. It a

conidered ossib that the nmyintended to tae Sowintrt bfor

advancing on Nuenbrg.

-258 4M

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CeS2O um~259n

Arevolt had broken out on Texel Island. Th retclltnig ' risonene

weze tcsd b ut the cadre pcnvonl were killed.

In spite of strcrug artillery- swn ort tro was i1ttle hapdway

mae in the sou th.

Terrorist activity wa reported to beincreasing.

The enemy advan;ced to the northeast by ay o Lireyn and passed

Eheine. Fighting was reported south of Jrau ad at Verden. Enem

forces crused the W'eser River between £tolp. adPtershaer an

advanced twenty kilcemetens to reach Vhmtor and ?eutat in the

direction of fannover. A switch position w as being constructed west of

the towm. Gesaralobenst Ztudent was asswatng eouwaui of the sector.

During th normin, a force of1(X tanks advanced beyond Eame in Luth.

direction .f enigsn. The lertran were forced back to the stern out-w

ski of flfldeshein.

The enemy reached the !4oelme valley in the sector of Arna' Group B.

To the southwet the advance was cheked * There was sufficient

anttitio for only two weeks * An attempt vas to be made to ros

production in thoe areas whih bad not yet ben occ upied..

Lnageeln ws ac' occupied. Thre was lns activity reporte In

the Thuerisgen Fewest. The exqadvanced west fi n t rt. flhl4bnrgeP

M aussn was lost. Re iestadt was attaced. Sehvinturt stil held atut.

Reqw fonce peetrated into Mergethea. Figtig wasreprte in the

Dikelseh and Cntilbsa awns .where the enm advace veyred in the

direction ochwasehe Hal. Close comubat antitank units wor bein

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.M , # am -26a

employed heo., The enemy enter d t oei. othing ofi htQrtanee

occurred on the upjper fhino.

tfls fl . Th .fe rebelling rusians on Toi ere sealed off o

the northern part of the islan. Zltx in ad tbolten were lost. The

penetration at tDoventer was extided. Attack were repulsed at

Fnerstenau inthe sector of the paret rMy.

Bassia Syk., and seeral neighboring localities wrn lost.

Armored spearheads advanced as far as Lhrte a Veryo. Th* enm

attacked on both sides ofthe Steinhudor iake i the sector of -s

grp. Student.' Stad .n, Dueoksbrc, an Rintela wore cupioei.

From Rfldsheiathe eqavnednorthwrds an southeast towards

Saisgiter. The Weerier intws crossed at I txt..

further grond ws lost in the Arm Orop B sector. A bridgea

wen established .t Dermg in the sector of the ? lovnth Ary. F'rm

Veckerhagen enem forces advacdb way ofQettingon to Landolfahausen

and from Vitsaaimsaen to fihengdr.,. Airborne troops crossed the

river at floods the eney ta wy of Ueiltestradt..

is the sector of Arm Group C0 a GOrusa hedeho positionwa

.itsbflhed at ?r "iaerd. Attack were mae from &*1 towad the

eat.as lat from Arabs tt..k werae in* theU

diretion of n ,At Volkactz thea se crse th.azRvrCraia b wa IsGnshas ea f1 orcslttt tw4sae

off. The Jaget front was still holding out. At Pfonzheim the eem

was forcd bak.

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HI4 0-20-21

flAnit2A The eny uituatic opposite Army Grouzp URwa still

obscure. lten ofls regarding division which had formerly been ep1hyd

in Italy had not yet been conirmed. The Britis still advanced orth

Ward, whil the Americans did not proe eonsistently inthe dseto.am*

eneraloberat BUiakwts assue comaar of *?ortres $ofln.*

T l lssd as being .tt.*.d. Qenn tene were withdrawingfr

Zwlle. The * continued to advance northwards at lMep"*n Strong

pre~sure was e tdo the left wing of the- II Phachute Corps. The

15th Paurgrensttier lflvieion ada~das Ias Syke, where it was

forwd to stdp. There was little aibt activity report from th

urea. At Terdens the .n cuidthe vsterbako the river.

?gbtat wa Vepre at Seharmtedt. iU elemets advanced towirs

Cefle. The cetral are of I cvr was puer artfllery fir. The

enemy advanced as far as the i ars)omtds.9 Fro U1de hai. ttack

ere ad e nstward. QeaOVNltbSZ'Zt Student assue oft his new

bth tw Grasp area strgg attaks co.ined is the sttm

C isothnt secton. Soost v" eqtund* An attempt to cress te rime

atLemekn a peetd 'hxe weo so siiicant actions @n th

stera settsst tome frot.

fihigw eorted at atse end

?110"Rt AryIro flul1dedeei the .nty aaced to the Saisgitter area.

Both Gndesi ndtiaeck were lost. Mpid progress was mae east of

261.'

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i'S ;. 462

Goettirigen where rery forooea avanc ed fry: Eeiigenstat to Duers talt.

The road between Antat and ILrenau wtw reached. FEnemy forea were

being assemble vest of Eisenach.-

An advane wa tbnatee trou Koenigahofen towards :aberg. eNor

ground wa lost north of $ohweintw't. The tow was to be held as 1o1

as poss ible. The ball bearing plants wee not to be destroyed. All

resistanc at Wuers~bug bdstopped. Eat of thenfurt the ener

continued to advatce. Thoe cits thatwere, pocketed at luerehofen

suceeded in fightin their wa bek to German Lines. ftghting was in

progess vest of )'ferzheim. The greater peat the city was ntfll

holdin out. Gonan fores made scm progress at Nekanvula.

The right win of the 25tnth Any was again in. an saute position.

D efending tortes at D amffberad to fight off the UT.8. 14th Arired

Diviion ad two infantry divisions. The situation there was serios.

There were o Surher reports fro the 6th S.S )4outain Division, which

adperhaps spit up into sal groups sxa bedu operations behind the

new" lines in accdance with ores. The Potadm division wa owr oflta ae tet't t ase being

Tweltth Arw hes~ arte vas t* bo trasferred to Mneug

British pamplet, the 'flips.,'0 togther with the arps cv nas

was eaptrd. The pamphlt dulIt with the adainistrationmo at Gerga

after the .apitAulatio43 Berlin was to bean enclave ithin the boalsn

30 This probably refn to pian LCL1fl. (Eitor).

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j? 0-20 sj3a

Zone ad was to be partitioned between the hre occupygjtrs Th

rn p we s T e Wlz Ameri an were to be give an enclave on the 4:o Rivr which was t

Xntalt Wilhaaven.

J~ra2A1.Three atonaers totaling 22,000 w'ra rogistcr ton

were sunk off the coast of ?Azland. Atta frop Dunkrk sad Lrient

wore aose

1t~th AmyGroup U sector the ene pepare aifields aM lction

frair, drw*'. Thrten cargo airpl a were identfif ed during the night,frThe U.S. 34 Division reached Dntor,9 1 t hie the 4th Armred

Division continud to row eatward. The Dritish 531Ifantry 1ivioai

was at the lin-er virr. T he 6th Airre tv iio joibe the metns

at ftanor. Apparenty the 24 Armed Dltvisioz and the 30 Infantry

Division were comitted agaist Brwsiok. AryGroup 3 was tring

down twenty infatrt divisions or one-third of the ene's ftoa infanr

strength. (fl-tenth of the *s armored divisions werec c ittdi

this sectr. Moreovr# it h4d b eesnry towithdraw divisions from

ote sectors offth front for comtteut against Awe Goup 3.Tire

aencdiv±fsicn. ba pparenty asssled smith of the Thsis let

Zviesw the foiet wes to be trpaepe4 in a 64w twards Ilpsig and

t te suthasttowcts owtra reus

Prsuewe st st) ieto of 0*1*a f itgn

retd at Terdes.

obabl 3d Armoed ivision. -(ditor).

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fi 0-% -264-

Fighting continued in Holland. The iaraohute army s uffered fizn

the lack of artillery.

Since the last canal through north west Hollani was threatened and

it was not possible to reroute water transport to the Zuider Zon, the

supplying of 'Fortress Holland" was not expected to continue. The ene y

made no progress an 1'exel Island. At Deventer the tner circle of

defenses had been 'breached by terrorists. A nestch position was

being built up on the western outskirts of the ton. The Ijssl Caal

vas still being held. Amred points had advaned to the Orange Canal

and armored reoonnaiesance forces were reperted at Graningn. Terrorists

were actiVe west of the Ems eRver.

