The French Military in Africa: Past and Present Author(s): Shaun Gregory Source: African Affairs,...

8/12/2019 The French Military in Africa: Past and Present Author(s): Shaun Gregory Source: African Affairs, Vol. 99, No. 396 (J

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The Royal frican Society

The French Military in Africa: Past and PresentAuthor(s): Shaun GregorySource: African Affairs, Vol. 99, No. 396 (Jul., 2000), pp. 435-448Published by: Oxford University Presson behalf of The Royal African Society

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AfricanA.ffairs2000), 99, 435-448THE FRENCH 1\4ITTTARY N AFZCA:PAST AND PRESENT

SHAUNGREGORYABSTRACTIn the post-ColdWar era, and particularlyince the events in Rwanda n1994, French military policy in Africa has been in transition. Theemergence of this new policy trajectoryhas coincided with, and beeninformedby, the restructuring f Frenchdefence policypresented n thegovernmentdefenceWhite Paper of 1994 and in the Presidentialdocu-ment Une DefenseNouvelle of 1996. As part of these reformsFrance isending conscriptionand reorientatingts armedforces towards he exer-cise of greater military power outside Europe in the novel roles ofpreventionandprojection. This articleexplores he reasons or thechangesin Frenchmilitarypolicy n Africaandlooks at the trends n the projectionof conventionalmilitaryforces that are shaping the future role of theFrenchmilitary n Africa. To do this it outlines his role during he ColdWar and examines the reasons for the relative stabilicy of Frenchpolicy. It then chartsthe events and processeswhich haveprecipitatedchange n chepost-ColdWarera and looksat future rendswhichpoint toa continuingbut refocusedrole for the French military n Africa.

IN ENGINEERINGHENOMINALNDEPENDENCEf Francophonietates inAfricaby means of 'Treaties of Co-operation' n the late 1950s and early1960s PresidentCharles de Gaulle ensured a transition rom colonial toneo-colonialdependence,l the latterbeing defined as 'the survivalof thecolonial system in spite of forlllalrecognitionof political ndependence nemerging countrieswhich [thereafterbecame] the victims of an indirectand subtle form of dominationby political, economic, social, militaryortechnicalmeans'.2 Overthe following35 yearsor so, in the context of theCold War, France exercised a 'virtualempire' in sub-SaharanAfrica,premised on the cultural, economic, linguistic and personalties forgedduring the colonial period and, somewhat less plausibly, on 'geographicShaun Gregory is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Peace Studies, University ofBradford. He was formerly Visiting Fellow at the Institutde Relations nternationalestStrategiquesnd Visiting Associate at the Inst*utFranvcaise Relationsnternationales,oth inParis.1. See Georges Lavroff (ed.), La PolitiqueAfricainedu General e Gaulle Pedone, Paris,1990). In English a useful if uncritical analysis of de Gaulle and this transition can be foundin Dorothy Shipley White, BlackAfricaand de Gaulle Pennsylvania State University Press,Philadelphia, 1979).2. 'Resolution on Neo-colonialism', quoted in Colin Legum, Pan Afiricanism:short oliticalguide Pall Mall Press, London, 1962), p. 254.

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436 AFRICAN AFFAIRSproximity'.3 While accepting that these elements shaped French policy,they do not fully explain it. At its heart French policy flowed fromnational nterest and nationaladvantage. In post-colonialAfrica,Francefound an exclusive sphere of influence, a 'pre carre'africain,on which tobase its claims of grandeur nd greatpower status and also claims of ThirdWorld eadership.4 In AfricaFrance ound strategic esources, n particu-lar oil and uranium,and a readymarket or French goods, French cultureand French ideas. With FrancophoneAfrica, France was always morethan a middle-sizedEuropeanstate.One of the most remarked pon featuresof the Frenchpresence n Africahas been the continuityand stabilityof policy.5 In understanding his wecan discern something of the characterof French involvement on theAfricancontinent. One reason or the Frenchdominanceof FrancophoneAfrica (though one which is deeply unpalatable n France), was Americanindulgence, underpinnedby a broad alignmentof shared nterests. Hadthe French hand faltered in maintainingthe stability and pro-Westernorientationof FrancophoneAfricaduring he Cold War, it is unlikely hatthe exclusivityof French influence would have remained. Similarly, heFrench diplomaticdistancefrom Washingtonkept the Soviet Union fromserious engagement in Francophone Africa for fear of drawing in theUnited States.Continuity of policy throughout the presidencies of de Gaulle,Pompidou, Giscard d'Estaing, and Mitterrandwas underwrittenby acomplex interplayof factors. First, the bonds of languageand the termsunder which the transition to independence was made ensured apro-French orientation in the emergent states. Secondly, structuralarrangements currency inks, the deep penetrationof French companies,Franco-African olitical and economic fora, close personal inks betweenFrench and Afgcan elites, and a dedicated French Ministry ofCo-operation served both to bind Francophonestates to France and topreserve he status quo. Finally,one cannot ignorethe enduring nfluenceof JacquesFoccart. Foccart served n the Elysee as SecretaryGeneral orAfricanand MalagasyASairsunderde Gaulle. His closenessto de Gaulleand the subsequentpersistenceof Gaullist ideas ensured a continuity ofinfluence for Foccart who, first from the Elysee and later from his home,3. See Dominique Moisi and Pierre Lellouche, 'French policy in Africa: the lonely battleagainst destabilisation', Internationalecurity , 3 (1979), pp. 108-33.4. On contemporary French-African relations see Roland Louvel, QuelleAfrique ourQuelleCooperation?L'Harmattan, Paris, 1994); Serge Michailof, La France t l'AfriqueKarthala,Paris, 1993); Pierre Pean, AffairesAfricainesFayard, Paris, 1983) and FranSois-XavierVerschave, La FrancafriqueEditions Stock, Paris, 1998). The definitive English-languagestudy of Franco-African security relations remains John Chipman's FrenchPotoer n Africa(Blackwell, Oxford, 1989).5. Guy Martin, 'France and Africa', in Robert Aldrich and John Connell (eds), France nWorld oliticsRoutledge, London, 1989), pp. 103-5.



