The Formation of Minority Governments in Central and Eastern Europe

Dorothea Keudel-Kaiser European University Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder), Germany

keudel@europa-uni.de

First draft – please do not quote without the author’s permission!

Paper to be presented at the 6th ECPR General Conference, Reykjavik, University of Iceland, 25th - 27th Aug. 2011

Section Comparative Political Institutions, Panel Government Formation and Survival

1

1 Introduction

About one third of all governments in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are minority gov-

ernments. It is characteristic that they do not control the majority of seats in parliament. At

first glance minority governments seem to be a counterintuitive phenomenon. Why should a

party decide to stay in opposition and forgo the benefits of government participation, but

support a government that has no majority?

Government formation processes in the CEE countries are a diverse, yet so far, widely un-

explored area of scientific research. Primarily, research into minority governments, as well as

on government formation in general, has been focussed on Western (European) countries.

Are the influencing factors that are valid for the formation of minority governments in Western

Europe such as institutional facts (e.g. investiture votes or an opposition’s influence possibili-

ties), or the policy positions of parties (ideological centrality of the largest party) applicable to

the Eastern European context? Or, do the underlying factors differ depending on the different

political background?

The aim of this paper is to illustrate the combination of conditions that lead to the formation of

minority governments in CEE by means of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). The first

part of the article is devoted to theory on government formation: Firstly, a brief overview of

government formation in general, and concerning minority governments in particular is pre-

sented, culminating with the summary of the state of the art on coalition research regarding

CEE. In the second and main part of this paper, hypotheses are derived from the fully devel-

oped coalition-research and -theory concerning minority governments in Western Europe, as

well as from close examination of the existing hypotheses and the empirical evidence of (mi-

nority) governments in CEE. After a short introduction of the cases and definitions (part 4),

the performance of the QCA is described and the results are discussed (part 5). In the con-

cluding section, the main results are summarized and further proceedings are presented.

2 Research context

2.A Research on coalition formation

Examining the formation of minority governments is part of coalition theory with a special

focus on government formation. As coalition theory has primarily focused on Western Eu-

rope, the first part of this overview refers to Western Europe, followed by an overview on the

state of the art of coalition research pertaining to CEE.

Government coalitions are one of the most studied fields in political sciences.1 Within this

field, the formation of governments has received the most attention, as compared to govern-

1 For an overview on coalition research and theory see for example Grofman and van Roozendaal 1997; Diermeier 2006 ; Müller 2004; Strøm et al. 2008.

2

ment duration and practice.2 Early coalition theory, standing in the tradition of rational choice

and cooperative game theory, aimed to predict the composition of coalition governments in

multiparty systems, in which no party wins a majority of seats (Gamson 1961; Riker 1962).

The size of the coalition and the office-seeking motivation3 of political parties and their lead-

ers, (conceived as rational, unitary actors), were seen as the determining factors of the coali-

tion building. The authors predicted “minimal-winning coalitions” as the most probable form of

coalition. That is to say, coalitions which have a majority with the minimum number of party

and seats. The addition of a surplus member would be irrational, as coalition partners would

have to share unnecessarily the advantages of holding office. The size criterion was soon

supplemented by the integration of party system characteristics and policy-seeking motiva-

tions4 of the actors: Policy proximity was introduced as an additional constraint on coalition

formation, but office seeking was still seen as the basic motivation of the actors (Leiserson

1966). The basic assumption is that parties try to form “minimum connected winning coali-

tions” with ideologically proximate partners (Axelrod 1970). However, these theories failed to

explain minority and oversized coalitions that are a quite common in Western European

countries. Therefore, policy-motivation was placed at the centre stage of coalition bargaining

and formation (for an overview see Laver and Schofield 1990:110 et seq.). First, one-

dimensional accounts of policy bargaining were prevailing (de Swaan 1973). In the tradition

of spatial voting models, authors predicted that the party controlling the central place in a

policy dimension (left-right-scale), the so-called “median legislator”, plays a crucial (“dicta-

torial”) role in the government formation process and will always get into the government.

More recent work assumed that more than one policy dimension must be considered at the

same time (Laver and Schofield 1990:119). Also the vote-seeking motivation5 of actors be-

came integrated into coalition theory (Strøm 1990; Müller and Strøm 1999), but as part of the

policy- and office-seeking motivation: Votes can be only “instrumental goals”: “Parties only

seek votes to obtain either policy influence, the spoils of office, or both.” (Müller and Strøm

1999:9).

2 While early coalition theory was concentrated on coalition formation, in the 1980s, attention shifted to the duration and the dissolution of coalitions (for example Dodd 1984; King et al. 1990; Warwick 1992). Today, it is an intensively studied field of research (for an overview see Woldendorp et al. 2000:78; Müller et al. 2008:28). The practice of coalition government is still a widely unexplored area of study, probably due to the difficulty of gathering information about the largely informal processes. But since the 1990s, there is “a greatly enhanced interest in how governance occurs once a cabinet coalition has been formed.” (Müller et al. 2008; Müller and Strøm 2000:572; see e.g. Kropp 2001). Recently, coalition researchers advocate a unified approach: The authors promote the idea that the different phases of coalition government should be regarded as an interconnected, dynamic process: the “life cycle of coalition” (Strøm et al. 2008). 3 Office-seeking party: a party that seeks to maximize the control over political office benefits (Müller and Strøm 1999). 4 Policy-seeking party: a party that seeks to maximize its impact on public policy (Müller and Strøm 1999:5). 5 A vote-seeking party: a party that seeks to maximize its electoral support (Müller and Strøm 1999:9).

3

With the neoinstitutionalist turn in political science in the 1980s, institutional variables were

integrated into coalition theory. Institutional requirements are seen as constraints that influ-

ence the bargaining process and its outcome. These requirements are, on the one hand,

rules under which cabinet formation takes place. Many authors stress the importance of in-

vestiture rules.6 Others stress the importance of recognition rules that specify which party will

be asked to be the “formateur”, that is, to form the government (e.g. Austen-Smith and Banks

1988) or analyse the influence of the head of state in the formation process (see Strøm et al.

1994:312). On the other hand, there are rules influencing the work of the cabinet when in

office that are said to have an anticipated effect on government formation, for example bi-

cameralism: In political systems with a second chamber, broadly based coalitions are said to

be more likely (Müller and Strøm 2000:569; Druckman et al. 2005; Diermeier et al. 2007).

Beyond the above-mentioned constraints, the party system is seen as a very important con-

textual factor in coalition bargaining (see e.g. Laver and Budge 1992; Müller and Strøm

2000).

2.B Coalition theory and the formation of minority governments

For a long time, minority governments were neglected by coalition theory. At first glance, the

formation of minority coalitions contradicts the office-seeking motivation of parties, as well as

the size-principle. Why should a party decide to stay in opposition but support a government

that has no majority? Minority governments are a “counter-intuitive phenomenon” (Strøm

1990:8) and were therefore seen as “anomalies” and “accidents” – despite of the fact that

about one third of coalitions in Western Europe since 1945 are minority governments

(Woldendorp et al. 2000). Suggested explanations for the emergence of minority govern-

ments ranged from deep crises (e.g. von Beyme 1970:150; Taylor and Herman 1971) and a

conflictual political culture (Luebbert 1984), to the extreme instability of the political systems,

high fragmentation and deep cleavages (for example Dodd 1976; for an overview: see Strøm

1990:9f).

Herman and Pope (1973) drew a more differentiated picture. They showed that the assump-

tion that coalitions that are formed must be winning (that is to say hold at least a majority of

seats) has to be questioned (Herman and Pope 1973:191). They demonstrated that the for-

mation of minority governments is not infrequent and specified five reasons that may lead to

the formation of minority governments.7 They particularly stressed the importance of the size

of the government: Most minority governments in Western Europe are only a small number

6 For example Strøm 1990; Bergman 1993; Strøm et al. 1994; Martin and Stevenson 2001. 7 1) Coalitions are not the normal accepted form of government; 2) there is an “immobiliste situation”, e.g. “when certain structural features inherent in the party system severely handicap the formation of majority coalition”; 3) the government is a caretaker administration, a non-political government with a limited life-span; 4) a tradition of co-operation between coalition partners collapses; 5) there is a situa-tion “in which the party forming the government is only a small number of seats short of a legislative majority.” (Herman and Pope 1973:195 et seq.).

4

of seats short of a legislative majority (Herman and Pope 1973:197et seq.). A real turn of

perception took place with Strøms pioneering work on minority governments grounded in the

rational-choice-tradition. Strøm demonstrates that minority government formation can be

understood as the consequence of rational behaviour by the relevant party leaders, evoked

by institutional incentives (Strøm 1990:23). He points to the fact that legislative and executive

coalitions need not to coincide: “Majority status is not necessarily the effective decision point

in parliamentary legislature.” (38) He poses three main arguments:

(1) In the process of government formation, parties are not only motivated by office con-

siderations, but also to a significant extent by opportunities for policy influence.

(2) The attainment of cabinet portfolios is not a necessary condition for payoff. Parties in

opposition may be able to exert policy influence in the legislative arena. This is espe-

cially true for political systems with strong committees. (41)

(3) Political leaders take the future into consideration: The more competitive the elec-

tions (“electoral decisiveness”), the higher the expected costs of holding office, the

more likely the renunciation of office (49).

Bergman (1993; Bergman 1995) complements Strøms mainly rational-choice-based assump-

tions with further institutional factors. He applies a mixture of a neo-institutionalist and a ra-

tional-choice-approach. Using the example of Sweden, he takes the importance of govern-

ment formation rules for the type of government (minority or majority governments) into con-

sideration. He distinguishes two major government formation rules, formulated in positive

and in negative terms. He points out that negative parliamentarism – where a government

only needs to be tolerated, but not formally invested in by parliament – leads to a high num-

ber of minority governments in countries with proportional systems (Bergman 1993:60;

Bergman 1995).

Apart from these studies concerning minority governments per se8, research into the for-

mation of minority governments is included in studies that deal with the general factors that

influence the type of government that will form. Variables from six different blocks are ana-

lysed: Time and space parameter, structural attributes, preferences, institutions, the bargain-

ing environment and critical events (Mitchell and Nyblade 2008:202). With regard to minority

governments, these studies confirm the importance of the mode of the investiture vote and

point to other factors increasing the likelihood of the formation of minority governments. The-

se are for example the bargaining duration, opposition influence, or the ideological position of

the largest party.9

8 Besides these two seminal studies, there is a third research project devoted exclusively to the for-mation of minority governments: Nikolenyi (2010) studies the formation of minority governments in India. 9 See e.g. Mitchell and Nyblade 2008:232; Crombez 1996; Warwick 1998; Reniu 2011. In more detail see section 3.

