The Future of Radar Electronic Warfare: Beyond (Monostatic ... · The Future of Radar Electronic...

Commercial Sensitive

Sqn Ldr Ioannis VAGIAS CEng FRAeS [email protected] +44 1793 78 5907

The Future of Radar Electronic Warfare: Beyond (Monostatic)

Radar Applications

Mar 20, 2019Combat Air Survivability Conference

© BAE Systems

Royal United Services Institute

mailto:[email protected]


Definition

An integrated capability of military action involving the use of EM and directed energy to

control the EM spectrum or to attack the enemy. EW exploits the opportunities and

vulnerabilities which are inherent in the physics of EM energy and includes three major

subdivisions:

Electronic Support (ES)

Electronic Attack (EA)

Electronic Protection (EP)


RADAR Spectrum

VHF UHF L S C X K mmW

0.1 0.25 0.3 0.5 1 2 3 4 6 8 10 12.5 20 40 60 100

A B C D E F G H I J K L M

NATO EW Frequency Designations

Radio Frequency (GHz)

ITU Frequency Designations

RADAR Frequency Designations


Air (and Space) Warfare Doctrine

• Interdiction, Strike and Air Support

• Air Defence

Offensive Counter Air (OCA)

Attack Operations

Fighter Sweep

Fighter Escort

Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defence

Defensive Counter Air (DCA)

Air and Missile Defence

Passive Defence

...Detection and Warning

...Electronic Warfare

...Signature Control

• Intelligence Surveillance Targeting Acquisition Reconnaissance (ISTAR)

• Air Mobility: Air Lift, Air Refuelling (AR), Special Air Operations (SF) and MedEvac


Air Warfare Key Functions

• ATTACK

Target

Engage

Assess

• SURVIVAL

Detection

Targeting

Engagement

• SENSING

Search

Detect

Locate & Track

• ISTAR

Force Direction

Information Collection and

Processing

Dissemination

• CORE

Position & Synchronization

Information Security

Man-Machine Interface

System & Data

Management

Mission & Resource

Management

War fighter Identification

Rules of Engagement

Record


Col John Richard Boyd USAF

Erie PA, 23 Jan 1927 – West Palm Beach FL, 9 Mar 1997

Known for OODA loop, intellectual father of the F-15, F-16, F/A-18 and A-10 (together

with Pierre Sperry, Chuck Myers, Tom Christie and Col. Everest Riccioni USAF


The Disruption – Innovation Cone

Capabilities of the

enemy are known

Develop narrowband

doctrine and capability

Innovative ideas,

capabilities and doctrine

Enemy cannot counter

capability. Opportunities

for defence manipulation

Saturation

Disruption


Sensing and the OODA Loop1

• Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS): domain for collection,

distribution, processing and distortion of information

Information supremacy and superiority

Information congestion and contest

Defence of information; defence of decision making

(cyberwarfare)

Freedom of Manoeuvre and Operational Advantage

• Boyd’s OODA Loop is applied to Land, Sea, Air (and

Space) Operations...and business

• Can it be applied for sensors, information and achieving

spectrum supremacy?

• Beating the loop (speed) by going around the loop;

understand faster and thus decide faster.

• Need to complete the loop before acting effectively; this

is not always the case in actual operations.

• Sometimes, slowing down produces better results

(1 Col John Boyd USAF)


Boyd’s Original Diagramme

• Operate inside opponent’s OODA loops to create distrupt.

• Observe, orient, decide and act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity.

• Produce a period of shock, confusion, hesitancy.

• ...until the opponent develops an understanding of what has happened.

https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Books/B_0151_Boyd_Discourse_Winning_Losing.pdf


OODA Loop onto a Platform: Integration

• Many sensors and many

effectors with own OODA loop

• Man-In-The-Loop

• Human operator might observe

the sensors’ information output

• Data assessment from the

network for orientationMission

System

Effector

Sensor

Effector

Sensor

Effector

Sensor


Orient Phase is most important

• It is the ‘corporate culture aligned with CONOPS

(concept of operation), Doctrine, Dogma and

SOPs (standard operating procedures)

• Also known to operators (aircrew) as Situation

Awareness (SA)

• It shapes the way we understand the situation

and the way we react

• Must be continuously updated, which relies on a

learning process (Artificial Intelligence)

• When all participants are aligned, we have:

Common understanding of mission intent

Shared Situation Awareness

Orient

Previous Experience

Analysis and

Synthesis

Genetic Heritage

New Information

Cultural Traditions


OODA Loop is not outdated

• Experienced observers know when they need more time

• Experienced observers know what to look for

• Taking extra time for decision making is not being passive nor giving up the initiative

• Applies to sensors as well as to humans

• Paradoxa:

How delaying decisions can make better cars faster” (2nd Toyota Paradoxon1)

Dress me slowly because I am in a hurry (the Pope to his aide)

Read thoroughly the exam questions (pressure of time) before you start writing the answers

Ward, Liker, Cristiano, Sobeck (1995)