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437RENCH MILITARY IN AFRICA: PAST AND PRESENTexercisedenormous nfluenceon French Africanpolicy, often in competi-tion with both the Ministry of Co-operation and the Foreign Ministry.Foccart'snetworksof personalcontactswith African eadersand other keyfigures (his reseaux occart) nd his intimate inks with French intelligenceservices and France's diplomatic representatives n Africa allowed himto exercise a near fiefdom in Francophone Africa underpinning hisimportance o each of de Gaulle's successors.6TheFrenchmilitary n Cold WarAfrica

The final element in both the continuity and stability n FrancophoneAfricahas been the role of the French military.7 Following ndependenceFrance establisheda variety of formal defence and militaryco-operationaccords with the Francophone states in Africa,8 and incorporatedtheformerBelgiancolonies of Burundi,Rwandaand Zaire ess forlllallywithinthis group n the mid-1970s. These arrangements ave allowedFrance omaintain hegemony and regional stabilityby force if necessary, a powerFrance has not hesitated to exercise. In all, between 1962 and 1995France intervenedmilitarily 19 times in African states, not including itsparticipation n UN operations n Angola as part of the United NationsAngolan VerificationMission (UNAVEM) and in Somalia as part of theUnited Nations InterventionTask Force (UNITAF), and the Foccart-inspiredFrench support of Biafra. These interventions nvolved Senegal(1962), Gabon (1964 and 1990), Chad (1968-72, 1978, 1983 and 1986),Mauritania (1977), Zaire (1978 and 1991), Central African Republic(1979), Togo (1986), Comores (1989 and 1995), Rwanda (1990-93,1994), Djibouti (1991), Benin (1991), and SierraLeone (1992).9 In allbut a few of these interventions French action was to protect Frenchnationals, subdue rebellion (irrespectiveof its legitimacy), and prop uppro-Frenchrulers, including some of the most despotic and murderousindividuals n post-colonialAfricanhistory.l?6. On Foccart see Pierre Pean, L'Homme t l'Ombre: lements 'enque^teutourde ffacquesFoccart)'hommee plus mysterieuxt le pluspuissantde la 5e RepubliqueFayard, Paris, 1990)and Jacques Foccart and Phillipe Gaillard, FoccartParle: EntretienAvec 3tacques occart(Fayard, Paris, Vol. I, 1995 and Vol. II, 1997).7. A useful overview of this role is provided by Andre Dumoulin, La FranceMilitaire tl'AfriqueGRIP/Editions Complexe, Brussels, 1997).8. The chronological list of these accords is as follows: Republic of Central Africa (13August 1960), Gabon (17 August 1960), Congo (1 January 1974), Cameroon (21 February1974), Senegal (29 March 1974), Benin (27 February 1975), Chad (6 March 1976), Togo(23 March 1976), Mauritania (2 September 1976), Niger (19 February 1977), Djibouti(27 June 1977) and Mali (14 October 1977) .9. Dumoulin, La FranceMilitaire,pp. 123-5. See also 'Les precedentes interventionsmilitaires francaises', Le Monde,24 May 1996.10. Amongst these were the self-styled Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central AfricanRepublic and the Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko. See respectively Charles Onana,Bokassa:Ascension t chute d un EmpereurEditions Duboirris, Paris, 1998); N'GbandaAtumbu, Les Derniers rours u MarechalMobutu(Gideppe, Paris, 1998): and ColetteBraekman, Le Dinosaure: e Zairede MobutuFayard, Paris, 1992).



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438 AFRICAN AFFAIRSBy the time President Jacques Chirac came into the Elysee in 1995Francehad activemilitaryagreementswith 23 FrancophoneAfrican tates:

Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic,Chad, Comores, Congo, Djibouti, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, EquatorialGuinea, Guinea-Conakry, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Mauritania,Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Togo and Zaire. In six of these itdeployed standing missionde presence orces: Cameroon (10), D jibouti(3,500), Gabon (610), Cote d'Ivoire (580), the CentralAfricanRepublic(1,500), and Senegal (1,300), and also had 850 troops in Chad under theterms of a temporarybilateralmilitaryassistanceagreement.lStanding forces and a propensity to intervene were only the visibledimensions of French military influence. Less obvious, but no lessimportant,was the influenceof the Frenchmilitaryon the nationaldefencepolicies and armies of the Francophone African states. Post-colonialdefence agreements ypicallygave France primacy n the externaldefenceof Francophonestates while their own armed forces were left to fimctionlargelyas a local gendarmerie. Even as these distinctionswere eroded, asGuy Martin has pointed out, 'the size, location and mobility of Frenchforces . . . in effect result[ed] n France'sstrict control over the defence ofFrancophonietates one of the foremost attributesof their sovereignty-furtherexacerbat[ing] heir alreadyacute dependence on Paris'.l2 Sincetheir creation at the time of independence FrancophoneAfrican armieshave been trained and largelyequipped by France for close co-operationwith French forces, and as a result are often functionally dependenton France. This is a model which France continued to use as newstates joined the Francophonemilitarygroup. As Robin Luckham hastrenchantlyobserved:

The presence of French troops and military advisers, the consolidationandreproductionof national militarystructures hrough externalsupport, and thetransmission hroughmilitary rainingof metropolitan i.e. French)skills,tacticsand ideologies onstitute a permanent intesention. (emphasisadded) 3

TheFrenchmilitary n post-ColdWarAfrzcaIt is a measure of the insularityof the Francophonie fricanregion thatthe end of the Cold War had relatively ittle immediate mpact on Frenchpolicy. France continued to support the status quo, maintainedexistingpatternsof relations, ntervenedwhere it felt it necessaryand maintainedstable standingforce levels. Between 1994 and 1997, however,France's11. There are some annual variations for these figures: the 1994 White Paper had 8,600personnel in 1994; Figarohad 8,200 for 1996 ('Afrique, la France ne baisse pas la garde',20 March 1996); and Dumoulin had 8,400 for 1997 (Dumoulin, La FranceMilitaire,pp. 113-14).12. Martin, 'France and Africa', pp. 114-15.13. Robin Luckham, 'French militarism in Africa', Reviewof AfricanPoliticalEconomy 4(1982), p. 56; the whole article repays reading, pp. 55-84.



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439RENCH MILITARY IN AFRICA: PAST AND PRESENTplace in Africa changed significantly. The decisive fracturewith thepatternsof the pastbeganwith the humancatastrophen Rwanda.

Frenchinvolvementn RwandastartedwithaJuly1975 bilateralaccordon military echnicalassistance. The natureof Frenchmilitarynfluence,discussedabove,providesevidencethat, while this agreementwas nomi-nallya limitedrelationship, t obscuredfar-reachingFrenchinfluenceonRwandan national defence. The operational involvement of Frenchtroops began in October 1990 when in OperationNorolt France intro-duced troops to protect French nationalsworkingin Rwandaand thecorruptHutu-dominatedgovernmentof JuvenalHabyarimanaromguer-rillas of the Tutsi-controlledRwandanPatrioticFront (FPR). Frenchtrooplevelswere boosted to around550 during1992 and 1993, while atthe same time France stepped up the supply of militaryhardwaretogovernment orces.Habyarimana's eathin a planecrash n April1994 sparkeda genocidal'finalsolution'led by the ethnicmajorityHutu militiawho systematicallyslaughteredbetween 500,000 and 1,000,000 mainlycivilianTutsis. Inthe chaos the FPR advancedacross Rwandadefeatingthe governmentarmywhich was French supplied and trained, and in its wake at least2 millionHutus, including housands mplicated n the killings, led acrossthe borders nto Zaireand Tanzania.l4In April 1994 Francecarriedout OperationAmaryllis, endingaround500 troops into Rwandato evacuateFrench nationalsand 'personalitesrzoandaises',he latter ncludingkeygovernmentigures omeofwhomwereimplicatedn the unfoldingslaughter. As the scaleof the killingsbecameclearto the rest of the worldthe UN mandatedactionunderResolution925, but circumscribed ts interventionto humanitarianobjectives, alimitedduration(two months), and the exerciseof strictneutrality n thesecurityand protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians.l5Whilethe UN debated the deploymentof troops, France led a multi-nationalforce from mainly FrancophoneAfricanstates (Chad, Congo,Guinea-Bissau,Mauritania,Niger and Egypt) in OperationTurquoise,whichwas hastilymandatedby the UN under Resolution929 the day14. For a rangeofviews,thebalanceofwhich mplicatesFrancedeeply nthegenocide,see:MedhiBa, Un GenocideFranSais L'EspritFrappeur,Paris, 1997); Colette Braekrnan,Rwanda: istoire 'ungenocideFayard,Paris,1994);JacquesCastonguay,LesCasques leusau Rwanda(L'Harmattan,Paris, 1998); Alain Destexhe, Rwanda:Essai sur le genocide(EditionsComplexe,Brussels, 1994); Jean-PaulGouteux, Un Getnocideecretd'Etat:LaFrancet le Rwanda199F97 (EditionsSociales,Paris 1998), GerardPrunier's wo-volumestudy f the Rwandangenocideandits aftermath ubiished n Englishas: TheRwandaCrisis1959-94:History fa genocideC. Hurst Co., London, 1995) andRwandan Zaire:Fromgenocideocontinentalar(C. Hurst Co., London,1999);andPaulQuiles(ed.),EnqueAteurlaTragedie wandaise4 vols), ReportNo. 1271 (AssembleeNationale,Paris,1998).15. ThierryGarcin, L'interventionrancaise uRwanda',Le TrimestreuMonde33 (1996),pp. 7-9. Seealso:LouisBalmand,Les nterventionsilitaires ranSaisesnAfriquePedone,Paris, 998), pp. 99-108.