5

2.C Coalition theory and Central and Eastern Europe

More than 20 years after the breakdown of communism, government coalitions in CEE are

still a largely unexplored field of research: “[T]he new democracies in the CEE countries pro-

vide a huge and as yet largely untapped potential to which coalition research ought to be

extended.” (Bergman and Ersson 2009:4). Obviously, because of the different political, social

and economical context, approaches used to examine Western European coalitions cannot

easily be transferred to CEE: “Coalition behaviour in new democracies is an unexplored area

of investigation despite much rich material in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe.

Established coalition theory is relevant to such research, but it needs to adapt to special

problems found in new regimes undergoing transition and not yet consolidated.“ (Pridham

2002:75). Only recently have studies considered coalition governments in the Eastern Euro-

pean countries in a general context (Kropp et al. 2002a; Kropp 2008).10 Some authors as-

sess the factors that lead to the (in)stability of coalition governments.11 There is hardly any

study on the practice of coalition government in CEE (two of the few exceptions: Pridham

2002; Clark and Jurgeleviciute 2008). In contrast to coalition research into Western Europe,

very few studies focus on the formation of coalition governments in CEE. In the existing stud-

ies, the role of communist successor parties in coalition bargaining and formation is a central

topic. Grzymala-Busse demonstrates that “the fundamental predictor of coalition formation

continues to be the regime divide, the depth and character of the persisting conflict between

the successors of the pre-1989 Communist parties and the parties emerging from the Com-

munist-era opposition.” (Grzymala-Busse 2001:85; see also Druckman and Roberts 2007).12

Some studies discuss single factors that might explain the government formation processes,

for example presidential influence, or the influence of intra-party conflict (Nikolenyi 2003;

Ştefuriuc 2004; Protsyk 2005). In an explorative study building on previous studies of coali-

tion politics in Western Europe, Bergman and Ersson (2009) make a first attempt to elabo-

rate which factors known to be important for coalition formation processes in Western Europe

also play a crucial role in coalition formation processes in CEE.13 Their preliminary result:

10 There are a few articles that give a general overview of the context of coalition formation, stability and praxis in Eastern European countries. For the Baltic States: Tiemann and Jahn 2002; for Hungary and Poland: Dieringer 2002; for Slovakia: Pridham 2002. 11 Nikolenyi 2004; Grotz 2007; Grotz and Weber 2011. These studies are related to other work focus-ing on the (in)stability of party systems, often referring to Peter Mair’s model of party government (Mair 1997), see for example Toole 2000; Müller-Rommel 2005; see also Krupavičius 2001; Bakke and Sit-ter 2005; Tavits 2008. 12 Druckman and Roberts show that communist successor parties (CSPs) are less likely than other parties to be included in government coalitions and that coalitions that include CSPs are more likely to be oversized (Druckman and Roberts 2007:5) 13 Their dependent variables are coalition formation (government coalition or one-party government) and electoral performance of the cabinet. They use independent variables from five clusters: structure, preferences (policy distances), institutions, bargaining costs and critical events (Bergman and Ersson 2009:11).

6

The inclusion of the CEE countries implicate that “some of the institutional effects that can be

detected in Western Europe wash out” (Bergman and Ersson 2009:18).

Regarding CEE, the existence of different types of coalition governments is widely neglected

and there are no studies specifically addressing minority governments – although, just as in

Western Europe, they make up about one third of all governments.

3 Hypotheses on the formation of minority governments

In the following, the main hypotheses put forward in coalition research to explain the for-

mation of minority governments are summarized (divided in institutional factors, party system

factors and the bargaining environment) and their applicability to the Eastern European con-

text is discussed.

3.A Institutional factors

Investiture vote

There is broad consensus in coalition research that the type of investiture rule influences the

type of government that will form and that minority governments are particularly likely to form

if there are only low investiture requirements or no investiture vote at all.14 In line with this

assumption, Bergman (1993; 1995) showed that the type of government formation rule corre-

lates with the outcome of the government formation process. He distinguishes between two

major types of government formation rules: positive and negative. Positive means that a par-

ty or coalition that wants to come into office needs an explicit level of vote support: It has to

win a vote of investiture in the parliament. Negative means the absence of a positive thresh-

old: The new government “need[s] only to be tolerated by parliament.” (43) The negatively

formulated rules are, according to Bergman, associated with a high frequency of minority

governments.

All CEE countries have, according to Bergman’s definition, positively formulated formation

rules. But they differ in their precise form: While in six out of the ten CEE countries, a simple

majority of votes is sufficient, in Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia, parties or coalitions

need an absolute majority to get into office.15 That is why it seems to be appropriate to adapt

Bergman’s typology to the CEE context: In the study at hand, the countries are divided into

those where the government needs an absolute majority to get into office and those where a

simple majority is sufficient. Previous studies on the CEE countries confirm the appropriate-

ness of adapting this typology: Simple majority requirements correlate with a higher frequen-

cy of minority governments (Nikolenyi 2008; Strohmeier 2009: 270 et seq.).

14 Budge and Laver 1992a:12; Strøm 1990:78; Martin and Stevenson 2001:36; Nikolenyi 2008:18; Mitchell and Nyblade 2008:219. 15 See the constitutions of the countries and Ismayr 2010; Döring and Hönnige 2008.

7

Hyp. 1: Investiture vote (simple majority) plays a role in the formation of minority govern-

ments.

Committees

Under the presumption that parties are not only interested in office and vote, but also in poli-

cy, the scopes of influence of the opposition attract notice. Strøm (1990) could show for the

Western European countries, especially for the Scandinavian countries, that the ability of the

opposition parties to exert policy influence make the formation of minority governments more

likely (Strøm 1990:40; 71, see also Juul Christiansen and Damgaard 2008:50). Strøm em-

phasizes the influence via committees as the most important channel of influence.16

Von Steinsdorff (2011) shows for the Eastern European Countries that the degree of the op-

position’s influence is relatively equal: She classifies the potential influence of the opposition

through the committees in 9 of the 10 CEE countries as high. 17 Because of this uniformity

the formation of special types of governments cannot be traced back to the variable “influ-

ence via committees.”

Other factors

The mode of influence of other institutional factors is contested. This is true for the mode of

the constructive motion of no confidence. Some researchers claim that its existence makes

the formation of a minority government more likely: The more difficult it is to bring down the

government, the more likely the government is to stay in office even if it has no majority and

the more likely a minority government is to form (Strohmeier 2009:272 et seq.). Others argue

the other way round and state that the existence of a constructive motion of no confidence

makes the formation of minority governments less likely (see e.g. Mitchell and Nyblade

2008:219). The empirical evidence in CEE seems to disprove the assumption that there is

any link between the mode of the motion of no confidence and the type of government

formed. Of the five countries making up more than one minority government, two have a vote

of no confidence requiring an absolute majority (Bulgaria and the Czech Republic), one has a

constructive vote of no confidence (Poland) and two have a vote of no confidence requiring

only a simple majority (Latvia and Romania).

Another factor which is ascribed to favour the formation of minority government is a powerful

prime minister: When the prime minister and his party have exclusive rights, which improve

16 He names five indicators: (1) The number of standing committees (more than 10 committees stand for high oppositional influence), (2) fixed areas of specialization which (3) correspond to ministerial departments, (4) the number of committee assignments per legislator (if there are restrictions, legisla-tors are more likely to be specialists which enhances the status of the opposition), (5) committee chairs are proportionately distributed (which is to say that the government does not control all chairs). 17 The indicators introduced by Strøm are very similar to those used by Döring (1995), which von Steinsdorff (2011) applies to the Eastern European parliaments. She comes to the somewhat surpris-ing result that committees in CEE legislatives have much more autonomy and influence than commit-tees in the Western European legislatives.

8

their scope of action compared to that of the coalition partners, government participation be-

comes less attractive – the formation of minority government becomes more likely: “[T]he

more the institutional design rules advantage the party of the prime minister relative to other

coalition partners, the less appealing it should be to be a junior partner.” (Mitchell and Ny-

blade 2008:219). There are two reasons why this assumption is not applicable to the CEE

countries. First of all, two different datasets on the positions of Prime Ministers inside the

cabinet, one based on the constitutions (Woldendorp et al. 2000) and one based on minister

interviews (Blondel et al. 2007) come to the same result: There is not much variation in the

position of prime ministers in the cabinet in the CEE countries, especially compared to the

variety of the powers of prime ministers in Western Europe. Thus, the variable cannot tell us

a lot about the different frequency of formation of minority governments in the CEE countries.

Anyway, the results of the study by Blondel et al. (2007) indicate that the position of the

prime minister does not have any impact on the specific shape of the government: “There is

in effect no difference among single-party cabinets and coalition cabinets, whether of the

minority, minimum winning or surplus majority character, in terms of the proportion of strong

ministers [...].” (Blondel et al. 2007:186). So, even if there might be variety in prime ministers

power, the exclusion of the variable “prime ministers power” seems justified against this

background.

3.B Party system features

Party system characteristics are seen as crucial factors influencing the government formation

process.18 Of special importance are explanations referring to (1) the numerical dimension as

well as explanations referring to (2) the ideological dimension.

Overview: Party system characteristics influencing the government formation process

(1) Numerical dimension (2) Ideological dimension

(A) Position of a single party Seat share of the largest party

Existence of an ideologically central party (“median party”, “core party”)

(B) All parties Degree of fragmentation Distribution of ideological prefer-ences

Seat share of extremist parties

(1) Numerical dimension

(A) The formation of minority governments is said to be more likely when the seat share of

the largest party is large (near to 50%) so that this party can easily form a minority govern-

ment without being challenged by a powerful opposition (Herman and Pope 1973:197). As 18 Budge and Laver 1992b; Kropp et al. 2002b:26; Müller et al. 2008:21.

9

the seat share variable is usually combined with the ideological dimension, it is subsumed

under this point (see below).

(B) High degrees of fragmentation, referring to the number and relative strength of parlia-

mentary parties, are supposed to increase information uncertainty in the coalition formation

process and are consequently supposed to lead to deviations from the minimum winning

status. While some coalition researchers assume that high fragmentation leads to the for-

mation of undersized OR oversized coalitions (Dodd 1976:68; see also Crombez 1996:3),

more recent studies could show that high degrees of fragmentation are linked to oversized

governments as high fragmentation leads to overall bargaining uncertainty about each oth-

er’s preferences (Mitchell and Nyblade 2008:216). While low fragmentation renders the for-

mation of minimal winning coalitions more likely, a moderate degree of fragmentation is said

to enhance the likelihood of minority governments to form: Nikolenyi (2008) as well as Grotz

and Weber (Grotz 2011) show for the CEE countries that a moderate degree of fragmenta-

tion, defined as an effective number of parliamentary parties less than five (Sartori 1976)

makes the formation of minority government more likely. It is not clear how the five per cent

threshold is deduced from Sartori, or why it should be appropriate for the Eastern European

context. Also, the empirical evidence is not as straightforward as stated by the authors. As

the following table shows, a medium degree of fragmentation is equally linked to minimal

winning, minority, and surplus governments.