The eney made some proress An. the sector held by tb. First

Parachute Arm but was pressed back again. There was fighting northeast

of uerstenaa nd south of ?3rsmen. The bridge in Bremen was under

artillery fire. A conterattack b the 15th ?anzergrenadier Division

Wade no hndwsy. Eney torces at uoaihols were repulsed, from Pine

ta. enmy advanced to the north a d eat as far as Uchte4afllb

Wut did not enter the toi. Several villages were -lost in the. Wolten

beuttel ares. Salgttc was attacked. tnty-tor eemy tanks vanM_

reprtdly .. +destroyd.

Local lowst are reportod onthe nrtheasters frnt. of th As'

aMp sector. Seris penetration were made I the Au area btvase

t rtmun and !ssen. There was houetohoun fighting in Eehvu The

situation on the southern -ection of the front bad not chaged exezpt

-264-

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-265-

at the southeastern corner slone the army boundry where a deep pene-

tration was roade near Olpe. This ws regarded as serious because the

front there was wakly held.

The enemy advanced into the nr Mountains and occupied Goslar and

Bad Rnburg. fennth Arm did not sed a complete report because it

was changing position. n ta Hueh ualhun the enemy advaneed, into the

Nordhaia n area. ?ighting began in the Thueringeen. Forest. The Germ

were. fored back to Eiokfeld. The enmy concentrated their effort at

Co bug whoe they mreba d the area north of the to and then advanced

south and northwest. A German line still formed an arc around Sol weins-

atit, Locaizeed fighting wa reported east and south of Wers b rg.

Crasheim we recaptured by the Germ as. The 2d Mountain Division, the

len# Tiplaesent Division and the 19th Vokgrenadier Division were

to be commtted in a counterattack againstt the eney armored forces in

th. penetration ara.

At lisilbronn in the Wineteenth ArM sector there was only localized

fighting. The upper Rhine front as qidet. The 96th Inantry mDiiio

had ben withdrawn to thene to fm t reserve.

ri s The .S. d and 5th Arnd Divisions were fightng

at Wadebtrg. Nrth of the T uflg orst, T A the 11.5. Tid Ar; adnuod

to the e , tf routh .f the T riaga ret other elements of the

ensw -rt1a adved to the sout~hest. T tf) sa:- 14th Armoed aivialcas

Vere rer t d at Oorg and the 13t Arred Division was conitted

against the southwestern corner of the Arq Group B front.

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MS "0 C-020-2 -

Genmn forces on texel Island made no re progrers. Sotb of Deventer

the eney threv a small tridhetl acro; p the Ijssel liver. Tast of'

Zwolle the ene;y was repulsed but (itrna n forces loot further ground in

north-eastern Itiland.

fleavy fighting continued on the right wing in the area of the Sixth

Parachute ry, where enem forces were contained. 3 2 There was atifl

resistance forward of the Geran lines. Fighting vas reported at ua oene

ruek. South of ram there was little combat activity. there was

fighting at Sohwrmtadt with alterating sUcess. A bridgehead .was

formed acro the fler 'River. Cello. was lost during the morning.

Bnmi ok was being attacked bone armored and one infantry divisin.

The auleiter 's report that Drunawick had been captured was evidently

incorrect. Enemy frcs adanced. northwards by way of Cifhorn. At

Gardelae n .two hundred vehicles trned north in the direction of Sals-

vedel and duvand as far as Calve. The eney ar eare -at Ztohosnebeok

on the Elbe. The Magdoburg sector was assigned to the parachute rm.

In the rmy Graop) s ctor there ~was boitinued~ ressuI~re) from the~

x* the serlargest jart of the i dustrial distriet, including tXuebheiu,

h rn bee lost.- Oernx forcs fuord soon be ftnce to vithdrsv ,fro

th Rhine. l ee and Witten were the last areas in t industrial r *nb c uey r

whic a ! ~set be:eni sa~Ptrad. Th enem aradvg~~Panee~r fsrm Qlb twards~

Iaennebtdt was mosidered erio e. Couterttacks wvre launched W

32 The< tthor probably refers to the fst Paraohute .Army. There isno record of a Sixth Parachute Arsy. (!4tor).

-264, i

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the Panzer bohr ivision. Army Growp B still om:, .tle seventeen

divisions, but since each ecmtpriaed only about 3,0CC> mzen there were in

reality, only the equivalent of :fWO to six divisions. N ortLy of' the liars

Mountai.ns the enemy ture -towards Blankenbrg and alvanced in the direction.

of D4Rssau.

There was pressure inthe leventh Army sector but no significent

chimge took plece. enmn force withdrew from the northwest cornr.

The situation around Nordhaunen was not clear. outh' of the liars.

Mountains the Germ .positions were threatened. Zrfurt and "W-eiaar were

lost during the wrning. After the Sal flivnir wi crossed at Ksnaenberg,

the entry advanced towrds Iaubuing. Zuemy forces stood before Jen.

Th. stu ationi the Thurige Fo rest ass. u hanged.. At Ooburg then

was Little action. floeer, & new danger was produced by a penetration

from the north which reached a point eight kiloseters from Bamberg,

stain threatening the Z ighteonth Ary from the rear. "Further grouud waMs

lost in the Cra lshela area. The assumption of the Cownner in Chief

Vest that a ajor attack was imnent ha not yet beers coninae, although

-it was eviet that the sneur intended to advance towards the south

Strong . ssaulta were mae9 spne frbr 'and uraborg Sout .of there

tVi sw was stope.

After the 24 Thftxsi DivIsion. was vithdnvft,1 the enem .uar the

Widgeeabd &tat)fislbrom Tanks: pushed abs*ad oait of Paden 0AS

The 17th 35 Division was shifted to Nuremberng and the 19th )iviaios

to Regensburg. Both of these divisions were part of )Uet entz Arn.

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Mws 0-020r

The 98th Infantry ivison wato replace the 17th Von toer Division at

the roit.

An order was 4von to ticid the ater: $on tais. A ccnttrary rt4er

isvspd to the E eVnth Army by the Reichseterr 33 and dolivered by an

officer was not clear.

The weltth nuy was being led W General :enek, forter ohist af

the Operations Brach of' the Aw General Staff. The Reiohsfuehrer 55,

In his capacity as Ltdcbh Minster of the Interior, stated that sio 'opn

citiet* would be declared.

l1 Aril 194. In eastern Thgend there ware no preptratiou.n in

proess for an immediate major landing.

The aupply senioe of Amy Grop B was apparently i order now.

Strn pressr. was exerted on the right wing of Anieegruppe Student. It

was expected that this fore* would he pushed back to the coast within

a short time. The line between Cloppenurg and Proisnn aa still being

hold. The situation in the yreen - Cello aea was unchanged. There was

pressure free C.11. weno one regiment ha4 taken up psitiee north of

the tow. Ealberstadt was still holding out. & acmb t cc dadvanced

a ar as tftnbsrge where the bidge had been destroyed. Th. enemy

entered Sterse8l and appeared near Tanranende. a iome west of

V~gdebparg wecaptured. Wring the night a small torc crossed the UWb

betwee fagdebtwg and Se eriossbeo, whereuon efforts to bridge the rive'

wret begd. The a or of th t.elfth Army placed the ea of

Mageburg under his authority. erm force were eommitted againft the

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KS -020-29

sass's attempt to bridge thQ iv*r. ZSu'pport uwa aa 1able Cron Dtvislo

Soharnhoret. and Division Huttoen, both ot which vere nez.rly ready' ror

coiit'npt..inthe barz sector tile eoe y advance4d to W 1ttatadt mnd

south of the mountains to S ctdatstadt near Parseburg. The "Uaven th

fra in tbe Lans 1ounteine was ner enveloped on three 44de0. It was

not yet known whether W Issofsl wee - ocoup .ed. 'Woak enem forces

very reported in the Leipzig area.

