The G20 ||

The G20A New Geopolitical OrderKaroline Postel-VinayISBN: 9781137367754DOI: 10.1057/9781137367754Palgrave Macmillan

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137367754

The G20

10.1057/9781137367754 - The G20, Karoline Postel-Vinay

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137367754

The Sciences Po Series in International Relations and Political Economy

Series Editor: Christian LequesneThis series consists of works emanating from the foremost French researchers from Sciences Po, Paris. Sciences Po was founded in 1872 and is today one of the most prestigious universi-ties for teaching and research in social sciences in France, recognized worldwide.This series focuses on the transformations of the international arena, in a world where the state, though its sovereignty is questioned, reinvents itself. The series explores the effects on international relations and the world economy of regionalization, globalization (not only of trade and finance but also of culture), and transnational flows at large. This evolution in world affairs sustains a variety of networks from the ideological to the criminal or terrorist. Besides the geopolitical transformations of the globalized planet, the new political economy of the world has a decided impact on its destiny as well, and this series hopes to uncover what that is.

Titles include:Karoline Postel-Vinay, translated by Cynthia SchochThE G20: A NEw GEoPoliTiCAl ordErFrançoise Mengin and Jean-louis rocca (editors)PoliTiCS iN ChiNA: MoViNG FroNTiErSMarie-Claude Smouts, translated by Cynthia SchochTroPiCAl ForESTS, iNTErNATioNAl JuNGlE: ThE uNdErSidE oF GloBAl ECoPoliTiCSJavier SantisoThE PoliTiCAl ECoNoMy oF EMErGiNG MArKETS: ACTorS, iNSTiTuTioNS ANd FiNANCiAl CriSES iN lATiN AMEriCAFrançoise Mengin (editor)CyBEr ChiNA: rEShAPiNG NATioNAl idENTiTiES iN ThE AGE oF iNForMATioNdenis lacorne and Tony Judt (editors)wiTh uS or AGAiNST uS: STudiES iN GloBAl ANTi-AMEriCANiSMStéphanie Balme and Mark Sidel (editors)ViETNAM’S NEw ordEr: iNTErNATioNAl PErSPECTiVES oN ThE STATE ANd rEForM iN ViETNAMdaniel Sabbagh, translation by Cynthia Schoch and John AthertonEquAliTy ANd TrANSPArENCy: A STrATEGiC PErSPECTiVE oN AFFirMATiVE ACTioN iN AMEriCAN lAwAriel Colonomos, translated by Chris TurnerMorAliziNG iNTErNATioNAl rElATioNS: CAllEd To ACCouNTzaki laidi, translated from the French by Cynthia SchochNorMS oVEr ForCE: ThE ENiGMA oF EuroPEAN PowErSamy Cohen (editor), translated by John Atherton, roger leverdier, leslie Piquemal, and Cynthia SchochdEMoCrACiES AT wAr AGAiNST TErroriSM: A CoMPArATiVE PErSPECTiVEGilles Andréani and Pierre hassner (editors), translated by John hulsey, lesliePiquemal, ros Schwartz, and Chris TurnerJuSTiFyiNG wAr? FroM huMANiTAriAN iNTErVENTioN To CouNTErTErroriSM


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DOI: 10.1057/9781137367754

The G20: A New Geopolitical OrderKaroline Postel-VinayDirector of Research at the National Foundation for Political Science, Paris

Translated by Cynthia Schoch


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the g20Copyright © Karoline Postel-Vinay 2014.All rights reserved.First published in French in 2011 as le G20, laboratoire d’un monde émergent by les Presses de Sciences Po, Paris, France.This edition published in 2014 byPAlGrAVE MACMillANwhere this book is distributed in the uK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of houndmills, Basingstoke, hampshire rG21 6XS.Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the united States, the united Kingdom, Europe and other countries.iSBN: 978–1–137–36776–1 EPuBiSBN: 978–1–137–36775–4 PdFiSBN: 978–1–137–36774–7 hardbacklibrary of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication data is available from the library of Congress.A catalogue record of the book is available from the British library.First edition: 2014www.palgrave.com/pivotdoi: 10.1057/9781137367754


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http://www.palgrave.com/pivot

DOI: 10.1057/9781137367754 v

Contents

List of Maps vi

List of Figures vii

Introduction For a Political Reinterpretation of the G20 viii

1 The G20 in the Constellation of Gs 1 Establishment of the G20: 1997–2008 1 The proliferation of Gs and other

state groupings since 1945 7 The G20, a leadership summit or

a leadership network? 14

2 Does the G20 Lack Legitimacy? 25 Defining international legitimacy 25 The G20 against the UN? 33 The G20 instead of the G8? 39

3 The End of “The West and the Rest” 48 The changing South 48 Redrawing the world 57

Conclusion: The G20, A New Grand Geopolitical Narrative? 70

Appendices 74

Bibliography 106

Index 111


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List of Maps

1 The Gs of the North xiii2 The Gs of the South xiv3 The G20 xiv


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DOI: 10.1057/9781137367754 vii

List of Figures

1 weight of the Gs in the world 432 Average development levels of the Gs, 2010 44


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Introduction

For a political reinterpretation of the G20

“Mr. President, the Europeans want to convene the mem-bers of the G20 to discuss the crisis.” “what’s the G20?” George w. Bush reportedly replied. yet another illustra-tion of the American president’s legendary ignorance? Not necessarily. in the spring of 2008, the G20 was still a confidential discussion forum organized at the ministerial level, familiar mainly to economists and a small com-munity of international relations analysts. Since then, the Group of Twenty has taken up such a place in the media landscape that it appears to be here to stay. Could it therefore be a new world directorate? The idea has become virtually a commonplace. it provokes reactions ranging from enthusiasm to concern, from hope to resignation. yet the G20 looks more like a buzzing construction site than a long-established and well-honed institution. it probably prefigures a new but as yet undefined mode of world gov-ernance. it is more like a laboratory: within it, a rapidly changing international order is analyzed and attempts are made to organize it.

Most commentators and analysts seem to believe that the G20 is the outcome of a carefully designed plan, the response studied and approved by a certain number of world leaders for handling the major challenges presented by globalization: a more effective tool for global govern-ance. in fact, the emergence of the G20 in the international


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Introduction

order arose from a combination of chance and necessity. it is partly the product of improvisation. it is also a logical consequence of the socio-economic evolution of the world. The structure of the uN was pondered for many years and negotiated among the Allies for months during the deliberations that took place at dumbarton oaks from August to october 1944. The European Coal and Steel Community, the future Eu, was the outcome of countless projects, drafts and trial balloons before resulting in an agreement among the six founding countries. The G20 came together in the wake of events and transformations that followed the fall of the Berlin wall. in 2008, it was in the right place at the right time.

The G20 is the result of a complex yet partly familiar chain of events that includes the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s and its aftermath, the involvement of certain nations – especially Singapore and Canada – and the economic development of the so-called emerging powers. Before being a summit for heads of state and government, up until 2008 the G20 was a forum for finance ministers and central bank governors. And before bringing together 19 countries and one regional organiza-tion, between 1997 and 1999 the Group of Twenty was made up of 14 countries, then 22, and then 23. At the very start, it was not a “G” fol-lowed by a number but the Manila Framework Group. it acted as a crisis management forum to deal with the financial turmoil affecting East Asia, then the most dynamic region in the world. under Singapore’s initiative and with uS backing, the Manila Framework became a coordination group operating beyond the Asia-Pacific region. The group expanded to become the G33. its members themselves expressed the feeling that it was too unwieldy. The G7 finance ministers suggested trimming it down, resulting in the G20.

The new group was the result of a balance sought between size of GdP and regional representativeness. it operated in this way from 1999 to 2008, for the most part out of the public eye; then came the burst of the American real estate bubble and the ensuing economic crises that hit developed countries one after the other. France, which held the Eu presidency at the time, backed by the united Kingdom, argued for an emergency summit meeting, a meeting that the Europeans believed should be held in washington. The white house agreed. But who was to be invited? why not the G20? The group had been functioning at the ministerial level for nearly ten years; it merely had to be upgraded a step. That way it became possible to forego arduous diplomatic negotiations over the list of participants for which there was no time.


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Introduction

The very composition of the G20, finalized in 1999, is not entirely arbitrary. it seems logical that countries such as Mexico, Brazil, india and China, already qualified by financiers in the early 1980s as “emerg-ing markets” should be part of it. There is also Argentina, indonesia and Turkey as well as South Africa which were called the new “big emerging markets” in the late 1990s, until international investors invented new and now familiar acronyms such as BriC (Brazil, russia, india and China) and other, less familiar ones such as ViSTA (Vietnam, indonesia, South Africa, Turkey and Argentina), CiVETS (Colombia, indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa) and MiST (Mexico, indonesia, South Korea and Turkey). unsurprisingly, given that it was the G7 finance ministers that had drawn up the list, the Group of Twenty includes the G8 member states. The passage from ministerial meeting to summit meeting in 2008 was not an entirely new idea, either. Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin had already made such a suggestion in 2005. it was later picked up on by some of his fellow countrymen as well as intellectuals from many other horizons: Turkey, india, united States, Mexico, South Africa and so on. There was no other forum for dialogue at the state level that included developed and developing nations without distinction. world institutions such as the uN and the international Monetary Fund (iMF) had not managed to overcome the North-South divide in their mode of deliberation. The two main “Gs” for informal cooperation, the G8 and the G77, perpetu-ated this dichotomy. For large countries that were both rich and poor, such as China, india and Brazil, and thus from the standpoint of the world order, the North-South divide was no longer as clear, and the contrast between the two was becoming less relevant. Standard geopo-litical representations were becoming somewhat obsolescent, and the G20 offered an initial response to the need for reform.

one of the leitmotifs in discussions about the G20, both among its proponents and its critics, is that the group supposedly lacks sufficient or even any legitimacy. The G20, it is pointed out, does not bring together all the world countries, unlike the uN. The so-called least developed countries are conspicuously absent from it. To start with this entirely accurate observation to measure the G20’s legitimacy objectively is to forget that legitimacy is precisely not an objective notion. it is a funda-mentally political one. The historian Pierre rosanvallon has shown how within the internal workings of democracies, legitimacy is reliant on a notion of general interest that cannot be defined solely by arithmetic


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Introduction

majority and that moreover evolves over time.1 in the case of interna-tional society, legitimacy is gauged by the coherence between collective norms that are accepted at a given historical moment and the actions of those that share them.

international legitimacy is thus based on a judgment that cannot be reached simply by counting up states. That being said, if the G20’s legiti-macy arose solely from quantitative criteria, it might be noted that the majority of the world population living beneath the poverty threshold does not reside in the least developed countries but in the so-called emerging nations. This is due to the usually very inegalitarian development within them, a phenomenon amplified by the sheer population size of some of them, China and india being in the lead. The emerging powers are all in the G20: the majority of the world’s poorest inhabitants are therefore represented by it. Furthermore, the change in the South illustrated by the rapid development of emerging nations has led to redefining the issue of poverty: it has in fact become a transnational issue of inequality.

Furthermore, the legitimacy of an international body is judged in terms of what is expected of it. That, too, is a matter of political interpretation, whether the entity is an informal club such as the G8, the G77 and the G20, or instead the uN, whose mission has grown considerably since 1945. A few years after the end of the Cold war, the uN and the iMF have more and more frequently been criticized for lacking legitimacy. The uN was accused of not fulfilling its mission of peace and development, of being undermined by a bloated bureauc-racy and recurrent corruption scandals and especially, of giving only five out of nearly two hundred countries the right of veto on strategic decisions. The iMF was criticized for the brutality of its interventions in the financial crises of the 1990s, having imposed stringent policies on debtor countries that were not even required of their creditors. The iMF was also deemed to grant too much decision-making power to the west, and its critics had grown weary of always seeing a European at its head. Today when a “legitimate” uN is contrasted with an “ille-gitimate” G20 or that is “not legitimate enough,” shortcomings of the organization that only a few years before were considered to have sapped its legitimacy seem to have been forgotten, those very failings that made a vast overhaul necessary that even the organization itself favored and still wishes to implement.

The most radical “G20-skeptics” fear that the Group of Twenty will replace the united Nations. yet in the G20 declarations as well


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Introduction

as in its initiatives, it is hard to detect any intention on its part of mounting a takeover of the world body. Everything on the contrary indicates that all the Group’s members, including the Eu (which, not being a state, has no vote in the united Nations General Assembly), recognize the need to preserve a place where all the world’s nations can congregate. “Pro-G20s” argue that the legitimacy deficit affecting the Group with respect to the uN is offset by its greater effectiveness. in contrast to the united Nations’ cumbersome processes, they point out that the G20 managed to come together swiftly in 2008 to curtail the damage of the financial crisis and that it played a decisive role in the reform of iMF voting rights announced in 2010. But there again, gauging the effectiveness of an international body depends on the mission assigned to it. The goal the G20 set for itself – to provide a forum for discussion – is incomparably more limited than that of the main international organizations, and notably, it claims no legislative or executive power.

The G20, as it currently functions, is not set up to manage world affairs. it is a place for consultation that has the essential merit of bringing together around one table actors whose habits have been more confrontational than cooperative. on the basis of his experience in supranational management, President of the European Commission José Barroso considers that “the very fact that [these actors] are engaged in a joint process of addressing global imbalances ... should be recognized for what it is: enormous progress that simply would not have been pos-sible some years ago.” 2 The world order is undergoing a major upheaval on a scale that is rare in international history and which encourages dip-lomatic creativity, as similar changes have done in other times. Such was the case at the end of the 19th century when the world’s first international organizations were founded, both governmental organizations such as the international office of Public hygiene (forerunner of the world health organization) and the inter-Parliamentary union, forerunner of the league of Nations, and non-governmental organizations, such as the red Cross. Another watershed in the world order was 1945, which gave rise to the united Nations systems and the Bretton woods institutions. Today, the legacy of the end of the Cold war, combined with the rise of emerging powers, is producing a new situation of which the magnitude is obvious, although it is too early to assess the consequences with any great accuracy.


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Introduction

The G20 is at once the illustration and the mirror of this historic moment, which again requires re-imagining the regulation of inter-national relations and demonstrating diplomatic creativity. in this regard, the G20 functions like a research institute. it is a platform for observing the world’s socioeconomic changes. one of the G20’s major activities involves using the expertise of specialized organiza-tions such as the oECd, the ilo and the FAo to take stock of the world situation on key issues such as taxation, growth, employment and food. The G20 is also a place for experimentation. The so-called Northern countries are learning to work on an equal footing with the countries referred to as the South. All its member countries are establishing new channels of communication with the world’s regions, not only the Eu but also other regional organizations that are regularly invited to the G20 summit meetings. Together, vastly different countries, religious and secular, democratic and authoritar-ian, highly developed and less developed, are defining a discussion agenda on concrete issues. The Group of Twenty may or may not become a more formal and institutionalized entity. The question is rather secondary. The most important thing at this point is to have an operational framework within which to design the future of inter-national cooperation.

of the G10Member countries of the G8 (names in bold)

Source: G10, www.g10.org Sciences Po - Atelier de cartographie, 2011

CanadaUnited States

Japan

Russia

United KingdomBelgiumNetherlandsGermanySweden

FranceSwitzerland

Italy

Indicative Chronology:

Gs of the North ( )

1961: Group of Ten (G10) created in coordination with the IMF.

1964: Switzerland joins the G10.

1973: Meeting of the Library Group or G4 (West Germany, France, United States, Great Britain).

1975: �e G6 (the G4 plus Italy and Japan) is o�cially formed at Rambouillet.

1976: �e G6 becomes the G7 with Canada.

1960

1970

Gs of the South ( )

1964: �e G77 is o�cially formed in parallel with the �rst United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

1971: Intergovernmental Group of the Twenty-Four on International Monetary A�airs and Development (G24) formed in coordination with the G77.

Map 1 The Gs of the North


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http://www.g10.org

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Introduction

of the G24observer (China)

Member countries of the G77 (all G24 members are members of the G77)see complete list in appendix

Sources: Intergovernmental group of 24 (G24), www.g24.org, �e Group of 77 at the United Nations (G77), www.g77.org

Sciences Po - Atelier de cartographie, 2011

Ivory CoastGhana

NigeriaGabon

DR Congo

MexicoGuatemala

IndiaSri LankaEthiopiaSouth Africa

BrazilArgentina

AlgeriaEgypt

PeruColombiaVenezuelaTrinidad-and-T.

Philippines

LebanonSyriaPakistanIran

1980

1990

1999

2004

1981: �e term “emerging markets” is coined by a World Bank economist.

1985: Plazza Accord signed by the G7, ratifying a strong depreciation of the dollar.

1997: �e G7 becomes the G8 with Russia. �e G7 Finance continues to exist without Russia.

1998: Russian �nancial crisis.�e IMF rati�es the “New Arrangements to Borrow” (NAB), on a proposal from the G10.

2000: Opening of a G8 dialogue with Africa.

1981: �e G77 launches a program of action on Economic Cooperation among Developing countries (ECDP) in Caracas.China becomes a guest member of the G24.

1994: Mexican monetary crisis.

1997: Asian �nancial crisis.

1998: Caracas declaration II by the G24. Call for developed countries to assume greater responsibility.

2000: �e G77 has 131 members. It holds its �rst South Summit in Cuba.

Map 2 The Gs of the South

of the G20 (names in bold)

Members countries of the former G22 (all G20 members were members of the G22*)of the former G33 (all G22 members were members of the G33*)1997:

�e G22 formed alongside the Asia Paci�c Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, with IMF participation.

March 1999: �e G22 is enlarged to become the G33, in coordination with the G8.

December 1999:�e G33 is overhauled resulting in the G20, announced by the G8. �e G20 is a meeting of �nance ministers and central bank governors.

2008: �e G20 becomes a leadership summit.

Presidency

* except the EU

Source: G20, www.g20.org Sciences Po - Atelier de cartographie, 2011

BrazilChileArgentinaSouth Africa

CanadaÉtats-UnisMexique

IndiaSingaporeIndonesiaAustralia

JapanSouth KoreaChina

UKSwitzerland

FranceItaly

Spain RussiaTurkey

MoroccoEgyptSaudi ArabiaIvory Coast

SwedenGermany

NetherlandsBelgium

PolandEU

Hong Kong�ailandMalaysia

Indicative Chronology:

1998

2005

2009

2011

Canada

India

Mexico

Germany

China

Australia

South Africa

Brazil

UK

South Korea

France

Mexico

Map 3 The G20


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http://www.g24.org

http://www.g77.org

http://www.g20.org

DOI: 10.1057/9781137367754

Notes

Pierre rosanvallon, 1 Democratic Legitimacy. Impartiality, Reflexivity, Proximity, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, Princeton, Princeton university Press, 2011.José Manuel durão Barroso, “The G20. Putting Europe at the Centre of the 2 Global debate,” European Parliament plenary debate on the G20, Strasbourg, November 24, 2010.


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1The G20 in the Constellation of Gs

Establishment of the G20: 1997–2008

how did the G20 come about? it is impossible to compre-hend the diplomatic status of this group without under-standing its origin. But it is also extremely difficult to trace the history of an entity whose culture is predominantly oral. legally established organizations such as the united Nations (uN) and the European union (Eu) produce large volumes of documents—deliberations, communiqués, declarations and so on—which are all archived. The abun-dance of documentation makes it possible to reconstruct the history of these institutions, within the limits of the transparency of their proceedings and their main actors. An informal institution such as the G20, not having any legal structure, logically produces far fewer written or publicly accessible documents. Peter hajnal has pointed out that when the G20 met at the ministerial level, the documentation produced essentially consisted in the final communiqués of its meetings.1 That remains true for the G20 summit meetings of heads of state and government. writing the history of the Group of Twenty thus entails observing what is apparent but that has not necessarily


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The G20

been expressed—for instance, the evolution in meeting formats and agenda—, or else retracing the trajectory of its components—the G7 countries, the emerging nations or even its individual members.

Politically driven institutionalization

As a sign of its gradual institutionalization, in 2007, the Group of Twenty decided to record its own history. The initiative was undertaken by deputies from G20 member countries. Chaired by a former director of Canada’s central bank, the team preparing the report featured a strong Canadian presence, while other G20 members, South Korea and Saudi Arabia, were not represented. The report was submitted at the 2007 G20 meeting in November and published by the university of Toronto.2 The document contains a wealth of factual information on the early days of the G20. it also expresses a consensual, “politically correct” vision. To some extent, this is what makes it interesting, as it is the self-portrait of an institution and sheds light on its ambition. At the very least, the insti-tution aimed to become a fixture of international politics and would pref-erably gain influence. on receiving the report, South African President Thabo Mbeki declared, “The study of the G-20’s History is revealing—a new institution established less than ten years ago—has emerged as a central player in the global financial architecture and an effective contributor to global eco-nomic and financial stability.”3 The intention of certain actors, particularly Canada and South Africa, to carve out a new space for dialogue and a springboard for new ideas in the international sphere appeared fairly early in the G20’s trajectory.

This political resolve, later bolstered by players with more weight, starting with the united States, was vital not only to bring such an entity into being but also to make its voice heard on the international stage. Two other facts help to understand why the G20 emerged, and more precisely why it came together in the late 1990s. it has often been claimed that the G20 was an extension of the G7 and G8, and even that the G20 had already replaced the G8. This analysis merely confuses the matter all the more since the G8, as will be seen, obeys a fundamentally different logic than the rationale behind the G20. what is true is that the G7’s legitimacy came increasingly under fire around the early 1990s and that demands for its enlargement grew more vocal.

one of the best-known proposals in this regard came from zbigniew Brzezinski, former advisor to uS Presidents Jimmy Carter and


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George h. w. Bush, in an article for The New York Times in the summer of 1996. he suggested opening up the G7 to four countries that had come to be qualified as “emerging”: Brazil, China, india and russia.4 russia joined the group the following year, with staunch backing from the united States. The G7 thus turned into the G8 in 1997, but it continued to meet at the level of finance ministers and central bank governors of the seven “old” capitalist economies.

The G8 first opened up to countries of the South in 2000 when Japan took the initiative to invite the presidents of three African powers—South Africa, Algeria and Nigeria—as well as the prime minister of Thailand to the okinawa summit. when France presided the G8 in 2003 at Evian, it repeated the initiative, inviting a considerably larger number of coun-tries: the five members of the New Partnership for Africa’s development (NEPAd), South Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria and Senegal, as well as Malaysia and Morocco, representing the Non-Aligned Movement and the G77 respectively, and four “emerging” countries: Brazil, China, india and Mexico. The following year, in 2004, the G8 met as a restricted cir-cle, presided by the united States, in a strained context due to the war in iraq. The united Kingdom renewed the dialogue with emerging powers one year later, however, inviting Brazil, China, india, Mexico and South Africa to the summit at Gleneagles. Germany suggested associating these five countries systematically in the preparation and organization of G8 summits. Thus was instituted the “heiligendamm Process” or the “outreach 5.” The five states, representative by their economic weight, such as China and Brazil, or their regional position, such as South Africa, became permanent guests of the G8.

But it is important to note that this still did not turn the G8 into a G13. The question of whether or not to alter the composition of the G8 members was not on the agenda. it was and remains diplomatically too complex—somewhat akin to the thorny problem of the representative-ness of the uN Security Council permanent members. in addition, the coexistence of a more influential G20 alongside the G8 makes the issue less crucial.