ENPP MW Min SP

≤ 3 8 1 2

> 3 < 5 17 8 7

≥ 5 7 3 3

Source: Compiled by the author; data: Döring and Manow 2010; Müller-Rommel et al. 2008; Popescu and Hannavy 2001. ENNP: Effective Number of Parliamentary Party (Laakso and Taagepera 1979); MW: Minimal winning; Min: Minority: SP: Surplus

Additionally, the hypothesis that high fragmentation is linked to surplus governments seems

to be rejected by the empirical evidence. As neither the theoretical nor the empirical evidence

is convincing and as the seat share variable is also included in other conditions (polarisa-

tion), fragmentation is excluded here.

(2) Ideological dimension

(A) In the tradition of spatial voting models, coalition researchers point to the strategic ad-

vantage of the party being situated in the centre of the decisive policy dimension. The main

prediction is that the party controlling the central place in the most important policy dimen-

10

sions, the so-called “median legislator” or “core party”, plays a crucial (“dictatorial”) role in the

government formation process, will always get into government and can decide to form a

government without controlling a majority of seats (Laver and Schofield 1990; Lijphart

1999:95; Warwick 1998:31). But the ideological explanation alone is not sufficient to explain

the formation of minority governments. A party might have an ideologically central position,

but still not sufficient power in terms of seat share. Therefore, the numerical and the ideologi-

cal dimension are combined: The basic hypothesis is that the greater the seat share and the

greater the ideological centrality of the largest party, the more likely minority government

formation will occur.19

Hyp. 2: The position of the biggest party (biggest party = median party) plays a role in the

formation of minority governments.

The chances that a minority government can come into office are said to get bigger the larger

the ideologically division of the opposition (polarisation).20 On the one hand, the emergence

of minority governments in ideologically divided parliamentary systems can be explained by

the fact that ideologically divided opposition parties are not able or willing to form a worth-

while replacement.21 Alternatively, it can by explained by the value of government: If the par-

liamentary parties are ideologically divided, potential majority governments would be ideolog-

ically heterogeneous, but ideologically diverse governments are expected to be less valua-

ble: “The reason that polarisation should encourage the formation of smaller government

types is that greater distances among parties augment the importance of policy costs relative

to portfolio benefits and thereby make membership in larger governments less attractive.”

(Warwick 1998:322)

Hyp. 3: A high index of polarisation plays a role in the formation of minority govern-

ments.

There is a second argument with regard to the policy positions of parties: Minority govern-

ments are said to be more likely to form the bigger the seat share of extremist parties (Sartori

1976; Laver and Schofield 1990). The basic assumption is that extremist parties are exclud-

ed from the government formation thus reducing the number of feasible coalitions (Martin

19 “If the largest party is large and centrally located, it has a favorable bargaining position. Since it is large, it is likely to keep control of the government formation process. Moreover, government policy is close to its policy position, because it is centrally located. Therefore, it does not have to offer other parties government portfolios to attract support for a government and it can form a minority govern-ment.” (Crombez 1996:16, see also Schofield 1993; Laver and Shepsle 1996; Martin and Stevenson 2001: 37; Mitchell and Nyblade 2008: 218). 20 Martin and Stevenson 2001:35, see also Warwick 1998; Mitchell and Nyblade 2008:218. 21 Warwick 1998:31; see also Budge and Laver 1992; Laver and Schofield 1990:79.

11

and Stevenson 2001:37).22 There are, however, some pitfalls with this assumption: The basic

assumption in coalition research that extremist parties are not suitable for coalitions is not

completely transferable to the Eastern European context. Extremist right-wing parties which

are seen as non-coalitional in the Western (European) countries are not seldom government

members in the CEE countries – as for example the Slovakian National Party SNS which

was not only part of the HZDS regime, but also junior partner of the social-democratic Smer-

SD (2006-2010). On the other hand, there are parties which are usually not classified as “ex-

tremist”, as the Czech communist party KSCM (at least since the late 1990s when the party

got much more moderate), whose ability to engage in coalitions is restricted. Therefore, in

the study at hand, the factor “existence of extremist parties” is replaced by the factor “exist-

ence of parties not suitable for coalitions.”

Hyp. 4: A large seat share of parties not suitable for coalitions plays a role in the for-

mation of minority governments.

3.C Bargaining environment

Inconclusive bargaining rounds

A basic assumption, also underlying some of the above described hypothesis concerning

institutional and party system factors, is that minority governments are more likely to form the

weaker the incentive of office seeking. Long formation duration and inconclusive bargaining

rounds are considered to indicate a lower value being placed on office holding (Mitchell and

Nyblade 2008:229). Indeed, the authors can show for the Western European countries that

inconclusive bargaining rounds make the formation of minority governments more likely.

However, time to formation, is not significant in explaining minority governments, but in ex-

plaining surplus governments. This result corresponds to the empirical evidence that in the

CEE countries, on average, formation of a minority government did not take more time than

that of minimal winning or surplus coalitions.23

Hyp. 5: Inconclusive bargaining plays a role in the formation of minority governments.

Electoral decisiveness

Strøm can show for the Western European countries that the formation of minority govern-

ments is more likely when elections are decisive. That is to say, when there are clear gov-

ernmental options for the voters (“identifiability of government alternatives”), when there is 22 This assumption did not remain unchallenged. Strøm (1990) could show for the Western (European) countries that “there is no tendency for minority governments to form in more polarized environments than majority coalitions.” (polarisation here: existence of extremist parties) (Strøm 1990:66; see also Bergman 1995). In the CEE countries, however, the seat share of extremist parties is often large and there is strong empirical evidence that the factor is important (Grotz and Weber 2011). 23 The average time to formation for minimal winning governments in CEE (44 days) has even been longer than the average time to formation for minority (42 days) or surplus governments (42 days).

12

significant fluctuation in the distribution of seats between the parties from election to elec-

tions (“electoral competitiveness or volatility” 24), when the government is formed by parties

that have gained rather than lost in the elections (“electoral responsiveness”), and when

governments are formed in close proximity to general elections (“proximity”) (Strøm

1990:47). When these factors are considered, the electoral consequences of government

participation are significant and therefore the value placed on government membership is

low: If elections are decisive, there is a trade-off between a party’s short term office- and pol-

icy-objectives, and its longer-term electoral incentives (Strøm 1990:44). Government incum-

bency could harm parties’ future electoral success and parties might decide to stay in opposi-

tion and to support a minority government.

To what extent are these variables transferable to the Eastern European context? Strøm

himself pointed to the fact that the scope of his explanation is limited: It is restricted to politi-

cal systems with stable party systems: “[T]he decision makers should expect to encounter

roughly the same competitors and coalition partners.” “If the future is perceived as uncertain,

unpredictable, and uncontrollable, it makes little sense to defer the gratification of holding

office.” (Strøm 1990:53) There are reasons to believe that in CEE where the party systems

are often still in flux and volatility is still comparably high (Shabad and Slomczynski 2004),

the future is at least partly perceived as uncertain and unpredictable (see e.g. Niedermayer

2008:365; Bos and Segert 2008). Volatility goes not, as in Strøm’s assumption, hand in hand

with the “identifiability of government alternatives”. Additionally, the last variable, proximity, is

not applicable to this study because only governments formed after elections are included in

the sample. Against this background, it seems appropriate to omit this set of variables.

4. Definitions and cases

The term Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is used here for the new member states of the

European Union (accession 2004/2007): Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia,

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria. Minority governments are gov-

ernments that do not control the majority in the legislature. Minority governments can be sin-

gle party-governments as well as party coalitions. In contrast to the usually used very broad

definition of the formation and duration of governments25 the project at hand includes only

governments formed after elections as there are different logics behind the formation of mi-

nority governments after elections, compared to those formed during the legislative period:

While the former are built in a regular process and under comparable conditions, the latter

24 Strøm measures volatility as the fluctuation in the distribution of seats between the parties from election to election, following Pedersen (Pedersen 1979; Strøm 1990:73). 25 Usually, the following conditions are regarded sufficient conditions for a change of government: any change of prime minister, any change of parties presented in the government, any general election, any by-election resulting in a change in the government’s parliamentary basis from majority to minority status, or vice versa. See for example Woldendorp et al. 2000, Müller-Rommel et al. 2008.

13

are caused by crisis of the precedent government. As the factors influencing the formation of

the minority governments are the subject under investigation, the two different types of gov-

ernments have to be examined separately.

The investigation period ranges from the first free elections in the early 1990s up to 2010.

Counting only post electoral governments, there are 56 governments in total (as compared to

117 governments using the broad definition): 32 minimal winning governments (MW), 12

minority governments (Min) and 12 surplus governments (SP).

Overview: post electoral governments in the CEE countries, first free elections up to 2010

Country MW Min SP Total

Bulgaria 3 2 1 6

Czech Republic 3 3 0 6

Estonia 5 0 0 5

Hungary 2 0 4 6

Latvia 2 2 2 6

Lithuania 3 1 1 5

Poland 3 2 1 6

Romania 2 2 1 5

Slovakia 5 0 1 6

Slovenia 4 0 1 5

32 12 12 56

Source: Compiled by the author; data: Döring and Manow 2010; Müller-Rommel et al. 2008; Popescu and Hannavy 2001.

5 Empirical Analysis: Method and operationalization

5.A Method

With 56 cases (12 minority governments compared to 44 other governments formed after

elections) the number of cases is intermediate. As the number of cases is too small for a

statistical analysis and too large to conduct in-depth case studies for each of the cases,

Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) (Ragin 1987) that is suitable for intermediate-n-

designs is an appropriate approach. QCA is a case-oriented approach based on Boolean

algebra. The particularity of QCA is the “concept of multiple conjunctural causation” (Rihoux

and Lobe 2009:223) which differs from conventional research approaches: Typically, re-

searchers focus on the “net effects of causal conditions” (Ragin and Sonnett 2005:180), and

“treat each causal condition as an independent cause of the outcome” (187). The strength of

the QCA method lies in working out key combinations of conditions leading to the outcome of

interest.

