The Execution of the Forty-Two Martyrs of Amorion. Proposing an Interpretation 2

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The Execution of the Forty-two Martyrs of Amorion:Proposing an interpretationAthina Kolia-Dermitzaki

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Al-Masaq, Vol. 14, No. 2, September 2002

The Execution of the Forty-two Martyrs of Amorion:proposing an interpretation

ATHINA KOLIA-DERMITZAKI

ABSTRACT On the 6th of March 845 the Arabs executed forty-two Byzantine prisoners, someof them very eminent, who had been captured after the fall of the city of Armorion in AsiaMinor. This seems, on the face of it, to defy logic, as it was common practice in those days tokeep prisoners in custody while negotiating an exchange, particularly of high-ranking ofécials.It seems even more perverse when one considers that the forty-two prisoners had been kept incustody for six-and-a-half years before their execution and that an agreement for an exchangehad been concluded between the caliph and the emperor some months before. Moreover, theByzantines had a greater number of Arab prisoners awaiting exchange. However, by lookingat the internal policies of the caliph, al-Wathiq, one can see a different picture: Hisdetermination to impose the religious Mu¨tazila doctrine, by force if necessary, provoked a seriesof uprisings (842, 844–46). The public decapitation of the forty-two ofécers after they hadrefused to pray with the caliph, was a valuable propaganda exercise, a show of power, whichmattered much more to him in those circumstances than the freedom of a number of his soldiersand ofécials.

On 15 August 8381 Amorion, the headquarters of the Anatolikon thema, was con-quered by the army of the caliph at Mu‘tasΩim (218–227/833–842). The “glorious city”,second after Constantinople, as it was described by the Martyrion of the Holy Forty-twoMartyrs (texts narrating their martyrdom), an exaggeration but suggesting that it wasthe most important city of Asia Minor,2 was burned down and totally demolished. Thedefence of this fortiéed town was entrusted by the emperor Theophilos to the strategos(general) of the Anatolikon patrician Aetios, the domestikos of the Excubita andprotospatharios Theophilos, the drouggarios of the Vigla patrician KonstantinosBaboutzikos, who was the emperor’s brother in law and and, later, to the domestikos ofthe Hikanatoi (or strategos of the Boucellarii) protospatharios Theodoros Krateros, whowas in charge of forces of up to 30,000 men.3 The Byzantine and Arabic sources (themost detailed of which is that of TΩ abarõ [d. 310/922–3]), that describe the events of thesiege and the capture of Amorion, suggest that all men were slaughtered and all womenand children were captured. Among those who survived and were imprisoned were theabove-mentioned leaders of the Byzantine army and many other generals (’a´kkoi

pk

«i˜rsoi sx˜ n «’n

rsqasgci´ai

Ödia

fa

nx˜ n, l«

ci´rsoi

Ö «’lpq

«po

ns

«Öa

’xix´ l

ari

n) according toIoannis Skylitzes.4 The majority of the prisoners, together with the rest of the plunderwas immediately sold to markets which were organized in situ, obviously because itwould be impossible to transfer such a great number of people without causingdiféculties to the movements of the Arab troops. The rest of the prisoners – including

Correspondence: Athina Kolia-Dermitzaki, Palteia Kalliga 3, 112 53 Athens, Greece. E-mail: [email protected]

ISSN 0950-3110 print/ISSN 1473-348X online/02/020141-22 Ó 2002 Society for the Medieval MediterraneanDOI: 10.1080/0950311022000010547

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Jakub Sypiański

142 Athina Kolia-Dermitzaki

the Byzantine army ofécers and the eminent and wealthy citizens of Amorion – weregathered to be transferred to Tarsus, where they were imprisoned, waiting for anexchange with Arab prisoners kept by the Byzantines.5

Concerning the Byzantine ofécers, the study of the texts of their Martyrion makes itclear that they were initially imprisoned in Tarsus, and transferred to the capitalSamarra only when it was made clear to them that they had to decide between changingtheir faith or execution.6

The Fate of the Eminent Prisoners

It must be noted that the Muslim jurists, notwithstanding that the Qur’an makes somerelevant provision, often deviated from this and offered conèicting solutions to theproblem of exchanging prisoners. Some of them totally prohibited exchange, whileothers suggested ransoming.7 However, after the end of the eighth century, customsrelating to the exchange of prisoners between the Arabs and the Byzantines, stabilized.

The Byzantine legislation did not include special provisions regulating the treatmentof foreign prisoners. On the contrary, it emphasised the importance of the redemptionof the Empire’s citizens. However, some information about prisoners’ exchange can bederived from the military manuals, the Taktika. So, in the Taktika of Leon V (886–912), the possibility of exchange is anticipated. The writer advises the general not to killthe prisoners before the end of the war, “especially those of the enemies who areglorious and great, bearing in mind the uncertainty of fate and the constant rotation ofvictory. In doing so, you (the general), should some of your people be caught or a castleof yours captured, would be able to exchange them for those (the eminent enemies) andretrieve the – as a matter of course – occurring defeats, obtaining the friends and alliesas against the enemies”.8

Thus, keeping the eminent prisoners alive was the usual practice, not only of Byzanti-nes, but also of Arabs, giving them the advantage of being able to exchange their ownprisoners, i.e. members of the military or civil administration, of the aristocracy, or evenmembers of the sovereign families of both sides. They did not, therefore, sell them asslaves, like the majority of the other prisoners; neither did they execute them but keptthem imprisoned till the time of their exchange. They often provided them with specialliving conditions, totally different from those of the other, non-eminent, prisoners.9

One of the most characteristic examples is that of the poet Abu Firas al-HΩ amdanõ(d. 357/968), relative of Sayf al-Dawla (333–356/945–967), who was captured duringthe fall of Ierapolis (Manbij) in 962, and remained in excellent conditions in Constanti-nopolis for four years until he was exchanged in 966.

Another case is that of the amõr of Crete, ¨Abd al-Azõz b. HΩ abõb (337–350/949–961),who was offered a great amount of silver and golden gifts by the emperor, as well asland.10

On the Arab side, testimonies concerning favourable behaviour towards eminentByzantine prisoners are either not clear or controversial. An example of the érst case isindirect evidence given by manuscript no 497 of the National Library of Paris, whichcontains texts of the Fathers of the Church. The manuscript bears a note that attributesthe copying of the texts to the drouggarios tou ploimou (the commander of the imperialèeet), patrician Niketas, who was captured by the Arabs after the defeat of theByzantine èeet in Sicily in 964 and imprisoned in Africa. This fact suggests quite goodliving conditions for the eminent Byzantine prisoner.11 A second case, representingmore controversial evidence, is that of Konstantinos, son of domestikos Bardas Phokas

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The Forty-two Martyrs of Amorion 143

and brother of Nikephoros Phokas, later to become emperor, and that of general Meliasaccompanied by forty ofécers. All of them died during their imprisonment a short timeafter their capture. Ioannes Skylitzes, referring to the fate of Konstantinos, mentionsthat he died in 953 being poisoned on the order of the amõr of Aleppo, Sayf al-Dawla.Matthew of Edessa, who describes the imprisonment of Melias and his ofécers,suggests that they died after being transported to Baghdad (973/4), without deéning theway of their death. However, according to almost all Arab sources that mention them,all these people died of natural causes.12

Deénitely, on neither occasion were there any ofécial executions of eminent prison-ers, but there seems to have been assassinations or deaths caused by their conditions ofimprisonment, or even natural death. The attempt of the Arabs to hide the causes ofdeath, according to Byzantine sources, indicates that this was not the usual tacticspursued concerning eminent prisoners.

In the Amorion case, TΩ abarõ asserts quite deénitely, conérmed by both Syrian andGreek sources, that al-Mu¨tasΩim gave the clear command to separate the eminentByzantines from the other prisoners who were to be sold immediately after the captureof Amorion city. Later on he did the same thing, when, on the way back, he decidedon the exemplary punishment of 6000 prisoners, because a small group of Byzantineshad managed to escape, killing some Arab soldiers. Al-Mu¨tasΩim ordered that theeminent prisoners be put aside and executed 6000 from the others. These eminentprisoners had to be kept untouched, obviously for a future exchange, and they includedthe leaders of the army, accompanied by their ofécers.13

The destruction of Amorion was indeed a real disaster for all the Byzantines andmostly for the Emperor Theophilos. The latter immediately sent a deputation to thecaliph under the command of patrician Basileios, offering him 200 golden kentenaria(200 pounds 5 1,440,000 coins) in order to ransom all the Amorion prisoners, andespecially the eminent men and their relatives. Al-Mu¨tasΩim declined the offer andargued that he had spent 1000 kentenaria in order to gather his numerous army.14 It isdifécult to explain the caliph’s refusal, as the Byzantines had a great number of Arabprisoners from the capture of Sozopetra and Arsamosata [which had taken place theprevious year (837) and it is well known that it was this that caused al-Mu¨tasΩim’sattack against the cities of Ankara and Amorion]. According to Theophanes Continua-tus (114 [lines 17–21]), there were about another 25000 prisoners from Theophilos’expedition against the Arabs during 831.15 So one can only assume that al-Mu¨tasΩim’saim was the humiliation of the Byzantine Emperor, or that he wanted, indeed, moreransom. A second deputation, sent by Theophilos in 841, did not achieve agreement onexchange of prisoners, although gifts were mutually given and compliments paid.16

Specifying the Problem

The Amorion prisoners, as we have seen, were probably transported and imprisoned inTarsus, waiting for the conclusion of an exchange agreement. This exchange took placeprecisely seven years after their capture, on 16 September 845. However, the leaders ofthe Byzantine army and other Byzantine ofécers, 42 all together in number, were notamong those liberated from the hardships of imprisonment, because they had beenexecuted on 6 March of the same year, with the exception of the general of theAnatolikon thema, Aetios, who had been executed between 838–839.17

It is a fact that the Arabs decided on their execution, though they had been keepingthese men alive for six and a half years, presumably in order to have the means of

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negotiating an exchange for their own eminent prisoners. This execution was an actionagainst their usual practice and their own beneéts, something, which gives rise tospeculation and requires further research regarding the reasons that had caused thisdecision and an interpretation of their motives. It has to be noted that the reasons arenot mentioned in any of the sources.

Before proceeding to this research, I would like to suggest that one should notconsider the almost seven year period of time as éctitious, linked with the “magic”sense of the number seven.18 This point of view is supported by the fact that two of thetexts of Martyrion group B, i.e. texts B and C , mention that the prisoners had been keptfor six years before the énal demand to renounce their Christian faith and convert toIslam was imposed on them.19

I think that this differentiation, which has never attracted any notice till now, mustbe due to the fact that both authors of these two texts, which along with the P text arethe oldest ones, did not lengthen the number of the imprisonment years to seven, as didthe majority of the Martyrion authors. There had been in fact precisely 6 years and 6months of imprisonment. It is possible that this preference for the number seven by theauthors of the rest of the Martyrion texts instead of six, which might be more accurate,could be due to the special semantic meaning of number “seven”. However, I do notbelieve that the year of the prisoners’ execution must be doubted and besides, bothtexts of Martyrion D and E (the latter one represents a variation of the text D) do notgive a general reference to the time interval of six or seven years, but give a precisedating: “the holy forty two martyrs died on 6 March of the 8 indictio, in the year 6353,while Michael, Theodora and Thekla were reigning over the Romans”.20

The authors of three of the Martyrion texts, as we shall see below, attempted to givean explanation for the caliph’s sudden decision to press hard on the prisoners to changetheir faith after six and a half years of capture. According to them, this decision wasrelated to the protracted attempts by the Arabs to bend the will of the prisoners.21 Theauthors sought an explanation in the moral strength of the martyrs, something wellsuited to the ethical and educative aims of the texts.

