THE FINANCIAL CRISIS—CHALLENGES AND IMPLICATIONS …The TED-Spread reached its all-time peak in...
Transcript of THE FINANCIAL CRISIS—CHALLENGES AND IMPLICATIONS …The TED-Spread reached its all-time peak in...
D E C E M B E R 1 7 , 2 0 0 8
T H E F I N A N C I A L C R I S I S — C H A L L E N G E S A N D I M P L I C A T I O N S
Dr. Karl-Georg Altenburg
CEO J.P. Morgan Germany/Austria
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Events of the last few weeks and months have created unprecedented turmoil across markets …
Lehman file for biggest bankruptcy ever (15 September)
Barclays and Nomura to buy Lehman assetsEuropean governments step in to rescue Fortis
BNP Paribas buys Belgium/Lux. activities
Lloyds to acquire HBOS for US$22bn (18 September)
Bank of America to buy Merrill Lynch for US$50bn (15 September)
AIG bailed out by the Fed with a US$85bn facility(14 September)
Goldman & MS to become Fed-regulated banks
Government takes control of B&B and Santander buys branch network
Goldman raise US$10bn capital via Buffett and stock offering (24 September)
Regulators fight back and take aggressive steps to support markets and pre-empt financial crisis
Assisted bail outs e.g. AIGBroadening of allowed
collateral rulesAdditional liquidity operations
Federal rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Guaranty Program for Money Market Funds
Short-selling restrictionsFurther bank deposit
guarantees
$700bn Emergency Economic Stabilisation Act Capital injections for banks
across the globeGovernment guaranteed FIG
bond issuance
Government guaranteed commercial paper
Citi and FDIC try to bail out Wachovia, Wells Fargo steps-in
MS to sell 20% stake to MUFJ
Plans for further bail-outs, but path to rescue is not smooth
Icelandic government acquires 75% of Glitnir, worries over other Icelandic banks
J.P. Morgan Chase to buy WaMu’s banking operations (25 September)
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100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
Oct-98 Jan-00 May-01 Aug-02 Nov-03 Feb-05 May-06 Aug-07 Nov-08
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%FTSE 100
S&P 500
MSCI EM
10-year performance of selected equity indices and volatility 10-year performance of selected equity indices and volatility
Equity indices rebased to 100 VIX volatility index
… causing an unusual period of sustained volatility …
Source: Bloomberg (as at 25 November 2008)
Russian
/Asian
crises
9/11
US
accounting
scandals
Current crisis
Dot-com
bubble
burst
Spring 2006
correction/
growth fears
� Sharp corrections in global markets have been observed in the past with significantly varied recovery periods
� In fundamentally stable environments, recoveries were quick and sharp (e.g. spring 2006 “growth fears” correction)
� With deteriorated fundamentals, recoveries were more lengthy (e.g. Russian crisis, dot-com bubble as well as potentially the current situation)
� Currently, significant uncertainties persist on the geopolitical, macro and markets front. In the absence of significant catalysts, markets are not expected to embark on a
consistent recovery trajectory until 1H 2009
Dec-08
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… with credit markets having witnessed unparalleled disturbance, leaving lenders in great uncertainty
Source: MorganMarkets, as of 05-Dec-2008
J.P. Morgan Global / Euro High Yield IndexJ.P. Morgan Global / Euro High Yield Index
� Spreads in the European high yield universe reached all-time highs in October, easily exceeding post-09/11 levels
� The secondary loan and high yield trading desks saw almost only sellers in October, putting prices under extreme pressure
� The TED-Spread reached its all-time peak in October, before dropping more than 50% within days following Fed interventions
Source: International Index Company, as of 05-Dec-2008
72
74
76
78
80
82
84
86
88
90
92
94
96
98
100
102
104
106
Jan-08 Mar-08 May-08 Jul-08 Sep-08 Dec-08
Senior Series 1 (170bps)
Senior Series 2 (525bps)
Senior Series 3 (575bps)
77.5
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
JPM Global HY Index STW
JPM Euro HY Index STW
1877 bps
2153 bps
Corporate Scandals
(Enron, Worldcom)
Sep-11 terror attacks
Previous peak levels
bps
?