The Asian financial crisis: from the G22 to the G33

The emergence of the G20 was thus fostered by the growing perception that the G7 was losing legitimacy, as it was less and less representative of global balances after the end of the Cold war. The conditions that


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The G20

actually launched the G20 were related to the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998. This crisis, which affected all of East Asia with a few notable exceptions such as China—at the time much less engaged than today in the dynamics of globalization—, prompted an emergency meeting of representatives from the iMF, the world Bank and 14 Asia-Pacific countries in the fall of 1997 in the Philippines. it set up a framework for dialogue known as the Manila Framework Group.5 At the request of Singapore’s prime minister, backed by other Asian leaders, the united States expanded this initiative by constituting the Group of Twenty-Two or G22, sometimes called the “willard Group,” after the name of the hotel in the uS capital where meetings took place. The G22 was the precur-sor to the G20.6 it brought together central bank governors and finance ministers representing the G7 powers—who had majority voting power at the iMF, a central player in managing the 1997–1998 crisis—and Asian countries as well as others that were also affected by the financial turmoil of the 1990s, such as Mexico, Argentina and russia.7 The composition of the G22 thus reflected two factors: the effort to limit the ripple effects of an economic upheaval in East Asia, the most dynamic region in the world, and the perception that this turmoil was in fact a manifestation of growing interdependence at the global level.

in the fall of 1998, APEC, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum, held its annual meeting.8 The delegates declared on this occasion that they welcomed the work undertaken “to improve co-ordination and involvement of the private sector in the prevention and orderly resolution of international financial crises.” And regional leaders added,

we believe that there would be considerable value in continuing this work in a process involving both industrialised and emerging markets econo-mies. we agree that a forum such as an expanded G22 would be appropriate for this purpose.9

discussions were held among the most influential iMF member countries to examine if the work of an expanded G22 could be tied in with that of the interim Finance Committee—an advisory board that has since been renamed the international Monetary and Financial Committee (iMFC). But the issue touched on the question of the global representativeness of iMF governing bodies: the institution was not ready to tackle the matter head on and so did not risk opening the door to negotiating the place of emerging countries down the road by engaging in formal dialogue with them. it was finally with the G8’s endorsement


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that an expanded G22 with eleven new members,10 making it the G33, came about in March 1999. however, from its very first meeting, the G33 members experienced the limits of a dialogue including such a large number of participants. At about the same time, “G7 Finance”—the G8 finance ministers minus russia—was examining how to put together a more effective and hence more manageable tool for dialogue. Following its recommendations, the G8 announced in June 1999 that it would work together to “establish an informal mechanism for dialogue among systemi-cally important countries, within the framework of the Bretton Woods institu-tional system.”11 A few months later, the G7 finance ministers confirmed the formation of the new group to replace the G33:

in december in Berlin, we will invite our counterparts from a number of systemically important countries from regions around the world to launch this new group. The Eu Presidency and European Central Bank will be invited. in addition, to ensure effective liaison with the iMF and world Bank, we will invite the world Bank President, iMF Managing director and interim and development Committee chairmen to serve as ex officio members of the group. we are grateful to Paul Martin of Canada for agree-ing to lead this group as Chairman for its first two years.12

A G20 of “systemically important countries”

The G20 thus got off the ground in Germany in winter 1999. Several countries involved in the history of its formation were absent from the G20, in particular Singapore, which had encouraged the united States to set up the former G22. The fact that, at the time, the G20 brought together ministers instead of heads of state and government, thereby drawing less media attention, probably facilitated the delicate operation of paring down the G33, therefore excluding 14 members (13+1 so that the Eu would have a seat). Some of these, mainly Asian countries once again, had taken part in bringing this cooperation project to fruition.13 Even if this evolution was facilitated, it was not for all that unanimously accepted. The composition of the G20 was inevitably to some extent arbi-trary. The selection criterion—“systemically important countries”—could be interpreted in different ways, and still can be. The disappearance of Sweden and the Netherlands when the G33 was converted into the G20 was criticized because it deprived the new group the long experience of these countries in loans and development aid. Keeping Argentina in the group was debated because, like South Africa, it did not rank among the world’s twenty largest economies. debates about the relevance of the


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The G20

G20’s composition remained discreet in the early years, however. They came back into the spotlight when the G20 went from the level of minis-terial meeting to a summit of heads of state. it will be shown further on to what extent this issue goes largely beyond the G20, or rather, how the G20 raises very fundamental questions about the representativeness of international institutions handed down from 1945.

The G20 became a high-level forum in 2008. The initiative was announced by the united States, but it actually came from France, endorsed by the united Kingdom. Paris and london, which had strengthened their ties, shared the same analysis of the shortcomings of existing international organizations. in an interview granted to the French daily Le Monde, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown declared in March 2008,

France and the united Kingdom can work together hand in hand with common interests and shared values. This is the case, as you will see in the coming weeks, of the reforms of international institutions created in 1945: uN, world Bank, international Monetary Fund. These organizations are no longer adapted to the challenges of 2008. President Sarkozy and myself share the same plans and are working together.14

Shortly thereafter, France, then president of the European union, managed to convince the American President George w. Bush, hardly a champion of multilateralism, to convene the heads of state and gov-ernment of the 19 G20 nations to decide on emergency measures to address the plight at hand. The spectacular crisis of 2008, which many have compared to that of 1929, had been generated in the united States; it thus seemed logical for washington to host such a meeting. President George w. Bush accepted the role. his decision was certainly simplified by the fact that the summit brought together member states of a struc-ture that had been functioning for some ten years—the G20 of finance ministries and central bank governors—, thereby theoretically avoiding the diplomatic headache of drawing up a list of participants. The crite-rion for inclusion, “systemically important countries,” also had the virtue of existing, even though it did not put an end to the debate about the G20’s representativeness.

Even prior to the Franco-British initiative to turn the G20 into the institution we know today, the idea of a “leaders’ 20 Summit” or “l20” was already afloat. one of the most fervent advocates of the idea was Paul Martin, former Canadian finance minister who chaired the G20 for


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its first three years and in this capacity witnessed its beginnings. once he became prime minister, he regularly pleaded for transforming the G20 into a leadership forum, particularly in an article in Foreign Affairs entitled “A Global Answer to Global Problems.”15 The G20, which had helped to improve global economic coordination, he said in substance, should become an “l20” to extend this cooperation to the political field. The l20 concept was debated within the community of international relations experts and analysts. Political scientist John Kirton, founder of the research group on the G8 at the university of Toronto, identified three opinion trends in the debate over the l20.16 First the l20 “rejec-tionists” were against expanding the G20’s economic agenda into the political sphere. Second, the “reinforcers” were in favor of strengthen-ing the group into an l20 that would coexist along with established international institutions. Third were advocates of replacing the G8 by the l20, the “replacers.” The second approach, championed by the rein-forcers, finally won out, as the G20 became a leadership summit and to date it has replaced none of the existing institutions, not even the G8, despite countless predictions that it was about to disappear or the many expressions of hope that it would. The only difference between what the reinforcers recommended and what actually happened is that the G20 changed its status but not its name. Keeping the same appellation enabled it to maintain an impression of continuity and thereby diminish the risk—albeit inevitable—of reviving the controversy about the group’s composition.

The proliferation of Gs and other state groupings since 1945

what place does the G20 occupy today in what raymond Aron called the “diplomatic constellation,”17 the multitude of fora in which inter-national negotiations take place? what more precisely is its position within the various “Gs,” those informal groups of states also known as “clubs,” “committees” and “communities”? why has the G20 prompted such unusual reactions of curiosity, distrust or optimism, and why at this time?

The G7 and the G8 have been familiar to the general public for a few decades now. The G20 cropped up in the news more recently, together with the financial crisis catalyzed by the bursting of the American real


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The G20

estate bubble in 2008. But as we have seen, the Group of Twenty had already existed as an instrument of international economic cooperation for about ten years prior to that. other Gs, however, had been established for even longer, some of them practically just after world war ii, without receiving the same degree of media attention.

Gs of the North versus Gs of the South

The G10, for instance, was created in 1962. it brought together delegates from ten industrialized countries18 that were prepared to make up for the iMF’s budgetary shortfalls due to a rise in borrowing. This grouping of the most developed economies took place in a context of the dollar crisis in a heavily indebted united States owing to its involvement in the Vietnam war and confronted with the growing difficulty of maintain-ing its currency’s convertibility into gold, a rule of the Bretton woods Agreements. it was the G10 that crafted the Smithsonian Agreement in december 1971, which ratified President richard Nixon’s decision to suspend the dollar’s convertibility. while the volume of its activity has varied over the years, the group continues to function today as a think tank and source of new ideas, coordinating with the iMF. Above all, the informal setting in which the G10 brought together the finance ministers and central bank governors of its member states prefigured the G5, fore-runner of the G7 and G8.

in November 1971, twenty-four countries of the South19 felt the need for a body that could counterbalance the G10’s influence. Thus was established the G24, the intergovernmental Group of the Twenty-Four on international Monetary Affairs and development. The idea of form-ing a “Southern G” was not new, however, as the G77 had been founded officially in June 1964 with the Joint declaration of the Seventy-Seven Countries20 in the wake of the first united Nations Conference on Trade and development (uNCTAd) in March 1964. As historian of the iMF James Boughton notes,21 the idea of cooperation among South countries, although it progressed throughout the Cold war and to a certain extent beyond that, was not as self-evident as coordination among nations of the North. The context of decolonization, the great diversity of situ-ations in so-called developing countries, their sheer number and their lesser experience in international negotiations made the project for a Southern coalition a far more hazardous undertaking. But both the G77 and the G24 indicated a tangible desire to make heard the voice of a


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whole segment of the world that until then had been fairly inaudible, if not silent, on the diplomatic stage. it could now appropriate, at least in form, the new instruments for dialogue offered by the emergence of these groups alongside the official institutions.

The UN system and regional actors

The international system that took shape at the end of world war ii produced the formal institutions of the united Nations and its many agencies at the same time as informal structures that were more or less complementary to the official bodies. For instance, the Bretton woods Agreements mentioned above were signed in July 1944 and paved the way for establishing the iMF and the world Bank. The first meeting of the governors of these two bodies took place in 1946. only ten years later, in May 1956, 19 industrialized iMF member countries met with Argentina outside the institutional sphere to restructure its debt, thus launching the Club of Paris. This informal group of public creditors which, just like the “Gs,” never established a legal framework, exists to this day with a core of permanent members that has remained unchanged. it has nevertheless added associated members, bringing the Club’s composition more in line with the world’s economic reality.

The creation of the uN system took place in a context of a profusion of international cooperation initiatives. This flurry of activity was first the product of a diffuse desire for dialogue in response to the particularly destructive effects of world war ii as well as a counterpoint reaction to the incipient Cold war. But it was also the expression of a certain degree of dissatisfaction among many actors, especially regional groupings, which were disadvantaged by the establishment of the uN. The matter of country representation was debated very early on in the process of designing the organization, in winter 1939–1940, both within the uS administration as among the Allies. The problem was to decide whether nations or representatives of the various world regions should sit on the future security council. The debate was settled, as we know, in favor of states, the uN Charter also recognizing the right of sovereign states to organize into regional associations.

The European Community, before becoming the international organi-zation it is today, with its highly structured legal framework, was a loose association of movements and groups of states. in contrast, the meeting of South East Asian countries after the region was decolonized produced


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The G20

an association, ASEAN,22 which for a long time asserted its informal nature and lack of a strict set of rules. Formed in 1967, the Association took nearly ten years to hold its first summit of heads of government, in 1976, and did not formalize its legal existence until december 2008, when the ASEAN Charter came into force. in the meantime, the East Asia Summit (EAS) was launched as a meeting forum between ASEAN members and the three major North East Asian states, China, Japan and South Korea. The purpose of the EAS—to promote dialogue, coordina-tion and make proposals—, the subjects it deals with—financial regula-tion, the environment, development—and its format—lack of formalism and search for media exposure—, make it an entity that is reminiscent of the G20 but on a regional scale. The parallel is all the more significant as the region in question, East Asia, represents a considerable portion of the world economy and population.

The G20 and the blurred dividing lines of the world order

The growing interest in the G20 among economic and political analysts is not due to the fact that it is a new form of international cooperation. “Gs” have existed for over a half-century. And if such groups are replaced in the broader category of non-contractual bodies that have developed alongside and often as a complement to legally established institutions, the G20 then appears to be a fairly ordinary phenomenon in today’s diplo-matic landscape. But from a more geopolitical standpoint, the emergence of the Group of Twenty reflects notably well the major evolutions on the international stage in the new millennium. in this regard, the nature of this particular “G” is unusual. Aside from the G15 formed just before the fall of the Berlin wall,23 the G20 is the first “G” to come about in the post-Cold war era. By its very composition it illustrates the end of the conflict between East and west. it also exposes the blurring of the line dividing North and South, a process that actually began in the early 1980s with the decline of the notion of Third world. lastly, the G20 is the first tangible expression of a rebalancing of power relationships on the international stage, characterized by challenges to western hegemony.

All of the “Gs” that have come into being since the postwar period show evidence of “asymmetric global governance,” to use roy Culpeper’s expression.24 The parallel establishment of the G10 and the G77, then the plan announced by the G24 to draw up common positions among Southern countries on themes discussed by the Northern group, have


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laid bare an underlying logic of distinction in the dynamics of informal international cooperation. There were de facto two types of “Gs,” those for the rich and those for the poor, corresponding to two worldviews and a certain divergence of interests. Pondering the composition of the G10 and the G24 today respectively, the rather anachronous aspect of these groupings is striking. The G24, for instance, includes Brazil, india and, as a special guest since 1981, China, in other words the emerging powers represented in the G20. As for the G10, it includes countries such as Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Sweden, developed economies and founding members of the oECd but that are not mem-bers of the G20.

The anachronism of maintaining these two groups, the G10 and the G24, is not however, absolute. Even though the so-called emerging economies have become new powers in terms of their GNP—starting with China which holds second place in the world—and in this regard have joined the North, they continue to be confronted with problems typical of the South. if one reasons instead in terms of per capita GNP, or more concretely takes into account deeply impoverished areas, problems of infrastructure or the illiteracy rate in these countries, their presence in a forum of developing countries is not incongruous. in that case what the constitution of the G20 points up is that it is impossible today to consider the world according to a clear division between North and South and settle for a dialogue that is confined to this overly simplistic representation. The new powers are in fact countries that are both rich and poor, with internal inequalities that are much more severe than in mature economies. one of the main challenges facing the G20 is pre-cisely to factor in this parameter.

The G20 also differs from the groups formed after 1945 because it goes beyond the bipolar notion of East and west that structured the Cold war. But not because the G20 was an “enlargement” of the G8, which is as we have seen a rather hasty if not inaccurate analysis. indeed, the G20 did not sweep away the G8, as each group has its own historical rationale. it should not be forgotten that the G20 was not only the outcome of a debate on the need to open up the G7, but also and more significantly from the viewpoint of its founding actors such as Singapore, it is an ad hoc discussion forum put together in the context of the Asian finan-cial crisis of 1997–1998. indeed, the G7 also originated in a crisis situa-tion, the oil crises of the 1970s, but at a time when the world economy was split between capitalism and communism.


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The G20

The G7 was at first a G4. it brought together the finance ministers of the united States, the united Kingdom, France and west Germany (Federal republic of Germany or FrG). it was the uS Treasury Secretary who took the initiative of inviting his counterparts in 1973 to take part in informal discussions—literally fireside chats—in the white house library, thereby giving the G4 its nickname, the library Group. The Japanese finance minister was invited to another meeting that same year in washington, and the group became the G5. in 1975, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, a participant in the library Group as France’s finance minister who had in the meantime become president, launched the idea of raising the G5—which also occasionally included italy, thus forming a G6—, to the status of a summit of heads of state. Approved first by the FrG and then the united States, the idea took form in rambouillet in November 1975 at a meeting of the heads of state and government of the united States, France, the united Kingdom, italy, Japan and the FrG. This new G6 became the G7 the following year with the arrival of Canada.

in contrast to the strictly oral and even secret nature of the library Group meetings, the rambouillet summit produced an official declara-tion. The content and choice of terms used in the declaration unam-biguously placed the G6, and then the G7, in the specific ideological framework of the confrontation between East and west. The declaration stated in its introduction,

we came together because of shared beliefs and shared responsibilities. we are each responsible for the government of an open, democratic society, dedicated to individual liberty and social advancement. our success will strengthen, indeed is essential to, democratic societies everywhere.25

Further down in the declaration, the signatories posed as the rep-resentatives of the “industrial democracies.” This vocabulary would be unthinkable, and in fact is non-existent, in official G20 communiqués. Not only because the East-west conflict is over, to the advantage of what was called “the free world” during the Cold war, but also and especially because the G20 includes representatives of both democratic societies and others that are not. The G20 member countries do not share the same convictions about universal suffrage and civil liberties. Furthermore, it was precisely in pursuing the logic of the Cold war, or more generally the opposition between democracy and totalitarianism or authoritarianism, that russia was invited to join the G7 in 1997, which


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then became today’s G8. The united States under Bill Clinton’s presi-dency was the first to encourage the opening of the G7 to russia under Boris yeltsin, perceived at the time as the hero who had withstood an attempted overthrow by the Soviet rear guard in summer 1991. The uS president believed, to use his own words, that the world’s oldest democ-racy, the united States, had to reach out to the world’s youngest, the russian Federation. The Europeans were more receptive to the idea that it was important to avoid bruising the pride of the power vanquished in the Cold war by inviting it to the G7. The former western bloc, which also represented the countries of the North, thus was not reasoning entirely in economic terms.

in 1996, zbigniew Brzezinski had already argued that Brazil, China and india were as deserving of a place in an expanded G7 as russia was. russia, however, possessed a huge military and more precisely a nuclear arsenal that it was in the process of partly dismantling. it was thus worthwhile for the G7 powers to have a privileged dialogue framework within which to discuss matters of proliferation with it. But there again, this concern is quite remote from the issues preoccupying the G20 today. Moreover, in subsequent years, russia has proved to be far more a stagnating, even declining economy than an “emerging” one characterized by low industrial investment and a population decrease. And contrary to Bill Clinton’s outlook, the young russian democracy quickly deteriorated, and the nature of the political regime in Moscow today in fact is at variance with the ideological unity that had bound the G7 together.

if one ponders the relevance of the G8 and its preservation alongside the G20, the presence of an authoritarian russia on an uncertain devel-opment path is probably the most striking anomaly. insofar as “Gs” are useful, that they do indeed promote more fluid dialogue and a more reactive consultation process than legally established organizations and that they thus improve their effectiveness, then the G7 could not remain the only informal body representing the world’s largest economies. An entity such as the G20 was needed. That does not necessarily mean that the “industrial democracies,” to use the expression of the rambouillet declaration, could do without a political forum for discussion. Contrary to certain beliefs about globalization, whether optimistic or pessimistic, economics cannot take the place of politics. And as we will see, this basic fact of international relations is actually highlighted rather than obscured by the rising importance of the G20.


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The G20, a leadership summit or a leadership network?

From the standpoint of democratic practices, does the G20 represent a new way of managing international affairs? or does it instead fit in with the long tradition of summits held by princes and nations, as politi-cal scientist david dunn argues in his analysis of the G7?26 has it thus revived the practice of the concert of nations, or of great powers, inau-gurated by the 1815 Congress of Vienna that produced the Concert of Europe? if the G20 is indeed a variety of concert diplomacy, does it thus offer an effective means of cooperation for the 21st century as suggested by German political scientist harald Müller, who advocates a revival of dialogue organized by the great powers?27 or on the contrary, can it lead to “connivance diplomacy,” at best ineffective and at worst dangerous, a concern expressed by his French colleague Bertrand Badie?28

harald Müller’s and Bertrand Badie’s reference to the Congress of Vienna is both illuminating and oversimplifying. There is obviously a common thread in the structuring of the international stage: it is the balance of power between states (the definition of power involved in this balance having evolved, however, over the centuries). The other constant, a corollary of this parameter, is the inclination of stronger states toward hegemony and the reactions it provokes among others. The desire to contain hegemony, if only minimally by simply creating a balance of forces with no other concern for international cooperation, can certainly be seen as an essential motive in the historic tradition of “concert diplo-macy.” But beyond this remark, can one really compare the 19th-century Congress of Vienna to the 21st-century G20? And if such a comparison is indeed possible, how and to what extent is it relevant?

An institutional architecture characterized by “multi-multilateralism”

From the standpoint of the history of European integration, the Congress of Vienna was obviously a turning point: it established a certain mode of regulation at the level of the continent. Seen from outside Europe, this congress was one of the last episodes in an international history in which “the world” was not yet imagined at the global level but instead in a more limited geographical framework. Therein lies the essential difference between the Congress of Vienna, in which participants were limited


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to the sovereigns of the European powers, and the Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of international disputes drafted in The hague in 1899 by a conference gathering not only the Europeans, but also the President of the united States of America, the Emperors of China and Japan, the ottoman sultan, the Shah of Persia and the King of Siam. This Convention established the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The hague. it was the first legal institution that had truly global jurisdiction (not limited to Europe), and which still functions.

it was also the second half of the 19th century, marked by a consid-erable intensification of international exchanges, primarily economic and migratory—a period that some economists call “the first wave of globalization” —,29 that witnessed the appearance of the first so-called universal international organizations,30 meaning they were open to all the sovereign states on the planet. These organizations provided the foundation for the institutional architecture within which many international subjects are dealt with today. The international Sanitary Conference of 1851 laid the groundwork for the international office of Public hygiene in 1907, the ancestor of today’s world health organization. The international Telegraph union, founded in 1865, became the international Telecommunication union in 1932, which functions to this day. The 20th-century international organizations were built on this institutional legacy, particularly the league of Nations and its Commissions, and then the uN and its agencies.

At the start of the 21st century, the institutional architecture of international relations is extremely dense, to say the least. international organizations, be they global, regional or subregional, have proliferated. The main postwar organizations, the uN and the Bretton woods institu-tions, also each spawned their own committees, clubs and groups shortly after being formed, either to produce tools to make it easier to perform their mission—such as the G10 with respect to the iMF—or to create open forums for specific debates—such as the G77 with respect to the uN. in addition to the proliferation of legally established organizations, associations of states with more or less informal structures multiplied during the second half of the 20th century. Some of them have evolved over time, as in the case of ASEAN, which as we have seen drafted its charter 40 years after coming together.

The decision to join one institution or another has always been a strategic choice for the countries involved. But the conditions in which this choice was made were naturally different during and after the Cold


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war. The disappearance of the bipolar constraint of having to choose between East and west or become part of the Non-Aligned Movement has allowed more latitude for states to position themselves. This new margin for maneuver has fostered the practice of what political scientist Francis Fukuyama calls “multi-multilateralism.”31 in other words, the vast number of institutions, which no longer mirror an East/west divide and less and less a clear gap between North and South due to emerging powers that are at once rich and poor, now make it possible to become part of several multilateral bodies of varying size rather than having to choose just one. while the united States in particular excels in this multidimensional multilateralism, as Francis Fukuyama notes, all the G20 countries resort to this practice as well. The European members, however, are relatively more strictly bound by the obligations of loyalty inherent in their union.

This context of expanding international institutionalism on a global scale that fosters to “multi-multilateralism” is in any event poles apart from the international stage in the late 19th century, which was much less densely organized, in particular the Congress of Vienna. in the 21st-century international landscape, the G20 might be able to offer condi-tions conducive to the diplomacy of trust that harald Müller’s analysis alludes to. But it shows no sign of the “connivance diplomacy” that Bertrand Badie describes, which moreover would scarcely be compatible with the various actors’ “multi-multilateralist” practices.

The democratization of the international arena

Another major difference between the conditions that brought about the tradition of summit meetings with the Congress of Vienna and the situ-ation in the 21st century is the multiplication and diversification of inter-national actors. States remain the central actors in today’s international system, as international relations specialist Samy Cohen demonstrates.32 however, all states are not equal; some are economic and/or military powers, others are not; some take into account their society’s public opinion, others do not; and last, there are states that are more nominal than real, “quasi-states,”33 to borrow an expression from political theorist robert Jackson, due to their very weak legitimacy and efficacy.

Beyond this diversity among states, there are a large number of non-state actors involved in diplomacy today that were not present in the 19th century or even in the mid-20th century. Never has civil society been


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so active, or simply visible, in the management of international issues. As within nations themselves—where on balance democracy has pro-gressed and citizen participation has increased since the end of the 20th century—there has been a form of democratization of the international sphere. The growing role of non-state actors, as well as the number of NGos specialized in development aid and peacebuilding, is also due to the fact that the major international organizations—the uN, the world Bank—call on such actors to contribute their expertise (particularly in fieldwork) that the larger, more established institutions sometimes lack. For both intergovernmental organizations and states, dialogue with civil society can also be a political necessity.