Before looking for the reasons that led to the execution, the conditions of both theimprisonment and the execution of the eminent prisoners should be brieèy presented.These conditions are described mainly in the hagiological texts, i.e. the Martyrion,whereas the rest of the Greek, Syrian and Arab sources are restricted to a very shortaccount, with the exception of TΩ abarõ, who gives a very detailed description of the fallof Amorion and the capture and fate of all the prisoners, whether eminent or not. Itmust be noted that almost all of the Martyrion texts (eight published and one unpub-lished) were written within the ninth century. The oldest one is considered to be theMartyrion text C , which was written by Michael Synkellos, before January 846 or June847 – very close to the prisoners’ execution. However, according to Sophia Kotzampas-sis, it is possible that Martyrion text B and P are older than C . The only exceptions areMartyrion text M, as it must have been written between the tenth and twelth century,and the unpublished Martyrion text K, which represents a variation of the text M22 andis dated in the tenth century.

The evaluation of the information provided by these hagiological texts is made withspecial care, taking into consideration their eulogising nature.23

Three of the Martyrion texts [A, Z ( 5 Martyrion written by Euodios) and M, whichtogether with the unpublished K form a common group] provide a vivid and detaileddescription of the hardships, which the 42 martyrs suffered during their imprison-ment.24 Texts B, C and P are more synoptic, whereas text D only succinctly mentions

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that the martyrs suffered “the usual hardships of a prisoner” (oia ca`q jai` pa´rv

«i

ai

©v

l

a´kxso

Ö).25

According to the érst three texts, the Arabs waited for the Byzantine dignitaries tolose their physical strength and morale because of the unbearable prison conditions,before demanding from them a denial of their faith. They considered that after theperiod of six and a half years the prisoners should have been totally physically andmentally exhausted and then they started to persuade them to accept Islam, eithertrying to bribe them with offers of wealth and high rank or threatening them withexecution if they refused to convert.

The detailed description of the efforts made by the Arab representatives of the caliph,the means of persuasion they applied and the considerably extended polemic dialogues,containing the religious arguments presented by both sides showing the persistence ofthe martyrs in their faith, will be omitted, since they are not directly related to thisstudy. The fact remains that it was the deénite refusal of the forty-two eminent captivesto accept Islam that led to the decision of their execution by decapitation.26

As far as I know, J. Bury has been the only historian who has attempted to interpretthis execution of the eminent prisoners, albeit without paying attention to the exactmoment the execution was decided. He argued that their execution should not beattributed only to religious intolerance (which he takes for granted), but that it mightbe considered that caliph al-Mu¨tasΩim and, later on, his successor al-Wathiq (227–232/842–847) tried in this way, by presenting the adoption of Islam as the only way tofreedom, to pressurise the Byzantines in order to get from them an extremely highransom.27

However, we have already seen that Theophilos had offered a ransom for theprisoners, which was rejected by al-Mu¨tasΩim. We must now look at the possibility thatthe caliph’s aim was the great impression that the conversion of these eminent captiveswould have made on the Christian and Islamic world. As has been mentioned before(p. 141), one of the prisoners, Konstantinos Baboutzikos, was closely related to theimperial family and according to the sources28 other relatives of Theophilos as well as amember of the important and powerful family of Melissenoi, the tourmarches andspatharios Kallistos were included.29 One way or another, by changing the prisoners’ faithor extracting a very high ransom, the caliph would have been the winner of this conèict.

Additionally, we must not overlook the possibility of exchanging the prisoners foreminent Arab ones, whose presence at the exchange that énally took place in 845, isclearly declared by TΩ abarõ.30 There was also the possibility of exchanging one of themfor a great number of non-eminent Arab prisoners. This was the case of a Byzantinepatrician, who was exchanged for 1000 Muslims in 860.31 Whatever the case, therefusal of the 42 prisoners to change their faith did not decrease their bargaining valuefor the caliph, especially if the prospects of the exchange were already visible. Subse-quently, the decision of al-Wathiq to execute them at that speciéc moment (beginningof March 845) seems to be both illogical and almost inexplicable. The fact that thecaliphate authorities kept in their hands much fewer Byzantine prisoners than theByzantines had Arabs, makes this decision even more difécult to interpret.32

The relations between Byzantium and the Caliphate around the end of 844 and thebeginning of 845 do not justify any action of revenge or exemplary punishment fromthe Arab side. Theoktistos’s expedition versus Amer (¨Amr al-AqtΩa¨, amõr of Meliteneaccording to Vasiliev) in the year 844, who had invaded the Byzantine state, failed andthe Arabs won an important victory, whereas Theoktistos’s Byzantine army returned toConstantinople.33 Therefore, the caliph had every reason to feel bullish towards the

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Byzantines, who had been seriously defeated two more times during the year 843: onein Crete, when Theoktistos unsuccessfully attempted to re-conquer the island, and theother one in the West, when Messina was captured. Moreover, next year (844), twomore cities and fortresses of Sicily were captured by the Arabs, despite the vigorousresistance of the Byzantines.34 Because of all this, the Byzantine government decided tosend a deputation to the caliph al-Wathiq requesting peace and an exchange ofprisoners.35

Negotiation Procedures for the Exchange of the Year 845

Is it possible to determine, even approximately, the time the Byzantines sent thedeputation, giving special consideration to the time of the prisoners’ execution? Tabarõis once more our basic source, as the Byzantine sources do not refer to this exchangeat all. However, the Arab historian just quotes successively six different testimonies,thus making the researcher’s work even more difécult.

According to AhΩmad b. Abõ QahΩ tΩaba’s testimony, the eunuch Khaqan al-Khadimwas ordered by al-Wathiq to accomplish the exchange. He started around the end of230/18 September–6 September 845 in order to be ready on 16 September 845, the dayon which it had been agreed with the Byzantine ambassadors to exchange the prisoners.Further on, the same eye witness, who was a companion of the eunuch Khaqan – statesthat he went to Constantinople to investigate the number of the Arab prisoners thatwere kept in the Byzantine prisons and found 3000 men and 500 women.36

Supposing, based on AhΩmad’s testimony, that Khaqan started preparing the ex-change during August or even July 845 (at the end of 230 AH37) AhΩmad should by thenhave returned from Constantinople with his report concerning the number of Muslimprisoners. It must be noted that the number of Muslims reported by the Arab delegate,was considerably higher compared to that of Byzantine prisoners kept by the caliph.This obliged the caliph not only to buy out from their masters all the Byzantineprisoners that had already been sold, but also to dispose of all the Byzantine womenprisoners, who had been kept at his personal service in his palace.38

It is obvious that the tracking down of an unknown number of Byzantine prisonerssold as slaves39 in several places, as well as the negotiations to buy them must have beenextremely time consuming. Therefore, at least one month should have been needed forthe gathering together of the prisoners. Subsequently, AhΩmad should have returnedfrom his journey to the Byzantine capital between June and July. The duration ofAhΩmad’s journey from Samarra to Constantinople and the way back could be approx-imately estimated on the basis of the route he followed and the speed he moved at.

If we suppose that the Arab delegate and his escort followed the route of Samarra –Takrõt–Mossoul–Amida–Melitene (Malatya) (through Samosata), a journey that lasted27 days and then went from Melitene to Constantinople (through Kaesareia–Koloneia–Aspona–Ankara–Nikomedia) in a time-span of another 27 days, travelling without hasteand with the assistance of imperial services as was common practice in Byzantium, wecan conclude that AhΩmad needed almost two months to go and another two to return,i.e. approximately four months.

In case he followed the route via Tarsus [Samarra–Takrõt–Anbar–Raqqa–Balis–Ier-apolis (Manbidj)–Tarsus ( 5 42 days) and Tarsus–Constantinople ( 5 949 km: averagespeed 45 km/day supported by the public road services 5 21 days), he would haveneeded a total of 63 days to reach Constantinople and another 63 days to return, i.e.again approximately four months.40

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The latter route must be considered the most probable, since it was the road systemof Kappadokia that was mostly used by Byzantine and Arab delegations in the middleof the ninth and in the tenth century41 and the SE–NW route via Asia Minor wasgenerally preferred. In any case, whatever route had been used by the Arab delegation,as there existed much more than the two above mentioned, the divergence in time andkilometres between them was, it seems, rather small. Thus, the estimated duration ofthe journey from Samarra to Constantinople, mentioned above, remains approximatelyfour months.

By comparison, AhΩmad’s stay in Constantinople cannot be so easily estimated but itcould not have been particularly brief, due to the fact that he had to investigate everyprison, not only in town42 but in other places, so as to locate all the Muslim prisoners.Additionally, he had to meet with the Emperor (in this case Augusta Theodora) inorder to clarify the precise demands of the latter, according to TΩ abarõ.43

Taking as a sample the delegation of “Saracen friends”, which is described in the Decerimoniis aulae byzantinae (by Konstantinos VII Porphyrogennetos) who stayed in thecapital from May till at least 30 August 946,44 we can consider that AhΩmad spent atleast three months in Constantinople.45 It is possible, however, that the prolonged stayof the former delegates in Constantinople was the result of certain particularities ordiféculties of their mission.

As can be seen from TΩ abarõ’s account, the preliminary agreement concerning theexchange had been made; therefore the role of the Arab delegate was very concrete.However, AhΩmad could not have stayed in the Byzantine capital for less than a month.Bearing these estimations in mind, we can assume that AhΩmad started his journey atleast éve months before June–July 845, i.e. during January–February. This means thatthe agreement for the exchange of the prisoners had been achieved at least one monthbefore as there would be a necessary time interval for the preparation of the longjourney of the delegation, between December 844 and January 845. Subsequently, it isclear that the Byzantine ofécers had been executed at the beginning of March, when thecaliph’s delegate was on his way to the capital of the Empire.46

Once it has been established that the Byzantines had in no way challenged the Arabs,that the negotiations concerning the exchange had already begun, and that the numberof the Arab prisoners kept in Byzantium exceeded that of the Byzantines imprisoned bythe Arabs, it is in the internal situation of the Caliphate that one must seek for thereasons which drove al-Wathiq to this seemingly unjustiéed decision. Moreover, itshould be considered that the ofécial execution of prisoners, in particular the eminentones, because they refused to convert to Islam, did not seem to be common practice inthe Caliphate. As can be derived from the testimonies of the sources on this subject, inorder to achieve the conversion of Christian prisoners to Islam, the Arabs’ usualpractice was restricted to the use of execution threats, imprisonment hardships andother actions of a similar nature. These actions sometimes resulted in the conversion ofthe Byzantine prisoners or they died from hardship or through assassination, if weaccept the testimony of the Greek sources about the way of death of Konstantinos, sonof Bardas Phokas, as mentioned previously.47

Religious and Political Developments in the Caliphate

Al-Wathiq followed his father, al-Mu¨tasΩim, politically, not only in the way of governingthe Caliphate but in the domain of religion as well. Al-Mu¨tasΩim had introduced theinstitution of the “slave soldiers”, purchasing slaves and assembling a low in number,

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but well trained, disciplined and particularly capable éghting corps, which in combi-nation with his strong personality had secured him the succession to the throne after thedeath of his brother al-Ma©mun (198–218/813–833). In this way he had created amilitary elite, which consisted of the Caliphate’s regional groups (such as Turks,Armenians, Barbarians) and was, therefore, cut off from the rest of Arab society, byreason of origins, language, customs and traditions.

Additionally, this new “aristocracy” took the place of the old one, which hadincluded mainly the descendants of Arab warriors, who had contributed to the con-quests and therefore enjoyed special economic privileges such as a special salary, ‘atΩa’,from the conquered regions, not only in the army but also in the governing of theprovinces.48

All these actions coupled with the effort on behalf of al-Mu¨tasΩim to impose a newideology based on the theological views of the progressive Mu¨tazila quite expectedlyprovoked several reactions.