European Leveraged Loan CDS Index (LevX)European Leveraged Loan CDS Index (LevX)
?
Source: MorganMarkets, as of 05-Dec-2008
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
TED Spread (Treasuries vs. US$-Libor) TED Spread (Treasuries vs. US$-Libor)
?219bps
All-time peak on 10-Oct-
2008(459bps)
bps
Lehman
bankruptcy
Implied spread in the range of 1500-
1600bps²
Lehman
bankruptcy
Lehman
bankruptcy
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Write-downs as percentage of total market capitalisationWrite-downs as percentage of total market capitalisation
Source: Bloomberg, Factset based on market cap as of December 11, 2008
258%
151%
112%
101%
56%
45%
33%
17%
16%
$58.1bn
$68.1bn
$44.2bn
$8.2bn
$15.7bn
$11.7bn
$20.5bn
$13.7bn
Total write-downs in $bn
∞
$27.4bn
$4.9bn
The crisis triggered unprecedented write-downs …
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40
8285828585
121
240
168
274
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Market capitalisation of selected banks ($bn)Market capitalisation of selected banks ($bn)
Source: Factset as of December 11, 2008 Decline in share price in %
Take-overby BofA
Chapter 11
WarrenBuffet Mitsubishi
Jan 1, 2008 Nov 25, 2008
(65%) (75%)(67%)(25%) (100%)(82%) (73%)(67%)(83%) (64%)
023
125
84
39
2116
2845
31
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
… and changed the global banking picture
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Major national plans have been fathered in order to support financial institutions across Europe and the United States
UKUK
� Liquidity guarantee schemes of £200bn provided by BoE
� State funds for max. £50bn to recapitalise banks
� £250bn to guarantee inter-bank lending and new debt issuance
� Nationalisation of some banks
FranceFrance
� €320bn for the guarantee on new banks’ debt
� €40bn available for banks’capital increases� €10.5bn already injected
in six French banks� Dexia
PortugalPortugal
� Liquidity guarantee scheme of €20bn
SpainSpain
� €30-50bn available between 2008-09 for capital injections in Spanish banks
� €100bn fund to secure new debt issuance
Denmark
Austria
Spain
France
Portugal
BelgiumIreland
UnitedKingdom
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Switzerland
Italy
Germany
Sweden
Norway
Poland
CzechRepublic
SloveniaCroatia
480
70
150
360
216
100
NetherlandsNetherlands
� €200bn guarantee fund for inter-bank lending
� State fund of €20bn for capital injections in fin. inst.
� €16.8bn for the acquisition of Fortis Netherlands (incl. ABN)
GermanyGermany
� €400bn guarantee schemes for debt securities/deposits
� State fund of €80bn to recapitalise banks and to arrange asset swap agreements with banks
AustriaAustria
ItalyItaly
� State funds to recapitalize banks (c.€20-30bn)
� Temporary repo facilities from the Treasury (for a non-quantified amount) and the Central Bank (for c.€40bn)
Source: government press releases, press and Factiva¹ Data in euro: exchange rates €1.20/£, €0.65/CHF, €0.80/US$² Does not include government guarantees on Dexia’s debt and state deposit guarantee
A total of more than €2.4trn committed at European level, US$1.5trn in USA total of more than €2.4trn committed at European level, US$1.5trn in US
� Liquidity guarantee schemes of €75-85bn
� State fund of €15bn to recapitalise banks
� Nationalisation of some financial institutions
600¹
16²
BelgiumBelgium
� Capital injection for the rescue of several fin. inst. (Fortis, Dexia, KBC, Ethias)
� Guarantee on debt and toxic assets-related commitments of some banks (i.e. Dexia)
20 United StatesUnited States
� Troubled Asset Relief Program makes available up to US$700bn for banks recapitalisations, liquidity lines and asset purchases
� TALF: up to US$800bn from Fed and UST to support new ABS issuances and acquire GSE’s debt and Agency-MBS
SwitzerlandSwitzerland
� CHF6bn capital injection in UBS via a mandatory convert.