According to analyst and diplomat Jorge heine, the transformation of the international stage is such that the tradition of club diplomacy, in other words informal consultation among states so that “summits” can be organized, has given way to “network diplomacy” in which state and non-state actors are positioned.34 The sociological notion of “network” applied to the analysis of state foreign policy has been more thoroughly analyzed by other political scientists, in particular Anne-Marie Slaughter, leonardo Martinez-diaz and Ngaire woods.35 “Network diplomacy” refers at once to a method and a strategy. The way national governments communicate is increasingly modeled after the functioning of social networks, with more numerous, fast and informal channels of communication. And states not only can invest their efforts in flexible international cooperation structures—echoing Fukuyama’s notion of multidimensional multilateralism—but also further their action through civil society.

is the G20 a typical product of a networked international scene, as Anne-Marie Slaughter suggests?36 Even if its filial link with the Congress of Vienna seems tenuous, does it for all that mark a clean break with the tradition of “summits,” at least as it developed in the 20th century, analyzed by historians Keith Eubank and david reynolds among others?37 As reynolds notes, the basic format of summits—a meeting of monarchs—has been in effect for several centuries. But it was really in the 20th century that the practice developed and the term “summitry” was coined, after world war ii. david reynolds considers that sum-mits have flourished with progress in air travel, that weapons of mass destruction have made them necessary and that the broadcast media has turned them into household news.38 The British historian points out, however, that the boom in telecommunications in the later part of the


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20th century has also altered the diplomatic signification of summits, again because the expansion of communication technology has multi-plied the points of contact and cooperation between governments and also because it has encouraged the growing dramatization of summits, which have partly become spectacles, a phenomenon that can be observed in other international and national political arenas as well. what have not changed in the logic of summitry, however, even in the internet era, are two features that david dunn uses to define this practice: the shared sense of urgency and a common belief in the added value of face-to-face meetings.39 we have seen that like the G4 and the G7, created against a backdrop of oil crises in the 1970s, the G22 was thrust to the fore by the Asian crisis of 1997, and the establishment of the G20 at the highest level came about with the upheaval on wall Street in 2008. The occurrence of these events and at least as much the perception of them by the societies affected and their governments, each time spawned what could be called “crisis centers” at the international scale. And underlying the objective and subjective need to undertake emergency measures has always been the collective conviction that face-to-face dialogue among “leaders” would contribute a degree of effectiveness that measured up to expecta-tions. while experience has shown that such dialogue could in certain situations indeed hasten the decision-making process, there is neverthe-less a degree of wishful thinking in this conviction. For it is well known that leaders, even in authoritarian regimes, rarely decide alone and that “G” summits in particular have spawned a vast political-administrative apparatus organized around the “sherpas” in charge of preparing these meetings.

while the G20 thus has at least a genealogical link with the history of modern summitry, the way in which the group has evolved since 2008 shows that the G20 is also fully integrated in the “network” dynamics of 21st-century international relations. As economist and former dip-lomat Nicholas Bayne points out, since the mid-1980 the G7 has been confronted, including in the literal sense, with requests from third-world NGos to take their demands into account.40 on an initiative from the main British environmental movement, many of these NGos grouped together in 1984 to form an alternative G7, “The other Economic Summit” or ToES. Nicholas Bayne shows how a distinction has gradu-ally emerged between civil society movements whose objectives were mainly contentious and those that aimed to enter into a form of negotia-tion, even coordination, with the G7 and later the G8. The spectacular


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nature of what have become ritual anti- or alterglobalist gatherings in conjunction with G8 summits as well as meetings of the world Economic Forum in davos and world Trade organization (wTo) conventions has regularly put them in the media spotlight. The distinction among them, however, is less perceived by the public at large and assessed in different ways by national governments, but it was particularly patent during the 2009 Conference on Climate Change in Copenhagen: while the most radical environmental NGos gathered both to act as a pressure group and alternative source of information on environmental issues, well-established organizations such as Greenpeace positioned themselves as partners of these national governments.

in 2008, when the G20 was converted into a leaders’ club, cooperation between governments and civil society had become the norm in diplo-matic life. what is meant by “civil society” in general, and more particu-larly for international relations, in fact covers different types of reality. it includes citizens’ associations as well as professional federations that do not necessarily have the same political culture or the same modes of action. At the davos forum in January 2009, Stephen Green, chairman of the hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (hSBC), put out the idea of a “Business 20,” a B20 that would bring together representa-tives from the major companies in the Group of Twenty countries. This suggestion, endorsed by the British government, which held the G20 presidency at the time, came to fruition the following year at the G20 summit in Toronto. The Canadian government thus explained the pur-pose of the B20:

The goal of the B-20 is to enable leaders and finance ministers to receive candid and useful advice from the front lines of global commerce on the important economic issues at the centre of the G-20 agenda. it will also provide an opportunity to build support amongst the business community for G-20 policy objectives.41

The year in which the B20 concept got its start also saw the organ-ization of a G20 on labor and employment. Also under the British presidency led by Prime Minister Gordon Brown, the April 2009 G20 summit in london resulted in particular in the commissioning of a report from the international labor organization (ilo) on interna-tional employment and social protection conditions. The report,42 submitted in the fall following the G20 summit in Pittsburgh, insti-gated regular coordination between the group’s leaders and the ilo,


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made up of government, trade union and employer representatives. it was also in Pittsburgh that President Barak obama launched an initiative for the “Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth.” The G20’s new social orientation, which was not apparent in the first leadership summit in 2008, was necessary, according to the uS president, who called for an end to “era of profound irrespon-sibility” and “for international leaders to take steps, no matter how dif-ficult or unpopular, to ensure when growth returns, the old imbalances do not.” 43

with the evolution of the G20 agenda, as well as initiatives from the successive presidencies and proposals from civil society, other dialogue networks were established. in 2010 a Parliamentary G20 was formed comprising representatives from the Parliaments of the 19 countries and delegates from the European Parliament and the inter-Parliamentary union (iPu). like the iPu, established in 1889 and bringing together legislators from practically all the countries in the world, the G20 parliamentary meeting includes officials who have been elected by free suffrage and others who instead have been chosen by their govern-ment. But despite the democratic disparity of its member countries, an important point to be examined further on, this serves as an indication of the proliferation and diversification of participants in the dynamics of the G20. last but not least, after the Seoul summit in November 2010, it was decided to hold a meeting of G20 agriculture ministers, the first taking place under the French presidency in June 2011. in the context of another food crisis and unstable food commodity prices, this forum aimed for dialogue among G20 governments and both public and private actors in this area, in particular the united Nations Food and Agriculture organization (FAo). The fact that since 2008 G20 summits have always been presided by countries whose societies were open politi-cally has probably fostered this development of non-state participation. But although in the coming years the organization of G20 meetings by more authoritarian states may curb this evolution somewhat, it probably will not put an end to it.

Notes

Peter hajnal, 1 The G8 System and the G20. Evolution, Role and Documentation, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007.


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“The Group of Twenty. A history,” November 2007 2 (available at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca – last accessed on october 11, 2013). Both the Canadian government and its civil society have actively supported the G20’s development. until the Group instituted an annual rotating presidency, it was chaired by Canada for three years, from 1999 to 2001. The university of Toronto established a G20 information Center, complementary to a similar center that exists for the G8, which for a long time was the only significant source of documentation on the Group of Twenty.“Address of the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, at the G20 Finance 3 Ministerial Conference,” Kleinmond, western Cape, November 18, 2007 (available at http://www.polity.org.za).zbigniew Brzezinski, “let’s Add 4 to the G7,” 4 The New York Times, June 25, 1996.Comprising Australia, Brunei darussalam, Canada, China, South Korea, the 5 united States, hong Kong, indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New zealand, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.Piecing together how the G22 was created in the wake of the Manila 6 Framework Group while laying the groundwork for the G20 is a classic example of an undertaking for which there is no official documentation. The primary source used here is the transcription of the press conference given by two white house spokesmen after the November 1997 APEC meeting: “Press briefing by Press Secretary Mike McCurry and Assistant to the President for international Economic Policy dan Tarullo,” waterfront Centre hotel, Vancouver, November 25, 1997 (available at http://clinton4.nara.gov, last accessed on october 11, 2013). Cf. also Mark Sobel and louellen Stedman, “The Evolution of the G-7 and Economic Policy Coordination,” Department of the Treasury, Office of International Affairs, occasional Paper no. 3, July 2006.See Map 1 “The G20,” page xiii7 . The strong Asian presence in the G22, nearly half of the member countries, is noteworthy. in addition to Japan, of the G7, Asia was represented by China, hong Kong, india, indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore and Thailand. Australia was also represented as a nation of the Asia-Pacific.initiated in 1989 by Australian Prime Minister Bob hawke, APEC was at first 8 made up of 12 members: Australia, Brunei, Canada, South Korea, the united States, indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New zealand, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. in 1998, when the G22 was formed, it also included Chile, China, hong Kong, Mexico, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Taiwan, russia and Vietnam.“APEC Economic leaders declaration: Strengthening the Foundations 9 for Growth,” Kuala lumpur, November 18, 1998 (available at http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp, last accessed on october 11, 2013).


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http://www.polity.org.za

http://clinton4.nara.gov

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See Map 3 “The G20,” page xiv10 .“G7 Communiqué,” Köln, June 18, 1999 (available at http://www.g8.utoronto.11 ca/ – last accessed on october 11, 2013).“Statement of G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors,” 12 washington dC, September 25, 1999 (available at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/ – last accessed on october 11, 2013).The 14 countries left out were Belgium, Chile, ivory Coast, Egypt, Spain, 13 hong Kong (theoretically economically autonomous from the People’s republic of China), Malaysia, Morocco, Poland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Singapore and Thailand. Exclusion of the European members was offset by the introduction of the Eu as a full-fledged member of the G20, a status it does not have in the G8, for instance.interview with Gordon Brown, 14 Le Monde, March 26, 2008.Paul Martin, “A Global Answer to Global Problems,” 15 Foreign Affairs, May–June 2005.John Kirton, “Toward Multilateral reform: The G20’s Contribution,” in 16 John English, ramesh Thakur and Andrew F. Cooper (eds), Reforming from the Top: A Leaders’ 20 Summit, Tokyo, united Nations university Press, 2005.raymond Aron, “de l’analyse des constellations diplomatiques,” 17 Revue française de science politique, 4th year, no. 2, 1954.See Map 1 “The Gs of the North”, page xiii18 Switzerland joined the group two years later. The G10, although it has retained its original name, thus actually has 11 members.See Map 2 “The Gs of the South”, page xiv19 and Appendix 3, page 83.See “The Southern Gs” map, page xiv20 and Appendix 2, page 78.James M. Boughton, 21 Silent Revolution: The IMF, 1979–1989, washington dC, international Monetary Fund, october 2001.The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) first included 22 indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. it was later joined by Brunei, Vietnam, laos, Myanmar and Cambodia.Formed at the end of the 9th23 summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in September 1989, it promotes South-South cooperation and North-South dialogue. See its website: www.g15.org. last accessed on october 11, 2013.roy Culpeper, “Governance, Transparency and Accountability in the ‘Gs’,” 24 The North-South Institute, 20 April 2009.“declaration of rambouillet” by the heads of State and Government of 25 France, the Federal republic of Germany, italy, Japan, the united Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern ireland and the united States of America, Château de rambouillet, November 17, 1975 (see the full text in Appendix 4, page 87).


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http://www.g15.org




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david dunn (ed.), 26 Diplomacy at the Highest Level. The Evolution of International Summitry, london, Macmillan Press, 1996.harald Müller, “The importance of Framework Conditions,” in George 27 Perkovich and James M. Acton (eds), Abolishing Nuclear Weapons. A Debate, washington dC, Carnegie Endowment for international Peace, 2009.Bertrand Badie, 28 Diplomacy of Connivance, trans. Cynthia Schoch and william Snow, New york, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.richard Baldwin and Philippe Martin, “Two waves of Globalization,” in 29 horst Siebert (ed.), Globalization and Labor, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1999.The term “universal” does not mean, however, that these organizations were 30 representative of all of the world’s nations, as many of them were colonized. For a discussion of a greater length of the beginnings of the international global system, Karoline Postel-Vinay, L’Occident et sa bonne parole, Paris, Flammarion, 2005.Francis Fukuyama, 31 America at the Crossroads. Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy, New haven, yale university Press, 2006.Samy Cohen, 32 The Resilience of the State, trans. Jonathan derrick, london, hurst, 2006.robert h. Jackson, 33 Quasi-States. Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, Cambridge, Cambridge university Press, 1993.Jorge heine, “on the Manner of Practising the New diplomacy,” 34 The Center for International Governance Innovation (waterloo, ontario), working Paper no. 11, october 2006.Anne-Marie Slaughter, 35 A New World Order, Princeton, Princeton university Press, 2004; leonardo Martinez-diaz and Ngaire woods (eds), Networks of Influence? Developing Countries in a Networked Global Order, oxford, oxford university Press, 2009.Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Government Networks, world order and the l20,” 36 in John English, ramesh Thakur and Andrew F. Cooper, Reforming from the Top: A Leaders’ 20 Summit, Tokyo, united Nations university Press, pp. 281-95.Keith Eubank, 37 The Summit Conferences. 1919–1960, Norman, university of oklahoma Press, 1966; david reynolds, Summits. Six Meetings That Shaped the Twentieth Century, New york, Basic Books, 2007.david reynolds, 38 Summits, and, “Summitry as intercultural Communication,” International Affairs, vol. 85, no. 1, 2009.david dunn, 39 Diplomacy at the Highest Level.Nicholas Bayne, 40 Hanging in There. The G7 and G8 Summit in Maturity and Renewal, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2000.Canadian government communiqué during the Toronto summit, June 25–26, 41 2010 (available at http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g20 last accessed on october 11, 2013).


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“Protecting People, Promoting Jobs. A survey of country employment and 42 social protection policy responses to the global economic crisis,” International Labor Office, Geneva, September 2009.white house Communiqué, Pittsburgh Summit, September 24–25, 2009 43 (available at http://www.whitehouse.gov last accessed on october 11, 2013).


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2Does the G20 Lack Legitimacy?

Defining international legitimacy

For or against the G20? A true international debate on the subject has not yet taken place. But it is already clear that the G20 has its advocates and its detractors. Canada, it will be remembered, especially took the lead in promoting the G20 as a new instrument of global governance—a stance championed by former prime minister and finance min-ister Paul Martin,1 and espoused by a network of experts and academics, including the Center for international Governance innovation (CiGi), a think tank based in waterloo, ontario.2 The arguments against the G20 on the other hand have developed considerably in the Scandinavian countries. one of the most vocal critics of the G20 has been former Norwegian Foreign Affairs Minister Jonas Gahr Støre, whose opinion found resonance in Sweden and denmark, through the danish institute for international Studies (diiS), for instance.3 The major criti-cism these Nordic voices have formulated against the G20 is that it is said to be an “illegitimate” entity. This view-point, which emerged after 2008, in other words when the G20 became a forum for heads of state and government,


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more specifically pertains to the group’s announced ambition of acting as an essential dialogue forum for managing the global economy.

The legitimacy/efficacy paradigm

in an article posted on the website of the Norwegian Foreign Affairs ministry in spring 2010, Jonas Gahr Støre stated,

The spirit of the 1815 Congress of Vienna, where great powers assembled to determine the world’s fate, has no place in the contemporary international community. The Group of 20 (G-20) is sorely lacking in legitimacy and must change. ...

despite its leading role in response to the global financial, economic and development crises, the self-appointment of the G-20 represents, from the point of view of international law and multilateral principles, a major step backwards in the way international cooperation has occurred since world war ii. ...

whereas the G-7 was a group of the world’s richest economies, the G-20’s composition lacks such clarity. indeed, a number of non-participants, including the Nordic countries, are major financial contributors to develop-ment and to the Bretton woods institutions. They are of greater “systemic significance” and have larger gross domestic products than several G-20 countries. As the response to the financial crisis showed, there is value in having an effective forum of nations, equipped to act quickly when neces-sary. But within that framework, there are simple ways to make the G-20 more representative of the world it influences. As a first and immediate step, G-20 members and non-members should consult on a framework for interaction.4

reference to the 1815 Congress of Vienna once again appears in the head diplomat’s article, used as a foil against what is portrayed as con-temporary international cooperation. But again, there seems to be very little similarity in the situations characterizing the Congress of Vienna and the G20, if only owing to the extraordinary multitude and diversity of actors on the international stage in the 21st century compared to that of the early 19th century. Aside from the “Vienna 1815” argument, the Norwegian minister advances two main reasons for characterizing the G20 as an entity that lacks legitimacy. The first is cooptation: the G20 member countries decided to work together without devising any legal framework, which Jonas Gahr Støre claims to be at odds with the norms of multilateral cooperation. Coming from a diplomat whose country belongs to the very informal Paris Club, this viewpoint is paradoxical.


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The second reason put forward is more coherent: the Group of Twenty supposedly lacks legitimacy because in selecting its members, it does not apply the criterion established in 1999 when the G33 was transformed into the G20, that of being “systemically important countries.” The Norwegian minister points out that the Scandinavian countries were among the main contributors to the development of the iMF and the world Bank and that their GdP is higher than some of the G20 countries, giving them a greater “systemic” importance that should admit them into the group.

in fact, the desire to be part of the G20 rather than to reject it is indi-cated more clearly in an interview Jonas Gahr Støre granted in spring 2011 to Norden, a Nordic regional cooperation organization. The min-ister claims not to be “averse to the G20” but criticizes what he sees as its lack of legitimacy because, even though the G20 better reflects the new balances of power in the world than the G7 and the G8, its rep-resentativeness is not up to the mark. This shortcoming could be rem-edied, he adds, by adding a seat for the Nordic countries.5 The reasons for the G20’s composition are related to the history of its foundation, as we have seen, but there is no doubt that it carries a certain degree of arbitrariness. The exclusion of Sweden when the G33 was reduced to the G20 can, for instance, be called into question. The disappearance of a representative from the Nordic countries in the process of forming the G20 probably explains, or sheds a specific light on, the comments of certain Scandinavian analysts.

Swedish economist Anders Åslund, in an article entitled “The Group of 20 Must Be Stopped,”6 takes what appears to be a radical stance. The author portrays the Group of Twenty as an association that is not only illegitimate, that “violates fundamental principles of international co-operation,” but that is also “unjust and reactionary” because it reflects solely the authority of the great powers; he too uses the “Vienna 1815” argument. But it is interesting to note that in his conclusion Anders Åslund points out the positive role played by small countries, especially the wealthiest ones, in global governance, which contrasts with the atti-tude of the great powers:

The rule of big countries over small is likely to become extremely conserva-tive, just as with the Congress of Vienna. Small countries are on average wealthier than large ones per capita because they are easier to govern and therefore better ruled. usually big countries harbour the leading thinkers and public debates, but small countries tend to implement more important


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policy reforms. Examples abound. in the 1930s, Sweden pioneered Keynesian demand management. Chile introduced pension reforms based on private savings accounts in 1980.7

For the Swedish economist, the G20 is ultimately illegitimate because of its composition, which favors big countries to the detriment of small ones. it is revealing that Anders Åslund claims that small countries are generally wealthier than large ones when per capita GdP is taken into account. yet suffice it to consult world Bank figures, for instance, to realize that the overwhelming majority of small countries, most of them African, make up the poorest nations of the planet. The fact that criticism of the G20 has come from small countries other than the prosperous nations of Northern Europe will be discussed further on. it should simply be noted in passing that such appraisals, while they also underscore the G20’s shortcomings in terms of representation, express a clearly Southern perspective in the sense that they primarily see this new entity as an opportunity to bring to the fore viewpoints that until now were difficult to make heard in the existing organizations. The statement by datuk Anifah Aman, Malaysia’s foreign affairs minister, at a meeting of the G77 and China, is significant in this regard:

Even as we speak, leaders of the G20 are meeting in Pittsburgh, discussing issues, and taking decisions that are affecting us all. of course there continue to be questions regarding the legitimacy of the G20, given its exclusive and informal nature. of course we believe that as the only truly universal body, the uN has a special and important role to play on the issues addressed by the G20. of course unequal power relations exist in the dynamics of the G20 given the disparities in size and wealth of its membership.

having mentioned the drawbacks, i would like to turn to what i believe to be pertinent issues:

one, it seems that the G20 is here to stay;Two, the G20 is far more representative and inclusive as compared to the

G8. The G20 includes members of our own;Three, given present growth patterns, the voice of the developing coun-

tries who are members of the G20 is likely to grow; andFour, many of us are also represented by our regional groupings such as

NEPAd and ASEAN.8

what the viewpoints of small countries in the North and South on the G20 have in common, however, is the idea that the group lacks legitimacy because it is informal, with no legal foundation, and that its composition is not universal, like the uN, or at least not representative enough.


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it is interesting to compare these analyses with those made by G20 champions who consider on the contrary that the existing organizations, in particular the united Nations system and the Bretton woods institu-tions, are the ones whose legitimacy is sliding and that an instrument of cooperation such as the Group of Twenty could help to address the problem. in an article published in spring 2010 entitled “G20 Should increase the legitimacy of the international institutions,” Kemal dervis, former Turkish minister of economic affairs and former administrator of the united Nations development Program (uNdP), believes that while established institutions should be maintained, they have already benefited from G20’s leadership:

The london and Pittsburgh G20 meetings built confidence, proposed an increase in the war-chest of the iMF at a critical time and contributed to rebuilding the confidence shattered by the worldwide financial collapse. ...

Progress on issues such as long term financial stability, climate protec-tion, effective control of infectious disease and the peaceful management of nuclear energy depends on how the G20 will be able to provide leadership, while recognising that all nations and peoples must have a say and must be part of a legitimate international system.9

Kemal dervis and other defenders of the G20 claim that the group is ultimately legitimate because it is effective. The uN and its agencies and the Bretton woods institutions for years have been confronted with the matter of their internal reform—also deemed necessary first by the organizations themselves—to remedy their lack of reactivity, even inefficacy, in a number of areas.10 it is with this in mind that experts and politicians have promoted the G20 on the basis of the following reasoning: the uN and the iMF are formally structured institutions but their capacity for action poses problems, especially in crisis situa-tions, thereby tarnishing their legitimacy, whereas the G20 facilitates decision-making and is effective in this sense, thereby compensating for the legitimacy deficit inherent in its informal nature, even making it immaterial. According to economist and former world Bank executive Johannes linn, the G20’s effectiveness can be measured precisely by its ability to break the stalemate in the multilateral cooperation system of established organizations, in particular in the area of development.11 Political economist Jakob Vestergaard contends on the other hand that the G20’s track record is far more limited—which would make the legiti-macy/efficacy paradigm irrelevant as an instrument for evaluating the action of the Group of Twenty with respect to existing institutions.12


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Legitimacy: a subjective and relative notion

what has not been pondered, or perhaps simply not formulated, in this debate is that the legitimacy criterion is in no way an objective and absolute criterion. Nor is the criterion of efficacy a constant and inde-pendent variable. As international politics specialist ian Clark points out, legitimacy in international relations first of all stems from a politi-cal judgment.13 what certain British thinkers have called “international society,”14 in other words the set of states and institutions that regulate relations among nations, not only produces rules but norms as well. The legitimacy of such and such institution or state, or their specific actions, will be judged according to their conformity to international norms.

These norms evolve over time. For instance, slavery was an interna-tional norm until its abolition became the new norm. At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the major European powers committed to abolishing the slave trade, paving the way for making slavery illegal, particularly in France in 1848. European colonialism was “normal” practice until the end of world war ii. The notion of people’s right to self-determination, introduced in 1918 by American President woodrow wilson, ended up taking a firm hold with the advance of nationalism in Africa and in Asia and the emergence of two new powers, the united States and the Soviet union, both having a fundamentally anti-colonial stance. up until the late 1940s, the label “democracy” was applied to countries in which women did not have the right to vote, such as in France in the 1930s. in the early 21st century, a country that does not recognize male and female suffrage rights does not fit the democratic norm and lacks the legitimacy necessary to be part of the community of democracies.