The Mu¨tazilite doctrine, a religious movement which made its appearance in Basrain the érst half of the second/eighth century, refers to God’s nature and “attributes”and purports that God is invisible not only in this world but in the other as well. Itpromotes man’s free will, rejects the notion that destiny is pre-imposed by God andconsiders the Qur’an as God’s creation and not “uncreated” and “internal along withGod”.49

This doctrine, applied in the life of the Islamic community, something which, it isworth noting, the Mu¨tazila were deeply interested in, enabled the imam, the religiousand political leader, to determine and extend revelation and tradition (Qur©an andsunna), so that they could be adapted to the demands of different periods and could bereplaced according to the judgement of the imam led by God.50

The érst leader who brought this kind of theological thought to the political scene inearly 827, was al-Ma©mun, the predecessor of al-Mu¨tasΩim. In 833, shortly before hisdeath, he announced that this doctrine was to be accepted by the government function-aries, the Muslim “jurists” (the scholars of the Islamic law) and teachers. Thus, heimposed an “interrogation”, a “trial” (mihΩna), the aim of which was to ascertain,whether they accepted this doctrine or not, and were, subsequently, devoted to thecaliph, the central point being the matter of the creation of the Qur©an by God.51

The main goal of al-Ma©mun and his successors was the reconciliation of severalopposite religious–political groups that existed in the Caliphate. Nevertheless, thisdoctrine caused resistance, particularly in Baghdad, which intensiéed during al-Mu¨tasΩim’s reign and was related to the opposition and discontent about the creationand support on behalf of al-Mu¨tasΩim of this new military and governmental elite,mentioned above, and to the religious intolerance of al-Mu¨tasΩim regarding theinèiction of Mu¨tazilite doctrine.52 The theological and political matters became sogreatly interlinked, that the admittance of this doctrine could also mean the acceptanceof the new political tendencies. Vice versa, any rejection could suggest oppositiontowards the new military and political elite.

Al-Wathiq’s Policy

Nevertheless, the one who imposed the procedure of “interrogation” with greater force,was the son and successor of al-Mu¨tasΩim, al-Wathiq. The testimonies concerning hispersonality are not at all èattering: he was lustful, voluptuous, a drunkard, leading a lifeof sin who had left the government of his country in the hands of three superior ofécers,

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who oppressed the people by imposing heavy taxes and ruled with great cruelty. BarHebraeus’ reference to the sufferings and the economic “drainage” that “jurists” hadbeen exposed to, clearly depicts the violence of the measures that al-Wathiq took inorder to impose the Mu¨tazilite doctrine.53

Perhaps a more realistic description of the way in which al-Wathiq was oppressing hispeople is clearly given by TΩ abarõ: in the year 231/845–6 the caliph ordered all theinhabitants of the cities close to the frontiers to be “interrogated” (mihΩna) about thecreation of the Qur©an. Four of them, who rejected the creation, were beheaded,whereas the rest of them were presented with gifts. Furthermore, during the prisoners’exchange in September of 845, al-Wathiq ordered the “interrogation” of the Muslimswho were about to be exchanged. Everyone who accepted the basic principles ofMu¨tazila’s doctrine, was exchanged. The rest were left in the hands of the Byzantines.According to Mas¨udõ (d. 345/956–7), many prisoners chose to return to the Byzantineterritory rather than give up and accept these conditions.54

The gradually increasing opposition to the caliph’s politics was manifested in Bagh-dad, where there was a movement organised under the leadership of AhΩmad b. NasΩral-Khuza©õ (d. 231/846). One of Baghdad’s most important personalities, he was a stoutsupporter of the traditional orthodox Islamic doctrine, as represented by AhΩmad b.HΩ anbal (d. 241/856) and who belonged to the group of old “aristocratic” Arab families,which had lost their political power. Al-Khuza©õ’s strong proéle, as can be derived fromTΩ abarõ’s detailed description of the events, established him as the leader of themovement against al-Wathiq. However, the plot was discovered on the eve of the daythat the revolt was to take place and al-Khuza©õ was arrested and driven in front of thecaliph, facing the accusation of heresy, not treachery. Answering al-Wathiq’s relevantquestion, he refused to recognise the Qur©an as a creation, thus provoking the caliph’srage. The caliph himself gave him a fatal wound with his sword and afterwards orderedhis body to be hanged in the centre of the city as an example. Al-Khuza©õ’s movementcan be characterised as a political–religious one, because it represented opposition toboth the prevalence of the slave mercenaries, mainly the Turks, and to the coerciveimposition of the caliph’s religious views.

However, the caliph laid greater emphasis on the dogmatic views of his opponent, ascan also be inferred from the fact, that on the scaffold, where al-Khuza©õ’s body washanged, there was placed an inscription presenting him as, “faithless polytheist, anddeviated (from the true faith)” (the translation belongs to J. Kraemer), because he hadrejected the doctrine imposed by the caliph, without though referring to AhΩmad as a“traitor”. In this way the religious dimension of the movement was particularlyhighlighted while the political one was suppressed, showing that the caliph consideredthe former to be much more important than the latter, and made his intention toimpose his theological views quite clear. At the same time, he gave a good example tothe supporters of the orthodox dogma.55

According to the sources, al-Khuza©õ’s movement took place in the year 231/7September 845 – 28 August 846, while its repression and the execution of its protagon-ist (who was later recognised as a martyr of faith) took place in April 846, a year afterthe execution of the Byzantine eminent prisoners. The build up to this movement,which had been the most serious one al-Wathiq was faced with during his reign,56 amovement which was mainly the outcome of increasing opposition to his religiouspolicy, must have started much earlier and the government of Samarra must have beenaware of the reactions caused by the “interrogation”, violently imposed by the caliph.

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The Execution of the Byzantine Ofécers

Attempting an Interpretation

While feelings of discontent, caused by the pressure exerted by the caliph in religiousmatters combined with the following up of his father’s politics towards the newmilitary elite, were getting sharper, there was at the same time a lot of turmoilin the Arab peninsula (around Medina) which énally became a revolt that lasted twoyears (230–231/18 September 844–28 August 846). The main reason for this revolt wasthe conèict between the powerful tribe of Banu Sulaym and the other Arab tribes,concerning the exerting of inèuence on the price formation in the markets of HΩ ijaz andthe control of the roads leading the pilgrims to Mecca and Medina, which crossed theSulaym area.57

The decision to execute the 42 Byzantine ofécers was taken at the same difécultperiod so it is possible to see this action as a demonstration of power on behalf of thecaliph, who tried in this way to make clear his determination to enforce his policymainly concerning the matters of religion.

Two points seem to support this assumption. First of all, the most important pointis that, according to most of the Martyrion texts, special publicity was given to theimminent event of the execution, particularly after the énal refusal of the prisoners toaccept the caliph’s faith. Thus, instead of being beheaded in Tarsus prison, where Iinferred they were kept,58 the prisoners were led to an area on the banks of the Tigrisriver,59 where they were executed in front of the caliph and an enormous crowd ofMuslims and Christians, who gathered there from all over the caliphate.60

In Martyrion texts A, Z and M it is clearly stated that the Byzantine ofécers were kepttogether with the rest of the prisoners and the Arabs picked them out from this crowdjust before they made the last attempt to persuade them to follow Islam.61 Thus, shortlybefore the execution, they were kept in the same prison with other captives and werenot transferred to the capital. Their transportation must have fallen within the scope ofthe pursued publicity, which would be of use to the caliph in both cases: either if thehigh ranked Byzantines converted to Islam (in the doctrine supported by al-Wathiq) inpublic or, in the opposite case, if they were executed.62 The inèux of not only Christiansbut also Arabs to the place of execution is probably an indication that the caliph aimedat passing his message to the latter as well, if not mainly to them.63

The presence of the caliph himself at the prisoners’ execution place at the banks ofthe Tigris is witnessed by the texts constituting the second group (Martyrion texts B, C ,D , P). According to these texts, the caliph reached the place by boat. The texts of theérst group (A, Z, M) give the information that the ’a´qvx

nso

npqxsort

l

bot´kot (possiblythe vizier Ibn al-Zayyat (d. 233/847), the second in rank after al-Wathiq),64 was orderedby the Arab sovereign to be present at the execution. Besides, the case of AhΩmad b.NasΩr al-Khuza’õ indicates that the caliph is present at the execution of his importantopponents.65

It is also worth noting that in the cases of both the martyrs and the Arab mutineers,the caliph demanded from the prisoners a public declaration of conversion (to his ownreligious doctrine). Whatever the case, in my opinion, the presence of either the caliphhimself or his vizier and the way they publicised the event show the particularimportance that the Samarra government gave to the execution of the eminent Byzan-tine prisoners.

Moreover, the caliph’s great interest in the conversion of the Byzantine prisoners isalso apparent in the fact that his representatives, following his commands, urged the

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captives to accept the circumcision and to pray together with al-Wathiq. They promisedthem that in this way they could be saved and become rich, while they could escapeduring a future battle between Arabs and Byzantines (which means they would beallowed to escape) and return as “fugitives to their religion and nation”.66 Thisinformation, preserved in the texts of a common group (A) and also provided byTheophanes Continuatus,67 could of course be considered as coming from the authorsof those Martyrion texts, who were attempting in this way to emphasize even more thesacriéce of the martyrs in resisting such a tempting offer. However, estimating theabove mentioned information together with the rest of the data concerning al-Wathiq’sreligious policy makes it quite plausible and presents the picture of an Arab leader who,in spite of vehement opposition from his own people, wants to impose his own religiousviews. So even a temporary acceptance of Islam by the Byzantine prisoners would bea valuable propoganda tool and would have strengthened his position.

The authors of the Martyrion texts, trying to praise the refusal of the Byzantineprisoners to accept Islam, express in a way the caliph’s real aim. Thus, they write thatal-Wathiq considered that the prisoners’ change of faith would bring him much moreglory than the capture of the great and wealthy city of Amorion,68 thereby revealinginadvertently, the great importance the whole matter had for the Arab leader.

I think that this point of view is supported by the reference to the crowd inèux, whichis made in all the texts of the Martyrion belonging to group A and additionally in textsB and C of group B and which must have been the result of the announcement of theforthcoming event by the caliph himself.

Aetios, the General of the Anatolikon thema

Before completing this attempt to interpret the event of the execution of the 42 eminentByzantine prisoners (6 March 845), who were declared martyrs a year after theirmartyrdom,69 it is necessary to refer to the fate of the chief of Amorion’s defendingforces, Aetios.

The information about Aetios is restricted to the statements of the historians andchronographers, who describe the siege and the capture of Amorion. They refer to himas a patrician and general of the Anatolikon thema and as one of the ofécers, who werecaptured while defending the city of Amorion. There is also a reference to Aetios on aninscription in a temple devoted to the Virgin Mary at Sivrihisar (south of Nazianzos)and another one on a seal, attributed to him by G. Schlumberger.70 Despite the factthat certain historical sources refer to the event of his capture together with the rest ofthe military leaders and that their authors consider that he suffered the martyrdomtogether with them, his name is absent from the Martyrion texts of the latter.71

Among these texts, only A and B bear in their title the names of éve of the martyrs(Theodoros Krateros, Konstantinos Baboutzikos, Kallistos Melissenos, Theophilos andVassois) and C bears those of three of them (Theodoros, Konstantinos, Kallistos). Theremaining thirty-seven of the martyrs are referred to as “their escort” (rt

nod

«i´a at

’sx˜ n).

In the Martyrion texts themselves nominal references are made only to the éve:Theodoros Krateros [in A, B, C , D , Z, M, P; he was the érst who suffered martyrdomaccording to all the texts apart from text E, where his name is not mentioned at all,while Theophanes Continuatus (p. 115 [lines 12–14]), presents him as “the leader ofthe phalanx of the forty-two martyrs”], Konstantinos Baboutzikos (in A, C , D , E, Z, M,P), Vassois (in A, B, C , D , E, Z, M, P), Kalllistos Melissenos (in C , D , E, P) and

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Theophilos (C , D , E, P). Therefore, it is clear, that Aetios was not among the 42martyrs.72

This fact becomes more obvious in the passage of Martyrion text D , where, just afterthe description of protospatharios Theodoros Krateros’ beheading, there are given thenames of the remaining four of the above mentioned (and evidently most eminentamong the Byzantine captives) martyrs in the order in which they had been beheaded.The order in which the author of this text refers to the martyrs, is correlated totheir ofécial titles: patrician Konstantinos (Baboutzikos), protospatharios Theophilos,spatharios (protospatharios according to text P) Kallistos Melissenos, dromeus (“runner”)Vassois, who were followed by the rest of the prisoners.73 If patrician Aetios hadbeen included in the executed Byzantine captives, the texts would at least, havementioned his name while describing their execution. In that case he should have beenreferred to érst, as being the general of the Anatolikon thema, he was the head ofthe forces defending the besieged headquarters of the Anatolikon thema, the city ofAmorion.