� US$54bn loan to a SPV to take over US$60bn of toxic assets from UBS balance sheet
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IrelandIreland
� €400bn liquidity guarantee scheme for six Irish banks
400
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Source: Company information, press release and pressExchange rate used: €1.20/£, €/1.5CHF¹ Price at which the Dutch government purchased on October 3, 2008 Fortis’ banking and insurance activities in the Netherlands from Fortis Group² Includes the first €4.7bn capital injection of the Belgian government in Fortis Belgium and the second €4.7bn injection made before selling 75% of the company to BNP Paribas ³ Includes both capital injection in form of preference shares and underwriting of common shares issuances
Key capital injections realised by European governments (€bn)Key capital injections realised by European governments (€bn)
European governments supported major capital infusions
6.6
13.8
3.0 2.6 3.01.2 1.7
2.0
1.5
3.5
10.0
3.0
2.5
0.4
4.02.7
1.5
8.210.0
UK France Belgium NetherlandsLuxembourg Switzerland Austria Germany
¹
³
16.8
(29-Sep)(30-Sep) (13-Oct) (13-Oct) (13-Oct) (16-Oct)(19-Oct)(20-Oct) (20-Oct)(20-Oct) (20-Oct) (27-Oct) (28-Oct)
24.0
³³
(30-Oct) (03-Nov)
In the process of being merged
(20-Oct)
²9.4
(28-Nov)(05-Dec)
4
4 €7.0bn provided by the State of Bavaria, former core shareholder of BayernLB 7T
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De-leveraging across the banking sector will require higher capital levels after the crisis De-leveraging across the banking sector will require higher capital levels after the crisis
Banking leverage after the crisis will be significantly lower and the competition is setting new capitalisation benchmarks
� Abbey: Tier 1 ratio to 9.25% after a £1bn capital injection from Santander
� Barclays: Tier 1 ratio above 11%1,2 by raising £6.5bn in the markets
� RBS: Tier 1 ratio of 12.7%1,2 after a £20bn capital injection by the UK
government
� Combined Lloyds TSB / HBOS: Core Tier 1 ratio of 8.5%¹ after the £17bn
capital injection by UK government
¹ Pro-forma estimate; source: banks and press2 As of 30 June 2008
9-13% Tier 1 ratio
� Bank of America: Tier 1 ratio of 9.5%¹ after a $20bn injection
� Citibank: Tier 1 ratio of 10.8%¹ after a $25bn injection
� J.P. Morgan: Tier 1 ratio of 10.9%¹ after a $25bn injection
� Wells Fargo: Tier 1 ratio of 9.8%¹ after a $25bn injection
� BNP Paribas: Tier 1 ratio of 8.1%¹,² after intended issuance of €2.55bn hybrid
debt to the French government
� Crédit Agricole: Tier 1 ratio of 9.8%¹,² after intended issuance of €3.0bn
hybrid debt to the French government
� Société Générale: Tier 1 ratio of 8.7%¹,² after intended issuance of €1.7bn
hybrid debt to the French government
8-10%Tier 1 ratio
10-11% Tier 1 ratio
� KBC: Bank Core Tier 1 ratio of 8.2%¹ and Tier 1 ratio of 10.7%¹ after the
issuance of €3.5bn of non-transferable, non-voting core-capital securities to
the Belgian State
� ING: Bank Core Tier 1 ratio of c. 8%¹ and Tier 1 ratio over 10%¹ after issuing
€10bn of Core Tier 1 securities to the Dutch State
10-11%Tier 1 ratio/
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US and German main interventions to support domestic banks
Main available measures (November 25, 2008)Main available measures (November 25, 2008)
Main aspects of the intervention (October 13, 2008)Main aspects of the intervention (October 13, 2008)
� Recapitalisation
� Participation via common / preferred shares, participation
certificates or silent participations
� Up to 50% of registered capital for shares
� Exclusion of subscription rights
� No approval from general meeting
� Total amount max. €80bn2
� Guarantee
� Government guarantee for debt securities and deposits up to a
maturity of 36 months
� Guarantee fee generally amounting to not less than 2% p.a.