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440 AFRICAN AFFAIRSbefore French troops arrived n the theatre on 23 June 1994. Francecontributed 2,550 troops (including 1,500 from its standing forces inAfrica)to the total force of 3,000.16The objectivesand role of OperationTurquoisehavebecome the subjectof much controversy.l7 Defenders of the French interventionargue thatit was intended to halt the killing, stabilize the situation, advance theprincipleof humanitarian nterventionand uphold the role of the UnitedNations. But it was not irrelevant hat it demonstrated he continuedrelevanceof France n Africa,premisedon a Frenchwillingnessand abilityto act while others vacillated.l8 To others OperationTurquoise was acynical operation irst to attempt to prop up the crumblingregime as theFPR swept acrossRwanda,and thereafter o create safe havens' or fleeingHutus in orderto protect 'lesgenocidaires'nd 'lesamisde France' rom theFPR and wider accountability.l9 It was pertinent o this view that a 'spiritof Fashoda'was informingFrenchpolicy, premisedon the perception hatthe FPR were Anglophone Uganda-backed, ntruding on Francophonetetory.With hindsight, the 'shock waves' from Rwanda can be seen to haveplayed out as they did in France because of the past patterns of Frenchbehaviour n Africa. In RwandaFrance supported,armed, and trainedacorimpt egimeand sent troops to defend it from rebellion. In April 1994it sent in troops to pull out its own nationals and some allies, and thenpromptly withdrew leaving Rwanda to its fate. The deployment ofOperationTurquoisewas too little too late to preventeitheran FPR victory(of the 3,000 troops deployed on the Zaire/Rwanda order France hadaround 1,000 troops inside Rwandabut faced 20,000 FPR troops) or thekilling,which was largelyover by June but which nevertheless ontinuedata lower level in the French-controlled ones 'under the noses of Frenchtroops'.20

The events n Rwandaarguablymarked he point at whichthe traditionalpatterns of French policy in Francophone Africa ceased to serve evennarrowlydefinedFrench nterests. Francehad sleepwalked nto a disasteron the assumption that established policy would continue to work.Subsequently it was unable to escape the consequences of either its

16. J. A. C. Lewis, 'New mission for France as it re-enters Rwandan conflict', 3rane's efenceWeekly2, 1 (1994), p. 19.17. 'La France et la tragedie rwandaise au histoire devenu plus lisible', MarchesTropicaux,1496 (1998), pp. 156-8.18. Garcin 'L'intervention francaise', pp. 63-72.19. See, for example, Philippe Richard, 'Afrique: quelle politique de securite?', Damocles 2(1997), pp. 8-9. For the French role in arming and training the Rwandan govemment forcessee Colete Braekman, Qui a Arrnee Rwanda?Les Dossiers du GRIP, Brussels, 1994).20. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic utmey 99F1995 (IISS/OxfordUniversity Press, Oxford, 1995), p. 209.



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441RENCH MILITARY IN AFRICA: PAST AND PRESENTassociationwith a murderousregime or its failure to provide securityforthat regime or for the Rwandanpeople.

It was not immediately evident, however, that these lessons wereassimilatedby French political elites. Analysesof the Africanpolicies ofPresidents Mitterrand and Chirac between 1994 and 1997 point to acontinuity of ideas, evidenced by continued intervention in Comores inOctober 1995, in the CentralAfricanRepublic n 1996, and in the Congofrom March 1997), static standing force levels, the scrappingof an earlyidea of the Chirac government o subsume the Ministryof Co-operationwithin the ForeignMinistry,and even the reappearance t the Elysee of anaged JacquesFoccart.2lThe 'double death' of Foccart n March 1997 (i.e. the death of the manand the end of his influence on Francophone African policy) seemednevertheless to symbolize the passing of an era.22 This notion wasconfirmedwithin a few months by events in Zaire. The collapse of theregimeof Mobutu Sese Seko in May 1997 and the US-brokered ransferofpower to the forces of LaurentDesire Kabilacrystallized he erosionof theFrenchposition. Francehad clung on to the supportof Mobutu until thelast, prolonging he agony and forfeiting egitimacywith the new regime;atthe same time French forces were unable to save Mobutu and indeed, at

the end, so irrelevant ad Francebecome that Mobutu did not even informthe French of his decision to go. As the formerdefence ministerFrancoisLeotardcommented:events in Zairehave produceda triple failure or France: acticallybecause MrKabila was backed by the United States and Anglophone African countries,morally because France had given the impression [sic] of supporting thediscreditedMobutu to the end, and geopolitically ecauseZairewas an essentialelement in the French presenceon the continent.23