On the other hand, some of the Greek historiographic and/or chronographic sourcesdo add Aetios to the 42 martyrs,74 whereas some others make a discernable differen-tiation between Aetios and the rest of the army leaders, who were among the forty-twomartyrs.75 Ioannes Skylitzes76 mentions only three out of the éve leaders by name[including Kallistos Melissenos, who, however, was captured not in Amorion but whileéghting against Paulicians considerably later (844/845)77], but leaves out Aetios andTheophilos; Ioannes Zonaras,78 in his turn, referring to the Amorion’s defenders,names only Theodoros Krateros, while concerning the executed leaders, he mentionsthe same martyrs as Skylitzes does. It should, therefore, be considered, that Aetios wascaptured together with the remaining Byzantine defenders of Amorion, during the fallof the city.

The evidence for this is derived not only from the Greek sources but also from thedetailed description of the capture of Aetios given by TΩ abarõ: A section of the Byzantinearmy was lost in èames, éghting obstinately around (or inside) a big church that hadbeen set on ére by the Arabs. After that, Aetios gathered around him all those soldiersof his army still alive together with the Byzantine citizens and continued to éght in thetower, till everyone was either killed or injured. Then, surrounded by the Arabs led byal-Mu¨tasΩim himself, he was forced to give up his sword and surrender.79

TΩ abarõ makes one more reference to Aetios’ name – when stating that the latter wascruciéed together with the Hourramite revolutionary Babak at Samarra during 224/23November 838 to 11 November 839.80

However, TΩ abarõ suggests that Babak was arrested in 223/3 December 837 to 22November 838 and was cruelly executed in public on the 4 January 838. The sameauthor does not mention at all Aetios’ concurrent execution or even his presence.81

Apparently TΩ abarõ could not correlate the two executions, as Aetios was captured eightmonths later, on the 13 or 15 August of the same year. On the other hand, Mas¨udõdoes not say explicitly that the two men were simultaneously executed, but that Aetios’and Babak’s bodies were hanging at the same place.82 Therefore, we must consider thatAetios was executed between August 838 and November 839 and accept that TΩ abarõ,or his source, got the impression that both men were executed simultaneously due tothe common place of their execution and of the exposure of their bodies. The timedeviation between the two executions does not seem to present a problem, since TΩ abarõstates that AhΩmad b. NasΩr al-Khuza©õ’s body, who, as mentioned above, was executedin 231/845–846 at Samarra, was left hanging in common view as an example till

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237/851–852, when caliph al-Mutawakkil ordered it to be rendered to his relatives sothat they could bury it!83

Thus, it has become obvious that the general of the Anatolikon thema and leader ofthe military forces that had defended Amorion, was not executed together with the restof the forty-two prisoners. This is proved by the total absence of any reference to hisname in the Martyrion texts,84 while those of the other leaders are mentioned, if notalways together, i.e. those of Theodoros Krateros, Konstantinos Baboutzikos,Theophilos, Kallistos Melissenos and Vassois. The reasons for Aetios’ execution,almost one year after his capture, that means éve years earlier than the rest of theeminent captives, still remain unknown.

Summarizing the Proposed Interpretation

Analysis of the data outlined above has led to certain interesting conclusions, which aresummarised as follows:(a) A common standard tactic of both Byzantines and Arabs was to keep alive the

prisoners belonging to higher military and political rank, so that they could beexchanged. Sometimes they were exchanged for a great number of non-eminentprisoners, soldiers mainly, or simple citizens (this could be as much as 1 for 1000)or they were bought off for high ransom. In spite of this, the Arabs in the case underdiscussion decided on and conducted the execution of the 42 eminent prisonersafter having kept them imprisoned for the long period of six and a half years.

(b) The caliph decided to execute them, although negotiations concerning the ex-change of prisoners had already started. It is a fact that the Arabs could earn muchmore by exchanging the Byzantine eminent prisoners, as they, the Arabs, possessedfar fewer prisoners than the Byzantines did.

(c) There is no evidence in favour of the supposition that this execution was conductedas an action of revenge or for exemplary reasons.

(d) The dating of the execution of the martyrs in the year 845 cannot be questioned,neither can the reference to the seven years of their imprisonment be attributed tothe “magical” properties of number “seven”.

(e) The execution of prisoners in public, as a punishment for their refusal to convertto Islam, was not, as it seems, common practice.

(f) The caliph al-Wathiq encountered several reactions against his internal policy,which, from the year 844 up to 846, resulted in several revolutions in the Arabicpeninsula.

(g) The caliph’s attempt to impose the Mu¨tazila doctrine violently was met with strongresistance, mainly in the area of Baghdad. The reactions culminated in the organ-isation of a conspiracy movement, which was revealed (April 846) and its leader,AhΩmad b. NasΩr al-Khuza’õ, was executed. He mainly faced the charge of refusingto make a public statement of faith to the above-mentioned doctrine and was,therefore, executed.

(h) Not only was AhΩmad b. NasΩr al-Khuza’õ ordered to accept the Mu¨tazila doctrine,but the eminent Byzantine prisoners were also to state their conversion in publicand to pray together with the caliph.

(i) The caliph himself (or the second in rank authority) was present at thedecapitation of the Byzantines.

(j) The forty-two prisoners were moved from Tarsus to Samarra, where the Arabsasked

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them for the last time to change their religion. Their transportation to a place some42 days walking distance must have been caused by very serious reasons.

(k) If the special publicity that was given to the forthcoming execution of the Byzantinecaptives is combined with points (e) to (i), then it will be quite clear that theexemplary punishment of the Byzantines, who refused to renounce their faith andaccept in public the faith of Islam and more particularly the heretical form of theMu¨tazila doctrine, in the presence of the crowd, must have been of great import-ance for al-Wathiq.

The combination of all the above mentioned data leads to the following conclusions:What should be accepted as the only possible explanation for the public decapitation ofthe eminent Byzantine prisoners after six and a half years of imprisonment and whennegotiations for an exchange had already begun, is the fact that the caliph badly neededto demonstrate his power to his subjects. This need for a show of power on the part ofthe Arab sovereign was caused by the uprisings and general turmoil in his territory, oneof the main reasons for which was the coercive imposition of the doctrine taught by theprogressive Mu¨tazila.85 Thus, we should consider that the decision which led theprisoners to martyrdom, was due to the need of Samarra’s authorities to either cause adistraction or to give a strong warning to those opposing their policy.

NOTES1. According to some sources the city was captured on the 12 or 13 August. For the events of the siege

and capture of Amorion see A. Vasiliev (ed. M. Canard et al.), Byzance et les Arabes, I, La dynastied’Amorium (Bruxelles, 1935) (hereafter: Vasiliev, I), pp. 160–171 and J.H. Rosser, Theophilus “theUnlucky” (829 to 842): A Study of the Tragic and Brilliant Reign of Byzantium’s Last Iconoclastic Emperor(1972), pp. 231–241. For the date see as above, p. 170 and note 3, and Ath. Markopoulos, “The lifeof the Empress Theodora (BHG 1731)”, Symmeikta, 5 (1983): 249–285, at pp. 279–280.

2. See Martyrion text B in: V. Vasilievskij and P. Nikitin, Skazania o 42 amoriiskich mucenikach[Memoires de l’Academie Imperiale des Siences de St. Petersbourg, VIIIe Serie, v. V, No. 2] (St.Petersbourg, 1905) (hereafter: Vasilievskij–Nikitin; for the edition of the Martyrion texts A–Z,hereafter: Martyrion text A, B, C , D , E, Z.), 11 (lines 12–16); text D , 42 (lines 4–6); Martyrion textM [ed. Sophia Kotzambassi, “So l

aqst´qio sx

n l

b9 l

aqst´qx

nsot

Al

oqiót. Aciokocija´ jai

t

lnokocija´ j«i´l«n

a” (The martyrdom of the forty-two martyrs of Amorion. Hagiological andhymnological texts), Epistemonike Epeteris Philosophikes Scholes Aristoteleiou Panepistemiou Thessa-lonikes, periodos B9, Tmema Philologias, volume II (Thessalonike, 1992), pp. 109–153 (hereafter:Kotzambassi). Edition of the text in pp. 131–148, hereafter: Martyrion text M)], Ch. 12 (lines4–8), Ch. 15 (lines 11–12). Cf. Ioannes Skylitzes, ed. I. Thurn, Ioannis Scylitzae SynopsisHistoriarum [CFHB 5] (Berlin–New York, 1973) (hereafter: Skylitzes), p. 78 (line 34) (g‘ sx˜ n «‘xΩx

npo´k«x

ndiapq«p«rs«qa); Ya‘qubõ, in: Vasiliev, I (hereafter: Ya‘qubõ), p. 275. According to Michael

the Syrian: Amorion “gathered the population and wealth of many other cities [Chronique de Michelle Syrien, partiarche jacobite d’Antioche (1166–1199), ed. J.-B. Chabot, volume III (Bruxelles, 1963;érst published Paris, 1905), hereafter: Michael the Syrian], p. 100. See Sp. Vryonis, The Declineof the Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamisation from the Eleventh through theFifteenth Centuries (Berkeley–Los Angeles–London, 1971), pp. 20–21 and mainly C.S. Lightfoot,“The survival of cities in Byzantine Anatolia: the case of Amorium”, Hommage a la memoire de JulesLabarbe, Byzantion, 68 (1998): 56–71, mainly 56, 58–60.

3. Theophanes Continuatus, X qonocqa

fiá, ed. I Bekker, Theophanes Continuatus … [CSHB] (Bonnae,

1838) (hereafter: Theoph. Cont.), p. 126 (lines 3–15); Skylitzes, 75 (lines 36–41). Cf. also withPseudo-Symeon, X qonocqa

fiá, ed. I Bekker, in Theophanes Continuatus … , as above (hereafter:

Pseudo-Symeon), pp. 638 (line 23)–639 (line 4); Georgius Monachus Continuatus, Biói sx˜ n n«x

nbarik«x

n, ed. I. Bekker, Vitae imperatorum recentiorum in Theophanes Continuatus … , as above(hereafter: Georg. Monachos Cont.), p. 805 (lines 14–19), where there is also mentioned thetourmarches of Koloneia, Kallistos Melissenos (see also note 29), the dromeus (“runner”) Vassois (seenote 73) and many other leaders of the Byzantine army. Ioannes Zonaras, ©Episol

g` Ïrsoqix˜ n, ed.Th. Buttner-Wobst, Epitomae Historiarum, [CSHB] volume III (Bonnae, 1897) (hereafter: Zonaras),

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pp. 377 (lines 12–17), 379 (lines 1–4), also mentions Kallistos, whereas he omits Aetios’s name(about Aetios, see below, pp. 151–153). Concerning the martyrs’ personality, see the commentsof P. Nikitin, in: Vasilievskij–Nikitin, 202–219, in particular at 204–205 (Theodoros Krateros, whohe regards as the general of the Boukellarioi), 208–210 (Vassois), 212–214 (KonstantinosVavoutzikos), 215 (Theophilos), 215–218 (Kallistos); R. Guilland, Recherches sur les institutionsbyzantines [Berliner Byzantinische Arbeiten 35] (Berlin–Amsterdam, 1967), I: 568–569 (Aetios,Vavoutzikos), II: 101 (Theophilos, Krateros); H.-J. Kuhn, Die byzantinische Armee im 10. und 11.Jahrhundert [Byzantinische Geschichtsschreiber 2] (Wien, 1991), pp. 88 (Kallistos), 99(Theophilos), 107 (Vavoutzikos), 112 (Aetios); Vassiliki Vlyssidou, Eleonora Kountoura-Galaki,St. Lampakis, T. Lounghis, A. Savvides, H Mijqa´ Ariá sx

nh«l

a´sx

n. ¡Eq«t

n«Ö pańx rsg

c«xcqa

fijg´ f

trioc

nx

l

iá jai pqorxpocqa

fiá sx

nbt

za

nsi

nx´ n

h«l

a´sx

nsgÖ M

ijqa´Ö AriáÖ (7o

Ö–11o

Ö

ai.) (Asia Minor of the “Themata”. Researches on the Geography and Prosopography of theByzantine “Themata” of Asia Minor (7–11th century)) [Ereunetike Bibliotheke 1] (Athens, 1998),pp. 354 (Aetios), 210, 254, 409, 432 (Theodoros Krateros), 322, 486 (Kallistos Melissenos). Cf.Vasiliev, I: 147 with note 1, 171, 230; Rosser, 208, note 39 and 242, note 129. For the totalnumber of the Byzantine troops that defended Amorion, see W. Treadgold, The Byzantine Revival780–842 (Stanford, Calif., 1988), pp. 298 (note 408, concerning the leading ofécers and the rankof Theodoros Krateros ), 301, 303.