� Total guarantee amount max.
€400bn
� Risk transfer
� Transfer of risk assets such as receivables, securities and derivatives
� Does not required the debtors approval
� Total amount max. €80bn¹
Source: German law, government press releases, press1 Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility2 For recapitalisation and risk transfer
� TALF1
� Under the TALF, the Fed will lend up to US$200bn on a non-recourse
basis to holders of certain AAA-rated ABS backed by newly and
recently originated consumer and small businesses loans. New loans
will be granted until Dec 2009
� GSE’s debt and MBS purchase program
� The Fed will purchase, through a series of competitive auctions
starting in Dec 2008, up to US$100bn of GSE’s direct obligations
� The Fed will also initiate by 2008 year-end a US$500bn mortgage-
backed securities purchase program, on a competitive basis, from
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae
1
2
3
Main available measures (October 14, 2008)Main available measures (October 14, 2008)
� Capital purchase program
� Treasury to purchase senior preferred shares from eligible banks up
to US$250bn (funded from the US$700 EESA rescue package)
� Treasury to receive also warrants for the participating banks’
common shares
� Commercial paper funding facility
� Federal Reserve to initiate between October 27, 2008 and April 30,
2009 a funding facility program by purchasing unsecured and asset-
backed US dollar-denominated three month commercial paper from
eligible US issuers (including US issuers with a foreign parent)
� Liquidity guarantee program
� FDIC to guarantee newly senior unsecured debt issued by banks,
thrifts and certain holding companies on or before June 30, 2009.
The guarantee will be limited up to June 30, 2012
1
2
3
1
2
Available measuresAvailable measures
� Establishment of a fund for the stabilization of the financial markets
by resolving the current liquidity shortfall and strengthening of
financial institutions’ capital base
GermanyGermanyUSAUSA
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“Good Bank/Bad Bank” structures can be used to clean-up the balance sheet
Börsen-Zeitung, 10.12.2008
WestLB will weiteres Portfolio auslagern
Aufsichtsrat tagt am Freitag - S&P im Nacken
Börsen-Zeitung, 10.12.2008 ab Düsseldorf - Der Aufsichtsrat der
WestLB wird sich am kommenden Freitag mit möglichen Wegen
zur Rekapitalisierung der Bank beschäftigen. Nach
Informationen der Börsen-Zeitung geht es dabei jedoch nicht
um Maßnahmen im Rahmen des Sonderfonds
Finanzmarktstabilisierung (Soffin), sondern vor allem um die
Auslagerung eines weiteren Portfolios risikobehafteter
Wertpapiere.