The rnqW continue d to advance towards tabr;. iiostile tones

attaokd Solieinfurt and broke th-rough to the high read, cretiting wtat

wass lmoot a hedgehog position around fchwetnf"urt. Threc waso no combat

activity btween Schweinfurt and flothenburg. The situation at Crails--

shot had developed well

it .aril 19LS, b. Cnadian let Division, f'orerly employed i

Italy, wras now reported at )venter. The 7th Amored Division and the

524 and 53d l Thf..try Ilivisions were concentrated at Vcrdon whra the

nqr was eerting strong proscarn. therore, an attack against famburg

m exected. About sixty tank were in tin $tendal area. The U.S.

Firt A n ow nned its opratios to south of the iRen )Iuntalns.

'No inf antry divnision wero attack i n thee ountains. The 69th Wntst

DtvieSa advanod to Lipsig, so that te arq boundary nOW rDa south o

ratsig. The 4th Armored Division wem comitted against Ssxony, perhap

is Jpoint eft with the 4th (nfantry Pvision. In the Kuisbach ae

th. ines 0 s objective was iof. For that reason, forcs which had been

separated to rove arod both sides of the Thuringm Forest were again

-21

91

*;920

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w R -020 20

,joined together.

There was no eimane in the situation on Texel 1stbrnd. Cor unication

with Holland becam more difficult. Gi'oonmgn wag already under artillery

fire. 'The enemy still continued to attack in the sector o'the parach ute

army. Cloppenburg was l4n t, while to the north reeinrnta of the Divisiou

O~-.'.sutSchkIW wer still holdiing out. Th .ginf sector was quiet.

A bridgehead we forme across the Afl er iver at Ottsnse. Fightingcontinued at Seharaatedt. A ermm attack had been planned further to

the east but the lotion of the 230th Antitank Battalion, which was to

participate, was not know. Attacks against the Gemi~a bridgehead wore

repulsed. Thirty enm tanks wee reported at Seehansen.

The situation had deteriorated in the Ary Group D. sector. The

n)zetratioe areas around Luedeneebeidt and southeast of Hlagen had been

widened. Begwen the Ea'~st and the Woet there was only a lane 'twelve

kilometers in width. Axmuition and fuel stocks vire expected to last

uantil 14 or 16 Ari,r~, with food supp~lies acetd to lust longer. it

wedoubtful whether contact with the prod ction a ea c could be matain d.

Several thrusts were made into the He*r untains. South of gburg

th* forces on the mast aide of the river were attacked but the dee o

e'woe was not yet kuow*. En~ forces also crossed the river at Deby

ithe 41x"eto of Zrbet but were pressed bait again. T he Twlfth

Ai'uy we be te it onl wee forces along th $afle River. Enos

elements cotinued to advance to the southest towcar~ fe. It was

ossible that the Division Sohsrnhorat had arrived during the day. The

--

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WI, t 4

situation around !.sipntg was tvnehrngod exei~t 'or tko ritht swing of iiri

Group 03 where the env'had apture dhitz end advanced into the Chwzits

ars. Gera and Wida wre ocouded. At the 14 ' e bend fur'ther nttaocs

were Tade towards the northwest, ighting was reported at Lbo htenberg,

to the souith of uich a stron force was being oonctntzte.

On th southern sector of the front the sritustirx had further

deteriorated. !ezq forces were twelve kiomters from Bayruth. Thire

wes still no newt concrning the eocitmt t the 189th Infantry

Division and the 17th $3 Division. There was no report on the situation

in the !hwin rt area where the First Army had advanced as far a

fillbronn. Ta the Nineteenth lrt sector there was only localized

fighting. esistanae continued in the norther Black Forest. There

wnno important changn o the Rhin front.

It ws learne that the Polis 3..t Armored Division and the

Canadian 5th Armored Division were to take part in the attack against

?"ortnese lland.' The U.S. 11th Armored DivIsion wa ?i ,kting at

Uelsmn. In this :ars the ermane were able to advance ten klm eters

without opposition. Sine, the erm had not used all of their strengt

at the bgnig, addtional yoes wer still aailable to throw into

the attack. It wsnot fleer tore the eayhad oml yd tb 6th

Amored Division The 4th moe d Division vst in BAzozy and the th

Armrd iflision was at ? * Th '142. Third A had sua

turned to the northeast. Since a.l1 three American airborne divisions

were employed at the front opposite Any Group B, only the airbon units

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PC ;1 -7ze

still in !nland wore aailable for an air landing.

IS Ai A194 . Ater repudiating the armistie agremnt, the French,

snpported by 120 American boTwboras attacked the north and sOuth Gironde

fortresses. The French declared that any destruction b the Germans

resulting from th. fighting would be regarded as nbotage, since the cute

come of the war was a foregone cncluaion.

The iua ton on ton Iserand nob not yet iremedaied. The tener

captured Arahem and advanced to the north and; norteat. There was no

Mahge in the situation at the Deventer briwslgehead but the enesy was

receiving reinfrcepente. Fores were being concentrated at Zvolle. The

wterst ede of teal Isad wes still in Gran hands;. WVi the aid of

territs 9 the eyar ent d ronizesa. Twenty enem tanks wen dis-

abled. A part. of the advancing fore turned eastward towards the Ema

titer, Fighting was reported at Friseuthe and Cloppenr g. At reas

tere was no change. A now bridgehead was thrown aross the Alter River

and the bridgehead at $chwar te was enlarged. A arme orce of

twaety tanks aru ed at Veluen. The Corman attack began at 0500

hrbos ad net with resistnce at Vettenkap, after vhioh the frnrcs were

'tzouped. Saa de Aredye were lest.

The sitation is the Am Qrotq S sector had eonuiddenb dbter rated.

8am ties cosmptin was higher then had bees calculated. The eupp2ly

tr.ais lacked wayne. rther ground wes lost. The tlevnth ry as

hard' prssed in the Ea l&ars tain by attacks frmi the soth and west.

Vighting was rorted at Stolberg. An attack v lauc ahed from Rlnkenburg

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Ms 47 0-020

tewards the youth. vefl r, the sttuntion t'-ere 1i- vd. Thc're we no

longer any c~onnrect# ith the Tsct. The Tlfthb Arv-y 1s position on

the rit had been 2tsblibd. South o? Y debnrrg ttw enay brid ehea

was narrowed down end the bridg~e was destrryed. Whethe brid ehead a-t

Darby was enlarred, no brid~e wan as yet avrdl.e ?nd, therefore, n

t ak had reached the easter n bnnk. There wams no nignttioat actIvity

reported at frnburg. ruevy forces advanced through DitterFeld tDessau

whore four battalions fro ivision Schsrnborsot we're comittod. "flvisioa

Button was to be npioyed at the ?f!ulde River. fletuenWal and Leipzig

there war n o ohstge. C ersan faoes retired wreat o? the Sanale River

after the bridge was destroyd. ,A section of Menseburg was still3 in

Goran hais. 1nstn was lost. cmrmiation with Leipzig bad not

yet been out of.

in the Army Groop C sector th esituatio had detsriorted south o

Leipzig where the enemy ,advanced from Cheaiitz towards 0Cfldita to the

northeast. Tanks were reported in the waitern part of' Ch& its. Clsuohsu

was being attacked, There were no enter gains onthe northern Stale

Liver from Hfb a thrst vas directed tows Hirscbeg. Rqnutb weg

lot South of fliberg the enemy advanced to Riltroun where the attack

stopped. On the Rhine plain the Gemans were foroed tAo withdraw fifee

to twenty kfl.oetera to the soat.

ltuf13. The Girodo fortresses were again attackd by 1#200

American boutbrs. At the same time, the main Usne of resistance wes

assaulted by goud troops. rrom the sea, the .fortresses were shelle

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efl74e

navanl forces. At 2~3 hours th -aizdr~Roanr iral $ieahofle,

sent rd by r± 1io tirt eemy r ror had broken through *nv. that the

fighting had reached hit' eorcn ott. The. ?Ftai btttle had begun.

French troops vers erployd.

