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UNIVERSITATEA DIN CRAIOVA FACULTATEA DE ECONOMIE ȘI ADMINISTRAREA

AFACERILOR SPECIALIZAREA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND

BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

LUCRARE DE DISERTATIE

Îndrumător științific: Absolvent: Asis. univ.dr. George Ciobanu Alina Sabina BOGHEANU

CRAIOVA 2013

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UNIVERSITATEA DIN CRAIOVA FACULTATEA DE ECONOMIE ȘI ADMINISTRAREA

AFACERILOR SPECIALIZAREA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MIGRATION

Îndrumător științific: Absolvent: Asis. univ.dr. George Ciobanu Alina Sabina BOGHEANU

CRAIOVA 2013

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction Page 4

1.1.Recruitment Page 6

1.2 Movement and job placement Page 8

1.3. Circulation Page 9

2. Labour Migration Trends and Characteristics Page 10

2.1.Trends in Labour Migration Page 10

2.2.Driving forces Page 10

2.3.Type of flows Page 11

3. Labour Migration in the European Union Page 12

3.1. Economic growth in the EU

3.2. EU fragmentation and sub-regional bloc formation

Page 12

Page 13

3.3. EU Labour Markets Page 13

3.4. Xenophobia, racism and identity policies Page 14

Page 15

Page 17

Page 19

Page 19

Page 28

Page 30

Page 32

Page 35

Page 37

Page 40

Page 42

Page 47

Page 50

Page 60

Page 61

3.5. Mobility in Europe

3.5.1. Levels of mobility

3.5.2. Main reasons for moving

3.5.3. Socio-economic factors of migration

3.5.4. Advantages and disadvantages of geographical mobility

3.5.5. Migration intentions

3.5.6. Barriers to geographical mobility

3.5.7. Forced and voluntary mobility

4. The Future of Job Mobility

4.1. EU Policies

4.2. Migration trends in an enlarging European Union

4.3. Migration flows

5. Study Case: Romanians Migration within the EU Framework

Conclusions

References

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1.Introduction

Recent globalization trends have been characterized by the greater integration of global

markets for goods, services and capital across borders while their impact on the cross

border movement of people and labour remains much more restricted, regulated by

immigration laws and policies that uphold the principle of state sovereignty.1 Yet

globalization has had important implications for international labour migration, acting

as a 'push' and 'pull' factor. It has facilitated linkages of international labour markets

through vast improvements in information and communications technology. The

demand for high tech skills has expanded opportunities for mobility of skilled labour.

Concurrently, expanded trade would reduce the need for migration by creating jobs in

source countries. Virtual mobility enabled by ICT has similarly promoted outsourcing

and more jobs in source regions.

2. At the same time, globalization has led to widening disparities of employment

opportunities, incomes and living standards, and human security across the globe.2 In

some countries, globalization has adversely affected jobs and livelihoods in traditional

sectors. The failure of globalization to create new jobs where people live is a prime

factor in increasing migration pressures. "When people cannot find work at home in their

communities and societies they look elsewhere.” 3

3. Each year millions of women and men leave their homes and cross national borders

in search of greater security for themselves and their families. "Throughout human

history, migration has been a courageous expression of the individual's will to overcome

adversity and to live a better life.”4 Most are motivated by the quest for higher wages and

better opportunities, but some are forced to do so because of famine, natural disasters,

violent conflict or persecution.5 Labour migration has increasingly become a livelihood

strategy for women and men because of the lack of opportunities for full employment

and decent work in many developing countries. Almost half of the international

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migrants are women, now mostly migrating on their own and not as family members.

In the face of numerous immigration barriers in receiving countries, an increasing

proportion choose to, or are forced to migrate in irregular status which has been a cause

of concern for the international community.6

4. Most of the world's migrants - estimated at 191 million in 20057- are migrant workers

- those who migrate for employment- and their families. In 2000 economically active

migrants were estimated to number some 81 million, and with their families accounted

for almost 90 percent of total international migrants. Refugees and asylum-seekers

account for about 10 per cent of migrants.

5. Global economic, social, political and demographic trends indicate clearly that

international labour migration is likely to increase in the future, and not decrease. Thus

the challenge is how to manage migration in such a way that the positive effects are

maximized, making it a win-win phenomenon for all concerned.

Since the onset of the 1990s, skilled labour migration has been a burgeoning and

everdeveloping field of research. Here, skilled migrants – most broadly defined as those

in possession of a tertiary degree or extensive specialized work experience – include

architects, accountants and financial experts, engineers, technicians, researchers,

scientists, chefs, teachers, health professionals, and – increasingly – specialists in

information technology (IT, including computing professionals, computing engineers,

managers, sales reps, etc.). Social and professional characteristics, industrial needs and

strategies and government policies surrounding this field will be addressed by other

participants in the workshop. This brief contribution outlines some concepts, patterns

and issues surrounding kinds of globallystretched, or transnational, networks involving

highly skilled workers.

Several researchers have pointed out that – particularly with regard to the highly skilled

– ‘migration’ may now not be the most accurate term. Instead, ‘movement’ or ‘mobility’

may be more apt terms. This is because migration has connotations of permanency or

long-term stay,whereas the movement of many highly skilled persons tends, today, to

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be intermittent and short-term. It is transnational networks that precondition, arise out

of, and perpetuate the intermittent and short-term patterns of movement typifying

contemporary skilled workers.

The paper is organized into sections highlighting (a) the role of networks in

migration,(b) the nature of transnationalism today, and (c) patterns, processes and

impacts of transnational networks with regard to the movement of skilled workers. The

paper concludes by pointing to a few key issues concerning the future of field.

As already mentioned in passing, the networks utilized by skilled migrants often tend

to be of a different nature, and may have different migratory outcomes, than those

characterizing low or unskilled migrants. In three sub-sections below, various aspects of

skilled labour networks are sketched.

Before embarking on a description of such networks, however, it is important to

underscore the fact that migration networks – among skilled or unskilled workers – are

significantly gendered. Gender and gender relations have much to do with conditioning

who one’s contacts are, what one’s relationship to them is, and how networks are

accessed,managed and taken advantage of. This needs highlighting particularly in

current discussions of skilled labour, since most recent literature on the topic has been

marked by the ‘invisibility’ of women and gender relations (Kofman 2000)9.

1.1 Recruitment

The differential networks characterizing various kinds of workers influences, first of all,

ways in which skilled migrants are recruited. Schools and universities are a foremost

source of skilled migrant networks, especially among people who have completed

degrees abroad. Many studies show that the experience of being a foreign student

significantly increases the likelihood of being a skilled migrant at a later stage. The

networks that foreign students develop may also serve subsequently to provide

opportunities for colleagues and friends from the home country as well.

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Meyer (2001) indicates that general researchers tend to enter the migration stream

through their own ad hoc networks of colleagues and project collaborators; engineers

and information technologists, for example, tend instead to move through more

institutional ‘migration channels’ such as recruitment and relocation agencies. Skilled

migration processes have also witnessed an ever-increasing role taken by global

professional organizations in providing access to migration channels and jobs abroad.

The role of global professional associations in augmenting migration has, in many

occupations, eveloped alongside regulatory agencies that oversee the accrediting and

licensing of professional qualifications and the right to practice in different countries.

Such professional and official frameworks provide an important prerequisite – and a

kind of guarantee to employers – that importantly facilitates the creation of skilled

migration systems.

Other facets of recruitment have globalized, as it were, by way of setting up conditions

that simplify and speed up the search for, and employment of, skilled workers from

abroad.

Within the area of IT, to take one noteworthy example, worldwide opportunities and

competition is stimulated by the extension of a kind of common playing field.

The following characteristics prevail within the industry: it is highly fluid in terms of

skill requirements; international and with little impact of particular cultural contexts;

dominated by English language as the basis; on-the-job experience as the most

important means of acquiring human capital or becoming multiskilled; a high level of

intra- and inter-company and inter-region/country mobility; potential for return

migration and investment, and a profession that is largely unregulated by unions or

other mechanisms11.

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1.2 Movement and Job Placement

The migration of professionals often necessitates the interaction of several

intermediaries involved in: checking immigration rules and procedures, dealing with

immigration authorities, ensuring employability and transportability of qualifications,

negotiating wages, facilitating travel, arranging accommodation. Today there are

numerous specialist agencies that take care of exactly such forests of red tape. ‘The

recent proliferation of professional international intermediaries of this kind confirms

the fact that globalization of the highly skilled labour market does not occur without

massive network investments’

A highly notable example, especially within the IT industry, is the agency work known

as ‘body shopping’.

The basic idea behind body shopping is for local recruiters (in India for instance) to

supply on-site, ‘just-in-time’ labour abroad at an economical price for employers. The

rationale follows developments within an industry in which short-term projects

predominate; it usually doesn’t make sense for IT employers to invest (in terms of

money, administration and legal responsibility) in 1-4 year visas for workers when

there will suffice a short-term contract overseen, in practically all its parts, by an

intermediary agency.

As detailed, agencies which supply firms with short-term IT workers can: address

employers’ needs quickly, follow labour market trends closely, provide a ‘buffer’

between the labour market and employer, and relieve both employer and employee of

considerable hassles surrounding the administration of immigration (acquiring visas,

monitoring rules, filling-out applications, etc.). The agents themselves – whether small,

middle or large – are substantially networked transnationally amongst themselves

(with smaller agents providing workers for larger ones, who in turn supply industrial

firms). On the negative side, many such body shops have been shown to involve

various kinds and degrees of fraud, mostly by making claims that workers are needed

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for jobs which don’t exist (in order to bring IT workers into a country to sit ‘on the

bench’ until a specific for a client firms arises) or by falsifying workers’qualifications14.

1.3 Circulation

As the concept suggests, transnational networks of skilled workers are not merely bi-

national avenues of movement. They regularly entail the mobility of workers

throughout an international arena (such as Indian IT workers who work, at one time or

another, in Singapore, Australia and the USA as well as in India).