Pressemitteilung, 1. Dezember 2008
BayernLB stellt sich neu auf—
Bank fokussiert sich auf Kernaktivitäten
� Fokussierung auf Bayern, Deutschland und ausgewählte
europäische Regionen
� Klare Konzentration auf die Kerngeschäftsfelder Mittelstand,
Großkunden einschließlich Institutionelle Kunden und
Sparkassen,Gewerbliche Immobilien und Privatkunden
� Konsequente Trennung von langfristig nicht profitablen
Aktivitäten
� Signifikante Kosteneinsparungen und Effizienzsteigerungen
� Good Bank sells portfolio of non-strategic assets to “Bad
Bank” vehicle
� Bad Bank doesn’t necessarily need banking license
� Good Bank’s owners purchase Bad Bank's "equity“
� Retain asset upside
� Various options for Bad Bank senior funding:
� If no loss on asset sale, then likely improvement in
capital ratios
� Size of improvement depends a.o. on reg cap
treatment of senior financing provided by Good Bank
� Key drivers for size of Bad Bank equity:
� Good Bank no longer owning “majority of risks &
rewards” (cash flow based analysis)
� Senior debt rating requirements (if relevant)
� Desired market signalling
Description “Good Bank/Bad Bank” structures Description “Good Bank/Bad Bank” structures
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The financial crisis has discharged into a global recession in all centres of the world significantly affecting consumer confidence
Business confidence Business confidence
US consumer confidenceUS consumer confidence
Source: Bloomberg (NTC Economics), ISM, ACEA, AutoStat, US Bureau of Economic Analysis, SIAM and University of MichiganNote: Business confidence below 50 indicates contraction ¹ Compares October based SAAR numbers (annualised actual October sales for Western European and BRIC countries) with 2007A full year actual sales figures² Represents only sedans³ The index is normalised to have a value of 100 in December 19644 Long-term average is (10)
3040
5060
7080
01/02 01/03 12/03 12/04 12/05 12/06 11/07 11/08
US (ISM Manufacturing Survey)
Eurozone (Purchasing Managers’ Index)
80100120140160180
01/02 12/02 12/03 12/04 11/05 11/06 11/07 11/08
University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index³
Light vehicle sales Light vehicle sales
Impact magnified in countries with high consumer debt levels and
falling house prices
EU consumer confidenceEU consumer confidence
(30)
(20)
(10)
0
01/02 12/02 12/03 12/04 11/05 11/06 11/07 11/08
ESI Consumer Confidence Indicator4
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Sales (K units) 2008 Y/Y change (%)
Region/country Sep Oct Nov Sep Oct Nov Full¹
West. Europe 1,213 1,035 867 (9%) (15%) (25%) (16%)
France 161 175 146 8% (7%) (14%) 2%
Germany 261 259 234 (2%) (8%) (18%) (1%)
Italy 176 168 138 (6%) (19%) (29%) (19%)
Spain 66 78 63 (32%) (40%) (50%) (42%)
UK 330 128 100 (21%) (23%) (37%) (36%)
BRIC
Brazil/Arg. 332 273 N/A 38% (3%) N/A 13%
China² 416 410 N/A (2%) 12% N/A 4%
India 109 99 N/A 3% (7%) N/A (17%)
Russia 240 232 N/A 13% (1%) N/A 15%
United States 962 835 744 (27%) (32%) (37%) (35%)
A significant de-leveraging process is under way …
Historical supply (€bn eq.) vis-à-vis interest rates (%) and credit spreads performance (bp)
Source: J.P. Morgan and Dealogic; Federal Reserve
Note: Includes EUR and GBP supply by Corporates and Financials
376
238
417 390
511
210249
102
139
136
131
165
186
186
250
89
264
312
408
233
318 28
256
23
278
431
298
394
540
424
603
646
761
447
372
420
1H 2003 2H 2003 1H 2004 2H 2004 1H 2005 2H 2005 1H 2006 2H 2006 1H 2007 2H 2007 1H 2008 2H 2008
ECB
Banks Senior
Bonds ABS
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.50
5.00
Jan-03 Jun-03 Dec-03 Jun-04 Dec-04 Jun-05 Dec-05 Jun-06 Dec-06 Jun-07 Dec-07 Jun-08
0
50
100
150