Thern was ttill ti ting f or tj.esge Mollsnd' and northwst

Germany. A major conentratin of forces at Seahansen ws observed. flu

eneer bridohed south of Mgdbwg was emoved. Sout of Dery the

adva reached the ieiflty tel ne. 7 t of Zerbst. Strog prensufl

was exerted ajainat the still large~e' bridghed in the Derubergw

Pessau-littorf old area. Co nterattaeka rert!ted in local 'ains. I

hlls the enemy advanced as tar as the cathedral, whil to the south o

there the br~head vae further enlarged. The northeri par of

kMerneburg ans till in n hbnds. There was no action in the taPSIS

area but e ne Forces advanced through± Grtm to ?4tsschen.

The enemy Continud to attack the !!i Mntains fro the est and

the south.

The situationi the AyGroup E area was rapidly bai g onrn.

Gorau forcs were split vp. To th et a emil poket cotaining the

Fifteeth AnqP was- being attooked fron the svifth sn east. Tb. Fit

Panser AM vas fighting i a lgr poket to thevest where the aq

also attce from the sout an est The ftiia front was still quit

Un the Am Group 0 a thVe enm advnce en W aeg. Fonbach

was lest, The brideed at Refltram was enlage. (~thwpeRie

armor penetrated deeper towards the south. Rear tahr th flak Forest

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MS I CeO2O or?,-

border position was occuied. The ueem reported the cawue ofr Field

Marhl von 14alnen and Prinoo August Wi.hel. Ct the previous day

tat. capture of Axbaesador von Pa pen had been reported.

fl42xrUJ4. 'ighting cotinued at theG Gironde-ortt fortresewhere a sewon lin of dees had been organised. There was also

fighting at Giroatp-3oth. Ground attacks received air and naval support.

Fors ware releaed from f1plend for emnloyment against the German

posonsO along th a River. South of Bremnen, t rdane hid Salted.

The ritish viII corps ld the assault at Usea. The 83d Inantry

Dtvision and one armored division were c omitted at Patty. It was not

clear what imits were being eme in the northern onrs fontainsan

whethr the en was bringing up forces which had been released from

other sectors .1' the front. Two armored divisions were reported to b

in the Hlle w Leipzig area. A American divisio req uested saps of the

ar K rlab ad se cto r. T e U .S . S ev en th A ruM co n tinu ed to advance tow ard s ? ste s u h a d s t e . A c r i gc e s r p r s n A e l

dat hi established radio contest ith the . ed Arsyr

is th notwest the en' enlarged the bridgehead at Arehem and

advaned to the road leading to 4pltoorn. ast of the Zuider 'Zon the

ersaus attaske towars th sothwst in order to hold th Gebbs libe.

A arma bridg ed wats stil held en tat. eastern .ita of th*e mandike.

?4ting cn~ at Oroninges. At teLsriver furher progress ws

ade towads the noth. Enmy fees ware r eaused again at rizuide.

South of' Bm the eney tpassed. oltan and advanced to Schnverdingoa.

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M.310..020-76

-Pressure was everted at las and Imediately to the west. It s

not known bow far the advance ba reace in the ares south of ldee rg.

Further; progress was reportby Division Clausevita. There were no

reports from Sahwvedel or the area isadiately to the south. The reports

of an e econcentration at Seehausen would ;set have been ilstaken.

In the Ay Group t4 sector the final decisive battle ba bedu..

There wrln 110 ge fS f frot the Fifteenth rMy. 'The ase'~ group _101 ,-

reported two deep pontretione. Several =nits ba already been overrun.

Guns and amanmition were lacking. The corner of the front near fessele

dof was being held. The staff of the arygroup comander sered as a

reserve forem. A deiad to surrender had been reusd. Radio contact

was still maintained.

The situatio in the Hars Muntains was liewsewre aut.

Penetrations w're made south of the rocke. Fighting was in progrss

nea~r feaunla and k~rnigero.e. There was racnaasa to the east.

Despite heavy artillery fir wnd air attacksa the defendera at

hgdelsarg refused a demnd tosure ar. B~oth sides suffered losses .at

Bab. Aditiona nm reinforcesants arrive. Division Soarnorst

was to narrow down thenes7s position. There we no action at erarge

I closed main lie resistanee was to beestab'lishted at Desist

Division tten warn fghtg nrh ofittorf'eld. At flli sad flrseburg

esail forcs were holding out bravel. It ws still posuible to

o o with Itipsig fro the noarth and the northest. The enemy

continued to advance eastr.

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MSI -2O 47

Ithe Arqw Qrvnp 0 area & oonoentration asreported it the Mude

iner near emnts. The population .ae d.ffktfties. The soo' was

souith of flt.e. 130 was oapturedt Other advancing fones moed no--

wards against a g. At 0300 hours tgrpp Orafenoh bega

a ooufortrust towards the vest. Gra forces made sor prgrss ait

hitdorf atie enm~ continued to m west of rg POP

trationsd five to ten kilometers deep wre vae twa the ?irst A' y secto.

Figting co nt id t thlack corest and at Oflbwg. A bridgehead

WAS still being held at Kabi

18 Ait 141. The U.S. 5th A&rrerd Division was at Arton1

foflowed upbg the U74S. tfnth Arq. The 8th In entr Division, thougt

to be at wasno reported ,t eeausen Fret the Ruhr area

the 35th Wa tr Divisioe asn vv through annon to Koehe.

The en 1rs main effort was oonetnttd between Sohoenebe en

Dttterfeld, aimed obviously at Derlin. Sonth of taipsig the 9th. Arored

Division advanced towards the loude Rdver. Fo cs were still being con-o

merte for a ates agist taipst 1 while in the Ottt rathe

Mssng amm ime doet wait for the iunfntry divisions. the

7th Inftr Division "$' at Pine IThe 145.S 14th Divs ongn

tart north thi 2d Marie Dvia vas at euW

the3 4 lriai Diilas me at ?tiuzshalu.

'tm gdu°r'trtees eOnf the oi n j a r outo

wee ot attacked by 60 pis as eme fi

frot the ent ed ln. Sehfortresses vere Atll hling out.

UsTh 14th Division. attacin Gens at doarf. (Kdttor).

r

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MS G.2O"mn

(bi To:i s n~ five German fort uw' still being held. The

pibility of flooding the land to protoot the forts 'was coueidcrod.

tide te omAof the First Paraoe A-rm eadqarter, th orner

of th. front at mroingen was stil being defended. Little activity

was reported on th. lower Era. An nerj bridge was trown arOus

the ut. canal.

Southwst o f eebawg the w thet rood to Sltan.

Uolsen could still bereached from the nrthest. Under the cadof

the fUX Panser Corps, an attack was launhdb Division Cleusetes

buit was stopped by ma aroed force of fifty American tans. A new

attack plinei the directio of Faflereleben had apparenty wit yet

bee arrisd out. An order was given to dstenns whether the 160th

and 194th Infantr Pivisions could bedote at Lne~burg.

It was learnd tht enem reinforoenents had definitely arrived In

the Seusen area. Wittenberg and the bridzehads .irediately to the

south, were wder artillery fine. The Eleventh ArW was new being

supiced byair bat no rort re h a~y mae reive.

Any Group S bad oip l *&1 chermnt resiste - ,17 arm. 1mal

units cotinue to fight

The euW- mde futhe ror is the direction of Nagisbug. the

par of the totu on th west beak of, the Elbe bad to be considerdlost.

sattac fo the direotio of:aBes was empeted. Slase it was sot

Vosaible to desro the bridgehead, an order was given to narro it

dow byml-cl attaeks.

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MS I c.ao "Mm9

Presue contiue wet of tDsssau. The tia of the population

was bad. South of )esau contact was to hrmstablished with Division

Thttn which had formd a bragiad at IttterfsIA. Oenan fores still

held out south of 111. The u aexjeotedly attacked Leipzig ft's.

the trest but not yet from the east. ?rcseure was exerte at Zilenber

on 0 the )enld, Rvr. Near Chemits, there was quiet. ?lauz asid

vieka were lost. Deep penetnatione were asd. &t Mambagv east

of £tdort whene fightn cntiziwd on the outskirts ofthe to n. The

convention hell scaght fire.. ihre were no cntion ith Anstach

w here fighting was rep=rtd. Ksmptgruppe Grai'enw r was able to ake

furher headwa ine the sea ter northeast, of {urberg was oovrd

onyby th US. l4th Anoned Dlivisica. Thes 17t S~ Psrgnnaadier

Piviuics and Division Nib1elgen werseoed up to this area from the

swath. The .garrison at 4roab~rg was to make sorties. Pighing

continued at the eas outlets of the $laok oreat, at )orb, a d in

other localities.