In the wake of Zaire the new administration f Lionel Jospin announcedsubstantial uts in France'sstanding orces in Africa. The existingforcesof more than 8,000 troops were to be cut to around 5,500. Moreover,France was to close its bases in Cameroon and the Central AfricanRepublic, eavingbases operational n only five Afkican ountries includingChad). The reductions n troop levels were to be implementedas follows:in Chad from 840 to 550; in Gabon from 600 to 550; in Djibouti from21. See, for example, Francois Jolivald, 'Regards sur la politique africaine de FrancoisMitterrand', MarchesTropicaux,474 (1997), pp. 1474-5; Claude Wauthier, 'La politiqueafricaine de Jacques Chirac', Relationsnternationalest Strategiques5 (1997), pp. 121-8, andFransois Gaulme, 'La France et l'Afrique de Francois Mitterrand a Jacques Chirac',MarchesTropicaux,369 (1995), pp. 1112-14. On Foccart's reappearance at the Elysee see'Why were they there?', TheEconomist42, 7999 (1997), p. 54.22. Paul-Marie de la Gorce, 'La deuxieme mort de Jacques Foccart',3reuneAfrique, 990-91(1997), pp. 40-42.23. David Buchan, 'France broadens African policy focus', FinancialTimes, April 1997.



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442 AFRICAN AFFAIRS3,250 to 2,800; those in Cote d'Ivoire were to remain at 550; and inSenegal from 1,300 to 1,100, in total a 40 per cent reduction.24

These cuts have been largelydeterminedby budgetaryconstraintsandare consistent with the overall cuts anticipatedby the Presidentialdocu-ment UneDefenseNouvelleof 1996 and the 1997-2002 Loi de Programma-tionMilitaire, he latterbeing the principalbudgetframework ocumentforFrenchdefence spending. The cuts arenevertheless ontextualized y thechangingFrenchposition n Africa,and it is importantbriefly o summarizethis. A loss of French legitimacyand influence, displacement rom theGreat Lakes region, and the encroachmentof the United States, Britainand AnglophoneAfrican tates (particularly igeriaand South Africa)haveended the exclusivityof French nfluence n FrancophoneAfrica. Franceis no longer dealing with Francophone Africa as a bloc, and seemsincreasingly ikely to 'cherrypick' close links with the few Francophonestates which best serve its interests.25In the aftermathof Rwandathe key novelty in French policy has beenmultilateralism an 'Africanization' f regional security26and a 'multi-nationalization'of Western interests exemplified by Franco-BritishandAmerican-led nitiativesto create regional peacekeeping orces.27 Boththese strands of French thinking find their clearest expression in thetrilateralAfrican peacekeeping initiative agreed by France, the UnitedKingdom and the United States on 23 May 1997.28 As part of this theUnited Kingdomhas establisheda regionalPeacekeepingTrainingCentreat Harare n Zimbabweand the United States has begun to implement tsAfricanCrisisResponseInitiative ACRI). France, or its part,has led the'Recamp' ('renforcementes capacitesafricainesde maintiende la paix')programme. Recamp is an initiativeto beef up the capacity of Africanstates,underthe aegis of the United Nations and in close co-operationwiththe Organization of African Unity (OAU), to conduct peacekeepingoperations n Africa. Its objective s to traina sizeableAfrican orce (up to4-5,000 troops by the end of 2000) in the techniquesof peacekeepingandto equip and support the force appropriately or rapid intervention nregional crises.29 To this end France set up the Ecolede Maintiende la24. 'La France sonne la retraite a bangui', Liberation,24 July 1997.25. Jose GarSon, 'L'onde de choc rvvandaise', Liberation, 3 July 1997; Pierre Prier, 'LaFrance veut reviser sa politique africaine', Figaro, 5 July 1997; and Joseph Fitchett, 'Newpolicy for Africa: don't rely on troops from France', InternationalHerald Tribune, 11 August1997.26. Dumoulin, La France Militaire, pp. 89-110.27. J. A. C. Lewis, 'France looks for ways to keep its African influence intact', ffane's DefenceWeekly 26, 17 (1996), p. 23; and Thomas Lippman, 'US revises plans for Africa force',InternationalHerald Tribune, 10 February 1997.28. Groupe Intercomites No. 4, France-Afrique: Un nouveau partenarzatpour la securite(IHEDN Report, Paris, 1998), p.729. Emmanuel Ela Ela, 'La nouvelle politique de cooperation militaire de la France enAfrique', Defense Nationale 56, 2 (2000), pp. 98-9.