Moreover, there is a certain confusion in the debate about the G20’s legitimacy between “legitimacy” and “legality.” while these two notions are linked, that does not mean they are synonymous. The conceptual imprecision is all the greater when supplemented with the idea that an association of states is not legitimate if it does not have a legal frame-work. To return to the example of the Paris Club, which ever since its formation has chosen not to adopt a legal structure: this club is not usu-ally considered “illegitimate” and even less so “illegal.” And the lack of specific legal framework has not prevented its members, which are states, from signing a number of agreements with other states that are perfectly in keeping with international law. informality does not necessarily lead


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to illegality or illegitimacy. That point having been made, it should also be remembered that the legality of an institution is not enough to confer legitimacy upon it, and that conversely a movement can be deemed legitimate even if it exists outside of a legal framework. Two events that struck European public opinion in recent decades have cast a particu-larly stark light on the complex relationship between “legitimacy” and “legality”: the war in Kosovo in 1999 and the war waged by the united States in iraq in 2003. There was scarcely any debate in Europe or North America as to whether or not NATo strikes in former yugoslavia were legitimate, even though they were undertaken without united Nations Security Council endorsement. on the other hand, the iraq invasion, led by a coalition that did not have uN approval either, was perceived by a large majority of European public opinion as illegitimate. in the first case, putting a stop to ethnic cleansing seemed to take precedence over securing official authorization from the united Nations, which seemed improbable due to russia’s position. in the second case, circumventing the uN did not pose any more or less of a problem of legality, but it defi-nitely raised a question of legitimacy, particularly among Europeans, the war appearing even less justified as the military invasion itself seemed disputable. The contrast in public opinions on these two wars spawned new reflection among geopolitical analysts on the notion of “just war” and beyond that, legitimacy in international politics.15 As political sci-entist Shane Mulligan notes, this notion of legitimacy has proven to be much less straightforward, and above all less static, than it may at first seem. it depends on factors that all vary according to place and time, such as ethics, legality, custom, tradition and popular approval.16

Efficacy, a constantly changing notion

The efficacy criterion, which allegedly characterizes the G20 as opposed to cumbersome and insufficiently reactive intergovernmental organiza-tions, is not an objective measure either, whether or not one deems that the Group of Twenty is efficient. There again, in such a context, the notion is intrinsically political. As political scientist Martha Finnemore points out regarding the functioning of multilateralism, everything depends on the definition of objectives and the means to achieve them as well as the evaluation of their overall impact, including their side effects.17 The proc-ess of defining goals and assessing impacts is inevitably normative. in a situation of multilateral cooperation, it must take into account not only


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the particular interests of each state but more fundamentally a plurality of worldviews and value systems.

in the case of the G20, it is often said, even among “G20-skeptics,” that the first summit in 2008 was effective because it limited the expansion of the international financial crisis. This assessment was based on the idea that the group’s agenda was borne of consensus and that since the results were in line with this agenda, the G20 had accomplished its mission. Now, this mission, defined in very vague terms—to help revive the world economy—was subject to a variety of interpretations. And in fact we witnessed an evolution in the G20 agenda in the course of the months following the 2008 summit in washington. At this meeting the issue of sustainable development, in the sense that it is now understood regard-ing aid for poor countries, was far from a focal point and was virtually a mere footnote in the final declaration.

From the standpoint of the so-called emerging nations of the G20, the financial crisis that had justified transforming the G20 into a leadership summit and that had inspired its mission was above all a rich countries’ problem—it was in fact a crisis caused by the former Northern powers. For the emerging economies, mobilization of the G20 member countries only made sense if it prompted a broader reflection on the definition of the prosperity of nations, necessarily including a notion of sustainable, shared growth. Thus, in particular thanks to Brazil’s and Argentina’s ini-tiative, and with the noted support of the British presidency, a number of social topics cropped up on the G20 agenda over the course of the year 2009. its efficacy will therefore henceforth be gauged by these new priorities, and more generally according to what the group’s members define as their common mission. But this definition is far from having been stabilized.

lastly, in making an a priori judgment that the G20 is legitimate or not, a more essential question regarding the conditions of international cooperation is overshadowed. in the context of the early 21st century, marked by the growing involvement of non-governmental actors in international politics, can states legitimately claim to be the sole regula-tors of world affairs, be it within the G20 or elsewhere? in some sense, the question has become irrelevant. Civil society, in its great diversity of manifestations, has already found its place both in the deliberations of formal international organizations and in ad hoc summits such as rio, Kyoto, Copenhagen and so on—either because it carved out a place for itself or because states have occasionally acknowledged their own


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limitations and recognized the utility of calling on outside expertise. however, from the standpoint of international legitimacy, this evolution does not resolve the matter of inviting actors other than states to join in world politics. how indeed to decide which NGo, which trade union or which employer association should take part in such and such dialogue and according to what criteria?18

while there is an established norm according to which all states are in theory legitimate international actors, there is no such convention for civil society. in this regard, the G20 simply fell in line with the current practice of network diplomacy that consists in broadening the circle of dialogue out of principle. it should be recalled that the Group of Twenty coordinates, for instance, with the ilo on employment issues and with the FAo on agriculture, two organizations which themselves bring in or systematically cooperate with non-governmental actors. if the issue of the G20’s legitimacy is to be analyzed in earnest, then this fact must also be taken into account.

The notion of legitimacy, as complex as it is useful to understand the functioning and evolution of the world order, cannot shed light on the “G20” phenomenon if one loses sight of the fact that the notion is by nature normative and political. By sticking to a priori assertions such as “the G20 has no legitimacy,” one forgoes analyzing the many questions raised by the emergence of the Group of Twenty in the management of international relations. what is its degree of representativeness, and especially, how are the questions of representation that it raises indica-tive of the functioning of international society today? Can the principle of representativeness still be reduced to a mere matter of arithmetic, a question sociologist Pierre rosanvallon raises with regard to the inter-nal dynamics of democracies?19 if the uN’s universality is limited to a numerical reality—the sum of all the nations on the planet—can the G20 make a different contribution to defining world public inter-est? More particularly, can it help solve the dilemma of “asymmetrical governance,”20 crystallized around the North-South divide and sustained by the international organizations set up after 1945?

The G20 against the UN?

is the Group of Twenty the opponent of the 174 other united Nations member countries that do not belong to it? Should the G20 be overhauled for their sake, answering a plea made by economists robert wade and


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Jakob Vestergaard?21 during the Pittsburgh summit in September 2009, the G20 defined itself as the “premier forum for international economic cooperation.”22 This is the moment from which warnings started to multiply against the Group of Twenty taking too much power; it being deemed detrimental to the proper functioning of the international system and more specifically the role played by the united Nations. The Swiss president was one of the first to allude to a potential antagonism between the G20 and the uN:

The G-20 has taken over a role in discussing important global issues. This development must not take place at the expense of other nations or global institutions such as the uN.23

Two potentially complementary entities

yet, as Finnish analyst Juha Jokela notes, the uN itself, in a 2004 report compiled by a high-level commission, recommended giving the G20 greater importance, before it had become a forum for heads of state.24 The contrast between this recommendation and the warnings subse-quently issued in the name of the united Nations though without its official approval is indeed striking:

while the annual meetings of the G8 group at head of State or Government level fulfill some of the characteristics required to give greater coherence and impetus to the necessary policies, it would be helpful to have a larger forum bringing together the heads of the major developed and developing countries. one way of moving forward may be to transform into a leader’s group the G20 group of finance ministers, which currently brings together States collectively encompassing 80 per cent of the world’s population and 90 per cent of its economic activity, with regular attendance by the international Monetary Fund, world Bank, wTo and the European union.25

The concerns about the new post-2008 G20 encroaching on the uN’s prerogatives has been expressed in different ways, reflecting as many diverse, even divergent, preoccupations and interest. on the united Nations side, there has been no routine opposition between the organization and the G20 but rather questions as to how the two entities should coordinate their actions. The analysis offered by General Assembly President Joseph deiss in August 2011 is explicit:

Traditional multilateral institutions, like the uN and the Bretton woods institutions, are increasingly criticized for not being efficient and repre-sentative enough.


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As a response, new actors, like the G20 and other ad hoc informal groups have emerged. The economic and financial crisis has highlighted the importance of a rapid and coordinated response, which the G20 has—at least in the immediate aftermath of the crisis—effectively delivered.

There is a risk for the uN to be marginalized. Suffice it to recall here that when heads of State and government of the G20 met in Pittsburgh, on 24–25 September 2009, to work out a collective response to the economic and financial crisis, the General debate was still going on at the united Nations in New york!

yet, if we have to acknowledge that these smaller groupings can indeed act in an efficient manner, their inclusiveness and legitimacy on the other hand is questionable. we have to find the best possible articulation between expertise, leadership and legitimacy, and all this has to be coherent.26

The president of the uN General Assembly uses the notion of “legiti-macy” with the same assumption of objectivity as many of the others previously cited. But what stands out above all is an awareness of the uN’s shortcomings in terms of its current functioning, a problem that had come to light well before the idea was conceived of a G20 at the level of heads of state and government. Joseph deiss in particular notes that the question of representation pertains as much to the uN as the G20. in fact, neither of the two entities adequately resolves this issue. As regards democracies, Pierre rosanvallon shows how the principle of universal suffrage has sustained the myth that numerical majority alone defined the general interest.27 with the progress of citizen participation, the definition of the general interest has expanded to include new criteria, in particular giving minorities a greater voice. while the national—and what’s more democratic—scenes and the international scenes are not entirely comparable, this analysis is basically applicable to the matter of representativeness in the world order. A majority in numerical terms does not suffice to define the general interest at the international level. Though it may seem indispensable to have, or rather inconceivable not to have, an institution such as the uN in which all the countries of the world are represented or nearly (Taiwan being a notable exception), the organization cannot be expected to manage to define and defend what Pierre rosanvallon calls “social generality,” in other words the “general” aspect of the general interest, on the basis of a numerical value alone. And in fact, hardly had the ink dried on the signatures at the bottom of the uN Charter than a number of associations of states were formed—regional groups (the Arab league in March 1945), Northern


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and Southern groups—to defend what these sub-groups considered to be their common interest.

The G77 came together to give a voice to countries that considered they were poorly represented in the uN decision-making process and which moreover, having just emerged from colonization, had not taken part in bringing the organization into being. The uN was historically conceived to work toward universal peace, a design in which the poverty factor was only very marginally taken into account. The only states that have a right of veto in the entire organization—the five victors of world war ii, forming a club that has remained unaltered for more than 60 years—have been the active arbiters or the passive witnesses of many armed conflicts that have been extremely costly to poor countries. Admittedly, the uN has integrated development into its mission and in 1971 established the notion of least developed Countries (ldC) by which it identifies specific programs to combat poverty. Countless initiatives have been devised, including the Millennium development Goals (MdG) in 2000, which were to be attained by 2015, and which according to a midpoint progress report by the world Bank seem out of reach.28 More fundamentally, the uN to date has been unable to curb the need felt by nations of the South to form their own interest groups, the G77 now consisting of 130 member countries. As economist hubert Mpunga Tshisambu points out, the uN is not the G1.29 it does not represent the only voice of a single universality that is difficult to produce. it is indeed the G193 in which power struggles are no less absent than anywhere else.

Common representation issues

The problem of the G20’s representativeness should be gauged by its ambition to serve the international general interest, but how and to what extent? This ambition remains as it was defined in Pittsburgh in 2009: to be the “premier forum for international economic cooperation.” The term “forum” indicates that it is a consultative body with no power to constrain the world’s nations or any of its members. it thus does not have a power comparable to the uN Security Council in which each member can authorize or block a decision that may affect entire regions, even a considerable portion of the world. on the other hand, the choice of “pre-mier” as an adjective to qualify this forum reflects a strong determination to influence international politics.

The 19 countries in the G20 and the European union could probably have strived to wield the same influence through the game of coalitions


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frequently played in existing institutions. By creating a specific frame-work, they improve their ability to achieve it. once again, the G20 has no tangible means to make its decisions binding, and that remains a considerable difference with the uN, even though the organization’s resolutions are not always complied with. But by bringing together 19 nations, most of them among the world’s largest economies, as well as the Eu, the most powerful regional grouping of the globe, and by pub-licly announcing its intention to have an impact on the international economic agenda, the G20 makes the matter of representation all the more salient. it becomes more so as the G20 agenda expands, the defini-tion of “the global economy” broadening with each of its summits.

in the very early stages of its inception, from 1997 to 1999, the G20 went from 14 to 22 and then to 33 members. once it reached this fig-ure, the G33 almost immediately realized that the swift coordination required to tackle the subjects within its purview was impossible due to its size . The G8’s suggestion to reduce the G33 to the G20 implied the removal of certain existing members, but no addition of new ones except for the European union. As a result, most of the world’s 19 larg-est economies and a few smaller ones whose presence could be justified by their regional representativeness, remained in the Group. it is thus not surprising that this uneasy compromise—it is difficult to describe it any other way—met with criticism, especially after 2008. why were small countries such the Netherlands and Switzerland (16th and 18th largest world economies respectively in 2010) not included? why did Spain (12th largest economy) apparently have to give up its place to Argentina (27th largest economy), and if Argentina was there to rein-force the presence of latin America, why not Venezuela (24th largest economy) instead?30 it is not hard to imagine that political preferences carried weight in the trade-off.

More generally speaking, some arbitration processes are known to cause intense diplomatic headaches and are rarely resolved. This has been evidenced by the debate over the plan to increase the number of per-manent members on the uN Security Council: a consensual candidate country for Africa has yet to be agreed upon. At the G20, inclusion of South Africa as the continent’s only representative has been disputed. At the Toronto summit in June 2010, Nigeria officially requested entry into the Group of Twenty. And if a representative of the “least developed Countries”—an economic classification devised for granting develop-ment assistance but that does not correspond to any coherent political


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community—were to be included, the choice would likely be just as tricky.

while the uN brings together all the world’s nations, the organization does not for all that reflect any true political universality. The prolif-eration of ad hoc groups and summits is not the only indication of the limits of uN responses to the world’s problems. For the past several decades there has also been a debate on the need to reform the uN as much among those who would like to see its power curbed and its vast bureaucracy reduced as among those on the contrary who would like its international weight to increase while enhancing its efficacy and transparency. The debate—or the rhetoric—on the need for reform is even more alive among many of the organization’s civil servants and executives. Several internal initiatives on the theme have been produced, such as the “Delivering as One” program that aims to address the grow-ing fragmentation of institution services in the areas of development, humanitarian assistance and the environment.31

discussion of a conflict between the G20 and the G172 (actually 174) thus disregards the united Nations’ functioning problems, despite the fact that these have long since been identified and solutions for which have long eluded specialists. Moreover, this opposition assumes a unity within the G20—which remains to be seen—and the “G172” (174)—which is likely non-existent. it is moreover revealing that the “pro-G172s” who have expressed themselves jointly usually either repre-sent a fairly broad one though not universal political movement, such as the alter-globalists,32 or large entities that defend specific interests, such as the Commonwealth and Francophonie.33

has the G20, whose 19 member states after all are part of the uN, including the five permanent members of the Security Council, been attuned to the various demands to take into account the “G172” (174)? insofar as the members of the G20 themselves, especially the emerging countries, have promoted a more holistic interpretation of the “global economy” by adding a number of social dimensions; it seemed logical that the Group would call on institutions that already had the necessary expertise and links with civil society in specific areas, such as the ilo for employment and the FAo for agriculture. The G20 has thus gradu-ally intensified cooperation with various united Nations agencies. The French G20 presidency also gave this cooperation greater political vis-ibility by keeping the General Assembly directly informed of the Group’s progress: in February 2011, Agriculture Minister Bruno lemaire, and


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then labor Minister Xavier Bertrand the following June, traveled to New york to present their respective files. The following G20 presidency, held by Mexico, had already announced its intention to pursue the Group’s coordination with the uN. The russian presidency has done the same, by inviting the uN secretary-general to attend the 2013 G20 summit in St. Petersburg. it seems doubtful that the trend should be reversed, all the more as, if the G20 indeed hopes to have an impact on international socioeconomic cooperation, it will have to rely on existing institutional resources.

The G20 instead of the G8?

is it time to proclaim the G8 is dead, long live the G20? it is impossible to list them all here, but an astounding number of declarations have announced the demise of the G8 in the past few years. They irresistibly bring to mind Mark Twain’s famous remark after having read his obitu-ary in a newspaper: “the report of my death was an exaggeration.” The his-tory of both formal and informal international institutions shows that while the process of establishing may be onerous, it is much more dif-ficult to dismantle them. institutions by nature endeavor to perpetuate themselves, and associations of states in particular offer their members a degree of prestige and influence on the international scene that they are reluctant to relinquish, however much it may be on the wane. This resilient nature of international institutions also explains their tendency to enlarge. The G77 has more than doubled in less than 50 years. The Asia Pacific Forum, originally a small group of five countries, became an association of 12 members in 1989 and was 21 members strong 10 years later.

The G8 is thus still alive and well, and its composition has remained remarkably stable. it took events of considerable magnitude—the fall of the Berlin wall and the breakup of the Soviet union—to envisage transforming the G7 and opening it up to russia. This decision as we have seen followed on from the spirit of the Cold war rather than tran-scended it. russia’s admission was justified by the idea of welcoming the “defeated” nation or the “other power” of the bipolar conflict, not by a concern for better representing world balances, in which case it would have made more sense to invite China, india and Brazil. it now seems unlikely that the G8 will be enlarged any further. it is more plausible


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that it will maintain its established dialogue mechanisms with Africa on the one hand, and the “G5” or “outreach 5” made up of South Africa, Brazil, China, india and Mexico, on the other. The status quo seems all the more appropriate as a transformation of the G8 into, for instance, a G13 that would include “outreach 5,” would too obviously duplicate the purpose of the G20. russia has clearly expressed its opposition to replacing the G8 by the G20, which would dilute its influence. italy seconded russia’s objection. The other European countries, theoretically faced with the same dilemma, have remained more discreet. The France decision’s while presiding both the G8 and the G20 in 2011 to hold two separate summits at different points in time, speaks for itself. The white house would have liked the two “Gs” to be held back to back, suppos-edly to spare President Barak obama an extra trip. At the last minute, on his January 2011 visit to washington, President Nicolas Sarkozy finally convinced his American counterpart to cross the Atlantic twice.

The problem posed now is not whether to replace the G8 by the G20, but of how to define the two Gs’ respective perimeters. The G8 of 2011 in deauville was enlightening in this regard. By a chance of history, the summit was held right in the middle of what has been termed the Arab Spring, a widespread series of revolutions that rocked one of the most geopolitically strategic areas in the world. All of a sudden the G8, and even more so the G7, had the opportunity to reconnect with its original political identity as it was outlined in the rambouillet declaration; the champion of democracies. The previous summit in Muskoka, Canada, was organized around the theme “recovery and New Beginnings,” reflecting a moment, according to the final declaration, in which the world was beginning “a fragile recovery from the greatest economic crisis in generations.”34 Many of the topics dealt with revolved around growth and development, in fact overlapping the themes dealt with by the G20 and the uN, and leaving considerably less room for the G8’s traditional issues of international peace and security.

The final communiqué of the deauville G8 announced a clear change of direction with the title “renewed Commitment for Freedom and democracy.” The global economy, pushed down the agenda and rel-egated to a secondary discussion point, was clearly not the subject of the introduction, which was worded thus:

we, the leaders of the Group of Eight, met in deauville on 26 and 27 May 2011. in this period of change, we reaffirmed our profound commit-ment to the values of freedom and democracy, and their universality.


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in light of the recent developments in the Middle East and North Africa, and in SubSaharan Africa, we renewed our commitment to support democratic reform around the world and to respond to the aspirations for freedom, including freedom of religion, and empowerment, particularly for women and youth. democracy lays the best path to peace, stability, pros-perity, shared growth and development.35

A separate declaration was even devoted to the “Arab Springs.” Celebrating the “spirit of 1989” that had freed Eastern Europe from communism, the declaration reaffirmed the G8’s political and economic solidarity toward countries South of the Mediterranean that had in turn come out of the winter of authoritarianism by offering them a program of support, the deauville Partnership:

The changes under way in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are historic and have the potential to open the door to the kind of transforma-tion that occurred in Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin wall. The aspiration of people for freedom, human rights, democracy, job opportunities, empowerment and dignity, has led them to take control of their own destinies in a growing number of countries in the region. it resonates with and reinforces our common values.

we, members of the G8, strongly support the aspirations of the “Arab spring” as well as those of the iranian people. ...

Today we launched the “deauville Partnership” with the people of the region, based on our common goals for the future, in the presence of the Prime Ministers of Egypt and Tunisia, the two countries that originated the movement, and of the Secretary General of the Arab league. ...

This Partnership is based on two pillars: a political process to support the democratic transition and foster governance reforms, notably the fight against corruption and the strengthening of the institutions needed to ensure transparency and accountable government; and an economic frame-work for sustainable and inclusive growth.36

in agreement with journalist Jean quatremer, the “Arab Spring” in 2011 can to a certain extent be said to have saved the G8 from growing uncer-tainty as to its main purpose.37 The deauville summit also allowed France to clarify its diplomatic position in the area, particularly after Paris’s confused reactions to the events in Tunisia. The new circumstances in the Arab world undeniably provided substance for the G8’s political renewal and thus enabled it to reassert its specificity with respect to the G20.

other factors, however, suggest that this evolution was not merely the product of current events and that it reflected, and still reflects, a


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more deep-seated tendency. The French G8 presidency in particular had planned an “e-G8 Forum” well before the Arab uprisings. it was a pre-deauville summit meeting devoted to internet-related socioeconomic and political issues. in this context, President Nicolas Sarkozy stated that the internet had reinforced democracy and human rights, and that “states have been incited to greater transparency and, in some countries, oppressed peoples have been empowered to make their voices heard and to act collectively in the name of freedom.”38 when the plan for the forum was announced, the demonstrations in iran in summer 2010, dubbed the “Twitter revolution” due to the role this tool played in the mobilization, were still fresh in mind; the importance of social networks was confirmed in the Maghreb. The “e-G8” meeting, held in Paris on May 24–25, 2011 and attended by indus-trial actors of these new forms of communication, including the founder of Facebook, was greeted with mixed reactions however. it was criticized by several associations, French and American ones in particular, that campaign for greater internet deregulation. The critics consider that the pertinent issues had been masked by a forum coordinated by Group of Eight leaders. however, if it was possible to hold such a debate, it is precisely because it was in Paris, in a democratic context. it would have been unthinkable in Tehran or in Beijing. in China, Communist Party officials, overwhelmed by the effectiveness of social networks in the revolutions in the Maghreb, blocked all electronic messages containing the word “jasmine,” a reference to the revolution known by that name, fearing it would be used as a code name for organizing subversive movements.

The return of an explicitly political rhetoric emphasizing terms such as “democracy,” “freedom” and “human rights” was possible at the G8 summit in 2011, even with an authoritarian russia. its political regime makes russia a de facto minority in the Group of Eight. The country nevertheless places great store in the group because, once again, it enjoys greater visibility there than in the G20. on the other hand, neither of the two deauville summit declarations—the overt request for Muammar Gaddafi to leave Tripoli (“He must go”) and criticism of iran’s nuclear program and condemnation of North Korea’s—, could be envisaged by the Group of Twenty, where inter-pretations of democracy and civil liberties as well as geopolitical viewpoints are too far apart. A white house official in deauville told the press that while the G20 remained the premier forum for international economic coopera-tion, the G8 had the advantage of being a small group of leaders having a “strong relationship.” 39 The French president compared the G8 to a meeting of the “democratic family.”40


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The idea of bringing together an “alliance,” a “union,” a “concert” or yet again a “league” of the world’s democratic nations was the topic of extensive debate in the united States.41 it reflects a vision, shared by republicans and democrats alike, of cooperation that would revive the philosophy of the Atlantic Charter, blueprint for the united Nations charter and would be truly effective by espousing the ideal of a fight for liberty against totalitarianism. This idea was also well received in Europe, especially by former danish Prime Minister Anders rasmussen who had become secretary-general of NATo. Aside from the diplomatic difficulties that establishing such an alliance would involve, interest in it waned when some of its champions endorsed President George w. Bush’s plan to “export democracy” to the Middle East and failure of the plan was confirmed with particularly disastrous results in the case of iraq. The ambition to create a space for discussion for countries that share and abide by the same major democratic principles has neverthe-less not vanished. it continues to be the topic of backstage discussions at the united Nations, for instance, among certain members. it obviously serves as a reference point for the G8, even if the group has to deal with the fact that russia seems rather to be sinking into authoritarianism, and despite the absence of two other large democracies—Brazil and india—in terms of their populations and their economies. if the composition of the G8 is supposed to be representative of the “democratic family,” it is plainly once again the result of an uneasy compromise. But it is also undeniable that despite its lopsided aspect, this “family” can claim to play a role that the G20 cannot fulfill, and thereby helps perpetuate it.

Totals for Member States of Each G (% of world total), 2010

Sources: OECD, World Bank, IMF, SIPRI, UN-DESA Sciences Po - Atelier de cartographie, 2011

53.9 12.832.647.964.5

11.8 37.83.913.6 25.9

26.4 77.523.130.4 58.0

77.0 61.642.166.567.8 68.0

G8

G24*

G77

G20

Gross national income(GNI) Population

Militaryexpenditure

IMF quotashare

O�cial developmentassistance (ODA) donors

ODA recipients

* China (observer status) is not counted.