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M 0102 .20

TMl SwTr?

I . DZELORW M IN JAEART AND BlRIAT? 2

1. Chanjem in , oo At the be ginningr ofa Ja ry 7i1.34 arhl

Ksseirig again sensed cosa of An Qer roup C (C -er in Chiat

othest ). H. bI altol no r f ram the effets of an

accident in which hi mtorcar had collided with a gun. Since Geeral-

oberet von fletinghoft (tailed vn School ), who bad served as hsdeputy,

bad taprrl beenW gi v en a e omd onthe masoe Frot, t he command

of the two unait h a j s ral Ues. Wheo esseiigtokoe

oand of th West on 1March, van 1VietInhoft suceeeded hism as

o ner in Chief' Southwest and remained in that poition until the

en of the vat. During a11 of these cangs, General ficttiger reseired

-s objet .f staff of .theacs p'p

Beinu in 194x ta as mbaseor assite by $

and Poall#e e Csute IWde.

I I this area th ttrsts of bends cai sonerial for an 4 eithuho)

2 Regoiti t toare seprt .: eap ttos of Awy mp Southwst,whieb tore b u .in Jama, .4y know - n to th Wehnoh QpntoStaff aftertn l bad takes plan, anwo thrfe 'a t un"tise isthe dosiret an are not ntferra t he bre. (Ahor).

qm2sow

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2. >eea SiMsina ~eiRiRh of Ta. With the excptionoft

awm lecalised fighting, the calm period which stagto at th*eand of

1944, in the Apennines and th Alps continued in 195o. hIovevr, the

enemy vas .eoted to reame the offensive at anyt n. Asthe enemy

was far superior in nmiters ari t riel and had already outflanked

the Germ forces onthe eastern foothills of the Apenin. ~oa

as far as the Senio Itivers, the worst was to bempeted of a new major

attack # Therefore, the tendeny had been to ithdrav the armored

division s and to wove the paraechte divisions to the east where the

danger way lratest.

The, snowfall in Jaury a revented anattack inthe Alps and wade

inpobble an operation in the Ape nica Whil, this was an a dvazta #

the Geman suffered fram the fact that the northern Italian railroad

net as well en te P bridges were constantly expfsed to air attacks,

so that all of ths suppl routes were not aways open. There were

900 major interruptioar in weber, 51) of which were styl not cleared

up byI Januar. T. Grmsn air forces in this area were cmpletely

inadeute, cad siime the repeated and urgent requests for reluoreo-

Manto would have brought about no *ajar change is the situatio, thu

were always dm1nad. (~yrein replamet shifmets were reoeived

a : tsiian i issions wers assigned.

Duringf Deambre tbir.eig.t ny airsrf vera de strc de4

metl by antialsraft artillery, ad thirteen German planes (mostly

reconnaisrsance) were lest.

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Mhs 1~ 0-02 -Zn

n spite of th." 4ff leulties, the supply siuation had not bee.

critcal nt the begtinig of the year, larglg due to goo org-

lntic of the moor truffle ash to riorOus conservation saire.

Tese ss weasem, which had stood the teat in Italy, ere as r a

possible introduced to the W"stern frt.

lip to the begining of the year 30.000 ton of supplies per ROath

were sent to Italy. This 1.4 to attempts at sking the theater self-

sufficient. The reslt was to further decrease the alreay strained

supply o ,o sine the Amt and War Miistries and other

gevermzat agencies apeared as buyers. The prie level as not to b

eangeWred, as had been the ease in Onto., where inflation had teen

th. result. Since in ancases there was no opportunity to forward

the purchased gobIs, an effort was ade to coordinate the demads of

the off ices cerd a.eording to their uec, giing priority to

the C , ier in Chief $rnthwest. The chief ofthe s eractt Operations

Staff pLae4 the Fieid Faconcies Office in carg. of these transactios.

ecause railroad traffic could be na 1stsind only in isolated

&an, the crantly appointd chief of 2mltary admnitratioc, St

.Grppestuebnr reehter requested that Germa rprusetativa be

assigned to Itia rimil administration. Ti propoal0, else

Saed for other enldention, was supporfted by the Rfiehstuhrer

SI and tq the W ermaht Qpertisus Staff.

Regisniug a Januay incrstred amiet vas, aused y the lack of

off. GA 21 _ J t2 C . r in Chief Southwest va. iformed that

i~k~

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$3102n23

in the ftur Es vault have to aet an alnost oocplate stoppage tf

suppes trm era..

3. * ~ritto (9lam the n~appoared to have

aailabl.e ' 26 113divisions, or about the same rut as hd bee

fortdon 23 Deember. 14* chang was expected in the9 strength .t

ene forces in the western lieiterr aes while from six to eight

faor units yern aused to bein the eastern Mediterranea.

According to en estimate by the Caner in Chief Southwest, only

two Amriean divisions were empl1 0 4 em the front. south of B~ologna an9 Janmr. It was sot knn wht had becom ot the other -divisions

previously reported thene. Sine there was nondication that they had

bass sent to Pgance, it w" autatd that these division were beid

assembled for a ewlargeesoale attack, perhaps directed against the

weak Gems right wing. The US. 85th Division hdbeen identified

at l ae. ?Areovor, the interrogation of prisoners adthe. reet

navia baratnt serxed to support this theory. It was also posible,

however that the en pannd a axeial oprtion against aSpesia.

l ,, ,an estimate set an rerves at five rather than

save divisions. Thes eePrise4 British awiste division a14

four Italia diviims. hrw fighting strength of the Itals dirisis

was con sede segljiible. Ca the follown dqr it was determined that

the VA8. 30th)an 4thU DivIis ha nearo the fruit.

3 Tis is an .rwin. (EdSite).

MOMM

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Ms oni a e it was o t o that the ~ritish had available

three infantry and two armored division with which to forte a noewpon

of is effort. Sinc only1 Itu.tasa units and security fores h o bee

identified on the eastern wi g, so attack was expected from that area .

jq ;only 4' division were believed to. be spicyod,

thereb indicating that' nine divisions were being held in reserve. The

unit sti in ?Xrth Africa vwr not considered available for emlomet.

The VA.. 10th (ioutia) )ivbisa hod recently mrived from Aerica.

The new Italion Division "Crea=om was identid as part of tht !rit h

)Uinth Airy

Noe morxtent chane occurred until the en fFebruary.,

b , 2 2/3 divie tons were assue to b at or behndth frost.

aOvfn diviions wer being held in remev, two of hih wae Italia.

By the middle of February it was confirmed that all ttts division

with t he neptio of the 6th. Armored Divisios, (i.e. the hth, 56th,

an 78th 1sf ntry Ptfleion) tad been withdraw from the front.

The traffi at EOiratar was norma arid reedcaias* along the

Italian oast t at Nice, in pert usie idget sumrines, offere no

sugest ions as to the enemy 'ani mowsVi.

atar the iritish hal .ttas Pelt anal Traste, destroying two

'torpedo boats ed4aag n trdo boat had the wharves, the

C saml is Chin! f the Navy pointe out on 21 Nbn ary that the*

nmWr. ti ti i,. a , to wo ke, under observato won

closely, flowerer risky an operation miht be, it would beof great

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MS #C-O~O .fl5e

value to theea to gain .a foothold behind the Genmn fores in the

Sothat arid S ouzthwst.It was onsidere signiiant that the $ritish 24 Airborne Brigul.,

until then asswn to be inAre tat bad now appeared near Rtome. This

ant that thn 5th Airborne Division now comprised three brigaes.

an adition, the Italia had rehabilitated two further divisions, The

C or in Chief was to report on whether he weu24 be able to cordutao

an operation against those Italian =Iits on itted onthe front with

the supplies of .tion eurrentl at had. Cx r be VaS

intoneod that the ?ehrer requested stronger sesures against the

opposing Italian divisions in order tower their sorule and to ,force

the anlto ssplq AMoriton or British diuisiocs in their stead, Th

C or inChief Solozvst replied that the operation could not be

canted out beoause of insufficient amition. Te decioio was

;accepted by the *u rr.