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443RENCH MILITARY IN AFRICA: PAST AND PRESENTPaix (EMP) at Zambakro n Cote d'Ivoire n 1998, and has integrated hework of this school with relevant elements of military-related rainingprovidedby a number of is EcolesNationales VocationRegionale ENVR)established n the l990s to promotewiderFrancophonedevelopment romcentres in Benin, BurkinaFaso, Cameroon,Senegal and Togo. To datethese forces have undertaken wo majorexercises:ExerciseGuidimakha nFebruary1998 in which 3,500 troops (including500 from France,the UKand the US) took part in manoeuvresaround the Mali, Mauritania,andSenegalborders,and ExerciseKompienga n April 1998 in which Togo ledseven other sub-regionalFrancophonestates in similarmanoeuvres. Atthe time of writing furtherexercises are planned for Gabon in 2000 andDjibouti in 2002.3?Andre Dumoulin's argumentthat French interests in Africa will alsotend to become 'Europeanized' eems unlikely, f understoodas meaningthat France will co-opt the EuropeanUnion or WesternEuropeanUnionin pursuit of its interests n FrancophoneAfrica.31But it could be highlyprescient if understoodto suggest that existing European nterests acrossAfrica are likely to become harmonizedas France, for example, looks toAnglophonestates like South Africa o extend its influenceand to partnerslike the United Kingdomto co-ordinateresponses o events in continentalAfrica.32At the same time, the pace of these changes should not beoverstated. France has yet to divest itself formallyof any of its existingmilitaryagreementswith FrancophoneAfrican tates and there are many nFrancestill arguing or continuityof policy on the grounds hat the Frenchpresence works for continentalstability.33 The catastrophe n the GreatLakes region and the instability rom SierraLeone to Somalia and fromChad to Angola do not appear to have intruded on this viewpoint.Perhaps he safest conclusionto drawat the startof the new millennium sthat French securitypolicy in FrancophoneAfrica is on a new trajectorywhich, over time, seems certain to take it further and further from thenorms and patternsof the past.Thespecial aseof Djibouti

Because of its anomalous ituation n relation o the rest of FrancophoneAfrica and its strategic importance, France's largest overseas base at30. Ela Ela, 'La nouvelle politique', p. 99.31. A Franco-German brigade did, however, carry out exercises in Gabon in the autumnof 1997. See Jean-Dominique Merche, 'Ne plus arbiter entre forces rivales', Liberation,4 August 1997.32. Dumoulin, La France Militaire, pp. 89-110.33. See, for example, Dominique de Combles de Nayves, 'La nouvelle politique militairefranSaise en Afrique', Defense Nationale 54, 8 (1998), pp. 12-16; Albert Bourgi, 'La fin del'epopee coloniale?', yeuneAfrique, 1990-91 (1997), p. 3; Mireille Duteil, 'La France va-t-elleperdre l'Afrique?', Le Point, 1297 (1997), pp. 38-41; 'Non, la France n'a pas 'perdu'l'Afrique', Marches Tropicaux, 1468 (1997), p. 1071- and Hugo Sada, 'Reexamen de lapolitique militaire franSaise en Afrique', Defense Nationale 53, 6 (1997), pp. 183-5.



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444 AFRICAN AFFAIRSDjiboutiwarrants pecialmention. Slightly maller han Kuwait,Djiboutisits on the coast of the Horn of Africa on the strategically mportantBab-el-MandebStrait between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, themaritime gateway to the Indian Ocean and the Asia-Pacific region.Occupiedby Francesince 1862 (firstas the FrenchSomali Coast and thenthe FrenchTerritoryof Afarsand Issas) to challengeBritishdominanceofthe region, Djibouti gained its independence on 27 June 1977, havingalready agreed protocols for the perpetuation of the French militarypresence.34France explains its role in Djibouti in terms of its defence againstEthiopia, Eritreaand Somalia and against regional instability,35 ut thebase is of far greatergeopolitical and geostrategic mportance han that.From Djibouti Francehas a role in the Horn of Africa(and in Africamoregenerally), he Middle East and the Indian Ocean, as well as influence inone of the world's key strategicwaterways. Djibouti gives it an entree tothe Arab League and regionalco-operative ora, a further nfluence n theOAU and an ally in the UN. In Djibouti France also finds itself at anintersection of revolutionary slamic influence between Sudan, Yemen,Somaliaand Iran.36 From DjiboutiFrance s able to project ts forces ntothree theatres: irst into Africa where, for example, troops from Djiboutitook part in OperationsOryx and UNITAF II in Somalia in 1992-3, inOperation Turquoise in Rwanda in 1994, and in Operation Azalee inComores in 1995g37 econdly into the Middle East as, for example, n the1991 Gulf Warand subsequentoperations elating o UN sanctionsagainstIraq;38 nd finallyas a vital link with its territoriesn the Indian Ocean andbeyond.The size and range of the forces at Djibouti reflect these diverseinterests. For most of the 1990s troop levels were relativelystable ataround 3,500 personnel, comprising2,200 army, 900 air force, and 300naval forces plus support. The key elements of this force are the 5thRegiment nter-Armees utre-MerRIAOM) and the 13th Demi-Brigade eLegionEtrangereDBLE). The 1997 cuts in force evelsfor Djibouti (from3,250 to 2,800) will neither substantiallyalter the range of forces at the34. Marcel Maymil, 'Avenir de la presence francaise a Djibouti', Bulletind'Etudes e laMarine8 aulY996), pp. 43-4. For an excellent political history of Djibouti and a critiqueof the French presence, see Ali Coubba, Djibouti:Une nationen otage L'Harmattan, Paris,1993).35. 'Le FFDj: forces franXcaisestationees a Djibouti', CID Tribune (1996), pp. 214-15.For example, in Operation Godoria in May 1991.36. 'L'armee francaise a Djibouti', Marches Tropicaux,1401 (15 December 1995),pp. 2772-3.37. 'Les forces francaises a Djibouti [FFDj]: un emplacement exceptionnel', Armeesd Aujourdhui,209 (1996), pp. 24-5.38. Troops from Djibouti did not participate directly in the Gulf War itself, remaining onstand-by due to their specialized roles, but Djibouti played a major support role in Frenchoperations throughout the war and subsequently.