For a number of years, the migration of skilled workers from developing countries was

regarded as a problem of ‘brain drain.’ With the recognition of networks of skilled

worker circulation, many social scientists and national policymakers have tended to

shift from a discourse of ‘brain drain’ to notions of the globalization of human capital,

brain exchange, brain circulation and the creation of a global mobile workforce. The

idea is to accept the fact that skilled persons may want to migrant for personal, familial

and career development, while seeking to encourage the skilled migrant’s return,

mobilization or association with home country development. Indeed, it is transnational

networks of professionals that are deemed crucial to realize such goals.

There have emerged a number of schemes and types of transnational networks of

expatriate professionals that can be tapped to enable their effective and productive role

in a home country’s development – even without any physical temporary or permanent

return.

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2.Labour Migration Trends and Characteristics

2.1 Trends in labour migration

Over the last 45 years, the number of persons living outside their country of birth has

more than doubled, from an estimated 75 million in 1960 to nearly 191 million in 2005

Worldwide, one in every 35 persons is a migrant. This trend of increasing international

migration and migrants in absolute terms can be expected to continue in the coming

decades.

Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that, during the same period, the world’s

population also grew two- fold and the proportion of migrants in the total population

remains about 3 per cent Estimates put the number of migrant workers at over 86

million and, although there has been an increase, migrant workers represented no

more than 4.2 per cent of the industrialized countries’ total work-force in 1998.

While the majority of international migrants originate from developing countries, it is

not only a “South-North” or “East-West” phenomenon. Nearly half of all reported

migrants move from one developing country to another. Intra-regional flows are also

significant.

2.2. Driving forces

Three key determining factors will continue to fuel international labour migration; the

“pull” of changing demographics and labour market needs in high income countries;

the “push” of wage differentials and crisis pressures in less developed countries;

established inter-country networks based on family, culture and history.

From the migrant’s point of view, migration is often a livelihood strategy, since most

migration is for economic purposes. It is an outcome of decisions made by individuals

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and families that are seeking the best solution, given the opportunities and constraints

they face.

2.3.Type of flows

A large proportion of labour migration is unauthorized. The labour market needs both

skilled and lower skilled workers. While destination countries are now competing for

highly skilled workers, many host societies are becoming more hesitant about admitting

lower skilled workers. Nevertheless, there are frequently acute shortages of labour in

lower skilled sectors in some countries, given that these are jobs that nationals are

reluctant to take and that, consequently, governments are designing temporary worker

programmes to meet labour needs in these sectors.

Almost half of the 191 million migrants in the world today are women. While women

have always migrated as spouses and family ently. Women migrants take up both

skilled and less-skilled employment in destination countries, although in both cases,

these tend to be gender-specific jobs or jobs in sectors where women predominate. As

skilled migrants, women frequently work in the welfare and social professions, as

teachers, social workers and nurses. As less-skilled migrants, they are mainly employed

as domestic or care workers, as “entertainers”, in the garment manufacturing industry

and, to a lesser extent, in agriculture. In a number of European countries (particularly in

France, Italy and Spain), the Gulf States, and in some countries in the Middle East (e.g.

Jordan and Lebanon), the domestic service sector remains the most important

employment category for migrant women.

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3. Labour Migration in the European Union

In the context of North Africa, the Global Migration Futures (GMF) team applied them

to examine future migration in Europe. Existing research on the future of international

migration tends to focus on demographic change, and ignores key migration drivers

which are more difficult to predict. The very purpose of the scenario methodology is to

expand current thinking about future developments by creating scenarios around key

uncertainties. Scenario-building exercises identify which factors deserve the most

attention when examining potential future migration patterns and trends and

appropriate policy responses.

3.1.Economic growth in the EU

It is difficult to predict economic growth in the region in 2035, as this depends on a

combination of factors, including, but not limited to, the paths taken by various

European countries to attempt full recovery from economic recession; the future of the

Eurozone; and any future economic

restructuring of Europe’s main trading partners. What we do know is that there is a

strong, positive relationship between economic growth and immigration. In Germany,

France, and

the Netherlands, annual data on immigration rates and GDP from the early 1970s to the

late 2000s reveal that increases and decreases in GDP directly correspond to increases

and decreases in immigration rates. Thus, if economic growth is strong in the coming

decades, we can expect immigration to increase and to remain a vital factor in meeting

expanding European economies’ demand for labour. The impact of economic growth

on European emigration appears smaller than on immigration, for during times of

economic decline, migrants in Europe tend not to leave the region at rates that

significantly correspond to declining labour market demand.

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3.2 EU fragmentation and sub-regional bloc formation

Tensions between state policies and disparities in the financial health of European states

– in particular, the difficulties facing countries like Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain

in managing

their primary deficits – reveal challenges to the economic and political cohesion of the

European Union. While it is unlikely that the EU and Eurozone will entirely fragment

by 2035, the future strength of EU cohesion, the position of the less prosperous

members in the Union, and the future of the process of EU expansion remain highly

uncertain. Future EU cohesion can impact immigration and intra-regional migration in

various ways. If cohesion weakens on an economic level, whether or not states

withdraw from the Eurozone, and markets become increasingly depressed in the

weakest European states while others remain stable or experience growth, a process of

economic divergence will occur and the EU may experience increases in intra-regional

migration. If EU cohesion persists or strengthens in the future, the Union may continue

to accept new members, which may also become new sources of (free) labour migration.

3.3 EU labour markets

The future of EU labour markets depends on future age distribution within and outside

Europe, labour market policies, skills levels, possible rises in the retirement age, the

structure and level of pension schemes, employment benefits, foreign workforce

policies, and advancements in labour mechanization, to name a few factors. The

combination of these factors and their complex interplay makes the future of EU labour

markets highly uncertain15.

We do know that in 2035, Europe will confront an aged population and a high

dependency ratio, which, particularly under conditions of economic growth, are likely

to result in an increased labour demand in particular sectors as well as strained or

reduced pension and welfare systems. At the same time, we know that, overall,

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educational attainment and skill levels are increasing. Thus, EU countries may face an

increasing scarcity of higher and lower skilled labour in 2035. However,

the significance of this shortage will depend on levels of economic growth, changes to

production systems, advances in labour mechanization, and the ‘off-shoring’ of

industrial and service-sector operations. EU governments may design new temporary

or permanent labour immigration schemes to meet market demands, increase migration

quotas, and alter migration policies to increasingly allow the lower skilled to immigrate.

EU governments may also respond by increasing minimum wages to attract nationals

to lower skilled jobs.

3.4. Xenophobia, racism, and identity politics

If the emergence of nationalist and xenophobic rightwing political parties in Europe is a

signal of a larger trend towards increasing xenophobia in the future, it is possible that

we may see more restrictive and selective immigration policies. We may see evidence of

this trend in the ‘culture of denial’ existing in asylum processing and bilateral migration

agreements with North African states, for such processes and agreements assume

migrants are not legally entitled to refugee protection16. However, it is highly uncertain

whether and to what degree these trends will occur. Future improvements in the

integration of immigrant groups might cause a decline in xenophobia or Islamophobia.

Moreover, Europe’s commitment to international legal norms and principles and

multicultural aspirations may suggest a future in which, despite incidences of

xenophobia, most migrants will be welcomed and incorporated into society.

Consequently, the future of xenophobia, racism and identity politics in Europe remains

highly uncertain.

It is often assumed that the level of restrictiveness of immigration policies reflects

sentiments towards outsiders. However, past research tells us that a significant gap

often exists between the number of migrants European states say they want to admit

and the number of migrants who are admitted, because of the real benefits that labour

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migration brings to European economies.4 Moreover, past migration research tells us

that despite public support for deportation policies, the public often opposes their

enforcement17.

3.5. Mobility in Europe

A cornerstone of the European agenda is the right of freedom of movement throughout

the EU – a basic human and social right. Since the Treaty of Rome in 1957, freedom of

movement for EU citizens and their families has been one of the core ‘acquis’ of the

European Communities. This also means that EU citizens

be equally entitled to employment opportunities, public housing, tax advantages and

social benefits, regardless of their Member State of origin.

This right is of central importance to European citizens: when asked what the EU

represents to them, 53% say ‘freedom to travel and work in the EU’. This answer comes

first, well ahead of the introduction of the euro as a common currency (44%) and

safeguarding peace (36%) - Eurobarometer survey.

The importance of mobility to European policymakers is evident from the decision to

designate 2006 as ‘European Year of Workers’ Mobility’. To learn more about the extent

of European citizens’ geographical and job mobility, and their future intentions, the

European Commission funded a special Eurobarometer survey (EB 64.1), which was

carried out at the end of 2005 in the 25 Member States then forming the Union. The

Foundation conducted the analysis of the data in cooperation with the Commission,

looking at the drivers of, and barriers to, mobility in Europe, and the economic and

social effects of mobility patterns.

Despite their approval of mobility as a concept, EU citizens are unlikely to show a

dramatic increase in actual mobility in the near future. Moving across borders

represents a challenge for potential migrants: they risk losing the support of their social

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networks and finding a new job is a challenge, as is dealing with the administrative

systems of another country.

Concerns about an exodus from the NMS to the EU27 are overly simplistic: citizens in

different countries in the NMS have very different intentions in terms of their

willingness to move within the EU. In four of these countries, indeed, citizens have

much lower mobility intentions than their fellow citizens in the EU27.

The majority of migrants are young, and have significantly higher levels of education

than those who have no intention of moving. An inflow of energetic and skilled

workers would be a gain for the recipient country, but a loss for the home country.

For national economies, higher levels of geographical mobility and job mobility are

associated with higher rates of GDP growth, higher employment rates and lower rates

of long-term unemployment. For the individual, job-related inter-regional mobility is

associated with higher employment rates and better access to permanent employment,

while job mobility is associated with upwards occupational mobility.