4.. Th Inta S5tedeStuation. At the begiging of the yar

it bees.. say to reinfrc the 1.ft vw of the Tenth Aw in

prepmrtioc for the, exete .qtrut twara lc. Conehio. The

4M Infantr Diiiota v replaced bth n Inaty ivision and

the bul o the au sad available wasrns yore o itte4 sath of

the lae The 4 Infantr Diviion too over the sector between the

16th 138 g din Division and the southern tip of the lak,

tile th. 1t Intntrz Diviion amed resonibility for the sea

shzore ea the land between the lake and the sea.

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CS eZ0

thechieotstafftto the0C crinClefothw..

declardb telephone -that wie he- conidere en attac k tobe the best

*707 if impoving the sitution, it -was not feas ible be ause sucoss

V$ prmsed conly in b*4 weather, edunder such eonittons, the tanks

v d41 be unable to cross the cans . Mooer, it was neesar to

maintain a reserve force* in oae the uneq conuted en opeation

ajakat La Spes ia.

5.~~~~~~ Tharans nJnar n em At times the sncq one*

poyad roe than 1,000 fighttr plane in daylight attacks. etwee 100

and 200 bwming ission wore Lime per day, in additi to the usual

night attacks. The avernge numbr of mission flown per day atbered

sever hudred.

In the beins of January when the encq bad w e4 up to Lk

Conoobto, it could not be igroed whether th lake was inpas able,

meannj a stregtwang of the frnt, or whether the lake could b

crossed bymsera cqutimet. The naval unit attach to thecrs

bano fame availbl tow proteottag the shore. A Lofthe 36h Pader Diviio vs rnferred to th nrthern se, es

that for the preet th trait eald still he enitsed4 fiul belm.

A si a S u were toata e the G i n d f eders. t e L M C r o h

4 A regimet etratedduin oprtin en *misting of se aequtpmnat twos variou an. (itor).

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WIa f Cm ml

dates, of the northern shore. oni its righ, the Ut? Pazer Corps

.d the trot ar aas 1 with a lUnbaed on the Soul* Diver.

Th. front foflowed a line almost due souh, the trnd towards the

.west at a oint just south of t~lg.a

?k the Wehrmoht Oprations Stat!f hearl a ro-Port tw'an officer Pust rered from th northern Adriatic Sea areas The

operational son along the riatic Coast was not oonsidered thrned

at the prsent time, althoug there was danger that te eamq sight

oeeupy the Daltatla Itlmns and fro there jump to Yluw., There w

also a possibility that the en night attaek the southeastern flank

othe continent, where untfl now nofortif ications had been constructed.

A thrut through the (lu of T reats5 h weer9 was not expcted.

secause offavorable lending posibfli.tiel, the report said, the

western coastal sector etween tZalvore er Cittsnov was endangered.

Lately the oendn'se corned had discussed the_ defense of the

northern Daltian Islans * The Navyes reuet to fortify these islans

had been refused by the C or. Sa Chief Soft aust onthe grounds

that the ecessary force were not arailable. It was his intention not

to sp l it tp the fere a n on3 t o deed t h eomet. The av y Ci 111il

noth bed been asked to tasfar additioal nav a oes to the islets.

Zontm withot ensq prssur was not to be com se. The area

v. alrd veil prtecte ies., The defense of. Pots caed general

eanoern since its land sad sn defee were still ink.

Defense ratlon alob the oast had not been upto ezpnetatiwon.

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MI et .280-

to ooustnet peutiio tn aree emadr ba explqd .120,000

waiters, inoltding sen from Crgntntic tot. Th Chibeeoden line

ws. to be eostpleted about 15 rbuay n would hold roughly two

divisions. The fl.ig Position to the southeast was still. bin

reconnoitered. a~ difficrulties Vote cased 'by the nerly 35,+(X

foreign troops +eployed in the oprational sone. These inelwd

Cosaks, Chetnik, Serbs, and the 10h 1.A.5. (an Italian naval

formation).s The report conoluded with the observation that the bulk of

the artillery' batteries were only infield positions.

On the C er in Chief Sotlrestv'as informed that

he Van not to withdraw major sections of the front line. Ps! replid

on jfr!IMgZ int, while he did not it'en doig so, be did desire

tomoavebaokosertwnsetorvhih wudbebadly epsed in case Of'a

strong neqattack. H. referred skeitioafly to eectos eoath o

Lugo and south and east of take Ccmaohio. Ci 2s.w thise pundssio

was grated, so log as it was evident before the fPront .Line was

alterd that a larpceeleenm attaok bad alrady begu.

How he C derin Chief Sowthvt viened his position at the

alefl of the month can be see frmn a memrandm he prepared for a

possibl, reot to th Nttr a e~~ h 17Vsapc9

to tr#om t. break theog to the to plain. Thrs wan assemble a

strateg a . at six or tern division, which could bereinforced

byusing U'aff clos divisio (ni.., tl ian, and ooh tnoop)as fores on the line v4d by eovirg zp duter divisions. (Mls to thbe

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MS # ~O2O 489e

of e m n e s, it w as n ot y et detemieho the

reserve xa to bemre. It was possible that a strategi attack

wotil be ad amant the enthena tract, aimd at the weaker hel

coatal flanks. The piet'w. was rot yet clear, bt new nigniievce

was ade b th cangmi th .Wran situatios th ipreonto

the weather; the reins, oX' battleatstd wauits; the increa izg gravity

ofthe nppy vn4 trssaport s ituation; ant the derease inmbil.ity.

Grines a m; the civilian population reutn tb r toad showtgs and

tn'epleywiet wen ezmted to onue further dirficulties. Mtrtz

units could only be roved 250 kiloitetro, thereby ncenaitatIMg the

use of horse-draw unite as strategic reserves. * Te tine factorta

to be closel conz i4 rd in all, opertiod oleulatir* and it was

necssary that decisions be wae early,

kartfl ro rosifl attacks on the Ltiartn coast, enemy operation

we, also efet ti aain t the caton wing of the ary roup, with

armphibious 1nfriings twa the ave a nd Iren Riven * This would

strategicall effet the Visas portito. At least two hbrearawn

diwisien whih cold eybe tae from Taoth A y, wld tat to b

00314 . a o d t h t 4 O q t ve k n n f o t T eaoly be e c p nsate tow by alteri g the cotut ot bettle a t tha

eastr wing oft the soutern fret. the attack whieb valt tov a

landing was to be worn doma by stubsor atefs and ht-to a bait

at the latest at the Gghs WM* lie.. it this sttuation. fi'edt

develop, the enec vould have to take into aut thosw diviion h.$d

w 289w

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14 1 0-020

in resre s1ing th rit coastal m.o db diadvantageo losing

time tbroitgh returing the Iu to the Southern Front was not as gret

as tha resulting if this wone not don. The Couder lzChif So.

west asked the chief of the Wehneoht dpotin Staf for his opinion

an for a reply as to wheother he deired a persoal rernt bythe

Ci sr in Chief Sthwest or byhisobiefotamsf.

Th e rAeh Op4Mration taff conurd nerally wit the esimate

of' the situation but did not conider the danger of a lendin htutePeeea ienmteouh Jse t

o f t h at coast a t the oense of the soer front. A brewaetrou

to the V iem ars, for which ftones and transpor facilities wart

both lacking, ys mowoer i cels for pliwa reasows It any

ease, sch an obique thet could no bring about the collapse of the

southern front. Therf eTh, it was colsdered suficent t*take

defensive resures that woed not weaken the s outhern front. it wa

suggested thtthe f1lOhWnantariivao be clydbetween the

Pane i4hosead toshift a diilmc te the area northest of Lake

Comceic A redaction of * fa Ma the Adratic wa s JvUaibl

risk,.n a diioalg teshore of the lake wol be aalae as

aresewve for the atha front eaelsoemwid be movedi t to t he-

AErite ent

Th. objectv of an enW laudin would w to bring about the

collapse .f the. stern frn, attrfr th. atak would m~

robably mae between the eas line of resistance at the. P efstua.

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)Z I 0n33 .491er

This dmner woud be irased it the loft wing of the Tenth r

won withdran Mreover, the lake col not be ecoafiered an effective

oLsteCle so that fonces from that area could not be released to rein-*

t o the &drtatio cast.