200
250% bp
1,500
1,700
1,900
2,100
2,300
Sep-06 Dec-06 Mar-07 Jun-07 Oct-07 Jan-08 Apr-08 Jul-08 Nov-08
US$ bn Outstanding USCPs
Case-Shiller House price Index
Max = 207
162
136
Dec-08
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Maturity profile of loans to European IG CorporatesMaturity profile of loans to European IG Corporates
… hampering banks’ willingness to lend
30% of existing loans in EMEA mature by 2009, 50% by 2010
Trend of loan margin for 364-day tenor 2003—2008Trend of loan margin for 364-day tenor 2003—2008
14%
14%
18%
21%
9%
14%
13%
23%
53%
44%
42%
33%
15%
13%
11%
5%
10%
15%
16%
18%
2005
2006
2007
2008
<1 year 3-year5-year 7-yearOff the run maturities
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Jan-05 Oct-05 Jul-06 Apr-07 Jan-08 Nov-08
A BBB I-traxx Main Indexbps
Source: Dealogic—LPC – J.P. MorganSource: Dealogic—LPC1 Off the run maturities mean maturities different of 364-day, 3-, 5- or 7-years
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Note: Highlighted marks J.P. Morgan led transactions
Although public bond activity has picked up in Europe in recent weeks several themes still prey on investor minds
H2 2007H2 2007 H2 2008H2 2008
Issuer Date Rating Size (m) Tenor Pricing
20-Nov-08 Baa2/BBB+ €500 5-year MS+590
19-Nov-08 Baa1/BBB+ £250 20-year G+400
17-Nov-08 A2/A €1,000 2-year MS+150
13-Nov-08 A2/A- €750
€750
5-year
10-year
MS+230
MS+270
BMW 13-Nov-08 A2/A €750 5-year MS+525
12-Nov-08 A1/A €1,000
€1,000
5-year
10-year
MS+215
MS+255
Selected priced transactions in GermanySelected priced transactions in Germany
Issuer Date Rating Size (mm) Tenor Pricing
€1,750 5-year MS+60
20-Sep-07 A2/A
€1,750 10-year MS+85
19-Sep-07 Aa3/AA- €1,000 7-year MS+52
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Secondary spread updateSecondary spread update
Issuer Rating Size (€mm) Coupon (%) Maturity
z-spread
10 Dec
2008 (bp)
z-spread
3 Dec
2008 (bp)
z-spread
Jan 2008 (bp)
Change today
vs. Jan 2008 (bp)
Lanxess Baa2/BBB 500 4.125 21-Jun-12 440 433 109 +331
Lafarge Baa2/BBB 750 5.750 27-May-11 628 620 NA NA
Bayer A3/A- 2,000 6.000 10-Apr-12 196 187 70 +126
Clariant Baa3/BBB- 600 4.375 05-Apr-13 863 857 157 +706
Lufthansa Baa3/BBB 500 4.625 06-May-13 213 246 96 +117
DSM A3/A- 300 4.000 10-Nov-15 188 216 85 +103
Source: Bloomberg
Credit spreads already price in an increase in default rates …
Global high yield spreads and corporate default ratesGlobal high yield spreads and corporate default rates
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1,000
1,100
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2007 2008 2009
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
25-Aug—31-Aug-98:turmoil in Russia; LTCM meltdown
Sep-11 terror attacksCorporate Scandalseg. Enron/ WorldcomBurst of dot com
bubble; high-yield defaults rise for third consecutive year
Oct-87: Stock market loses 504 points
Jan-91:US attacks Iraq
Drexel files for bankruptcy
RJR buyout
Global high-yield spreads (bps) Default rates (%)
General Motors and Ford credit uncertainty
Historic lows
Average default rates
Long term average spread
878bps
1.19%
Source: Thomson Financial
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… with large restructuring to be expected over the next years
Source: Alix Partners, J.P. Morgan Credit Research
Default rate and distressed debt volumeDefault rate and distressed debt volume
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007E
2008E
2009E
2010E
2011E
2012E
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000Speculative grade default rate (in%) Distressed debt volume ($bn)
2,000
4,000
1,207
2,106
517
11.1%
2.9%
5.0%
10.0%9.5%
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Curr. 4Q08 1Q09 2Q09 3Q09