Although the national proportions of those intending to leave the NMS are low, the

absolute numbers may be quite substantial. Between 2.4% and 3.6% of the working age

population in Poland expressed a firm intention to move to another EU country in the

next five years. With a working-age population of around 25 million, this could

translate into a potential outflow of between 600,000 and 900,000 people over the period

2006 to 2010. Moreover, findings indicate that future levels of geographical mobility

may be higher than at present.

While European citizens view geographical mobility very positively, an overwhelming

majority (almost 70%) have no intention of moving in the near future.

Countries that have high levels of geographical mobility also have high levels of job

mobility.

Liberal welfare states (Ireland and the UK) and social-democratic type regimes (the

Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries) have the highest levels of job mobility.

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A dual labour market appears to exist, with more vulnerable workers being exposed to

more involuntary job changes than their higher-skilled or better protected counterparts.

3.5.1 Levels of mobility

The overall picture of geographical mobility gained from the Eurobarometer data is that

Europeans are not very mobile. Figure 1 illustrates that the extent of mobility decreases

as the distance to be moved increases. Longdistance mobility is not common: only 18%

of Europeans have moved outside their region, while only 4% have ever moved to

another Member State and 3% outside the Union.

However, almost a quarter have moved within their region.

This level of mobility is frequently contrasted with the levels of geographical mobility

seen in the US, where almost a third of citizens (32%) live outside the state in which

they were born, substantially more than the 22% of Europeans who have ever lived in

another region or Member State. However, migration between states in the US takes

place within the same linguistic, political and cultural context, unlike long-distance

migration in Europe.

Source: Eurobarometer (2005)

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

Mobile within town/city

Mobile within region

Mobile across regions

Mobile within EU

Mobile outside EU

Figure 1: Past mobility, by distance of move (%)

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Source: Eurobarometer (2005)

Age

Source: Eurobarometer (2005)

Education

Note: Fig. 2 indicates past geographical mobility levels in the EU by gender, age and education; that is the

percentage of people in each of those categories that has ever moved between regions in the EU.

20,30%

22,20%

19,00% 19,50% 20,00% 20,50% 21,00% 21,50% 22,00% 22,50%

Male

Female

Fig.2. Mobility by demographic characteristics (%)

0,0%

10,0%

20,0%

30,0%

15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+

17,3%

20,4%

33,7%

23,8%

0,0% 5,0% 10,0% 15,0% 20,0% 25,0% 30,0% 35,0% 40,0%

Low/none

Average

High

Still studying

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3.5.2. Main reasons for moving

The survey data reveal that long-distance moves (to another region or Member State)

are most often related to the labour market. A new job or job transfer was cited by 34%

of respondents as being their reason for moving. Another key reason was a change of

partnership or marital situation (18%). Strong gender differences are apparent in these

findings: men report moving because of a ‘new job or job transfer’ far more often than

do women (44% as against 27%);women more often seem to make a longdistance move

in order to follow their partner.

3.5.3 Socio- economic factors of migration

3.5.3.1 Education level

Well educated individuals are substantially more likely to have moved than those with

a low or average level of education. This difference in mobility may be because workers

with a lower level of education face significantly higher employment risks: as a result,

they are more dependent upon their social networks (in particular their extended

families) if they should become unemployed. This is not surprising: economic

globalisation has tended to result in highly-skilled workers being more mobile on the

international labour market.

High educational attainment is regarded as a positive factor influencing migration.

According to human capital theory, higher levels of education offer increased income

returns on specific segments of the labor market. It is also argued that higher levels of

education provide a greater ability to collect and process information, which lowers the

risk and therefore increases the propensity for migration. The prevalence of low-skilled

labor markets for migrants in the destination countries makes migration less beneficial

for high-skilled individuals.

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Some observers see the migration of students as a form of migration of young and

qualified labor. In several receiving countries it has proven easier to switch from

student to worker status than to migrate as a fully qualified employee.

As far as tertiary education is concerned more than 15 percent of the Turkish

respondents want to migrate. The other three country groupings, with 3 to 4 percent,

are significantly lower. Thus, as far as the general intention to migrate is concerned

Turkey faces a serious threat of a brain drain in the years to come.

Fig.1 Intention to migrate by education

3.5.3.2 Age

Age is clearly important in terms of past mobility: the youngest age group, those aged

between 15 and 24 years, are too young and have not yet had the time to move to

another country. However, the next youngest (25–34 year olds) have moved as much as

the older generations in a shorter time span, indicating that there may be a general, EU-

wide increase in mobility taking place.

15%

3% 3%

4%

12%

13%

9%

5%

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

Turkey Poland NEW9 AC2

University degree

Student

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Younger cohorts are regarded as more mobile, whereas beyond the age of 40 there is a

significant drop of intended migration. From an economic point of view, two main

explanations are given. Younger cohorts usually have better labor market prospects in

the receiving country, in particular when they are prepared to take up lower-paid jobs

mainly in the service sector. They often increase their labor market chances in the

receiving countries by accepting work beneath their actual level of qualification, thus

providing local employers with a lower wage rate combined with higher productivity.

The second economic argument comes from human capital theory, which suggests a

better return on investment in migration with decreasing age. Older workers have a

lower economic incentive to migrate, as the amortization period for their investment is

shorter.

Figure 2 focuses on the people willing to migrate as a percentage of a specific age

group. For NEW9 and ALL13 one out of ten of the youngest age cohort wants tomigrate

into the EU. The highest tendency to migrate is shown in AC2, where nearly one in five

wants to migrate. Poland reaches 12 percent and Turkey has a share of around 8 percent

in the youngest age group. Overall, this has the potential of a massive “youth drain”

from these countries.

As far as the second youngest cohort (25–39) is concerned, between 4 and 5 percent in

NEW9, Poland and AC2 want to migrate. The highest percentage is in Turkey, where 7

percent of the 25–39 year old age group have a general intention to migrate to the EU. In

this respect Turkey has a slightly higher age profile than the other three country

groupings.

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Fig.2 Intention to migrate by age

3.5.3.3 Gender

Approximately equal percentages of men and women have lived elsewhere, women

being slightly more mobile. Long-distance mobility is undergoing a process of

‘feminisation’, due to: women’s increasing education and professional training; better

job opportunities for women in specific parts of the services sector, such as care for

children and the elderly; emancipation of younger women from traditional family or

partnership structures.

Traditionally, the largest proportion of migrants has been male. Younger men were sent

out to look for work to finance the remaining family through remittance payments back

home, whereas younger women stayed at home taking over family responsibilities. If

female migration occurred it was family-linked and was seen in policy terms as a

secondary type of migration. It is estimated that previously 65 percent of all female

permanent migration into the EU was family-linked.

The increasing level of education of women in many countries, the frequent loss of

employment due to economic transformation, the search for new employment

8%

12%

8%

19%

7%

4% 4% 5%

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

18%

20%

Turkey Poland NEW9 AC2

15 - 24 years

25 - 39 years

23 |

opportunities and a changing role model, which challenges the traditional male

breadwinner model, has triggered a reverse trend. This is, however, based on the

assumption that higher educational attainment and changed labor market conditions in

the sending countries goes hand in hand with a higher propensity to migrate. In

addition, female migration could be increased by better labor market opportunities for

women in specific segments of the expanding service sector, e.g. in health, care and

household-related services of the receiving countries.

New groups of migrants are emerging, which include young single women or female

family breadwinners. An increasing number of women move independently rather than

under the authority of older relatives or integrated into a family strategy. Migration

takes place more and more within female networks which are separated from those of

men. The group of female migrants differs in regard to their socio-economic

background.

There have been four groups identified:

(1) women from rural backgrounds migrating on their own or as part of family

reunification;

(2) low-skilled women from urban backgrounds migrating due to divorce, increasing

poverty and deprivation levels;

(3) more highly educated women motivated by the lack of appropriate job

opportunities in the country of origin; and (4) women fleeing civil unrest in their home

countries.

24 |

Fig.3 Intention to migrate by gender

Figure 3 shows the percentage of men and women with a general intention to migrate

as part of the whole population of 15 years of age and older. In Poland and the AC2

between 6 and 7 percent of all men want to migrate, in the NEW9 this is reduced to 3

percent. Turkey, with 9 percent, has the highest proportion of a male population which

is mobile.

As far as women are concerned, the country differences are less pronounced.

Between 3 percent (Poland) and 5 percent (AC2) of the female population are mobile.

The highest absolute share is in Romania and Bulgaria with 5 percent. However, the

NEW9 are the only country grouping where we have a slightly higher percentage of

women (4 percent) than men (3 percent) with a general intention to migrate. The

situation in Turkey is completely the opposite: Here the proportion of men (9 percent) is

more than double that of women (4 percent) with an intention to migrate.

9%

6%

3%

7%

4%

3%

4%

5%

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%

8%

9%

10%

Turkey Poland NEW9 AC2

Male

Female

25 |

3.5.3.4 Location

Geographical mobility in general tends to be higher in the Nordic countries; by contrast

in most of the NMS and in most of the southern European countries, mobility within or

outside the region is relatively low.

There is a longstanding debate on whether migration comes mainly from rural areas of

the sending countries or to a higher extent from urban areas and larger towns.

Again the four country groupings show some important structural variation on the

same lines, as we have observed in the previous section. Turkey is the only country

grouping in which we find a higher rural migration rate than an urban rate.

Accordingly, in Turkey 7 percent of the respondents in rural areas and only 5 percent in

cities have a general intention to migrate.

The situation in Poland and the NEW9 is different. Here the location-specific migration

rate is double in cities compared to rural areas. The AC2 are in the middle with only a

slightly higher propensity to migrate in urban areas.

The bivariate analysis confirms the particular migration pattern of Turkey in

comparison to the other country groupings. Potential Turkish migrants have a stronger

rural background, are more often in the lowest income quartile and have a relatively

high mobility rate within the unemployed. The combination of all three dimensions

indicates additional challenging problems of labor market integration in the receiving

countries. But there is also another structural feature of Turkish migrants, as they

present the relatively highest proportion of migrants with a university degree and a

significant proportion of migrants who are still studying. This part of the Turkish

migration potential provides a lesser challenge for a successful economic integration.