4. Skylitzes, 78 (lines 35–38); see also Ath. Markopoulos, 263, paragraph 7 (lines 1–4); Martyriontext A, 1 (lines 14–15): jai` pań

saÖ a

’naiq«i˜ l

avai´qaΩ, sot´Ö s« rsqasix´ saÖ sot´Ö s« poki´saÖ (“and heknifed to death everyone, both soldiers and citizens”); text D , 42 (line 28)–44 (line 12); text Z, 65(lines 4–10); text M, Ch. 12 (lines 36–41); text P (ed. Fr. Halkin, Hagiologie byzantine [Bruxelles,1986], hereafter: P), pp. 156–157; Theoph. Cont., 129 (line 13)–131 (line 7); Ioseph Genesios,B

arik«iãi, ed. A. Lesmuller-Werner and I. Thurn, Iosephi Genesii Regum Libri Quattuor [CFHB 14](hereafter: Genesios), pp. 45 (line 51)–46 (line 84); Pseudo-Symeon, 638 (line 12)–639 (line 4);Georg. Monachos Cont., as above; Michael the Syrian, 99–101; Bar Hebraeus, The Chronographyof Gregory Abu’l-Faraj 1225–1286 … known as Bar Hebraeus, ed. and trans. E.W. Budge (London,1932) (Amsterdam) (hereafter: Bar Hebraeus), p. 137; TΩ abarõ (trans. C.E. Bosworth, The Historyof al-TΩ abarõ, XXXIII (Albany, 1991) (hereafter: TΩ abarõ, XXXIII), pp. 115–116. Concerning therest of Arabic sources see: Vasiliev, I: 268, 269, 275, 330–332, 348, 352, 372, 386, 387, 388.

5. Concerning the total number and the fate of the imprisoned citizens and defenders of Amorion,see Athina Kolia-Dermitzaki, “Some remarks on the fate of prisoners of war in Byzantium (9–10thcenturies”), in La liberazione dei ‘captivi’ tra Cristianita e Islam. Oltre la Crociata e il GÏ ihad:Tolleranza e Servizio Umanitario. Atti del Congresso interdisciplinare di studi storici (Roma 16–19settembre 1998), ed. G. Cipollone [Collectanea Archivi Vaticani 46] (Citta del Vaticano, 2000),pp. 583–620 (hereafter: Kolia-Dermitzaki, “Remarks”), on pp. 590–592. Of the 42 martyrs’Martyrion text (A, 2 [lines 32–34] and Z, 67 [lines 16–18] and M, 138 [lines 11–12]) mention70,000 imprisoned Byzantine soldiers, a number corresponding to the whole of Theophilos’expedition army, and not only to the troops that were sent to Amorion (see also above, note 3).

6. See TΩ abarõ, XXXIII: 119, who refers to the arrival of al-Mu‘tasΩim at Tarsus, without making clearif the prisoners stayed there, or if they were immediately transported to Samarra. However, compareMartyrion text P, 157–158 (after the prisoners had been imprisoned for seven years, probably inTarsus, where they suffered great misfortunes together with the other prisoners from Amorion, theywere transported to another prison near the Tigris river, apparently in the capital which was built onthe river), text A, 1 (lines 15–16), 6 (lines 13–15), text Z, 65 (lines 11–12), 75 (lines 15–17), text M,Ch. 12 (lines 42–43) and Ch. 36 (lines 1–3) (simply that the caliph transported them to his country,imprisoned them, and from there “they were dragged to the slaughter place”); text B, 12 (lines28–30), 13 (lines 6–10) (he imprisoned them in his city, but after their refusal to revert they were sentto him); text C , 29 (lines 29–33) (in Syria); text D , 44 (lines 9–12), 44 (line 27)–45 (line 5), 45 (lines17–26) (initially, he sent them together with the rest of the prisoners to the “public prison”, afterseven years he invited them to his palace and, after their refusal, he sent them to the execution place,that was about 15 hours walk). Although the name of Tarsus is not stated as the imprisonment placeof the eminent prisoners of war, all the above mentioned references lead to the conclusion, that theprisoners were kept there until a short period of time before their execution. Besides, they were meantfor the exchange that usually took place at the river Lamos, a few kilometers away from Tarsus, thecity where the Byzantine prisoners, who were about to be exchanged, were kept (see F. Hild-H.Hellenkemper, Kilikien und Isaurien [Tabula Imperii Byzantini 5] (Wien, 1990), p. 330. Therefore,their immediate transport to Samarra, in the area of Mesopotamia, would have been totally meaning-less. See also, p. 150.

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7. M. Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore, 1955), pp. 127–128; E. Graf,“Religiose und rechtliche Vorstellungen uber Kriegsgefangene in Islam und Christentum”, DieWelt des Islams, N.S., 8 (1962–63): 89–139 (104ff, 111ff); Rashad A. Khouri al Odetallah, ‘Aqab«Öjai

Bt

za

nsi

noi´. So pqo´bkg

l

a sx

naiv

l

akx´ sx

npok«lot (Arabs and Byzantines. The Problem of the

Prisoners of War) (Thessalonike, 1983), p. 27. Cf. Kolia-Dermitzaki, “Remarks”, 601–605 and therest of the relevant studies included in La liberazione dei ‘captivi‘ tra Cristianita e Islam …, as above(note 5).

8. Leon VI, Taktika, Const. XVI, 11, Patrologia Graeca 107, vol. 909 (jai` l

a´kirsa sot`Ö «’ndo´xotÖ jai`

l«ca´kotÖ paqa` soi˜Ö pok«l

ióiÖ ’ońsaÖ «’nht

l

ot´l«noÖ so` ’a´dgko

nsg˜Ö st´vgÖ, jai` so` pakińsqopon

x

‘ Ö ’«pi`so` pokt` sg˜Ö n

i´jgÖ ‘iń’ ’«vgÖ, «’i´ c« rt

l

bg˜ ’g` sx˜ nt

‘po` r« si

na`Ö jqasghgñ

ai, ’g` ja´rsqot c«n«rhai i

’diót

rot ‘a´kxri

n, di’ a

’tsx˜ n

a

’ nsijasakka´ss«i

njai` a

’najak«i˜rhai sa´, x

‘ Ö «i

’joÖ, rt

l

baińonsa g

‘ssg´l

asa

.jai`

a

’ nsi` sx˜ n

pok«l

i´xnai

’v

l

akx´ sx

na

’naka´bgΩÖ sot`Ö u i´kotÖ jai` rt

ll

a´votÖ). Cf. Leon VI, SyllogeTacticorum, ed. A. Dain (Paris, 1938), 50.6, 50.8. Concerning the treatment of war prisoners bythe Byzantine Law, see D. Letsios, “Die Kriegsgefangenschaft nach Auffassung der Byzantiner”,Byzantinoslavica 53 (1992): 213–227.

9. See Kolia-Dermitzaki, “Remarks”; Rashad A. Khouri, 79–82.10. Pseudo-Symeon, 760 (lines 3–4). Concerning Abu Firas and the rest Arab and Byzantine eminent

prisoners of war, see Sophia Patoura, Oi aiv

l

a´kxsoi xÖ paqaćons«Ö «pijoi

nx

niáÖ jai

pkgqo

fo´qgrgÖ (4o

Ö–10o

Öai.) (The Prisoners as Communication and Information Factors (4th–

10th centuries) [the National Hellenic Research Foundation, Institute for Byzantine Research](Athens, 1994), pp. 93–97, 101, 111–124.

11. Patoura, 119–120. Cf. G. Schlumberger, Un empereur byzantin au dixieme siecle. Nicephore Phocas(Paris, 1923), pp. 377–378, 382–383. Leon Diaconos, Historiae, ed. C. Hase, Leonis DiaconiHistoriae [CSHB] (Bonn, 1828), pp. 75 (line 6)–77 (line 2), provides information about the wayof his liberation.

12. Skylitzes, 241 (line 24–27); Matthew of Edessa, transl. A.E. Dostourian, The Chronicle of Matthewof Edessa (PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1972), pp. 17–18. Cf. Bar Hebraeus,173–174 (Melias’ death caused by a disease). See also G. Schlumberger, L’epopee byzantine a la éndu dixieme siecle. Jean Tzimisces. Les jeunes annees de Basile II le tueur des Bulgares (969–976) (Paris,1896), pp. 259–261 and note 1 (who also mentions Abu l-Fida’s statement that Melias waspoisoned after one year of imprisonment according to the caliph’s order, as well as the quiteopposite aspect, that the Arabs made in vain serious efforts to cure him from the disease, expressedby Ibn al-Athõr); M. Canard, Histoire de la dynastie des H‘amdanides de Jazõra et de Syrie (Paris,1953), pp. 776, 842; A. Vasiliev (ed. M. Canard), Byzance et les Arabes, II/i, La dynastiemacedonienne (Bruxelles, 1968), pp. 350–352; Khouri, 112–113, who justiées the Arabic sourceswithout any doubt and Patoura, 116–118. However, the number “forty” concerning Melias’ofécers could be symbolic and initiated by the forty martyrs of Sebasteia, who had suffered duringLikinios’ reign, and were honoured as patrons of the Byzantine army, or even the martyrs ofAmorion (see H. Gregoire, “Notes epigraphiques”, Byzantion 8 (1933): 79–88 (80–83). Cf. thecomments of P. Nikitin in: Vasilievskij–Nikitin, 130, 274–275, concerning the inèuence of thehagiological texts written for the forty martyrs of Sebasteia on some of the Martyrion texts praisingthe martyrs of Amorion).

13. TΩ abarõ, XXXIII: 116, 119. Cf. Martyrion text D , 44 (lines 17–18), Martyrion text M, Ch. 12 (lines38–41) and Martyrion P, 157. Rosser, 241, misinterprets TΩ abar õ and considers that only theforty-two martyrs to be were saved among the rest of the prisoners who were following the caliph’sarmy.

14. Theoph. Cont., 131 (lines 7–16); Genesios, 46 (lines 87–95); Skylitzes, 78 (line 42)–79 (line 49);Zonaras, 3 (lines 4–11) 79 (both Skylitzes and Zonaras mention that Theophilos offered only 24kentenaria). According to Bar Hebraeus, 138, the caliph demanded the hand over of the Persian(Kurd according to others) defector NasΩr/Theophobos and the domestikos of the Scholae Manouel,as a presupposition for “peace”. Neither Bar Hebraeus nor Michael the Syrian, 96, refer to anexchange against money. Cf. Vasiliev, I: 174–175, 413–417; Rosser, 242–243.

15. See Mas‘udõ, 336, who mentions that the exchange of the Sozopetra citizens took place just in 845.Concerning both Theophilos’ expeditions, in 831 and 837 (against Sozopetra and Arsamosata),see Vasiliev, I: 103–105, 137–142; Rosser, 154–155, 193–200; Treadgold, 275, 292–294. For thefate of Arab prisoners, see Kolia-Dermitzaki, “Remarks”, 588–590, 615, table II.

16. See Michael the Syrian, 102; Bar Hebraeus, 139 (both contain the obscure indication: “and therewas peace”). See Vasiliev, I: 176.