The QCA approach can be attributed to the “European politics tradition“ as compared to a

more quantitative, deductive approach working with a large number of variables and cases,

14

often based on game theory, which aims at testing formal theories and creating formal mod-

els.26 The quantitative, game theoretic approach is prevailing in coalition research, although it

is often criticized.27 Today, coalition researchers argue for a combination of deductive, statis-

tical large-n studies and inductive small-n studies (e.g. Bäck and Dumont 2007; Kropp

2008:531). As the QCA is a medium-n-approach, which allows for a certain degree of gener-

alization, but at the same time a case-sensitive approach devoting attention to every single

case (Rihoux and Lobe 2009), the use of QCA in coalition research can contribute to the

closure of the above described research gap. Furthermore, it contributes to the “modelling of

the interactions between the various type of explanatory variables used to understand coali-

tion formation” (Mitchell and Nyblade 2008:233), a point so far neglected in coalition re-

search.

Here, the crisp set version of QCA is used. To perform the QCA, the variables (in QCA-

terms: conditions) have to be dichotomized, where 1 stands for: condition is likely to lead to a

positive outcome (= the formation of minority governments); 0 for the opposite.

5.B Operationalization of the conditions

From the above introduced hypotheses, the following conditions can be outlined as playing a

role in the formation of minority governments: the investiture vote (simple majority), the exist-

ence of a median party which is at the same time the largest party, a high degree of polarisa-

tion, the existence of non-coalitionable parties and inconclusive bargaining rounds.

The operationalization of the condition Investiture vote is straightforward as it refers to the

constitutions. Formation rules requiring an absolute majority are coded as 0; formation rules

requiring a simple majority as 1. The next two conditions, median party and polarisation, refer

to the policy positions of the parliamentary parties. There have been a number of attempts to

locate parties in the policy space28 – expert surveys (e.g. Benoit and Laver 2006; Hooghe et

al. 2010), manifesto data (Comparative Manifesto project, Klingemann et al. 2006), and a

new approach combining expert judgements, textual analysis and the parties own judgement

(Trechsel and Mair 2009), all of which have their respective pitfalls (for a discussion of the

26 Budge and Laver 1992; de Winter et al. 2002:3; Kropp 2008:615, see also Müller et al. 2008. 27 The main criticism is that the adding of more and more variables leads to an ever-higher complexity of the formal models, while the operationalization of variables tends to be more and more crude. Some of the models are blamed for having lost touch with reality: „[R]esources would be more efficiently invested in thick descriptions, rather than in testing ever more complex formal theories with ever more sophisticated statistical techniques – a line of research that has not significantly enhanced our under-standing of real world formations during the past decade. In other words, coalition researchers should abandon their computer screens and get their hands dirty again.” (de Winter 2002:206; see also Pridham 1986:1; de Vries 1999:241). An example for a convincing “countermovement”: Andeweg et al. (2011) use case studies to overcome these shortcomings and to understand why numerous for-mation processes and outcomes diverge from theoretical predictions. 28 In coalition research, the location of parties in a common policy space has been introduced by Downs (1957) and has been further elaborated by de Swaan (1973) and Dodd (1976).

15

different approaches see Electoral Studies 26/2007; Marks 2007). As changes in party posi-

tion over time have to be considered, there is no alternative to using the manifesto data

(EMP) as the expert surveys cover only single points of time. The use of the manifesto data

in coalition research is contested as policy positions are inferred from salience measures –

still it is commonly used in coalition research (see e.g. Bergman 1995; Mitchell and Nyblade

2008). Where possible, the data are crosschecked with Expert survey data.

The median legislative party is determined by using the left-right scales provided by the EMP

data sets in conjunction with seat share data (Bergman et al. 2008:98) 29. If the median party

is at the same time the biggest party, it is coded as 1.

To measure the polarisation, that is to say the ideological spread of the parliament, the polar-

isation index as a measure “of the standard deviation of the parliamentary party system” as

introduced by Warwick (1998) resp. Dodd (1976) is used. With regard to Central and Eastern

Europe there are no robust criteria in the literature for defining whether a parliamentary party

system is highly polarized or not. Therefore, this condition was dichotomized using the medi-

an value technique (for this proceeding see Bäck and Dumont 2006:51). Thus, an index of

polarisation exceeding 10,8 is coded as 1.

As explained above, parties are classified as “non-coalitionable” if they are excluded from

coalition bargaining, given that they are extremist parties, or for other reasons. Grotz and

Weber (2011) who look at the influence of a high degree of extremist parties on government

formation introduce a threshold of 10% as a high seat share of extremist parties. They do not

give a theoretical explanation, but here, this threshold is chosen because it comes near the

median value.30 Thus, a seat share of more than 10% is coded as 1.

The measure of the last condition, inconclusive bargaining rounds, is again straightforward: If

there is an inconclusive bargaining round, it is coded as 1. The assignment is based on de-

scriptions of the government formation processes (e.g. Electoral studies; European Journal

of political research).

5.C Performance of the QCA

The first step of a QCA analysis is to create a “truth table” showing the different combination

of conditions (configurations) associated with the outcome (Rihoux and de Meur 2009:44).

There are configurations with an [1] outcome (minority government) and configurations with

29 The objection that the use of the left right dimension alone is not sufficient can be disproved in two ways: First of all, the left-right dimension is composed of a multitude of dimensions, also including cultural issues such as “traditional morality” (Klingemann et al. 2006:5; the authors refer to the left-right positions of parties as given in Laver and Budge 1992). Second, Klingemann et al can show that the Left-Right framework can indeed be used for the CEE countries “[W]e can certainly say that the analyses of this chapter do not refute the idea that voting and party competition occur primarily in a one-dimensional Left-Right space.” (Klingemann et al. 2006:27). 30 The median value is 11,9%, but there are some outliers.

16

an [0] outcome (majority governments). Besides these two types, there are contradictory

configurations [C] that lead for some cases to a “0” outcome, for others to a “1” outcome.31

There are different program that can be used to perform the QCA. Here, the program

“Tosmana” (Cronqvist 2007) is used.

Truth table including alI 56 cases and the five conditions described above (Inv: investiture vote, Med:median party; Pol: polarisation; nonc: non-coalitionable parties; Inc: inconclusive bargaining rounds). v1: Inv v2: Med v3: Pol v4: Nonc v5: Inc O: Outcome id: Fall v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 O id 0 0 0 0 0 C Bul9,Hu42,Hu43,Lat59,Slov127,Slov128 0 1 1 0 0 0 Bul12,/Hu45(Med:1)(Pol:1)/,/Lat63(Med:1)(Pol:1)/,/Lat67(Med:1)(Pol:1)/ 0 1 0 0 0 C Bul14,Bul17,Hu40,Hu41,Lat49,Lat55,Slov124 0 0 1 0 0 0 Bul15,Slov122,/Hu45(Med:0)(Pol:1)/,/Lat63(Med:0)(Pol:1)/,/Lat67(Med:0)(Pol:1)/ 0 0 1 0 1 0 Bul16 1 0 1 1 0 C CR18,Rom95 1 0 0 1 0 C CR19,Rom98 1 1 1 1 1 1 CR21,/CR25(Med:1)(Pol:1)/ 1 1 1 1 0 0 CR22,/CR28(Med:1)(Pol:1)/ 1 1 1 0 0 0 Est29,Est35,Pol88,Rom104,Slok115,/Est39(Med:1)(Pol:1)/,/Lith76(Med:1)(Pol:1)/,/Lith79(Med:1)(Pol:1)/ 1 1 0 0 0 0 Est31,Est37,Lith68,Lith71,Pol94,Rom107,Slok109,Slok114,/Est39(Med:1)(Pol:0)/,/Lith76(Med:1)(Pol:0)/,/Lith79(Med:1)(Pol:0)/ 0 0 1 1 1 0 Lat51 1 0 0 0 0 C Lith74,Pol83,Pol86,Slok113 1 0 1 0 1 1 Pol80 1 0 0 0 1 1 Pol91 1 1 0 1 0 1 Rom103 1 0 1 0 0 0 Slok117,/Est39(Med:0)(Pol:1)/,/Lith76(Med:0)(Pol:1)/,/Lith79(Med:0)(Pol:1)/ 0 0 1 1 0 0 Slov119,/Hu48(Med:0)(Pol:1)/ 1 1 0 1 1 1 /CR25(Med:1)(Pol:0)/ 1 0 0 1 1 1 /CR25(Med:0)(Pol:0)/ 1 0 1 1 1 1 /CR25(Med:0)(Pol:1)/ 0 1 0 1 0 0 /Hu48(Med:1)(Pol:0)/ 0 1 1 1 0 0 /Hu48(Med:1)(Pol:1)/ 0 0 0 1 0 0 /Hu48(Med:0)(Pol:0)/ 1 1 0 0 1 0 /Slok118(Med:1)(Pol:0)/ 1 1 1 0 1 0 /Slok118(Med:1)(Pol:1)/

It is clear that substantial modifications have to be made: From 26 possible combinations,

five configurations comprising 21 out of 56 cases are contradictory configurations. Only five

out of the 12 minority governments can be explained. Additionally, there are counterintuitive

configurations: configurations showing hardly any a [1] condition, but leading to a [1] out-

come – or the other way round (see e.g. row 9).

31 Solutions in brackets (see truth table): missing data; the program shows the different possible solu-tions.

17

Detecting contradictory configurations in the course of a QCA is “perfectly normal”; it is an

integral part of a csQCA analysis and does not mean that the researcher failed (Rihoux and

de Meur 2009:48). Addressing them is part of the iterative process of a QCA between theory

and cases (Rihoux and Lobe 2009:229). There are two strategies to solve the contradictions:

reconsidering the outcome variable or/and reconsidering the conditions.

5.D Re-codification of the outcome and the conditions

First, the outcome variable, minority governments [0] as compared to governments com-

manding a majority [1] (minimal winning or surplus governments), is reconsidered. As shown

above (part 2), in coalition theory the formation of minimal winning coalitions are seen as the

“normal” outcome of a government formation process. Indeed, they make up the biggest part

of governments in Eastern as well as in Western Europe. Further more, coalitions research-

ers could show that different factors underlie the formation of the three types of government

(minority, minimal winning, surplus) (Mitchell and Nyblade 2008). Therefore, it might be a

solution to exclude all surplus governments from the analysis and to compare minority gov-

ernments only to the “expected” outcome, minimal winning governments. The result: There

are still 4 contradictions including 16 cases (see appendix, table 2).

Another source of error could be the time factor: All governments formed from the first free

elections up to 2010 are included in the same analysis. But there might be differences due to

the different stages of consolidation of the new democratic systems: After the second legisla-

tive period (ca. 1998) that coincides with the intensified EU accession process, all the politi-

cal systems reached a certain level of consolidation. 32 Therefore, the first two regular legisla-

tive periods are now analysed separately from the following ones. The new result still in-

cludes many contradictions (see appendix, table 3 and 4). Additionally, there are too many

conditions compared to the number of cases, leading to a huge number of possible combina-

tions of conditions and a growing number of logical reminders. It might be a compromise to

exclude only the first free elections that definitively took place under special conditions not

comparable to the later elections. Indeed, the result is a little more satisfying, but there are

still two contradictions including eight cases and three counterintuitive rows (see table 5).