$aes the ew~ prob lewso deci ive i yrt ae all de&i

of' the Wdohot Iigh C were tobe made If in advance, HWever~

it would be, neaS~a~ to give authorization now for a delaying atiom

on the asenwing ofthe Tnt f. M

ata was danded cononting the occupation ofthe Aeriatic coat

between °riestea and the iain line of rests tamce in oflr to obtain a

decisin from the Fotrer.

CAn2 a directive was reevet according t@ which the

eotbat xalsk assiiued on15 Decstber was still vaid s "A forces

had tee vea ine and reserve strerth was low, the defenre should he

ortn ad in gnestor depth in crier to s trengthen the post ion of' the

towar defe lti . The Febre would bject to a planed with

dral to stra poitio in the fac. of a luagesne attc, Wut

hevoul neve coen to a delay action, bhc he f.It wotd

toatr the troops' j nm3~

an & t a the chief 4C tbe W eaht Opattion Staf nut

the fooig rApy to the Ci orin C?4i.f Southwest with refers

to t latter's stinat. of th eit'atio datd 15 hbrazye7 A nnwd

large-scale attack direct against the cen ter &ad left wing of the

tenth tiny was ezpete at t egging ofspring. $trog chiefly

91*.

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ML #+ CaO 2Q 9

Brttff nres woulvmd be epee, ilesos thy were previo sl with..

drawn. While landings were Poseible bt~s the Pine* and Isonie

Rirs, it was ooasildsre4 more likely that anamphibio opetirton

would de dirted at a' point betwee the tatin flne of raistae

and the Po eary. tn~ause at tefr united iaoblity, resn'%t would

have to be autsembled at those points Were the would mo probbl

bewee. Th. chie! of the Webrmneht Qprattoc s$taff onsfdred the

foflowin distrIbution adquto s The 710h Wianry Divisio awl one

preohato division (wrhich na to benewly aotivate4) between Vealee

ad the Ise=so River; o r mbile division (29th P ssr tirisoz) sout'.

Est of Fers;. and ott infmntry division or the 93t1 Panzergreadier

Division .south ast ofBoil . tispoitic with regr t@ the vitm.

, l i u t o ol . * l te.'eOn 27 F bu ry a order was given to occupy nfisi 4lia in

atmt,&sso ot a p edble lanling on the Le Clank.

6. 3hnec4Cza ctt~h Jaury lasses w ere reported a

follosa

Sikn

Piting Jansry only 3,00 ao were receive as pom s

47 22 Jasuary th 35t IUfanr Di~ bad apsrtet- fow

flugry in aeeofann with an orer of 14 Jnuar (miut. trvisio0

Ennt Pass; four trafr~oads per tvety or bans).*

I'll

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14;5 OX"42 03

Th 715th Thetry lliso v trntferred tothe som or interior

at the ed of Ysbnzery, e ~ras repaced b' th 27Mt Infatr Diviion

N evem ent b egan fr n V erona on 25 7,h f n "; n r J mi : s i' :br a nnry . n r ,4

to Ihagary. W4vent hegan on '7 re brary but in dlyri bydr't to

tue railroad sstem.

S3vera1 wxontain opnies were transterrrd tho'et

Ey 3 Januaryz th fl71OW Intantr Dlvlzdon kwA ardived fre !ra* .

evral o pa hte batt c were tra r .w from tne earct to nplae

the departed 16th Panr fr ivisio.

Mtcr the te 4.ins oC ~ruwry stt ts Krc tite to ztrctpthe

the let n 4th Parachute )ivlsione ci to aeYtamtc tir 10th rae}m

Dtvision. This S~asre wMs Qrdhrd by tn.e esehrr 26 7cbrty. 4t

th cr5 z ik=Pq~roL t ' are u grn wasz r<e to troSnit;'"r :, - r~t

7. gRon rLM . i fl Janiuary te 157th ~aaer V Ivizion sa& the

Italia lt Infantry Division were withdrawn fro in " 'attack prao9

Alpine front for rhabflitation.

IiThzring the nooMr hal of Januar the l1t Res er liv iot ro

plac the 4th Parachute Division. Thsc latter unit had been trsnrnd,

tthe mast in orer trolese a jnzer diio for the reserve. The

98th Inantry Tvieton was insertdin the line, to f14aclitat the

remova o-f otar 'w tt Tor rcia tttioa. The 710t Ilimraft7 Uvii

64", U

Page 160: The German Wehrmacht in the Last Days of the War Part 2 of 2

as reltrod by, the 12ltt natr Division t. tranferel to t ,he

diatto coast, All trsxse were ccxspae by thin cry of Jauery,~

Th Z7St "n tnr D.1viuL n n~ tz ravnr t "n ebt ; . Th' 169th

to r4.icv a div ion for coni .tnt at btr. front,* Iu antiettov r of

Melt.xi wnWn the .piae£ fnt, thoi &vtor.bh thefn vs

brought forv'ard.

? 4hsuar the Duce urg1 the ccwtmet of Itsfr dvivsos

Lou r off iiie tad been activa te * 2iscver, no change irero ratt r Ines

IAhe Italiana 4th toutain Divisio an teeints of the Italia n 2d nfantz7

tilviaion 1web6 alead cein cwlvc along quiet sectr: of the £rozt

and wcr e nct cuited for eombat s0140. The. Foreign Group6 was rdcrn

on 25 January to info i'h Ai accordingIy.

% V~~nt4he~ Itai~ lct ZDiv in whiot ha! hec tved forvard

in . ~tomta, isa at~aade aid dfeati It th a L acil Velley.

'a S Thn' an orIor was jgiven to alternat-e 1ralian dtision

with O6n diviica on the ine.* Fixperiowo durin g the past fe

woks tad prove4 their low cosbat value.

b-* the tlo'n dtvii ware tob smp:ed ti

Italian front (li order zfro riht to ieit).

m h 169th tfvitr dos not sets to have been ative ina this aeIn Jawuy. Perhaps the 1624 Thfatry Division, whoe penSowel waIm4r aby tr o 7ozctu, I; heart. ThIs is I on vts in the area. (dltor).64 Am-up of the C,4,, ire1wini t. %1rarto, for } :litar ttaches.

Page 161: The German Wehrmacht in the Last Days of the War Part 2 of 2

Italia lEt DiiioItalian 4th LDiisios148th Infantry Division (t the nx)

ofthe two abov, twits22 Infantry Division (boundary)9&th Infantry Division.157th Ronntaiu iv in (after 27 February

redes igte the .th t~ tain Die i on )65th Infantry Division305th Infantry Divisika1st Parahte flivtsion334th Infantry ivisio715th Infantry flivis ion (repl1aced by the

278th Infantry Diris ion)90th ?anse rgrenedir Division4th Panochute Diiio26th ?ennr Division98th Infantry Division3624 Infantry Divisio

42 Ig~ht Infantry Dirtsn169th (Turkestan) Igantry i.vision

LI.~~ ~ rr}GrsThKM % A~ AP&IL

1. St *i At the be tnniw of Wroh Jritish reserves

were estimate to total five divisitons:a thelt 4th, 46th, and 76th

Infantry Dirion e au e aroredI v!it . ftherry oe rstnfr

Itffy ap anst th +. bpae were no longer ooxwtredol probabU . Riepots

L'nat the Iritish wee wltlra~ig izits bati sqtiil niot bee ~ofre.

iCflvmly the enemy's sir forces had been rndueed anprprt .on to the

deerne.ed ara of the Italian theoater of ?a.

The tiny had been ninfornd by apkla t)'a three Italian

divisions. (i it was dete rm that the Eritish tad nov

u responsibility for the fruit as far as the coat. Theb zofthe Pois orps ha been shifted to thb northeast. The loatio

of the New Zaan 24 .2vistac, which hMi been relieved bythe trttish

5th Infantry D1iiio, cii of the Canadia 5th If Apry Division was

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'7 L

not knwn Thu U.S~ 8th Irtfan z~yflvisio was asume to hiave been

w ttnv to the are of the 11.. corp*=s stationed near Anmomna

'Utxf increasing evidence izvfleae that thet erg~

con 4ed ty Italinot of £eoa imnortant.. Tt Er iab

divisioy hadi been vitbinwri and replaced at the. frozt 1c txo Tdien

divisions, one ratili.tatd Polish division, ed three It0alian

d1iviin of lo *=bat vim . By tts Ma da. of Febr tht nritish

lt Div iiohd already been tranferred tothe it a it and th

L6th Infsntxy 'Edvision had been moved to Gr ee "h U.S 1 t 1#ut

.f 1i O !, 'w h ic h had a rriv e d re c e n t y fr =z th e U n ited : S t tu , w s±,n2 i ar a 1 e w d n t i w n 1 o t a k

Lallandings verx still weeted along the Adrtatto cwat.