Repo rate (%) 3.00 2.00 1.50 1.00 1.00
3m LIBOR (%) 4.04 3.20 2.25 1.85 1.95
10yr govt. (%) 3.86 3.20 2.25 1.85 1.95
Curr. 4Q08 1Q09 2Q09 3Q09
10yr swap spread (bp) 24 10 5 (3) (3)
Curr. 4Q08 1Q09 2Q09 3Q09
Refi rate (%) 3.25 2.75 2.00 1.25 1.00
3m EURIBOR (%) 4.00 3.40 2.30 1.75 1.55
10yr govt. (%) 3.39 3.15 3.00 2.95 2.95
Curr. 4Q08 1Q09 2Q09 3Q09
10yr swap spread (bp) 61 40 35 30 25
Curr. 4Q08 1Q09 2Q09 3Q09
Fed funds rate (%) 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00
3m LIBOR (%) 2.18 1.80 1.45 1.30 1.15
10yr govt. (%) 2.98 3.00 2.80 2.50 2.35
Curr. 4Q08 1Q09 2Q09 3Q09
10yr swap spread (bp) 20 25 20 20 20
$ rate forecasts$ rate forecasts 50bp cut expected in fourth quarter
€ rate forecasts€ rate forecasts 50bp cut expected in fourth quarter
Foreign exchange forecastsForeign exchange forecasts $ strength to remain in the interim
£ rate forecasts£ rate forecasts 100bp cut expected in fourth quarter
Curr. 4Q08 1Q09 2Q09 3Q09
EUR/USD 1.30 1.18 1.18 1.20 1.22
USD/JPY 105 87 87 93 95
GBP/USD 1.53 1.33 1.28 1.32 1.36
Looking forward, the debate around the depth and length of a broad recession will drive market sentiment …
Economic outlookEconomic outlook
%q/q 3Q08 4Q08 1Q09 2Q09 3Q09
Euro area (0.3) (4.0) (3.0) (0.5) 1.5
US (2.1) (2.5) (2.0) 0.0 0.5
UK (2.0) (3.0) (2.5) (1.5) 0.0
Japan (0.4) (3.5) (3.0) (0.5) (1.2)
Real GDP forecastsReal GDP forecasts Global recession now expected
US market update
� The October employment report was one of the worst ever published in the US.
Unemployment has risen in last six months by 1.5%—fastest rate since early 1980s. Payrolls declined 240k, further than expectations, with also downward
revisions in September numbers
� Barack Obama’s first conference as president-elect, promised confrontation of this economic crisis, going forward we can expect large fiscal packages in the new year from his new administration
Euro market update
� Europe’s economy fell into its first technical recession in 15 years in 3Q 2008
� Different countries are faring better than others, with Germany leading the
way, but the overall picture shows a consistent message
� The ECB cut in line with expectations at its November monthly meeting by 50bp, despite the discussed possibility of a 75bp cut
UK market update
� The recent 150bp base rate cut was beyond market expectations, and the largest cut made by the independent body in its 10 year history. Interest rates
in the UK are now the lowest that they have been since 1954
� In their latest inflation report the bank expects inflation to fall below the 1% floor towards the end of 2009, reflecting expectations of deep recession in 2009
� Poor economic data triggered the pound to fall below $1.50 for the first time in
six years, and reached historic lows against the Euro
Source: J.P. Morgan research (as at 26 November 2008)
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… central banks are easing to jumpstart the economy, sending base rates to historic lows …
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
14.00
16.00
18.00
Jan-51 Apr-58 Jul-65 Sep-72 Dec-79 Mar-87 May-94 Aug-01 Nov-08
UK Bank of England base rate UK Bank of England base rate
Source: Bank of England statistics (as at 26 November 2008)Note: Changes through bank rate, minimum lending rate, minimum dealing rate, repo rate
6 November 2008: 3.00%13 May 1954—27 Jan 1955: 3.00%
� Recent sharp fall in core inflation
� Oil prices now levelling out—near
term deflation unlikely?
� In the medium term, however,
deepening recession and rising
unemployment rate is putting
further downward pressure on
already low price levels (i.e. high
medium term risk of deflation)
Inflation / deflation?