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445RENCH MILITARY IN AFRICA: PAST AND PRESENTbase or diminish ts role and importance or France. In fact, changesindefence policy seem likely to empowerthe remainingFrench forces atDjibouti (as elsewhere in Africa). Understandingthis requires moredetailed considerationof the trends in the role of French conventionalforcesoutsideEurope.Theprojectionf conventionalmilitary ozverIn orderto reconcileits ambitious nternational ommitmentswith itslimited means France has focused the post-Cold War adaptationof itsconventional orces(les orces lassiques)n the exerciseof influenceoutsideEurope and the maximizationof the utility of the armed forces at itsdisposal.39 To understandthis more fillly in the Africancontext it isnecessary o lookatthe newmilitary olesofprevention and rojection. Thecentral hemeunderpinninghe emergingconceptsdefining he exerciseofFrench conventionalpower is the emphasison dealing with ireats toFrench nterestsandto regionalandinternationaltabilityby the use of thelowest level of military orcepossible. As the notion of preventionmakesclear,Franceprefers o tacklesituationsorconflictsbeforetheyescalate,onthe basis that a modicum of involvementtoday may save considerablyriskiercommitmentstomorrow.40 If this seems an oversimplified bser-vation, it is not. The dispositionto take early action is premised onknowledgeandunderstanding f thepotentiallyescalating ituationandonthe capabilityand willingnessto act promptly, f necessary n advanceofbroader nternational onsensus.These requirementsare reflected in the twin pillars of prevention:intelligence renseignement)ndthe pre-positioning f forces(prepositionne-mentde orces). France'sefforts o strengthenntelligencecapabilities avecentredon nationalresponsesfor theatreintelligenceand European-levelresponsesfor space-basedassets. The former exploits France's globalpresence, intelligence-gatheringacilities on French-controlled erritoryaround he world,and dedicatedtheatremilitary ntelligencesystems,themost importantof which are the Army'sBrlgadede Renseignementt deGuerreElectroniqueBRGE), the Navy's MINREM system (transferredfromthe Berryto the Bourganville n May 1999), and the Air Force'sSarigue-NG,AWACSand reconnaissanceaircraft.4l The AirForce sys-temcentreson the Helios satellitesystemand the WEU SpaceCentre.

39. For overviews of the new French emphasis on the projection of conventional forces seePierre Pascallon, 'L'evolution de nos forces classiques d'intervention', Revue Politique etParlementaireS, 967 (1993), pp. 47-54; L'Actionpar la Projection:un nouveauconceptau coeurdenotrepolitiquede defense,(IHEDN Report No. 48-1, Paris, 1995); Raymond Bassac et al.,'Les interventions exterieures: pourquoi? comment?', Defense 73 (1996), pp. 31-66; andPierrePascallon (ed.), Les InterventionsExterieuresde IArmee Fran,caise(Bruylant, Brussels,1 97) .40. 'La prevention, une nouvelle priorite', Armeesd'Aujourd'hui,208 (1996), p. 15.41. 'La programmation militaire 1997-2002', La 3rournelOfficielde la RepubliqueFranjcaise,3July 1996, p. 9991.



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446 AFRICAN AFFAIRSThe idea behindprepositionnements to maximize he utilityand flexibilityof French standing orces outside Europe. The professionalization f the

armed forces permits an increasingnumber of French troops on differentmissions overseas (4missionsde presence' in Africa, 'missions de paix'with the United Nations, and 'missions de souverainete' in France'soverseasterritorialpossessions, the Departementst Territoires'OutreMer(DOM-TOMs) to be rotatedsmoothlybetween operations, hus erodingthe long-standingbarriersbetween these deploymentsand pavingthe wayfor increased effectiveness. The trends in French military activity inAfrica discussed above dovetail with the increasinglyrobust rules ofengagementof French forces on UN deployments42 nd the boosting ofprojectable orces in the DOM-TOMs43and point to increasedsynergiesamong the three. These are intended to allow France to extend the kindof cross-deploymentswhich have recently been possible, for example inOperationsOryx and Turquoise.Prepositzonnements aboutmore than standing orces,however. It is alsoabout enhancingthe permanent nfrastructure f France'sglobal militarypresence (airbases, ports, logistics, communications and so forth) tofacilitate interactionsbetween French forces deployed overseas and toallow the projectionof more substantive orces, if necessary either fromFrance tself or to better supportmulti-national perations.44 To this endconsiderable resources have been directed by the 1997-2002 Loi deProgrammation ilitaire o enhance this infrastructure.45The pattern ofthis spending reveals the prioritizationof France's remaining bases inAfrica(includingDjibouti), from which it is safe to deduce an emphasis nthe future on preventionwithin the African continent, North Africa and(fromDjibouti) the Middle East. This assessment s in line with France'sstated anxietyabout threats o its interestsarising rom these quarters.If one accepts the argumentsmade above about the trends in France'smilitarypolicy in Africa,there may appear o be a contradictionbetweenthe prepositionnement emphasis on the African bases and the evident42. On the evolution of French UN peacekeeping missions and rules of engagement, seeFranSois Chauvancy, 'La doctrine militaire fransaise pour les operations de maintien de lapaix', DefenseNationale 51, 7 July 1995), pp. 144-5; Philippe Guillot, 'France, peacekeepingand humanitarian intervention', International Peacekeeping 1, 1 (1994), pp. 30-43; ThierryTardy, 'La France et l'ONU: 50 ans de relations contrastees', Regards sur l'Actualite, 215(November 1995), pp. 3-23; and Charles Zorgbibe, 'La France et le maintien de la paix:propositions', Les Cahiers de Cedsi, 21 (1998), pp. 57-64.43. Prior to the reforms only around one-third of French forces based overseas wereprofessional soldiers capable of being projected to a combat theatre. Despite the overalldecrease in the number of personnel garrisoned outside Europe, from c. 20,000 to c. 17,000,a much higher proportion (perhaps as high as 75-80 per cent) of these will be professional.France may consequently be able to boost its 'projectable' forces from the DOM-TOMs by asmuch as 65-70 per cent.44. 'L'adaptation du deploiement outre mer', CID Tribune, 11 June 1997), pp. 106-9.45. Projetde Loi Relatif a la ProgrammationMilitairepour les Annees 1997-2002 (Ministere dela Defense, Paris, 1996) . See also the dossier Restructurations e la Defense2000-2002: Dossierde l'lnformation (Ministere de la Defense/SIRPA, Paris, 1999), unpaginated.