There waad tus mande partly for poltial purpose and vomid not involve

' tt e ";a , 'Ee = " o c en etn ee 2 ) F uw r t ut m ore v e ssels had been tsber vn i d sep rttn g

than ariving. Thirty -more lading craft had ajived.

The Italia Divisio 'riui on the wester part of the front

wv laced uc A r the am& of the P os corps . pparntl the

aasption that the U.S 5th infantry viiin a on the est era

coat was in rrect.

The Britis Uth fvlvuin had been wita since ?Febrtuuy and

tr"afrred to Orecee. This further confirmed the opinion that the

italia theater wat considered of seonary i otane; a view, hcAeflr9

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35C4047

which yar cot ske tV the CoUmmande 1A Chie SethvOt

A fobrt Itla division wa aw SntifiSd at tefrt.i

4 ~ deo'the *Wt t it bee.. ewient that the Drtih

tbIntantqy Division bad also been f itrava. The british let

fIat' Division teA bee idntltiSd at Cairo an the Br i t 4t

Infantry Diviin ve rn to be in &Nre. h Arioa bavith

idrn both the 8t r I nfanty Dtvisicms.

byte i o e GeeO Claro Iar Fil blnk

£Sut Mate et en inprix offensive in Itely. a erica and Btitish

activities nported thin thery

At the begirmfrg of April the attotn ot - C ad in Chief

Sct- was 4ireete towards the attitude etthe Italians which gave

rise to Su~nio.a

tib the en y l*4 wing, ad5ent to Th V.3-S. lst iv*izn th,

43.* 9lst 0ivisiort tookth pin of t}3 34th Infantry )ivioion. Me

4oien or thxe liewere the 1thIznd In ttC tsn tvc tai=

diif, an the Polsh unitsf

'The lo efpotd lbgeeale attack began 1c 2ox2. Dy the

idle! April it wa definitey nf'ine th th U.S. 7th Diisio

adbeen traneredt the litern Frt . The ltian of the

Caad~as 5th Inat D~iin wa not clear. Ck L~ a speech t1r

Gealm Alexader ecuwfined that this wats to be* the f1a.l t'easive.

Aleast six snord brigades ha nowbe idemtifted btven the Via

Lia s sd the sea.

4497M

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Sm ICeU

* 2. * A ttacks began at Xcctn n is lth

senter of ti..8 dlu (60u) Ditvision. 'lb. 29 t mnrpenadier Divisioc

w a d up to set oft h pntats, whe edbeen mad up to

three kfl o s in tepth. Py hL m t e u* a -a been stopped byn t t .te ma n l n f r i

to te oatflo 15*., eat cc the tolwag da the 'niw gains

ware eenltanbl rue d. Whfl e the rtero the nwth wa

r*latlv~ citft a flow assaults were mae in the area of the Great

(r. L4 l styr oa attacks woe mad, agait the LeC amlra lf otffOgvrui stms Cc

ised their egdcuflr stafms. Zyevnfrg the encired unite baA

fught their way beok t the Gtnrns lieos. Oi J, te ey broke

thro 4 thc rv cviteb psition. On ', Atit 10$flhour strong artill.ery

Lire ceoicnn d ontheo ltgu an ca t but was tollodcmyb a local

attak.. ~ lttfr , n thtr r3at wits v alsdo local, altho~s =a na Wlost on± j.Cwct ativit cowd Lake Ceaoblo did not inase

ntfl2sa

Cm jgflstrong artiler tir preodd th lng npetsd major

attack At. ti. same time there wa an ingress nparts activity

Wa! sabotage.

Vii the .neq pressd beak the tones orhof tb.

iaf r a t . T O o R v r v r eaTelandi g vs wa de at aw * tak. C aoch o A t that tii the att dc

Page 165: The German Wehrmacht in the Last Days of the War Part 2 of 2

NB fC.O~O

stow bad a wjAth of sity tl nt v.

By 2~.E~headquarters stiff EM did )zo o k w ether, the . via

tttpt1g a b « rbwouh r 4.y V tot tie dov Gfwuss to..

The Visitbility of an Xtaliaw 4otet vs t *os~a d wd. Thee vas no

ehswio of fuxwdshing *1 with fuel, forus, or a3 tft.

~ the follwig OM to" e re Identified as taking

part in the astks The 2d Nov Mfa~ Dvisi~os; the 60h Indian

)v ion; the Italian Di 1aia 0 wo aa'; .1at of the Drtish 56th

Irza tv Dlvi tn; and the )'olish wavts. Tc situation looke4 s3Igbti$

be tter, time attacks spainst the U~gurisn ost ME ,bted. Part sn

ctWity made it dificult to defen Carr ra. C the left wing the

Oriey approac ~d St. Ton* but jgaizid 110 major s cos.

C~ 3Arf the a 4w~e alon th Sala River a3 south

of Inola ir the d reeLion of Eae'ass ,sue.&. L= o2a tas lost on the

toll~ing dad.

In aFditi n to the atror; attack on the rzt wing, 1by -5 krri1

the offensive a 2e spy~dt the Salaopa area. b$4tin c= iiUmed

been the Via Eil$ and the le. Genrally, a oeted front

was still beltg W&Stae15i0

2..k1 eewy fosoa admoed to at point north of Carrara.

Groun Was lost southvaat ate, south of i4.gna. (a the Via !.ia the

wn~apoebe t"~iu ad aterd Argeta.

It vas u~ a idsr a matter of 4qsa if not hamr, before the

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510.49 000

RI te alLl .t Spl the Fresh Is the mes Spsla e-6soli~tetree aiateO SAO as ,

Lordiag to astint. Oa Lh4, th esqal& 2,00

twiweu aM tour ea bebiad lae

S'. Jti eay isal ns e haLs bees game aglst th 41tvieg. West etEoloa lbwmr oe e~e kg uras Ve.

ableow to filter through tb. lies Penetnatoas men made ha t the fot

south of BDooa bnst the 65th Inatr Division d~tnguise Iif

by ol~ngthe are intact. Enem tones -were contained setuth of theVia bsills. At Argesta the lma. vttMr~v eagy two kilnters Is

spite of the fact that 60,00 shellbs Vote tire by the eeq.

3. Field Marha £essanlring

arrivod at the Ntehrer's hadqurers, Ctthe fofloia day,. afterraking a personal reort, he pa put in o ewt of the Weten Frot,

Getrslobet von ti t asied a e.of Ay Group 1outhwnt.

4.. 1 pi A th begnlz of P th 14th Ugt

Iantry flvlo tover the right eM cetnal secto ot theposition. d by the 2324 Inatity 4iiin

4 abt U tth 234laryDvson svldaa afterhain stood the tett battl. VUSi .JiktefkbIfnrXDivlslm as- bal wet Lfa n o oe.

aw=h Yt nat D iin vas plaVth

Italian let Divii

Stt th midl a 0 th onfth ppea Ma ie to theO On er

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ICf* 93~

Chief' s wqst teo dlsb t the 362 (7zta Mylisme but the-lsde va then oouat. wmn e.

Daisg the second balt of Naeh th. 334th Xutaatrg 1iytica

rplae. the 29M Paws wgztnal Divisis In Od.r that the Uatz~eou16 he blittat sorth of )obuha

The towiwt its wee n .mlq (twsm tight toleft).s

l4th Irt4 Divisii

334th fi try Divisiop

94th i fAntwy Iiai8I h i~tai* Di io65th Itnfa Oivtion305th TI'faJt17 D~ivisioin

1sth Patra ! Divisia,4t Faate. Di ii26th Paree Divioloui

364Ztn Divisia

4