The structure of potential migrants in the AC2 also has a particular feature. Migrants

represent an exceptionally high percentage of students, singles and very young people

in comparison to the other three country groupings. From a labor market perspective,

potential migrants from the AC2 are probably the most promising group for successful

26 |

integration in the receiving countries. At the same time, the stronger brain and youth

drain creates a particular challenge for the future economic and social development of

Bulgaria and Romania.

Figure 4. Intention to migrate by location.

The NEW9 countries have their most specific feature in the relatively high percentage of

female migrants. In addition, they have a similar profile to the AC2 but have a

significantly lower level of intention to migrate.

Poland is in the middle between Turkey on one side and the AC2 and NEW9 on the

other. It shares with Turkey the higher mobility rate of the unemployed and of men.

Poland has more in common with NEW9 and AC2 in regard to the importance of youth,

being a student and single and belonging to the highest income quartile.

However, the results of this bivariate are only of limited importance. They have to be

tested in the final step of our analysis within a multivariate analysis.

7%

3%

2%

6%

5%

6%

4%

7%

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%

8%

Turkey Poland NEW9 AC2

Rural

Large town

27 |

3.5.3.5 Unemployment

Labor market theory emphasizes income differentials as the strongest and employment

differentials as the second strongest factors influencing migration—some scholars

reverse the order.33 As income and employment differentials cannot be measured

within the remit of this contribution, we will concentrate on the behavior of the

unemployed. In some countries with a high unemployment rate, the unemployed are

more mobile than employed people. A counter-argument is developed based on socio-

economic concepts, which stress the importance of a minimum of resources to provide

the capability for migration as a realistic option. Both hypotheses suggest some cross-

pressure on the intention to migrate for the unemployed, who may face the necessity

but lack the resources for migration. The combined hypothesis would lead to a

migration threshold: below the threshold one is too poor to migrate and above one is

too comfortable.

Economic concepts, focusing on search and information costs, predict that the

unemployed have lower opportunity costs during the search process and less

constrained time budgets for preparatory search and information behavior related to

Fig.5 Intention to migrate by unemployment rate

12%

7%

4%

6%

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

Turkey Poland NEW9 AC2

Unemployment rate

28 |

migration. This would suggest a higher propensity for migration by the unemployed in

comparison to employed people with higher opportunity costs.

The share of potential migrants among the unemployed also shows large variations

between the four country groupings. In Turkey, 12 percent of the unemployed want to

migrate. Also the unemployed in Bulgaria/Romania and Poland have a higher

propensity for regional mobility (6/7 percent). The lowest mobility among the

nemployed is in the group of new Mediterranean and Central European member states

(4 percent). These are countries with better current and future labor market conditions.

Immobility may, under those conditions, be a more rational option for the unemployed.

3.5.4 Advantages and disadvantages of geographical mobility

Greater job mobility appears to result in higher overall levels of upward mobility.

Of those who were working at the time of the Eurobarometer survey, around 15% had

experienced occupational upward mobility during their career – moving jobs, but

simultaneously moving to a higher-level occupation. Only 6% had experienced

downward mobility. The majority had experienced horizontal occupational mobility –

moving to a different job, but remaining at the same occupational level. A more in-

depth analysis found that the greater the levels of job mobility, the greater was the

increase in overall occupational mobility. Hence, more movement overall in the labour

market increases, at least statistically, a person’s chances of upward occupational

mobility.

The overall perception on the part of those who had moved long distances was that it

was a positive outcome: 45% felt that nothing had got worse (only 11% felt that nothing

had improved). The single largest improvement was in housing: 36% felt that their

housing conditions had improved. 25% felt that the job situation of one of the

household members had improved (as against only 4% who felt it had got worse) and

household income: 22% felt it had improved, as against 7% who felt it had got worse.

29 |

Just because mobility delivers benefits, it is not correct to say that more mobility is

always a good thing. Moving region or country poses challenges to individual citizens,

their families, employers and wider societies. Workers take a risk when moving – they

may suffer a loss of material conditions, or find that their new job is less suitable than

they may have hoped. They may also find that their previously valued skills are no

longer applicable, and that the support of family and community networks is gone. The

large scale emigration of younger, better educated workers would represent a

substantial loss to a country or a region – a so-called ‘brain drain’.

One of the most important aspects of geographical mobility for EU labour markets is

the potential it holds for offering a way to balance labour shortages and surpluses

across the Union. However, whether such potential is likely to be realised in the near

future is open to question. Only 31% of respondents said they would move to another

region or country to find a job in the event of unemployment. This may be explained by

concerns over loss of social support networks, and potential language barriers.

At the macroeconomic level, higher levels of geographical mobility are associated with

higher rates of GDP growth, higher employment rates and lower rates of long-term

unemployment.

Greater geographical mobility also seems to be associated with fewer regional labour

market imbalances. While it is not possible to establish a causal relationship on the basis

of this, it is highly significant that such geographical mobility is not associated with

lower GDP or rates of employment.

Similar positive associations are seen at the microeconomic level. Job related inter-

regional mobility is associated with greater individual labour force participation, higher

employment rates and better access to employment on permanent contracts. Inter-

country migration appears to improve the employment opportunities for those moving

for job-related reasons.

30 |

3.5.5. Migration intentions

European citizens are broadly in favour of mobility. Of those surveyed, 49% think

mobility is beneficial for individuals, 50% think is beneficial for the labour market and

62% think it is beneficial for European integration. Despite this largely positive view of

mobility, however, almost 70% of respondents have no intention to move in the near

future (the next five years).

A key part of the debate concerning migration and mobility is the potential effect of

migration from the NMS upon the former EU27’s labour markets. Hence, the

expectations of citizens from the NMS regarding moving to other Member States are

crucially important to current policy and debate concerning future migration flows.

Analysis of the findings from the Eurobarometer survey indicated that between 1% and

1.5% of the working-age population of the EU25 have a firm intention to move to

another country in the Union over the next five years. Between 2.8% and 3.5% have a

similarly firm intention to move to another region of their country of residence.

Such low percentages do not point to a mass exodus of workers to other Member States.

European citizens who do express an intention to migrate tend to be younger and better

educated. Single people are most inclined to move long distances. Next most likely to

move are those who are divorced and separated.

Single parents are the most prepared to move.

In general, citizens in the EU27 express greater intentions of moving than their

counterparts in the NMS. However, when individual countries are looked at, a pattern

emerges of four groups of countries, with distinct profiles of mobility expectations.

These four groups are listed in descending order of the expressed intentions of their

citizens.

1. In four ‘high mobility’ NMS (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland), more citizens have

firm intentions of moving – between 2.4% and 4.2%.

31 |

2. In four high mobility EU27 countries (Denmark, Ireland, Finland and Sweden)

between 1.4% and 2.9% of citizens have firm intentions of moving: more than twice the

level in the low-mobility NMS; In the 11 low-mobility EU27 countries, citizens display a

slightly higher intention of moving than those in the low mobility NMS.

4. In four ‘low mobility’ NMS (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia) few

citizens have firm intentions of moving – between 0.5% and 1.8%.

The distinction between the high and low mobility groups of countries in the NMS is an

important one, in light of concerns in the EU27 regarding potential inflows from these

countries.

Given the low levels of stated mobility intentions in the low-mobility NMS, it is

unlikely that future migration from these countries would challenge labour markets in

the EU27. On the basis of the stated intentions, it is possible to estimate likely migration

flows from the NMS. For the low mobility countries, it isbetween 0.5% and 1.8% of the

working population. For the high mobility countries, it is between 2.4% and 4.2 %. (For

a large country such as Poland, this small percentage does represent a considerable

absolute number of individuals).

The Foundation’s analysis of the Eurobarometer findings compared the data with those

obtained in an earlier survey (from 2001). Between 2005 and 2009, in the high mobility

NMS, there was an increase of between two and three percentage points in the numbers

of those with a firm intention to migrate. Actual labour market figures on economic

migration from these countries to the EU27 – in particular, Ireland and the UK –

confirm a substantial movement of people. In turn, the developing social networks of

migrants who have already made a move create an additional ‘pull’ for potential

migrants. This tends to show that migration flows in the future are likely to be greater

than in the past.

This may well be a direct consequence of EU enlargement. Furthermore, the mobility

intentions of citizens in the NMS are rising relative to those of their EU 27 neighbours.

32 |

As with the profile of those who moved in the past, those who plan on moving from the

high mobility NMS are young (75% are aged less than 35) and well educated (one third

is still studying and one third is highly educated). For these countries, cross-border

mobility could represent a significant ‘brain drain’.

3.5.6. Barriers to geographical mobility

While long-distance mobility may deliver clear economic benefits for individuals, the

numbers who intend staying where they are indicate that citizens have broader

concerns about mobility than solely economic considerations. Responses to the survey

indicate that far from being simply ‘rational actors’ who attempt to ‘maximise their

utility’, EU citizens must balance aspirations for career advancement with the

uncertainty of moving, and the potential loss of systems of support. For the EU27 as a

whole, the key factor that deters people from moving is the fear of losing one’s social

network: 44% give ‘losing direct contact with family or friends’ as a reason for not

wishing to move region or country, while 27% cite ‘missing support from family and

friends’. Such social network factors are much more of a disincentive to moving than

the challenge of learning a new language. This is usually considered a key factor in

limiting geographical mobility between EU countries.

However, only 19% cited this as a reason for not moving. Housing conditions and

healthcare were cited as less important concerns. When country groupings are

compared, concerns over loss of one’s social networks is still the primary deterrent.

However, in the highmobility NMS, this is much less of an impediment then for the

other country groupings: 10 percentage points less than in the low mobility NMS, and

20 percentage points less than in the high mobility EU15.