17. See, pp. 151–153.

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18. See Aikaterine Christophilopoulou, Bt

za

nsi

ng` Ïrsoqiá (Byzantine History), volume II(i) (Thessa-

lonike, 1993), p. 206, note 2.19. Martyrion text B, 13 (lines 6–10), text C , 29 (lines 32–34).20. See the Martyrion text D , 52 (lines 7–9) and E, 59 (lines 19–22) («’s«k«ix´ hgra

nd« oi

‘ ‘aćioi

s«rraqa´jo

nsa dtó l

a´qstq«Ö l

g

ni` M

aqsi´xΩ &9 i

’ndijsix˜ noÖ H9 «’n ’«s«i 9&S

NC9, barik«tón

soÖ sg˜Ö¨Rx

l

ai´xna

’qvg˜Ö M

ivag`k jai` H«odx´ qaÖ jai` H«jkgÖ…) and the point of view of W. Treadgold,“The chronological accuracy of the Chronicle of Symeon the Logothete for the years 813–845”,Dumbarton Oaks Papers 33 (1979): 157–197 (185), where he supports the fact that 845 representsthe year of the martyrdom.

21. See below p. 145 and note 26. It must be considered as certain that such efforts had been alsomade earlier, as they represented stable tactics of both opponents, Christians and Muslims, tryingto change the prisoners’ faith by offering them security and several facilitations. But in this case,this was an ultimatum. See below p. 147 and note 47; M. Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law ofIslam (Baltimore, 1955), p. 127; Athina Kolia-Dermitzaki, O

bt

za

nsi

no´Ö i«qo´Ö po´k«loÖ. H «nn

oia

jai g pqobokg´ sot hqgrj«tsijot´ pok«l

ot rso

Bt

zańsio [Irsoqij«Ö M

o

nocqa

fi´«Ö 10] (The

Byzantine “Holy War”. The Idea and Propagation of Religious War in Byzantium) (Athens, 1991),pp. 273–274. Compare for example with TΩ abar õ’s narration, The History of al-Tabarõ, trans. J.Kraemer, volume XXXIV (Albany, 1989) (hereafter: TΩ abar õ, XXXIV), pp. 138, 165, and BarHebraeus, 144–145. However, the information of both authors, that Theodora (or the logothetes toudromou Theoktistos) ordered the execution of 12,000 prisoners, because they refused to acceptChristian religion (TΩ abar õ, XXXIV: 43; Bar Hebraeus, 142), is considered by Vasiliev, I: 225, quitecorrectly according to my opinion, to be particularly doubtful (it must be noted that everythingthat Bar Hebraeus writes, in the above mentioned passages, is rather obscure). For the conversionprocedures and the living conditions of the Christians in the Islamic territory see M. Gervers andR.J. Bikhazi (eds.), Conversion and Continuity. Indigenous Christian Communities in Islamic Lands.Eighth to Eighteenth Centuries [Papers in Medieval Studies 9] (Toronto, 1990).

22. The Martyrion text K is dated in the tenth century, as it is found in the imperial Menologion (thebook of monthly feasts of the Orthodox Church) B of the codex Athoniticus Koutloumousiou 23,which has been dated by Th. Detorakis, “H

vqo

nokoćgrg sot atsojqasoqijot´ l

g

nokociót sot B.

Latysev” (The dating of the imperial calendar by B. Latysev), Byzantinische Zeitschrift 83 (1990):46–50. For the dating of the rest of the Martyrion texts, see Kotzampassi, 120–128, where thereare stated all the above-mentioned points of view.

23. See Fr Halkin, “L’hagiographie byzantine au service de l’histoire”, Proceedings of the XIIIthInternational Congress of Byzantine Studies (Oxford, 5–10 September 1966) [Main Papers, XI](London, 1967), pp. 345–354; Evelyne Patlagean, “Ancienne hagiographie byzantine et histoiresociale”, Annales 23 (1968): 106–126; E. Gamillscheg, “Historische Gegebenheiten im Spiegelhagiographischer Texte”, Jahrbuch der Osterreichischen Byzantinistik 25 (1976): 1–23 (mainly 1–2,22 and note 3); Constantina Mentzou-Meimaris, “The life of saint’s biographers in the Middle andLate Byzantine period”, Septieme Congres International d’Etudes de Sud-Est Europeen (Thessalonique,29 aout–4 Septembre 1994) (Athenes, 1994), pp. 547–601 (551–555).

24. UqotqaΩ l«nsot`Ö… a

’qvgcot`Ö sx˜ n

rsqas«t

l

a´sx

nrjos«i

ngΩ si

ni jai` dtrxd«rsa´sgΩ jai` dipkariáiÖ jai`

sqipkariáiÖ ridgqop«daiÖ jai` sgΩ sx˜ n xt´kx

njah«i´qx«i rt

n«r

fic

l«notÖ «’naposi´h«sai, bqav«i˜ d« si

ni

’a´qsxΩ jai` bqavts«qxΩ ‘

t´dasi sot´sotÖ «’ns«ika´l«noÖ si

l

xq«i˜rhai, ft´kajaÖ jai` sgqgsa`Ö «’cjahi´rsgri

nx

‘ Ö l

g´ si

na pkg`n

sx˜ n fqotq«x

nsot´soiÖ pqoro

l

ikg˜rai. … ot

’ca`q sorot´sot

l«s«i˜vo

n ‘t´dasoÖ ‘

o´ro

nsx˜ n

o

’fhak

l

x˜ npqo«vo

nso` da´jqto

n.ot

’sorot´sot

l«s«ka´l

ba

no

n ’a´qsot … , ‘

o´ro

nsg˜Ö at

’sx˜ n

raqjo`Öt

‘faiqotñso ai

‘ fh«i˜q«Ö s« jai` oi

‘l

t´«Ö jai` sa` «’pi` cg˜Ö zxt¨fia i

’ktrpx´ l«n

a

.jkińg at

’soi˜Ö g

‘cg˜, jai`

t

‘porsqx´ l

asa g

‘dtrx´ dgÖ jai` k«psosa´sg joń

iÖ… . ©Ej d« sot˜ rjo´sotÖ ot

’d« «’n at

’sgΩ l«rg

l

bqiáΩ sa`Öa

’kkg´kx

n ’o´w«iÖ a

’jqibx˜ Ö «’pic

nx´ n

ai g

’dtńa

nso … . O

t

’rt

n«vxq«i˜so at

’soi˜Ö pqor«kh«iñ baka

n«i´xΩ , ot

’j

a

’poj«i˜qai sg˜Ö jo´l

gÖ so` p«qissoń, ot

’v t

‘pojahi´rai a

’jsiñaÖ g

‘kiaja´Ö… . [(The caliph) put the leaders

of the troops in a dark, extremely dirty prison bound up with double and triple iron and woodenbonds. He ordered that—as a punishment—they would get only restricted portion of bread and evenmore restricted portion of water and he placed guardians, so that the prisoners could talk only to thecustodians. … The water they got was less than their tears, the bread … was less than the èesh of thelice, the mice and the small animals of the earth, dirty with mud, exerted from them. The ground wastheir bed and the stinking and extremely éne dust was their mattress … . It wasso dark, that even at noon they could not see each other … . They were not allowed to visit a bath,to cut their hair, to expose themselves to the sunrays.] (Martyrion text Z, 65 [lines 11–27]). Cf. textA, 1 (line 15)–2 (line 3), M, Ch. 14 (line 11) and Theoph. Cont., 132 (lines 1–8). Concerning both:the two Martyrion groups and the relation between the Martyrion texts, see Kotzampassi, 113–120,

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who does not though refer to their differentiation related to the caliph’s presence or not, duringthe execution (see below, p. 150), and on the duration of their imprisonment. Concerning theliving conditions of the prisoners see Kolia-Dermitzaki, “Remarks”, 599–600.

25. Martyrion text B, 12 (lines 28–31), C , 29 (lines 32–33), P, 157 and D , 44 (lines 23–24).26. Martyrion text A, 2 (line 7)–6 (line 36), B, 13 (line 6)–20 (line 33), C , 30 (line 16)–35 (line 13),

D , 44 (line 27)–50 (line 13), Z, 66 (line 1)–76 (line 18), M, Ch. 15 (line 1), Ch. 38 (line 6), P,157–160. The disputatious dialogues between the martyrs and the caliph’s representatives are,apparently, created by the author (cf. also Vasilievskij–Nikitin, 278).

27. J. Bury, A History of the Later Roman Empire from Arcadius to Irene (395–800), volume II (London,1965), pp. 272–273.

28. Theoph. Cont., 131 (lines 10–11); Genesios, 48 (lines 90–91); Skylitzes, 78 (lines 42–44);Zonaras, 379 (lines 7–8).

29. Kallistos had not fought in Amorion, but he was captured (844/845) éghting against the Pauliciansand rendered to the caliph, who ordered him to be imprisoned together with the prisoners fromAmorion. See Martyrion text C , 29 (lines 10–32); P. Lemerle, “L’histoire des Pauliciens d’AsieMineure d’apres les sources grecques”, Travaux et Memoires 5 (1973): 1–144 (Essais sur le mondebyzantin [London, 1980], IV), at pp. 89–91. In particular, for Kallistos, his rank and the family ofMelissenoi see the comments of P. Nikitin in Vasilievskij–Nikitin, 215–218. The Martyrion text C

is especially devoted to Kallistos, whereas his relation with the family of Melissenoi is stated by D ,50 (lines 5–6) (Ka´kkirso

nrpaha´qio

njasa` sot`Ö M«kirr«i

not`Ö k«co´l«n

o

n). Concerning Konstanti-nos Baboutzikos and the rest of the ofécers, see above, note 3.

30. See p. 41, where it is clearly mentioned the presence of the eminent Arabs at this exchange, to eachof whom al-Wathiq offered a horse and 1000 dirhams [silver coins, see entry in G.C. Miles,“Dirham”, Encyclopedie de l’Islam, volume II (Leiden, 1965), 2nd edn], apparently as a compen-sation.

31. See Kolia-Dermitzaki, “Remarks”, note 73.32. See the relevant statement of TΩ abarõ, XXXIV: 39–40. Cf. Kolia-Dermitzaki, “Remarks”, 591 with

note 29.33. Pseudo-Symeon, 654 (lines 16–20), Georg. Monachos Cont., 815 (lines 7–18). See also Vasiliev,

I: 196 with note 2: ‘Amr accompanied the great raid of Abu-Sa‘õd until the Opsikion thema.34. Vasiliev, I: 193–196, 204–205; E. Eickhoff, Seepolitik zwischen Islam und Abendland (Berlin, 1966),

pp. 180–181. Cf. the description of Ibn al-Athõr (Vasiliev, I): 363, who mentions the loss of 10,000Byzantines in the same year, during the siege and the capture of one of Sicily’s cities, the nameof which in Arabic is given as S-r-h.

35. TΩ abarõ, XXXIV: 39; Ya‘qubõ, 275. See also Vasiliev, I: 199–203. For the deputation exchangesand generally the Byzantine–Arab relations see H. Kennedy, “Byzantine–Arab diplomacy in theNear East from the Islamic conquests to the mid-eleventh century”, in Byzantine Diplomacy, Papersfrom the Twenty-fourth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, Cambridge 1990, eds. J. Shepard andS. Franklin (Aldershot/Brookéeld, 1992), pp. 133–143.

36. TΩ abarõ, XXXIV: 40, 41. According to other statements the number of prisoners, who wereexchanged, reached 4600 or 4460 (see above, 41, 42). Concerning the number of the exchangedprisoners, see Kolia-Dermitzaki, “Remarks”, 591–592 and 615, table II.

37. It must be noted that an exchange represented a very important event for the Arabs (I refer tothem because the relative statements come mainly from Arabic sources) during which a greatnumber of people and army was gathered [see the narration of Mas‘udõ for the exchange of804/805, which is repeated by Maqrõzõ and the analysis of Maria Campagnolo-Pothitou, “Lesechanges de prisonniers entre Byzance et l’Islam aux IXe et Xe siecles”, Journal of Oriental andAfrican Studies 7 (1995): 1–56 (15, 34–36)]. At this exchange, there were present according toTΩ abarõ, XXXIV: 41, 4000 Arab soldiers; on the other hand Ya‘qubõ, 275–276, gives (thoughexaggerating) 70,000 soldiers. The exchange procedures deénitely needed an important timeinterval to be prepared.