Maybe the definition of minority governments as governments that do not control the majority

of seats in parliament is not precise enough. There is a qualitative difference between minori-

ty governments depending on their support in the legislative arena. Minority governments

can be “formal” or “substantive”: while the former rely on negotiated, long-term binding

agreements of support with other parties, the latter have no such (long-term binding) agree-

ments (Bergman 1995:29; Strøm 1990:62). If the minority government has a legislative ma-

32 There are, however, several pitfalls with this quite schematic classification. To mention only one: The degree of consolidation differs between the countries. In Bulgaria and Romania, for example, the cut should be made later than after the two first legislative periods.

18

jority that is ensured by a contract with one or more opposition parties, we can speak of a

majority government in disguise. Out of the 12 minority governments, there are three gov-

ernments that can be classified as majority governments in disguise (Czech Republic 1998,

Poland 1991, Romania 2000) and that that are therefore re-coded as majority governments.

The re-codification of these cases does not ameliorate the result; at the contrary, the Czech

case (1998, = CR21), before perfectly fitting the hypotheses, becomes a contradictory case

(see table 6).

As the respecifications of the outcome do not help, attention has to be turned to the condi-

tions. The basic strategies here are (1) to add some conditions, (2) to remove one or more

conditions and replace them by others and/or (3) to re-examine the way in which the various

conditions are operationalized (Rihoux and de Meur 2009:48). In this case, the use of strate-

gy 1 is not advisable, as the number of conditions has to be kept moderate.33 Instead, one or

more conditions should be removed and replaced by others (2). With regard to the theoretical

explanation, the condition “median party is the biggest party” is the weakest of the five condi-

tions. The fact that the median party is at the same time the biggest party cannot tell us much

about the bargaining power of the party in the process of coalition formation. Therefore, this

condition is replaced by an index commonly used in coalition research, “bargaining power of

the biggest party”, measured in terms of the percentage of all potential winning coalitions that

the biggest party would be part of (Banzhaf-Index) (Mitchell and Nyblade 2008:216; see also

see Bergman et al 2008:96). The higher the power index, the higher the expected walk-away

value of the biggest party, the smaller the likelihood of coalitions, the greater the likelihood of

minority governments (Mitchell and Nyblade 2008:216). A power Index exceeding 33,3% is

therefore coded as 1. Again, the replacement of the condition does not ameliorate the result

(see table 7).

There seems not to be much margin in the codification of the thresholds (strategy 2) (see

section 5.B), but the operationalization of the conditions itself can be re-examined. This ap-

plies to the polarisation index (Warwick 1998 in combination with the EMP data). Tiemann

(2011) who uses another index (Dalton 2008) and other data to define the polarisation of the

CEE party systems comes to different results. But even if the data on polarisation is replaced

by those provided by Tiemann (2011), there are still two contradictory rows including seven

cases and three counterintuitive rows (see table 8).

To summarise: The use of the strategies to overcome the contradictions failed.

5.E Interpretation and handling of the results

33 The number of possible configurations increases exponentially with the number of conditions – the number of logical remainders will grow (“limited diversity”) and results will become very complex (Schneider and Wagemann 2007:22).

19

The question now is what to conclude from the data? The answer from two QCA-experts:

Either turn to other techniques (which in this case is difficult to realize34), or, when you used

csQCA for theory testing: “stop there and happily conclude that csQCA has allowed you to

falsify theory.” (Rihoux and de Meur 2009:50). Indeed, it seems to be quite obvious that the

conditions derived from theory regarding Western Europe, even if they are adjusted to the

Eastern European context, can not explain the formation of minority governments in CEE. Of

course this is an important result. But to “happily conclude” that the QCA has rejected the

hypotheses is not enough. To find out what really influences the formation of minority gov-

ernments in CEE in-depth case studies should be carried out. But note not all the conditions

used in the QCA should be rejected. At least two of the conditions, inconclusive bargaining

rounds and the mode of investiture, are indeed influential factors, as the empirical evidence

as well as the result of the QCA analysis show.35 A closer look at the cases reveals that there

are especially two additional factors that are influential in CEE: The personal relationship

between politicians and, often related, the (informal) role of the president in the coalition for-

mation process. In the following, a very brief insight is given in two cases that are particularly

revealing with regard to these two factors: Latvia 1998 and Poland 2005.

In the 1998 Latvian elections, the Social Democrats attained strong grows in support, but still

the conservative and the liberal parties gained most votes (The People’s Party: 24 seats;

Latvian Way: 21 seats; FFF/LNNK: 17 seats). The latter parties had “much in common in

broad policy terms” and were therefore seen as natural coalition partners (Davies and Ozo-

lins 2001:137). The People’s party, however, was excluded from coalition bargaining due to

personal antipathy between the leader of the People’s Party (Skele), and the leader of Latvi-

an Way (Kristopans) (Davies and Ozolins 2001:140). As additionally Skele ruled out any co-

operation with the Socialdemocrats, the range of possible coalitions became very small. As a

consequence, President Ulmanis authorised Kristopans to form the government, even

though he was not the leader of the biggest party. In the end, Kristopan formed a minority

government with FFF/LNNK and the New Party (Schmidt 2010:143). This example shows

that personal antipathies between political leaders play an important role and that the presi-

dents sometimes have a bigger range within which to manoeuvre, than is written in the con-

stitution or foreseen by unwritten rules.

34 The use of fsQCA instead of csQCA will be tested, but it is not very promising, as a huge part of the conditions has coded in a dichotomous way anyway. As described above, the number of cases is too small to conduct a purely quantitative analysis, but to big to conduct in-depth case studies for every case. Nevertheless, the best solution is to use a more qualitative approach/case studies, see in more detail part 5.E. 35 These two conditions appear in almost every solution. Of course, these findings have to be used under reserve as the results do not meet the QCA-guidelines (contradictions). In the Czech Republic, the country exhibiting most minority governments, a simple minority is suffi-cient. In the 1998 as well as in the 2002 government formation processes there have been a number of inconclusive bargaining rounds before, finally, a minority government was formed.

20

The 2005 Polish elections exhibit a particularity: The conservative PiS (J. Kascynski) and the

liberal-democratic PO (Tusk), both rooted in the Solidarity movement of the 1980s, had a

longstanding coalition commitment (Millard 2007). The polish population as well as the com-

mentators took the formation of the coalition PiS-PO that together had slightly over 50% of

the seats granted (Szczerbiak 2006:36). But in the end, PiS formed a minority government,

supported by the League of Polish Families and the Self-defence. This result can mainly be

explained by the political circumstances: the dynamics of the presidential elections that took

place at the same time interfered with the government formation process (Jasiewicz and

Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz 2006:1243; see also Szczerbiak 2006). The “growing viciousness of

the presidential campaign, in particular the Tusk’s grandfather issue” (Jasiewicz and

Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz 2006:1243)36 is probably the most important part of the explanation

why Tusk finally denied government participation and Kaczynski formed a minority govern-

ment. This second example also shows that personality factors play an important role.

6 Conclusion and outlook

The paper has presented that coalition formation processes, in particular the formation of

minority governments in CEE, are a diverse and up to now, poorly studied topic in coalition

theory. The failure of the QCA shows that the hypotheses and theories formulated with re-

gard to Western Europe cannot be one-to-one transferred to the Eastern European context.

The hypothesis often formulated in the literature that the political systems of Eastern and

Western Europe are in a process of assimilation has to be questioned. While some condi-

tions that have proven valid for the formation of minority governments in Western Europe

also seem indeed to play a role also in government formation processes in CEE (as e.g. the

type of investiture vote), there are obviously some conditions typical for the Eastern Europe-

an context, for example personality factors and the informal influence of the presidents. The-

se finding mirror general findings in research into party systems and political systems in

CEE. Personality factors, which are very difficult to measure, also play a role in government

formation processes in Western Europe. However, there are obviously more absorbed by the

much greater importance of party affiliations. Policy positions and policy proximity seems to

be much more important in Western than in Eastern Europe. To determine what really influ-

ences the formation of minority governments in CEE, in-depth case studies have to be con-

ducted. The results can than be re-fed in a QCA-analysis.

36 The manager of Kaczynski’s campaign stated that Tusk’s grandfather had served in the German Army (Wehrmacht) (Jasiewicz and Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz 2006:1242).

21

7 References Andeweg, Rudy B., Lieven de Winter, and Patrick Dumont, eds. (2011). Puzzles of Government

Formation. Coalition Theory and Deviant Cases. Abingdon; New York: Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Science.

Austen-Smith, David, and Jeffrey Banks (1988). ‘Elections, Coalitions and Legislative Outcome’, American Political Science Review, 82:2, 405–22.

Axelrod, Robert (1970). Conflict of Interest. Chicago, IL: Markham. Bäck, Hanna, and Patrick Dumont (2006). ‘Why so few, and why so late? Green parties and the

question of governmental participation’, European Journal of Political Research, 45:1, 35–67. Bäck, Hanna, and Patrick Dumont (2007). ‘Combining large-n and small-n strategies: The way forward

in coalition research’, West European Politics, 30:3, 467–501. Bakke, Elisabeth, and Nick Sitter (2005). ‘Patterns of Stability. Party Competition and Strategy in

Central Europe since 1989’, Party Politics, 11:2, 243–63. Benoit, Kenneth, and Michael J. Laver (2006). Party Policy in Modern Democracies. London; New

York: Routledge. Bergman, Torbjörn (1993). ‘Formation rules and minority governments’, European Journal of Political

Research, 23:1, 55–66. Bergman, Torbjörn (1995). Constitutional Rules and Party Goals in Coalition Formation. An Analysis of

Winning Minority Governments in Sweden. Umea: Umea University Printing Office. Bergman, Torbjörn, and Svante Ersson (2009). ‘Coalition Politics and Institutions: Bringing in Central

and Eastern Europe’. Paper prepared for workshop No. 8 "Party Government and Parliamentary Democracy in the new Europe", ECPR Joint Sessions, Lisbon, April 14-19. 2009.

Bergman, Torbjörn, Elisabeth R. Gerber, Scott Kastner, and Benjamin Nyblade (2008). ‘The Empirical Study of Cabinet Governance’, in: Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller and Torbjörn Bergman (eds.), Cabinet and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 85–122.

Beyme, Klaus von (1970). Die parlamentarischen Regierungssysteme in Europa. München: Piper. Blondel, Jean, Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, and Darina Malova (2007). Governing New European

Democracies. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Bos, Ellen, and Dieter Segert, eds. (2008). Osteuropäische Demokratien als Trendsetter? Parteien

und Parteiensysteme nach dem Ende des Übergangsjahrzehnts. Opladen, Farmington Hills: Verlag Barbara Budrich.