Figure 1 Weight of the Gs in the world


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Sources: World Bank, UN-DESA, Unesco, Transparency International, Economist Intelligence Unit Sciences Po - Atelier de cartographie, 2011

Mean Indicators for Member States of Each G

GNP at PPP per capita(thousands of $)

Life expectancyat birth (years)

Literacy rate (% of adults)

Population living with less than $1.25 per person per day** (%)

TransparencyInternational index rating*

�e Economistdemocracyindex score

G8 33.7 79.3-6.5

G24 7.7 67.178.6 30.52.9G77 8.4 65.478 263.2

G20 23.1 75.294 195.2

United States 47.1 79.6- -7.1Japan 34.7 83.2- -7.8

France 34.3 81.6- -6.8

Russia 15.3 67.299.5 1.92.1Turkey 13.3 72.288.7 2.64.4

Brazil 10.6 72.990 5.23.7South Africa 9.8 5289 26.24.5

China 7.2 73.593.7 15.93.5India 3.3 64.462.8 41.63.3

Nigeria 2.1 48.460.1 64.42.4

** mean determined from populations, no coutries.

- too much data lacking to calculate mean.

* a low �gureindicates a highcorruption level.

7.7

5.14.6

6.9

8.28.17.8

4.35.77.17.8

3.17.33.5

G8

G24G77

G20

United StatesJapanFrance

Russia TurkeyBrazilSouth Africa

ChinaIndiaNigeria

Figure 2 Average development levels of the Gs, 2010

Notes

See1 Paul Martin, “A Global Answer to Global Problems,” Foreign Affairs, May–June 2005.See http://www.cigionline.org (last accessed on october 14, 2013).2 See http://www.diis.dk (last accessed on october 14, 2013).3 Jonas Gahr Støre, “Time for G-20 to Address its legitimacy,” Norwegian Foreign 4 Affairs Ministry, April 6, 2010 (available at http://www.regjeringen.no (last accessed on october 14, 2013)). This article was widely distributed and published in April 2010, for instance, in the following newspapers: Times of India, Ottawa Citizen, New Straits Times (Malaysia), The Straits Times (Philippines) and Al Hayat.interview with Jonas Gahr Støre, “10 Nordic Politicians,” Copenhagen, Norden, 5 March 2011 (available at www.norden.org (last accessed on october 14, 2013)).Anders Åslund, “The Group of 20 Must Be Stopped,” 6 Financial Times, November 26, 2009.ibid.7 “Statement by the hon. datuk Anifah Aman, Minister of Foreign Affairs of 8 Malaysia, at the Thirty-Third Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Group of 77 and China,” New york, September 25, 2009.Kemal dervis, “G20 Should increase the legitimacy of the international 9 institutions,” Europe’s World, Spring 2010 (available at http://www.europesworld.org (last accessed on october 14, 2013)).


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http://www.diis.dk

http://www.regjeringen.no

http://www.norden.org

http://www.europesworld.org


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See10 among others david Vines and Christopher Gilbert (eds), The IMF and Its Critics. Reform of Global Financial Architecture, Cambridge, Cambridge university Press, 2004; Peter Coffey, robert riley, Reform of the International Institutions. The IMF, World Bank and the WTO, Northampton, Edward Elgar, 2006; Sumihiro Kuyama and Michael ross Fowler (eds), Envisioning Reform. Enhancing UN Accountability in the Twenty-First Century, Tokyo, united Nations university Press, 2009; Thomas George weiss, What’s Wrong with the United Nations and How to Fix It, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2009; Mohamed Mansour Kadah, “united Nations. Building legitimacy and Maintaining relevance in a weakened institution,” Portuguese Journal of International Affairs, Fall–winter 2010.Johannes linn, “how the G20 Can Break the Stalemate in the reform of the 11 Multilateral development System. Proposals for Action,” in Colin Bradford and wonhyuk lim (eds), Global Leadership in Transition. Making the G20 More Effective and Responsive, washington and Seoul, Brookings institution Press, Korea development institute, 2011.Jakob Vestergaard,12 “The G20 and Beyond. Towards Effective Global Economic Governance,” Copenhagen, danish institute for international Studies, April 2011.ian Clark, 13 International Legitimacy and World Society, oxford, oxford university Press, 2007. See also Martin wight, “international legitimacy,” in hedley Bull (ed.), Systems of States, leicester, leicester university Press, 1977; Thomas Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations, oxford, oxford university Press, 1990; Andrew hurrell, On Global Order. Power, Values, and the Constitution of International Society, oxford, oxford university Press, 2007.halfway between the so-called realist viewpoint of the international sphere that 14 rests on the assumption that states are basically selfish and not cooperative, and an “idealist” interpretation in which the dominant tendency on the contrary is cooperation, the English School of international relations theory claims that states are indeed selfish by nature but they accept collective rules and norms as long as these ultimately follow their own interests. See hedley Bull’s seminal work, The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics, london, Palgrave Macmillan, 1977.See,15 for instance, Pierre hassner and Gilles Andréani (eds), Justifying War, New york, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, and “Force and legitimacy in world Politics,” special issue of Review of International Studies, vol. 31, december 2005.Shane Mulligan, “The uses of legitimacy in international relations,” 16 Millennium-Journal of International Studies, vol. 34, no. 2, 2005.Martha Finnemore, “Fights About rules. The role of Efficacy and Power in 17 Changing Multilateralism,” in Review of International Studies 31, 2005.


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on this issue, see18 Michael warning, Transnational Public Governance. Networks, Law and Legitimacy, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.Pierre rosanvallon, 19 Democratic Legitimacy, Impartiality, Reflexivity, Proximity, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, Princeton, Princeton university Press, 2011.See20 roy Culpeper, “Governance, Transparency and Accountability in the ‘Gs,’ ” The North-South Institute, 20 April 2009.robert wade and Jakob Vestergaard, “overhaul the G20 for the sake of the 21 G172,” Financial Times, october 21, 2010. The concept of “G172” has been picked up by various international actors, in particular the alter-globalist movement. To be exact, the precise number of uN member countries that are not part of the G20 is actually 174. The error arises from the fact that people often forget that there are only 19 states in the G20 (the 20th member is the Eu), and the expression “G172” was coined prior to South Sudan’s entrance in the uN in July 2011. The uN now has 193 member countries.“leaders’ Statement. The Pittsburgh Summit,” September 24–25, 2009 (available 22 at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0925.html – last accessed on october 14, 2013).“Statement by h.E. Mr. hans-rudolf Merz, President of the Swiss Confederation. 23 General Assembly, 64th Session, General debate,” united Nations, New york, September 24, 2009.Juha Jokela, “The G-20. A Pathway to Effective Multilateralism?” 24 Chaillot Papers (Paris), April 2011.“A More Secure world. our Shared responsibility,” 25 UN Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, New york, united Nations, 2004.“Address given by the President of the united Nations General Assembly h.E. 26 Mr. Joseph deiss: Global Governance at the Beginning of the 21st Century. what is the role of the united Nations?” united Nations Economic Commission for latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAl/uNElAC), Santiago, August 8, 2011.Pierre rosanvallon, 27 Democratic Legitimacy.“Global Challenges. The Poorest Countries,” 28 The World Bank Group, washington, october 2008.hubert Mpunga Tshisambu, “G2, G2, G4+, G8 ... G77: la gouvernance 29 économique mondiale sous l’emprise de l’informel,” Kongo Times, January 21, 2010 (http://afrique.kongotimes.info – last accessed on october 14, 2013).Keeping Argentina was also a subject of tension within the G20 according to a cable 30 published by wikileaks on March 11, 2011. Cf. MercoPress (http://en.mercopress.com last accessed on october 14, 2013), March 18, 2011, as well as rodrigo orihuela, “G20: Argentina Belongs here,” The Guardian, April 1, 2009.Secretary-General’s high-level Panel on uN System-wide Coherence in 31 the Areas of development, humanitarian Assistance, and the Environment, “delivering as one,” united Nations, New york, November 9, 2006.


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See32 , for instance, the interview given by Susan George, honorary president of Attac, in Rue 89 (http://www.rue89.com/entretien/2011/01/17/susan-george-dattac-il-faut-mettre-les-banques-sous-tutelle-185859 – last accessed on october 14, 2013), January 17, 2011; Marc-André Blais, “Pour un G-172!” Le Journal des Alternatives (Montreal), February 9, 2011.See33 the joint declaration by Kamalesh Sharma, Commonwealth Secretary-General and Abdou diouf, Francophonie Secretary-General, “Ecoutez la voix du G172,” March 27, 2009 (available at the website of the Réseau des organisations non gouvernementales de l’espace francophone: http://ong-francophonie.net last accessed on october 14, 2013).“G8 Muskoka declaration. recovery and New Beginnings,” Muskoka, June 25–26 34 2010 (available at http://canadainternational.gc.ca last accessed on october 14, 2013).“deauville G8 declaration. renewed Commitment for Freedom and 35 democracy,” G8 Summit in deauville, May 26–27, 2011 (available at ec.europa.eu/commission_2010.../deauville-g8-declaration_en.pdf – last accessed on october 14, 2013).“declaration of the G8 on the Arab Spring,” G8 Summit of deauville, May 26–27, 36 2011 (available at http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g8/).Jean quatremer, “le printemps arabe sauve the G8,” 37 Libération, May 27, 2011.President’s welcome Address, e-G8 Forum, May 24–25, 2011 (retrieved in June 38 2011 from http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2011deauville/eg8/eg8-sarkozy-en.html).“G8’s last hurrah? Summitry Evolves, Not dead,” 39 Reuters, May 29, 2011.Le Monde40 , May 27, 2011.See41 the reasoned presentation by Pauline Peretz and Manuel lafont rapnouil, “l’union des démocraties: un semblant de multilatéralisme sans légitimité?” Esprit, no. 347, August–September 2008.


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http://www.rue89.com/entretien/2011/01/17/susan-george-dattac-il-faut-mettre-les-banques-sous-tutelle-185859%E2%80%93LastaccessedonOctober14

http://ong-francophonie.DOI:

http://ong-francophonie.DOI:

http://canadainternational.gc.ca

http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/g8/

http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2011deauville/eg8/eg8-sarkozy-en.html

http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2011deauville/eg8/eg8-sarkozy-en.html

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3The End of “The West and the Rest”

The changing South

whatever its future may bring, the G20 has already made history in international cooperation as the first informal grouping of states that has transcended the North-South divide. This major point of fact tends to be sidelined, even virtually overshadowed, in European perceptions of the G20. Both the G77 and the G24 were created specifically to make the voice of developing countries heard, within the united Nations in the former case, and in the face of the 11 major iMF creditor countries in the latter. The G15, which grew out of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1989, set itself the objective of pursuing “a more positive and produc-tive North-South dialogue” but nevertheless defined itself exclusively as a group of developing countries.1 Conversely, the G10 could only be a group of developed countries, dis-cussing issues of loans and debt with debtor countries. And the G7 has always been a group of Northern countries that gradually incorporated a dialogue with the South—first Africa, and then the emerging powers—into its agenda.

The G20 is thus innovative in that the membership criterion for this group is not to be from North or South


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The End of “The West and the Rest”

but to be “systemically important”—a criterion that takes into account economic size, but not only, per capita wealth not being a decisive factor. The G20’s existence thus does not mean that the world gap between wealth and poverty has disappeared, but that the “asymmetri-cal governance” illustrated by the coexistence of the G7 and the G77 is no longer the only horizon for international cooperation. Even if dialogue mechanisms between the “Northern” and “Southern” entities are still useful, it has also become possible, even necessary, to create a space for dialogue shared by these two entities. it also means that for the first time since the end of colonialism, the west no longer stands alone—the Japanese exception set aside—on the decision-making side. in particular it is no longer the only one to decide who is invited (or not) to dialogue with it.

South Korea, the only non-western nation to date to have presided the G20 as a leadership summit (prior to the Mexican presidency of 2011–2012), has gauged the importance of this evolution. The South Korean delegation made this comment on the decision to entrust Seoul with organizing the 2010 summit:

South Korea is the first non-G7 (G8) country to host the G20 summit. it will be a memorable event for South Korea, on a par with its entrance to the united Nations in 1991. up until now, South Korea has played by rules made by developed countries. Now it is part of the group that drives the global economy.2

South Korea’s trajectory is indeed spectacular. one of the poorest countries of the globe after the civil war on the peninsula in the 1950s, South Korea joined the oECd in 1996, and 15 years later, with a per capita GdP of nearly 30,000 dollars, its wealth is now comparable to the European union average. isolated diplomatically during the Cold war, its emergence is not only economic but also political.

Thus it is understandable why South Korea has been particularly attentive to questions of representation in the G20 summit. The list of the Group’s permanent members will probably remain unchanged. The issue debated now revolves around the list of countries to be invited to the summit. it is a delicate question subject to an arbitration process that is not transparent, one that Seoul resolved by seeking a consensus among the Twenty regarding the choice of external participants. This diplomacy of compromise, undertaken by a former developing country, contrasts with the position of other so-called emerging countries of the G20, and


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Identity, Citizenship, and Violence in Two Sudans

moreover points up how different the realities underlying the notions of “South” and “emergence” can be.

Emerging nations: a highly diverse category

Never has there actually been a unified “South” but rather different Southern realities, as historian Sophie Bessis writes.3 The monolithic notions of “the North” and “the west” are also socio-historical construc-tions that correspond to changing and diverse realities. For the purposes of communication or argument, the image of a unified South has been sustained as much by elites in developing countries as by their counter-parts in rich countries. during the Cold war, the idea of general solidar-ity among Southern nations fueled Third-worldist discourse, despite the fact that a number of Third world analysts detected and pointed out dividing lines running through this movement practically since its inception.4 These more or less closely followed the moderate to radical positions taken toward the two camps of the Cold war and crystallized around rivalries of influence and access to material resources.

More fundamentally, it is the major differences in trajectories among South countries that highlight the extraordinary heterogeneity of what may have seemed from a distance, from Europe, for instance, as being one immense ocean of poverty. in the 1970s, South Korea was still much less developed and industrialized than its communist rival to the North that nevertheless belongs to the Non-Aligned Movement. Twenty years later, the situation was completely reversed, the southern part of the peninsula moreover becoming democratic. More generally speaking, the economic transformation of East Asian countries starting in the late 1980s, and sometime their political metamorphosis—as in Taiwan or to a lesser extent in Thailand—altered the image that the west as well as Japan tended to have of the South.

This representation further evolved with the eruption of certain so-called emerging countries on the diplomatic stage in the early 2000s. The term itself, “emerging markets,” was invented in 1981 by a private sector economist at the world Bank, Antoine van Agtmael, who was seeking to replace the expression “Third world” by a more attractive expression for investors: the concept was a financial tool long before entering the sphere of geopolitical analysis.5 Apart from similar growth rates, there was, and still is from an international relations standpoint, a large vari-ety of situations among emerging nations. Some countries such as South Korea or other “Asian dragons” have experienced a fairly even increase


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in wealth. others such as China and india have seen chasms between rich and poor develop in their societies. Some seem to have left military authoritarianism behind for good, such as Brazil and once again South Korea; others, such as China, have not.

Emerging nations have gained more or less diplomatic sway: some already had influence, such as China with its seat on the uN Security Council. Brazil and Turkey have become much more visible in the geo-political game; others, such as Mexico, have remained more discreet. lastly, russia, which as a great power in the Cold war took umbrage at being labeled “emerging,” has scarcely experienced any real economic development, the rent from hydrocarbons hampering rather than stimulating it. whereas many emerging countries, both large and small, are part of the wTo, and some also belong to the oECd (Turkey and Mexico), russia’s admission to this organization remains problematic. on the other hand, Moscow continues to wield considerable influence on the diplomatic scene, not only due to its seat on the uN Security Council, but precisely because it was the “other power” in the bipolar conflict and has both an imposing nuclear arsenal and an array of bar-gaining skills, an area in which the other emerging powers to a large extent remain novices.

The “emerging” concept has given some countries a face, bringing them out of the anonymous mass embraced by the notion of “South,” or even out of the no less homogenizing group of the G77’s 130 nations. As of the 1990s, the success of this concept—which first pertained to the financial sphere—led to a labeling craze aiming to designate the new groups of promising markets. After the mainly Asian “dragons” and the “tigers,” there was the “Big Ten,” also known as the “Big Emerging Markets” (BEM), a set of economies identified in 1997 by former American commerce undersecretary Jeffrey Garten and which for a long time served as a reference for investors.6 Then came the acronyms: the best known, the BriC—for Brazil, russia, india and China—was coined in 2001 by Jim o’Neill, head of research at Goldman Sachs.7 There have been others, also coined with a view to encourage foreign investment in the countries involved, such as CiVETS (Columbia, indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa) and ViSTA (Vietnam, indonesia, South Africa, Turkey, Argentina). And in January 2011, the same Jim o’Neill from Goldman Sachs invented a new concept that may gain the same currency as the BriC ten years earlier: MiST, made up of Mexico, indonesia, South Korea and Turkey.8


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Two trajectories of emergence: the BRIC versus IBSA

Promotion of the BriC financial object, by stimulating the flow of trans-actions and investments into these markets, has partly contributed to the prosperity of these four countries. The acronym’s media success has also made it useful politically. After a short-lived improvement in relations between washington and Moscow due to George w. Bush’s personal perception of Vladimir Putin as an ally in his “war on Terror,” tension again mounted between russia and NATo countries. it was in this context that President Putin, seeking to diversify his alliances, initiated a meeting of the Chinese, indian and Brazilian foreign affairs ministers with their russian counterpart on the fringe of the 61st united Nations General Assembly in September 2006.

The BriC officially became a leadership forum three years later, again on an initiative from russia, which hosted the first summit at yekaterinburg in June 2009. This summit was thus held a few months prior to the Pittsburgh G20 meeting. The goal was not to form an opposition force within the G20 but to group together the emerging nations that mutually recognized their newfound power and wanted to make its voice heard. The final joint statement of yekaterinburg, while confirming the central role of the G20 in international economic coordination, announced the group’s intention to improve the representativeness of the existing institutions:

we are committed to advance the reform of international financial insti-tutions, so as to reflect changes in the global economy. The emerging and developing economies must have greater voice and representation in international financial institutions, whose heads and executives should be appointed through an open, transparent and merit-based selection process. we also believe the there is a strong need for a stable, predictable and more diversified international monetary system.9

The message was crystal clear. The BriC wanted to have greater deci-sion-making power, particularly in the iMF, which implied redefining the quotas attributed to each of the Fund’s member countries. it also wanted the custom of appointing a European as head of the iMF to be replaced by a more legitimate procedure. The group furthermore challenged the predominance of the dollar in the international monetary system. By emphasizing these two points, it is easy to see why russia, whatever its own geopolitical agenda, had little trouble convincing the other three countries to form the BriC alliance. A third point, which pertained more specifically to india and Brazil, was added to the agenda:


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we express our strong commitment to multilateral diplomacy with the united Nations playing the central role in dealing with global challenges and threats. in this respect, we reaffirm the need for a comprehensive reform of the uN with a view to making it more efficient so that it can deal with today’s global challenges more effectively. we reiterate the importance we attach to the status of india and Brazil in international affairs, and understand and support their aspirations to play a greater role in the united Nations.10

The BriC’s activism has had mixed results to date. it has certainly had an impact in the framework of G20 discussions regarding the decision-making structure of the iMF. it was at the G20 summit in Seoul in November 2010 that the quota review was officially announced, giving more rights and duties to non-western countries.

on the other hand, the four major emerging powers, joined in the meantime by South Africa to become BriCS (“S” for South Africa), were unable to agree on a non-European candidate to replace Frenchman dominique Strauss-Kahn at the head of the iMF in June 2011. This failure contrasted with the convergence of open and public criticism from BriCS representatives, particularly from the government of india, against the process that ended up installing France’s former finance min-ister Christine lagarde at the head of the Fund, a process that indeed owed much to a tacit agreement between Americans and Europeans.

Furthermore, the support the BriC proclaimed and reiterated in favor of india’s and Brazil’s application for a permanent seat on the uN Security Council has not made any tangible progress. instead, russia and China showed very little eagerness for undertaking a genuine reform of the Security Council. A few years prior to that, when Germany, Brazil, india and Japan had applied jointly for admission into the circle, China already opposed such a plan, arguing that Tokyo had not reached maturity for a permanent seat given the Japanese government’s difficulty in recogniz-ing its responsibility for the war in the Pacific. This time, in response to demands from india and Brazil, and more timidly from South Africa, China revealed its profound reluctance in general toward any enlarge-ment of the core Security Council membership.

what the functioning of the BriC and then the BriCS has also revealed is that there are practically as many points of divergence among these countries as points of convergence. while it is objectively in the interest of these emerging powers to counterbalance the influence western countries acquired through their historic alliance over world


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governance and in particular within the G20, each of them has specific economic and political interests to defend. in some cases, such as for China and india, the rivalry is flagrant. in the early 2000s, there was a moment of euphoria over the progress made in resolving territorial disputes that have pit Beijing against New delhi since the Sino-indian war of 1962; optimism was also encouraged by the increase in trade between the two neighbors and the theoretical complementarity of their economies potentially leading to a new area of cooperation, “Chindia” (China and india). Since then, conflicting interests have returned to the fore: competition for access to energy resources, geopolitical disputes in particular regarding Pakistan and the investment race in Africa.

The high stakes in Africa are more generally speaking a source of rivalry among emerging powers, particularly with Brazil, which under President luis inácio lula da Silva, or “lula,” engaging in frenzied diplomatic activ-ity on the continent. This factor should be taken into account in analyzing China’s december 2010 initiative of inviting South Africa to join BriC. while Pretoria is not the undisputed leader of Africa, a position chal-lenged among others by Nigeria, it without a doubt represents the largest economy on the continent and a point of access for investment.

The ideal vision of a new China-india alliance seems all the less con-vincing as these two neighboring Asian giants probably form the weak-est link in what could constitute a coalition of Southern voices within G20. The complexity of this inter-Asian relationship is evident in the coexistence of BriCS with another forum, iBSA, formed by india, Brazil and South Africa. iBSA, which has been described as a new instrument of South-South cooperation,11 came together on the sidelines of the G8 summit in Evian in 2003, to which these three countries as well as China and Mexico had been invited for the first time to dialogue with the group of Northern nations. The india-Brazil-South Africa dialogue was officially launched in Brasilia in June 2003 and formally presented before the uN General Assembly in September the same year. what clearly sets iBSA apart from BriCS is their respective identities as well as their agendas. iBSA from the outset presented itself, in the Brasilia declaration, as a group of “vibrant democracies”: this self-definition has been reiterated in successive communiqués, its current stock expression being “multiethnic and multicultural democracies.” 12 BriCS, for obvi-ous reasons, has never defined itself in this fashion but has nevertheless introduced another type of democratic reference by claiming to promote “greater democracy in international relations.” 13


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As for its agenda, iBSA clearly aims to win a permanent seat on the uN Security Council for its members—a goal, as we have seen, that was no sooner announced than forgotten by BriC—and it also seeks to combat world poverty in conjunction with the united Nations and its Millennium development Goals program. BriC, and later BriCS, also announced its intention to support developing countries but in less specific terms. The forum’s prevailing objective manifests itself in a more general, geopolitical vein, aptly summed up by russian President dimitri Medvedev’s comment after the first official BriC meeting:

during our discussions in yekaterinburg, i pointed out to my colleagues that none of us took part in establishing the international financial system back in the 1930s–40s. i mean, none of our countries took part. Everything was decided for us. we cannot accept this situation again. we need to ensure that our countries, which between them are home to billions of people, take part in setting the new rules of the game.14

Even though the three iBSA countries are also part of BriCS, it must be noted that the two fora have not merged. China, now the other geo-political heavyweight in BriCS alongside russia, suggested a merger at the summit hosted by that country in Sanya in April 2011. The idea was rejected out of hand by india. if iBSA were to be eclipsed by BriCS, it would be primarily detrimental to New delhi’s influence. The problem that would be posed to the three iBSA members if a democratic platform representing the South were to be eliminated should also be taken into account. The combination of China’s and russia’s economic and diplo-matic strength respectively makes the BriCS a more powerful bargaining tool than iBSA in discussions with the west within the G20 or during ad-hoc summits. To some extent, the BriCS offers a real advantage for its three democratic members. But for the reasons just mentioned, including the rivalry between China and india, the two groups are likely to continue to coexist.