38. TΩ abarõ, XXXIV: 39–40; Ibn al-Athõr, in: Vasiliev, I: 353; Bar Hebraeus, 140.39. TΩ abarõ, XXXIV: 39–40, states that al-Wathiq gave an order to buy the slaves from the areas of

Baghdad and Raqqa, but Bar Hebraeus, 140, mentions that the slaves came “from all the borderlines”, meaning, probably, the areas near the Islamic border with the Empire, where it was mostprobable to énd the Byzantine prisoners.

40. The calculations were based on: (a) the routes described by Ibn HΩ awqal, Conéguration de la terre,trans. J.H. Kramers and J. Wiet (Beyrouth/Paris, 1964), I: 129, 183–184, 190–191, 203, whocounts the speciéc distances in day duration, (b) the routes suggested by F. Hild, Das byzantinische

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Strassensystem in Kappadokien [Tabula Imperii Byzantini 2] (Wien, 1977) (mainly route C1,pp. 77–103 as well as picture 1 and maps of the routes); K. Belke and N. Mersich, Phrygien undPisidien [Tabula Imperii Byzantini 7] (Wien, 1990), pp. 139–143; F. Hild and H. Hellenkemper,Kilikien und Isaurien, as above (note 6), 132–133, and (c) the distances of several routes relatedwith the movement velocities (derived from different sources), which are included in I. Dim-itroukas, Reisen und Verkehr im Byzantinischen Reich vom Anfang des 6. Jhr. bis zur Mitte des 11. Jhr.[Historical Monographs 18] (Athens, 1997), I: 158, note 100, 244; II: 585–599 and I. Dim-itroukas, E

nd«i´x«iÖ cia sg dia´qj«ia sx

nv«qrai´xn

sa

xidix´ n

jai

l«saji

ng´r«x

nrso

Bt

zań

sio 6o

Ö–11o

Ö

ai.) (Indications for the duration of terrestrial travels and transportation in Byzantium [6th–11thcentury]), Symmeikta 12 (1998): 7–42. Ibn HΩ awqal does not mention the duration of the routeSamarra–Takrõt. The distance between them, however, is approximately 60 km. If we take intoaccount the fact that the traveller had to cross the river Tigris because the two cities were on theopposite banks, he might have covered the distance in two days. The speed, at which thedeputations were moving, depends on various factors (the condition of the roads, the number ofthe moving groups, the weather conditions, reasons for intensive marching or no etc.). There arestatements concerning velocities of 16.5 km/day, but also of 40–50 km/day in cases where thedeputations were low numbered and ordered to move quickly in areas such as Asia Minor, Syria,Upper Mesopotamia. If we take into account the fact that AhΩmad’s mission was speciéc and thearmistice and exchange procedures had already been agreed, we can assume that this deputationgroup was of low number and thus easily mobile, supported by the imperial services when movingin the Byzantine territory and able to cover about 40–50 km/day, though there was no actual needof haste. Concerning the road system of Asia Minor, see also Vryonis, 31–34.

41. Dimitroukas, I: 246; Hild, 33; Hild and Hellenkemper, 130–131 (route A1, A–A2).42. Concerning the prisons of Constantinople see Kalliopi Mpourdara, “O

i

Bt

za

nsi

n«Ö ftkaj«Ö” (the

Byzantine prisons) in Ëcjkg

l

a jai si

l

xqiá rso

Bt

zań

sio, ed. Sp. Troianos (Athens, 1997),pp. 317–336 (319–322). Concerning the place and the imprisonment conditions of the prisonersof war see Khouri, 79–82; Kolia-Dermitzaki, “Remarks”, 599–600.

43. See pp. 40 and 41 (Abu QuahΩ tΩaba (AhΩmad) reported—he was the emissary … to the Byzantineruler whose task was to examine the number of prisoners and to ascertain the accuracy of whatMichael, the Byzantine ruler, claimed—that the number of the Muslims prior to the exchange was3000 men, 500 women, and children, who were in Constantinople and elsewhere, save thosewhom the Byzantines brought forth … ).

44. See Constantini Porphyrogeniti De Cerimoniis Aulae Byzantinae, ed. Io. Reiske (Bonn, 1829), BookII: chapter 15, pp. 570 (line 11)–592 (line 19), where the reception (dovg´) of the ambassadors tookplace on 31 May of the fourth indictio, whereas the circus ceremony was held on 6 August, day ofthe Transéguration and the invitation (jkgsx´ qio

n) on the ninth of the same month.45. See F. Tinnefeld, “Ceremonies for foreign ambassadors at the court of Byzantium and their

political background”, Byzantinische Forschungen 19 (1993): 193–213 (195–196, 206). The meet-ing of the ambassadors with the Emperor (in this case the Augusta Theodora) was usuallypreceded by a rather time-consuming procedure: they had to pose a request for their reception,which was accepted and enabled them énally to be ofécially presented (see as above, p. 206; cf.De cerimoniis … , as above, I: 89 and 90, pp. 402 (line 10)–410 (line 3).

46. According to relevant estimations the Byzantine ambassadors should have started their travel,bringing peace and exchange proposals, at the latest in November–December of 844. The bigtime-span between the beginning of the negotiations and the énal exchange should not beconsidered as exaggerated, but apparently the usual one required by the necessary procedures. Seefor example TΩ abarõ, XXXIV: 156 and 168, where it is noted that the needed time interval betweenthe initial and the énal phase of the exchange of 860, exceeded one year, probably 14–16 months.Cf. Ibn al-Athõr, 319–320.

47. Andronikos Doukas, for example, together with his son Konstantinos and some of his relatives andfriends, were forced “to abjure their faith, because they were incapable of tolerating the hardshipsof imprisonment” (Skylitzes, 187 [lines 91–94]; cf. Theoph. Cont., 373 [lines 8–11]; Pseudo-Symeon, 711 [lines 8–10]; Georg. Monachos Cont., 868 [lines 3–5]; Zonaras, 451 [lines 9–13]),although they had not been captured during a éght, but had taken refuge in the Caliphate afterSamona’s conspiracy and their rebellion against Leon VI, in 906–7. On this subject, see A.Vasiliev, II/i: 184–189, and mainly D. Polemis, The Doukai. A Contribution to Byzantine Prosopog-raphy (London, 1968), pp. 17–21. See also above, pp. 142–143, concerning the case of Konstanti-nos Phokas, and TΩ abar õ, XXXIV: 165, for the Byzantine patrician, who was handed over by

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the inhabitants of Loulon, together with their city, to al-Mutawakkil in 860. The patrician wasthreatened with execution, if he did not convert to Islam, but he did not yield. Finally, the Arabsexchanged him for 1000 Muslims (see Kolia-Dermitzaki, “Remarks”, note 73 and 615, pl. II).

48. This body initially numbered approximately 4000 soldiers, who quickly reached 70,000. SeePatricia Crone, Slaves on Horses. The Evolution of Islamic Polity (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 74–85; D.Pipes, Slaves Soldiers and Islam: the Genesis of a Military System (New Haven, 1981); S. Sabari,Mouvements populaires a Bagdad a l’epoque Abbaside, IXeme–XIeme siecles (Paris, 1981), pp. 43–45;H. Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates. The Islamic Near East from the Sixth to theEleventh Century (London/New York, 1986), pp. 158–159.

49. See M. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology (Edinburgh, 1972), pp. 58–71; A.Giannoulatos, I

rka´l. Vqgrj«iokocijg´ «pirjo´pgriÖ (Islam. An Overview on the Science of

Religion) (Athens, 1979), pp. 160–162, 236–237; see the entry D. Gimaret, “Mu‘tazila”, Encyclo-paedia of Islam, volume VII (Leiden, 1992), 2nd edn, pp. 783–793, with the most recentbibliography.

50. Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates … , 163.51. See the entry M. Hinds, “MihΩna”, Encyclopedie de l’Islam, volume VII (Leiden, 1993), 2nd edn,

pp. 3–6. Cf. Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates … ,163–164; Patricia Crone andM. Hinds, God’s Caliph: Religious Authority in the First Centuries of Islam (Cambridge, 1986),pp. 92–96.

52. These reactions towards al-Mu‘tasΩim’s policy were the main reason why he transported the capitalfrom Baghdad to Samarra, situated on the bank of the river Tigris about 120 km north of Baghdad.Samarra had represented the governmental centre till 892, when it was abandoned by al-Mu‘tasΩim,and Baghdad became the capital once again. When al-Mutawakkil (232–247/847–861) ascendedthe throne, he took dimensions from the policy of his predecessors not only in the religious domainbut also in the choice of the members of his government and abolished the “interrogation”(mihΩna). See Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates … , 164–165, 168–170; A.Northedge, “Samarra”, Encyclopedie de l’Islam, volume VIII (Leiden, 1995), 2nd edn, pp. 1074–1076. Cf. also the description of Ibn HΩ awqal, 236. See also below, note 59.

53. Bar Hebraeus, 140, 141; Michael the Syrian, 113. TΩ abar õ, XXXIV: 8–11, 15–16, relates such typesof al-Wathiq’s prosecutions against high-ranked administrative ofécers (843–844) with their lackof devotion to him, a fact that probably indicates their refusal to accept the theological views oftheir sovereign. According to Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates … , 168, al-Wathiqwas the only sovereign of the middle ‘Abbasid period, who left so little traces of his, short termedanyway, government that we cannot possibly get a clear picture of his personality. See K.V.Zettersteen, “al-Wathiq bi’llah”, Encyclopedie de l’Islam, volume IV (Leiden, 1934), p. 1194.

54. TΩ abarõ, XXXIV: 38–39, 40; Mas‘udõ, 336; Bar Hebraeus, 141.55. See TΩ abar õ, XXXIV: 27–35 and note 88 (for the rest Arabic sources and the bibliography); W.W.

Muir, The Caliphate. Its Rise, Decline and Fall, ed. by T. H. Weir (New York, 1975 [érst published1924]), pp. 520–521; Crone, 182–183; Sabari, 102; H. Kennedy, The Early Abbasid Caliphate. APolitical History (London–Totowa, NJ, 1981), p. 80 and idem, The Prophet and the Age of theCaliphates…, 164.

56. It must be noted that revolutions were taking place during the whole reign of al-Wathiq in severalplaces of all his territory. Quite menacing were those of Syria–Palestine (842), the Arab peninsula(844–846), but most of all that of Baghdad. See W. Muir, as above, and exactly below.

57. TΩ abarõ, XXXIV: 17–26. The armed collision started between 13 February to 13 March 845, butthe rebellion had started even earlier, since al-Wathiq had already sent there a military detachmentin order to protect Medina. See also Muir, 520, Vasiliev, I: 198 (related to the general reaction anddiscontent for the caliph’s politics) and the entry, M. Lecker, “Sulaym”, Encyclopedie de l’Islam,volume IX (Leiden, 1997), 2nd edn, pp. 852–853.

58. See above, pp. 141–142 and note 6.59. According to Martyrion text D , 46 (lines 24–26), the prisoners marched for about 15 hours, from 3

o’clock in the afternoon till the next morning, until they reached the execution place at the banks ofTigris. This place was 100 stadions far (18 km approximately) from the place in Samarra, where theywere temporarily kept (see Vasilievskij–Nikitin, 201–202, 207). In Martyrion text A, 6 (line 16), textZ, 75 (lines 18–19) and text M, Ch. 36 (lines 5–7) and Theoph. Cont., 133 (lines 18–20), who musthave followed their description, Euphrates is referred to as their execution place. This is an error ofthe authors of these Martyria, who seem to ignore the transportation of the capital from Baghdad(which is by Euphrates river) to Samarra, at that time interval. Cf. the view of P. Nikitin in:Vasilievskij–Nikitin as above. Concerning the foundation of the city in 836 by Mu‘tasΩim, its

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location by Tigris river and the reasons, which caused the transportation of the capital fromBaghdad to Samarra, see above, note 52.