1 https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-second-toyota-paradox-how-delaying-decisions-can-make-better-cars-faster

https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-second-toyota-paradox-how-delaying-decisions-can-make-better-cars-faster


Experimentation using CL Decision Systems

• The Implicit Loops allow us to use our ‘proven repertoire’ (memory of effectiveness)

Fastest responses and the ones we have been trained to use

• The slower Explicit command and guidance loops are the way we build up the

experience and knowledge that allows us to use the faster Implicit loops

• The DECISION & ACTION phases in the Explicit Loops develop a ‘new repertoire’

Trials, training and computer-based scenario modelling are the way of building up a

set of plausible scenarios, information and a range of ‘hypothetical responses’

This is an experimental approach, which takes time and needs data to be collected

• The Decision-Action loops are the heart of Innovation

Investigation to build capability and understanding of the possible scenarios we

may face

Experimentation using the EXPLICIT loops

Developing new ideas, capabilities and doctrine


Current EW Technology

• Network Centric Enabled Warfare:

Share EW information through tactical data links

• Not-Only-RADAR Sensors:

Use powerful AESA RADARs as jammers

• Netted RF Passive and Active Sensors:

Low frequency passive sensors to detect LO

targets

• Stealth Coatings and Shaping:

Ferromagnetic particles and heat abductive

materials and use CNT

• Tactical Battlefield Cyber Warfare:

Attack enemy computer networks to degrade

sensors

CESMO, NCCT

APG-81, ES-05

where’re getting there...

HAVE GLASS IV, surface wave suppression

...to be addressed at some point...


New Concepts

• Trimmable expendable (passive or active) decoy

• Rechargeable expendable active decoy

• Loitercopter

• 3D arrays

• RCS reduction at hypersonic velocities

• Kinetic countermeasure

• Future air power (ÆTHON)

• Further ideas and concepts for future Radar EW applications


• So far...free fall:

55mm, 200mm length

218 (inches)

Incapable of gliding

• Proposed gliders:

55 (mm)

218 (in)

118 (in)

228 (in)

• Large lift-to-drag ratio

• Long flight time

• Fit two actuators and an IMU for trimmed flight capability

• Passive (trihedrals) or active

• The round format can also spin thus producing a microDoppler signature

New Expendable Active Formats


New Expendable Active Formats Cont’d


Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II RCS

• Suitability for LO aircraft

• Combination of:

Chaff to stealth AGC

On-board or off-board

deception to steal the

range/Doppler gate

Passive decoy to give the

incoming missile something

realistic to chase

• The decoy can be:

• Ejected

• Ejected and towed

• Ejected, towed and released


Advanced Passive Expendable Glide Path (6DOF model)


Rechargeable Expendable Active Decoy

• Standard EAD body

• Decouple propelled from the body

• RAM air spins the propeller

• Induction motor (rotor-stator) produces AC current

• AC is converted to 28V DC

• DC current charges battery for high power pulse bursts

• Vision to irradiate for more that 1 min (depending the drop altitude)

• As the RF missile seeker flies towards the decoy, the decoy ERP requirement drops for a constant burn-through range


Loitercopter

• Off-board platform that can loiter and deliver effects:

Jamming and deception techniques

RGPO/VGPO

Coherent noise (narrow/wideband)

Cooperating and blink jamming

Waveform distortion:

Cross-eye (2 cartridges & laser LOS link)

Terrain-bounce

Kinetic effects

Directional warhead

Blast & fragmentation

Kevlar net (anti-drone)

Chaff


Loitercopter (Cont’d)

• Various formats for naval, helicopter and large

cargo aircraft

• Recoverable

Parachute

Floaters

Fly-back option

• Air-breathing or electrical motor

• Rechargeable or thermal battery

• Air-breathing motor can recharge the battery

• Option for LOS RF and/or SAT COM link for beyond visual range operation

• To protect a ship against salvo of anti-ship missiles, typically four can be deployed to the four corners of the ship several hundreds meters away


Loitercopter, Cooperative Jamming

0

10

20

30

40

0 35 70 105 140 175 210 245 280 315 350

Mis

sile

Mis

s D

ista

nce

(m

)

Jammer Separation Distance (m)

CASE A

CASE B

CASE C

CASE D

• A = Reference Case; Vr=1200 m/sec, B = 12.5deg, latax 20g

• B = Reference Case; but with Missile Acceleration 25g

• C = Reference Case; but with Seeker B = 10deg

• D=Reference Case; but with Vr=1000 m/sec


3D Antenna Array

• Crow’s Nest research revisited

• Tripole concept:

Set of three dipoles orthogonal to each other

Can transmit any polarization) in any direction

Can transmit and receive at co-polar or cross-polar

Vertical (VV), Horizontal (VV)

RHCP, LHCP, Slant

• Ability to steer one or multiple beams spherically

• Ultra fast beam steering and tracking

Several planes within the dome, generate several

planar arrays

Switch from one plane to another instead of steering

the beam (phase shifting the elements

Random element placement favors interferometry


3D Antenna Array

• Feeding network is a challenge

• Element cross coupling and shadowing has proved

not to be an issue

• In theory can be applied to any shape

• Practically however, there’s need for two topologies:

Surveillance sensors (hemispherical layout)

Missile seekers (conical layout)

• Different layouts leads to different feeding network

• Each element (dipole) needs it’s own phase shifter

Meteor Radome 3D CAD

Geodesic Radome 3D CAD


RCS of Hypersonic Vehicles

• Hypersonic regime M>5

• Formation of plasma (ionization of air) at M21.5 for a carbon CFRP structure

• M21.5 suggest hypersonic gliders for global strike capability

• A hypersonic glider can evade IADS through manoeuvring

• Literature suggests that plasma absorbs RF waves

China

India

Russia

Pakistan

South Korea


Kinetic Countermeasures against air-to-air Missiles

• Northrop Grumman:

Kinetic Missile Defense System

• Paradox: a more accurate missile seeker,

increases the kinetic decoy effectiveness. A

proximity fuses kill at a distance, renders the

decoy ineffective as fragments cannot neutralize

fragments

Need for directional warhead with blast

fragmentation effects

Several points of initiation

Proximity sensing (radar, ESM, IR/UV or

laser)

• Deployment of a Kevlar net?

"A missile defense system on an aircraft for destroying

threats to the aircraft. The defense system includes at least on

miniature guided missile mounted in a launch tube on the

aircraft, where the guided missile includes a target

acquisition and seeker system. The system also includes at

least one sensor on the aircraft for acquiring a target threat,

and a controller on the aircraft receiving signals from the at

least one sensor. The controller generates a fire control

solution that is provided to the at least one guided missile

that directs the guide missile once if is fired from the launch

tube towards the target threat, and the seeker system on the

guided missile acquires the target once it is launched from

the aircraft so as to destroy the target."


Æroplane Tenable Heuristic Omnirole Nimble (ÆTHON)

• Length 24m, wingspan 14m, height 3m

• OCA, SEAD, Deep Strike, Strategic ISTAR

• Large combat radius (>1,500km), large ferry range (>4,500km)

• Internal fuel >12,000kg

• 2 turbofan engines; installed max power >400kN

• Thrust-to-Weight ratio >1.25

• Autonomy: mission dependant

• Service ceiling >50,000ft

• Supercruise, Supermanoeuvrable

• No flaperons, nor LEF, nor elevons

• Non linear fluidic control for manoeuvring (leading, trailing edge and exhaust)

• 2D TVC5

• Low RCS6, low IR Signature

• Max 24 medium A2A7 missiles in 6 tubes

• 20mm or 30mm gun

• Supercruise speed >M2.0

• Max speed >M3.0


ÆTHON Innovative Aspects

• Non linear wing planform blowing (WPB) for aerodynamic control

A step beyond the technology behind Tempest (Manchester University)

• Enhanced manoeuvrability, sensors and effectors to counter IADS

• Low observability (RF & EO)

• Torpedo tube like weapon bays

Lockheed managed to launch an AIM-47 from the weapon bay of the YF-12 at M3.2


Radar EW: Disruptive Technologies and Concepts

• Pattern recognition of EM activity

Discriminate EM emitters using pattern recognition

Discriminate EM activity to guess adversary intentions (compare idle EM activity with

abnormal activity)

Behavioural Learning for Adaptive Electronic Warfare; BLADE (DARPA)

• Creating RF Effects with Electro-optics

E.g.: Optical mirage in the desert is the equivalent of waveform distortion in EW

Light bending coatings → use of antennae metamaterial skin to bend RF waves

Laser applications...

• Jamming and Deception of ESM

Pretend to be somebody else (reception and processing are not susceptible to

jamming/deception)

Wavefront distortion; works against interferometers (phase comparison receivers)

Receiver power saturation; works against multiport systems (amplitude comparison)


R EW: Disruptive Technologies and Concepts (Cont’d)

• Bioinspired Radar and Coatings

Echolocation in chiroptera; wideband, coherent techniques for navigation,

surveillance, targeting and acquisition

Tiger moth has a primitive stealth coating to avoid being consumed by its pursuer

• Waveform Diversity

Wideband transmission vs narrowband processing; degrade jammer performance

Different waveform on each monopulse lobe; range vs velocity ambiguity

• Next Generation Radar Stealth

Suppression of surface (creeping) waves

Use of metamaterials (carbon nanotubes; CNT)

Check fibre mat; Lockheed Martin stealth coating of the F-35


Thank you for your attention. I can now answer to your questions


All rights, including copyright, in the content of this presentation are

owned or controlled for these purposes by the Ministry of Defence.

You are not permitted to copy, download, store (in any medium), show or

play in public, adapt or change in any way the content of this presentation

without the prior written permission of the MOD.

Permission for further use may be sought in writing from:

Joint Business Office, Cranfield University at DA-CMT,

Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Swindon SN6 8LA

Copyright

© Leonardo MW

The Future of Radar Electronic Warfare: Beyond (Monostatic ... · The Future of Radar Electronic...

Documents

Transcript of The Future of Radar Electronic Warfare: Beyond (Monostatic ... · The Future of Radar Electronic...