Since iBSA preserves its raison d’être and its three members are precisely part of the BriCS, it is also highly unlikely that the BriCS will become an opposition club to counter western countries represented by the former G7. The final BriCS declaration in April 2011 made a certain impression on the western press due to its unusually political dimension and in par-ticular its stand against NATo’s military intervention in libya:

we are deeply concerned with the turbulence in the Middle East, the North African and west African regions and sincerely wish that the countries


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affected achieve peace, stability, prosperity and progress and enjoy their due standing and dignity in the world according to legitimate aspirations of their peoples.

we share the principle that the use of force should be avoided. we main-tain that the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of each nation should be respected.15

This declaration has often been perceived as a message of opposition to the west; the wide media coverage that greeted it indeed suggested this.16 But the truth is far more nuanced. South Africa voted in favor of uN resolution 1973 that paved the way for NATo’s intervention in libya. Although russia, which like Brazil, China and india abstained during the vote, cosigned the Sanya declaration, it also endorsed the G8 deauville declaration that called for Colonel Gaddafi’s immediate depar-ture. Furthermore, Germany, a founding member of the G7, had also abstained from the vote on resolution 1973. one might infer from this that neither the west of the G7 nor the BriCS are homogenous entities. There is nothing new in this observation. The iraq invasion instigated by the united States in 2003 prompted strong dissension within the west, or more generally speaking the North (including Japan). in a less-controversial context such as NATo’s intervention in libya, what seem more significant are the various judgments on the “Arab Spring.” None of the G7 countries, or those in iBSA, feels threatened by the democ-ratization of the Arab world, at least if it does indeed come about. Both China and russia reacted by worrying about spillover effects, tightening government control over the internet and social network websites.

As political scientist Christophe Jaffrelot notes, there is a certain dis-crepancy between india’s democratic identity and its idealistic diplomatic tradition on the one hand and the lack of clarity of its position toward the events in the Arab world in the early months of 2011 on the other.17 Although South Africa and Brazil do not have a comparable democratic trajectory or similar diplomatic experience, this observation also applies to these other two iBSA members. one might have expected these countries, having experienced their own “springs” after a long winter of repressive regimes, to demonstrate more vocal support for political transformations in the Arab world. More generally speaking, one might ask what added value iBSA offers for international politics, this entity presenting itself as a group of democracies with such insistence. Sovereignism and wariness toward anything that might smack of western imperialism naturally provide convincing explanations for the positioning of the new Southern


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powers. Moreover, the large Southern democratic countries, and all the more the smaller ones, are just beginning to join the circle of geopolitical policy-makers: in very concrete terms that means that the socialization process of diplomats and other government officials as well as their partners in civil society is still underway. it is thus too early to tell how these players will affect the new world order. The only certitude, but a sig-nificant one for international balances, is that democracies theoretically offer guarantees of stability that are more debatable with authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. This political parameter was probably not taken into account when defining the criterion for membership in the Group of Twenty—to be “systemically important”—but it will necessarily arise down the road as the G20 develops.

Redrawing the world

“The west and the rest” was one of the emblematic phrases used in the international intellectual scene in the 1990s. Coined by the Singaporean diplomat Kishore Mahbubani, it was originally meant as a denunciation of western ethnocentrism and a celebration of mysterious “Asian values” that more than anything seemed to justify the authoritarianism of a country such as Singapore and other South East Asian nations.18 “The west and the rest” gradually took on a broader sense, encompassing the general debate over the predominance of Europe, taken over by the united States, in international history.

Ten years later, one of the main topics of discussion as it appears in journalistic and academic publications could be summed up by “the end of the west” and “the boom of the rest” duo—“the west” appearing in the guise of Europe or the united States, or both at once, and “the rest” either being reduced to China or expanded to include a loose nexus of emerging powers.19 what is striking in the terms of the debate, whether it is conducted by westerners or commentators from the “rest,” is the assumption they express of a zero sum game: the rise of the South sup-posedly implies the decline of western countries. Neither the economic nor the political logic of such an axiom appears self-evident, unless one sticks to a very exclusive and thus simplistic viewpoint of the notions of influence and prosperity.

The assertion of the G20 as a tool of international cooperation has brought to light not a sort of “victory” of the South over the North but instead a transcendence of this division. A more equitable distribution of influence and prosperity on a global scale does not necessarily imply


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role reversal. Furthermore, the criteria of power and representativeness in global governance are not stable. The process of establishing the G20 and the reactions it provokes points to a diversity of possibilities in a world order that has far from completed the profound transformation it is currently undergoing. Three major questions arise from the process underway. how will the decentering of the west be negotiated in the new world order? will national wealth be the only source of influence (what will become of normative power)? will regions take on a role that the uN order never truly allowed them?

“Provincializing” the West?

in a work that has left its mark on the thinking about the dominance of European social science categories, historian dipesh Chakrabarty suggests “provincializing Europe” to analyze the modernization of non-western countries.20 The project he undertakes does not set out to refute Europe’s influence in world modernization but to reconsider this evolution from a decentered standpoint; to excavate local experi-ences and trajectories, particularly those in colonized countries, buried until now under an overly Eurocentric vision in writing international history. one of the main hypotheses of this intellectual undertaking—which in fact has had numerous ramifications—is that it is possible, and desirable, to improve our understanding of past events in order to make what is supposed to be a common frame of references truly collective.

Enriching the writing of international history does not, however, imply rewriting it entirely: in particular, the point is not to uncover national histories that have been preserved like sleeping beauties in their non-European “purity” during the long winter of western imperialism and that can be reawakened today . whatever criticisms one might formulate—and there is certainly reason to condemn the brutality of colonialism that is often behind this reality—Europe has left a deep mark on both national and international modern institutions. wanting to “de-Europeanize” or “de-westernize” the institutional legacy of moderniza-tion from the 19th and 20th centuries is a project as remote from obvious historical fact as any ambition to reinvent, invent, even “purify” national or pan-national identities (such as Asianism or Africanism). The dif-ficulty of comprehending the hybrid reality of the world is nevertheless very present in current representations of international relations.


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The notion that the rapid development of emerging nations would automatically mean the end of the west partly arises from this difficulty. First of all, and once again, redistribution of prosperity does not mean role reversal. The Netherlands and the united Kingdom are no longer the great powers they once were, but they have not for all that become poor, underprivileged countries. Second, the fact that some countries of the South have taken on greater geopolitical weight does not mean that the world order will suddenly become “Chinese,” “Brazilian” or “emerging.” First, because, despite the nationalist pronouncements of many of them, the emerging powers do not have a global alternative to the existing system, a sort of ideal institutional kit that would replace the codes, norms and rules that for better or for worse have organized inter-national relations on a worldwide scale for the past two centuries. And conversely, because Europe’s original contribution to the production of these codes, norms and rules, in other words to the constitution of an international set of standards,21 has such structuring power that it cannot be done away with without leading to the disintegration of international society on the whole.

The need to create a space for cooperation that transcends the division between North and South and the notion of “The west and the rest,” indicated by the establishment of the G20, requires new thinking about the sharing of influence. This thinking could be built upon some form of “provincialization” of the west. As in dipesh Chakrabarty’s project, the goal would not be to refute or disown the European and Euro-American foundations of current international standards, but to no longer use them as the sole framework for interpreting the world.

For instance, the notion of “world” war, in other words a war involv-ing the entire globe, applied to the Great war, world war ii and the Cold war, is a sort of truism for westerners. it is not self-evident for the nations that were colonized up until 1945 and beyond who had no say, or those that were simply not involved, such as in latin America, or yet again China. To refer, for instance, to what westerners and more precisely the Americans 22 were the first to name the Second world war, China talks about the war of resistance against Japan (kang ri zhan zheng), because that appellation corresponds to its own view of events. Nevertheless, establishment of the uN, and of course the Security Council, was based on a representation of the international order shaped by the so-called world war. reforming the uN’s executive is not merely


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a matter of redistributing power but of putting in perspective dominant geopolitical representations, those of the west, and how they sustain their conception of universality. The Allied combat against German, Japanese and italian fascism in the 1940s has an undeniably universal significance. But this value of universality has found other expressions in the course of international history, such as the fight against apartheid in South Africa or the overthrow of dictatorships in latin America.

The business of “provincializing” the west presumes a balance that might not be easy to achieve. This is suggested by certain anti-western positions on the one hand—postures of opposition rather than con-struction that do not propose any real alternative—, and expressions of pessimism on the other, that confuse the end of western supremacy with the end of the west, period. The incompatibility between “the west” and “the rest” seems all the more artificial in the realm of international rela-tions as certain major polarizing norms, such as political and economic liberalization, are henceforth shared worldwide but in different ways. Capitalism has spread considerably throughout the North, South, west and East with variants that do not correspond to civilizational divisions. Even if the west remains mostly democratic, many other countries have also become democracies.

yet these democracies and those of the western world have not formu-lated a common discourse to assert these shared values. This is partly due to the difficulty westerners have of realizing they do not have a monopoly on universalism. democracy as it has been constructed historically in Europe and in America is not what is universal: it is instead the human aspirations that induce societies to set up democratic institutions that are fundamentally universal. Moreover, non-western democracies, and more obviously those of the emerging powers, tend to confuse eman-cipation from the economic and geopolitical domination of western countries with a systematic rejection of the “west”: some authors see this as the production of an over-simplistic “occidentalism” symmetrical to the “orientalism” analyzed by the historian Edward Said.23

The negative view of a monolithic “west” becomes more tangible—and to a certain extent less paradoxical—in the posture of emerging powers that do not have a democratic regime. in that case it can become problematic, not because it would endanger the west itself but because on a much more universal level it conflicts with democratic ideals. The “Asian values” praised in Singapore and Malaysia in the 1990s and that are now fashionable in China describe a theoretically fundamental


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opposition between the “west” and “Asia”. Examining the substance of such ideas, it becomes clear that what is supposedly the quintessence of “Asia” amounts to the negation of political pluralism and civil liberties. once again, the history of nations has shown that neither tyranny nor its opposite is the privilege of specific cultures. The culturalist interpre-tation of the world is more than ever strongly tempting in the field of international relations. it is bound to influence the dynamics of the G20 one way or another.

What is “systemic” importance?

By laying down “systemic importance” as a criterion for membership in the G20, the group’s founders to some extent opened a sort of Pandora’s box. The definition of what is important or what matters in the interna-tional system is open to interpretation. we know that the ability to shape the world order is no longer measured solely in terms of firepower as Stalin once did in exclaiming “The Pope! how many divisions does he have?” European union analysts have shown that while the Eu does not have an army, it has an ability to wield influence worldwide, illustrated by the considerable body of norms it produces and imposes throughout the globe.24 The study of middle powers has shown how certain countries that do not hold the lead in economic and military matters have taken important roles in multilateral cooperation.25 This body of research high-lights significant factors describing the dynamics of the international system.

But it is hard to know whether and if so how these factors were taken into account in the criterion of “systemic importance” attributed to the G20. No representative of the Group of Twenty has in fact ever explained just what this criterion implied. if the trajectory of this entity—from the establishment of the Manila Framework Group to the formation of the G20, first as a ministerial group in 1999, and then as a group of states in 2008—is any indication, then the choice of members has obviously been partially arbitrary.

But from the viewpoint of G20 leaders, acknowledging this arbitrary aspect is not politically conceivable. hence Pandora’s box: by giving the choice of the Twenty a semblance of justification—“the twenty members have systemic importance”—G20 representatives have opened the door to endless questions, challenges or even succinct interpretations. Among the latter is the most frequently cited assertion that the G20 is a meeting


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of the world’s twenty largest GNPs: a claim that disregards the fact that the twentieth member of the G20 is not a state (the Eu thus has no gross national product), and that three of its members—South Africa, Saudi Arabia and Argentina—are not among the twenty largest world economies.

The Group of Twenty apparently has no coordinated communication strategy. Consequently, the general message it conveys about its identity is minimalist. The official G20 website merely repeats that the group was formed to bring together “systemically important industrialized and devel-oping countries to discuss key issues in the global economy.” 26 on the website for the French presidency of the G20 in 2010–2011, the question “who is a member of G20?” was answered thus: “G20 members account for 85 percent of the world economy and two-thirds of the world’s population,” 27 followed by a list of the twenty members. This strictly material and quantitative criterion is used moreover as an explanatory factor in most comments on the G20, especially journalistic ones.

however, boiling down the G20’s identity to two figures—the size of its economy and population—poses two corollary problems. For one, it encourages a logic of the strongest that goes against the trend of con-temporary global governance, thereby vindicating critics of the G20 who consider it an archaic concert of powers. This logic is moreover found in the rhetoric of the BriCS where representing very populated countries with high GNPs appears to be an end in itself. Second, it does not explain why the G20 brings together countries that are not significant as gauged solely by the double yardstick of “GNP and population,” and by some mysterious calculation includes a regional grouping. while there is no official or even unofficial G20 document explaining the notion “systemic importance,” even less explanation has been offered for the absence of economic and demographic “heavyweights” such as Spain in favor of lighter-weight countries, or the presence of the Eu to the detriment of other regional groupings.

Some members have taken pains to explain why they believe they are part of the G20. Saudi Arabia’s governor of the Monetary Agency, for instance, stated,

Saudi Arabia is now part of the G20, which reflects our systemic role in the global production of energy as well as our substantial financial assets.28

Saudi Arabia’s systemic importance from the standpoint of inter-national cooperation in energy matters is scarcely debatable; it is less


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decisive regarding its financial assets (compared to China, for instance), but is far from being negligible either. Saudi Arabia is now the only oPEC member in the G20 since indonesia, also in the G20, officially left the petroleum exporters consortium in January 2009. riyadh could also define its systemic importance in the framework of the G20 by its regional connection, it being the only representative of the Arab world, just as Pretoria alone represents the African continent.

Actually, there are countless coherent ways to define systemic impor-tance. it might be remembered that according to Norway’s former for-eign affairs minister Jonas Gahr Støre, the Scandinavian countries better meet the criterion of systemic importance because they are the main financial contributors to development aid. More precisely, the Northern European countries are the leading contributors in terms of the size of their respective economies. one of the development goals defined by the uN is to get the world’s largest economies to commit 0.7% of their gross national income to official development assistance (odA). only Norway, luxemburg, Sweden, denmark and the Netherlands have achieved this goal. if states’ commitment to odA has an influence on the international system, and if considerations of prestige and influence characteristic of all governments are set aside, then the Nordic countries’ request to be represented in the G20 is not absurd.

it is fairly unlikely that future G20 declarations and publications will be any more specific regarding the nature of systemic importance, because any such precision is liable to bring about diplomatic complica-tions. if systemic importance was broken down into indicators such as involvement in odA or environmental protection measures, it would become much more difficult to refuse admission to the G20 for certain candidates as permanent members or even as mere outside participants. The possibility open to each member in charge of the group presidency to suggest a list of invitees will probably, and in fact already has, peri-odically modulated the profile of the G20. Furthermore, there is noth-ing to prevent each member from giving a definition of the systemic importance criterion that reflects its views alone, as Saudi Arabia has done. The European union, without referring explicitly to this criterion, emphasized its “experience in political and economic integration,” 29 which it can effectively boast as the only regional organization in the G20, and which confirms its situation as the most sophisticated union of states in the world. Although the Eu as such has a seat in certain international bodies, particularly the wTo, the fact that a regional grouping as a


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full-fledged member of a “G” is an unusual situation. it might inject new thinking into the role of regions in institutions of global governance, a question that has now been raised in the framework of the G20.

What role for regions?

Singapore was the first international player to react to the rising influence of the G20 when it became a high-level summit in 2008 with a concrete initiative: in March 2010 it formed the Global Governance Group or 3G, representing “UN members who are not G20 members.” 30 This new entity has often been perceived and described as being in opposition to the G20. it could even be as an expression of Singaporean resentment for at least two reasons. First, the city-state was excluded from the composition of the G20 in 1999 even though it had played a decisive role in setting up the original group, the G22. Second, Singapore is one of the countries, along with others such as Switzerland, that the G20 has severely criti-cized for encouraging tax evasion.

however, if the 3G’s discourse and action are examined, this new club appears less as an opposition force than a source of proposals to make up for what can be seen as the G20’s shortcomings. in the text read by Singapore’s permanent representative before the uN General Assembly, the 3G was presented as a bridge between the united Nations and the G20:

while the 3G has been supportive of the G-20 process, we see room for improvement. we firmly believe that the G-20 process should enhance and not undermine the uN. All countries, big and small, will be affected by how the G-20 deals with the issues it takes under its charge. Given the complexi-ties and interdependencies of the global economy, it is important for the G-20 to be consultative, inclusive and transparent in its deliberations for its outcome to be effectively implemented on a global scale. in this regard, the 3G has raised several ideas on how to improve the engagement between the G-20 and the uN.31

The 3G thus suggested four directions this engagement could take: regular consultation with G20 non-member countries (the group did not specify whether this means the 24 3G members or the other 174 uN member states), attendance by the uN secretary-general at G20 sum-mits, regular participation of regional organizations other than the Eu, a “variable geometry” inclusion of non-member countries in G20 working groups. The dynamic action of the 3G has been fairly successful, especially


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for Singapore which was invited to the Seoul and Cannes summits by the South Korean and French presidencies of the G20 respectively, due to its “systemic importance,” a qualification it henceforth shares with Spain.32 Furthermore, this outcome cannot be attributed solely to the 3G, preparation of G20 summits increasingly involves cooperation with uN agencies; the Twenty’s working groups have addressed their conclusions to the uN General Assembly as well. lastly, inviting regional organiza-tions to G20 summits has now apparently become standard practice. APEC, ASEAN, NEPAd, the African union (Au), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have all been invited at least once, if not more often. This is interesting to note for although the 3G does not represent a specific region in the world, its leader, Singapore, has had significant influence in promoting regionalism. it has been a major actor in renewing ASEAN after the Cold war and played a decisive role in creating the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM).

According to economist Gary hawke, one of the biggest challenges the G20 will have to face in the future will be its ability to coordinate with regional institutions.33 Political scientist Andrew Cooper points out that the most vocal but also the most constructive critics of the G20 are regional bodies.34 his analysis shows that they do not contest the Group of Twenty’s rise in importance but rather seek inclusion. reasoning in geographic terms, it is obvious that some regions in the world are indeed underrepresented, starting with the African continent, while others enjoy much greater visibility, especially Europe, which many feel is over-represented. This same concern is also expressed, though not necessarily to Europe’s detriment, in the project of economist Jakob Vestergaard to create an alternative to the G20, a Global Economic Council or GEC, composed in such a way as to reflect the weight of the world’s various regions.35

The place regions should have in the world order is a recurring ques-tion. it already arose in 1942 after the declaration of the united Nations was signed by the united States and its twenty-five allies. undersecretary of State Sumner welles suggested to President Franklin roosevelt that the future united Nations organization should have a Security Council with seats that would be filled by regional groupings rather than states. in the early 1940s, Africa and Asia were colonized for the most part, and so in practice the notion of “regions” referred to the spheres of influence of the great powers—the only real exception being latin America, that precisely via its lobby in washington influenced the Sumner welles initiative. For that


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reason, another State department advisor, leo Pasvolsky, viewed a regional distribution of power in the future uN as running the risk of a clash between imperial powers, including the uSSr, which in fact had the ambition of rep-resenting the Soviet sphere of influence at the united Nations. This advisor of russian stock who feared Soviet expansionism managed to convince the uS president to opt for national representation at the uN, seeing no other effective way to guard against the budding bipolar conflict.

The uN was thus conceived as a place in which the principal actors were states. it retains this basic identity today. A certain number of articles (51 to 54) in the uN Charter give regional groupings some degree of autonomy in handling security issues, as long as it does not interfere with state preroga-tives. during the Cold war, the regional associations formed after decolo-nization rarely managed to achieve the goals they had set themselves, with the exception of the Eu. At the end of the bipolar conflict, there was renewed interest in regional cooperation. international institutions such as the world Bank, the uN and its agencies more frequently turned to regional organizations for development aid and conflict resolution. The program to reform the united Nations, already discussed in the late 1970s and revived after the Cold war, included reflection on how to achieve bet-ter representation of regional groupings in the uN. like the rest of the plan for uN reform, the regional idea did not produce any spectacular results. The fact that a number of regional actors are not opposed to the Group of Twenty and on the contrary see it as an opportunity to better make their voices heard, to some extent vindicates G20 advocates who consider it a tool that might help the uN achieve true reform.36

Notes

“Aims and objectives,” Group of Fifteen (www.g15.org – last accessed on 1 october 16, 2013).quoted on the South Korean Go presidency’s official website (retrieved in 2 November 2010 from www.g20.org.go.kr).Sophie Bessis, 3 L’Occident et les autres, Paris, la découverte, 2001.See4 in particular robert Malley, The Call from Algeria. Third Worldism, Revolution and the Turn to Islam, Berkeley, university of California Press, 1996; Pascale Bezançon, ruben Camara, issiaka Mande and Jakob Schlupmann, Les sources historiques dans les Tiers-Mondes, Paris, l’harmattan, 1997; Mark Berger (ed.), After the Third World? london, routledge, 2009.


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As Antoine van Agtmael remarks in his book, 5 The Emerging Markets Century, New york, Simon & Schuster, 2007.Jeffrey Garten, 6 The Big Emerging Markets and How They Will Change Our Lives, New york, Basic Books, 1997. The ten countries are South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, China, india, indonesia, Mexico, Poland and Turkey.Jim o’Neill, “Building Better Global Economic BriCs,” 7 Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper, no. 66, November 30, 2001.See8 Sreeram Chaulia, “long live BriC, welcome MiST,” Asia Times, January 26, 2011.“Joint Statement of the BriC Countries’ leaders,” 9 Yekaterinburg, June 16, 2009 (available at http://archive.kremlin.ru – last accessed on october 16, 2013).Ibid.10 See11 among others lyal white, “iBSA. South-South Co-operation with a difference?” Global Insight (Pretoria), no. 36, 2004; Chris Alden and Marco Antonio Vieira, “The New diplomacy of the South. South Africa, Brazil, india and Trilateralism,” Third World Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 7, 2005.“Brasília declaration,” June 6, 2003 and presentation of “The india-Brazil-12 South Africa dialogue Forum,” August 2011, on the official iBSA website. (available at http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org – last accessed on october 16, 2013).See13 the final yekaterinburg declaration (http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2009/06/217928.shtml – last accessed on october 16, 2013), and “BriCS Summit 2011 Joint declaration,” Sanya, hainan, April 14, 2011.interview with dimitri Medvedev by Kirill Kleimenov for Channel one 14 russia, June 18, 2009 (available at http://archive.kremlin.ru – last accessed on october 16, 2013).“BriCS Summit 2011 Joint declaration.”15 See16 among other “l’offensive politique des Brics,” RFI, April 14, 2011; “China et les BriCS s’affirment face à l’occident,” Radio 86, April 16, 2011; Jagannath Panda “BriCS’ Sanya declaration. what it Means to Emerging Global Strategic Calculus,” The Tribune (Chandigarh), April 23, 2011; “libye: les arrière-pensées de Moscow dans son rapprochement vers l’occident,” Xinhua (french.news.cn), June 2, 2011; Vijay Prashad “BriCS vs. G7 with libya as Proxy,” CounterPunch (California), July 7, 2011.Christophe Jaffrelot, “india Keeps Abstaining ... ,” 17 The Caravan, vol. 3, no. 8, August 2011.Kishore Mahbubani, “The west and the rest,” 18 National Interest, no. 28, Summer 1992. The theory of “Asian values” has been sharply criticized by analysts of East Asian democracies, particularly the former dissident turned president of South Korea, Kim dae-jung: “is Culture destiny?” Foreign Affairs, vol. 73, no. 6, 1994.