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447RENCH MILITARY IN AFRICA: PAST AND PRESENTdenationalization nd multilateralizationf French policy in Africa. Thiscontradiction s explained n partby the appearance f UneDefenseNouvelleand the 1997-2002 Loi de Programmation ilitaire n early 1996, a yearbeforethe collapseof the Mobutu regimedealt the finalblow to traditionalFrench policy, and by divisions within the French governmentbetweentraditionalists nd modernizers. It is also explainedas France seeking torenew its relevance in Africa by using its standing presence and infra-structure to facilitate multi-nationaloperations. In this way France isassuredeithera leadingrole in international eployments n much of Africa(and the use of its SecurityCouncil veto to ensure it has a strongvoice inany UN deploymentson the continent) or, if other states or organizationsare unwilling o act, the chance to reasserta unilateral elevance.Prevention arries both advantagesand risks for France. The advan-tages flow from the better match between French capabilities and thesituationalrequirements f France acts early in an evolvingcrisis. In the1990s it repeatedlydeployedforces around he world at levels below 5,000troops, and this willingnessand ability o act in relation o low-level hreats,in most cases, enhanced French influence at relatively ittle cost (thoughobviously not in Rwanda). The risks in prevention rise from the samepredisposition o act. France may be drawn into conflicts unnecessarilybecause of the way its forces and doctrine are structured, and thepropensity to intervene risks the perception of French adventurismandneo-colonialism,the latter in particular n contexts such as Africa wherethis relationshiphas previouslyobtained. Preventionmay also underminethe French capacity to find multi-nationalresponses to crisis, becausepotentialpartnersmay balk at being bounced into action.Ishe possibility of France exercisingforce levels in Africa much above5,000 troops s in manyrespectsquestionable,because t is hardto envisagea plausible scenario in Africa which would require the deployment ofFrench forces on anything ike the scale planned for under the proyectionrubric of Une DefenseNouvelle. Projection lanning has earmarkedup to60,000 troops and commensurate heavy armour to be projected andsustainedoutside Europe,to enable Franceto avoid the degree of nationalimpotence evident in the Gulf War of 1990-91. It will be many years,however,beforethe air and sea-lifecapacity s in place to move such a forcerapidly. Indeed, in the short term some senior military taff have warnedthat the national defence reformshave weakened the French capacity toprojectsubstantial orces and that the presentsituation,at least up to 2002,may even be worse than it was in 1990-91.46 The reformshave frozen hesize of France'ssmall navaltransport leet and cut French airlift rom 95 to52 aircraft. Though some US C-130s have been purchased o improve46. Jacques Isnard quotes senior military personnel to this effect in 'L'armee de terre reduitsa force de 'projection' exterieure', Le Monde,2 October 1996.



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448 AFRICAN AFFAIRSmatters, it is telling that even before the cuts France had long-termproblems n this regardand in 1994, for example,needed to rent RussiantransportaircraE o move little more than 2,500 men into Rwanda,mainlyfrom bases alreadywithin Africa.47These problemshave led many people to conclude that, for the foresee-able future, large-scale French deployments will be possible only in aEuropean or, more likely, Euro-Atlanticcontext involving the UnitedStates. This would appear o confirm he multilateralmperative ncreas-ingly shapingFrench defence policy as nationaloptions diminish.4847. PhilippeMorillon) Militaryaspects of field operations', n BrigitteStern (ed.), UnitedNationsPeacekeeping perations: guide o French olicies United Nations UniversityPress,New York, 1998), p. 99.48. This point is developedand explored n my FrenchDefencePolicy nto the Tzventy-FirstCerztutyMacmillan/StMartin'sPress, London, 2000), pp. 181-4.

The French Military in Africa: Past and Present Author(s): Shaun Gregory Source: African Affairs,...

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