If Europeans are to move more from one job to another, labour markets will need to

become more flexible, economic growth will need to become more employment

intensive and the isks of job transitions will have to be minimised. Currently, Member

33 |

States differ in the institutional arrangements that they have implemented to promote

this sort of labour market flexibility.

To understand present levels of job mobility, it must first be measured. Job mobility can

be assessed by counting the number of times people have changed employer, and

measuring the average duration of each job they have held.

The survey looked at the relative proportions of people who had never changed

employer after the age of 35 years (this age was chosen to balance the fact that younger

people may never have had the opportunity to change jobs).

Across the EU27, 23% of respondents had never changed employer. Furthermore,

substantial differences are found between Member States in terms of mobility: only 6%

of Danish respondents had never changed employer, compared to 42% in Malta.

Corporatist welfare states, where reasonably generous provision benefit systems are

largely funded by citizens own contributions during their working lives (Austria,

Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg).

It is the social-democratic, and the liberal, welfare states that facilitate the highest levels

of market flexibility. More liberal employment protection legislation in these countries

means that jobs are less protected, and hence workers are forced to be more flexible.

However, greater security – in the form of active labour market policies, low exit rates

and high re-entry rates – encourages and enables citizens to make job changes and

hence participate in greater job mobility. With their much higher levels of job

protection, corporatist welfare states have less flexibility, and therefore have less

mobility.

Southern European countries, while not forming as coherent a group as the other three,

also show lower levels of flexibility and hence mobility. (The picture for the NMS is

more mixed, with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania having relatively high mobility.)

Job mobility, as indicated above, can also be measured by job duration. Shorter job

durations indicate greater mobility: those countries with the lowest proportion of

34 |

citizens who had never changed jobs also have the shortest job durations (the

Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands, Ireland, the UK and Estonia, Latvia and

Lithuania). Denmark has the shortest job duration, at just under five years, while

Portugal has the longest, at 11 years.

The average job duration increases sharply with age. This indicates that people change

jobs more frequently early in their careers. It may be that older workers are more

satisfied with the position that they have found; alternatively, they may be less

confident about their chances of finding an acceptable alternative job at their later stage

in life. It is noteworthy that the average number of jobs does not increase for people

aged 35 years and over: this indicates that, in the past, people stayed longer with the

same employer than they do now.

In terms of other demographic characteristics, people with children are among the most

mobile; parents have the most pressing financial needs and are likely to search actively

for better paying jobs. This is particularly the case for single parents.

When sectoral and job differences are examined, very different levels of job mobility

become apparent.

1. Not surprisingly, workers in the more protected public sector display the least

mobility: in public administration and defence, average job duration is almost 12 years.

By contrast, workers in the hotels and restaurants sector have average durations of just

over six years. Low-skilled manual workers also have shorter job durations.

2. Managers have somewhat longer job durations than other employees.

3. As would be expected, employees on permanent contracts have longer job

durations – more than twice as long as those on other types of contract.

4. A spell of unemployment also appears to predispose a person towards higher

mobility: once a respondent had been unemployed for three months or more, at least

once, their average job duration fell by half.

35 |

3.5.7.Forced and voluntary mobility

Job mobility is assumed to be generally desirable: however, an important distinction to

make is to determine whether a job change was taken voluntarily or was forced on the

worker. Demographic, sectoral and occupational differences emerge when this

distinction is drawn. Across Europe, 65% of the working age population voluntarily

changed employer in the previous five years, while 38% were forced to do so.

Age and education

Age differences are noteworthy: younger people aged between 15 and 24 years

experience more forced mobility (46% being forced to leave their job); those aged

between 25 to 34 years are more likely to leave their employer voluntarily (only 34 %

being forced to leave). However, the proportions of older people being forced to leave

their employer rises to 56% for those aged 55– 64. These older respondents are both

more likely to be made redundant or to have to leave for health reasons; the youngest

age group is more likely to have had their contract expire.

Lower levels of educational attainment are also associated with a greater likelihood of

forced mobility. Respondents who finished their formal education between ages of 16

and 19 are made redundant much more often than those in other categories. By

contrast, those with the highest level of education have the lowest proportion of forced

mobility.

Sectoral differences

When sectoral differences are examined, it becomes apparent that heavy industrial

sectors (manufacturing, mining and quarrying) have a high proportion of redundancies,

and hence of forced mobility. Again, as might be expected, those working in the public

sector on permanent contracts are unlikely to have been forced to leave their employer.

As the skills level of a job increases, so too does the ratio of voluntary to forced

mobility. Workers in the service sector have the highest proportion of voluntary

transitions (75%) and the lowest proportion of forced transitions (27%). This contrasts

36 |

with unskilled manual workers, who have slightly more forced transitions (55%) than

voluntary transitions (53%). Furthermore, health-related transitions are more prevalent

among manual than white-collar workers.

Unemployment

A spell of unemployment earlier in the career increases a respondent’s chances of being

forced to leave their employer: the ratio of voluntary to forced transitions increases.

When there are two or more spells of unemployment, the ratio then switches entirely:

such workers more often eport having been forced to leave than having done so

voluntarily.

Dual labour market

Job mobility can have positive outcomes in terms of skills acquisition and the

employability of people. However, the picture that emerges is of a dual labour market,

with more vulnerable workers more likely to be mobile than betterprotected or

hierarchically higher employees.

These more vulnerable workers – lone parents, blue-collar workers, those who have

experienced unemployment, or who are on temporary contracts – are likely to change

jobs more often and change to jobs that do not have longer job durations. Moreover,

they are more likely to have been forced to leave their last employer than having done

so voluntarily.

37 |

4.The Future of Job Mobility

At the macroeconomic level, greater job mobility is associated with higher rates of GDP

growth, higher employment rates and lower rates of long-term unemployment. While it

is not possible to establish a causal relationship on the basis of this, it is highly

significant that job mobility is not associated with lower GDP or rates of employment.

Of those respondents who were currently working at the time of the survey, 43% said

that they expected to change their current job in the next five years. As might be

expected from the findings discussed above, expectations of future mobility are highest

in the liberal and socialdemocratic welfare states, and in the Baltic countries. Citizens in

corporatist welfare states and southern European countries have fewer intentions of

changing employer.

Respondents who had changed jobs before were more likely to report that they

expected to change in the future. Those who had never changed jobs were especially

reluctant to change.

However, it should be noted that expectations of job mobility are higher than actual job

mobility. While 43% of respondents said they expect to change jobs in the next five

years, only 32% had actually done so in the preceding fiveyear period. Some caution

when making projections about job mobility is therefore required.

Geographical and job mobility are clearly related: as already stated, a majority of moves

across regions or borders are made for jobrelated reasons. The findings on geographical

and job mobility can thus be combined to form a composite picture of European

mobility.

Across Europe, it would seem that levels of geographical and of job mobility coincide:

in countries that have high levels of geographical mobility, people tend to change jobs

more often.

38 |

The countries can be grouped into five mobility ‘clusters’.

The Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland and Sweden) and the UK

combine

The highest levels of geographical and job mobility.

Three Mediterranean countries (Malta, Italy and Portugal) and four

central/eastern European countries (Austria, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia): these

countries have a generally low mobility profile, both in terms of geographical

and job mobility.

Three eastern European Member States (Czech Republic, Hungary and Latvia):

have high levels of job mobility but the lowest levels of geographical mobility.

Two country groupings have medium scores on one dimension but higher scores

on the other. France, Ireland and Luxembourg have a high level of geographical

mobility combined with medium levels of job mobility, whereas Estonia, Latvia

and the Netherlands have the highest levels of job mobility but only medium

levels of geographical mobility.

Four countries (Belgium, Cyprus, Germany and Spain) have average levels of

both forms of mobility.

This pattern recalls the typology of welfare states discussed earlier: higher levels of both

types of mobility are found in the social-democratic and liberal states. Such countries

may have a wider application of social insurance, which encourages their citizens to

consider both residential and job mobility as feasible options.

This may be particularly relevant for those with lower levels of educational attainment,

who may otherwise be more restricted in their overall mobility. Moreover, because

most job transitions result in upward occupational mobility, this suggests that these

states perform quite well in ensuring career advancement and social mobility for their

citizens. While the survey findings paint a complex picture of geographical and job

mobility, it is clear that at the national level greater levels of both are associated with

higher rates of GDP growth, better rates of employment and lower rates of long-term

39 |

unemployment. Together with the greater opportunities for upward mobility available

to those who undertake more job changes, it would seem that the focus on mobility in

the European Employment Strategy is justified.

However, a reliance upon greater geographical mobility to resolve Europe’s labour

market issues could be misguided. The survey found that, in the event of

unemployment, only 31% of respondents said they would move region or country to

find a job. This indicates that only a small proportion of the European workforce would

be prepared to cross national borders in the event of unemployment. While migration

may be a solution to unemployment and labour market imbalances, it is likely to be so

for a relatively restricted number of persons or households.

Moreover, encouraging greater mobility will be a challenge: despite its perceived and

actual benefits, geographical and job mobility in the EU is likely to remain at a low

level. Only 4% of EU citizens have ever moved to another country

in the Union, and fewer than 3% have moved to a non-EU country. When asked about

their future intentions to move country, only 3% indicated that they might move in the

next five years. Even when interregional mobility is considered, 21% have lived outside

their region of birth. In terms of job mobility, a similar preference emerges for stability:

68% of working Europeans still have the same employer as they had five years ago,

while 57% see themselves being with the same employer in five years’ time.

Only around one in three job transitions is voluntary, with a view to improving labour

market position; the rest of the time, job changes are either forced upon the worker or

are the result of an attempt to reconcile working and personal life.