Budge, Ian, and Michael J. Laver (1992a). ‘Coalition Theory, Government Policy and Party Policy’, in: Michael J. Laver and Ian Budge (eds.), Party Policy and Government Coalitions. New York: St. Martins Press, 1–14.

Budge, Ian, and Michael J. Laver (1992b). ‘The Relationship Between Party and Coalition Policy in Europe: An Empirical Synthesis’, in: Michael J. Laver and Ian Budge (eds.), Party Policy and Government Coalitions. New York: St. Martins Press, 409–30.

Crombez, Christophe (1996). ‘Minority governments, minimal winning coalitions and surplus majorities in parliamentary systems’, European Journal of Political Research, 29:1, 1–29.

Cronqvist, Lasse (2007). Tosmana. Tool for SMAll-N Analysis. Marburg. Dalton, Russell J. (2008). ‘The Quantity and Quality of Party Systems’, Comparative Political Studies,

41:7. Davies, Philipp, and Andrejs V. Ozolins (2001). ‘The parliamentary elections in Latvia 1998’,

Electoral Studies, 20, 135–41. Dieringer, Jürgen (2002). ‘Koalitionen in Ungarn und Polen: Mehr Eliten- als Parteienkonkurrenz?’, in:

Sabine Kropp, Suzanne S. Schüttemeyer and Roland Sturm (eds.), Koalitionen in West- und Osteuropa. Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 249–70.

Diermeier, Daniel (2006). ‘Coalition Government’, in: Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman (eds.), Political Economy. The Oxford Handbooks of Political Science. New York: Oxford University Press, 162–70.

Diermeier, Daniel, Hülya Eraslan, and Antonio Merlo (2007). ‘Bicameralism and Government Formation’, Quarterl Journal of Political Science, 2, 227–52.

Dodd, Lawrence D. (1976). Coalitions in Parliamentary Governments. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Dodd, Lawrence D. (1984). ‘The Study of Cabinet Durability: Introduction and Commentary’, Comparative Political Studies, 17:2, 155–62.

Döring, Herbert, ed. (1995). Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. New York: St. Martins

22

Press. Döring, Herbert, and Christoph Hönnige (2008). ‘Parlament, Regierung, Staatsoberhaupt’, in: Oscar

W. Gabriel and Sabine Kropp (eds.), Die EU-Staaten im Vergleich. Strukturen, Prozesse, Politikinhalte. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 451–81.

Döring, Holger, and Philip Manow (2010). ‘Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies.’. www.parlgov.org.

Downs, Anthony (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper. Druckman, James N., and Andrew Roberts (2007). ‘Communist Successor Parties And Coalition

Formation In Eastern Eruope’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 32:1, 5–31. Druckman, James N., Lanny W. Martin, and Michael F. Thies (2005). ‘Influence without Confidence:

Upper Chambers and Government Formation’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 30:4, 529–48. Gamson, William A. (1961). ‘A theory of coalition formation’, American Sociological Review, 26:3,

373–82. Grofman, Bernard, and Peter van Roozendaal (1997). ‘Review Article: Modelling Cabinet Durability

and Termination 3/27, 419-451’, British Journal of Political Science, 27:3, 419–51. Grotz, Florian (2007). ‘Stabile Regierungsbündnisse? Determinanten der Koalitionspolitik in

Ostmitteleuropa’, Osteuropa, 57:4, 109–22. Grotz, Florian (2011). Regierungssysteme in Mittel- und Osteuropa. Die neuen EU-Staaten im

Vergleich. Wiesbaden: VS Verl. für Sozialwissenschaften. Grotz, Florian, and Till Weber (2011). ‘Regierungskoalitionen: Bildung und Dauerhaftigkeit’, in: Florian

Grotz and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (eds.), Regierungssysteme in Mittel- und Osteuropa. Die neuen EU-Staaten im Vergleich: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 11–26.

Grzymala-Busse, Anna (2001). ‘Coalition Formation and Regime Divide in New Democracies: East Central Europe’, Comparative Politics, 34:1, 85–104.

Herman, Valentine, and Jone Pope (1973). ‘Minority Governments in Western Democracies’, British Journal of Political Science, 3:2, 191–212.

Hooghe, Liesbet, Ryan Bakker, Anna Brigevich, Catherine de Vries, Erika Edwards, Gary Marks, Jan Rowny, and Marco Steenbergen (2010). ‘Reliability and Validity of Measuring Party Positions: The Chapel Hill Expert Surveys of 2002 and 2006’, European Journal of Political Research, 4, 684–703.

Ismayr, Wolfgang (2010). ‘Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas im Vergleich’, in: Wolfgang Ismayr (ed.), Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas., 3., aktualisierte und erweiterte Auflage. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 9–78.

Jasiewicz, Krzysztof, and Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz (2006). ‘Poland’, European Journal of Political Research, 45, 1231–46.

Juul Christiansen, Flemming, and Erik Damgaard (2008). ‘Parliamentary Opposition under Minority Parliamentarism: Scandinavia’, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 14:1, 46–76.

King, Gary, James E. Alt, Nancy E. Burns, and Michael J. Laver (1990). ‘A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies’, American Journal of Political Science, 34:3, 846–71.

Klingemann, Hans- Dieter, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, Ian Budge, and Michael McDonald (2006). Mapping Policy Preferences II. Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in Eastern Europe, the European Union and the OECD, 1990-2003. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kropp, Sabine (2001). Regieren in Koalitionen. Handlungsmuster und Entscheidungsbildung in deutschen Länderregierungen. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.

Kropp, Sabine (2008). ‘Koalitionsregierungen’, in: Oscar W. Gabriel and Sabine Kropp (eds.), Die EU-Staaten im Vergleich. Strukturen, Prozesse, Politikinhalte. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 514–49.

Kropp, Sabine, Suzanne S. Schüttemeyer, and Roland Sturm, eds. (2002a). Koalitionen in West- und Osteuropa. Opladen: Leske und Budrich.

Kropp, Sabine, Suzanne S. Schüttemeyer, and Roland Sturm (2002b). ‘Koalitionen in West- und Osteuropa. Theoretische Überlegungen und Systematisierung des Vergleichs’, in: Sabine Kropp, Suzanne S. Schüttemeyer and Roland Sturm (eds.), Koalitionen in West- und Osteuropa. Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 7–41.

Krupavičius, Algis (2001). ‘Party Systems in Central East Europe: Dimensions of System Stability’, in: Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Raivo Vetik (eds.), Perspectives on Democratic Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe. New York: Columbia University Press, 141–64.

Laakso, Markku, and Rein Taagepera (1979). ‘The Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe’, Comparative Political Studies, 12:1, 3–27.

Laver, Michael J., and Ian Budge, eds. (1992). Party Policy and Government Coalitions. New York: St. Martins Press.

Laver, Michael J., and Norman Schofield (1990). Multiparty Government. The Politics of Coalition in Europe. New York: Oxford University Press.

Laver, Michael J., and Kenneth A. Shepsle (1996). Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and

23

Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Leiserson, Michael (1966). Coalitions in Politics. Yale University: PhD thesis. Lijphart, Arend (1999). Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six

Countries. New Haven; London: Yale University Press. Luebbert, Gregory M. (1984). ‘A theory of government formation’, Comparative Political Studies, 17,

229–64. Mair, Peter (1997). Party System Change. Approaches and Interpretations. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Marks, Gary (2007). ‘Editorial. Introduction: Triangulation and the square-root law’, Electoral Studies,

26, 1–10. Martin, Lanny W., and Randolph T. Stevenson (2001). ‘Government Formation in

Parliamentary Democracies’, American Journal of Political Science, 45:1, 33–50. Millard, Frances (2007). ‘The 2005 parliamentary and presidential elections in Poland’,

Electoral Studies, 26, 196–231. Mitchell, Paul, and Benjamin Nyblade (2008). ‘Government Formation and Cabinet Type’, in: Kaare

Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller and Torbjörn Bergman (eds.), Cabinet and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 201–35.

Müller, Wolfgang C. (2004). ‘Koalitionstheorien’, in: Ludger Helms and Uwe Jun (eds.), Politische Theorie und vergleichende Regierungslehre. Eine Einführung in die politikwissenschaftliche Institutionenforschung. Frankfurt a.M., New York: Campus Verlag, 267–301.

Müller, Wolfgang C., Torbjörn Bergman, and Kaare Strøm (2008). ‘Coalition Theory and Cabinet Governance: An Introduction’, in: Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller and Torbjörn Bergman (eds.), Cabinet and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–50.

Müller, Wolfgang C., and Kaare Strøm (1999). Policy, Office or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Choices. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Müller, Wolfgang C., and Kaare Strøm, eds. (2000). Coalition Governments in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand (2005). ‘Parteienwettbewerb in mittelosteuropäischen Demokratien: Zum Zusammenhang von Strukturen der Regierungsbildung und Stabilität von Parteisystemen’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen, 36:3, 666–79.

Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand, Henrike Schultze, Philipp Harfst, and Katja Fettelschoss (2008). ‘Parteienregierungen in Mittel- und Osteuropa: Empirische Befunde im Ländervergleich 1990 bis 2008’, 4, 810–31.

Niedermayer, Oskar (2008). ‘Parteiensysteme’, in: Oscar W. Gabriel and Sabine Kropp (eds.), Die EU-Staaten im Vergleich. Strukturen, Prozesse, Politikinhalte. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 351–88.

Nikolenyi, Csaba (2003). ‘Coordination problem and grand coalition: the puzzle of the government formation game in the Czech Republic, 1998’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 36:3, 325–44.

Nikolenyi, Csaba (2004). ‘Cabinet Stability in Post-Communist Central Europe’, Party Politics, 10:2, 123–50.

Nikolenyi, Csaba (2008?). ‘Learning to Win: Parties, Parliaments and Minority Governments in Post-Communist Democracies’. http://plutomail.huji.ac.il/~miodownik/seminar/Nikolenyi_paper.pdf

Nikolenyi, Csaba (2010). Minority governments in India : the puzzle of elusive majorities. London: Routledge.

Pedersen, Mogens N. (1979). ‘The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility’, European Journal of Political Research, 7, 1–26.

Popescu, Marina, and Martin Hannavy (2001). ‘Project on Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe.’. http://www.essex.ac.uk/elections/.

Pridham, Geoffrey (1986). ‘An inductive theoretical framework for coalitional behaviour: political parties in multi-dimensional perspective in Western Europe’, in: Geoffrey Pridham (ed.), Coalitional behaviour in theory and praxis: an inductive model for Western Europe Cambridge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1–31.