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See19 among others Fareed zakaria, The Post-American World and the Rise of the Rest, New york, Norton & Co, 2008; “le monde occidental est-il en danger?” Revue Internationale et Stratégique, no. 75, Fall 2009; Stefan halper, The Beijing Consensus. How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century, New york, Basic Books, 2010; “American decline. This Time it’s real,” Foreign Policy, special issue, January-February 2011; “l’occident est-il fini?” Courrier International, special issue, February/March/April 2011; Philippe Esper, et al., Un monde sans Europe? Paris, Fayard, 2011; rana Foroohar, “The decline and Fall of Europe (and maybe the west),” Time, August 22, 2011.dipesh Chakrabarty, 20 Provincializing Europe. Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, Princeton, Princeton university Press, 2000.See Karoline Postel-Vinay, 21 L’Occident et sa bonne parole, Paris, Flammarion, 2005.See david reynolds, “The origins of the Two ‘world wars’. historical 22 discourse and international Politics,” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 38, no. 1, January 2003.Edward Said, 23 Orientalism, New york, random house, 1978, and James G. Carrier, Occidentalism. Images of the West, oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995; ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, Occidentalism. The West in the Eyes of its Enemies, london, Penguin Books, 2004.See in particular François duchêne, “Europe’s role in world Peace,” in 24 richard Mayne (ed.), Europe Tomorrow, london, Fontana, 1972, ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe. A Contradiction in Terms?” Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, 2002; zaki laidi, Norms over Force, trans. Cynthia Schoch, New york, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.See among others Cranford Pratt (ed.), 25 Internationalism under Strain. The North-South Policies of Canada, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, Toronto, Toronto university Press, 1989; davis Bobrow and robert Kudrle, “Mid-level Power Strategies for Changing international Niches. Experience in the ‘old world order’ ,” Journal of East Asian Affairs, vol. 5, no. 2, Summer–Fall 1991; Andrew Cooper et al., Relocating Middle Powers. Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order, Vancouver, university of British Columbia Press, 1993.http://www.g20.org (last accessed on october 16, 2013).26 http://www.g20-g8.com (last accessed on october 16, 2013).27 Muhammed Al-Jasser, “Keynote Address,” Conference of the institute of 28 international Finance, National Commercial Bank, riyadh, February 24, 2010.“Joint letter of President Van rompuy and President Barroso on the G20 29 Summit in Seoul,” Brussels, october 29, 2010, and see also “Joint Statement by President of the European Council herman Van rompuy and President


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of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso at the end of the G20 Summit in Seoul,” Seoul, November 12, 2010 (available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu (last accessed on october 16, 2013)).See30 Annex to the letter from Permanent representative of Singapore to the united Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, “Strengthening the Framework for G-20 Engagement of Non-members,” New york, March 11, 2010 (available at http://www.mfa.gov.sg (last accessed on october 16, 2013)). The 3G member states are Commonwealth of the Bahamas, Kingdom of Bahrain, Barbados. Botswana, Brunei darussalam, Chile, Costa rica, Guatemala, Jamaica, Principality of liechtenstein, Malaysia, Principality of Monaco, New zealand, Panama, republic of the Philippines, State of qatar, republic of rwanda, republic of San Marino, republic of Senegal, republic of Singapore, Switzerland, united Arab Emirates and uruguay.“Statement by Ambassador Vanu Gopala Menon Permanent representative 31 of Singapore to the united Nations on behalf of the Global Governance Group (3G) at the meeting of the ad-hoc open-ended working group to follow up on the conference last June of the world financial and economic crisis and its impact on development,” New york, June 2, 2010.According to the official website of the Banque de France: “la composition 32 du G20” (available at http://www.banque-france.fr (last accessed on october 16, 2013)).Gary hawke, “G20 Consensus, Compliance and the limits of legitimacy, 33 East Asia Forum Quarterly, vol. 2, no. 4, october–december 2010.Andrew F. Cooper, “The G20 and its regional Critics. The Search for 34 inclusion,” Global Policy, vol. 2, no. 2, May 2011.Jakob Vestergaard, “The G20 and Beyond: Towards Effective Global 35 Economic Governance,” DIIS Report, danish institute for international Studies (Copenhagen), no. 4, 2011.See36 Kemal dervis, “G20 Should increase the legitimacy of the international institutions,” Europe’s World, Spring 2010; Johannes linn, “how the G20 Can Break the Stalemate in the reform of the Multilateral development System. Proposals for Action,” in Colin Bradford and wonhyuk lim (eds), Global Leadership in Transition. Making the G20 More Effective and Responsive, washington and Seoul, Brookings institution Press, Korea development institute, 2011; Paul heinbecker, “The Future of the G20 and its Place in Global Governance,” CIGI G20 Papers, no. 5, April 2011.


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Conclusion: The G20, A New Grand Geopolitical Narrative?

For Colin Bradford, a former chief economist at the uS Agency for international development, the G20 has already virtually replaced the G8 and thus offers a “grand narrative,” that of “cultural diversity in the global age.”1 For according to this American economist,

The cultural diversity of the countries in the G20, in stark contrast to that of the G8 countries, embraces the cultural encounters occurring daily across the world in the lives of all of us and in our societies. This is the “grand narrative” of G20 summitry, which extends beyond leaders to everyone everywhere.2

The G20 is without question a more heterogeneous group than the G8. More precisely, as we have seen, the G20 has transcended a form of asymmetrical governance illustrated up until then by the coexistence of the G8 and the G77. it goes beyond the North-South division in management of international affairs as well as the “west and the rest” dichotomy. in this regard, the G20 indeed offers a new representation of the world. But it is not one that has been deliberately thought out and formulated. it is not a “grand narrative,” and thus not a “geopolitical narrative,” such as international history has seen in the past, for instance the “cold war,” a narrative construction fashioned in the united States and given a name by the essayist walter lippmann.3 it is not the “grand narrative” the Eu is desperately seeking to write in the hope that the union’s inhabitants identify with it and become truly


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Conclusion

European citizens.4 The G20 offers a certain tableau of international life. it is possible, maybe even probable, that a structured narrative, or a representation of the world, will finally emerge from it. it is too early to say for certain.

The vision of a “cultural diversity on a global scale” narrative that the G20 is supposed to produce is perhaps not unrealistic, but that is not the only possible scenario. The issues of shared growth or the profusion of international actors might, for instance, also enter into the narrative components. Furthermore, Colin Bradford’s thesis rests on two assump-tions that are not based on fact. First, the G20 has not replaced the G8. As notes John Kirton, a longtime observer of the two “Gs,” there are a number of factors to suggest that the status quo will endure.5 Even if all the members are not part of the G8, the “democratic family” Nicolas Sarkozy referred to in deauville in the spring of 2011 has not found any other framework in which to meet. Second, the G20 cannot produce a “geopolitical narrative,” in other words a controlled collective construc-tion process, unless it affirms a formal identity. For the present, this is not the case. The persistent lack of clarity surrounding the criterion of “systemic importance” instead indicates hesitation to define itself in anything else than purely functional, even technical terms. At the Pittsburgh summit in the fall of 2009, the G20 presented itself as the “premier forum for international economic cooperation.” The words were chosen carefully; the term “cooperation” was, for instance, preferred to “governance” at the request of a certain number of countries, including France, to accurately reflect the ambition of the Group of Twenty as well as the limits to its scope of action. This is poles apart from the assertion of a distinct personality such as the G7 and the G77 have done.

The G20 is not an exhaustive and ready-made answer to the questions raised by the partial obsolescence of the institutional legacy since 1945. Nor does it offer an instant solution to the countless present and future prob-lems of a highly interdependent world with a socioeconomic cartography undergoing deep transformations. while the G20 has not replaced the G8, it is even less a sort of directorate that could replace all the governing bod-ies of the uN, the iMF and the world Bank at once. Moreover, in absolute terms, the G20 is not a binding decision-making body. The Group, both as a ministerial forum and leadership summit, first acted as a crisis center in situations of acute economic turmoil. The post-2008 G20 set itself the longer-term goal of working toward world economic stability. Moreover, the definition of what constitutes “economic” has since evolved, now


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including social issues that were not taken into account in 2008. Fulfilling this goal does not necessarily imply that the G20 will become anything else than what it is at present, a forum for dialogue and coordination, and if possible a wellspring of new ideas. But the role that the G20 plays by bringing together actors with such disparate profiles is already a consider-able feat. it would have been unthinkable 20 years ago.

The G20 reflects the complexity of a world order in which bounda-ries that were still familiar at the end of the 20th century have become blurred. East and west have disappeared, leaving in their wake enormous uncertainty, both within the former western camp as in the one oppo-site, regarding the promotion of political progress. The division between North and South is no longer as sharp as before. The difference between “developed” and “developing” countries does not systematically match national borders: China, india and Brazil are at once both very rich and very poor. The problem of combating underdevelopment by referring to the dichotomy of “rich” and “poor” has become a cluster of issues related to inequality that are found at both the global and the national scale. Nations are another reference point that has become blurred. designated by the united Nations as predominant international actors, states must henceforth make arrangements, negotiate and cooperate with a multi-tude of other public and private, subnational and supranational players. By its very composition, the G20, being made up of democracies and authoritarian regimes, old rich countries and emerging powers, states and a regional grouping, reflects all these changes.

But the G20 is not just a mirror of the new state of the world. it is more actively a locus of observation and experimentation of new modes and codes of international relations. Starting from concrete topics ranging from currencies to employment and agriculture, it offers an opportunity to test how extremely diverse actors, often with diverging interests, can cooperate. The question as to whether the G20 will become a real decision-making body in the more or less near future is premature and probably secondary, if not pointless. Beyond its deliberations on specific topical issues at hand, the main advantage of the G20 is to show us what the new world order might look like.

Notes

Colin Bradford, “The Cultural Foundations for the New dynamics of 1 Summitry,” in Colin Bradford and wonhyuk lim (eds), Global Leadership


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in Transition. Making the G20 More Effective and Responsive, Seoul and washington, Korea development institute et Brookings institution Press, 2011.Ibid.2 walter lippmann, 3 The Cold War, New york, harper & Brothers, 1947. on the notion of geopolitical narrative, see Karoline Postel-Vinay, “récits géopolitiques pour le XXie siècle,” Études, January 2005 (available at diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/0102-Postel-Vinay.pdf – last accessed on october 16, 2013)).See4 in particular romano Prodi, interview on Europe, Le Monde, october 26, 1999; Kalypso Nicolaïdis and robert howse, “ ‘This is My Eutopia ...’: Narrative as Power,” Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 4, 2002; Justine lacroix and Kalypso Nicolaïdis, European Stories, oxford, oxford university Press, 2010.John Kirton, “why the G8 will Endure,” 5 G8-G20 Publications and Papers, university of Toronto, 10 February 2011.


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Appendices


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Appendix 1: Chronology: International Cooperation and the Gs since 1944

April 1944: the Allies propose the establishment of the international Monetary Fund.

July 1944: meeting of the united Nations at Bretton woods (New hampshire, united States); creation of the international Monetary Fund (iMF) and the international Bank for reconstruction and development (iBrd) is announced, the first step toward setting up the world Bank.

August–October 1944: talks at dumbarton oaks in washington discussing a plan to organize the united Nations.

April–June 1945: united Nations Conference in San Francisco to establish an international organization.

January 1946: first General Assembly of the united Nations (uN) in london.

April 1955: Bandung Conference in indonesia brings together 29 countries, most of them former colonies.

May 1956: Paris Club formed with 19 creditor countries; first agreement reached to deal with Argentina’s debt.

July 1956: Brioni Conference in yugoslavia; start of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

December 1960: signature of the Convention on the organization for Economic Cooperation and development (oECd).

February 1962: Group of Ten (G10) formed; the iMF prepares the General Arrangements to Borrow.


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June 1964: Group of Seventy-Seven (G77) formed as an outcome of the first united Nations Conference on Trade and development (uNCTAd).

October 1967: first ministerial meeting of the G77 in Algiers.April 1971: the criterion of “least Advanced Countries” established by

the united Nations.November 1971: intergovernmental Group of Twenty-Four (G24)

established by the G77 in response to the creation of the G10.March 1973: meeting of the “library Group,” a meeting of finance

ministers from the united States, Germany, France and Great Britain at the white house.

July 1973–August 1975: meetings of the Group of Five (G5), including the library Group and Japan.

November 1975: the Group of Six (G6) is formed at rambouillet.June 1976: the G6 becomes the Group of Seven (G7) with the addition of

Canada.September 1981: the financial concept of “emerging markets” invented by

Antoine van Agtmael to replace “Third world.”October 1981: conference on the new international economic order to

promote North-South dialogue in Cancun.September 1989: the Group of Fifteen (G15) established as an outcome

of the 9th Non-Aligned Summit advocating better North-South dialogue.

May 1994: Mexico and South Korea leave the G77 and join the oECd.December 1994: Mexican monetary crisis.June 1997: the G7 becomes the Group of Eight (G8) with the addition of

russia.July 1997: start of the Asian financial crisis in Thailand.November 1997: the Manila Framework is formed, bringing together

several of the future G20 member countries, to manage the financial crisis.

April 1998: Group of Twenty-Two (G22) or willard Group established in the wake of the Manila Framework.

March 1999: the G22 becomes the Group of Thirty-Three (G33).September 1999: G7 Finance Ministers (G7 Finance) announce the

conversion of the G33 into the Group of Twenty (G20).September 2000: the uN publishes the Millennium development Goals

(MdG) to be achieved by 2015.


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November 2001: the “BriC” (Brazil, russia, india, China) financial entity is invented by Jim o’Neill.

June 2003: the democratic emerging nations form iBSA (india-Brazil-South Africa); Brasilia declaration.

September 2003: failure of wTo negotiations in Cancun.October 2003: a group of twenty-two emerging nations is formed (G22),

including Brazil, China and india, protesting against agricultural subsidies.

September 2007: start of the subprime mortgage crisis in the united States.

September 2008: financial crisis in the united States and then in Europe.November 2008: first G20 summit of heads of state and government in

washington.June 2009: first meeting of BriC heads of state and government in

yekaterinburg, russia.September 2009: during the Pittsburgh summit, the G20 describes itself

as the “premier forum for international economic cooperation.”November 2009: South Korea is announced as the first non-G8 member

to host the next G20 meeting of heads of state and government.January 2011: Argentina, also member of the G20, holds the presidency

of the G77.


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Appendix 2: The Founding Declaration of the G77 and Signatories

Joint declaration of the seventy-seven developing countries made at the conclusion of the united Nations Conference on Trade and development.Geneva, June 15, 1964.

Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (leopoldville), Costa rica, Cyprus, dahomey, dominican republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, haiti, honduras, india, indonesia, iran, iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, laos, lebanon, liberia, libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, republic of Korea, republic of Vietnam, rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra leone, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, uganda, united Arab republic, united republic of Tanganyika and zanzibar, upper Volta, uruguay, Venezuela, yemen and yugoslavia

I

The developing countries named above recognize 1 the united Nations Conference on Trade and


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development as a significant step toward creating a new and just world economic order. They regard this Conference as the fruition of sustained efforts which found expression in the Cairo declaration, the Alta Gracia Charter, the resolutions of Brasilia, Addis Ababa, Niamey, Manila and Teheran and, above all, in the Joint declaration of the seventy-five countries made at the eighteenth session of the General Assembly of the united Nations. These efforts helped to forge the unity of the seventy-five—the outstanding feature of the entire Conference and an event of historic significance.

II

The basic premises of the new order were enumerated in 2 these earlier declarations and in the report of the secretary-general of the Conference. in brief, they involve a new international division of labor oriented toward the accelerated industrialization of developing countries. The efforts of developing countries to raise the living standards of their peoples, which are now being made under adverse external conditions, should be supplemented and strengthened by constructive international action. Such action should establish a new framework of international trade that is wholly consistent with the needs of accelerated development.The several themes of a new and dynamic international policy for 3 trade and development, including the question of transit trade of land-locked countries, found concrete expression in specific programs and proposals presented by the developing countries to this Conference as a united expression of objectives and measures in all major fields. The developing countries consider it an achievement that this Conference has provided a basis for the fullest discussion of these programs and proposals by the entire international community. They are confident that the deliberations of this Conference will be of assistance in the formulation of new policies by the governments of both developed and developing countries in the context of a new awareness of the needs of developing countries.


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III

The developing countries declare, however, that they consider the 4 final recommendations of the Conference as only an initial step toward an international endorsement of a new trade policy for development. They do not consider that the progress that has been registered in each of the major fields of economic development has been adequate or commensurate with their essential requirements. There has not, for instance, been an adequate appreciation of the problem of the “trade gap” of developing countries. only the most limited approaches were made regarding trade in primary commodities, and of preferences for exports of manufactures. Similarly, only preliminary steps were possible relating to schemes for compensatory financing to meet long-term deterioration in the terms of trade. The developing countries have, nevertheless, accepted the results of this Conference in the hope that these results would lay the foundation for more substantial progress in the period ahead. They have also accepted these resolutions in recognition of the need for a cooperative effort in the international field. To this end they have chosen to arrive at the widest measure of agreements possible, rather than to register their aspirations by majority decisions.

IV

The developing countries attach singular importance to the 5 establishment of international machinery in the field of trade and development. it is vitally necessary that this new machinery should be an effective instrument for the discussion of issues, the formulation of policies, the review of results, and for taking such operational measures as are needed in the sphere of international economic relations.The developing countries recognize the value of the general 6 agreement attained regarding the establishment of continuing machinery. They note that some important issues pertaining to such machinery have been held over the decision by the General Assembly. in this connexion , it is their view that there should be ample scope for reaching workable agreement on substantial issues.


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But, they categorically declare that no arrangements designed for this purpose should derogate from the ultimate right of the proposed Board and the Conference to adopt recommendations on any point of substance by a simple majority vote in the case of the Board and two-thirds majority in the case of the Conference. The developing countries attach cardinal importance to democratic procedures which afford no position of privilege in the economic and financial, no less than in the political spheres. Furthermore, the developing countries would stress the need for continued evolution in the institutional field, leading not merely to the progressive strengthening of the machinery that is now contemplated, but also to the ultimate emergence of a comprehensive international trade organization.

V

The developing countries regard their own unity, the unity of the 7 seventy-five, as the outstanding feature of this Conference. This unity has sprung out of the fact that facing the basic problems of development they have a common interest in a new policy for international trade and development. They believe that this unity has given clarity and coherence to the discussions of this Conference. Their solidarity has been tested in the course of the Conference, and they have emerged from it with even greater unity and strength.The developing countries have a strong conviction that there is a 8 vital need to maintain, and further strengthen, this unity in the years ahead. it is an indispensable instrument for securing the adoption of new attitudes and new approaches in the international economic field. This unity is also an instrument for enlarging the area of cooperative endeavor in the international field and for securing mutually beneficent relationships with the rest of the world. Finally, it is a necessary means for cooperation among the developing countries themselves.The seventy-five developing countries, on the occasion of this 9 declaration, pledge themselves to maintain, foster and strengthen this unity in the future. Toward this end they shall adopt all


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possible means to increase the contacts and consultations among themselves so as to determine common objectives and formulate joint programs of action in international economic cooperation. They consider that measures for consolidating the unity achieved by the seventy-five countries during the Conference and the specific arrangements for contacts and consultations should be studied by government representatives during the nineteenth session of the united Nations General Assembly.

VI

The united Nations Conference on Trade and development 10 marks the beginning of a new era in the evolution of international cooperation in the field of trade and development. Such cooperation must serve as a decisive instrument for ending the division of the world into areas of affluence and intolerable poverty. This task is the outstanding challenge of our times. The injustice and neglect of centuries need to be redressed. The developing countries are united in their resolve to continue to quest for such redress and look to the entire international community for understanding and support in this endeavor.


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Appendix 3: Member Countries of Gs of the South and Emerging Nations in 2008

G77 members

AfghanistanAngolaAntigua and BarbudaBahamasBahrainBangladeshBarbadosBelizeBeninBhutanBoliviaBosnia-HerzegovinaBotswanaBrunei DarussalamBurkina FasoBurundiCambodiaCamerounCape VerdeCentral African RepublicChadChiliComorosKorea (North)


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Costa RicaCubaDjiboutiDominicaEcuadorEl SalvadorEquatorial GuineaEritreaEthiopiaFijiGambiaGrenadaGuineaGuinea-BissauGuyanaHaitiHondurasIraqJamaicaJordanKenyaLiberiaLibyaMadagascarMalawiMalaysiaMaldivesMaliMarshall IslandsMauritiusMauritaniaMicronesiaMongoliaMoroccoMozambiqueMyanmarNamibiaNepalNicaragua


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NigerOmanPalestinePanamaPapua New GuineaQatarRwandaSt. Kitts and NevisSt. Vincent and the GrenadinesSaint LuciaSamoaSao Tomé and PrincipeSenegalSeychellesSierra LeoneSingaporeSolomon IslandsSomaliaSudanSurinameSwazilandTanzaniaThailandTimor LesteTongaTongoTunisiaTurkmenistanUgandaUnited Arab EmiratesUruguayVanuatuVietnamYemenZambia


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Members of the G77 and the G24

AlgeriaColombiaCongoCôte d’IvoireEgyptEthiopiaGabonGhanaGuatemalaIranLebanonNigeriaPakistanPeruPhilippinesSri LankaSyriaTrinity and TobagoVenezuela

Members of the G77, the G24 and the G20

ArgentinaBrazilChina (special guest of the G24)IndiaMexicoSouth Africa


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Appendix 4: The Founding Declaration of the G6, Future G8

Château de rambouillet, November 17, 1975The heads of State and Government of France, the

Federal republic of Germany, italy, Japan, the united Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern ireland, and the united States of America met in the Chateau de rambouillet from 15 to 17 November 1975, and agreed to declare as follows:

1 in these three days we held a searching and productive exchange of views on the world economic situation, on economic problems common to our countries, on their human, social and political implications, and on plans for resolving them.

2 we came together because of shared beliefs and shared responsibilities. we are each responsible for the government of an open, democratic society, dedicated to individual liberty and social advancement. our success will strengthen, indeed is essential to, democratic societies everywhere. we are each responsible for assuring the prosperity of a major industrial economy. The growth and stability of our economies will help the entire industrial world and developing countries to prosper.

3 To assure in a world of growing interdependence the success of the objectives set out in this declaration, we intend to play our own full part and strengthen


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our efforts for closer international cooperation and constructive dialogue among all countries, transcending differences in stages of economic development, degrees of resource endowment and political and social systems.

4 The industrial democracies are determined to overcome high unemployment, continuing inflation and serious energy problems. The purpose of our meeting was to review our progress, identify more clearly the problems that we must overcome in the future, and to set a course that we will follow in the period ahead.

5 The most urgent task is to assure the recovery of our economies and to reduce the waste of human resources involved in unemployment. in consolidating the recovery, it is essential to avoid unleashing additional inflationary forces which would threaten its success. The objective must be growth that is steady and lasting. in this way, consumer and business confidence will be restored.

6 we are confident that our present policies are compatible and complementary and that recovery is under way. Nevertheless, we recognize the need for vigilance and adaptability in our policies. we will not allow the recovery to falter. we will not accept another outburst of inflation.

7 we also concentrated on the need for new efforts in the areas of world trade, monetary matters and raw materials, including energy.

8 As domestic recovery and economic expansion proceed, we must seek to restore growth in the volume of world trade. Growth and price stability will be fostered by maintenance of an open trading system. in a period where pressures are developing for a return to protectionism, it is essential for the main trading nations to confirm their commitment to the principles of the oECd pledge and to avoid resorting to measures by which they could try to solve their problems at the expense of others, with damaging consequences in the economic, social and political fields. There is a responsibility on all countries, especially those with strong balance-of-payments positions and on those with current deficits, to pursue policies which will permit the expansion of world trade to their mutual advantage.

9 we believe that the multilateral trade negotiations should be accelerated. in accordance with the principles agreed to in the Tokyo declaration, they should aim at achieving substantial tariff cuts, even eliminating tariffs in some areas, at significantly


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expanding agricultural trade and at reducing non-tariff measures. They should seek to achieve the maximum possible level of trade liberalization therefrom. we propose as our goal completion of the negotiations in 1977.

10 we look to an orderly and fruitful increase in our economic relations with socialist countries as an important element in progress in détente, and in world economic growth. we will also intensify our efforts to achieve a prompt conclusion of the negotiations concerning export credits.

11 with regard to monetary problems, we affirm our intention to work for greater stability. This involves efforts to restore greater stability in underlying economic and financial conditions in the world economy. At the same time, our monetary authorities will act to counter disorderly market conditions, or erratic fluctuations, in exchange rates. we welcome the rapprochement, reached at the request of many other countries, between the views of the united States and France on the need for stability that the reform of the international monetary system must promote. This rapprochement will facilitate agreement through the iMF at the next session of the interim Committee in Jamaica on the outstanding issues of international monetary reform.

12 A cooperative relationship and improved understanding between the developing nations and the industrial world is fundamental to the prosperity of each. Sustained growth in our economies is necessary to growth in developing countries; and their growth contributes significantly to health in our own economies. The present large deficits in the current accounts of the developing countries represent a critical problem for them and also for the rest of the world. This must be dealt with in a number of complementary ways. recent proposals in several international meetings have already improved the atmosphere of the discussion between developed and developing countries. But early practical action is needed to assist the developing countries. Accordingly, we will play our part, through the iMF and other appropriate international fora, in making urgent improvements in international arrangements for the stabilization of the export earnings of developing countries and in measures to assist them in financing their deficits. in this context, priority should be given to the poorest developing countries.


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13 world economic growth is clearly linked to the increasing availability of energy sources. we are determined to secure for our economies the energy sources needed for their growth. our common interests require that we continue to cooperate in order to reduce our dependence on imported energy through conservation and the development of alternative sources. Through these measures as well as international cooperation between producer and consumer countries, responding to the long-term interests of both, we shall spare no effort in order to ensure more balanced conditions and a harmonious and steady development in the world energy market.