While mobility is seen as a desirable goal of European social policy, it is important to

recognise that too much mobility, or mobility of the wrong sort, could create as many

problems as it might be expected to solve. Geographical mobility has the potential to

erode communities and lead to a loss of social cohesion; it can also result in a ‘brain

drain’ for countries or regions facing substantial emigration of young, welleducated

workers (witness recently expressed concerns in Poland about the movement of many

40 |

of its young people to the EU15). Job mobility can also represent a downward spiral for

disadvantaged workers, who may be forced into an ongoing situation of precarious

employment. Moreover, less mobile workers – the lower educated, those aged 45 years

and over – may be in greater need of the protection against social exclusion provided by

the social support of family and networks. Long-distance mobility could weaken this

support. High levels of voluntary mobility can also create problems for employers, as it

means higher recruitment and training costs (Employers may aim to reduce these costs

by minimising staff turnover through a policy of raising levels of job satisfaction.) A

policy goal for mobility then, is that it should be optimised, rather than maximised.

4.1. EU policies

While mobility is an important goal of EU policy, it must be recognised that it exists in a

policy context with other, established structural and regional policy directions.

Throughout the EU’s history, regional development support has played an important

role in protecting the human, social and economic capital of marginalised areas. This

support, implementing capital mobility or foreign direct investments in these areas

regions, has enabled less developed regions to compete with more industrialised

regions of the Union. If mobility policy was implemented in such a way as to facilitate

the permanent mass migration of better educated citizens from these regions, it would

undermine policies of regional support. Instead, mobility policy and structural and

regional policy should be designed and implemented in the context of an integrated EU

employment, regional and social policy.

In recognition of the impact of demographic ageing on the economy, the European

Commission has highlighted the need to review immigration policies in the longer

term: more sustained flows could help contribute to the needs of the EU labour market.

For this to work, a strategic pan-European initiative is required.

41 |

In its absence, migration flows are more likely to be able to bypass current national

legislation; Part of such a strategic approach should be a system of recognition of the

qualifications of workers from third countries; such recognition can give migrant

workers better access to the labour market and hence facilitate integration.

This would also entail wider recognition of the qualifications gained from initial

induction and training courses.

Vulnerable workers – the previously unemployed, manual or unskilled workers, the

poorer educated, and those on temporary contracts – make more job changes and are

more likely to have been forced to leave their last employer. Such workers may require

targeted intervention to ensure that they do not become discouraged and withdraw

from the labour market.

Those countries with the highest levels of mobility also have the best institutional

arrangements balancing flexibility and security – for instance, the flexicurity ethos

prevalent in Denmark. If institutional arrangements are such that security and

flexibility go hand in hand, it is likely that both the individual worker and the broader

economy will benefit. Such welfare systems minimise the risk of moving; the cost of

changing jobs, or residence, is equalled, or more than recompensed by, greater ‘profits’

in terms of income, skills, or job satisfaction. Where such a favourable outcome is not

guaranteed, however, people are more likely to remain in the situation that they are at

least familiar with, retaining access to social support networks How to ensure that

mobile citizens can be rewarded for mobility, and their risks minimised, is a challenge

for policymakers.

Employment protection legislation results, clearly, in better job protection for workers.

This has the advantage of reducing workers’ expectations of being forced to leave their

jobs; it also results in less downward occupational mobility. However, it would appear

that more restrictive legislation reduces overall expectations of mobility – both

voluntary and forced, and reduces the level of upward occupational mobility. Hence,

42 |

while and important feature of labour market regulation, the implications of using strict

EPL should be considered before making legislative changes.

The complementarity observed between geographical and job mobility suggests a

mutually reinforcing effect. This benefits those who are already advantaged, but it

could also mean that individuals who do not have the skills or resources to be more

mobile (including languages), would become progressively disadvantaged over the life

course. Mobility of all types is easier for the young, the better off and the well educated.

Other groups however, require assistance if they are to become more mobile. One way

to progress this would be to expand and upgrade the EURES job information network,

so that it is readily available in each Member State.

4.2 Migration Trends in an Enlarging European Union

How is the potential to migrate defined and measured? The study measures the

attitudes towards migration into the EU on two different levels: (1) general intention to

migrate and (2) firm intention to migrate.

(1) The general intention to migrate reflects a basic attitude towards migration to

the EU. The questionnaire includes a direct question: “Do you intend to go to live and

work—for a few months or for several years—in a current European Union country in

the next five years?” In order to control the validity of the answers to this question and

to construct the indicator on the general intention to migrate, positive answers to this

question are combined with the results of questions which measure the intention of

regional mobility in the next fiveyears by moving to any place outside the same city,

town or village. In this respect, one filter question and one follow-up question were

asked: “Do you intend to move in the next five years?” and if the answer was positive

the follow-up question: “In the next five years, do you intend to move to another city,

43 |

town or village within the same region; to another region within the same country; to

another country in Europe and to live in a country outside Europe?”

Not only for logical reasons, but also from a common-sense point of view, it has to be

assumed that anybody who intends to migrate into the EU also has a basic intention of

regional mobility in the next five years.2 Respondents answering positively to the

combined indicator can be regarded as having overcome their “natural inertia” against

migration and have a general intention to migrate into the EU.

(2) The firm intention to migrate to the EU provides a second measurement

within the present study, which should provide the highest degree of probability to

predict actual migration behavior by capturing, at least partly, the intensity of the

intention to migrate. It has been measured with the help of four variables— two of

which have already been used to measure the “general intention.” In addition, these

answers are controlled by a third indicator of “target regional mobility into the EU15”

and by a fourth indicator, which measures the willingness to live in a country with a

foreign language. The question was “How willing would you be to live in another

European country, where the language is different from your mother tongue?” To

accept explicitly the challenges that come with migrating to a country with another

language provides an indicator of “medium level” strength of the seriousness to

migrate. The response categories vary from “very much,” to “some extent,” “not much”

and “not at all.” The indicator of a firm intention to migrate includes only those

respondents who answered “very much” to this question. Similar to approaches by

other scholars, the present study aims to capture the strength of the intention to migrate

by using a four-dimensional scale.

The last part of the empirical analysis in this section compares the estimates of the

potential to migrate based on the Eurobarometer survey from 2002 with the results of

an econometric study of the European Commission on The Impact of Eastern Enlargement

on Employment and Labour Markets in the EU and Member States, which was conducted at

nearly the same time. Comparability is not easy as the studies use different

44 |

methodologies. The present study is based on individual survey data, with all its

advantages and disadvantages, to predict actual migration behavior.

It predicts the possible increase in migration stock in the “old” EU member states

within the next five years, i.e. by the end of 2006. Its key dependent variables arevarious

estimated migration rates in the country of origin as a percentage of the population 15

years and older.

The European Commission study uses a macroeconomic approach in order to estimate

annual migration flows between 2002 and 2030. Unlike the present study, the

Commission only includes eight new member states (NEW8) and two accession

countries (AC2), leaving out the three southern Mediterranean countries Malta, Cyprus

and Turkey. The coefficients for the estimation of the migration potential are based on

time series data of the migration flows to Germany in the period 1967 to 1998. Its key

dependent variable is the annual change in the ratio of the stock of migrants to the

population in the receiving country. The theoretical assumptions are based on the

human capital paradigm of migration. As independent variables the model uses the

following sets of indicators: the difference of per capita purchasing power parity, the

employment rate in the home and host countries, a lagged ratio of the stock of migrants

to the home population and other institutional variables. In addition, the model is

estimated with the help of country-specific effects to control for culture, policy,

language, distance, etc. For the dynamic analysis two additional basic assumptions are

made as far as the baseline projection is concerned: that the GDP gap between old and

new member states converges by two percentage points per year; and that the

unemployment rates are stable.

Based on these assumptions the study estimates an increase of the stock of migrants

from 1.16 million in 2002 to 3.9 million in 2030. The annual flow figures decrease from

340,000 in 2002 to below 3,000 in 2030.

Due to the different methodologies the two studies can only be compared on the basis

of estimated changes in the stock figures in ten countries between 2002 and 2006. For

45 |

this comparison the following calculations have to be made for the Commission study:

the stock of migrants is predicted to be 1.16 million in 2002 and 2.25 million in 2006.13

This results in a predicted increase of 1.1 million migrants in the time span 2002 to 2006

for the ten countries.

In order to make the present study comparable it has to provide results for the two

dependent variables for the ten countries included in the Commission’s study. The

results are as follows:

● General inclination NEW8 and AC2: 3.7 percent

● Firm intention NEW8 and AC2: 1.2 percent

In the next step it has to calculate the population in the NEW8/AC2 for the age groups

15 years and older. The total population of the ten countries on January 1, 2001 was 102

million.14 Subtracting the population under 15 years of age of around 19.5 million

provides a total number of 82.5 million inhabitants in the ten countries of 15 years of

age and older. Multiplying this basic figure with the three coefficients provides the

following band of a predicted increase in the migration stock up to the end 2006 in

absolute numbers:

● General inclination: 3.05 million

● Firm intention: 1 million (precisely 990,000)

The result of the comparison is that both methods lead to similar results predicting an

increase in the total number of migrants from the ten Eastern European Countries of

between 1 and 1.1 million people for the narrow band in the years up to the end of 2006

in the old member states of the EU.

Four main basic arguments are usually developed, which may explain the low

probability of a significant inflow of migrants from the three country groupings into

the EU:

46 |

● Firstly it is argued that a significant proportion of the overall potential of migrants

from these countries has already arrived in the existing EU member states in recent

years, i.e. before 2002. The available figures show that this had led to only a small

increase in the population of the “older” member states. In 1998, the 15 EU member

states hosted less than 900,000 citizens of the Central and Eastern European countries.

● Secondly, the demographic situation in the 13 countries is similar to the demographic

situation in the EU. Fertility in most of these countries is even lower than in the EU

(with the exception of Turkey) and mortality has dramatically increased, with the

consequence of a decreasing population trend in the next 30 to 40 years. Consequently,

everything being equal, the employment chances for younger and better educated

people will increase in the NEW10 and AC2. Based on this trend Fassmann and Muenz

predict a decrease of the potential for migration.

● Thirdly, transfer of resources for economic development, increased internationaltrade

and massive inward investment will accompany the accession process of the new and

the future member states. This will accelerate the economic development process and

will give the new member states a positive growth differential in relation to the “old”

member states.