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… the two key factors for the economy will be de-leveraging and policy support …
De-leveraging—source of all doom?De-leveraging—source of all doom? Policy supportPolicy support
� Markets have seen 20-years of increasing leverage
� Household sector saw real estate boom
� Corporate sector saw cheap debt, M&A and share
buybacks
� World is now seeing a sea-change as all participants
are increasing savings rates and cash holdings whilst
paying off debt
� Will depress asset prices and economic activity
� De-leveraging process will drive the depth and length
of the economic crisis (impact on GDP and
unemployment)
� Significant policy support acts in two main ways
� Limiting de-leveraging process—e.g. by
guaranteeing banking sector or purchasing
distressed assets combined with monetary easing
� Off-setting impact of de-leveraging on growth via
fiscal easing
� Deleveraging process is progressing strongly, led by
financial sector
� Both fiscal and monetary policy will hopefully create
a rebound in economic activity towards middle of
2009 as stress in financial sector eases and consumer
confidence returns
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… and companies will need to be nimble and flexible in order to weather the difficult environment
Government interventionGovernment intervention
Hedge fund unwinds
Hedge fund unwinds
Continued economic
stress
Continued economic
stress
Impact on valuations
Impact on valuations
Pressure on corporate earnings
Pressure on corporate earnings
Impact of bank cost of funds
Impact of bank cost of funds
Impact of supply on markets
Impact of supply on markets
Flexibility around amount, currency and
maturity
Flexibility around amount, currency and
maturity
CAPEX, disposalsCAPEX, disposals
DividendsDividends
Share buybacksShare buybacks
Equity volatilityEquity
volatility
Debt markets —focus on access not
cost
Economic backdrop and corporate health
Corporate strategy—focus on cash
Evolving market backdrop
Liquidity is king!
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Quarter-by-quarter trend since 2003 (any European involvement)Quarter-by-quarter trend since 2003 (any European involvement)
Note: Deal value $bn in the bars
M&A volume has decreased in the first three quarters of 2008 but is still on 2006 level
32 38 32 49 43 44 42 61 53 67 58 76 67 70 73 86 87 87 86 93 92 77 6315 26 1821 30 29 41
41 3637 31
40 42 56 4472 53 73 68 62 55 63
4616
16 1718 20 20 19
21 2223
2427 23
25 26
2625
27 33 31 30 3024
6057 86
93 7746
74
13599
137 170159
126
179 167
241227
340
188
272
174149
164
44
24 71
10
17
4176 38
101 212 6651
112
94
318
125
230
85
211
39
187
107
24
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Less than 100m 100m to 500m 500m to 1bn 1bn to 10bn Over $10bn
?
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
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“BANK OF THE QUARTER”
“J.P. Morgan earns reputation as white knight
to other banks”
“Over the past quarter J.P. Morgan has gained the reputation as the bank
other banks go to when they are in trouble.”
$19.7bn
The largest ever US IPO and second largest IPO globally
Launched on 19 March 2008
Initial Public Offering
Lead Left Bookrunner
€5.5bn Launched on 11 February 2008
Rights Issue
Joint Global Coordinator & Joint Bookrunner
J.P. Morgan agreed within 6 hours to underwrite €2.76bn
$2.1bnLaunched on 17 March 2008
J.P. Morgan acquires Bear Stearns
J.P. Morgan white knight acquirer of Bear Stearns
$15.4bn Launched on 21 May 2008
Rights issueJoint Global Coordinator & Joint Bookrunner
Significant capital commitment to UBS at a critical time
J.P. Morgan—a distribution power house
$54.8bn ($9.8bn equity bridge) Launched on 14 July 2008
Financing package
Joint bookrunner
$54.8bn financing of InBev’s acquisition of Anheuser-Busch is the largest all-cash transaction on record
$1.9bnLaunched on 16 September 2008
J.P. Morgan acquires Washington Mutual
J.P. Morgan white knight acquirer of Washington Mutual
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