Pridham, Geoffrey (2002). ‘Coalition Behaviour in New Democracies of Central and Eastern Europe: The Case of Slovakia’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 18:2, 75–102.

Protsyk, Oleh (2005). ‘Prime ministers’ identity in semi-presidential regimes: Constitutional norms and cabinet formation outcomes’, European Journal of Political Research, 44:5, 721–48.

Ragin, Charles C. (1987). The Comparative Method. Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies. Berkeley/ Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Ragin, Charles C., and John Sonnett (2005). ‘Between Complexity and Parsimony: Limited Diversity, Counterfactual Cases, and Comparative Analysis’, in: Sabine Kropp and Michael Minkenberg (eds.), Vergleichen in der Politikwissenschaft. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 180–97.

Reniu, Josep M. (2011). ‘"Spain is different": explaining minority governments by different party goals’,

24

in: Rudy B. Andeweg, Lieven de Winter and Patrick Dumont (eds.), Puzzles of Government Formation. Coalition Theory and Deviant Cases. Abingdon; New York: Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Science, 112–28.

Rihoux, Benoit, and Bojana Lobe (2009). ‘The Case for Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA): Adding Leverage for Thick Cross-Case Comparison’, in: David Byrne and Charles C. Ragin (eds.), Handbook of Case Based Methods. Thousand Oaks/London: Sage, 222–42.

Rihoux, Benoit, and Gisèle de Meur (2009). ‘Crisp-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA)’, in: Benoit Rihoux and Charles C. Ragin (eds.), Configurational Comparative Methods. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 33–68.

Riker, William (1962). The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press. Sartori, Giovanni (1976). Parties and Party Systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schmidt, Thomas (2010). ‘Das politische System Lettlands’, in: Wolfgang Ismayr (ed.), Die

politischen Systeme Osteuropas., 3., aktualisierte und erweiterte Auflage. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 123–70.

Schneider, Carsten Q., and Claudius Wagemann (2007). Qualitative Comparative Analysis and Fuzzy Sets. Ein Lehrbuch für Anwender und jene, die es werden wollen. Opladen, Farmington Hills: Verlag Barbara Budrich.

Schofield, Norman (1993). ‘Political competition and multiparty coalition governments’, European Journal of Political Research, 23:1, 1–33.

Shabad, Goldie, and Kazimierz M. Slomczynski (2004). ‘Inter-party mobility among parliamentary candidates in post-communist east central europe’, Party Politics, 10:2, 151–76.

Ştefuriuc, Irina (2004). ‘Towards a framework for analysis of Central and Eastern Europe coalition governments: The nexus between intra-party conflict and inter-party dynamics. Paper prepared for presentation at the ECPR Joint Session Workshop, Uppsala, 13-18 April.’.

Steinsdorff, Silvia von (2011). ‘Parlamente: Binnenorganisation im Spannungsfeld von Inklusion und Effizienz’, in: Florian Grotz and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (eds.), Regierungssysteme in Mittel- und Osteuropa. Die neuen EU-Staaten im Vergleich: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 171–93.

Strohmeier, Gerd (2009). ‘Minderheitsregierungen in Deutschland auf Bundesebene - Krise oder Chance? Ergebnisse eines internationalen Vergleichs’, Zeitschrift für Politik, 56:3, 260–83.

Strøm, Kaare (1990). Minority Government and Majority Rule. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Strøm, Kaare, Ian Budge, and Michael J. Laver (1994). ‘Constraints on Cabinet Formation in Parliamentary Democracies’, American Journal of Political Science, 38:2, 303–35.

Strøm, Kaare, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman, eds. (2008). Cabinet and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Swaan, Abram de (1973). Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations. Amsterdam: Elsevier Scientific Publishers.

Szczerbiak (2006). ‘‘Social Poland’ Defeats ‘Liberal Poland’?: The September-October 2005 Polish Parliamentary and Presidential Elections’, SEI Working Paper:86.

Tavits, Margit (2008). ‘On the linkage between electoral volatility and party system instability in Central and Eastern Europe’, European Journal of Political Research, 47:5, 537–55.

Taylor, Michael, and Valentine Herman (1971). ‘Party systems and government stability’, American Political Science Review, 65:1, 28–37.

Tiemann, Guido (2011). ‘Parteiensysteme: Interaktionsmuster und Konsolidierungsgrad’, in: Florian Grotz and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (eds.), Regierungssysteme in Mittel- und Osteuropa. Die neuen EU-Staaten im Vergleich: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 127–46.

Tiemann, Guido, and Detlef Jahn (2002). ‘Koalitionen in den baltischen Staaten: Lehrstücke für die Bedeutung funktionierender Parteien’, in: Sabine Kropp, Suzanne S. Schüttemeyer and Roland Sturm (eds.), Koalitionen in West- und Osteuropa. Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 271–300.

Toole, James (2000). ‘Government Formation and Party System Stabilization in East Central Europe’, Party Politics, 6:4, 441–61.

Trechsel, Alexander H., and Peter Mair (2009). ‘When parties (also) position themselves: an introduction to the EU profiler’, EUI Working Papers, 65.

Vries, Miranda de (1999). Governing with your closest neighbour: an assessment of spatial coalition formation theories. PhD Dissertation. University of Nijmegen.

Warwick, Paul V. (1998). ‘Policy Distance and Parliamentary Government’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 23:3.

Warwick, Paul (1992). ‘Ideological Diversity and Government Survival in Western Democracies’, Comparative Political Studies, 25:3, 332–61.

Winter, Lieven de (2002). ‘Parties and Government Formation, Portfolio Allocation, and Policy Definition’, in: Kurt R. Luther and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (eds.), Political Parties in the New Europe. Political and Analytical Challenges. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 171–206.

25

Winter, Lieven de, Rudy B. Andeweg, and Patrick Dumont (2002). ‘The State of the Art in Coalition Research: Critical Appraisals and Alternative Avenues. Position Paper for the workshop "Government Formation: a theoretically informed inductive approach directed by L. de Winter and R.B. Andeweg during the Joint Sessions of the European Consortium for Political Research, Torino, March 22-28.’.

Woldendorp, Jan, Hand Keman, and Ian Budge, eds. (2000). Party government in 48 democracies (1945-1998). Composition - Duration - Personnel. Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

26

Appendixes: Truth tables, created with Tosmana 1.3.2 (Cronquist 2007) Table 1: Basic truth table including alI 56 cases and five conditions

Inv: investiture vote, Med:median party; Pol: polarisation; nonc: non-coalitionable parties; Inc: inconclusive bargaining rounds

v1: Inv v2: Med v3: Pol v4: Nonc v5: Inc O: Outcome id: Fall v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 O id 0 0 0 0 0 C Bul9,Hu42,Hu43,Lat59,Slov127,Slov128 0 1 1 0 0 0 Bul12,/Hu45(Med:1)(Pol:1)/,/Lat63(Med:1)(Pol:1)/,/Lat67(Med:1)(Pol:1)/ 0 1 0 0 0 C Bul14,Bul17,Hu40,Hu41,Lat49,Lat55,Slov124 0 0 1 0 0 0 Bul15,Slov122,/Hu45(Med:0)(Pol:1)/,/Lat63(Med:0)(Pol:1)/,/Lat67(Med:0)(Pol:1)/ 0 0 1 0 1 0 Bul16 1 0 1 1 0 C CR18,Rom95 1 0 0 1 0 C CR19,Rom98 1 1 1 1 1 1 CR21,/CR25(Med:1)(Pol:1)/ 1 1 1 1 0 0 CR22,/CR28(Med:1)(Pol:1)/ 1 1 1 0 0 0 Est29,Est35,Pol88,Rom104,Slok115,/Est39(Med:1)(Pol:1)/,/Lith76(Med:1)(Pol:1)/,/Lith79(Med:1)(Pol:1)/ 1 1 0 0 0 0 Est31,Est37,Lith68,Lith71,Pol94,Rom107,Slok109,Slok114,/Est39(Med:1)(Pol:0)/,/Lith76(Med:1)(Pol:0)/,/Lith79(Med:1)(Pol:0)/ 0 0 1 1 1 0 Lat51 1 0 0 0 0 C Lith74,Pol83,Pol86,Slok113 1 0 1 0 1 1 Pol80 1 0 0 0 1 1 Pol91 1 1 0 1 0 1 Rom103 1 0 1 0 0 0 Slok117,/Est39(Med:0)(Pol:1)/,/Lith76(Med:0)(Pol:1)/,/Lith79(Med:0)(Pol:1)/ 0 0 1 1 0 0 Slov119,/Hu48(Med:0)(Pol:1)/ 1 1 0 1 1 1 /CR25(Med:1)(Pol:0)/ 1 0 0 1 1 1 /CR25(Med:0)(Pol:0)/ 1 0 1 1 1 1 /CR25(Med:0)(Pol:1)/ 0 1 0 1 0 0 /Hu48(Med:1)(Pol:0)/ 0 1 1 1 0 0 /Hu48(Med:1)(Pol:1)/ 0 0 0 1 0 0 /Hu48(Med:0)(Pol:0)/ 1 1 0 0 1 0 /Slok118(Med:1)(Pol:0)/ 1 1 1 0 1 0 /Slok118(Med:1)(Pol:1)/

27

Table 2: Truth table without surplus governments

v1: inv v2: med v3: pol v4: nonc v5: inc O: outcome id: fall v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 O id 0 0 0 0 0 C Bul9,Hu43,Lat59,Slov127,Slov128 0 1 1 0 0 0 Bul12,/Hu45(med:1)(pol:1)/,/Lat67(med:1)(pol:1)/ 0 1 0 0 0 C Bul14,Bul17,Lat49,Lat55,Slov124 0 0 1 0 1 0 Bul16 1 0 1 1 0 C CR18,Rom95 1 0 0 1 0 1 CR19 1 1 1 1 1 1 CR21,/CR25(med:1)(pol:1)/ 1 1 1 1 0 0 CR22,/CR28(med:1)(pol:1)/ 1 1 1 0 0 0 Est29,Est35,Rom104,Slok115,/Est39(med:1)(pol:1)/,/Lith76(med:1)(pol:1)/,/Lith79(med:1)(pol:1)/ 1 1 0 0 0 0 Est31,Est37,Lith68,Pol94,Rom107,Slok109,/Est39(med:1)(pol:0)/,/Lith76(med:1)(pol:0)/,/Lith79(med:1)(pol:0)/ 1 0 0 0 0 C Lith74,Pol83,Pol86,Slok113 1 0 1 0 1 1 Pol80 1 0 0 0 1 1 Pol91 1 1 0 1 0 1 Rom103 1 0 1 0 0 0 Slok117,/Est39(med:0)(pol:1)/,/Lith76(med:0)(pol:1)/,/Lith79(med:0)(pol:1)/ 0 0 1 0 0 0 Slov122,/Hu45(med:0)(pol:1)/,/Lat67(med:0)(pol:1)/ 1 1 0 1 1 1 /CR25(med:1)(pol:0)/ 1 0 0 1 1 1 /CR25(med:0)(pol:0)/ 1 0 1 1 1 1 /CR25(med:0)(pol:1)/ 1 1 0 0 1 0 /Slok118(med:1)(pol:0)/ 1 1 1 0 1 0 /Slok118(med:1)(pol:1)/