● In addition, contrary to the predictions of economic theory, European employees have

taken only little advantage of the free movement within a common labor market.

Straubhaar provides an explanation and notes: “To an important degree, trade has

replaced the economic demand for migration in the EU.”

Launched in December 2005, LABREF is an on-line database providing information on

enacted policy measures which are intended to have an impact on labour market

performance in the EU.

The database provides information on the design of reforms, their scope and durability.

LABREF is organised around nine policy fields, one of which is immigration policies.

Under this heading, the database covers the following types of policy measures:

47 |

• Border controls, encompassing measures related to the entry, stay and access to the

labour market;

• Selective immigration policies, including quota systems aimed at the recruitment of

foreign workers, the easing of recruitment policies for highly skilled or for specific

occupations as well as bilateral labour agreements on seasonal or temporary workers;

• Measures to facilitate the labour market integration of immigrants, ranging from

ALMPs to the recognition of formal education attainments and the entitlement to

benefits/social assistance programmes targeted at immigrant workers

The structure of the database enables the user to analyse policy measures by areas of

intervention and specific design characteristics. LABREF will be updated annually and

there are also plans to backdate the information. So far, the database contains a

summary overview of reforms enacted by EU Member States in 2004. The following

brief illustrates how LABREF can be used as an instrument for tracking trends in EU

Member States' migration policies.

4.3. Migration flows

As a response to increasing migration pressure, many EU Member States have set

migration control high on their political agenda, both at national and European level.

Combating illegal immigration is seen as a priority.

Spain, a country currently having one of the highest migration rates in Europe,

established an extraordinary process of legalisation in 2005. Registered immigrant

workers holding a work contract with a minimum duration of 6 months could obtain

residence permits. In Greece, immigrants with an expired temporary permit were

allowed to submit their renewal request. In both cases, the objective of the intervention

was to combat undeclared work, gain better control over the immigrant population and

facilitate their social and economic development.

48 |

The UK opened its labour market from 1 May 2004 and introduced a Worker

Registration Scheme (WRS). Under the scheme, citizens from EU-8 who took up work in

the UK needed to register with the authorities. The purpose of the scheme was to allow

the Government to monitor the participation of workers from EU-8 in the UK labour

market.

While toughening controls over migration flows, EU Member States also show

increasing interest in developing policies to promote selective immigration policies.

Several Member States have eased their legislation to facilitate the entry of highly

skilled workers. Special programmes, simplified administrative procedures and

bilateral agreements are used to further this aim.

Facing a shortage of graduates in the fields of physical science, engineering and

mathematics, the UK has introduced a Science and Engineering Graduates Scheme

(SEGS) which authorises foreign graduates in the relevant disciplines to remain in the

country for 12 months to pursue their careers. A similar measure has been enacted in

Germany, where students who complete their studies may remain in Germany for one

year after graduation to seek employment. Moreover, Germany welcomes self-

employed foreigners provided they are anticipated to have an impact on the economy

and employment.

The Netherlands also seek to attract skilled workers. According to a new regulation,

workers with a labour contract and an annual gross salary of at least € 45.000 now only

need a residence permit and no longer a separate work permit. In Spain, new measures

aim at linking legal immigration flows to the dynamics of the labour market. A new

system of entry for immigrants should make more room for individual recruitment of

high-skilled workers and for programmed recruitment of 'quota' workers required in

specific sectors.

49 |

4.4 Integration of the labour market

As regards measures to facilitate the integration of immigrants, reforms were focused

on efforts to curb discrimination and promoting integration of immigrants in the labour

market.

With the aim of promoting equality in the workplace, Ireland introduced new

employment rights which should prevent indirect discrimination and broaden the

scope for positive action. Similarly, Finland has reinforced legal protection against

discrimination based, among others, on ethnic origins. The legislation covers in

particular access to social services and requires each authority to draw up a plan to

foster ethnic equality.

To facilitate the participation of immigrants into the national labour market, some

Member States have formulated active labour policies aimed specifically at this group.

Denmark introduced special coaching schemes and entrepreneurial centres in

neighbourhoods where the majority of the population is of foreign background. In

France, the use of 'reception and integration contracts' has been extended to all of the

country. The contracts provide newly arrived immigrants with language classes and

social assistance in order to assure a successful integration process.

50 |

5. Study Case: Romanians’ Migration within the European Union framework

There are different factors and motivations which explain the movement of people from

a state to another. The motivation for migration is different in different moments of

migration. Many studies about migration and migrants take into account that economic

aspects have importance in a sustainable motivation for emigration.

First of all the motivation for emigration for Romanian people was to earn money,

because in their country the conditions of work were inappropriate, the distribution of

plus value between managers and workers was unfair, the corruption and bureaucracy

exist at all levels. The low level of living standards determined by the salaries of people

is another factor which is important for the migration process.

But why did they choose mostly latin countries?

“Language and culture similarities, rather friendly attitude from Spanish people,

networking, job opportunities, etc.” are very important for the Romanian people in

regards to their decision to emigrate in Spain.

The migration movement of the Romanian people developed in 3 main stages:

A. Stage 1: between 1990 and 1995: 3‰ migration rate, with the following profile of the

Romanian migrant: young, man, from the urban area, with general education, leaving

from Moldavia, Muntenia and Transylvania to work in countries like Israel, Turkey,

Italy, Hungary and Germany;

B. Stage 2: between 1996 and 2001: 7 ‰ migration rate, with the following features of

migration: men and women equally represented, urban and rural areas equally

represented. The migrants leave mainly from Moldavia to work in countries like: Spain,

USA and Canada.

51 |

Between 1990 and 2002, since the Romanian border was closed, the legislation allowed

Romanian people to enter the European Union countries only with a visa. The strategies

of emigration in this period were: illegal border crossing, buying a Shengen visa from

the “black market”, using friends or kin relations from Germany (especially people

from Transylvania), using the right for asylum. Before 2002, only the people with a very

good financial condition were engaged in migration abroad. Even if after 2002

Romanian migrants still had to present some guarantees for their trip abroad (booking

of accommodation in the destination country, 500 Euros in cash or an invitation to

prove inancial support in the country of destination), the migration became more

accessible for people. So, we can say that the “composition” of migration has changed

after 2002.

C. Stage 3: between 2002 and 2006, when Romanians were allowed free access to the

Schengen area, is characterized by a substantial increase of the migration rate up to

28‰, preserving the migration features of stage 2, except for the changes in terms of

host countries: Italy, Spain, Germany, Israel and Hungary. In this period, migration

flows were largely directed towards two main destination countries: Italy (50% of

Romanian labour migrants) and Spain (24%). Spain has become a preferred destination

since 1996, especially for Romanians leaving the rural areas of Romania (Muntenia,

Moldavia and Oltenia). In the same year a bilateral agreement between Romania and

Spain was signed (29th of April, 1996).

In 2007, Romanians who intended to migrate for work abroad were predominantly

young, with a good level of education and with relatively high incomes (with an

average of 570 Euros per month, i.e. double the net average wage in Romanian

economy). The main destinations of migrants were Italy (23%), Spain (20%) and Great

Britain (18%).

The free movement of persons within the EU did not come along with the right to work

in most EU member states and led to a “very peculiar configuration of European

citizenship without European employment rights”. The accession of Romania to the EU

52 |

in 2007 determined an explosion of circular movements. Romanian migrants were able

to leave and return to their home country without restrictions. Even after 2007, in many

EU countries Romanian migrants have had the right only to free travel (for periods of

three months) but not to freely access the national labour market of the destination

country.

The 2005 Act of Accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU allows the EU-25 Member

States to temporarily restrict free access of Bulgarian and Romanian workers to their

labour markets in countries providing these restrictions in their legislation. Despite

restrictions imposed by the transitional arrangements, a Member State must always

give priority to Romanian and Bulgarian workers in front of workers from non-EU

countries, in the priority of access to employment. No restrictions apply to workers

from EU-2 (Romania and Bulgaria) in the Member States of the EU-2. The seven years’

transitional period is separated into three distinct stages („2+3+2”). During each of the

three stages different conditions apply, thus:

• National legislation of other Member States regulated access of workers from Bulgaria

and Romania to the labour markets of these countries during the first two years.

• Member States had the option to extend their national measures for the second stage

for another three years, subject to notification to the Commission before the end of the

first stage, otherwise applying the EU legislation ensuring the free movement of

workers.

A Member State maintaining national measures at the end of the second phase had the

option, in case of serious disturbances of the labour market or risk of such disturbances

and after notification of the Commission, to continue to apply measures until the end of

seven years following the date of accession.

Also, there is a safeguard clause allowing Member States who stopped using national

measures and apply EU law on free movement of workers before the end of the global

transition to reintroduce restrictions if there are serious labour market disturbances or

the risk of such disturbances.

53 |

The transitional measures will be irrevocably removed December 31, 2013, and apply

only to get access to the labour market under EU law on free movement of workers.

Since the EU-2 workers are admitted to the labour market of a Member State, they

benefit fully from all other rights under EU law on free movement of workers. The

transitional measures influence in any way the fundamental right of EU citizens to

move and reside freely within the EU under Article 21 from the Treaty on the

Functioning of the EU (TFEU). There are transitional arrangements for implementation

of EU legislation on coordination of social security programs. (The Treaty of

Functioning of the European Union, 2010)

For Romania the possibility of imposing transitional arrangements on free movement of

workers was established by the EU accession treaty in April 2005. Transitional measures

govern the right of each Member State to determine the policy of access to employment

for workers of the Member States of the European Union according to local labour

market situation so as not to prejudice the economic and social security system.

In the case of EU states who do not apply to Romania the free movement transitional

measures for workers, Community legislation (Regulation 492/2011 on free movement

of workers within the Union) is applied, so that Romanian citizens become employed in

the same terms as citizens of the State.