60. At

’si´ja d« a

’ n’ ‘a´para

nsg`n

Rtqiáng

‘ … p«qih«otra

fg´l

g sg`n ’a´hkgri

njas«l

gńt«n. … sg˜Ö ca`q

fg´l

gÖ… diadqa

lot´rgÖ, g

‘kijiá pa˜ra jai` c«n

g rt

ll

icg˜ ©Aqa´bx

ns« jai` sx˜ n

jah’ g

‘l

a˜Ö jai` «‘s«qx

n«’pidg

l

otńsx

n «’hnx˜ n, jaha´p«q si q

‘«t˜la biáion «’j sx˜ noi

’jix˜ n

jai` a

’cqx˜ n

pqovth«ns«Ö, paqa´ sa`Ö

’o´vhaÖ sot˜ SićqidoÖ rt

ngΩ«ra

nposa

l

ot˜ [Immediately, the rumour, èowing through all over Syria,made their (forthcoming) martyrdom known. After the rumour had spread, people of every age,mixed races of Arabs and of our people, as well as of other nations that were staying there, gatheredtogether near the banks of Tigris overèowing from the houses and the éelds like a violent stream](B, 13 [lines 10–18]). Cf. Martyrion text A, 6 (lines 14–15), text B, 16 (lines 4–12), 20 (line 34),text C , 33 (lines 1–3), text Z, 75 (lines 17–18), text M, Ch. 36 (lines 3–5). See also note 65.

61. P, 5 (lines 17–20), 72 (lines 24–28), Ch. 30 (lines 1–7), respectively. Concerning the imprison-ment of the martyrs at Tarsus, see also above p. 158 and note 6.

62. Since, as we have seen above (p. 146), the distance between Tarsus and Samarra was calculatedto 42 days, we must assume that the transfer of the eminent prisoners must have started aroundthe end of January 845, when it was also decided that there would be made just one more énaleffort for their conversion.

63. Of course, the rush of such crowds in cases of miracles accomplished by saints either during theirlife or at the moment of their death, is quite common place in the hagiographical texts, the authorsof which aim at the promotion of the recognition of their holiness by crowds of believers. This is,probably, the reason why the author of Martyrion text B (13 [lines 10–26], 16 [lines 13–17], 20[line 34]–21 [line 5]) mainly emphasises the presence of Christians at the execution, which meanshe wants to point out the effect exercised on the Christian crowd by the strength of the Byzantineofécers’ belief and their immediate recognition as saints. However, the presence of a great numberof Arabs is also clearly stated here, as well as in the other Martyrion texts (see note 60).

64. B, 13 (lines 27–30), 15 (lines 27–28); C , 31 (lines 21–24), 32 (lines 20–21); D , 46 (line 17)–47(line 9); P, 158 and A, 5 (lines 17–19), 6 (line 17ff.); Z, 72 (lines 24–26), 75 (line 15)–76 (line2); M, Ch. 30, 1–3 and Ch. 36. The authors of the Martyrion texts with the word pqxsort´lbotkoÖindicate the caliph. Concerning the vizier Ibn al-Zayyat, who became ofécer during al-Mu‘tasΩim’sreign and also kept his oféce during al-Wathiq’s reign, see entry in D. Sourdel, “Ibn al-Zayyat”,Encyclopedie de l’Islam, volume III (Leiden, 1970), 2nd edn, p. 999.

65. P. Nikitin, in Vasilievskij–Nikitin, 201–202, takes for granted the presence of the Arab sovereignat the execution of the prisoners. See also, for example, the presence of al-Mu¨tasΩim at theexecution of the rebel Babak (TΩ abarõ, XXXIII: 86–88).

66. Martyrion text Z, 66 (lines 27–31); see also text A, 2 (lines 18–21); text M, Ch. 17 (lines 3–9) (Ei

’d« jai` l«ho´dot diapoq«i˜s«, px˜ Ö ’

ań sorot´sx

n «’cjqas«i˜Ö a

’cahx˜ n

c«ngrh«, dida´xo

l«nr

fo´dqa

fika

nhqx´ pxÖ.

t

‘pojqih«n

s«Ö t

‘l«i˜Ö p«qis

l

g´hgs« jai` at

’sxΩ dg` sxΩ pqxsort

l

bot´kxΩ rt

n«t´xarh«·’«p«isa, l

tqi´xnt

‘p’ «’j«ińot

l«sarvońs«Ö a

’cahx˜ n, «’n jaiqxΩ pok«l

ot

f«tjs«o

nt

‘liñ pqo`Ö sg`n

hqgrj«iánt

‘lx˜ n

jai` so` ’«h

noÖ jai` o

‘t´sx

nijgsai` l«sa` n

i´jg

njai` hat

l

arsoi` paqa` pa˜ri

n«’pa

n«k«t´r«rh«).67. P, 132 (line 15)–133 (line 2).68. Martyrion text M (lines 136–137), Ch. 15 (lines 10–16) (Ot

’d«n

ca`q

’«qcon «’do´j«i sxΩ d«i

nxΩ ’

a´qvo

nsi

«j«ińxΩ sg`n ‘o´kg

npaqarsg´rarhai po´ki

n, l«ca´kg

no

‘t´sxÖ ot’ra

njai` pkot´sxΩ bqi´hotra

n.so` d« sot`Ö

a

‘ciótÖ a

’ nap«i˜rai sot´sotÖ a

’po

l

ah«iñ sg`n «t

’r«b«ia

n, sot˜so pqa˜cl

a «’no

l

i´z«so

lng´l

gÖ ’a

xio

njai`

pokkg`nat

’sxΩ dt

na´l«n

o

np«qipoig˜rai sg`n «’

t´jk«ia

n, «’i` jai` pokkxΩ l«i˜zo

n ’«farj«n «i’nai sa`Ö wtva`Ö

nijg˜rai

l

a˜kko

n ’g´ rx´ l

asa). See also text A, 2 (lines 12–13) and text Z, 66 (lines 8–13).69. See Kotzampassi, 120–123.70. See note 3 concerning the Greek sources and literature; Ya‘qubõ, 275 (who considers Aetios as the

uncle of Theophilos); TΩ abar õ, XXXIII: 109–110, 115–116; Mas‘udõ, 332. See also H. Gregoire,“Inscriptions historiques Byzantines”, Byzantion 4 (1927–1928): 437–446 (443–444); G. Schlum-berger, Sigillographie de l’Empire Byzantin (Paris, 1884), pp. 340–341; R. Guilland, Recherches, asabove (note 3), who considers that, in fact, he suffered the martyrdom together with the rest of theAmorion martyrs.

71. See below. This has also been noted by P. Nikitin in Vasilievskij–Nikitin, 202–204, who used itas a means to show the greater reliability of the Martyrion texts versus the historical sources. Tillnow, however, it has not attracted the researchers’ attention. Kotzampassi, 150, simply notices thatAetios was not mentioned by Evodios, the author of Martyrion text Z.

72. Cf. p. 143 Nikitin, as above and p. 214. Concerning these martyrs see also above, notes 3 and 29,as well as the following footnote.

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73. Text D , 46 (line 2)–48 (line 12), 50 (lines 1–13). Cf. text P, 158–160; text C , 29 (lines 29–31),where there is no reference to Aetios’ name in the passages describing the moment of meeting ofthe just captured Kallistos (see above, note 29) with the rest captives from Amorion in prison. Anattempt to interpret the exact functions of dromeus (“runner”), the presence of Vassois among thedefenders of Amorion and the martyrs, and his place in the Byzantine army, was made by P.Nikitin, in his comments (see Vasilievskij–Nikitin, 207–210).

74. See Pseudo-Symeon, 638 (line 23)–639 (line 23), Georg. Monachos Cont., 805 (lines 14–22).75. Theoph. Cont., 126 (lines 3–14): P

okkx˜ not’n rt

l

botk«tońsx

n l«soijg˜rai so`n «’n ©Al

oqi´xΩ oi

’jotñsa

kao`n … , ’a´sopo

n l«n «’faiń«so sot˜so sxΩ V«o

fi´kxΩ jai` ’

ańadqon, jako`n d« jai` pqo`Ö a

’ ndq«ián «’

tódo

nso` l

a˜kko

n «’povtqx˜ rai at

’so` jai` rsqasgcot˜ c«nn

aiót diarx˜ rai botkai˜Ö. ©A«sioÖ g’n ot’soÖ pasqi´jioÖjai` sx˜ n ©An

asokijx˜ nrsqasgco´Ö. … ©Epi` sot´soiÖ «’di´dot dg` g

‘c«l

ońaÖ jai` ’

a´qvo

nsaÖ sot`Ö l«sa` bqavt`

l

aqstqg´ro

nsaÖ, V«o´dxqoń

s« so`n Kqas«qo`n

jai` V«ofiko

njai` so`n B

abot´szijo

no

‘i´si

n«Ö ot

’ l

ońo

n«’j«ińot sot˜ kaot˜ a

’kka` jai` sg˜Ö f

a´kkaccoÖ sx˜ ns«rraqa´jon

sa dtó l

aqst´qx

nc«coń

ari

na

’qvgcoi´.

[Many advised Theophilos (the Byzantine emperor) to move the inhabitants away from Amorion(at the announcement of the approaching of the Arab army). … This seemed to him an inappro-priate and cowardly action, while right and easily leading to bravery would be to better fortify it(the city) and save it by means of the willpower of a brave general. This general was the patricianand general of the Anatolikon thema Aetios. In addition, he (the emperor) gave (them) as princesand leaders, those who would soon afterwards become martyrs, Theodoros Krateros andTheophilos and Vavoutzikos. These men became leaders not only of that army but also of thephalanx of the forty-two martyrs.] It could be considered that Theophanes Continantus assumesthat among the forty-two martyrs, were only the last three leaders. Cf. Skylitzes, 75 (lines 32–41).

76. See 78 (lines 35–37).77. See above, p. 145 and note 26.78. See 376 (lines 13–17), 378 (line 15)–379 (line 4).79. TΩ abarõ, XXXIII: 115–116. Cf. Michael the Syrian, 99–100; Bar Hebraeus, 137. The narration of

TΩ abarõ seems to be conérmed by the up to now results of the excavations that have been carriedout in the area of Amorion and have proved the presence of a basilica, which at its érst phase bearstraces of a great ére (see Lightfoot, 67). According to my opinion TΩ abarõ’s narration can be easilycorrelated with the foundation of the above-mentioned basilica. Concerning the tower, which alsobears traces of ére, see Lightfoot, 60–62.

80. TΩ abarõ, XXXIII: 177. Concerning Babak’s revolution and execution see the relevant entry in D.Sourdel, “Babak”, Encyclopedie de l’Islam, volume I (Leiden, 1960), 2nd edn, p. 867; M. Rekaya,“Mise au point sur Theophobe et l’alliance de Babek avec Theophile (833/34–839/40)”, Byzantion44 (1974): 43–67 (mainly 49–60).

81. TΩ abarõ, XXXIII: 84–88. Compare also the Persian variation of TΩ abar õ’s description, Chroniquede … Tabarõ traduite sur la version persane d’Abou-‘Ali Mo‘hammed Bel‘ami … par H. Zotenberg,volume IV (Paris, 1958; érst published 1874), p. 545. Both texts vary considerably, but none ofthem mentions a simultaneous execution of Aetios and Babak; neither do Michael the Syrian, 90or Bar Hebraeus, 136.

82. See p. 332.83. TΩ abarõ, XXXIV: 34, 119.84. Martyr Aetios is included in the hagiology of the Orthodox Church, with the difference that his

name is referred among the forty martyrs of Sebasteia (see F. Halkin, Bibliotheca HagiographicaGraeca II [Bruxelles, 1957], no. 1203, p. 98).

85. It must be noted, that this doctrine showed tolerance towards Christians and Jews (see Kennedy,The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates …, 164.

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The Execution of the Forty-Two Martyrs of Amorion. Proposing an Interpretation 2

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