Table 3: Truth table without surplus governments; only the first two legislative periods

v1: inv v2: med v3: pol v4: nonc v5: inc O: outcome id: fall v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 O id 0 0 0 0 0 1 Bul9 0 1 1 0 0 0 Bul12 1 0 1 1 0 C CR18,Rom95 1 0 0 1 0 1 CR19 1 1 1 1 1 1 CR21 1 1 1 0 0 0 Est29 1 1 0 0 0 0 Est31,Lith68,Slok109 0 1 0 0 0 1 Lat49 1 0 1 0 1 1 Pol80 1 0 0 0 0 0 Pol83,Slok113 0 0 1 0 0 0 Slov122

28

Table 4: Truth table without surplus governments; without the first two legislative peri-ods

v1: inv v2: med v3: pol v4: nonc v5: inc O: outcome id: fall v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 O id 0 1 0 0 0 C Bul14,Bul17,Lat55,Slov124 0 0 1 0 1 0 Bul16 1 1 1 1 1 1 CR21,/CR25(med:1)(pol:1)/ 1 1 1 1 0 0 CR22,/CR28(med:1)(pol:1)/ 1 1 1 0 0 0 Est35,Rom104,Slok115,/Est39(med:1)(pol:1)/,/Lith76(med:1)(pol:1)/,/Lith79(med:1)(pol:1)/ 1 1 0 0 0 0 Est37,Pol94,Rom107,/Est39(med:1)(pol:0)/,/Lith76(med:1)(pol:0)/,/Lith79(med:1)(pol:0)/ 0 0 0 0 0 0 Hu43,Lat59,Slov127,Slov128,/Hu45(med:0)(pol:0)/,/Lat67(med:0)(pol:0)/ 1 0 0 0 0 C Lith74,Pol86 1 0 0 0 1 1 Pol91 1 1 0 1 0 1 Rom103 1 0 1 0 0 0 Slok117,/Est39(med:0)(pol:1)/,/Lith76(med:0)(pol:1)/,/Lith79(med:0)(pol:1)/ 1 1 0 1 1 1 /CR25(med:1)(pol:0)/ 1 0 0 1 1 1 /CR25(med:0)(pol:0)/ 1 0 1 1 1 1 /CR25(med:0)(pol:1)/ 1 0 0 1 0 0 /CR28(med:0)(pol:0)/ 1 0 1 1 0 0 /CR28(med:0)(pol:1)/ 0 1 1 0 0 0 /Hu45(med:1)(pol:1)/,/Lat67(med:1)(pol:1)/ 0 0 1 0 0 0 /Hu45(med:0)(pol:1)/,/Lat67(med:0)(pol:1)/ 1 1 0 0 1 0 /Slok118(med:1)(pol:0)/ 1 1 1 0 1 0 /Slok118(med:1)(pol:1)/ 1 0 1 0 1 0 /Slok118(med:0)(pol:1)/ Created with Tosmana Version 1.3.2 Table 5: Truth table without surplus governments; without the first free elections v1: inv v2: med v3: pol v4: nonc v5: inc O: outcome id: fall v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 O id 0 1 1 0 0 0 Bul12,/Hu45(med:1)(pol:1)/,/Lat67(med:1)(pol:1)/ 0 1 0 0 0 C Bul14,Bul17,Lat55,Slov124 0 0 1 0 1 0 Bul16 1 0 0 1 0 1 CR19 1 1 1 1 1 1 CR21,/CR25(med:1)(pol:1)/ 1 1 1 1 0 0 CR22,/CR28(med:1)(pol:1)/ 1 1 0 0 0 0 Est31,Est37,Lith68,Pol94,Rom107,/Est39(med:1)(pol:0)/,/Lith76(med:1)(pol:0)/,/Lith79(med:1)(pol:0)/ 1 1 1 0 0 0 Est35,Rom104,Slok115,/Est39(med:1)(pol:1)/,/Lith76(med:1)(pol:1)/,/Lith79(med:1)(pol:1)/ 0 0 0 0 0 0 Hu43,Lat59,Slov127,Slov128,/Hu45(med:0)(pol:0)/,/Lat67(med:0)(pol:0)/ 1 0 0 0 0 C Lith74,Pol83,Pol86,Slok113 1 0 0 0 1 1 Pol91 1 1 0 1 0 1 Rom103 1 0 1 0 0 0 Slok117,/Est39(med:0)(pol:1)/,/Lith76(med:0)(pol:1)/,/Lith79(med:0)(pol:1)/ 0 0 1 0 0 0 Slov122,/Hu45(med:0)(pol:1)/,/Lat67(med:0)(pol:1)/ 1 1 0 1 1 1 /CR25(med:1)(pol:0)/ 1 0 0 1 1 1 /CR25(med:0)(pol:0)/ 1 0 1 1 1 1 /CR25(med:0)(pol:1)/ 1 0 1 1 0 0 /CR28(med:0)(pol:1)/ 1 1 0 0 1 0 /Slok118(med:1)(pol:0)/ 1 1 1 0 1 0 /Slok118(med:1)(pol:1)/ 1 0 1 0 1 0 /Slok118(med:0)(pol:1)/

29

Table 6: Truth table without surplus governments; without the first free elections; with

“majority governments in disguise” coded as 0 Truth Table: v1: inv v2: med v3: pol v4: nonc v5: inc O: outcome id: fall v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 O id 0 1 1 0 0 0 Bul12,/Hu45(med:1)(pol:1)/,/Lat67(med:1)(pol:1)/ 0 1 0 0 0 C Bul14,Bul17,Lat55,Slov124 0 0 1 0 1 0 Bul16 1 0 0 1 0 1 CR19 1 1 1 1 1 0 CR21 1 1 1 1 0 0 CR22,/CR28(med:1)(pol:1)/ 1 1 0 0 0 0 Est31,Est37,Lith68,Pol94,Rom107,/Est39(med:1)(pol:0)/,/Lith76(med:1)(pol:0)/,/Lith79(med:1)(pol:0)/ 1 1 1 0 0 0 Est35,Rom104,Slok115,/Est39(med:1)(pol:1)/,/Lith76(med:1)(pol:1)/,/Lith79(med:1)(pol:1)/ 0 0 0 0 0 0 Hu43,Lat59,Slov127,Slov128,/Hu45(med:0)(pol:0)/,/Lat67(med:0)(pol:0)/ 1 0 0 0 0 C Lith74,Pol83,Pol86,Slok113 1 0 0 0 1 0 Pol91,/Slok118(med:0)(pol:0)/ 1 1 0 1 0 0 Rom103,/CR28(med:1)(pol:0)/ 1 0 1 0 0 0 Slok117,/Est39(med:0)(pol:1)/,/Lith76(med:0)(pol:1)/,/Lith79(med:0)(pol:1)/ 0 0 1 0 0 0 Slov122,/Hu45(med:0)(pol:1)/,/Lat67(med:0)(pol:1)/ 1 1 0 1 1 1 /CR25(med:1)(pol:0)/ 1 0 0 1 1 1 /CR25(med:0)(pol:0)/ 1 0 1 1 1 1 /CR25(med:0)(pol:1)/ 1 0 1 1 0 0 /CR28(med:0)(pol:1)/ 1 1 0 0 1 0 /Slok118(med:1)(pol:0)/ 1 1 1 0 1 0 /Slok118(med:1)(pol:1)/ 1 0 1 0 1 0 /Slok118(med:0)(pol:1)/ Table 7: Truth table without surplus governments; without the first free elections; with

“bargaining party of the median party” instead of “median party = biggest party” v1: inv v2: pol v3: nonc v4: inc v5: barg pow O: outcome id: fall v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 O id 0 1 0 0 1 0 Bul12,/Hu45(pol:1)/ 0 0 0 0 1 C Bul14,Bul17,Lat55,Slov124,Slov127 0 1 0 1 1 0 Bul16 1 0 1 0 1 1 CR19,Rom103 1 1 1 1 0 1 CR21 1 1 1 0 0 0 CR22 1 0 0 0 0 0 Est31,Lith68,Rom107,/Lith76(pol:0)/ 1 1 0 0 1 0 Est35,Rom104,Slok117,/Est39(pol:1)/,/Lith79(pol:1)/ 1 0 0 0 1 C Est37,Lith74,Pol83,Pol86,Pol94,Slok113 0 0 0 0 0 0 Hu43,Lat59,Slov128,/Lat67(pol:0)/ 1 0 0 1 1 1 Pol91 1 1 0 0 0 0 Slok115,/Lith76(pol:1)/ 0 1 0 0 0 0 Slov122,/Lat67(pol:1)/ 1 0 1 1 1 1 /CR25(pol:0)/ 1 1 1 1 1 1 /CR25(pol:1)/ 1 1 1 0 1 0 /CR28(pol:1)/ 1 1 0 1 1 0 /Slok118(pol:1)/

30

Table 8: Truth table without surplus governments; without the first free elections; with

“Polarisation” (Dalton 2008) instead of “Polarisation” (Warwick 1998) v1: inv v2: med v3: pol nach tieman v4: nonc v5: inc O: outcome id: fall v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 O id 0 1 0 0 0 C Bul12,Bul14,Bul17,Slov124 0 0 1 0 1 0 Bul16 1 0 1 1 0 1 CR19 1 1 1 1 1 1 CR21,/CR25(med:1)/ 1 1 1 1 0 0 CR22,/CR28(med:1)/ 1 1 0 0 0 0 Est31,Lith68,Pol94,Rom104,Rom107,/Lith76(med:1)/,/Lith79(med:1)/ 1 1 1 0 0 0 Est35,Est37,Slok115,/Est39(med:1)/ 0 0 1 0 0 0 Hu43,Lat59,/Hu45(med:0)/,/Lat67(med:0)/ 0 1 1 0 0 1 Lat55 1 0 0 0 0 C Lith74,Slok113,Slok117 1 0 1 0 0 0 Pol83,Pol86,/Est39(med:0)/ 1 0 1 0 1 1 Pol91 1 1 0 1 0 1 Rom103 0 0 0 0 0 0 Slov122,Slov127,Slov128 1 0 1 1 1 1 /CR25(med:0)/ 1 0 0 0 1 0 /Slok118(med:0)/ 1 1 0 0 1 0 /Slok118(med:1)/