The European Commission announced that starting January 1st, 2012, nine states had

decided to maintain restrictions for the next two years for workers from Romania and

Bulgaria. The only country that has lifted the restrictions imposed on Romanian

workers in the labour market from January 1st, 2012, was Italy.

Out of these, the first to have notified the Commission of their decision to maintain

labour market restrictions were Britain, Germany and Ireland.

Romanian and Bulgarian nationals intending to work in the UK will have to obtain a

work permit in advance from the United Kingdom Border Agency. This decision is part

of the British government’s strategy to reduce dependence on foreign workers to

employers, especially in sectors where unskilled labour is required, the main aim being

54 |

to help the unemployed to find a job.

Germany has not fully opened its labour market to Romanian and Bulgarian workers.

In December 2011, the government in Berlin decided that the disciples, seasonal

workersand persons with qualified advocates in Romania and Bulgaria have no need of

work permits to be employed in Germany. Decision came into force on January 1st,

2012.

Spain invoked the safeguard clause and the Commission accepted, on August 11th

2011, the request of that country to reintroduce restrictions to Romanian workers until

December 31st, 2012. The reason was that unemployment in Spain has increased

dramatically.

Belgium refused to open its labour market to Romanians and Bulgarians, extending

restrictions up to the end of 2013. The reason is that citizens of the two Eastern

European countries who are already working in this country refuse to pay social

contributions, thus deceiving the state. The Netherlands has also decided to extend the

restrictions for Bulgarian and Romanian citizens by 2013.

Luxembourg, France and Austria announced the European Commission in December

2011 that they will keep restrictions for of the EU-2 workers by 2013. The cause is the

growth of unemployment in these countries and the negative effects of the global crisis.

Thus, Romanian workers now have free access to the labour market in 16 of the 25 EU

Member States, 9 maintaining restrictions until 2013 (UK, Germany, Ireland, Spain,

Luxembourg, Belgium, Netherlands, France and Austria).

Each year, Member States that have not opened their labour market for Romanian

citizens publish a list of occupations and sectors/industries open to citizens of the new

EU member states and those for which the release of a work permit is not subject to the

national labour market situation.

Romania did not impose transitional measures for Member States concerning free

movement of workers.

55 |

Romania’s integration in the EU in 2007 was the major step taken by our country for its

both economic and social development. Starting 2007 Romanian citizens can freely

circulate within the Union or they can change their permanent domicile, becoming

permanent citizens of another member country.

On our country’s level we can see, especially in the last ten years, a permanent or

temporary movement of the citizens towards more developed countries of the Union,

the choice of the destination being made depending on the salary level obtained for a

potential job in the host country.

If until 2001 the migrants were mostly men, from 2002 to 2006 the number of migrant

women increased a lot, the gap between genders decreasing from 76% to 12% (Table 1).

Table 1. The evolution of persons who left to work abroad from 1990 to 2009

Stages Total

1990-1995 1996-2001 2002-2006 2007-2009

Gender Female 12 15 44 40 111

Male 88 85 56 73 302

Location Rural 41 48 49 47 185

Urban 59 52 51 58 220

Nationality

Romanians 92 89 94 99 374

Hungarians 8 10 4 11 33

Others 1 2 2 5

Marital

status

Married 88 76 60 82 306

Single 7 19 31 35 92

Others

(widowers,

divorced)

5 6 10 9 30

Education

Primary 3 3 1 3 10

Gymnsium 2 8 16 12 38

Vocational

and high

school

78 79 77 82 316

University 17 9 7 32 65

Source: OECD Economic Surveys, 2009

56 |

If we take into account the other variables too, we may say that in the first stages left to

work married men, from urban areas, with high school or vocational school studies. In

time, the number of persons from rural areas, unmarried and with a lower education

level has increased, so there was a diversification of the temporary emigration abroad.

The migration of Romanian workers abroad, confirming a imension of the neo-classic

economic theory, was firstly towards countries more economically developed where

there was a possibility to obtain higher wages compared to the one obtainable in

Romania. However, the economic dimension must be associated with the political one.

The limited legal possibilities for Romanians to go to work in the West have caused the

destinations for the temporary economic migration in the first 10 years after the 1989

events to be very scattered, the main targets being Israel and Italy with 17% followed by

Hungary, Turkey and Spain with lower percentages. After 2001 the situation changed

dramatically, Italy and Spain being by far the most wanted destinations for Romanian

workers. The possible explanations for the fact that almost three quarters of the

Romanian migrants go to these countries are the cultural resemblances (including the

ease to learn the two Latin languages), the local authorities’ flexibility in accepting

foreign immigrants and the existence, at least in Italy, of Romanians who have

facilitated the migration of other Romanians through the „migrant networks”.

Linguistic and geographical distances, migrant networks, as well as scale seem to have

played an important role in the allocation of migrants across destination countries. The

high number of migrants to Italy in the studied interval can also be explained by the

fact that the economy in this country is more developed and offers higher wages than in

Spain. If we consider the historical regions too, we can emphasize the role of the

networks and of certain migration traditions in the increase of the migration flow.

Workers from Moldavia prefer Italy, those from Muntenia prefer Spain. Many

inhabitants of Banat go to Germany and those from Ardeal to Hungary.

The importance of the migrant networks results clearly from the next table, where we

can see an increase in the number of those who were offered support when leaving the

57 |

country in finding a house and a job abroad. In the last stage compared to the first one,

the number of those who were helped when leaving has tripled and the number of

those supported to find a job and a house has doubled, help being offered primarily by

relatives and friends.

The fact that fewer and fewer left with contracts intermediated by the Employment

Agency or through specialized companies from Romania is positively correlated with

the decrease of those who said they worked legally abroad. One can also notice that the

number of persons who worked in house-work and agriculture has increased,

decreasing the number of those who worked in constructions, which is explicable by the

increase of the number of women migrants.

Table 2. Main destinations of temporary emigration by historical regions, 2001 – 2009

Moldova Muntenia Oltenia Dobrogea Transilvania Crisana Banat Bucharest

Italy 76 21 62 75 42 41 43 75

Spain 14 54 21 17 29 4 -

Germany 1 8 - 13 3 3 29 -

Hungary - - - - 17 6 -

Greece 3 1 - - - - 13 18

France 1 1 3 - 3 3 - -

Others 6 14 6 13 13 12 7 13

No

response

2 3 6 - 4 6 - -

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Source: OECD Economic Surveys, 2009

The high number of Romanians who left to work abroad could not remain without

effects on the Romanian labour market. From October 20th to October 30th 2007, a

national representative study was conducted at the request of the Soros Foundation

which targeted the identification of the issues that three economic areas were

confronted with (textile, constructions, hotels and restoration industries) due to the lack

of workforce.

58 |

Table 3. Migrants that go abroad

Stages

1990 - 1995 1996 -

2001

2002 - 2006 2007 - 2009

Helped by

anyone on

departure

Yes 22 40 60 50

No 69 56 38 15

No answer 8 4 2 3

Who helped

them leave

Native relative 8 4 2 3

Native friend 5 16 23 19

Native acquaintance 7 6 16 12

Others 3 3 5 4

Not the case 15 20 18 12

No answer 69 56 38

How were they

able to find a job

abroad

Contacts

intermediated by the

Employment Agency

0 0 1 0

Through

intermediation

companies in

Romania

22 21 11 25

Through relatives

from abroad

7 13 27 22

Through friends from

abroad

25 24 27 26

Left directly to the

employer

17 13 15 15

Others 12 10 12 12

No answer 7 10 7 7

Source: OECD Economic Surveys, 2009

The result was that in the textile industry 30% of the companies had available

unoccupied jobs for more than two months. The two other economic areas faced the

same issue although at a lower level.

The positive side of the matter is that these companies, in order to face the penury of

workforce, have invested in most of the cases in refurbishment (76%) and in work

productivity increase. Bringing workforce from abroad, which is a possible future

solution, was done by only 3% of the companies. This means that, at least for the time

being, the compensation of the lost workforce due to the Romanians’ emigration by

bringing foreign workers is not a solution.

59 |

Table 4. Situation of the way the migrant work abroad

Stage

1990 - 1995 1996 - 2001 2002 - 2006 2007 - 2009

Areas of

activity

Agriculture 14 16 16 20

Constructions 41 41 28 31

House-work 0 7 28 32

Others 44 32 26 29

No answer 2 5 3 3

Legal

worker/

Clandestine

worker

Legal 53 57 31 39

Clandestine 34 31 53 46

Legal and

clandestine

8 7 9 8

No answer 5 6 7 6

Migrations

who have

legalized

their

situation

No, they

haven’t even

tried

68 58 53 55

No, although

they tried

0 10 28 23

Yes 12 28 13 15

No answer 20 5 6 7

Source: OECD Economic Surveys, 2009

The workforce market is in crisis, the number of persons with a new job is decreasing,

the workforce market crisis affects men more than women, but the women’s salaries are

still lower than those of men’s at the same level of work. A significant percentage of the

full-time employees have had a salary decrease in the last year and those who have

earned more money during the last year have been judges, high public officials and

managers.

60 |

Conclusions

European Union needs to make full use of its labour potential to face the challenges of

an ageing population and rising global competition. Policies to promote gender equality

will be needed to increase labour force participation thus adding to growth and social

cohesion.

"An agenda for new skills and jobs" has like goal the modernization of labour markets

and to empower people by developing their skills throughout the lifecycle with a view

to increase labour participation and better match labour - supply and demand,

including through labour mobility.

The European Commission have to facilitate and promote intra-EU labour mobility and

better match labour supply with demand with appropriate financial support from the

structural funds, notably the European Social Fund (ESF), and to promote a

forwardlooking and comprehensive labour migration policy which would respond in a

flexible way to the priorities and needs of the labour markets.

The free movement of workers is not only a fundamental principle of the European

Union, but also a key precondition to reap the benefits from the opportunities offered in

the labour market, to ensure sustainability of member states’ welfare systems and to

strengthen the EU’s global competitiveness.

61 |

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