14 we welcome the convening of the Conference on international Economic Cooperation scheduled for december 16. we will conduct this dialogue in a positive spirit to assure that the interests of all concerned are protected and advanced. we believe that industrialized and developing countries alike have a critical stake in the future success of the world economy and in the cooperative political relationships on which it must be based.

15 we intend to intensify our cooperation on all these problems in the framework of existing institutions as well as in all the relevant international organizations.


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Appendix 5: Declaration of the First G8 Summit of Heads of State and Government

declaration G20 Summit on Financial Markets and the world Economy

washington, November 15, 2008

1 we, the leaders of the Group of Twenty, held an initial meeting in washington on November 15, 2008, amid serious challenges to the world economy and financial markets. we are determined to enhance our cooperation and work together to restore global growth and achieve needed reforms in the world’s financial systems.

2 over the past months our countries have taken urgent and exceptional measures to support the global economy and stabilize financial markets. These efforts must continue. At the same time, we must lay the foundation for reform to help to ensure that a global crisis, such as this one, does not happen again. our work will be guided by a shared belief that market principles, open trade and investment regimes, and effectively regulated financial markets foster the dynamism, innovation, and entrepreneurship that are essential for economic growth, employment and poverty reduction.


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Root causes of the current crisis

3 during a period of strong global growth, growing capital flows and prolonged stability earlier this decade, market participants sought higher yields without an adequate appreciation of the risks and failed to exercise proper due diligence. At the same time, weak underwriting standards, unsound risk-management practices, increasingly complex and opaque financial products and consequent excessive leverage combined to create vulnerabilities in the system. Policy-makers, regulators and supervisors, in some advanced countries, did not adequately appreciate and address the risks building up in financial markets, keep pace with financial innovation or take into account the systemic ramifications of domestic regulatory actions.

4 Major underlying factors to the current situation were, among others, inconsistent and insufficiently coordinated macroeconomic policies, inadequate structural reforms, which led to unsustainable global macroeconomic outcomes. These developments, together, contributed to excesses and ultimately resulted in severe market disruption.

Actions taken and to be taken

5 we have taken strong and significant actions to date to stimulate our economies, provide liquidity, strengthen the capital of financial institutions, protect savings and deposits, address regulatory deficiencies, unfreeze credit markets, and we are working to ensure that international financial institutions (iFis) can provide critical support for the global economy.

6 But more needs to be done to stabilize financial markets and support economic growth. Economic momentum is slowing substantially in major economies and the global outlook has weakened. Many emerging market economies, which helped sustain the world economy this decade, are still experiencing good growth but increasingly are being adversely impacted by the worldwide slowdown.

7 Against this background of deteriorating economic conditions worldwide, we agreed that a broader policy response is needed based on closer macroeconomic cooperation, to restore growth,


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avoid negative spillovers and support emerging market economies and developing countries. As immediate steps to achieve these objectives, as well as to address longer-term challenges, we will:

continue our vigorous efforts and take whatever further actions ▸

are necessary to stabilize the financial system;recognize the importance of monetary policy support, as deemed ▸

appropriate to domestic conditions;use fiscal measures to stimulate domestic demand to rapid effect, ▸

as appropriate, while maintaining a policy framework conducive to fiscal sustainability;help emerging and developing economies gain access to ▸

finance in current difficult financial conditions, including through liquidity facilities and program support. we stress the international Monetary Fund’s (iMF) important role in crisis response, welcome its new short-term liquidity facility, and urge the ongoing review of its instruments and facilities to ensure flexibility;encourage the world Bank and other multilateral development ▸

banks (MdBs) to use their full capacity in support of their development agenda, and we welcome the recent introduction of new facilities by the world Bank in the areas of infrastructure and trade finance;ensure that the iMF, world Bank and other MdBs have sufficient ▸

resources to continue playing their role in overcoming the crisis.

Common principles for reform of financial markets

8 in addition to the actions taken above, we will implement reforms that will strengthen financial markets and regulatory regimes so as to avoid future crises. regulation is first and foremost the responsibility of national regulators who constitute the first line of defense against market instability. however, our financial markets are global in scope, therefore, intensified international cooperation among regulators and strengthening of international standards, where necessary, and their consistent implementation is necessary to protect against adverse cross-border, regional and global developments affecting international financial stability. regulators


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must ensure that their actions support market discipline, avoid potentially adverse impacts on other countries, including regulatory arbitrage, and support competition, dynamism and innovation in the marketplace. Financial institutions must also bear their responsibility for the turmoil and should do their part to overcome it including by recognizing losses, improving disclosure and strengthening their governance and risk-management practices.

9 we commit to implementing policies consistent with the following common principles for reform:

Strengthening transparency and accountability: ▸ we will strengthen financial market transparency, including by enhancing required disclosure on complex financial products and ensuring complete and accurate disclosure by firms of their financial conditions. incentives should be aligned to avoid excessive risk-taking.Enhancing sound regulation: ▸ we pledge to strengthen our regulatory regimes, prudential oversight and risk management, and ensure that all financial markets, products and participants are regulated or subject to oversight, as appropriate to their circumstances. we will exercise strong oversight over credit rating agencies, consistent with the agreed and strengthened international code of conduct. we will also make regulatory regimes more effective over the economic cycle, while ensuring that regulation is efficient, does not stifle innovation and encourages expanded trade in financial products and services. we commit to transparent assessments of our national regulatory systems.Promoting integrity in financial markets: ▸ we commit to protect the integrity of the world’s financial markets by bolstering investor and consumer protection, avoiding conflicts of interest, preventing illegal market manipulation, fraudulent activities and abuse, and protecting against illicit finance risks arising from non-cooperative jurisdictions. we will also promote information sharing, including with respect to jurisdictions that have yet to commit to international standards with respect to bank secrecy and transparency.Reinforcing international cooperation: ▸ we call upon our national and regional regulators to formulate their regulations and other measures in a consistent manner. regulators should enhance their


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coordination and cooperation across all segments of financial markets, including with respect to cross-border capital flows. regulators and other relevant authorities as a matter of priority should strengthen cooperation on crisis prevention, management and resolution.Reforming international financial institutions: ▸ we are committed to advancing the reform of the Bretton woods institutions so that they can more adequately reflect changing economic weights in the world economy in order to increase their legitimacy and effectiveness. in this respect, emerging and developing economies, including the poorest countries, should have greater voice and representation. The Financial Stability Forum (FSF) must expand urgently to a broader membership of emerging economies, and other major standard setting bodies should promptly review their membership. The iMF, in collaboration with the expanded FSF and other bodies, should work to better identify vulnerabilities, anticipate potential stresses and act swiftly to play a key role in crisis response.

Tasking of ministers and experts

10 we are committed to taking rapid action to implement these principles. we instruct our Finance Ministers, as coordinated by their 2009 G20 leadership (Brazil, uK, republic of Korea), to initiate processes and a timeline to do so. An initial list of specific measures is set forth in the attached Action Plan, including high priority actions to be completed prior to March 31, 2009.

in consultation with other economies and existing bodies, drawing upon the recommendations of such eminent independent experts as they may appoint, we request our Finance Ministers to formulate additional recommendations, including in the following specific areas:

Mitigating against pro-cyclicality in regulatory policy; ▸

reviewing and aligning global accounting standards, particularly ▸

for complex securities in times of stress;Strengthening the resilience and transparency of credit ▸

derivatives markets and reducing their systemic risks, including by improving the infrastructure of over-the-counter markets;


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reviewing compensation practices as they relate to incentives for ▸

risk-taking and innovation;reviewing the mandates, governance and resource requirements ▸

of the iFis; anddefining the scope of systemically important institutions and ▸

determining their appropriate regulation or oversight.

in view of the role of the G20 in financial systems reform, we will 11 meet again by April 30, 2009, to review the implementation of the principles and decisions agreed today.

Commitment to an open world economy

we recognize that these reforms will only be successful if grounded 12 in a commitment to free market principles, including the rule of law, respect for private property, open trade and investment, competitive markets, and efficient, effectively regulated financial systems. These principles are essential to economic growth and prosperity and have lifted millions out of poverty, and have significantly raised the global standard of living. recognizing the necessity to improve financial sector regulation, we must avoid overregulation that would hamper economic growth and exacerbate the contraction of capital flows, including to developing countries.we underscore the critical importance of rejecting protectionism and 13 not turning inward in times of financial uncertainty. in this regard, within the next 12 months, we will refrain from raising new barriers to investment or to trade in goods and services, imposing new export restrictions, or implementing world Trade organization’s (wTo) inconsistent measures to stimulate exports. Further, we shall strive to reach agreement this year on modalities that lead to a successful conclusion to the wTo’s doha development Agenda with an ambitious and balanced outcome. we instruct our Trade Ministers to achieve this objective and stand ready to assist directly, as necessary. we also agree that our countries have the largest stake in the global trading system and therefore each must make the positive contributions necessary to achieve such an outcome.we are mindful of the impact of the current crisis on developing 14 countries, particularly the most vulnerable. we reaffirm


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the importance of the Millennium development Goals, the development assistance commitments we have made, and urge both developed and emerging economies to undertake commitments consistent with their capacities and roles in the global economy. in this regard, we reaffirm the development principles agreed at the 2002 united Nations Conference on Financing for development in Monterrey, Mexico, which emphasized country ownership and mobilizing all sources of financing for development.we remain committed to addressing other critical challenges such 15 as energy security and climate change, food security, the rule of law and the fight against terrorism, poverty and disease.As we move forward, we are confident that through continued 16 partnership, cooperation and multilateralism, we will overcome the challenges before us and restore stability and prosperity to the world economy.

Action Plan to implement principles for reform

This Action Plan sets forth a comprehensive work plan to implement the five agreed principles for reform. our Finance Ministers will work to ensure that the taskings set forth in this Action Plan are fully and vigorously implemented. They are responsible for the development and implementation of these recommendations drawing on the ongoing work of relevant bodies, including the international Monetary Fund, an expanded Financial Stability Forum, and standard setting bodies.

Strengthening transparency and accountability

Immediate actions by March 31, 2009

The key global accounting standards bodies should work to ▸

enhance guidance for valuation of securities, also taking into account the valuation of complex, illiquid products, especially during times of stress.Accounting standard setters should significantly advance their ▸

work to address weaknesses in accounting and disclosure standards for off-balance sheet vehicles.


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regulators and accounting standard setters should enhance the ▸

required disclosure of complex financial instruments by firms to market participants.with a view toward promoting financial stability, the governance ▸

of the international accounting standard setting body should be further enhanced, including by undertaking a review of its membership, in particular in order to ensure transparency, accountability, and an appropriate relationship between this independent body and the relevant authorities.Private sector bodies that have already developed best practices for ▸

private pools of capital and/or hedge funds should bring forward proposals for a set of unified best practices. Finance Ministers should assess the adequacy of these proposals, drawing upon the analysis of regulators, the expanded FSF, and other relevant bodies.

Medium-term actions

The key global accounting standards bodies should work ▸

intensively toward the objective of creating a single high-quality global standard.regulators, supervisors and accounting standard setters, as ▸

appropriate, should work with each other and the private sector on an ongoing basis to ensure consistent application and enforcement of high-quality accounting standards.Financial institutions should provide enhanced risk disclosures ▸

in their reporting and disclose all losses on an ongoing basis, consistent with international best practice, as appropriate. regulators should work to ensure that a financial institution’s financial statements include a complete, accurate and timely picture of the firm’s activities (including off-balance sheet activities) and are reported on a consistent and regular basis.

Enhancing sound regulation

Regulatory regimes

Immediate actions by March 31, 2009The iMF, expanded FSF and other regulators and bodies should ▸

develop recommendations to mitigate pro-cyclicality, including


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the review of how valuation and leverage, bank capital, executive compensation and provisioning practices may exacerbate cyclical trends.

Medium-term actions

To the extent countries or regions have not already done so, ▸

each country or region pledges to review and report on the structure and principles of its regulatory system to ensure it is compatible with a modern and increasingly globalized financial system. To this end, all G20 members commit to undertake a Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) report and support the transparent assessments of countries’ national regulatory systems.The appropriate bodies should review the differentiated nature of ▸

regulation in the banking, securities and insurance sectors and provide a report outlining the issue and making recommendations on needed improvements. A review of the scope of financial regulation, with a special emphasis on institutions, instruments and markets that are currently unregulated, along with ensuring that all systemically important institutions are appropriately regulated, should also be undertaken.National and regional authorities should review resolution regimes ▸

and bankruptcy laws in light of recent experience to ensure that they permit an orderly wind-down of large complex cross-border financial institutions.definitions of capital should be harmonized in order to achieve ▸

consistent measures of capital and capital adequacy.

Prudential oversight


regulators should take steps to ensure that credit rating agencies ▸

meet the highest standards of the international organization of securities regulators and that they avoid conflicts of interest, provide greater disclosure to investors and to issuers, and differentiate ratings for complex products. This will help ensure that credit rating agencies have the right incentives and appropriate


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oversight to enable them to perform their important role in providing unbiased information and assessments to markets.The international organization of securities regulators should ▸

review credit rating agencies’ adoption of the standards and mechanisms for monitoring compliance.Authorities should ensure that financial institutions maintain ▸

adequate capital in amounts necessary to sustain confidence. international standard setters should set out strengthened capital requirements for banks’ structured credit and securitization activities.Supervisors and regulators, building on the imminent launch of ▸

central counterparty services for credit default swaps (CdS) in some countries, should speed efforts to reduce the systemic risks of CdS and over-the-counter (oTC) derivatives transactions; insist that market participants support exchange traded or electronic trading platforms for CdS contracts; expand oTC derivatives market transparency; and ensure that the infrastructure for oTC derivatives can support growing volumes.

Medium-term actions

Credit ratings agencies that provide public ratings should be ▸

registered.Supervisors and central banks should develop robust and ▸

internationally consistent approaches for liquidity supervision of, and central bank liquidity operations for, cross-border banks.

Risk management


regulators should develop enhanced guidance to strengthen ▸

banks’ risk-management practices, in line with international best practices, and should encourage financial firms to reexamine their internal controls and implement strengthened policies for sound risk management.regulators should develop and implement procedures to ensure ▸

that financial firms implement policies to better manage liquidity risk, including by creating strong liquidity cushions.


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Supervisors should ensure that financial firms develop processes ▸

that provide for timely and comprehensive measurement of risk concentrations and large counterparty risk positions across products and geographies.Firms should reassess their risk-management models to guard ▸

against stress and report to supervisors on their efforts.The Basel Committee should study the need for and help develop ▸

firms’ new stress testing models, as appropriate.Financial institutions should have clear internal incentives ▸

to promote stability, and action needs to be taken, through voluntary effort or regulatory action, to avoid compensation schemes which reward excessive short-term returns or risk-taking.Banks should exercise effective risk management and due diligence ▸

over structured products and securitization.

Medium-term actions

international standard setting bodies, working with a broad ▸

range of economies and other appropriate bodies, should ensure that regulatory policy-makers are aware and able to respond rapidly to evolution and innovation in financial markets and products.Authorities should monitor substantial changes in asset prices ▸

and their implications for the macroeconomy and the financial system.

Promoting integrity in financial markets


our national and regional authorities should work together to ▸

enhance regulatory cooperation between jurisdictions on a regional and international level.National and regional authorities should work to promote ▸

information sharing about domestic and cross-border threats to market stability and ensure that national (or regional, where applicable) legal provisions are adequate to address these threats.


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National and regional authorities should also review business ▸

conduct rules to protect markets and investors, especially against market manipulation and fraud and strengthen their cross-border cooperation to protect the international financial system from illicit actors. in case of misconduct, there should be an appropriate sanctions regime.

Medium-term actions

National and regional authorities should implement national and ▸

international measures that protect the global financial system from uncooperative and nontransparent jurisdictions that pose risks of illicit financial activity.The Financial Action Task Force should continue its important ▸

work against money laundering and terrorist financing, and we support the efforts of the world Bank-uN Stolen Asset recovery (StAr) initiative.Tax authorities, drawing upon the work of relevant bodies such ▸

as the organization for Economic Cooperation and development (oECd), should continue efforts to promote tax information exchange. lack of transparency and a failure to exchange tax information should be vigorously addressed.

Reinforcing international cooperation


Supervisors should collaborate to establish supervisory colleges ▸

for all major cross-border financial institutions, as part of efforts to strengthen the surveillance of cross-border firms. Major global banks should meet regularly with their supervisory college for comprehensive discussions of the firm’s activities and assessment of the risks it faces.regulators should take all steps necessary to strengthen cross- ▸

border crisis management arrangements, including on cooperation and communication with each other and with appropriate authorities, and develop comprehensive contact lists and conduct simulation exercises, as appropriate.


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Medium-term actions

Authorities, drawing especially on the work of regulators, should ▸

collect information on areas where convergence in regulatory practices such as accounting standards, auditing and deposit insurance is making progress, is in need of accelerated progress or where there may be potential for progress.Authorities should ensure that temporary measures to restore ▸

stability and confidence have minimal distortions and are unwound in a timely, well-sequenced and coordinated manner.

Reforming international financial institutions


The FSF should expand to a broader membership of emerging ▸

economies.The iMF, with its focus on surveillance, and the expanded FSF, with ▸

its focus on standard setting, should strengthen their collaboration, enhancing efforts to better integrate regulatory and supervisory responses into the macro-prudential policy framework and conduct early warning exercises.The iMF, given its universal membership and core macro-financial ▸

expertise, should, in close coordination with the FSF and others, take a leading role in drawing lessons from the current crisis, consistent with its mandate.we should review the adequacy of the resources of the iMF, the ▸

world Bank Group and other multilateral development banks and stand ready to increase them where necessary. The iFis should also continue to review and adapt their lending instruments to adequately meet their members’ needs and revise their lending role in the light of the ongoing financial crisis.we should explore ways to restore emerging and developing ▸

countries’ access to credit and resume private capital flows which are critical for sustainable growth and development, including ongoing infrastructure investment.in cases where severe market disruptions have limited access to the ▸

necessary financing for counter-cyclical fiscal policies, multilateral


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development banks must ensure arrangements are in place to support, as needed, those countries with a good track record and sound policies.

Medium-term actions

we underscored that the Bretton woods institutions must be ▸

comprehensively reformed so that they can more adequately reflect changing economic weights in the world economy and be more responsive to future challenges. Emerging and developing economies should have greater voice and representation in these institutions.The iMF should conduct vigorous and even-handed surveillance ▸

reviews of all countries, as well as giving greater attention to their financial sectors and better integrating the reviews with the joint iMF/world Bank financial sector assessment programs. on this basis, the role of the iMF in providing macro-financial policy advice would be strengthened.

Advanced economies, the iMF and other international organizations should provide capacity-building programs for emerging market econo-mies and developing countries on the formulation and the implementa-tion of new major regulations, consistent with international standards.


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Appendix 6: G20 Summit Themes from 2008 to 2011

washington, November 2008: Summit on Financial Markets and the world Economy.

london, April 2009: “Growth, Stability, Jobs,” a comprehensive action plan to rebuild and reform the economy.

Pittsburgh, September 2009: A Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth.

Toronto, June 2010: “recovery and New Beginnings” (theme shared by the G8). Principles for innovative Financial inclusion.

Seoul, November 2010: development Consensus for Shared Growth (Seoul development consensus).

Cannes, November 2011: “New world, New ideas.”


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Bibliography

in addition to the sources cited in the footnotes, below is a list of selected publications on the G20, diplomatic practices (summits, networks, etc.), the problem of international legitimacy, and discussion of the “west and the rest” issue, in particular concerning the former and new powers.

The G20

AllArd, Patrick, lEChErVy, Christian, “les puissances émergentes et le G20. la musique ou les chaises?” Revue Défense Nationale, no 741, June 2011.

“Asia and the G20,” Special issue, East Asia Forum Quarterly, vol. 2, no. 4, october–december 2010.

BrAdFord, Colin, liM, wonhyuk (eds), Global Leadership in Transition. Making the G20 More Effective and Responsive, Seoul and washington, Korea development institute et Brookings institution Press, 2011.

ChAVAGNEuX, Christian, “le G20 va-t-il vraiment réguler la finance?” Alternatives Economiques, Novembre 2009.

CooPEr, Andrew, “The G20 and its regional Critics. The Search for inclusion,” Global Policy, vol. 2, no. 2, May 2011.

FiTouSSi, Jean-Paul, STiGliTz, Joseph, et al., The G20 and Recovery and Beyond. An Agenda for Global Governance for the Twenty-First Century, oFCE e-book (www.ofce.sciences-po.fr), February 2011.


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Diplomatic practices

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CooPEr, Andrew, hoCKiNG, Brian, MAlEy william (eds), Global Governance and Diplomacy. Worlds Apart? Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

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hEiNE, Jorge, “on the Manner of Practising the New diplomacy,” Center for International Governance Innovation, working Paper no. 11, october 2006.

lAFoNT rAPNouil Manuel, “A European View on the Future of Multilateralism,” Washington Quarterly, vol. 32, no. 3, July 2009.


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International legitimacy

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DOI: 10.1057/9781137367754 111

3G (Global Governance Group), 64–5, 69

ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), 10, 15, 22, 28, 65

Asian financial crisis, 3–4, 11, 18, 76

Asymmetrical governance, 33, 49, 70

Brazil, 3, 11, 13, 32, 39, 40, 43–4, 51–4, 56, 59, 67, 72, 77–78, 86, 95

Bretton, woods, 5, 8–9, 15, 26, 29, 34, 75, 95

BriC(S) (Brazil, russia, india, China and South Africa), 51–6, 62, 77

Canada, 2, 5, 12, 21, 25, 40, 76China, 3–4, 10–1, 13, 15, 21–2,

28, 39–40, 42–4, 51, 53–60, 63, 67, 72, 77, 86

Civil society, 16–20, 32–3, 38Cold war, 3, 8, 13, 39, 49–51, 59,

65–6, 70Congress of Vienna (1815), 14,

16–17, 26, 27, 30

democratic countries, 12, 30, 40–3, 54–5, 57, 60, 71, 87

Efficiency, 26–9, 34–5, 53Emerging powers, 38, 48–52,

54, 57, 59–60, 72, 83European union (Eu), 1, 5–6,

9, 13–6, 22, 28, 30–1, 34, 36–7,

40–1, 43, 48–50, 53, 57–66, 70–1, 77

FAo (Food & Agriculture organization), 20, 33, 38

G8, 2–5, 7–8, 11, 13, 18–9, 21, 23, 27–8, 34, 37, 39–44, 49, 54, 56, 70–1, 76, 87, 91, 105

G10, 8, 10–1, 15, 22, 48, 75–6G24, 8, 10–1, 43–4, 48,

76, 86G77, 3, 8, 10, 15, 28, 36, 39,

43–4, 48–9, 51, 70–1, 76–8, 83, 86

Geopolitical narrative, 70–2Global governance, 25, 27,

53–4, 58, 62, 64

iBSA (india Brazil South Africa), 52, 54–6, 77

iMF (international Monetary Fund), 4–6, 8–9, 15, 27, 29, 34, 43, 48, 52–3, 71, 75, 89, 93, 95, 97–8, 103–4

international legitimacy, 2–3, 16, 25–9, 30–3, 35–9, 41, 108

ldC (least developed Countries), 28, 36–7

MdGs (Millennium development Goals), 36

NGo (Non Governmental organization), 17–9, 33

Nordic countries, 25–7, 63

Index


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Index

rambouillet declaration, 12–3, 40, 87–90

regional representation, 9–10, 64–6

representativeness, 3–4, 6, 27–8, 33–7, 52–3, 58

russia, 3–5, 12–3, 21, 31, 39–40, 42–4, 51–3, 55–6, 76–7

Singapore, 4, 5, 11, 21, 22, 57, 60, 64–5, 68–9, 85

Summitry, 14, 16–18Systemically important countries, 5–6,

27, 49, 57, 62

ToES (The other Economic Summit), 18

uN (united Nations), 1, 3, 6, 8–9, 15, 17, 20, 28–9, 31, 33–40, 43, 46, 48–9, 51–6, 58–9, 63, 65–6, 71–2, 75–6, 78–9, 82, 97

uN reform, 29, 38, 52–3, 59, 66uSA (united States of America), 2–6,

8–9, 12–3, 15–6, 20–2, 30–1, 43–4, 56–7, 65–6, 70, 76–7, 87, 89

who (world health organization), 15world Bank, 4, 9, 50, 71world order, 10, 33, 35, 57–9, 61, 65, 72


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The G20 ||

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Transcript of The G20 ||